VII. Religion
Original German
1807 625
VII. *Die Religion*.
672 In den bisherigen Geſtaltungen, die sich im allgemeinen als Bewuſstseyn, Selbſtbewuſstseyn, Vernunft und Geiſt unterſcheiden, ist zwar auch die Religion, als Bewuſstseyn des abſoluten Weſens überhaupt vorgekommen; allein vom Standpunkte des Bewuſstseyns aus, das ſich des abſoluten Weſens bewuſst ist; nicht aber ist das abſolute Weſen an und für sich ſelbſt, nicht das Selbſtbewuſstseyn des Geiſtes in jenen Formen erſchienen.
673 Schon das Bewuſstseyn wird, insofern es Verſtand iſt, Bewuſstſeyn des Uebersinnlichen oder Innern des gegenſtändlichen Daſeyns. Aber das Uebersinnliche, Ewige, oder wie man es ſonſt nennen mag, ist ſelbſtlos; es ist nur erſt das Allgemeine, das noch weit entfernt ist, der sich als Geiſt wiſſchde Geiſt zu ſeyn. — Alsdenn war das Selbſtbewuſstseyn, das in der Geſtalt des unglücklichen Bewuſstſeyns ſeine Vollendung hat, nur der sich zur Gegenſtändlichkeit wieder herausringende aber sie nicht erreichende Schmerz des Geiſtes. Die Einheit des einzelnen Selbſtbewuſstseyns und 1807 626 ſeines unwandelbaren Weſens, zu der jenes sich bringt, bleibt daher ein Jenſeits deſſelben. — Das unmittelbare Daſeyn der Vernunft, die für uns aus jenem Schmerz hervorging, und ihre eigenthümlichen Geſtalten haben keine Religion, weil das Selbſtbewuſstseyn derſelben sich in der unmittelbaren Gegenwart weiſs oder ſucht.
674 Hingegen in der sittlichen Welt ſahen wir eine Religion, und zwar die Religion der Unterwelt; sie iſt der Glauben an die furchtbare unbekannte Nacht des Schickſals, und an die Eumenide des abgeſchiednen Geiſtes; — jene die reine Negativität in der Form der Allgemeinheit, dieſe dieſelbe in der Form der Einzelnheit. Das abſolute Weſen ist in der letztern Form alſo zwar das Selbſt, und gegenwärtiges, wie das Selbſt nicht anders ist; allein das Einzelne Selbst ist dieſer einzelne Schatten, der die Allgemeinheit, welche das Schickſal ist, getrennt von sich hat. Er ist zwar Schatten, aufgehobner Dieſer, und ſomit allgemeines Selbſt; aber noch ist jene negative Bedeutung nicht in dieſe poſitive umgeſchlagen, und daher bedeutet zugleich das aufgehobne Selbſt noch unmittelbar dieſen beſondern und weſenloſen. — Das Schickſal aber ohne das Selbſt bleibt die bewuſstloſe Nacht, die nicht zur Unterſcheidung in ihr noch zur Klarheit des ſich ſelbſt Wiſſens kommt.
675 Dieſer Glauben an das Nichts der Nothwendigkeit und an die Unterwelt wird zum Glauben an den Himmel, weil das abgeſchiedne Selbſt mit ſeiner 1807 627 Allgemeinheit sich vereinen, in ihr das, was es enthält, auseinanderſchlagen und ſo ſich klar werden muſs. Dieſes Reich des Glaubens aber ſahen wir nur im Elemente des Denkens ſeinen Inhalt ohne den Begriff entfalten, und es darum in ſeinem Schickſale, nemlich in der Religion der Aufklärung, untergehen. In dieſer ſtellt sich das übersinnliche Jenſeits des Verſtandes wieder her, aber ſo daſs das Selbſtbewuſstſeyn diſſeits befriedigt ſteht, und das übersinnliche, das leere nicht zu erkennende noch zu fürchtende Jenſeits weder als Selbſt noch als Macht weiſs.
676 In der Religion der Moralität ist endlich diſs wiederhergeſtellt, daſs das abſolute Weſen ein poſitiver Inhalt ist, aber er ist mit der Negativität der Aufklärung vereinigt. Er iſt ein Seyn, das ebenſo ins Selbſt zurückgenommen und darin eingeſchloſſen bleibt, und ein unterſchiedner Inhalt, deſſen Theile ebenſo unmittelbar negirt, als sie aufgeſtellt ſind. Das Schickſal aber, worin dieſe widerſprechende Bewegung verſinkt, ist das ſeiner, als des Schickſals der Weſenheit und Wirklichkeit, bewuſste Selbſt.
677 Der sich selbſt wiſſende Geiſt iſt in der Religion unmittelbar sein eignes reines Selbſtbewuſstseyn. Diejenigen Geſtalten deſſelben, die betrachtet worden, — der wahre, der ſich entfremdete, und der ſeiner ſelbſt gewiſſe Geiſt, — machen zuſammen ihn in seinem Bewuſstseyn aus, das seiner Welt gegenübertretend in ihr ſich nicht erkennt. Aber im Gewiſſen unterwirft er ſich wie seine gegenſtändliche Welt 1807 628 überhaupt, ſo auch seine Vorſtellung und seine beſtimmten Begriffe, und ist nun bey sich seyendes Selbstbewuſstseyn. In diesem hat er für sich, als Gegenſtand vorgeſtellt, die Bedeutung, der allgemeine Geiſt zu seyn, der alles Wesen und alle Wirklichkeit in sich enthält; ist aber nicht in der Form freyer Wirklichkeit oder der selbſtständig erscheinenden Natur. Er hat zwar Geſtalt oder die Form des Seyns, indem er Gegenſtand seines Bewuſstſeyns ist, aber weil dieses in der Religion in der wesentlichen Beſtimmung Selbſtbewuſstſeyn zu seyn, geſetzt ist, ist die Geſtalt sich vollkommen durchsichtig; und die Wirklichkeit, die er enthält, ist in ihm eingeschloſſen oder in ihm aufgehoben, gerade auf die Weise, wie wenn wir alle Wirklichkeit sprechen; sie ist die gedachte, allgemeine Wirklichkeit.
678 Indem also in der Religion die Beſtimmung des eigentlichen Bewuſstſeyns des Geiſtes nicht die Form des freyen Andersſeyns hat, so ist sein Daſeyn von seinem Selbſtbewuſstseyn unterschieden, und seine eigentliche Wirklichkeit fallt auſſer der Religion; es ist wohl Ein Geiſt beyder, aber sein Bewuſstseyn umfaſst nicht beyde zumal, und die Religion erscheint als ein Theil des Daſeyns und Thuns und Treibens, deſſen anderer Theil das Leben in seiner wirklichen Welt ist. Wie wir nun es wiſſen, daſs der Geiſt in seiner Welt und der seiner als Geiſt bewuſste Geiſt oder der Geiſt in der Religion daſſelbe sind, so beſteht die Vollendung der Religion darin, daſs 1807 629 beydes einander gleich werde, nicht nur daſs ſeine Wirklichkeit von der Religion befaſst ist, sondern umgekehrt, daſs er ſich als seiner selbstbewuſster Geiſt wirklich und Gegenſtand ſeines Bewuſstseyns werde. — Insofern der Geiſt in der Religion sich ihm selbſt vorſtellt, ist er zwar Bewuſstseyn, und die in ihr eingeſchloſſne Wirklichkeit ist die Geſtalt und das Kleid seiner Vorſtellung. Der Wirklichkeit widerfährt aber in dieser Vorſtellung nicht ihr vollkommnes Recht, nemlich nicht nur Kleid zu ſeyn, sondern selbſtständiges freyes Daſeyn; und umgekehrt ist sie, weil ihr die Vollendung in ihr selbſt mangelt, eine beſtimmte Geſtalt, die nicht dasjenige erreicht, was sie darſtellen ſoll, nemlich den seiner selbſtbewuſsten Geiſt. Daſs seine Geſtalt ihn selbſt ausdrückte, müſste sie selbst nichts anderes ſeyn als er, und er sich so erſchienen oder wirklich ſeyn, wie er in seinem Wesen ist. Dadurch allein würde auch das erreicht, was die Foderung des Gegentheils zu seyn ſcheinen kann, nemlich daſs der Gegenſtand seines Bewuſstseyns die Form freyer Wirklichkeit zugleich hat; aber nur der Geiſt, der sich als abſoluter Geiſt Gegenſtand iſt, iſt ſich eine ebenso freye Wirklichkeit, als er darin seiner selbſt bewuſst bleibt.
679 Indem zunächst das Selbstbewuſstseyn und das eigentliche Bewuſstseyn, die Religion und der Geiſt in seiner Welt oder das Daſeyn des Geistes unterſchieden wird, ſo beſteht das letztere in dem Ganzen des Geiſtes, 1807 630 insofern ſeine Momente als auseinandertretend und jedes für sich sich darſtellt. Die Momente aber ſind das Bewuſstseyn, das Selbſtbewuſstseyn, die Vernunft und der Geiſt; — der Geiſt nemlich als unmittelbarer Geiſt, der noch nicht das Bewuſstseyn des Geiſtes iſt. Ihre zusammengefaſste Totalitat macht den Geiſt in seinem weltlichen Daſeyn überhaupt aus; der Geiſt als solcher enthält die bisherigen Geſtaltungen in den allgemeinen Beſtimmungen, den so eben genannten Momenten. Die Religion ſetzt den ganzen Ablauf derselben voraus, und ist die einfache Totalität oder das abſolute Selbſt derſelben. — Der Verlauf derſelben ist übrigens im Verhältniſſe zur Religion nicht in der Zeit vorzuſtellen. Der ganze Geiſt nur iſt in der Zeit, und die Geſtalten, welche Geſtalten des ganzen Geiſtes als ſolchen sind, ſtellen ſich in einer Aufeinanderfolge dar; denn nur das Ganze hat eigentliche Wirklichkeit, und daher die Form der reinen Freyheit gegen anderes, die ſich als Zeit ausdrückt. Aber die Momente deſſelben, Bewuſstseyn, Selbstbewuſstseyn, Vernunft und Geiſt haben, weil ſie Momente ſind, kein von einander verſchiednes Daſeyn. — Wie der Geiſt von ſeinen Momenten unterſchieden wurde, ſo ist noch drittens von dieſen Momenten ſelbſt ihre vereinzelnte Beſtimmung zu unterſcheiden. Jedes jener Momente ſahen wir nemlich wieder an ihm selbst sich in einem eignen Verlauffe unterscheiden und verschieden geſtalten; wie z. B. am Bewuſstseyn, die ſinnliche Gewiſsheit 1807 631 Wahrnehmung sich unterschied. Diese letztern Seiten treten in der Zeit auseinander, und gehören einem beſondern Ganzen an. — Denn der Geiſt ſteigt aus ſeiner Allgemeinheit durch die Beſtimmung zur Einzelnheit herab. Die Beſtimmung oder Mitte ist Bewuſstseyn, Selbſtbewuſstseyn u. ſ. f. Die Einzelnheit aber machen die Geſtalten dieser Momente aus Diese stellen daher den Geist in seiner Einzelnheit oder Wirklichkeit dar, und unterscheiden sich in der Zeit, so jedoch, daſs die folgende die vorhergehenden an ihr behält.
680 Wenn daher die Religion die Vollendung des Geistes ist, worin die einzelnen Momente deſſelben, Bewuſstseyn, Selbſtbewuſstseyn, Vernunft und Geiſt, als in ihren Grund zurückgehen und zurückgegangen sind, so machen sie zuſammen die daſeyende Wirklichkeit des ganzen Geiſtes aus, welcher nur ist, als die unterſcheidende und in sich zurückgehende Bewegung dieſer seiner Seiten. Das Werden der Religion überhaupt ist in der Bewegung der allgemeinen Momente enthalten. Indem aber jedes dieser Attribute, wie es nicht nur im allgemeinen sich beſtimmt, sondern wie es an und für sich ist, d. h. wie es in sich selbst sich als Ganzes verlaufft, dargeſtellt wurde, so ist damit auch nicht nur das Werden der Religion überhaupt entſtanden, sondern jene vollſtändigen Verläuffe der einzelnen Seiten enthalten zugleich die Beſtimmtheiten der Religion selbſt. Der ganze Geist, der Geiſt der Religion, ist wieder die Bewegung, 1807 632 aus seiner Unmittelbarkeit zum Wiſſen deſſen zu gelangen, was er an sich oder unmittelbar ist, und es zu erreichen, daſs die Geſtalt, in welcher er für sein Bewuſstseyn erscheint, seinem Wesen vollkommen gleiche, und er sich anschaue, wie er ist — In diesem Werden ist er also ſelbſt in beſtimmten Geſtalten, welche die Unterschiede dieser Bewegung ausmachen; zugleich hat damit die bestimmte Religion ebenso einen bestimmten wirklichen Geist. Wenn alſo dem sich wiſſenden Geiste überhaupt Bewuſstseyn, Selbstbewuſstseyn, Vernunft und Geist angehören, so gehören den beſtimmten Gestalten des sich wiſſenden Geistes die beſtimmten Formen an, welche sich innerhalb des Bewuſstseyns, Selbstbewuſstſeyns der Vernunft und des Geistes an jedem besonders entwickelten. Die beſtimmte Gestalt der Religion greifft für ihren wirklichen Geist aus den Gestalten eines jeden seiner Momente diejenige heraus, welche ihr entspricht. Die Eine Bestimmtheit der Religion greifft durch alle Seiten ihres wirklichen Daseyns hindurch und drückt ihnen diſs gemeinschafftliche Gepräge auf.
681 Auf diese Weise ordnen sich nun die Gestalten, die bis hieher auftraten, anders, als sie in ihrer Reihe erschienen, worüber vorher noch das nöthige kurz zu bemerken ist. — In der betrachteten Reihe bildete sich jedes Moment, sich in sich vertiefend, zu einem Ganzen in ſeinem eigenthümlichen Princip aus; und das Erkennen war die Tiefe, oder der 1807 633 Geist, worin sie, die für sich kein Beſtehen haben, ihre Subſtanz hatten. Diese Substanz ist aber nunmehr herausgetreten; sie ist die Tiefe des seiner selbst gewiſſen Geiſtes, welche es dem einzelnen Princip nicht gestattet, ſich zu isoliren und in sich selbst zum Ganzen zu machen, sondern diese Momente alle in sich versammelnd und zusammenhaltend, schreitet sie in diesem gesammten Reichthum ihres wirklichen Geistes fort, und alle seine besondern Momente nehmen und empfangen gemeinschaftlich die gleiche Bestimmtheit des Ganzen in sich. — Dieser seiner ſelbſt gewiſſe Geist und seine Bewegung ist ihre wahrhaffte Wirklichkeit, und das an und für sichſeyn, das jedem einzelnen zukommt. — Wenn alſo die bisherige Eine Reihe in ihrem Fortſchreiten durch Knoten die Rückgänge in ihr bezeichnete, aber aus ihnen sich wieder in Eine Länge fortsetzte, so ist sie nunmehr gleichſam an dieſen Knoten, den allgemeinen Momenten, gebrochen und in viele Linien zerfallen, welche in Einen Bund zusammengefaſst, sich zugleich ſymmetrisch vereinen, so daſs die gleichen Unterſcheide, in welche jede beſondre innerhalb ihrer sich gestaltete, zusammentreffen. — Es erhellt übrigens aus der ganzen Darstellung von selbſt, wie diese hier vorgestellte Beyordnung der allgemeinen Richtungen zu verſtehen ist, daſs es überflüſsig wird, die Bemerkung zu machen, daſs diese Unterschiede wesentlich nur als Momente des Werdens nicht als Theile zu faſſen sind; 1807 634 an dem wirklichen Geiſte sind sie Attribute seiner Substanz; an der Religion aber vielmehr nur Prädicate des Subjects. — Ebenso sind an sich oder für uns wohl alle Formen überhaupt im Geiste und in jedem enthalten; aber es kommt bey seiner Wirklickkeit überhaupt allein darauf an, welche Beſtimmtheit für ihn in seinem Bewuſstſeyn ist, in welcher er sein Selbst ausgedrückt oder in welcher Gestalt er sein Wesen weiſs.
682 Der Unterschied, der zwischen dem wirklichen Geiſte und ihm der sich als Geist weiſs, oder zwischen sich selbst als Bewuſstseyn und als Selbstbewuſstseyn gemacht wurde, ist in dem Geiſte aufgehoben, der sich nach seiner Wahrheit weiſs; sein Bewuſstseyn und sein Selbstbewuſstseyn sind ausgeglichen. Wie aber hier die Religion erst unmittelbar ist, ist dieser Unterschied noch nicht in den Geiſt zurückgegangen Es ist nur der Begriff der Religion gesetzt; in diesem ist das Wesen das Selbstbewuſstseyn, das sich alle Wahrheit ist, und in dieser alle Wirklichkeit enthält. Dieses Selbstbewuſstseyn hat als Bewuſstſeyn sich zum Gegenstande; der erst sich unmittelbar wiſſende Geist ist sich alſo Geist in der Form der Unmittelbarkeit, und die Bestimmtheit der Gestalt, worin er sich erscheint, ist die des Seyns. Diſs Seyn ist zwar weder mit der Empfindung oder dem mannichfaltigen Stoffe, noch mit sonstigen einseitigen Momenten, Zwecken und Bestimmungen erfüllt, sondern mit dem Geiste, und wird von sich 1807 635 als alle Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit gewuſst. Dieſe Erfüllung ist auf diese Weise ihrer Geſtalt, er als Wesen seinem Bewuſstſeyn nicht gleich. Er ist erst als absoluter Geist wirklich, indem er, wie er in der Gewiſsheit ſeiner ſelbſt, sich auch in seiner Wahrheit ist, oder die Extreme, in die er sich als Bewuſstſeyn theilt, in Geistsgestalt für einander sind. Die Gestaltung, welche der Geist als Gegenstand seines Bewuſstseyns annimmt, bleibt von der Gewiſsheit des Geistes, als von der Substanz erfüllt; durch diesen Inhalt verschwindet diſs, daſs der Gegenſtand zur reinen Gegenständlichkeit, zur Form der Negativität des Selbstbewuſstseyns herabsänke. Die unmittelbare Einheit des Geistes mit sich selbst ist die Grundlage oder reines Bewuſstſeyn, innerhalb deſſen das Bewuſstſeyn auseinander tritt. Auf diese Weiſe in sein reines Selbstbewuſstseyn eingeschloſſen, existirt er in der Religion nicht als der Schöpfer einer Natur überhaupt; sondern was er in dieser Bewegung hervorbringt, sind seine Gestalten als Geister, die zusammen die Vollständigkeit seiner Erscheinung ausmachen, und diese Bewegung selbst ist das Werden seiner vollkommnen Wirklichkeit durch die einzelnen Seiten derselben, oder seine unvollkommnen Wirklichkeiten.
683 Die erste Wirklichkeit deſſelben ist der Begriff der Religion selbst, oder sie als unmittelbare und also natürliche Religion; in ihr weiſs der Geist sich als seinen Gegenstand in natürlicher oder unmittelbarer 1807 636 Gestalt. Die Zweyte aber ist nothwendig diese, sich in der Geſtalt der aufgehobnen Natürlichkeit oder des Selbſts zu wiſſen. Sie ist also die künſtliche Religion; denn zur Form des Selbſts erhebt sich die Gestalt durch das Hervorbringen des Bewuſstseyns, wodurch dieses in seinem Gegenſtande sein Thun oder das Selbst anschaut. Die dritte endlich hebt die Einseitigkeit der beyden erſten auf; das Selbſt ist ebensowohl ein unmittelbares als die Unmittelbarkeit Selbſt ist. Wenn in der erſten der Geiſt überhaupt in der Form des Bewuſstseyns, in der Zweyten — des Selbstbewuſstseyns iſt, so iſt er in der dritten in der Form der Einheit beyder; er hat die Geſtalt des an und fürſichſeyns; und indem er also vorgeſtellt iſt, wie er an und für sich ist, so iſt diſs die offenbare Religion. Ob er aber in ihr wohl zu seiner wahren Geſtalt gelangt, so ist eben die Geſtalt selbſt und die Vorſtellung noch die unüberwundne Seite, von der er in den Begriff übergehen muſs, um die Form der Gegenſtändlichkeit in ihm ganz aufzulösen, in ihm, der ebenso diſs sein Gegentheil in sich schlieſst. Alsdann hat der Geiſt den Begriff seiner selbſt erfaſst, wie wir nur erſt ihn erfaſst haben, und seine Geſtalt oder das Element seines Daseyns, indem sie der Begriff iſt, iſt er ſelbſt.
1807 637
A. *Natürliche Religion*.
684 Der den Geist wiſſende Geist ist Bewuſstseyn seiner selbst, und ist sich in der Form des Gegenſtändlichen, er iſt; und ist zugleich das Fürſichseyn. Er ist für sich, er ist die Seite des Selbſtbewuſstseyns, und zwar gegen die Seite seines Bewuſstſeyns, oder des sich auf sich als Gegenſtand beziehens. In seinem Bewuſstseyn ist die Entgegensetzung und hiedurch die Beſtimmtheit der Gestalt, in welcher er sich erscheint und weiſs. Um diese ist es in dieser Betrachtung der Religion allein zu thun, denn sein ungestaltetes Wesen, oder sein reiner Begriff hat sich schon ergeben. Der Unterschied des Bewuſstseyns und Selbstbewuſstseyns fällt aber zugleich innerhalb des letztern; die Gestalt der Religion enthält nicht das Daseyn des Geistes, wie er vom Gedanken freye Natur, noch wie er vom Daseyn freyer Gedanke ist; sondern sie ist das im Denken erhaltne Daseyn, so wie ein Gedachtes, das sich da ist. — Nach der Beſtimmtheit dieser Gestalt, in welcher der Geist sich weiſs, unterscheidet sich eine 1807 638 Religion von einer andern; allein es ist zugleich zu bemerken, daſs die Darſtellung dieses seines Wiſſens von sich nach dieser einzelnen Beſtimmtheit in der That nicht das Ganze einer wirklichen Religion erschöpft. Die Reihe der verschiednen Religionen, die sich ergeben werden, stellt ebensosehr wieder nur die verschiednen Seiten einer einzigen, und zwar jeder einzelnen dar, und die Vorſtellungen, welche eine wirkliche Religion vor einer andern auszuzeichnen scheinen, kommen in jeder vor. Allein zugleich muſs die Verschiedenheit auch als eine Verschiedenheit der Religion betrachtet werden. Denn indem der Geist sich im Unterschiede seines Bewuſstseyns und seines Selbstbewuſstseyns befindet, so hat die Bewegung das Ziel, diesen Hauptunterschied aufzuheben, und der Geſtalt, die Gegenſtand des Bewuſstſeyns iſt, die Form des Selbstbewuſstseyns zu geben. Dieser Unterschied ist aber nicht dadurch schon aufgehoben, daſs die Geſtalten, die jenes enthält, auch das Moment des Selbsts an ihnen haben, und der Gott als Selbſtbewuſstseyn vorgeſtellt wird. Das vorgeſtellte Selbst ist nicht das wirkliche; daſs es, wie jede andre nähere Bestimmung der Gestalt, dieser in Wahrheit angehöre, muſs es theils durch das Thun des Selbstbewuſstseyns in sie gesetzt werden, theils muſs die niedrige Bestimmung von der höhern aufgehoben und begriffen zu seyn sich zeigen. Denn das Vorgestellte hört nur dadurch auf, vorgestelltes und seinem Wiſſen fremd zu seyn, daſs das Selbst es hervorgebracht hat, und also die 1807 639 Bestimmung des Gegenstandes als die seinige, somit sich in ihm anschaut. — Durch diese Thätigkeit ist die niedrigere Bestimmung zugleich verschwunden; denn das Thun ist das negative, das sich auf Kosten eines Andern ausführt; insofern sie auch noch vorkommt, so ist sie in die Unwesentlichkeit zurückgetreten; so wie dagegen, wo die niedrigere noch herrschend ist, die höhere aber auch vorkommt, die eine selbstlos neben der andern Platz hat. Wenn daher die verschiednen Vorstellungen innerhalb einer einzelnen Religion zwar die ganze Bewegung ihrer Formen darstellen, so iſt der Charakter einer jeden durch die besondre Einheit des Bewuſstseyns und des Selbstbewuſstseyns bestimmt, das ist, dadurch daſs das letztere die Bestimmung des Gegenstands des erstern in sich gefaſst, sie durch sein Thun sich vollkommen angeeignet und sie als die wesentliche gegen die andern weiſs. — Die Wahrheit des Glaubens an eine Bestimmung des religiösen Geistes zeigt sich darin, daſs der wirkliche Geist so beschaffen ist, wie die Gestalt, in der er sich in der Religion anschaut, — wie z. B. die Menschwerdung Gottes, die in der morgenländischen Religion vorkommt, keine Wahrheit hat, weil ihr wirklicher Geist ohne diese Versöhnung ist. — Hieher gehört es nicht, von der Totalität der Bestimmungen zu der einzelnen zurückzukehren, und zu zeigen, in welcher Gestalt innerhalb ihrer und ihrer besondern Religion die Vollständigkeit der übrigen enthalten iſt. Die höhere Form unter eine niedrigere zurückgestellt 1807 640 entbehrt ihrer Bedeutung für den selbstbewuſsten Geist, gehört ihm nur oberflächlich und seiner Vorstellung an. Sie ist in ihrer eigenthümlichen Bedeutung und da zu betrachten, wo sie Prineip dieser besondern Religion und durch ihren wirklichen Geist bewährt ist.
a, *Das Lichtwesen*.
685 Der Geist, als das Wesen, welches Selbſtbewuſstseyn ist, — oder das selbſtbewuſste Wesen, welches alle Wahrheit ist und alle Wirklichkeit als sich ſelbst weiſs, ist gegen die Realität, die er in der Bewegung seines Bewuſstseyns sich gibt, nur erst sein Begriff, und dieser Begriff ist gegen den Tag dieser Entfaltung die Nacht seines Wesens, gegen das Daseyn seiner Momente als selbstständiger Gestalten das schöpferische Geheimniſs seiner Geburt. Diſs Geheimniſs hat in sich selbst seine Offenbarung; denn das Daseyn hat in diesem Begriffe seine Nothwendigkeit, weil er der sich wiſſende Geist ist, also in seinem Wesen das Moment hat, Bewuſstseyn zu seyn und sich gegenständlich vorzustellen. — Es ist das reine Ich, das in seiner Entäuſſerung, in sich als allgemeinem Gegenſtande die Gewiſsheit seiner selbst hat, oder dieser Gegenstand ist für es die Durchdringung alles Denkens und aller Wirklichkeit.
1807 641
686 In der unmittelbaren ersten Entzweyung des sich wissenden absoluten Geistes hat seine Gestalt diejenige Bestimmung, welche dem unmittelbaren Bewuſstseyn oder der sinnlichen Gewiſsheit zukommt. Er schaut sich in der Form des Seyns an, jedoch nicht des geistlosen mit zufälligen Bestimmungen der Empfindung erfüllten Seyns, das der sinnlichen Gewiſsheit angehört, sondern es ist das mit dem Geiste erfüllte Seyn. Es schlieſst ebenso die Form in sich, welche an dem unmittelbaren Selbſtbewuſstseyn vorkam, die Form des Herrn gegen das von seinem Gegenstande zurücktretende Selbstbewuſstseyn des Geistes. — Diſs mit dem Begriffe des Geistes erfüllte Seyn ist also die Geſtalt der einfachen Beziehung des Geistes auf sich selbst, oder die Gestalt der Gestaltlosigkeit. Sie ist vermöge dieser Bestimmung das reine, alles enthaltende und erfüllende Lichtwesen des Aufgangs, das sich in seiner formlosen Substantialität erhält. Sein Andersseyn ist das ebenso einfache Negative, die Finſterniſs; die Bewegungen seiner eignen Entäuſſerung, seine Schöpfungen in dem widerstandslosen Elemente seines Andersſeyns sind Lichtgüſſe, sie sind in ihrer Einfachhett zugleich sein Fürsichwerden und Rückkehr aus seinem Daseyn, die Gestaltung verzehrende Feuerströme. Der Unterschied, den es sich gibt, wuchert zwar in der Subſtanz des Daseyns fort und geſtaltet sich zu den Formen der Natur; aber die wesentliche Einfachheit seines Denkens schweift bestandlos und unverständig in ihnen umher, 1807 642 erweitert ihre Gräutzen zum Maſslosen, und löſst ihre zur Pracht geſteigerte Schönheit in ihrer Erhabenheit auf.
687 Der Inhalt, den diſs reine Seyn entwickelt, oder sein Wahrnehmen iſt daher ein wesenloses Beyherspielen an dieser Substanz, die nur aufgeht, ohne in sich niederzugehen, Subject zu werden und durch das Selbst ihre Unterschiede zu befestigen Ihre Bestimmungen sind nur Attribute, die nicht zur Selbstständigkeit gedeihen, sondern nur Nahmen des vielnahmigen Einen bleiben. Dieses ist mit den mannichfachen Kräfften des Daseyns und den Geſtalten der Wirklichkeit als mit einem selbstlosen Schmucke angekleidet; sie sind nur eignen Willens entbehrende Boten seiner Macht, Anschauungen seiner Herrlichkeit und Stimmen seines Preises.
688 Diſs taumelnde Leben aber muſs sich zum Fürſichseyn beſtimmen, und seinen verschwindenden Gestalten Bestehen geben. Das unmittelbare Seyn, in welchem es sich seinem Bewuſstseyn gegenüberſtellt, iſt selbſt die negative Macht, die seine Unterschiede auflöst. Es ist also in Wahrheit das Selbſt; und der Geist geht darum dazu über, sich in der Form des Selbsts zu wiſſen. Das reine Licht wirft seine Einfachheit als eine Unendlichkeit von Formen auseinander und gibt sich dem Fürsichseyn zum Opfer dar, daſs das Einzelne sich das Bestehen an seiner Substanz sich nehme.
1807 643
b. *Die Pflanze und das Thier*.
689 Der selbstbewuſste Geist, der aus dem gestaltlosen Wesen in sich gegangen, oder seine Unmittelbarkeit zum Selbst überhaupt erhoben, bestimmt seine Einfachheit als eine Mannichfaltigkeit des Fürsichseyns, und ist die Religion der geistigen Wahrnehmung, worin er in die zahllose Vielheit schwächerer und kräftigerer, reicherer und ärmerer Geister zerfällt. Dieser Pantheismus, zunächst das ruhige Bestehen dieser Geisteratomen, wird zur feindseligen Bewegung in sich selbst. Die Unschuld der Blumenreligion, die nur selbstlose Vorstellung des Selbsts ist, geht in den Ernst des kämpfenden Lebens, in die Schuld der Thierreligion, die Ruhe und Ohnmacht der anschauenden Individualität in das zerstörende Fürsichseyn über. — Es hilft nichts, den Dingen der Wahrnehmung den Tod der Abſtraction genommen, und sie zu Wesen geistiger Wahrnehmung erhoben zu haben; die Beseelung dieses Geisterreichs hat ihn durch die Bestimmtheit und die Negativität an ihr, die über die unschuldige Gleichgültigkeit derselben übergreifft. Durch sie wird die Zerstrenung in die Mannichfaltigkeit der ruhigen Pflanzen Gestalten eine feindselige Bewegung, worin sie der Haſs ihres Fürsichseyns aufreibt. — Das wirkliche Selbſtbewuſstseyn dieses zerstreuten Geistes 1807 644 ist eine Menge vereinzelnter ungeselliger Völkergeister, die in ihrem Haffe sich auf den Tod bekämpfen, und bestimmter Thiergestalten als ihres Wesens sich bewuſst werden, denn sie sind nichts anderes als Thiergeister, sich absondernde ihrer ohne Allgemeinheit bewuſste Thierleben.
690 In diesem Haffe reibt sich aber die Bestimmtheit des rein negativen Fürsichseyns auf, und durch diese Bewegung des Begriffs tritt der Geist in eine andere Gestalt. Das aufgehobne Fürsichseyn ist die Form des Gegenstandes, die durch das Selbst hervorgebracht oder die vielmehr das hervorgebrachte, sich aufreibende d. h. zum Dinge werdende Selbst ist. Ueber die nur zerreiffenden Thiergeister behält daher der Arbeitende die Oberhand, deſſen Thun nicht nur negativ, sondern beruhigt und positiv ist. Das Bewuſstseyn des Geistes ist also nunmehr die Bewegung, die über das unmittelbare Ansichseyn wie über das abstrachte Fürsichseyn hinaus ist. Indem das Ansich zur einer Bestimmtheit durch den Gegensatz herabgesetzt ist, ist es nicht mehr die eigne Form des absoluten Geistes, sondern eine Wirklichkeit, die sein Bewuſstseyn sich entgegengesetzt als das gemeine Daseyn vorfindet, sie aufhebt, und ebenso nicht nur diſs aufhebende Fürsichseyn ist, sondern auch seine Vorstellung, das zur Form eines Gegenstandes herausgesetzte Fürsichseyn hervorbringt. Diſs Hervorbringen ist jedoch noch nicht das vollkommne, sondern eine bedingte Thätigkeit und das Formiren eines Vorhandnen.
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c. *Der Werkmeister*.
691 Der Geist erscheint also hier als der Werkmeister, und sein Thun, wodurch er sich selbst als Gegenstand hervorbringt, aber den Gedanken seiner noch nicht erfaſst hat, ist ein instinctartiges Arbeiten, wie die Bienen ihre Zellen bauen.
692 Die erste Form, weil sie die unmittelbare ist, ist sie die abstracte des Verstandes, und das Werk noch nicht an ihm selbst vom Geiste erfüllt. Die Kryſtalle der Pyramiden und Obelisken, einfache Verbindungen gerader Linien, mit ebnen Oberflächen und gleichen Verhältniſſen der Theile, an denen die Incommensurabilität des Runden vertilgt ist, sind die Arbeiten dieses Werkmeisters der strengen Form. Um der bloſsen Verständigkeit der Form willen ist sie nicht ihre Bedeutung an ihr selbst, nicht das geistige Selbst. Die Werke empfangen also nur den Geist entweder in sich, als einen fremden abgeschiednen Geist, der seine lebendige Durchdringung mit der Wirklichkeit verlaffen, selbst todt in diese des Lebens entbehrende Kryſtallc einkehrt; — oder sie beziehen sich äufferlich auf ihn als auf einen solchen, der selbst äuſſerlich und nicht als Geist da ist — als auf das aufgehende Licht, das seine Bedeutung auf sie wirft.
693 Die Trennung, von welcher der arbeitende Geist ausgeht, des Ansichseyns, das zum Stoffe wird, den er 1807 646 verarbeitet, — und des Fürsichseyns, welche die Seite des arbeitenden Selbstbewuſstseyns ist, ist ihm in seinem Werke gegenständlich geworden. Seine fernere Bemühung muſs dahin gehen, diese Trennung der Seele und des Leibs aufzuheben, jene an ihr selbst zu bekleiden und zu gestalten, diesen aber zu beseelen. Beide Seiten, indem sie einander näher gebracht werden, behalten dabey die Bestimmtheit des vorgestellten Geistes, und seiner umgebenden Hülle gegeneinander; seine Einigkeit mit sich selbst enthält diesen Gegensatz der Einzelnheit und Allgemeinheit. Indem das Werk in seinen Seiten sich selbst nähert, so geschieht dadurch zugleich auch das andre, daſs es dem arbeitenden Selbſtbewuſstseyn naher tritt, und dieses zum Wiſſen seiner, wie es an und für sich ist, in dem Werke gelangt. So aber macht es nur erst die abstracte Seite der Thätigkeit des Geistes aus, welche nicht in sich selbst noch ihren Inhalt, sondern an seinem Werke, das ein Ding ist, weiſs. Der Werkmeister selbst der ganze Geist, ist noch nicht erschienen, sondern ist das noch innre verborgne Wesen, welches als Ganzes, nur zerlegt in das thätige Selbstbewuſstseyn und in seinen hervorgebrachten Gegenstand, vorhanden ist.
694 Die umgebende Behausung also, die äuſſere Wirklichkeit, die nur erst in die abstracte Form des Verstandes erhoben ist, arbeitet der Werkmeister zur beseeltern Form aus. Er verwendet das Pflanzenleben dazu, das nicht mehr, wie dem frühern unmächtigen 1807 647 Pantheismus heilig ist, sondern von ihm, der sich als das fürsichseyende Wesen erfaſst, als etwas brauchbares genommen und zur Auffenseite und Zierde zu rückgesetzt wird. Es wird aber nicht unverändert verwendet, sondern der Arbeiter der selbstbewuſsten Form vertilgt zugleich die Vergänglichkeit, welche die unmittelbare Existenz dieses Lebens an ihm hat, und nähert seine organischen Formen den strengern und allgemeinern des Gedankens. Die organische Form, die freygelaſſen in der Besonderheit fortwuchert, ihrerseits von der Form des Gedankens unterjocht, erhebt andererseits diese geradlmigten und ebnen Gestalten zur beseeltern Rundung, — eine Vermischung, welche die Wurzel der freyen Architectur wird.
695 Diese Wohnung, die Seite des allgemeinen Elements oder der unorganischen Natur des Geistes schlieſst nun auch eine Gestalt der Einzelnheit in sich, die den vorher von dem Daseyn abgeschiednen ihm innern oder äuſſerlichen Geist der Wirklichkeit näher bringt, und dadurch das Werk dem thätigen Selbſtbewuſstseyn gleicher macht. Der Arbeiter greift zuerst zur Form des Fürsichseyns überhaupt, zur Thiergestalt. Daſs er sich seiner nicht mehr unmittelbar im Thierleben bewuſst ist, beweiſst er dadurch, daſs er gegen dieses sich als die hervorbringende Kraft constituirt und in ihm als seinem Werke sich weiſs; wodurch sie zugleich eine aufgehobne und die Hieroglyphe einer andern Bedeutung, eines 1807 648 Gedankens wird. Daher wird sie auch nicht mehr allein und ganz vom Arbeiter gebraucht, sondern mit der Gestalt des Gedankens, mit der menschlichen, vermischt. Noch fehlt dem Werke aber die Gestalt und Daseyn, worin das Selbst als Selbst existirt; — es fehlt ihm noch diſs, an ihm selbst es auszusprechen, daſs es eine innre Bedeutung in sich schlieſst, es fehlt ihm die Sprache, das Element, worin der erfüllende Sinn selbst vorhanden ist. Das Werk daher, wenn es sich von dem Thierischen auch ganz gereinigt, und die Gestalt des Selbstbewuſstseyns allein an ihm trägt, ist die noch tonlose Gestalt, die des Strahls der aufgehenden Sonne bedarf, um Ton zu haben, der vom Lichte erzeugt, auch nur Klang und nicht Sprache ist, nur ein äusseres Selbst, nicht das innre zeigt.
696 Diesem äuſſern Selbst der Gestalt steht die andere gegenüber, welche anzeigt, ein Innres an ihr zu haben. Die in ihr Wesen zurückgehende Natur setzt ihre lebendige sich vereinzelnde und in ihrer Bewegung sich verwirrende Mannichfaltigkeit zu einem unwesentlichen Gehäuse herab, das die Decke des Innern ist; und dieses Innre ist zunächst noch die einfache Finsterniſs, das Unbewegte, der schwarze formlose Stein.
697 Beyde Darstellungen enthalten die Innerlichkeit und das Daseyn, — die beyden Momente des Geistes; und beyde Darstellungen beyde zugleich in entgegengesetztem Verhältniſſe, das Selbst sowohl als 1807 649 Inres wie als Aeuſſeres. Beydes ist zu vereinigen. — Die Seele der menschlich geformten Bildsäule kommt noch nicht aus dem Innern, ist noch nicht die Sprache, das Daseyn, das an ihm selbst innerlich ist, — und das Innre des vielformigen Daseyns ist noch das tonlose sich nicht in sich selbst unterscheidende, und von seinem Aeuffern, dem alle Unterschiede gehören, noch getrennte. — Der Werkmeister vereint daher beydes in der Vermischung der natürlichen und der selbstbewuſsten Gestalt, und diese zweydeutigen sich selbst räthselhaften Wesen, das bewuſste ringend mit dem bewuſstlosen, das einfache Innre mit dem vielgestalteten Aeuſſern, die Dunkelheit des Gedankens mit der Klarheit der Aeuſſerung paarend, brechen in die Sprache tiefer schwerverständlicher Weisheit aus.
698 In diesem Werke hört die instinctartige Arbeit auf, die dem Selbstbewuſstſeyn gegenüber das bewuſstlose Werk erzeugte; denn in ihm kommt der Thätigkeit des Werkmeisters, welche das Selbstbewuſstseyn ausmacht, ein ebenso selbstbewuſstes, sich ausſprechendes Innres entgegen. Er hat sich darin zu der Entzweyung seines Bewuſstseyns emporgearbeitet, worin der Geist dem Geiste begegnet. In dieser Einheit des selbstbewuſsten Geistes, mit sich selbst, insofern er sich Gestalt und Gegenstand seines Bewuſstſeyns ist, reinigen sich also seine Vermischungen mit der bewuſstlosen Weise der unmittelbaren Naturgestalt. Diese Ungeheuer an Gestalt 1807 650 Rede und That lösen sich zur geistigen Gestaltung auf, — einem Aeuſſern das in sich gegangen, — einem Innern das sich aus sich und an sich selbst äussert; zum Gedanken, der sich gebährendes und seine Gestalt ihm gemäſs erhaltendes und klares Daseyn ist. Der Geist ist Künſtler.
1807 651
B. *Die Kunst-Religion*.
699 Der Geist hat seine Gestalt, in welcher er für sein Bewuſstseyn ist, in die Form des Bewuſstſeyns selbst erhoben, und bringt eine solche sich hervor. Der Werkmeister hat das synthetische Arbeiten, das Vermischen der fremdartigen Formen des Gedankens und des Natürlichen aufgegeben; indem die Gestalt die Form der selbstbewuſsten Thätigkeit gewonnen, ist er geistiger Arbeiter geworden.
700 Fragen wir darnach, welches der wirkliche Geist ist, der in der Kunstreligion das Bewuſstseyn seines absoluten Wesens hat, so ergibt sich, daſs es der sittliche oder der wahre Geist ist. Er ist nicht nur die allgemeine Substanz aller Einzelnen, sondern indem sie für das wirkliche Bewuſstſeyn die Gestalt des Bewuſstſeyns hat, so heiſst diſs soviel, daſs sie, die Individualisation hat, von ihnen als ihr eignes Wesen und Werk gewuſst wird. Weder ist sie so für sie das Lichtwesen, in deſſen Einheit das Fürsichseyn des Selbstbewuſstseyns nur negativ, nur 1807 652 vergehend enthalten ist, und den Herrn seiner Wirklichkeit auschaut, — noch ist sie das rastlose Verzehren sich haſſender Völker, — noch die Unterjochung derselben zu Kasten, die zusammen den Schein der Organisation eines vollendeten Ganzen ausmachen, dem aber die allgemeine Freyheit der Individuen fehlt. Sondern er ist das freye Volk, worin die Sitte die Substanz aller ausmacht, deren Wirklichkeit und Daseyn alle und jeder einzelne als seinen Willen und That weiſs.
701 Die Religion des sittlichen Geistes ist aber seine Erhebung über seine Wirklichkeit, das Zurückgehen aus seiner Wahrheit in das reine Wiſſen seiner selbſt. Indem das sittliche Volk in der unmittelbaren Einheit mit seiner Substanz lebt, und das Princip der reinen Einzelnheit des Selbstbewuſstseyns nicht an ihm hat, so tritt seine Religion in ihrer Vollendung erst im Scheiden von seinem Bestehen auf. Denn die Wirklichkeit der sittlichen Substanz beruht theils auf ihrer ruhigen Unwandelbarkeit gegen die absolute Bewegung des Selbstbewuſstseyns, und hiemit darauf daſs dieses noch nicht aus seiner ruhigen Sitte und seinem festen Vertrauen in sich gegangen ist; — theils auf seiner Organisation in eine Vielheit von Rechten und Pflichten, so wie in die Vertheilung in die Maſſen der Stände und ihres besondern Thuns, das zum Ganzen zusammenwirkt; — hiemit darauf daſs der Einzelne mit der Beschrankung seines Daseyns zufrieden ist, und den schrankenlosen 1807 653 Gedanken seines freyen Selbsts noch nicht erfaſst hat. Aber jenes ruhige unmittelbare Vertrauen zur Substanz geht in das Vertrauen zu sich und in die Gewiſsheit seiner selbst zurück, und die Vielheit der Rechte und Pflichten wie das beschränkte Thun ist dieselbe dialektische Bewegung des Sittlichen, als die Vielheit der Dinge und ihrer Bestimmungen, — eine Bewegung, die nur in der Einfachheit des seiner gewiſſen Geistes ihre Ruhe und Festigkeit findet. — Die Vollendung der Sittlichkeit zum freyen Selbstbewuſstseyn und das Schicksal der sittlichen Welt ist daher die in sich gegangene Individualität, der absolute Leichtsinn des sittlichen Geistes, der alle festen Unterschiede seines Bestehens und die Maſſen seiner organischen Gegliederung in sich aufgelöst, und vollkommen seiner sicher zur schrankenlosen Freudigkeit und zum freysten Genuſſe seiner selbst gelangt ist. Diese einfache Gewiſsheit des Geistes in sich ist das Zweydeutige, ruhiges Bestehen und feste Wahrheit, — so wie absolute Unruhe und das Vergehen der Sittlichkeit zu seyn. Sie schlägt aber in das letztre um, denn die Wahrheit des sittlichen Geistes ist nur erst noch diſs substantielle Wesen und Vertrauen, worin das Selbst sich nicht als freye Einzelheit weiſs, und das daher in dieser Innerlichkeit oder in dem Freywerden des Selbsts zu Grunde geht. Indem also das Vertrauen gebrochen, die Substanz des Volks in sich geknickt ist, so ist der Geist, der die Mitte von bestandlosen Extremen war, nunmehr 1807 654 in das Extrem des sich als Wesen erfaſſenden Selbstbewuſstseyns herausgetreten. Dieses ist der in sich gewiſſe Geist, der über den Verlust seiner Welt trauert und sein Wesen, über die Wirklichkeit erhoben, nun aus der Reinheit des Selbsts hervorbringt.
702 In solcher Epoche tritt die absolute Kunst hervor; früher ist sie das instinctartige Arbeiten, das ins Daseyn versenkt aus ihm heraus und in es hineinarbeitet, nicht an der freyen Sittlichkeit seine Substanz, und daher auch zum arbeitenden Selbst nicht die freye geistige Thätigkeit hat. Später ist der Geist über die Kunst hinaus, um seine höhere Darstellung zu gewinnen; — neinlich nicht nur die aus dem Selbst geborne Substanz, sondern in seiner Darstellung als Gegenstand, dieses Selbst zu seyn, nicht nur aus seinem Begriffe sich zu gebähren, sondern seinen Begriff selbst zur Gestalt zu haben, so daſs der Begriff und das erzeugte Kunstwerk sich gegenseitig als ein und daſſelbe wiſſen.
703 Indem also die sittliche Substanz aus ihrem Daseyn sich in ihr reines Selbstbewuſstseyn zurückgenommen, so ist dieses die Seite des Begriffs oder der Thätigkeit, mit welcher der Geist sich als Gegenstand hervorbringt. Sie ist reine Form, weil der Einzelne im sittlichen Gehorsam und Dienste sich alles bewuſstlose Daseyn und feste Bestimmung so abgearbeitet hat, wie die Substanz selbst diſs flüſſige Wesen geworden ist. Diese Form ist die Nacht, worin die Substanz verrathen ward, und sich zum Subjecte machte; aus 1807 655 dieser Nacht der reinen Gewiſsheit seiner selbst ist es, daſs der sittliche Geist als die von der Natur und seinem unmittelbaren Daseyn befreyte Gestalt aufersteht.
704 Die Exiſtenz des reinen Begriffs, in den der Geiſt aus seinem Körper geflohen, ist ein Individuum, das er sich zum Gefäſſe seines Schmerzens erwählt. Er ist an diesem, als sein Allgemeines und seine Macht, von welcher es Gewalt leidet, — als sein Pathos, dem hingegeben sein Selbstbewuſstseyn die Freyheit verliert. Aber jene positive Macht der Allgemeinheit wird vom reinen Selbst des Individuums, als der negativen Macht, bezwungen. Diese reine Thätigkeit, ihrer unverlierbaren Krafft bewuſst, ringt mit dem ungestalteten Wesen; Meister darüber werdend hat sie das Pathos zu ihrem Stoffe gemacht und sich ihren Inhalt gegeben, und diese Einheit tritt als Werk heraus, der allgemeine Geist individualisirt und vorgestellt.
a. *Das abstracte Kunstwerk*.
705 Das erste Kunstwerk ist als das unmittelbare, das abstracte und einzelne. Seinerseits hat es sich aus der unmittelbaren und gegenständlichen Weise dem Selbſtbewuſstseyn entgegen zu bewegen, wie andererseits dieses für sich im Cultus darauf geht, die 1807 656 Unterscheidung aufzuheben, die es sich zuerst gegen seinen Geist gibt, und hiedurch das an ihm selbst belebte Kunstwerk hervorzubringen.
706 Die erste Weiſe, in welcher der künstlerische Geist seine Gestalt und sein thätiges Bewuſstſeyn am weitesten voneinander entfernt, ist die unmittelbare, daſs jene als Ding überhaupt da ist. — Sie zerfällt an ihr in den Unterschied der Einzelnheit, welche die Gestalt des Selbsts an ihr hat, — und der Allgemeinheit, welche das unorganische Wesen in Bezug auf die Gestalt, als seine Umgebung und Behausung, darstellt. Diese gewinnt durch die Erhebung des Ganzen in den reinen Begriff, ihre reine dem Geiste angehörige Form. Sie ist weder der verständige Krystall, der das todte behauſst, oder von der äuſſerlichen Seele beschienen wird, — noch die aus der Pflanze erst hervorgehende Vermischung der Formen der Natur und des Gedankens, deſſen Thätigkeit hierin noch ein Nachahmen ist. Sondern der Begriff streifft das ab, was von der Wurzel, dem Geäſte und Geblätter den Formen noch anklebt, und reinigt sie zu Gebilden, worin das Geradlinigte und Ebne des Krystalls in incommensurable Verhältniſſe erhoben ist, so daſs die Beseelung des Organischen in die abstracte Form des Verstandes aufgenommen und zugleich ihr Wesen, die Incommensurabilität für den Verstand erhalten wird.
707 Der innwohnende Gott aber ist der aus dem Thiergehäuse hervorgezogne schwarze Stein, der mit dem 1807 657 Lichte des Bewuſstseyns durchdrungen ist. Die menschliche Gestalt ſtreifft das thierische. mit der ſie vermischt war, ab; das Thier ist für den Gott nur eine zufällige Verkleidung; es tritt neben seine wahre Gestalt, und gilt für sich nichts mehr, sondern ist zur Bedeutung eines andern, zum bloſſen Zeichen, herabgesunken. Die Geſtalt des Gottes ſtreift ebendadurch an ihr ſelbſt auch die Bedürftigkeit der natürlichen Bedingungen des thieriſchen Daseyns ab, und deutet die innerlichen Anſtalten des organischen Lebens in ihre Oberfläche verſchmolzen und nur dieser angehörig an. — Das Weſen des Gottes aber iſt die Einheit des allgemeinen Daſeyns der Natur und des ſelbſtbewuſsten Geiſtes, der in ſeiner Wirklichkeit jenem gegenüberſtehend erſcheint. Zugleich zunächſt eine einzelne Geſtalt, iſt ſein Daſeyn eines der Elemente der Natur, ſo wie ſeine ſelbſtbewuſste Wirklichkeit ein einzelner Volksgeiſt. Aber jenes iſt in dieſer Einheit das in den Geiſt reflectirte Element, die durch den Gedanken verklärte, mit dem ſelbſtbewuſsten Leben geeinte Natur. Die Göttergeſtalt hat darum ihr Naturelement als ein aufgehobnes, als eine dunkle Erinnerung in ihr. Das wüſte Weſen und der verworrene Kampf des freyen Daſeyns der Elemente, das unſittliche Reich der Titanen, iſt beſiegt, und an den Saum der ſich klar gewordnen Wirklichkeit, an die trüben Gräntzen der ſich im Geiſte findenden und beruhigten Welt verwieſen. Diese 1807 658 alten Götter, in welche das Lichtwesen, mit der Finſterniſs zeugend, ſich zunächſt beſondert, der Himmel, die Erde, der Ocean, die Sonne, das blinde typhoniſche Feuer der Erde u. s. f. ſind durch Geſtalten erſetzt, die an ihnen nur noch den dunkel erinnernden Anklang an jene Titanen haben, und nicht mehr Naturweſen, ſondern klare ſittliche Geiſter der ſelbſtbewuſsten Völker sind.
708 Dieſe einfache Geſtalt hat alſo die Unruhe der unendlichen Vereinzelung — ihrer ſowohl als des Naturelements, das nur als allgemeines Weſen nothwendig, in ſeinem Daſeyn und Bewegung aber ſich zufällig verhält, — wie ihrer als des Volks, das in die beſondere Maſſen des Thuns und in die individuellen Punkte des Selbſtbewuſstseyns zerſtreut ein Daſeyn mannichfaltigen Sinnes und Thuns hat — an ſich vertilgt und in ruhige Individualität zuſammenbefaſst. Es ſteht ihr daher das Moment der Unruhe, ihr — dem Weſen das Selbſtbewuſstſeyn gegenüber, das als die Geburtsſtätte derſelben für ſich nichts übrig behielt, als die reine Thätigkeit zu ſeyn. Was der Subſtanz angehört, gab der Künſtler ganz ſeinem Werke mit, ſich ſelbſt aber als einer beſtimmten Individualität in ſeinem Werke keine Wirklichkeit; er konnte ihm die Vollendung nur dadurch ertheilen, daſs er ſeiner Beſonderheit ſich entäuſſerte, und zur Abſtraction des reinen Thuns ſich entkörperte und ſteigerte. — In dieſer erſten unmittelbaren Erzeugung iſt die Trennung des Werks, und ſeiner 1807 659 ſelbſtbewuſsten Thätigkeit noch nicht wieder vereinigt; das Werk iſt daher nicht für ſich das wirklich beſeelte, ſondern es iſt Ganzes nur mit ſeinem Werden zuſammen. Das gemeine an dem Kunſtwerke, daſs es im Bewuſstseyn erzeugt, und von Menſchenhänden gemacht iſt, iſt das Möment des als Begriff exiſtirenden Begriffes, der ihm gegenübertritt. Und wenn dieſer, als Künſtler oder als Betrachter, das Kunſtwerk als an ihm ſelbſt abſolnt beſeelt auszuſprechen, und ſich; den thuenden oder ſchauenden, zu vergeſſen uneigennützig genug iſt, ſo muſs hiegegen der Begriff des Geiſtes feſtgehalten werden, der des Moments nicht entbehren kann, ſeiner ſelbſt bewuſst zu ſeyn. Diſs Moment aber ſteht dem Werke gegenüber, weil er in dieſer ſeiner erſten Entzweyung beyden Seiten ihre abſtracten Beſtimmungen des Thuns und Dingſeyns gegeneinander gibt, und ihre Rückkehr in die Einheit, von der ſie ausgingen, noch nicht zu Stande gekommen iſt.
709 Der Künſtler erfährt alſo an ſeinem Werke, daſs er kein ihm gleiches Weſen hervorbrachte. Es kommt ihm zwar daraus ein Bewuſstseyn ſo zurück, daſs eine bewundernde Menge es als den Geiſt, der ihr Weſen iſt, verehrt. Aber dieſe Beſeelung, indem ſie ihm ſein Selbſtbewuſstſeyn nur als Bewunderung erwiedert, iſt vielmehr ein Bekenntniſs, das dieſe Beſeelung an den Künſtler ablegt, nicht ſeines gleichen zu ſeyn. Indem es ihm als Freudigkeit überhaupt 1807 660 zurückkommt, findet er darin nicht den Schmerz ſeiner Bildung und Zeugung, nicht die Anſtrengung ſeiner Arbeit. Sie mögen das Werk auch noch beurtheilen, oder ihm Opfer bringen, auf welche Art es ſey, ihr Bewuſstseyn darein legen, — wenn ſie ſich mit ihrer Kenntniſs darüber ſetzen, weiſs er, wie viel mehr ſeine That als ihr Verſtehen und Reden iſt; — wenn ſie ſich darunter ſetzen und ihr ſie beherrſchendes Weſen darin erkennen, weiſs er ſich als den Meiſter desſelben.
710 Das Kunſtwerk erfodert daher ein anderes Element ſeines Daſeyns, der Gott einen andern Hervorgang, als dieſen, worin er aus der Tiefe ſeiner ſchöpferiſchen Nacht in das Gegentheil in die Aeuſſerlichkeit, die Beſtimmung des ſelbſtbewuſstlosen Dinges herabfällt. Diſs höhere Element iſt die Sprache, — ein Daſeyn, das unmittelbar ſelbſtbewuſste Exiſtenz iſt. Wie das einzelne Selbſtbewuſstſeyn in ihr da iſt, iſt es ebenſo unmittelbar als eine allgemeine Anſteckung; die vollkommne Beſonderung des Fürſichſeyns iſt zugleich die Flüſſigkeit und die allgemein mitgetheilte Einheit der vielen Selbſt; ſie iſt die als Seele exiſtirende Seele. Der Gott alſo, der die Sprache zum Elemente ſeiner Geſtalt hat, iſt das an ihm ſelbſt beſeelte Kunſtwerk, das die reine Thätigkeit, die ihm, der als Ding exiſtirte, gegenüber war, unmittelbar in ſeinem Daſeyn hat. Oder das Selbſtbewuſstseyn bleibt in dem gegenſtändlich werden ſeines Weſens unmittelbar bey ſich. Es iſt, ſo 1807 661 in ſeinem Weſen bey ſich ſelbſt ſeyend, reines Denken oder die Andacht, deren Innerlichkeit in der Hymne zugleich Daſeyn hat. Sie behält die Einzelnheit des Selbſtbewuſstseyns in ihr, und vernommen iſt dieſe Einzelnheit zugleich als allgemeine da; die Andacht in allen angezündet iſt der geiſtige Strom, der in der Vielfachheit des Selbſtbewuſstſeyns, ſeiner als eines gleichen Thuns Aller, und als einfaches Seyn bewuſst iſt; der Geiſt hat als dieſes allgemeine Selbſtbewuſstseyn Aller ſeine reine Innerlichkeit ebenſowohl als das Seyn für Andre und das Fürſichſeyn der Einzelnen in Einer Einheit.
711 Dieſe Sprache unterſcheidet ſich von einer andern Sprache des Gottes, die nicht die des allgemeinen Selbſtbewuſstseyns iſt. Das Orakel ſowohl des Gottes der künſtleriſchen, als der vorhergehenden Religionen iſt die nothwendige erſte Sprache deſſelben, denn in ſeinem Begriffe liegt ebenſowohl, daſs er das Weſen der Natur als des Geiſtes iſt, und daher nicht nur natürliches ſondern auch geiſtiges Daſeyn hat. Inſofern diſs Moment erſt in ſeinem Begriffe liegt, und noch nicht in der Religion realiſirt iſt, ſo iſt die Sprache für das religiöſe Selbſtbewuſstseyn Sprache eines fremden Selbſtbewuſstseyns. Das ſeiner Gemeine noch fremde Selbſtbewuſstſeyn iſt noch nicht so da, wie ſein Begriff fodert. Das Selbſt iſt das einfache und dadurch ſchlechthin allgemeine Fürſichſeyn; jenes aber, das von dem Selbſtbewuſstſeyn der Gemeine getrennt iſt, iſt nur erſt ein einzelnes. — Der Inhalt dieſer eignen und 1807 662 einzelnen Sprache ergibt ſich aus der allgemeinen Beſtimmtheit, in welcher der abſolute Geiſt überhaupt in ſeiner Religion geſetzt iſt. — Der allgemeine Geiſt des Aufgangs, der ſein Daſeyn noch nicht beſondert hat, ſpricht alſo ebenſo einfache und allgemeine Sätze vom Weſen aus, deren ſubſtantieller Inhalt in ſeiner einfachen Wahrheit erhaben iſt, aber um dieſer. Allgemeinheit willen, dem weiter ſich fortbildenden Selbſtbewuſstseyn zugleich trivial erſcheint.
712 Das weiter gebildete Selbſt, das ſich zum Fürſichſeyn erhebt, iſt über das reine Pathos der Subſtanz, über die Gegenſtändlichkeit des aufgehenden Lichtweſens Meiſter, und weiſs jene Einfachheit der Wahrheit, als das anſichſeyende, das nicht die Form des zufälligen Daſeyns durch eine fremde Sprache hat, ſondern als das ſichre und ungeſchriebene Geſetze der Götter das ewig lebt, und von dem niemand weiſs, von wannen es erſchien. — Wie die allgemeine Wahrheit, die vom Lichtweſen geoffenbart wurde, hier ins Innre oder Untre zurückgetreten, und damit der Form der zufälligen Erſcheinung enthoben iſt, ſo iſt dagegen in der Kunſtreligion, weil die Geſtalt des Gottes das Bewuſstseyn und damit die Einzelnheit überhaupt angenommen hat, die eigne Sprache des Gottes, der der Geiſt des ſittlichen Volkes iſt, das Orakel, das die beſondern Angelegenheiten deſſelben weiſs, und das Nützliche darüber kund thut. Die allgemeinen Wahrheiten aber, weil ſie als das anſichſeyende gewuſst werden, vindicirt ſich das wiſſende Denken, und die Sprache derſelben iſt 1807 663 ihm nicht mehr eine fremde, ſondern die eigne. Wie, jener Weiſe des Alterthums, was gut und schön ſey in ſeinem eignen Denkenſuchte, dagegen den ſchlechten zufälligen Inhalt des Wiſſens, ob es ihm gut ſey mit dieſem oder jenem umzugehen, oder einem Bekannten gut, dieſe Reiſe zu machen und dergleichen bedeutungsloſe Dinge, dem Dämon zu wiſſen überlieſs, ebenſo hohlt das allgemeine Bewuſstseyn das Wiſſen vom Zufälligen von den Vögeln, oder von den Bäumen oder von der gährenden Erde, deren Dampf dem Selbſtbewuſstseyn ſeine Beſonnenheit nimmt; denn das Zufällige iſt das Unbeſonnene und Fremde, und das ſittliche Bewuſstseyn läſst ſich alſo auch, wie durch ein Würfeln, auf eine unbeſonnene und fremde Weiſe darüber beſtimmen. Wenn der Einzelne durch ſeinen Verſtand ſich beſtimmt und mit Ueberlegung das wählt, was ihm nützlich ſey, ſo liegt dieſer Selbſtbeſtimmung die Beſtimmtheit des beſondern Charakters zum Grunde; ſie iſt ſelbſt das Zufällige; und jenes Wiſſen des Verſtands, was dem Einzelnen nützlich iſt, daher ein eben ſolches Wiſſen als das jener Orakel oder des Looſes; nur daſs der das Orakel oder Loos befragt, damit die ſittliche Geſinnung der Gleichgültigkeit gegen das Zufällige ausdrückt, da jenes hingegen das an ſich zufällige als weſentliches Intereſſe ſeines Denkens und Wiſſens behandelt. Das höhere als beyde aber iſt zwar die Ueberlegung, zum Orakel des zufalligen Thuns zu machen, aber dieſe überlegte Hand lung selbſt wegen ihrer Seite der Beziehung auf das 1807 664 Beſondre und ihrer Nützlichkeit als etwas Zufälliges zu wiſſen.
713 Das wahre ſelbſtbewuſste Daſeyn, das der Geiſt in der Sprache, die nicht die Sprache des fremden, und alſo zufälligen, nicht allgemeinen Selbſtbewuſstſeyns iſt, erhält, iſt das Kunſtwerk, das wir vorhin geſehen. Es ſteht dem dinglichen der Bildſäule gegenüber. Wie dieſe das ruhende, ſo iſt jenes das verſchwindende Daſeyn; wie in dieſem die Gegenſtändlichkeit frey entlaſſen des eignen unmittelbaren Selbſts entbehrt, ſo bleibt ſie dagegen in jenem zu ſehr in das Selbſt eingeſchloſſen, kommt zu wenig zur Geſtaltung, und iſt, wie die Zeit, unmittelbar nicht mehr da, indem ſie da iſt.
714 Die Bewegung beyder Seiten, in der die im reinen empfindenden Elemente des Selbſtbewuſstseyns bewegte, und die im Elemente der Dingheit ruhende göttliche Geſtalt gegenſeitig ihre verſchiedne Beſtimmung aufgeben und die Einheit zum Daſeyn kommt, die der Begriff ihres Weſens iſt, macht der Cultus äus. In ihm gibt ſich das Selbſt das Bewuſstſeyn des Herabſteigens des göttlichen Weſens aus ſeiner Jenſeitigkeit zu ihm, und dieſes, das vorher das unwirkliche und nur gegenſtändliche iſt, erhält dadurch die eigentliche Wirklichkeit des Selbſtbewuſstſeyns.
715 Dieſer Begriff des Cultus iſt an ſich ſchon in dem Strome des hymniſchen Geſänges enthalten und vorhanden. Dieſe Andacht iſt die unmittelbare reine Befriedigung des Selbſts durch und in ſich ſelbſt. Es 1807 665 iſt die gereinigte Seele, welche in dieſer Reinheit unmittelbar nur Weſen und eins mit dem Weſen iſt. Sie iſt um ihrer Abſtraction willen, nicht das ſeinen Gegenſtand von ſich unterſcheidende Bewuſstſeyn, und alſo nur die Nacht ſeines Daſeyns und die bereitete Stätte ſeiner Geſtalt. Der abſtracte Cultus erhebt daher das Selbſt dazu, dieſes reine göttliche Element zu ſeyn. Die Seele vollbringt dieſe Läuterung mit Bewuſstseyn; doch iſt ſie noch nicht das Selbſt, das in ſeine Tiefen hinabgeſtiegen, ſich als das Böſe weiſs, ſondern es iſt ein ſeyendes, eine Seele, welche ihre Aeuſſerlichkeit mit Waſchen reinigt, ſie mit weiſſen Kleidern anthut, und ihre Innerlichkeit den vorgeſtellten Weg der Arbeiten, Straffen und Belohnungen, den Weg der die Beſonderheit entäuſſernden Bildung überhaupt durchführt, durch welchen ſie in die Wohnungen und die Gemeinſchaft der Seeligkeit gelangt.
716 Dieſer Cultus iſt nur erſt ein geheimes, d. h. ein nur vorgeſtelltes, unwirkliches Vollbringen; er muſs wirkliche Handlung ſeyn, eine unwirkliche Handlung widerſpricht ſich ſelbſt. Das eigentliche Bewuſstſeyn erhebt ſich dadurch in ſein reines Selbſtbewuſstſeyn. Das Weſen hat in ihm die Bedeutung eines freyen Gegenſtands, durch den wirklichen Cultus kehrt dieſer in das Selbſt zurück — und inſofern er im reinen Bewuſstseyn die Bedeutung des reinen jenſeits der Wirklichkeit wohnenden Weſens hat, ſteigt diſs Wesen von ſeiner Allgemeinheit durch dieſe 1807 666 Vermittlung zur Einzelnheit herunter und ſchlieſst ſich ſo mit der Wirklichkeit zuſammen.
717 Wie beyde Seiten in die Handlung eintreten, beſtimmt ſich ſo, daſs für die ſelbſtbewuſste Seite, inſofern ſie wirkliches Bewuſstseyn iſt, das Weſen ſich als die wirkliche Natur darſtellt; einestheils gehört ſie ihm als Beſitz und Eigenthum und gilt als das nicht-anſichſeyende Daſeyn; — anderntheils iſt ſie ſeine eigne unmittelbare Wirklichkeit und Einzelnheit, die von ihm ebenſo als Nichtweſen betrachtet und aufgehoben wird. Zugleich aber hat für ſein reines Bewuſstſeyn jene äuſſere Natur die entgegengeſetzte Bedeutung, nemlich das anſichſeyende Weſen zu ſeyn, gegen welches das Selbſt ſeine Unweſentlichkeit aufopfert, wie es umgekehrt die unweſentliche Seite der Natur ſich ſelbſt aufopfert. Die Handlung iſt dadurch geiſtige Bewegung, weil ſie diſs doppelſeitige iſt, die Abſtraction des Weſens, wie die Andacht den Gegenſtand beſtimmt, aufzuheben und es zum Wirklichen zu machen, und das Wirkliche, wie das Handelnde den Gegenſtand und ſich beſtimmt, auf- und in die Allgemeinheit zu erheben.
718 Die Handlung des Cultus ſelbſt beginnt daher mit der reinen Hingabe eines Beſitzes, das der Eigenthümer ſcheinbar für ihn ganz nutzlos vergieſst oder in Rauch aufſteigen läſst. Er thut hierin vor dem Weſen ſeines reinen Bewuſstseyns auf Beſitz und Recht des Eigenthumes und des Genuſſes deſſelben, auf die Perſönlichkeit und die Rückkehr des Thuns 1807 667 in das Selbſt Verzicht, und reflectirt die Handlung vielmehr in das Allgemeine oder in das Weſen, als in ſich. — Umgekehrt aber geht darin ebenſo das ſeyende Weſen zu Grunde. Das Thier, das aufgeopfert wird, iſt das Zeichen eines Gottes; die Früchte, die verzehrt werden, ſind die lebendige Ceres und Bacchus ſelbſt; — in jenem ſterben die Mächte des obern Rechts, welches Blut und wirkliches Leben hat; in dieſen aber die Mächte des untern Rechts, das blutlos die geheime liſtige Macht beſitzt. — Die Aufopferung der göttlichen Subſtanz gehört, inſofern ſie Thun iſt, der ſelbſtbewuſsten Seite an; daſs dieſes wirkliche Thun möglich ſey, muſs das Weſen ſich ſelbſt ſchon an ſich aufgeopfert haben. Diſs hat es darin gethan, daſs es ſich Daſeyn gegeben und zum einzelnen Thiere und zur Frucht gemacht hat. Dieſe Verzichtleiſtung, die alſo das Weſen ſchon an ſich vollbracht, ſtellt das handelnde Selbſt im Daſeyn, und für ſein Bewuſstseyn dar, und erſetzt jene unmittelbare Wirklichkeit des Weſens durch die höhere, nemlich die ſeiner ſelbſt. Denn die entſtandne Einheit, die das Reſultat der aufgehobnen Einzelnheit und Trennung beyder Seiten iſt, iſt nicht das nur negative Schikſal, ſondern hat poſitive Bedeutung. Nur dem abſtracten unterirdiſchen Weſen wird das ihm aufgeopferte ganz hingegeben, und da mit die Reflexion des Beſitzes und des Fürſichſeyns in das Allgemeine, von dem Selbſt als ſolchem unterſchieden bezeichnet. Zugleich aber iſt diſs nur 1807 668 ein geringer Theil, und das andre Opfern iſt nur die Zerſtörung des Unbrauchbaren und vielmehr die Zubereitung des Geopferten zum Mahle, deſſen Schmauſs die Handlung um ihre negative Bedeutung betriegt. Der Opfernde behält bey jenem erſten Opfer das Meiſte, und von dieſem das Nutzbare ſeinem Genuſſe auf. Dieſer Genuſs iſt die negative Macht, welche das Weſen ſowie die Einzelnheit aufhebt, und zugleich iſt er die poſitive Wirklichkeit, worin das gegenſtändliche Daſeyn des Weſens in ſelbſtbewuſstes verwandelt, und das Selbſt das Bewuſstſeyn ſeiner Einheit mit dem Weſen hat.
719 Dieſer Cultus iſt übrigens zwar eine wirkliche Handlung, ihre Bedeutung liegt jedoch mehr nur in der Andacht; was dieſer angehört, iſt nicht gegenſtändlich hervorgebracht, ſo wie das Reſultat, im Genuſſe ſich ſelbſt ſeines Daſeyns beraubt. Der Kultus geht daher weiter, und erſetzt dieſen Mangel zunächſt dadurch, daſs er ſeiner Andacht ein gegenſtändliches Beſtehen gibt, indem er die gemeinſame oder einzelne jedem thunliche Arbeit iſt, welche die Wohnung und den Putz des Gottes, ihm zu Ehren hervorbringt. — Es wird dadurch theils die Gegenſtändlichkeit der Bildſäule aufgehoben, denn durch dieſe Weyhung ſeiner Geſchenke und Arbeiten macht der Arbeitende den Gott ſich geneigt, und ſchaut ſein Selbſt ihm angehörig an; theils auch iſt diſs Thun nicht das einzelne Arbeiten des Künſtlers, ſondern dieſe Beſonderheit iſt in der Allgemeinheit aufgelöſt. Es iſt aber nicht nur die Ehre des 1807 669 Gottes, die zu Stande kommt, und der Segen ſeiner Geneigtheit flieſst nicht nur in der Vorſtellung auf den Arbeiter, ſondern die Arbeit hat auch die umgekehrte Bedeutung gegen die erſte der Entäuſſerung und der fremden Ehre. Die Wohnungen und Hallen des Gottes ſind für den Gebrauch des Menſchen, die Schätze, die in jenen aufbewahrt ſind, im Nothfalle die Seinigen; die Ehre, die jener in ſeinem Schmucke genieſst, iſt die Ehre des kunſtreichen und groſsmüthigen Volkes. Am Feſte ſchmückt dieſes ebenſo ſeine eignen Wohnungen und Bekleidungen, ſo wie ſeine Verrichtungen mit zierlichem Geräthe. Es empfängt auf dieſe Weiſe für ſeine Gaben die Erwiederung von dem dankbaren Gotte und die Beweiſe ſeiner Geneigtheit, in der es ſich mit ihm durch die Arbeit verband, nicht in der Hoffnung und einer ſpäten Wirklichkeit, ſondern hat in der Ehrenbezeugung und Darbringung der Gaben unmittelbar den Genuſs ſeines eignen Reichthumes und Putzes.
b. *Das lebendige Kunſtwerk*.
720 Das Volk, das in dem Cultus der Kunſtreligion ſich ſeinem Gotte naht, iſt das ſittliche Volk, das ſeinen Staat und die Handlungen deſſelben als den Willen und das Vollbringen ſeiner ſelbſt weiſs. Dieſer Geiſt, dem ſelbſtbewuſsten Volke 1807 670 gegenübertretend, iſt daher nicht das Lichtweſen, das ſelbſtlos nicht die Gewiſsheit der Einzelnen in ſich enthält; ſondern vielmehr nur ihr allgemeines Weſen und die herriſche Macht iſt, worin ſie verſchwinde… Der Cultus der Religion dieſes einfachen geſtaltloſen Weſens gibt ſeinen Angehörigen daher nur diſs im Allgemeinen zurück, daſs ſie das Volk ihres Gottes ſind; er erwirbt ihnen nur ihr Beſtehen und einfache Subſtanz überhaupt, nicht aber ihr wirkliches Selbſt, das vielmehr verworfen iſt. Denn ſie verehren ihren Gott als die leere Tiefe, nicht als Geiſt. Der Cultus aber der Kunſtreligion entbehrt andererſeits jener abſtracten Einfachheit des Weſens, und daher der Tiefe deſſelben. Das Weſen aber, das mit dem Selbſt unmittelbar geeinigt iſt, iſt an ſich der Geiſt und die wiſſende Wahrheit, ob zwar noch nicht die gewuſste, oder die ſich ſelbſt in ihrer Tiefe wiſſende. Weil das Weſen alſo hier das Selbſt an ihm hat, ſo iſt ſeine Erſcheinung dem Bewuſstseyn freundlich, und im Cultus erhält dieſes nicht nur die allgemeine Berechtigung ſeines Beſtehens, ſondern auch ſein in ihm ſelbſtbewuſstes Daſeyn; ſo wie umgekehrt das Weſen nicht in einem verworfnen Volke, deſſen Subſtanz nur anerkannt wird, ſelbſtloſe Wirklichkeit hat, ſondern in dem Volke, deſſen Selbſt in ſeiner Subſtanz anerkannt iſt.
721 Aus dem Cultus tritt alſo das in ſeinem Weſen befriedigte Selbſtbewuſstſeyn und der Gott eingekehrt in es als in ſeine Stätte. Dieſe Stätte iſt für ſich die Nacht der Subſtanz oder ihre reine Individualität, 1807 671 aber nicht mehr die geſpannte des Künſtlers, die noch nicht mit ihrem gegenſtändlich werdenden Weſen ſich ausgeſöhnt hat, ſondern die befriedigte Nacht, welche ihr Pathos unbedürftig an ihr hat, weil sie aus der Anſchauung, der aufgehobnen Gegenſtändlichkeit zurückkehrt. — Dieſes Pathos iſt für ſich das Weſen des Aufgangs, das aber nunmehr in ſich untergegangen iſt, und ſeinen Untergang, das Selbſtbewuſstſeyn und damit Daſeyn und Wirklichkeit an ihm ſelbſt hat. — Es hat hier die Bewegung ſeiner Verwirklichung durchlaufen. Sich aus ſeiner reinen Weſenheit herabſetzend zu einer gegenſtändlichen Naturkraft und deren Aeuſſerungen, iſt es ein Daſeyn für das Andere, für das Selbſt, von dem es verzehrt wird. Das ſtille Weſen der ſelbſtloſen Natur gewinnt in ſeiner Frucht die Stuffe, worin ſie, ſich ſelbſt zubereitend und verdaut, ſich dem ſelbſtiſchen Leben darbietet; ſie erreicht in der Nützlichkeit, gegeſſen und getrunken werden zu können, ihre höchſte Vollkommenheit; denn ſie iſt darin die Möglichkeit einer höhern Exiſtenz, und berührt das geiſtige Daſeyn; — theils zur ſtillkräftigen Subſtanz theils aber zur geiſtigen Gährung, iſt der Erdgeiſt in ſeiner Metamorphoſe dort zum weiblichen Principe der Ernährung, hier zum männlichen Principe der ſich treibenden Krafft des ſelbſtbewuſsten Daſeyns gediehen.
722 In dieſem Genuſſe iſt alſo jenes aufgehende Lichtweſen verrathen, was es iſt; er iſt das Myſterium 1807 672 deſſelben. Denn das Myſtiſche iſt nicht Verborgenheit eines Geheimniſſes oder Unwiſſenheit, ſondern beſteht darin, daſs das Selbſt ſich mit dem Weſen Eins weiſs, und dieſes alſo geoffenbart iſt. Nur das Selbſt iſt ſich offenbar, oder was offenbar iſt, iſt es nur in der unmittelbaren Gewiſsheit ſeiner. In dieſer aber iſt durch den Cultus das einfache Weſen geſetzt worden; es hat als brauchbares Ding nicht nur das Daſeyn, das geſehen, gefühlt, gerochen geſchmeckt wird, ſondern iſt auch Gegenſtand der Begierde, und wird durch den wirklichen Genuſs eins mit dem Selbſt und dadurch vollkommen an dieſes verrathen und ihm offenbar. — Dasjenige, von dem geſagt wird, es ſey der Vernunft, dem Herzen offenbar, iſt in der That noch geheim, denn es fehlt noch die wirkliche Gewiſsheit des unmittelbaren Daſeyns ſowohl die gegenſtändliche als die genieſſende welche in der Religion aber nicht nur die gedankenloſe unmittelbare, ſondern zugleich die rein wiſſende des Selbſts iſt.
723 Was hiemit durch den Cultus dem ſelbſtbewuſsten Geiſte in ihm ſelbſt offenbar geworden, iſt das einfache Weſen, als die Bewegung, theils aus ſeiner nächtlichen Verborgenheit herauf in das Bewuſstſeyn zu treten, deſſen ſtillernährende Subſtanz zu ſeyn, theils aber ſich ebenſo wieder in die unterirdiſche Nacht, in das Selbſt, zu verlieren und oben nur mit ſtiller Mutterſehnſucht zu verweilen. — Der lautre Trieb aber iſt das vielnahmige Lichtweſen des Aufgangs 1807 673 und ſein taumelndes Leben das von ſeinem abſtracten Seyn ebenso abgelaſſen, ſich zuerſt in das gegenſtändliche Daſeyn der Frucht befaſst, dann dem Selbſtbewuſstſeyn ſich hingebend, in ihm zur eigentlichen Wirklichkeit gelangt, — nun als ein Hauffen ſchwärmender Weiber umherſchweift, der ungebändigte Taumel der Natur in ſelbſtbewuſster Geſtalt.
724 Noch iſt aber dem Bewuſstſeyn nur der abſolute Geiſt, der dieſes einfache Weſen, und nicht der als der Geiſt an ihm ſelbſt iſt, verrathen, oder nur der unmittelbare Geiſt, der Geiſt der Natur. Sein ſelbſtbewuſstes Leben iſt daher nur das Myſterium des Brodes und des Weines, der Ceres und des Bacchus, nicht der andern, der eigentlich obern Götter, deren Individualität als weſentliches Moment das Selbſtbewuſstſeyns als ſolches in ſich ſchlieſst. Noch hat ſich ihm alſo der Geiſt als ſelbſtbewuſster Geiſt nicht geopfert, und das Myſterium des Brods und Weins iſt noch nicht Myſterium des Fleiſches und Blutes.
725 Dieſer unbefeſtigte Taumel des Gottes muſs ſich zum Gegenſtande beruhigen, und die Begeiſterung, die nicht zum Bewuſstseyn kam, ein Werk hervorbringen, das ihr, wie der Begeiſterung des vorhergehenden Künſtlers die Bildſäule, zwar als ein ebenſo vollendetes Werk gegenübertritt, aber nicht als ein an ihm lebloſes, ſondern als ein lebendiges Selbſt. — Ein ſolcher Cultus iſt das Feſt, das der Menſch zu ſeiner eignen Ehre ſich gibt, jedoch in 1807 674 einen ſolchen noch nicht die Bedeutung des abſoluten Weſens legt; denn das Weſen iſt ihm erſt offenbar, noch nicht der Geiſt; nicht als ſolches, das weſentlich menſchliche Geſtalt annimmt. Aber dieſer Cultus legt den Grund zu dieſer Offenbarung, und legt ihre Momente einzeln auseinander. So hier das abſtracte Moment der lebendigen Körperlichkeit des Weſens, wie vorhin die Einheit beyder in bewuſstloſer Schwärmerey. Der Menſch ſtellt alſo an die Stelle der Bildfäule ſich ſelbſt, als zur vollkommen freyen Bewegung erzogene und ausgearbeitete Geſtalt, wie jene die vollkommen freye Ruhe iſt. Wenn jeder einzelne wenigſtens als Fackelträger ſich darzuſtellen weiſs, ſo hebt ſich Einer aus ihnen hervor, der die geſtaltete Bewegung, die glatte Ausarbeitung und flüſſige Krafft aller Glieder iſt; — ein beſeeltes lebendiges Kunſtwerk, das mit ſeiner Schönheit die Stärke paart und dem der Schmuck, womit die Bildſäule geehrt wurde, als Preis ſeiner Krafft, und die Ehre unter ſeinem Volke, ſtatt des ſteinernen Gottes, die höchſte leibliche Darſtellung ihres Weſens zu ſeyn, zu Theil wird.
726 In den beyden Darſtellungen, die ſo eben vorkamen, iſt die Einheit des Selbſtbewuſstseyns und des geiſtigen Weſens vorhanden, es fehlt ihnen aber noch ihr Gleichgewicht. In der bacchiſchen Begeiſterung iſt das Selbſt auſſer ſich, in der ſchönen Körperlichkeit aber das geiſtige Weſen. Jene Dumpfheit des Bewuſstſeyns und ihr wildes Stammeln muſs in das 1807 675 klare Daſeyn der letztern, und die geiſtloſe Klarheit des letztern in die Innerlichkeit der Erſtern aufgenommen werden. Das vollkommne Element, worin die Innerlichkeit ebenſo äuſſerlich, als die Aeuſſerlichkeit innerlich iſt, iſt wieder die Sprache, aber weder die in ihrem Inhalte ganz zufällige und einzelne des Orakels, noch die empfindende und nur den einzelnen Gott preiſende Hymne, noch das inhaltslose Stammeln der bacchischen Raſerey. Sondern ſie hat ihren klaren und allgemeinen Inhalt gewonnen; ihren klaren Inhalt, denn der Künſtler hat ſich aus der erſten ganz ſubſtantiellen Begeiſterung heraus zur Geſtalt gearbeitet, die eignes in allen ſeinen Regungen von der ſelbſtbewuſsten Seele durchdrungenes und mitlebendes Daſeyn iſt; — ihren allgemeinen Inhalt, denn in dieſem Feſte, das die Ehre des Menſchen iſt, verschwindet die Einſeitigkeit der Bildſäulen, die nur einen Nationalgeiſt, einen beſtimmten Charakter der Göttlichkeit enthalten. Der ſchöne Fechter iſt zwar die Ehre ſeines beſondern Volkes, aber er iſt eine körperliche Einzelnheit, worin die Ausführlichkeit und Ernſt der Bedeutung, und der innere Charakter des Geiſtes, der das beſondere Leben, Anliegen, Bedürfniſſe und Sitten ſeines Volkes trägt, untergegangen iſt. In dieſer Entäuſſerung zur völligen Körperlichkeit hat der Geiſt die beſondern Eindrücke und Anklänge der Natur abgelegt, die er als der wirkliche Geiſt des Volks in ſich ſchloſs. Sein Volk iſt ſich 1807 676 daher nicht mehr ſeiner Beſonderheit in ihm, ſondern vielmehr der Ablegung derſelben und der Allgemeinheit ſeines menſchlichen Daſeyns bewuſst.
c. *Das geiſtige Kunſtwerk*.
727 Die Volksgeiſter, die der Geſtalt ihres Weſens in einem beſondern Thiere bewuſst werden, gehen in Einen zuſammen; ſo vereinigen ſich die beſondern ſchönen Volksgeiſter in Ein Pantheon, deſſen Element und Behausung die Sprache iſt. Die reine Anſchauung seiner ſelbſt als allgemeiner Menſchlichkeit hat an der Wirklichkeit des Volksgeiſtes die Form, daſs er ſich mit den andern, mit denen er durch die Natur Eine Nation ausmacht, zu einer gemeinſchaftlichen Unternehmung verbindet, und für dieſes Werk ein Geſammtvolk, und damit einen Geſammthimmel bildet. Dieſe Allgemeinheit, zu der der Geiſt in seinem Daseyn gelangt, iſt jedoch nur diese erſte, die von der Individualität des Sittlichen erſt ausgeht, ihre Unmittelbarkeit noch nicht überwunden, nicht Einen Staat aus diesen Völkerschaften gebildet hat. Die Sittlichkeit des wirklichen Volksgeiſtes beruht theils auf dem unmittelbaren Vertrauen der Einzelnen zu dem Ganzen ihres Volkes, theils auf dem unmittelbaren Antheil, den Alle, des Unterſchiedes von Ständen unerachtet, an den 1807 677 Entſchlüſſen und Handlungen der Regierung nehmen. In der Vereinigung, zunächſt nicht in eine bleibende Ordnung ſondern nur zu einer gemeinſamen Handlung, iſt jene Freyheit des Antheils Aller und Jeder einſtweilen auf die Seite geſtellt. Diese erſte Gemeinschaftlichkeit iſt daher mehr eine Versammlung der Individualitäten als die Herrschaft des abstracten Gedankens, der die Einzelnen ihres selbstbewuſsten Antheils an Willen und That des Ganzen berauben würde.
728 Die Versammlung der Volksgeister macht einen Kreis von Gestalten aus, der itzt die ganze Natur wie die ganze ſittliche Welt befaſst. Auch sie stehen unter dem Oberbefehl mehr des Einen, als seiner Oberherrschafft. Für sich sind sie die allgemeinen Substanzen deſſen, was das selbstbewuſste Wesen ansich ist und thut. Dieses aber macht die Krafft und zunächst den Mittelpunkt wenigstens aus, um den jene allgemeinen Wesen sich bemühen, der nur erst zufälligerweise ihre Geschäfte zu verbinden scheint. Aber die Rückkehr des göttlichen Wesens in das Selbstbewuſstſeyn ist es, die schon den Grund enthält, daſs dieses den Mittelpunkt für jene göttlichen Kräffte bildet, und die wesentliche Einheit zunächst unter der Form einer freundlichen äuſſerlichen Beziehung beyder Welten verbirgt.
729 Dieſelbe Allgemeinheit, welche diesem Inhalte zukommt, hat nothwendig auch die Form des 1807 678 Bewuſstseyns, in welcher er auftritt. Es ist nicht mehr das wirkliche Thun des Cultus, sondern ein Thun, das zwar noch nicht in den Begriff, sondern erst in die Vorstellung, in die synthetische Verknüpfung des selbstbewuſsten und des äuſſern Daseyns erhoben iſt. Das Daseyn dieser Vorstellung, die Sprache, iſt die erste Sprache, das Epos als ſolches, das den allgemeinen Inhalt, wenigstens als Vollſtändigkeit der Well, ob zwar nicht als Allgemeinheit des Gedankens enthält. Der Sänger ist der Einzelne und Wirkliche, aus dem als Subject dieser Welt sie erzeugt und getragen wird. Sein Pathos ist nicht die betäubende Naturmacht ſondern die Mnemosne, die Besinnung und gewordne Innerlichkelt, die Erinnerung des vorhin unmittelbaren Wesens. Er ist das in seinem Inhalte verschwindende Organ, nicht sein eignes Selbst gilt, sondern seine Muse, sein allgemeiner Gesang. Was aber in der That vorhanden ist, ist der Schluſs, worin das Extrem der Allgemeinheit, die Götterwelt, durch die Mitte der Besonderheit mit der Einzelnheit, dem Sänger, verknüpft ist. Die Mitte ist das Volk in seinen Helden, welche einzelne Menschen sind, wie der Sänger, aber nur vorgestellte und dadurch zugleich allgemeine, wie das freye Extrem der Allgemeinheit, die Götter.
730 In diesem Epos stellt sich also überhaupt dem Bewuſstseyn dar, was im Cultus an sich zu Stande kommt, die Beziehung des Göttlichen auf das Menschliche. Der Inhalt ist eine Handlung des seiner selbstbewuſsten Wesens. Das Handeln stört die Ruhe der 1807 679 Substanz und erregt das Wesen, wodurch seine Einfachheit getheilt und in die mannichfaltige Welt der natürlichen und sittlichen Kräffte aufgeschloſſen ist. Die Handlung ist die Verletzung der ruhigen Erde, die Grube, die durch das Blut beseelt, die abgeschiednen Geister hervorrufft, welche nach Leben durstend, es in dem Thun des Selbstbewuſstseyns erhalten. Das Geschäſſte, um welches die allgemeine Bemühung geht, bekommt die zwey Seiten, die selbstische, von einer Gesammtheit wirklicher Völker und den an ihrer Spitze stehenden Individualitäten, und die allgemeine, von ihren substantiellen Mächten voll bracht zu werden. Die Beziehung beyder aber bestimmte sich vorhin so, daſs sie die synthetische Verbindung des Allgemeinen und Einzelnen, oder das Vorſtellen ist. Von dieser Bestimmtheit hängt die Beurtheilung dieser Welt ab. — Das Verhältniſs beyder ist dadurch eine Vermischung, welche die Einheit des Thuns inconsequent vertheilt, und die Handlung überflüſſigerweise von der einen Seite zur andern herüberwirft. Die allgemeinen Mächte haben die Gestalt der Individualität und damit das Princip des Handelns an ihnen; ihr Wirken erscheint daher als ein ebenso freyes von ihnen ganz ausgehendes Thun, als das der Menschen. Ein und daſſelbe haben daher ebensowohl die Götter als die Menschen gethan. Der Ernst jener Mächte ist ein lächerlicher Ueberfluſs, da diese in der That die Krafft der handelnden Individualität sind; — und die Anstrengung und 1807 680 Arbeit dieser ist eine ebenso unnütze Bemühung, da jene vielmehr alles lenken. — Die übertägigen Sterblichen, die das Nichts sind, sind zugleich das mächtige Selbst, das die allgemeinen Wesen sich unterwirft, die Götter verletzt und ihnen überhaupt die Wirklichkeit und ein Intereſſe des Thuns verschafft; wie umgekehrt diese unmächtigen Allgemeinheiten, die sich von den Gaben der Menschen nähren und durch sie erst etwas zu thun bekommen, das natürliche Wesen und der Stoff aller Begebenheiten, und ebenso die sittliche Materie und das Pathos des Thuns sind. Wenn ihre elementarischen Naturen durch das freye Selbſt der Individualität erst in Wirklichkeit und bethätigtes Verhältniſs gebracht werden, so sind sie ebensosehr das Allgemeine, das sich dieser Verbindung entzieht, in seiner Bestimmung unbeschränkt bleibt und durch die unüberwindliche Elasticität seiner Einheit die Punctualität des Thatigen und seine Figurationen auslöscht, sich selbst rein erhält, und alles individuelle in seiner Flüſſigkeit auflöst.
731 Wie sie mit der entgegenstehenden selbstischen Natur in diese wiedersprechende Beziehung fallen, ebenso geräth ihre Allgemeinheit mit ihrer eignen Bestimmung und deren Verhältniſs zu andern in Widerstreit. Sie sind die ewigen schönen Individuen, die in ihrem eignen Daseyn ruhend, der Vergänglichkeit und fremder Gewalt enthoben sind. — Abei sie sind zugleich bestimmte Elemente, besondre 1807 681 Götter, die sich also zu andern verhalten. Aber das Verhältniſs zu andern, das nach seiner Entgegensetzung ein Streit mit ihnen ist, ist eine komische Selbstvergeſſenheit ihrer ewigen Natur. — Die Bestimmtheit ist in das göttliche Bestehen eingewurzelt und hat in seiner Begräntzung, die Selbstständigkeit der ganzen Individualität; durch diese verlieren ihre Charaktere zugleich die Schärfe der Eigenthümlichkeit und vermischen sich in ihrer Vieldeutigkeit. — Ein Zweck der Thätigkeit und ihre Thätigkeit selbst, da sie gegen ein Anderes, und somit gegen eine unbesiegbare göttliche Kraft gerichtet ist, ist ein zufälliges leeres Aufspreitzen, das ebenso zerflieſst und den anscheinenden Ernst der Handlung in ein gefahrloses, seiner selbst sichres Spiel ohne Resultat und Erfolg verwandelt. Wenn aber an der Natur ihrer Göttlichkeit das Negative oder die Bestimmtheit derselben nur als die Inconsequenz ihrer Thätigkeit und der Widerspruch des Zwecks und des Erfolgs erscheint, und jene selbstständige Sicherheit über das Bestimmte das Uibergewicht behält, so tritt ihr ebendadurch die reine Krafft des Negativen gegenüber und zwar als ihre letzte Macht, über welche sie nichts vermögen. Sie sind das Allgemeine und Positive gegen das einzelne Selbſt der Sterblichen, das nicht gegen ihre Macht aushält; aber das allgemeine Selbst schwebt darum über ihnen und über dieser ganzen Welt der Vorstellung, welcher der ganze Inhalt angehört; als die begrifflose Leere der Nothwendigkeit, — ein Geschehen, gegen 1807 682 das sie sich selbstlos und traurend verhalten, denn diese beſtimmten Naturen finden sich nicht in dieser Reinheit.
732 Diese Nothwendigkeit aber ist die Einheit des Begriffes, der die widersprechende Substantialität der einzelnen Momente unterworfen ist, worin die Inconsequenz und Zufälligkeit ihres Thuns sich ordnet und das Spiel ihrer Handlungen seinen Ernst und Werth an ihnen selbst erhält. Der Inhalt der Welt der Vorstellung spielt losgebunden für sich in der Mitte seine Bewegung, versammelt um die Individualität eines Helden, der aber in seiner Krafft und Schönheit sein Leben gebrochen fühlt und einem frühen Tod entgegensehend trauert. Denn die in sich feste und wirkliche Einzelnheit ist an die Extremität ausgeschloſſen, und in ihre Momente entzweyt, die sich noch nicht gefunden und vereint. Das eine Einzelne, das abstracte unwirkliche ist die Nothwendigkeit, die an dem Leben der Mitte nicht Antheil hat, so wenig als das andre, das wirkliche Einzelne, der Sänger, der sich auſſer ihm halt, und in seiner Vorstellung untergeht. Beyde Extreme müſſen sich dem Inhalte nähern; das eine, die Nothwendigkeit hat sich mit dem Inhalte zu erfüllen, das andre, die Sprache des Sängers, muſs Antheil an ihm haben; und der sich selbst vorher überlaſſene Inhalt, die Gewiſsheit und feste Bestimmung des Negativen an ihm erhalten.
1807 683
733 Diese höhere Sprache, die Tragödie, faſst also die Zerstreuung der Momente der wesentlichen und handelnden Welt näher zusammen; die Substanz des Göttlichen tritt nach der Natur des Begriffes in ihre Gestalten auseinander, und ihre Bewegung ist gleichfalls ihm gemäſs. In Ansehung der Form, hört die Sprache, dadurch daſs sie in den Inhalt hereintritt, auf, erzählend zu seyn, wie der Inhalt ein vorgestellter. Der Held ist selbst der sprechende, und die Vorstellung zeigt dem Zuhörer, der zugleich Zuschauer ist, selbstbewuſste Menschen, die ihr Recht und ihren Zweck, die Macht und den Willen ihrer Bestimmtheit wiſſen und zu sagen wiſſen. Sie sind Künstler, die nicht wie die das gemeine Thun im wirklichen Leben begleitende Sprache, bewuſstlos, natürlich und naiv das Aeuſſere ihres Entschluſſes und Beginnens ausſprechen, sondern das innre Wesen äuſſern, das Recht ihres Handelns beweisen, und das Pathos, dem ſie angehören, frey von zufälligen Umständen und von der Besonderheit der Persönlichkeiten in seiner allgemeinen Individualität, besonnen behaupten und bestimmt aussprechen. Das Daseyn dieser Charaktere sind endlich wirkliche Menschen, welche die Personen der Helden anlegen, und diese in wirklichem nicht erzählendem, sondern eignem Sprechen darstellen. So wesentlich es der Bildsäule ist, von Menschenhänden gemacht zu seyn, eben so wesentlich ist der Schauspieler seiner Maske, — nicht als äuſſerliche Bedingung, von der die Kunstbetrachtung abstrahiren müſſe, — oder insofern 1807 684 davon in ihr allerdings zu abstrahiren ist, so ist ebendiſs damit gesagt, daſs die Kunſt das wahre eigentliche Selbſt noch nicht in ihr enthält.
734 Der allgemeine Boden, worauf die Bewegung dieser aus dem Begriffe erzeugten Gestalten vorgeht, ist das Bewuſstſeyn der ersten vorstellenden Sprache und ihres selbstlosen auseinandergelaſſnen Inhalts. Es ist das gemeine Volk überhaupt, deſſen Weisheit in dem Chore des Alters zur Sprache kömmt; es hat an deſſen Krafftlosigkeit seinen Representanten, weil es selbst nur das positive und paſſive Material der ihm gegenübertretenden Individualität der Regierung ausmacht. Der Macht des Negativen entbehrend, vermag es den Reichthum und die bunte Fülle des göttlichen Lebens nicht zusammen zu halten und zu bändigen, sondern läſst es auseinanderlauffen, und preiſst jedes einzelne Moment als einen selbstſtändigen Gott, bald diesen, bald wieder einen andern, in seinen verehrenden Hymnen. Wo es aber den Ernst des Begriffes, wie er über diese Gestalten sie zertrümmernd einherschreitet, verspürt, und es zu sehen bekömmt, wie schlecht es seinen gepriesenen Göttern geht, die sich auf diesen Boden, worauf der Begriff herrscht, wagen, ist es nicht selbst die negative Macht, die handelnd eingreifft, sondern hält sich im selbstlosen Gedanken derselben, im Bewuſstseyn des fremden Schicksals, und bringt den leeren Wunsch der Beruhigung und die schwache Rede der Besänftigung herbey. In der Furcht vor den höhern Mächten, welche die unmittelbaren Arme der 1807 685 Substanz sind, vor ihrem Kampfe miteinander, und vor dem einfachen Selbst der Nothwendigkeit, das auch sie wie die Lebendigen, die an sie geknüpft sind, zermalmt; — in dem Mitleiden mit diesen, die es zugleich als daſſelbe mit sich selbst weiſs, ist für es nur der unthätige Schrecken dieser Bewegung, das ebenso hilflose Bedauern, und als Ende die leere Ruhe der Ergebung in die Nothwendigkeit, deren Werk nicht als die nothwendige Handlung des Charakters, und nicht als das Thun des absoluten Wesens in sich selbst erfaſst wird.
735 Auf diesem zuschauenden Bewuſstseyn als auf dem gleichgültigen Boden des Vorstellens tritt der Geist in seiner nicht zerstreuten Mannichfaltigkeit, sondern in der einfachen Entzweyung des Begriffes auf Seine Substanz zeigt sich daher nur in ihre zwey extremen Mächte auseinandergeriſſen. Diese elementarischen allgemeinen Wesen sind zugleich selbstbewuſste Individualitäten, — Helden, welche in eine dieser Mächten ihr Bewuſstseyn setzen, an ihr die Bestimmtheit des Charakters haben, und ihre Bethätigung und Wirklichkeit ausmachen. — Diese allgemeine Individualisirung steigt, wie erinnert, noch zur unmittelbaren Wirklichkeit des eigentlichen Daseyns herunter, und stellt sich einer Menge von Zuschauern dar, die an dem Chore ihr Gegenbild oder vielmehr ihre eigne sich ausſprechende Vorstellung hat.
736 Der Inhalt und die Bewegung des Geistes, der sich hier Gegenstand ist, ist bereits als die Natur und 1807 686 Realisirung der sittlichen Substanz betrachtet worden. In seiner Religion erlangt er das Bewuſstseyn über sich, oder stellt sich seinem Bewuſstseyn in seiner reinern Form und einfachern Gestaltung dar. Wenn also die sittliche Substanz sich durch ihren Begriff, ihrem Inhalte nach, in die beyden Mächte entzweytedie als göttliches und menschliches, oder unterirdisches und oberes Recht bestimmt wurden, — jenes die Familie, diſs die Staatsmacht, — und deren das erstere der weibliche, das andre der männliche Charakter war, so schränkt sich der vorher vielformige und in seinen Bestimmungen schwankende Götterkreis auf diese Mächte ein, die durch diese Bestimmung der eigenlichen Individualität genähert sind. Denn die frühere Zerstreuung des Ganzen in die vielfachen und abstracten Kräfte, die substantiirt erscheinen, ist die Auflösung des Subjects, das sie nur als Momente in seinem Selbst begreifft, und die Individualität iſt daher nur die oberflächliche Form jener Wesen. Umgehehrt iſt ein weiterer Unterschied der Charaktere, als der genannte, zur zufälligen und an sich äuſſerlichen Persönlichkeit zu rechnen.
737 Zugleich theilt sich das Wesen seiner Form oder dem Wiſſen nach. Der handelnde Geist tritt als Bewuſstseyn dem Gegenstande gegenüber, auf den es thätig, und der somit als das negative des Wiſſenden bestimmt ist; der handelnde befindet sich dadurch im Gegensatze des Wiſſens und Nichtwiſſens. Er nimmt aus seinem Charakter seinen Zweck und weiſs ihn 1807 687 als die sittliche Wesenheit; aber durch die Bestimmtheit des Charakters weiſs er nur die Eine Macht der Substanz, und die andre ist für ihn verborgen. Die gegenwärtige Wirklichkeit ist daher ein anderes anſich, und ein anderes für das Bewuſstseyn; das obere und das untere Recht erhalten in dieser Beziehung die Bedeutung der wiſſenden und dem Bewuſstseyn sich offenbarenden, und der sich verbergenden und im Hinterhalte lauernden Macht. Die Eine ist die Lichtseite, der Gott des Orakels, der nach seinem natürlichen Momente aus der alles beleuchtenden Sonne entsprungen, älles weiſs und offenbart, — Phöbus, und Zevs, der deſſen Vater iſt. Aber die Befehle dieses wahrredenden Gottes, und seine Bekanntmachungen deſſen, was ist, sind vielmehr trügerisch. Denn diſs Wiſſen iſt in seinem Begriffe unmittelbar das Nichtwiſſen, weil das Bewuſstseyn an sich selbst im Handeln dieser Gegensatz ist. Der, welcher die räthselhafte Sphinx selbſt aufzuschlieſsen vermochte, wie der kindlich Vertrauende, werden darum durch das, was der Gott ihnen offenbart, ins Verderben geschickt. Diese Prieſterin, aus der der schöne Gott spricht, ist nichts anders als die doppelſinnigen Schicksalsschweſtern, die durch ihre Verheiſſungen zum Verbrechen treiben, und in der Zweyzüngigkeit deſſen, was sie als Sicherheit angaben, den, der sich auf den offenbaren Sinn verlieſs, betriegen. Daher das Bewuſstseyn, das reiner iſt, als das letztere, das den Hexen glaubt, und besonnener 1807 688 und gründlicher als das erstere, das der Prieſterin und dem schönen Gotte traut, auf die Offenbarung, die der Geiſt des Vaters selbſt über das Verbrechen, das ihn mordete, machte, mit der Rache zaudert, und andre Beweise noch veranſtaltet, — aus dem Grunde, weil dieser offenbarende Geiſt auch der Teufel seyn könnte.
738 Diſs Miſstrauen iſt darum gegründet, weil das wiſſende Bewuſstseyn sich in den Gegensatz der Gewiſsheit seiner selbſt und des gegenſtändlichen Wesens setzt. Das Recht des sittlichen, daſs die Wirklichkeit nichts an ſich iſt im Gegensatze gegen das absolute Gesetz, erfährt, daſs sein Wiſſen einseitig, sein Gesetz nur Gesetz seines Charakters iſt, daſs es nur die eine Macht der Substanz ergriff. Die Handlung selbſt iſt diese Verkehrung des gewuſsten in sein Gegentheil, das Seyn, ist das Umschlagen des Rechts des Charakters und des Wiſſens in das Recht des entgegengesetzten, mit dem jenes im Wesen der Subſtanz verknüpft iſt, — in die Erinnye der andern feindlich erregten. Macht und Charakters. Diſs untre Recht sitzt mit Zevs auf dem Throne, und genieſst mit dem offenbaren Rechte und dem wiſſenden Gotte gleiches Ansehen.
739 Auf diese drey Wesen wird von der handelnden Individualität die Götterwelt des Chors eingeschränkt. Das Eine iſt die Subſtanz, ebensowohl die Macht des Heerdes und der Geiſt der Familienpietät, wie die allgemeine Macht des Staats und der 1807 689 Regierung. Indem der Subſtanz als solcher dieser Unterschied angehört, individualisirt er sich der Vorstellung nicht zu zwey unterschiednen Gestalten, sondern hat in der Wirklichkeit die zwey Personen seiner Charaktere. Hingegen der Unterschied des Wiſſens und Nichtwiſſens fällt in ein jedes der wirklichen Selbstbewuſstseyn — und nur in der Abſtraction, im Elemente der Allgemeinheit vertheilter sich an zwey individuelle Gestalten. Denn das Selbſt der Heros, hat nur Daseyn als ganzes Bewuſstseyn und iſt daher wesentlich der ganze Unterschied, der der Form angehört; aber seine Subſtanz iſt beſtimmt, und es gehört ihm nur die eine Seite des Unterschieds des Inhalts an. Daher erhalten die beyden Seiten des Bewuſstseyns, die in der Wirklichkeit keine getrennte, einer jeden eigne Individualität haben, in der Vorſtellung jede ihre besondere Geſtalt; die eine die des offenbarenden Gottes, die andre der sich verborgen haltenden Erinnye. Beyde genieſſen theils gleicher Ehre, theils iſt die Geſtalt der Subſtanz, Zevs, die Nothwendigkeit der Beziehung beyder aufeinander. Die Subſtanz iſt die Beziehung, daſs das Wiſſen für ſich iſt, aber seine Wahrheit an dem Einfachen, der Unterschied, wodurch das wirkliche Bewuſstseyn iſt, seinen Grund an dem ihn tilgenden innern Wesen, die sich klare Verſicherung der Gewiſsheit ihre Beſtätigung an der Vergeſſenheit hat.
740 Das Bewuſstseyn schloſs diesen Gegensatz durch das Handeln auf; nach dem offenbaren Wiſſen 1807 690 handelnd, erfährt es den Betrug deſſelben, und dem Inhalte nach dem Einen Attribute der Subſtanz ergeben, verletzte es das andre und gab diesem dadurch das Recht gegen sich. Dem wiſſenden Gotte folgend, ergriff es vielmehr das nicht offenbare, und büſst dafür, dem Wiſſen vertraut zu haben, deſſen Zweydeutigkeit, da sie seine Natur iſt, auch für es, und eine Warnung dafür vorhanden seyn muſste. Die Raserey der Prieſterin, die unmenschliche Geſtalt der Hexen, die Stimme des Baumes, des Vogels, der Traum u. ſ. f. sind nicht die Weisen, in welchen die Wahrheit erscheint, sondern warnende Zeichen des Betrugs, der Nichtbesonnenheit, der Einzelnheit und Zufälligkeit des Wiſſens. Oder was daſſelbe iſt, die entgegengesetzte Macht, die von ihm verletzt wird, iſt als ausgesprochenes Gesetz und geltendes Recht vorhanden; es sey das Gesetz der Familie oder des Staats; das Bewuſstseyn folgte dagegen dem eignen Wiſſen, und verbarg sich selbst das offenbare Die Wahrheit aber der gegeneinander auftretenden Mächte des Inhalts und Bewuſstſeyns iſt das Resultat, daſs beyde gleiches Recht und darum in ihrem Gegensatz, den das Handeln hervorbringt, gleiches Unrecht haben. Die Bewegung des Thuns erweiſt ihre Einheit in dem gegenseitigen Untergange beyder Mächte und der selbſtbewuſsten Charaktere. Die Versöhnung des Gegensatzes mit sich iſt die Lethe der Unterwelt im Tode, — oder die Lethe der Oberwelt, als Freysprechung, nicht von der Schuld, denn diese kann das Bewuſstſeyn, weil es 1807 691 handelte, nicht verlängnen, sondern vom Verbrechen und seine sühnende Beruhigung. Beyde sind die Vergeſſenheit, das Verschwundenseyn der Wirklichkeit und des Thuns der Mächte der Subſtanz, ihrer Individualitäten, und der Mächte des abſtracten Gedankens des Guten und des Bösen, denn keine für sich iſt das Wesen, sondern dieses iſt die Ruhe des Ganzen in sich selbſt, die unbewegte Einheit des Schicksals, das ruhige Daseyn und damit die Unthätigkeit und Unlebendigkeit der Familie und der Regierung, und die gleiche Ehre und damit die gleichgültige Unwirklichkeit Apolls und der Erinnye, und die Rückkehr ihrer Begeiſtung und Thätigkeit in den einfachen Zevs.
741 Dieses Schicksal vollendet die Entvölkerung des Himmels, — der gedankenlosen Vermischung der Individualität und des Wesens, — einer Vermischung, wodurch das Thun des Wesens als ein inconsequentes, zufälliges, seiner unwürdiges erscheint; denn dem Wesen nur oberflächlich anhängend iſt die Individualität die unwesentliche. Die Vertreibung solcher wesenlosen Vorſtellungen, die von Philosophen des Alterthums gefodert wurde, beginnt also schon in der Tragödie überhaupt dadurch, daſs die Eintheilung der Subſtanz von dem Begriffe beherrscht, die Individualität hiemit die wesentliche und die Beſtimmungen die absoluten Charaktere sind. Das Selbſtbewuſstſeyn, das in ihr vorgeſtellt iſt, kennt und anerkennt 1807 692 deſswegen nur Eine höchſte Macht, und diesen Zevs nur als die Macht des Staats oder des Heerdes, und im Gegensatze des Wiſſens nur als den Vater des zur Geſtalt werdenden Wiſſens des Besondern, — und als den Zevs des Eydes und der Erinnye, des Allgemeinen, im Verborgnen wohnenden Innern. Die weiter aus dem Begriffe in die Vorſtellung sich zerſtreuenden Momente, die der Chor nacheinander gelten läſst, sind hingegen nicht das Pathos des Helden, sondern sinken ihm zur Leidenschafft herunter, — zu zufälligen, wesenlosen Momenten, die der selbſtlose Chor wohl preiſst, aber die nicht fähig sind, den Charakter der Helden auszumachen, noch von ihnen als ihr Wesen ausgesprochen und geachtet zu werden.
742 Aber auch die Persönen des göttlichen Wesens selbſts, so wie die Charaktere seiner Subſtanz, gehen in die Einfachheit des Bewuſstlosen zusammen. Diese Nothwendigkeit hat gegen das Selbſtbewuſstseyn die Beſtimmung, die negative Macht aller auftretenden Geſtalten zu seyn, in ihr sich selbſt nicht zu erkennen, sondern darin vielmehr unterzugehen. Das Selbſt tritt nur den Charakteren zugetheilt auf, nicht als die Mitte der Bewegung. Aber das Selbſtbewuſstseyn, die einfache Gewiſsheit seiner, ist in der That die negative Macht, die Einheit des Zevs, des subſtantiellen Wesens, und der abſtracten Nothwendigkeit, es iſt die geiſtige Einheit, worein alles zurückgeht. Weil das wirkliche Selbſtbewuſstſeyn noch von der Subſtanz und dem Schicksale unterschieden wird, iſt es theils der Chor 1807 693 oder vielmehr die zuschauende Menge, welche diese Bewegung des göttlichen Lebens als ein Fremdes mit Furcht erfüllt, oder in der ſie als ein Nahes nur die Rührung des nicht handelnden Mitleidens hervorbringt. Theils insofern das Bewuſstseyn mithandelt und den Charakteren angehört, iſt diese Vereinigung, weil die wahre, die des Selbſts, des Schickſals und der Subſtanz noch nicht vorhanden iſt, eine äuſſerliche, eine Hyprokriſie; der Held, der vor dem Zuſchauer auftritt, zerfällt in seine Maske und in den Schauspieler, in die Person und das wirkliche Selbſt.
743 Das Selbſtbewuſstseyn der Helden muſs aus seiner Maske hervor treten, und sich darſtellen, wie es ſich als das Schickſal ſowohl der Götter des Chors, als der absoluten Mächte selbſt weiſs, und von dem Chore, dem allgemeinen Bewuſstseyn nicht mehr getrennt iſt.
744 Die Komödie hat also vorerſt die Seite, daſs das wirkliche Selbstbewuſstseyn ſich als das Schicksal der Götter darſtellt. Diese elementarischen Wesen sind als allgemeine Momente, kein Selbſt und nicht wirklich. Sie sind zwar mit der Form der Individualität ausgeſtattet, aber diese iſt ihnen nur eingebildet, und kommt ihnen nicht an und für sich selbſt zu; das wirkliche Selbſt hat nicht ein solches abſtractes Moment zu seiner Subſtanz und Inhalt. Es, das Subject, iſt daher über ein solches Moment, als über eine einzelne Eigenschafft erhoben, und angethan mit dieser Maske spricht es die Ironie derselben aus, die für sich etwas 1807 694 seyn will. Das Aufspreitzen der allgemeinen Wesenheit iſt an das Selbſt verrathen; es zeigt sich in einer Wirklichkeit gefangen und läſst die Maske fallen, eben indem es etwas rechtes seyn will. Das Selbſt hier in seiner Bedeutung als Wirkliches auftretend, spielt es mit der Maske, die es einmal anlegt, um seine Person zu seyn, — aber aus diesem Scheine thut es sich ebenso bald wieder in seiner eignen Nacktheit und Gewöhnlichkeit hervor, die es von dem eigentlichen Selbſt, dem Schauspieler so wie von dem Zuschauer, nicht unterschieden zu seyn zeigt.
745 Diese allgemeine Auflösung der geſtalteten Wesenheit überhaupt in ihrer Individualität wird in ihrem Inhalte ernſthafter und dadurch muthwilliger und bittrer, insofern er seine ernſtere und nothwendigere Bedeutung hat. Die göttliche Subſtanz vereinigt in ihr die Bedeutung der natürlichen und sittlichen Wesenheit. In Ansehung des Natürlichen zeigt das wirkliche Selbſtbewuſstseyn schon in der Verwendung deſſelben zu seinem Putze, Wohnung u. s. f. und im Schmauſſe seines Opfers sich als das Schicksal, dem das Geheimniſs verrathen iſt, welche Bewandniſs es mit der Selbſtwesenheit der Natur hat; in dem Myſterium des Brodes und Weines macht es dieselbe zusammen mit der Bedeutung des innern Wesens sich zu eigen, und in der Komödie iſt es sich der Ironie dieser Bedeutung überhaupt bewuſst. — Insofern nun diese Bedeutung die sittliche Wesenheit enthält, iſt sie theils das Volk, in seinen 1807 695 beyden Seiten, des Staats oder eigentlichen Demos, und der Familien-Einzelnheit; — theils aber das selbſtbewuſste reine Wiſſen, oder das vernünftige Denken des Allgemeinen. — Jener Demos, die allgemeine Maſſe, die sich als Herrn und Regent, so wie als den zu reſpectirenden Verſtand und Einsicht weiſs, zwingt und bethört sich durch die Besonderheit seiner Wirklichkeit, und ſtellt den lächerlichen Contraſt seiner Meynung von sich und seines unmittelbaren Daseyns, seiner Nothwendigkeit und Zufälligkeit, seiner Allgemeinheit und Gemeinheit dar. Wenn das Princip seiner vom Allgemeinen getrennten Einzelnheit, in der eigentlichen Geſtalt der Wirklichkeit, sich hervorthut und des Gemeinwesens’ deſſen geheimer Schaden es iſt, sich offenbar anmaſst und es einrichtet, so verräth sich unmittelbarer der Contraſt des Allgemeinen als einer Theorie und dessen, um was es in der Praxis zu thun iſt, die gänzliche Befreyung der Zwecke der unmittelbaren Einzelnheit von der allgemeinen Ordnung und der Spott jener über dieſe.
746 Das vernünftige Denken enthebt das göttliche Wesen seiner zufälligen Geſtalt, und entgegengesetzt der begrifflosen Weisheit des Chors, die mancherley Sittensprüche vorbringt, und eine Menge von Gesetzen und beſtimmten Pflicht- und Rechtsbegriffen gelten läſst, hebt es sie in die einfachen Ideen des Schönen und Guten empor. — Die Bewegung dieser 1807 696 Abſtraction iſt das Bewuſstseyn der Dialectik, welche diese Maximen und Gesetze an ihnen haben, und hiedurch des Verschwindens der absoluten Gültigkeit, in der sie vorher erschienen. Indem die zufällige Beſtimmung und oberflächliche Individualität, welche die Vorſtellung den göttlichen Wesenheiten lieh, verschwindet, haben sie nach ihrer natürlichen Seite nur noch die Naktheit ihres unmittelbaren Daseyns, sie sind Wolken, ein verschwindender Dunſt, wie jene Vorſtellungen. Nach ihrer gedachten Wesentlichkeit zu den einfachen Gedanken des Schönen und Guten geworden, vertragen diese es. mit jedem beliebigen Inhalt erfüllt zu werden. Die Krafft des dialektischen Wiſſens gibt die beſtimmten Gesetze und Maximen des Handelns, der Luſt und dem Leichtsinne der — hiemit — verführten Jugend Preis, und der Aengſtlichkeit und Sorge des auf die Einzelnheit des Lebens beschränkten Alters Waffen zum Betrug an die Hand. Die reinen Gedanken des Schönen und Guten zeigen also das komische Schauspiel, durch die Befreyung von der Meynung, welche sowohl ihre Beſtimmtheit als Inhalt, wie ihre absolute Beſtimmtheit, das Feſthalten des Bewuſstseyns enthält, leer, und ebendadurch das Spiel der Meynung und der Willkühr der zufälligen Individualität zu werden.
747 Hier iſt also das vorher bewuſstlose Schicksal, das in der leeren Ruhe und Vergeſſenheit beſteht, 1807 697 und von dem Selbstbewuſstseyn getrennt iſt, mit diesem vereint. Das einzelne Selbſt iſt die negative Kraft, durch und in welcher die Götter, so wie deren Momente, die daseyende Natur und die Gedanken ihrer Beſtimmungen, verschwinden; zugleich iſt es nicht die Leerheit des Verschwindens, sondern erhält sich in dieser Nichtigkeit selbſt, iſt bey sich und die einzige Wirklichkeit. Die Religion der Kunſt hat sich in ihm vollendet und iſt vollkommen in sich zurückgegangen. Dadurch daſs das einzelne Bewuſstseyn in der Gewiſsheit seiner selbſt es iſt, das als diese absolute Macht sich darſtellt, hat diese die Form eines Vorgeſtellten, von dem Bewuſstseyn überhaupt getrennten und ihm fremden, verloren, wie die Bildsäule, auch die lebendige schöne Körperlichkeit oder der Inhalt des Epos und die Mächte und Personen der Tragödie waren; — auch iſt die Einheit nicht die bewuſstlose des Cultus und der Myſterien; — sondern das eigentliche Selbſt des Schauspielers fällt mit seiner Person zusammen, so wie der Zuschauer, der in dem, was ihm vorgeſtellt wird, vollkommen zu Hause iſt und sich selbſt spielen sieht. Was diſs Selbſtbewuſstſeyn anschaut, iſt, daſs in ihm, was die Form von Wesenheit gegen es annimmt, in seinem Denken, Daseyn und Thun sich vielmehr auflöſt und preisgegeben iſt, es iſt die Rükkehr alles Allgemeinen in die Gewiſsheit seiner selbſt, die hiedurch diese vollkommne Furcht- und 1807 698 Wesenlosigkeit alles Fremden, und ein Wohlseyn und Sich-wohlseyn-laſſen des Bewuſstseyns iſt, wie sich auſſer dieser Komödie keins mehr findet.
1807 699
C. *Die offenbare Religion*.
748 Durch die Religion der Kunſt iſt der Geiſt aus der Form der Subſtanz in die des Subjects getreten, denn sie bringt seine Geſtalt hervor, und setzt also in ihr das Thun oder das Selbſtbewuſstseyn, das in der furchtbaren Subſtanz nur verschwindet, und im Vertrauen sich nicht selbſt erfaſst. Diese Menschwerdung des göttlichen Wesens geht von der Bildsäule aus, die nur die äuſſere Geſtalt des Selbſts an ihr hat, das innre aber, ihre Thätigkeit, fällt auſſer ihr; im Cultus aber sind beyde Seiten eins geworden, in dem Resultate der Religion der Kunſt iſt diese Einheit in ihrer Vollendung zugleich auch auf das Extrem des Selbſts herübergegangen; in dem Geiſte, der in der Einzelnheit des Bewuſstseyns seiner vollkommen gewiſs iſt, iſt alle Wesenheit versunken. Der Satz, der diesen Leichtsinn ausſpricht, lautet so: das Selbſt iſt das absolute Wesen; das Wesen, das Subſtanz und an 1807 700 dem das Selbst die Accidentalität war, iſt zum Prädicate heruntergesunken, und der Geiſt hat in diesem Selbſtbewuſstseyn, dem nichts in der Form des Wesens gegenübertritt, sein Bewuſstseyn verloren.
749 Dieser Satz: das Selbſt iſt das absolute Wesen, gehört, wie von selbſt erhellt, dem nichtreligiösen, dem wirklichen Geiſte an, und es iſt sich zu erinnern, welches die Geſtalt deſſelben iſt, die ihn ausdrückt. Sie wird zugleich die Bewegung und die Umkehrung desselben enthalten, welche das Selbſt zum Prädicate herunterſtimmt, und die Subſtanz zum Subjecte erhebt. So nämlich, daſs der umgekehrte Satz nicht an sich oder für uns die Subſtanz zum Subjecte macht, oder was daſſelbe iſt, die Subſtanz so wieder herſtellt, daſs das Bewuſstseyn des Geiſtes zu seinem Anfange, der natürlichen Religion zurückgeführt wird, sondern so daſs diese Umkehrung für und durch das Selbſtbewuſstseyn selbſt zu Stande gebracht wird. Indem dieses sich mit Bewuſstseyn aufgibt, so wird es in seiner Entäusserung erhalten, und bleibt das Subject der Subſtanz, aber als sich ebenso entäuſſertes hat es zugleich das Bewuſstseyn derselben; oder indem es durch seine Aufopferung die Subſtanz als Subject hervorbringt, bleibt dieses sein eignes Selbſt. Es wird hiedurch erreicht, daſs, wenn in den beyden Sätzen, — in dem der erſten Subſtantialität das Subject nur verschwindet, — und in dem zweyten die Subſtanz nur Prädicat iſt, und beyde Seiten also in jedem mit der entgegengesetzten Ungleichheit des Werthes vorhanden sind, — daſs die 1807 701 Vereinigung und Durchdringung beyder Naturen hervorgeht, in der beyde mit gleichem Werthe ebenso wesentlich, als auch nur Momente sind; hiedurch iſt also der Geiſt ebenso Bewuſstseyn seiner als seiner gegenſtändlichen Subſtanz, wie einfaches in sich bleibendes Selbſtbewuſstseyn.
750 Die Religion der Kunſt gehört dem sittlichen Geiſte an, den wir früher in dem Rechtszuſtande untergehen sahen, d. h. in dem Satze: das Selbſt als solches, die abſtracte Person iſt absolutes Wesen. Im sittlichen Leben iſt das Selbſt in dem Geiſte seines Volks versenkt, es iſt die erfüllte Allgemeinheit. Die einfache Einzelnheit aber erhebt sich aus diesem Inhalte, und ihr Leichtsinn reinigt sie zur Person zur abſtracten Allgemeinheit des Rechts. In dieser iſt die Realität des sittlichen Geiſts verloren, die inhaltsleeren Geiſter der Völkerindividuen sind in Ein Pantheon versammelt, nicht in ein Pantheon der Vorſtellung, deren unmächtige Form jeden gewähren läſst, sondern in das Pantheon der abſtracten Allgemeinheit, des reinen Gedankens, der sie entleibt, und dem geiſtlosen Selbſt, der einzelnen Person das an und fürsichseyn ertheilt.
751 Aber diſs Selbſt hat durch seine Leerheit den Inhalt freygelaſſen; das Bewuſstseyn iſt nur in sich das Wesen; sein eignes Daseyn, das rechtliche Anerkanntseyn der Person, iſt die unerfüllte Abſtraction; es besitzt also vielmehr nur den Gedanken seiner selbſt, oder wie es da iſt und sich als Gegenſtand weiſs, iſt es das unwirkliche. Es iſt daher nur die ſtoische 1807 702 *Selbſtſtändigkeit des Denkens, und diese findet durch die Bewegung des skeptischen Bewuſstseyns hindurchgehend, seine Wahrheit in derjenigen Geſtalt, die das unglückliche Selbſtbewuſstseyn genannt wurde.
752 Dieses weiſs, welche Bewandniſs es mit dem wirklichen Gelten der abſtracten Person und ebenso mit dem Gelten derselben in dem reinen Gedanken hat. Es weiſs ein solches Gelten vielmehr als den vollkommnen Verluſt, es selbſt iſt dieser seiner bewuſste Verluſt und die Entäuſſerung seines Wiſſens von sich. — Wir sehen, daſs diſs unglückliche Bewuſstseyn die Gegenseite und Vervollſtändigung des in sich vollkommen glücklichen, des komischen Bewuſstſeyns ausmacht. In das letztere geht alles göttliche Wesen zurück, oder es ist die vollkommne Entäuſſerung der Subſtanz. Jenes hingegen ist umgekehrt, das tragische Schicksal der an und fürsichseyn sollenden Gewiſsheit seiner selbſt. Es iſt das Bewuſstseyn des Verluſtes aller Wesenheit in dieser Gewiſsheit seiner und des Verluſtes eben dieses Wissens von sich — der Subſtanz wie des Selbſts, es iſt der Schmerz, der sich als das harte Wort ausspricht, daſs Gott geſtorben iſt.
753 In dem Rechtszuſtande iſt also die sittliche Welt und die Religiou derselben in dem komischen Bewuſstseyn versunken, und das unglückliche das Wissen dieses ganzen Verluſts. Sowohl der Selbſtwerth seiner unmittelbaren Persönlichkeit, iſt ihm verloren, als seiner vermittelten, der gedachten. Ebenso 1807 703 iſt das Vertrauen in die ewigen Gesetze der Götter, wie die Orakel, die das Besondre zu wiſſen thaten, verſtummt. Die Bildsäulen sind nun Leichname, denen die belebende Seele, so wie die Hymne Worte, deren Glauben entflohen iſt; die Tische der Götter ohne geiſtige Speise und Trank, und aus seinen Spielen und Feſten kommt dem Bewuſstseyn nicht die freudige Einheit seiner mit dem Wesen zurück. Den Werken der Muse fehlt die Krafft des Geiſtes, dem aus der Zermalmung der Götter und Menschen die Gewiſsheit seiner selbſt hervorging. Sie sind nun das, was ſie für uns sind, — vom Baume gebrochne schöne Früchte, ein freundliches Schicksal reichte sie uns dar, wie ein Mädchen jene Früchte präsentirt; es gibt nicht das wirkliche Leben ihres Daseyus, nicht den Baum, der sie trug, nicht die Erde und die Elemente, die ihre Subſtanz, noch das Klima, das ihre Beſtimmtheit ausmachte; oder den Wechsel der Iahreszeiten, die den Proceſs ihres Werdens beherrschten. — So gibt das Schicksal uns mit den Werken jener Kunſt, nicht ihre Welt, nicht den Frühling und Sommer des sittlichen Lebens, worin sie blühten und reifften, sondern allein die eingehüllte Erinnerung dieser Wirklichkeit. — Unser Thun in ihrem Genuſſe iſt daher nicht das gottesdienſtliche, wodurch unserem Bewuſstseyn seine vollkommne es ausfüllende Wahrheit würde, sondern es iſt das äuſſerliche Thun, das von diesen Früchten etwa 1807 704 Regentropfen oder Stäubchen abwischt, und an die Stelle der innern Elemente der umgebenden, erzeugenden und begeiſtenden Wirklichkeit des Sittlichen, das weitläufige Gerüſte der todten Elemente ihrer äuſſerlichen Exiſtenz, der Sprache, des Geschichtlichen u. s. f. errichtet, nicht um sich in sie hinein zu leben, sondern nur um sie in sich vorzuſtellen. Aber wie das Mädchen, das die gepflückten Früchte darreicht, mehr iſt, als die in ihre Bedingungen und Elemente, den Baum, Lufft, Licht u. s. f. ausgebreitete Natur derselben, welche sie unmittelbar darbot, indem es auf eine höhere Weise diſs alles in den Strahl des selbſtbewuſsten Auges und der darreichenden Gebehrde zusammenfaſst, so iſt der Geiſt des Schicksals, der uns jene Kunſtwerke darbietet, mehr als das sittliche Leben und Wirklichkeit jenes Volkes, denn er iſt die Er-Innerung des in ihnen noch veräuſſerten Geiſtes, — er iſt der Geiſt des tragischen Schicksals, das alle jene individuelle Götter und Attribute der Subſtanz in das Eine Pantheon versammelt, in den seiner als Geiſt selbſtbewuſsten Geiſt.
754 Alle Bedingungen seines Hervorgangs sind vorhanden, und diese Totalität seiner Bedingungen macht das Werden, den Begriff, oder das ansichseyende Hervorgehen deſſelben aus. — Der Kreis der Hervorbringungen der Kunſt umfaſst die Formen der Entäuſſerungen der absoluten Subſtanz, sie iſt in der Form der Individualität, als ein Ding, als seyender Gegenſtand 1807 705 des sinnlichen Bewuſstseyns, — als die reine Sprache oder das Werden der Geſtalt, deren Daseyn nicht aus dem Selbſt heraustritt, und rein verschwindender Gegenſtand iſt; — als unmittelbare Einheit mit dem allgemeinen Selbſtbewuſstseyn in seiner Begeiſterung und als vermittelte in dem Thun des Cultus; — als schöne selbſtische Körperlichkeit, und endlich als das in die Vorſtellung erhobne Daseyn und die Ausbreitung deſſelben zu einer Welt, die sich zuletzt in die Allgemeinheit, die ebenso reine Gewiſsheit ihrer selbſt ist, zusammennimmt. — Dieſe Formen, und auf der andern die Welt der Person und des Rechts, die verwüſtende Wildheit der freygelaſſenen Elemente des Inhalts, ebenso die gedachte Person des Stoicismus und die baltlose Unruhe des ſkeptiſchen Bewuſstseyns, machen die Peripherie der Geſtalten aus, welche erwartend und drängend um die Geburtsſtätte des als Selbstbewuſstseyn werdenden Geiſtes umherſtehen, der alle durchdringende Schmerz und Sehnsucht des unglücklichen Selbstbewuſstseyns iſt ihr Mittelpunkt und das gemeinſchaftliche Geburtswehe ſeines Hervorgangs, — die Einfachheit des reinen Begriffs, der jene Geſtalten als ſeine Momente enthält.
755 Er hat die zwey Seiten an ihm, die oben als die beyden umgekehrten Sätze vorgeſtellt sind; die eine iſt dieſe, daſs die Subſtanz sich ihrer selbſt entäuſſert und zum Selbſtbewuſstſeyn wird, die andre umgekehrt, daſs das Selbſtbewuſstſeyn ſich ſeiner 1807 706 entäuſſert und zur Dingheit oder zum allgemeinen Selbſt macht. Beyde Seiten sind sich auf dieſe Weiſe entgegen gekommen, und hiedurch ihre wahre Vereinigung entſtanden. Die Entäuſſerung der Subſtanz, ihr Werden zum Selbſtbewuſstſeyn drückt den Uebergang ins Entgegengeſetzte, den bewuſsiloſen Uebergang der Nothwendigkeit, oder diſs aus, daſs sie an sich Selbſtbewuſstſeyn iſt. Umgekehrt, die Entäuſſerung des Selbſtbewuſsſeyns diſs, daſs es an sich das allgemeine Weſen ist, oder weil das Selbſt das reine Fürsichſeyn iſt, das in seinem Gegentheile bey sich bleibt, diſs, daſs für es es iſt, daſs die Subſtanz Selbſtbewuſstseyn, und ebendadurch Geiſt iſt. Es kann daher von dieſem Geiſte, der die Form der Subſtanz verlaſſen, und in der Geſtalt des Selbſtbewuſstseyns in das Daſeyn tritt, geſagt werden, — wenn man sich der aus der natürlichen Zeugung hergenommenen Verhältniſſe bedienen will, — daſs er eine wirkliche Mutter, aber einen anſichſeyenden Vater hat; denn die Wirklichkeit oder das Selbstbewuſstseyn, und das Anſich als die Substanz sind seine beyden Momente, durch deren gegenseitige Entäuſſerung, jedes zum andern werdend, er als diese ihre Einheit ins Daseyn tritt.
756 Inſofern das Selbſtbewuſstſeyn einſeitig nur seine eigne Entäuſſerung erfaſst, wenn ihm ſchon ſein Gegenstand alſo ebensowohl Seyn als Selbſt iſt und es alles Daſeyn als geiſtiges Wesen weiſs, ſo ist dadurch dennoch noch nicht für es der wahre Geiſt geworden, inſofern nemlich das Seyn überhaupt oder 1807 707 die Substanz nicht an ſich ebenso ihrerseits ſich ihrer ſelbst entäuſſerte und zum Selbſtbewuſstſeyn wurde. Denn alsdann ist alles Daſeyn nur vom Standpunkte des Bewuſstſeyns aus geiſtiges Weſen, nicht an sich selbſt. Der Geiſt iſt auf diese Weiſe dem Daſeyn nur eingebildet; dieſes Einbilden iſt die Schwärmerei, welche der Natur sowohl, als der Geschichte, wie der Welt so den mythiſchen Vorstellungen der vorhergehenden Religionen einen andern innern Sinn unterlegt, als sie in ihrer Erscheinung dem Bewuſstſeyn unmittelbar darbieten, und in Anſehung der Religionen, als das Selbstbewuſstseyn, deſſen Religionen sie waren, darin wuſste. Aber diese Bedeutung ist eine geliehene, und ein Kleid, das die Blöſſe der Erſcheinung nicht bedeckt und sich keinen Glauben und Verehrung erwirbt, ſondern die trübe Nacht und eigne Verzückung des Bewuſstſeyns bleibt.
757 Daſs diese Bedeutung des Gegenſtändlichen also nicht bloſſe Einbildung ſey, muſs sie an. ſich ſeyn, das heiſst, einmal dem Bewuſstſeyn aus dem Begriffe entſpringen und in ihrer Nothwendigkeit hervorgehen. So iſt uns durch das Erkennen des unmittelbaren Bewuſstſeyns, oder des Bewuſstſeyns des ſeyenden Gegenſtandes durch ſeine nothwendige Bewegung der ſich ſelbst wiſſende Geiſt entſprungen. Dieſer Begriff, der als unmittelbarer auch die Gestalt der Unmittelbarkeir für ſein Bewuſstſeyn hatte, hat ſich zweytens die Gestalt des Selbstbewuſstſeyns an ſich d. h. nach eben der 1807 708 Nothwendigkeit des Begriffes gegeben, als das Seyn oder die Unmittelbarkeit, die der innhaltslose Gegenstand des sinnlichen Bewuſstſeyns ist, sich ſeiner entäuſſert, und Ich für das Bewuſstſeyn wird. — Von dem denkenden Anſich oder dem Erkennen der Nothwendigkeit ist aber das unmittelbare Anſich oder die ſeyende Nothwendigkeit ſelbst unterſchieden; — ein Unterſchied, der zugleich aber nicht auſſer dem Begriffe liegt, denn die einfache Einheit des Begriffes ist das unmittelbare Seyn ſelbst; er ist ebenso das sich ſelbst entäuſſernde oder das Werden der angeſchauten Nothwendigkeit, als er in ihr bey sich ist und sie weiſs und begreift. — Das unmittelbare Anſich des Geistes, der sich die Gestalt des Selbstbewuſstſeyns gibt, heiſst nichts anderes, als daſs der wirkliche Weltgeist zu dieſem Wiſſen von ſich gelangt ist; dann erst tritt diſs Wiſſen auch in sein Bewuſstſeyn, und als Wahrheit ein. Wie jenes geſchehen, hat ſich oben ergeben.
758 Diſs daſs der absolute Geist sich die Gestalt des Selbstbewuſstſeyns an ſich und damit auch für sein Bewuſstſeyn gegeben, erſcheint nun so, daſs es der Glauben der Welt ist, daſs der Geist als ein Selbstbewuſstseyn d. h. als ein wirklicher Mensch da iſt, daſs er für die unmittelbare Gewiſsheit ist, daſs das glaubende Bewuſstseyn diese Göttlichkeit ſieht und fühlt und hört. So iſt es nicht Einbildung, ſondern es iſt wirklich an dem. Das Bewuſstseyn geht dann nicht aus ſeinem Innern, von dem Gedanken aus, und schlieſst in sich den Gedanken des Gottes mit dem 1807 709 Daseyn zuſammen, sondern es geht von dem unmittelbaren gegenwärtigen Daseyn aus, und erkennt den Gott in ihm. — Das Moment des unmittelbaren Seyns ist in dem Inhalte des Begriffes so vorhanden, daſs der religiöse Geist in der Rückkehr aller Wesenheit in das Bewuſstseyn, einfaches positives Selbſt geworden iſt, ebenso wie der wirkliche Geist als solcher im unglücklichen Bewuſstseyn eben diese einfache ſelbſtbewuſste Negativität. Das Selbſt des daseyenden Geistes hat dadurch die Form der vollkommnen Unmittelbarkeit; es iſt weder als gedachtes oder vorgestelltes noch hervorgebrachtes gesetzt, wie es mit dem unmittelbaren Selbst theils in der natürlichen theils in der Kunst-Religion der Fall ist. Sondern dieser Gott wird unmittelbar als Selbſt, als ein wirklicher einzelner Mensch, sinnlich angeschaut; ſo nur iſt er Selbſtbewuſstseyn.
759 Diese Menſchwerdung des göttlichen Weſens, oder daſs es weſentlich und unmittelbar die Gestalt des Selbſtbewuſstseyns hat, ist der einfache Inhalt der absoluten Religion. In ihr wird das Wesen als Geist gewuſst, oder sie ist sein Bewuſstseyn über sich, Geist zu seyn. Denn der Geist ist das Wiſſen seiner selbst in seiner Entäuſſerung; das Wesen, das die Bewegung ist, in seinem Andersſeyn die Gleichheit mit sich selbſt zu behalten. Diſs aber ist die Subſtanz, insoſern sie in ihrer Accidentalität ebenso in sich reflectirt, nicht dagegen als gegen ein unwesentliches und somit in einem fremden sich 1807 710 befindendes gleichgültig, sondern darin in sich, d. h. insofern sie Subject oder Selbſt iſt. — In dieser Religion ist deſswegen das göttliche Wesen geoffenbart. Sein Offenbarseyn besteht offenbar darin, daſs gewuſst wird, was es ist. Es wird aber gewuſst, eben indem es als Geist gewuſst wird, als Wesen, das wesentlich Selbſtbewuſstseyn iſt. — Dem Bewuſstseyn ist in seinem Gegenſtand dann etwas geheim, wenn er ein Anderes oder Fremdes für es ist, und wenn es ihn nicht als sich selbſt weiſs. Diſs Geheimseyn hört auf, indem das absolute Wesen als Geiſt Gegenstand des Bewuſstseyns iſt; denn so ist er als Selbſt in seinem Verhältniſſe zu ihm; d. h. dieses weiſs unmittelbar sich darin, oder es ist sich in ihm offenbar. Es selbst ist sich nur in der eignen Gewiſsheit seiner offenbar; jener sein Gegenstand iſt das Selbſt, das Selbſt aber iſt kein Fremdes, sondern die untrennbare Einheit mit sich, das unmittelbar allgemeine. Es iſt der reine Begriff, das reine Denken oder Fürſichſeyn, das unmittelbar Seyn, und damit Seyn für anderes, und als dieſes Seyn für anderes unmittelbar in sich zurückgekehrt, und bey sich ſelbſt; es iſt alſo das wahrhaft und allein offenbare. Das Gütige, Gerechte, Heilige, Schöpfer Himmels und der Erde u. s. f. sind Prädicate eines Subjects, — allgemeine Momente, die an diesem Puncte ihren Halt haben, und nur erſt im Rückgehen des Bewuſstseyns ins Denken sind. — Indem sie gewuſst werden, ist ihr Grund und Wesen, das Subject selbst, noch nicht offenbar 1807 711 und ebenſo ſind die Beſtimmungen des Allgemeinen, nicht diſs Allgemeine ſelbſt. Das Subject ſelbſt, und damit auch diſs reine Allgemeine iſt aber oſſenbar als Selbſt, denn diſs iſt eben diſs in ſich reflectirte Innre, das unmittelbar da, und die eigne Gewiſsheit desjenigen Selbſts iſt, für welches es da ist. Diſs — seinem Begriffe nach das offenbare zu ſeyn, — ist alſo die wahre Geſtalt des Geiſtes, und dieſe ſeine Geſtalt, der Begriff, iſt ebenso allein ſein Weſen und Subſtanz. Er wird gewuſst als Selbſtbewuſstseyn und iſt dieſem unmittelbar offenbar, denn er iſt dieſes ſelbſt; die göttliche Natur iſt daſſelbe, was die menschliche ist, und dieſe Einheit iſt es, die angeſchaut wird.
760 Hier alſo iſt in der That das Bewuſstſeyn oder die Weiſe, wie das Weſen für es ſelbſt iſt, ſeine Geſtalt, ſeinem Selbſtbewuſstſeyn gleich; dieſe Geſtalt iſt selbſt ein Selbſtbewuſstſeyn; ſie iſt damit zugleich ſeyender Gegenſtand und dieſes Seyn hat ebenso unmittelbar die Bedeutung des reinen Denkens, des abſoluten Weſens. — Das absolute Weſen, welches als ein wirkliches Selbſtbewuſstſeyn da iſt, ſcheint von ſeiner ewigen Einfachheit herabgeſtiegen zu ſeyn, aber in der That hat es damit erſt ſein höchſtes Weſen erreicht. Denn der Begriff des Weſens, erſt indem er ſeine einfache Reinheit erlangt hat, iſt er die abſolute Abſtraction welche reines Denken und damit die reine Einzelnheit des Selbſts, ſo wie um ſeiner Einfachheit willen das Unmittelbare oder Seyn ist. — Was das ſinnliche Bewuſstseyn genannt wird, iſt eben dieſe reine Abſtraction, 1807 712 es iſt diſs Denken, für welches das Seyn, das Unmittelbare iſt. Das niedrigſte iſt alſo zugleich das höchſte, das ganz an die Oberfläche herausgetretene Offenbare iſt eben darin das Tiefſte. Daſs das höchſte Weſen als ein ſeyendes Selbſtbewuſstſeyn geſehen, gehört u. s. f. wird, diſs iſt also in der That die Vollendung ſeines Begriffes; und durch dieſe Vollendung iſt das Weſen ſo unmittelbar da, als es Weſen iſt.
761 Diſs unmittelbare Daſeyn iſt zugleich nicht allein und bloſs unmittelbares Bewuſstſeyn, ſondern es iſt religiöſes Bewuſstſeyn; die Unmittelbarkeit hat ungetrennt die Bedeutung nicht nur eines ſeyenden Selbſtbewuſstſeyns, ſondern des rein gedachten oder abſoluten Weſens. Weſſen wir uns in unſerem Begriffe bewuſst ſind, daſs das Seyn Weſen iſt, iſt das religiöſe Bewuſstſeyn ſich bewuſst. Dieſe Einheit des Seyns und Weſens, des Denkens, das unmittelbar Daſeyn iſt, iſt wie es der Gedanke dieſes religiöſen Bewuſstſeyns oder ſein vermitteltes Wiſſen iſt, ebenſo ſein unmittelbares Wiſſen; denn dieſe Einheit des Seyns und Denkens iſt das Selbſtbewuſstſeyn, und iſt ſelbſt da, oder die gedachte Einheit hat zugleich dieſe Geſtalt deſſen, was ſie iſt. Gott iſt alſo hier offenbar, wie er iſt; er iſt ſo da, wie er an ſich iſt; er iſt da, als Geiſt. Gott iſt allein im reinen ſpeculativen Wiſſen erreichbar, und iſt nur in ihm und iſt nur es ſelbſt, denn er iſt der Geiſt; und dieſes ſpeculative Wiſſen iſt das Wiſſen der offenbaren Religion. Jenes weiſs ihn als Denken oder reines Weſen, und diſs Denken als Seyn und als 1807 713 Daſeyn, und das Daſeyn als die Negativität ſeiner ſelbſt hiemit als Selbſt, dieſes und allgemeines Selbſt; ebendiſs weiſs die offenbare Religion. — Die Hoffnungen und Erwartungen der vorhergehenden Welt drängten ſich allein auf dieſe Offenbarung hin, anzuſchauen, was das abſolute Weſen iſt, und ſich ſelbſt in ihm zu finden; dieſe Freude wird dem Selbſtbewuſstſeyn und ergreifſt die ganze Welt, im abſoluten Weſen ſich zu ſchauen, denn es iſt Geiſt, es iſt die einfache Bewegung jener reinen Momente, die diſs ſelbſt ausdrükt, daſs das Weſen dadurch erſt, daſs es als unmittelbares Selbſtbewuſstſeyn angeſchaut wird, als Geiſt gewuſst wird.
762 Dieſer Begriff des ſelbſt ſich ſelbſt als Geiſt wiſſenden Geiſtes iſt ſelbſt der unmittelbare, und noch nicht entwickelt. Das Weſen iſt Geiſt, oder es iſt erſchienen, es iſt offenbar; diſs erſte Offenbarſeyn iſt ſelbſt unmittelbar; aber die Unmittelbarkeit ist ebenso reine Vermittlung oder Denken; ſie muſs daher an ihr ſelbſt als ſolcher diſs darstellen. — Bestimmter diſs betrachtet, ſo ist der Geist in der Unmittelbarkeit des Selbſtbewuſstſeyns dieſes einzelne Selbſtbewuſstſeyn, dem allgemeinen entgegengeſetzt; er ist ausſchlieſſendes Eins, das für das Bewuſstſeyn, für welches es da ist, die noch unaufgelöste Form eines ſinnlichen Andern hat; dieſes weiſs den Geiſt noch nicht als den ſeinen, oder der Geist ist noch nicht wie er einzelnes Selbst ist, ebenſowohl als allgemeines, als Alles Selbſt da. Oder die Gestalt hat noch nicht die Form des Begriffs; d. h. des 1807 714 allgemeinen Selbſts, des Selbſts, das in seiner unmittelbaren Wirklichkeit ebenso aufgehobnes, Denken, Allgemeinheit iſt, ohne in dieſer jene zu verlieren. — Die nächste und selbſt unmittelbare Form dieſer Allgemeinheit ist aber nicht ſchon die Form des Denkens ſelbſts, des Begriffes als Begriffes, ſondern die Allgemeinheit der Wirklichkeit, die Allheit der Selbſt, und die Erhebung des Daſeyns in die Vorſtellung; wie überall, und um ein bestimmtes Beyſpiel anzuführen, das aufgehobne ſinnliche Dieſes, erſt das Ding der Wahrnehmung, noch nicht das Allgemeine des Verſtandes iſt.
763 Dieſer einzelne Menſch alſo, als welcher das abſolute Wesen offenbar iſt, vollbringt an ihm als Einzelnem die Bewegung des finnlichen Seyns. Er iſt der unmittelbar gegenwärtige Gott; dadurch geht ſein Seyn in Geweſenſeyn über. Das Bewuſstſeyn, für welches er dieſe ſinnliche Gegenwart hat, hört auf, ihn zu ſehen, zu hören; es hat ihn geſehen und gehört; und erſt dadurch, daſs es ihn nur geſehen, gehört hat, wird es ſelbſt geiſtiges Bewuſstſeyn oder wie er vorher als ſinnliches Daſeyn für es auſſtand, ist er itzt im Geiſte aufgestanden. — Denn als solches, das ihn ſinnlich ſieht und hört, ist es ſelbst nur unmittelbares Bewuſstseyn, das die Ungleichheit der Gegenständlichkeit nicht aufgehoben, nicht ins reine Denken zurückgenommen hat, ſondern dieſen gegenſtändlichen Einzelnen, nicht aber ſich ſelbst als Geist weiſs. In dem Verſchwinden des unmittelbaren Daſeyns des als 1807 715 abſoluten Weſens gewuſsten erhält das Unmittelbare ſein negatives Moment; der Geist bleibt unmittelbares Selbst der Wirklichkeit, aber als das allgemeine Selbſtbewuſstſeyn der Gemeine, das in ſeiner eignen Substanz ruht, ſo wie dieſe in ihm allgemeines Subject ist; nicht der Einzelne für ſich, sondern zusammen mit dem Bewuſstseyn der Gemeine, und das was er für dieſe ist, iſt das vollständige Ganze deſſelben.
764 Vergangenheit und Entfernung ſind aber nur die unvollkommne Form, wie die unmittelbare Weiſe vermittelt oder allgemein geſetzt ist; dieſe ist nur oberflächlich in das Element des Denkens getaucht, ist als ſinnliche Weiſe darin aufbewahrt, und mit der Natur des Denkens ſelbst nicht in Eins geſetzt. Es ist nur in das Vorſtellen erhoben, denn diſs ist die ſynthetiſche Verbindung der ſinnlichen Unmittelbarkeit, und ihrer Allgemeinheit oder des Denkens.
765 Diese Form des Vorſtellens macht die Bestimmtheit aus, in welcher der Geist in dieſer ſeiner Gemeine, ſeiner bewuſst wird. Sie iſt noch nicht das zu ſeinem Begriffe als Begriffe gediehene Selbſtbewuſstſeyn deſſelben; die Vermittelung ist noch unvollendet. Es ist alſo in dieſer Verbindung des Seyns und Denkens der Mangel vorhanden, daſs das geistige Wesen noch mit einer unversöhnten Entzweyung in ein Diſſeits und Jenſeits behaftet ist. Der Inhalt ist der wahre, aber alle seine Momente haben in dem Elemente des Vorstellens geſetzt, den Charakter, nicht begriffen zu ſeyn, ſondern als 1807 716 vollkommen ſelbstständige Seiten zu erscheinen, die sich äusserlich aufeinander beziehen. Daſs der wahre Inhalt auch ſeine wahre Form für das Bewuſstſeyn erhalte, dazu ist die höhere Bildung des letztern nothwendig, ſeine Anſchauung der abſoluten Substanz in den Begriff zu erheben, und für es ſelbſt ſein Bewuſstſeyn mit ſeinem Selbstbewuſstſeyn auszugleichen, wie diſs für uns oder an ſich geſchehen ist.
766 Dieſer Inhalt ist in der Weiſe, wie er in ſeinem Bewuſstſeyn ist, zu betrachten. — Der abſolute Geist ist Inhalt, ſo ist er in der Gestalt ſeiner Wahrheit. Aber ſeine Wahrheit ist nicht nur die Substanz der Gemeinde, oder das Anſich derſelben zu ſeyn, noch auch nur aus dieſer Innerlichkeit in die Gegenständlichkeit des Vorſtellens heraufzutreten, ſondern wirkliches Selbst zu werden, ſich in ſich zu reflectiren und Subject zu seyn. Diſs ist also die Bewegung, welche er in seiner Gemeine vollbringt, oder diſs ist das Leben deſſelben. Was dieſer ſich offenbarende Geist an und für ſich ist, wird daher nicht dadurch herausgebracht, daſs ſein reiches Leben in der Gemeine, gleichſam aufgedreht und auf ſeinen erſten Faden zurückgeführt wird, etwa auf die Vorstellungen der ersten unvollkommnen Gemeine, oder gar auf das, was der wirkliche Mensch gesprochen hat. Dieſer Zurückführung liegt der Instinct zu Grunde, auf den Begriff zu gehen; aber sie verwechselt den Ursprung als das unmittelbare Daseyn der ersten Erscheinung mit der Einfachheit des 1807 717 *Begriffes. Durch diese Verarmung des Lebens des Geistes, durch das Wegräumen der Vorstellung der Gemeine und ihres Thuns gegen ihre Vorstellung, entsteht daher statt des Begriffes vielmehr die bloſſe Aeuſſerlichkeit und Einzelnheit, die geschichtliche Weiſe der unmittelbaren Erscheinung und die geistlose Erinnerung einer einzelnen gemeynten Gestalt und ihrer Vergangenheit.
767 Der Geist ist Inhalt ſeines Bewuſstseyns zuerst in der Form der reinen Subſtanz, oder ist Inhalt seines reinen Bewuſstſeyns. Diſs Element des Denkens ist die Bewegung, zum Daſeyn oder der Einzelnheit herunter zu steigen. Die Mitte zwiſchen ihnen ist ihre ſynthetiſche Verbindung, das Bewuſstſeyn des Anderswerdens oder das Vorstellen als ſolches. Das dritte ist die Rückkehr aus der Vorstellung und dem Andersſeyn oder das Element des Selbstbewuſstſeyns ſelbst. — Dieſe drey Momente machen den Geist aus; ſein Auseinandertreten in der Vorstellung besteht darin, auf eine beſtimmte Weise zu seyn; dieſe Bestimmtheit aber ist nichts anderes, als eines ſeiner Momente. Seine ausführliche Bewegung ist alſo diese, in jedem seiner Momente, als in einem Elemente ſeine Natur auszubreiten; indem jeder dieſer Kreiſe ſich in ſich vollendet, ist diese seine Reflexion in ſich zugleich der Uebergang in den Andern. Die Vorſtellung macht die Mitte zwiſchen dem reinen Denken und dem Selbstbewuſsseyn als solchem aus, und ist nur eine der Bestimmtheiten; zugleich 1807 718 aber, wie ſich gezeigt, ist ihr Charakter, die ſynthetiſche Verbindung zu seyn, über alle dieſe Elemente ausgebreitet, und ihre gemeinſchaftliche Bestimmtheit.
768 Der Inhalt ſelbst, der zu betrachten ist, ist zum Theil ſchon als die Vorstellung des unglücklichen und glaubenden Bewuſstseyns vorgekommen; — in jenem aber in der Bestimmung des aus dem Bewuſstſeyn hervorgebrachten und erſehnten Inhalts, worin der Geiſt sich nicht erſättigen noch Ruhe finden kann, weil er noch nicht an ſich oder als ſeine Subſtanz ſein Inhalt iſt; — in dieſem dagegen iſt er als das ſelbſtloſe Weſen der Welt oder als weſentlich gegenſtändlicher Inhalt des Vorstellens betrachtet worden, — eines Vorſtellens, das der Wirklichkeit überhaupt entflieht, und daher ohne die Gewiſsheit des Selbſtbewuſstſeyns iſt, die ſich theils als Eitelkeit des Wiſſens theils als reine Einſicht von ihm trennt. — Das Bewuſstseyn der Gemeine hingegen hat ihn zu ſeiner Subſtanz, ebenſo als er ihre Gewiſsheit des eignen Geiſtes iſt.
769 Der Geist zuerst als Subſtanz im Elemente des reinen Denkens vorgeſtellt, iſt er hiemit unmittelbar das einfache ſich ſelbſtgleiche, ewige Weſen, das aber nicht dieſe abſtracte Bedeutung des Weſens, ſondern die Bedeutung des abſoluten Geiſtes hat. Allein der Geiſt iſt diſs, nicht Bedeutung, nicht das Innre, ſondern das Wirkllche zu ſeyn. Das einfache ewige Weſen daher würde nur dem leeren Worte nach Geiſt ſeyn, wenn es bey der Vorſtellung und dem Ausdrucke des 1807 719 einfachen ewigen Wesens bliebe. Das einfache Weſen aber, weil es die Abſtraction ist, ist es in der Tha das negative an ſich ſelbſt, und zwar die Negativität des Denkens oder ſie wie ſie im Weſen an ſich iſt; d. h. es iſt der abſolute Unterſchied von ſich, oder ſein reines Anderswerden. Als Weſen iſt es nur an ſich oder für uns; aber indem dieſe Reinheit eben die Abſtraction oder Negativität iſt, iſt es für ſich ſelbſt, oder das Selbſt, der Begriff. — Es iſt alſo gegenſtändlich; und indem die Vorſtellung die ſo eben ausgeſprochne Nothwendigkeit des Begriffs als ein Geſchehen auffaſst und ausſpricht, ſo wird geſagt werden, daſs das ewige Weſen ſich ein Anderes erzeugt. Aber in dieſem Andersſeyn iſt es ebenſo unmittelbar in ſich zurückgekehrt; denn der Unterſchied iſt der Unterſchied an ſich, d. h. er iſt unmittelbar nur von ſich ſelbſt unterſchieden, er iſt alſo die in ſich zurückgekehrte Einheit.
770 Es unterſcheiden ſich alſo die drey Momente, des Weſens, des Fürſichſeyns, welches das Andersſeyn des Weſens iſt und für welches das Weſen iſt, und des Fürſichſeyns oder ſich ſelbſt Wiſſens im Andern. Das Weſen ſchaut nur ſich ſelbſt in ſeinem Fürſichſeyn an; es iſt in dieſer Entäuſſerung nur bey ſich, das Fürſichſeyn, das ſich von dem Weſen ausſchlieſst, iſt das Wiſſen des Weſens ſeiner ſelbſt; es iſt das Wort, das ausgeſprochen den Ausſprechenden entäuſſert und ausgeleert zurückläſst, aber ebenſo unmittelbar vernommen iſt, und nur dieſes ſich 1807 720 ſelbſt Vernehmen iſt das Daſeyn des Wortes. So daſs die Unterſchiede, die gemacht ſind, ebenſo unmittelbar aufgelöst als ſie gemacht, und ebenſo unmittelbar gemacht als ſie aufgelöst ſind, und das Wahre und Wirkliche eben dieſe in ſich kreiſende Bewegung iſt.
771 Dieſe Bewegung in ſich ſelbſt ſpricht das abſolute Weſen als Geiſt aus; das abſolute Weſen, das nicht als Geiſt erfaſst wird, iſt nur das abſtracte Leere, ſo wie der Geiſt, der nicht als dieſe Bewegung erfaſst wird, nur ein leeres Wort iſt. Indem ſeine Momente in ihrer Reinheit gefaſst werden, ſind ſie die ruheloſen Begriffe, die nur ſind ihr Gegentheil an ſich ſelbſt zu ſeyn und ihre Ruhe im Ganzen zu haben. Aber das Vorſtellen der Gemeine iſt nicht diſs begreiffende Denken; ſondern hat den Inhalt ohne ſeine Nothwendigkeit, und bringt ſtatt der Form des Begriffes die natürlichen Verhältniſſe von Vater und Sohn in das Reich des reinen Bewuſstseyns. Indem es ſo im Denken ſelbſt ſich vorſtellend verhält, iſt ihm das Weſen zwar offenbar, aber die Momente deſſelben treten ihm um dieſer ſynthetiſchen Vorſtellung willen theils ſelbſt auseinander, ſo daſs ſie nicht durch ihren eiguen Begriff ſich aufeinander bezichen, theils tritt es von dieſem ſeinem reinen Gegenſtand zurück, bezieht ſich nur äuſſerlich auf ihn; er iſt ihm von einem Fremden geoffenbart, und in dieſem Gedanken des Geiſtes erkennt es nicht ſich ſelbſt, nicht die Natur des reinen Selbstbewuſstseyns. 1807 721 Inſofern über die Form des Vorſtellens und jener Verhältniſſe, die aus dem Natürlichen hergenommen ſind, und damit beſonders auch darüber hinausgegangen werden muſs, die Momente der Bewegung, die der Geiſt iſt, für iſolirte nichtwankende Substanzen oder Subjecte, statt für übergehende Momente zu nehmen, — ist diſs Hinausgehen, wie vorhin bey einer andern Seite erinnert wurde, für ein Drängen des Begriffes anzusehen; aber indem es nur Inſtinkt ist, verkennt es ſich, verwirft mit der Form auch den Inhalt, und, was daſſelbe ist, ſetzt ihn zu einer geſchichtlichen Vorstellung und einem Erbstücke der Tradition herab; hierin ist das rein Aeuſſerliche des Glaubens nur beybehalten, und damit als ein erkenntniſsloses Todtes, das Innerliche deſſelben aber ist verschwunden, weil diſs der Begriff wäre, der ſich als Begriff weiſs.
772 Der abſolute Geist, im reinen Weſen vorgestellt, ist zwar nicht das abſtracte reine Weſen, ſondern dieſes ist vielmehr ebendadurch, daſs es im Geiste nur Moment ist, zum Elemente herabgeſunken. Die Darstellung des Geistes aber in dieſem Elemente hat denſelben Mangel der Form nach an ſich, den das Weſen als Weſen hat. Das Weſen ist das abſtracte, und darum das negative ſeiner Einfachheit, ein anderes; ebenſo der Geiſt im Elemente des Weſens ist die Form der einfachen Einheit, die darum ebenſo weſentlich ein Anderswerden ist. — Oder was daſſelbe ist, die Beziehung des ewigen Weſens auf ſein Fürſichseyn ist 1807 722 die unmittelbar-einfache des reinen Denkens; in diesem einfachen Anſchauen ſeiner ſelbſt im Andern ist alſo das Andersſeyn nicht als ſolches geſetzt; es ist der Unterſchied, wie er im reinen Denken unmittelbar kein Unterſchied ist; ein Anerkennen der Liebe, worin die beyden nicht ihrem Weſen nach ſich entgegenſetzten. — Der Geist, der im Elemente des reinen Denkens ausgeſprochen ist, ist weſentlich ſelbst dieſes, nicht in ihm nur, ſondern Wirklicher zu ſeyn, denn in ſeinem Begriffe liegt ſelbst das andersſeyn, d. h. das Aufheben des reinen nur gedachten Begriffes.
773 Das Element des reinen Denkens, weil es das abstracte ist, ist ſelbst vielmehr das Andre ſeiner Einfachheit, und geht daher in das eigentliche Element des Vorſtellens über, — das Element, worin die Momente des reinen Begriffes ein ſubſtantielles Daſeyn ebenſo gegeneinander erhalten, als ſie Subjecte ſind, die nicht für ein drittes die Gleichgültigkeit des Seyns gegeneinander haben, ſondern in ſich reflectirt ſich ſelbst voneinander abſondern und entgegen ſtellen.
774 Der alſo nur ewige oder abstracte Geist wird ſich ein Anders oder tritt in das Daſeyn und unmittelbar in das unmittelbare Daſeyn. Er erſchafft alſo eine Welt. Dieſes Erſchaffen ist das Wort der Vorſtellung für den Begriff ſelbst nach ſeiner abſoluten Bewegung, oder dafür daſs das als abſolut ausgeſagte Einfache oder reine Denken, weil es das abstracte ist, vielmehr das negative und hiemit ſich entgegengeſetzte oder Andre ist; — oder weil um daſſelbe noch in einer andern 1807 723 Form zu ſagen, weil das als Weſen geſetzte die einfache Unmittelburkeit oder das Seyn ist, aber als Unmittelbarkeit oder Seyn, des Selbsts entbehrt, und alſo, der Innerlichkeit ermangelnd paſſiv oder Seyn für anderes ist. — Diſs Seyn für anderes ist zugleich eine Welt; der Geiſt, in der Bestimmung des Seyns für anderes ist das ruhige Bestehen der vorhin in das reine Denken eingeſchloſſenen Momente, alſo die Auflösung ihrer einfachen Allgemeinheit und das Auseinandergehen derſelben in ihre eigne Beſonderheit.
775 Die Welt ist aber nicht nur dieſer auseinander in die Vollständigkeit und deren auſſere Ordnung geworfene Geist, ſondern da er weſentlich das einfache Selbſt ist, ist dieſes an ihr ebenso vorhanden; der daſeyende Geist, der das einzelne Selbst ist, welches das Bewuſstſeyn hat, und ſich als Andres oder als Welt von ſich unterſcheidet. — Wie dieſes einzelne Selbst ſo unmittelbar erst geſetzt ist, ist es noch nicht Geist für ſich; es iſt alſo nicht als Geiſt, es kann unſchuldig, aber nicht wohl gut genannt werden. Daſs es in der That Selbst und Geist ſey, muſs es ebenſo, wie das ewige Wesen ſich als die Bewegung in ſeinem Andersſeyn ſich ſelbſt gleich zu ſeyn darstellt, zunächst ſich ſelbst ein Anderes werden. Indem dieſer Geist bestimmt ist, als erst unmittelbar daſeyend oder als in die Mannichfaltigkeit ſeines Bewuſstseyns zerstreut, so ist ſein Anderswerden das inſich gehen des Wiſſens überhaupt. Das unmittelbare Daſeyn ſchlägt in den Gedanken, oder das 1807 724 nur ſinnliche Bewuſstseyn in das Bewuſstseyn des Gedankens um, und zwar, weil er der aus der Unmittelbarkeit herkommende oder bedingte Gedanke ist, ist er nicht das reine Wiſſen, ſondern der Gedanke, der das Andersſeyn an ihm hat, und alſo der ſich ſelbſt entgegengeſetzte Gedanke des Guten und Böſen. Der Menſch wird ſo vorgestellt, daſs es geſchehen ist, als etwas nicht nothwendiges, — daſs er die Form der Sichſelbſtgleichheit durch das Pflücken vom Baume des Erkenntniſſes des Guten und Böſen verlor, und aus dem Zustande des unſchuldigen Bewuſstseyns, aus der arbeitlos ſich darbietenden Natur und dem Paradieſe, dem Garten der Thiere, vertrieben wurde.
776 Indem diſs Infichgehen des daſeyenden Bewuſstseyns ſich unmittelbar als das ſich ſelbst ungleich werden bestimmt, so erscheint das Böſe als das erste Daſeyn des in ſich gegangenen Bewuſstseyns; und weil die Gedanken des Guten und Böſen ſchlechthin entgegengeſetzte, und dieſe Entgegenſetzung noch nicht aufgelöst ist, ſo ist diſs Bewuſstseyn weſentlich nur das Böſe. Zugleich aber ist um eben dieſer Entgegenſetzung willen auch das gute Bewuſstseyn gegen es vorhanden, und ihr Verhältniſs zu einander. — Inſofern das unmittelbare Daſeyn in den Gedanken umſchlägt, und das inſichſeyn theils ſelbst Denken, theils das Moment des Anderswerdens des Weſens damit näher beſtimmt iſt, ſo kann das Böſewerden, weiter rückwärts aus der daseyenden Welt hinaus schon in das erste Reich des Denkens verlegt werden. Es kann alſo 1807 725 geſagt werden, daſs ſchon der erstgebohrne Lichtſohn, als in ſich gehend es ſey, der abgefallen aber an deſſen Stelle ſogleich ein anderer erzeugt worden. Solche bloſs der Vorstellung nicht dem Begriff angehörige Form, wie Abfallen; ebenſo wie Sohn, ſetzt übrigens die Momente des Begriffs ebenſo umgekehrt in das Vorstellen herab, oder trägt das Vorstellen in das Reich des Gedankens hinüber. — Ebenso gleichgültig ist es, dem einfachen Gedanken des Andersſeyns im ewigen Weſen noch eine Mannichfaltigkeit anderer Geſtalten beyzuordnen, und das Inſichgehen in dieſe zu verlegen. Dieſe Beyordnung muſs darum zugleich gut geheiſſen werden, weil dadurch diſs Moment des Andersſeyns, wie es ſoll, die Verſchiedenheit zugleich ausdrückt; und zwar nicht als Vielheit überhaupt, ſondern zugleich als beſtimmte Verſchiedenheit, ſo daſs der eine Theil, der Sohn, das einfache ſich ſelbſt als Weſen wiſſende iſt, der andre Theil aber, die Entäuſſerung des Fürſichſeyns, die nur im Preiſſe des Weſens lebt; in dieſen Theile kann dann auch wieder das Zurücknehmen des entäuſſerten Fürſichſeyns und das Inſichgehen des Böſen gelegt werden. Insofern das Andersſeyn in zwey zerfällt, wäre der Geist in ſeinen Momenten bestimmter, und wenn ſie gezählt werden, als Viereinigkeit, oder weil die Menge wieder ſelbſt in zwey Theile, nemlich in gutgebliebne und böſe gewordne zerfällt, gar als Fünfeinigkeit ausgedrückt. — Die Momente aber zu zählen kann überhaupt als unnütz angeſehen werden, indem theils das Unterſchiedne 1807 726 ſelbſt ebenſoſehr nur Eines iſt, nemlich eben der Gedanke des Unterſchiedes, der nur Ein Gedanke ist, als er dieſes Unterſchiedne, das zweyte gegen das Erſte iſt, — theils aber weil der Gedanke, der das Viele in Eines befaſst, aus ſeiner Allgemeinheit aufgelöst und in mehr als drey oder vier Unterſchiedne unterſchieden werden muſs; — welche Allgemeinheit gegen die abſolute Beſtimmtheit des abſtracten Eins, des Princips der Zahl, als Unbeſtimmtheit in der Beziehung auf die Zahl ſelbſt erſcheint, ſo daſs nur von Zahlen überhaupt, d. h, nicht von einer Anzahl der Unterſchiede die Rede ſeyn könnte, alſo hier überhaupt an Zahl und ans Zählen zu denken ganz überflüſſig, wie auch ſonſt der bloſſe Unterſchied der Gröſſe und Menge begrifflos und nichts ſagend iſt.
777 Das Gute und das Böſe waren die beſtimmten Unterſchiede des Gedankens, die ſich ergaben. Indem ihr Gegenſatz ſich noch nicht aufgelöſt, und ſie als Weſen des Gedankens vorgeſtellt werden, deren jedes für ſich ſelbſtſtändig iſt, ſo iſt der Menſch das weſenloſe Selbſt und der ſynthetiſche Boden ihres Daſeyns und Kampfs. Aber dieſe allgemeinen Mächte gehören ebenſoſehr dem Selbſt an oder das Selbſt iſt ihre Wirklichkeit. Nach dieſem Momente geſchieht es alſo, daſs wie das Böſe nichts anderes iſt, als das Inſichgehen des natürlichen Daſeyns des Geiſtes, umgekehrt das Gute in die Wirklichkeit tritt und als ein daſeyendes Selbſtbewuſstſeyn erſcheint. — Was im rein gedachten Geiſte als das Anderswerden des 1807 727 göttlichen Weſens überhaupt nur angedeutet iſt, tritt hier ſeiner Realiſirung für das Vorſtellen näher; ſie beſteht ihm in der Selbſterniedrigung des göttlichen Weſens, das auf ſeine Abſtraction und Unwirklichkeit Verzicht thut. — Die andere Seite, das Böſe, nimmt das Vorſtellen als ein dem göttlichen Wesen fremdes Geſchehen; es in demſelben ſelbſt, als ſeinen Zorn zu faſſen, iſt die höchſte, härteſte Anſtrengung des mit ſich ſelbſt ringenden Vorſtellens, die, da ſie des Begriffs entbehrt, fruchtlos bleibt.
778 Die Entfremdung des göttlichen Weſens ist alſo auf ihre gedoppelte Weiſe geſetzt; das Selbſt des Geiſtes und ſein einfacher Gedanke ſind die beyden Momente, deren abſolute Einheit der Geist ſelbſt iſt; ſeine Entfremdung beſteht darin, daſs ſie auseinandertreten und das eine einen ungleichen Werth gegen das andre hat. Dieſe Ungleichheit iſt darum die gedoppelte, und es entſtehen zwey Verbindungen, deren gemeinſchaftliche Momente die angegebnen ſind. In der einen gilt das göttliche Weſen als das Weſentliche, das natürliche Daſeyn aber und das Selbſt als das unweſentliche und aufzuhebende; in der andern gilt dagegen das Fürſichſeyn als das Weſentliche, und das einfache Göttliche als das unweſentliche. Ihre noch leere Mitte ist das Daſeyn überhaupt, die bloſſe Gemeinſchafftlichkeit der beyden Momente derſelben.
779 Die Auflöſung dieſes Gegenſatzes geſchieht nicht ſowohl durch den Kampf der beyden, die als 1807 728 getrennte und ſelbſtſtändige Weſen vorgeſtellt ſind. In ihrer Selbſtſtändigkeit liegt es, daſs an ſich, durch ſeinen Begriff, jedes an ihm ſelbſt ſich auflöſen muſs; der Kampf fällt erſt dahin, wo beyde aufhören, dieſe Vermiſchungen des Gedankens und des ſelbſtſtändigen Daſeyns zu ſeyn, und wo ſie nur als Gedanken einander gegenüberſtehen. Denn alsdenn ſind ſie als beſtimmte Begriffe weſentlich nur in der entgegengeſetzten Beziehung; als ſelbſtſtändige hingegen haben ſie auſſer der Entgegenſetzung ihre Weſentlichkeit; ihre Bewegung iſt alſo die freye und eigne ihrer ſelbſt. Wie alſo die Bewegung beyder, die Bewegung an ſich iſt, weil ſie an ihnen ſelbſt zu betrachten iſt, ſo fängt ſie auch dasjenige von beyden an, welches als das Anſichſeyende gegen das andre beſtimmt ist. Es wird diſs als ein freiwilliges Thun vorgeſtellt; aber die Nothwendigkeit ſeiner Entäuſſerung liegt in dem Begriffe, daſs das Anſichſeyende, welches nur im Gegenſatze ſo beſtimmt iſt, ebendarum nicht wahrhaftes Beſtehen hat; — dasjenige alſo, dem nicht das Fürſichſeyn, ſondern das Einfache als das Weſen gilt, ist es, das ſich ſelbst entäuſſert, in den Tod geht, und dadurch das abſolute Weſen mit ſich ſelbſt verſöhnt. Denn in dieſer Bewegung ſtellt es ſich als Geiſt dar; das abſtracte Weſen iſt ſich entfremdet, es bat natürliches Daſeyn und ſelbſtiſche Wirklichkeit; diſs ſein Andersſeyn oder ſeine ſinnliche Gegenwart wird durch das zweyte Anderswerden zurückgenommen, und als aufgehobne, als allgemeine geſetzt; dadurch iſt das Weſen in ihr 1807 729 ſich ſelbſt geworden; das unmittelbare Daſeyn der Wirklichkeit hat aufgehört ein ihm fremdes oder äuſſerliches zu ſeyn, indem es aufgehobnes, allgemeines ist; dieſer Tod ist daher ſein Erſtehen als Geiſt.
780 Die aufgehobne unmittelbare Gegenwart des ſelbſtbewuſsten Weſens iſt es als allgemeines Selbſtbewuſstſeyn; dieſer Begriff des aufgehobnen einzelnen Selbſts, das abſolutes Weſen iſt, drückt daher unmittelbar die Conſtituirung einer Gemeinde aus, die bisher im Vorſtellen verweilend itzt in ſich als in das Selbſt zurückkehrt; und der Geiſt geht ſomit aus dem zweiten Elemente ſeiner Beſtimmung, dem Vorſtellen, in das dritte, das Selbſtbewuſstseyn als ſolches über. — Betrachten wir noch die Art, wie jenes Vorſtellen ſich in ſeinem Fortgange benimmt, ſo ſehen wir zuerſt diſs ausgedrückt, daſs das göttliche Weſen die menſchliche Natur annimmt. Darin iſt es ſchon ausgeſprochen, daſs an ſich beyde nicht getrennt ſind; — wie darin, daſs das göttliche Weſen ſich ſelbſt von Anfang entäuſſert, ſein Daſeyn in ſich geht und böſe wird, es nicht ausgeſprochen, aber darin enthalten iſt, daſs anſich diſs böſe Daſeyn nicht ein ihm Fremdes iſt; das abſolute Weſen hätte nur dieſen leeren Nahmen, wenn es in Wahrheit ein ihm Anderes, wenn es einen Abfall von ihm gäbe; — das Moment des Inſichſeyns macht vielmehr das weſentliche Moment des Selbsts des Geistes aus. — Daſs das Inſichſeyn und damit erſt Wirklichkeit dem Weſen ſelbſt angehöre, diſs was für uns Begriff ist, und inſofern es Begriff iſt, 1807 730 erſcheint dem vorſtellenden Bewuſstſeyn als ein unbegreiffliches Geſchehen; das Anſich nimmt die Form des gleichgültigen Seyns für es an. Der Gedanke aber, daſs jene ſich zu fliehen ſcheinende Momente, des abſoluten Weſens und des fürſichſeyenden Selbſts, nicht getrennt ſind, erſcheint dieſem Vorſtellen auch, — denn es beſitzt den wahren Inhalt, — aber nachher, — in der Entäuſſerung des göttlichen Weſens, das Fleiſch wird. Dieſe Vorſtellung, die auf dieſe Weiſe noch unmittelbar und daher nicht geiſtig iſt, oder die menſchliche Geſtalt des Weſens nur erſt als eine beſondre, noch nicht allgemeine weiſs, wird für diſs Bewuſstſeyn geiſtig in der Bewegung des geſtalteten Weſens ſein unmittelbares Daſeyn wieder aufzuopfern, und zum Weſen zurückzukehren; das Weſen als in ſich reflectirtes iſt erſt der Geiſt. — Die Verſohnung des göttlichen Weſens mit dem Andern überhaupt und beſtimmt mit dem Gedanken deſſelben, dem Böſen, iſt alſo hierin vorgeſtellt. — Wenn dieſe Verſöhnung nach ihrem Begriffe ſo ausgedrückt wird, daſs ſie darin beſtehe, weil an ſich das Böſe daſſelbe ſey, was das Gute, oder auch das göttliche Weſen daſſelbe, was die Natur in ihrem ganzen Umfange, ſo wie die Natur getrennt vom göttlichen Weſen nur das Nichts, — ſo iſt diſs als eine ungeiſtige Weiſe ſich auszudrücken anzuſehen, die nothwendig Misverſtändniſſe erwecken muſs. — Indem das Böſe daſſelbe iſt, was das Gute, iſt eben das Böſe nicht Böſes noch das Gute Gutes, ſondern beyde ſind vielmehr aufgehoben, das Böſe überhaupt das 1807 731 inſichſeyende Fürſichſeyn, und das Gute das ſelbſtloſe Einfache. Indem ſo beyde nach ihrem Begriffe ausgeſprochen werden, erhellt zugleich ihre Einheit; denn das inſichſeyende Fürſichſeyn iſt das einfache Wiſſen; und das ſelbſtloſe Einfache iſt ebenſo das reine in ſich ſeyende Fürſichſeyn. — Soſehr daher geſagt werden muſs, daſs nach dieſem ihrem Begriffe das Gute und Böſe, d. h. inſofern ſie nicht das Gute und das Böſe ſind, daſſelbe ſeyen, ebenſoſehr muſs also geſagt werden, daſs ſie nicht daſſelbe, ſondern ſchlechthin verſchieden ſind, denn das einfache Fürſichſeyn, oder auch das reine Wiſſen ſind gleicherweiſe die reine Negativität, oder der abſolute Unterſchied an ihnen ſelbſt. — Erſt dieſe beyden Sätze vollenden das Ganze, und dem Behaupten und Verſichern des erſten muſs mit unüberwindlicher Hartnäckigkeit das Feſthalten an dem andern gegenübertreten; indem beyde gleich Recht haben, haben beyde gleich Unrecht, und ihr Unrecht beſteht darin, ſolche abſtracte Formen, wie daſſelbe, und nicht daſſelbe, die Identität und die Nichtidentität für etwas wahres, feſtes, wirkliches zu nehmen, und auf ihnen zu beruhen. Nicht das eine oder das andre hat Wahrheit, ſondern eben ihre Bewegung, daſs das einfache Daſſelbe die Abſtraction und damit der abſolute Unterſchied, dieſer aber als Unterſchied an ſich, von ſich ſelbſt unterſchieden alſo die Sichſelbſtgleichheit iſt. Ebendiſs iſt der Fall mit der Dieſelbigkeit des göttlichen Weſens und der Natur überhaupt und der 1807 732 meuſchlichen insbeſondre; jenes iſt Natur, inſofern es nicht Weſen iſt; dieſe iſt göttlich nach ihrem Weſen; — aber es iſt der Geiſt, worin beyde abſtracte Seiten wie ſie in Wahrheit ſind, nemlich als aufgehobne geſetzt ſind, — ein Setzen, das nicht durch das Urtheil, und das geiſtloſe iſt, die copula deſſelben, ausgedrückt werden kann. — Ebenso iſt die Natur Nichts auſſer ihrem Weſen; aber diſs Nichts ſelbſt iſt ebenſoſehr; es iſt die abſolute Abſtraction, alſo das reine Denken oder inſichſeyn, und mit dem Momente ſeiner Entgegenſetzung gegen die geiſtige Einheit iſt es das Böſe. Die Schwierigkeit, die in dieſen Begriffen ſtatt findet, iſt allein das Feſthalten am; iſt, und das Vergeſſen des Denkens, worin die Momeute ebenſo ſind als nicht ſind, — nur die Bewegung ſind, die der Geiſt iſt. — Dieſe geiſtige Einheit oder die Einheit, worin die Unterſchiede nur als Momente oder als aufgehobne ſind, iſt es, die für das vorſtellende Bewuſstseyn in jener Verſöhnung geworden, und indem ſie die Allgemeinheit des Selbſtbewuſstseyns iſt, hat dieſes aufgehört, vorſtellendes zu ſeyn; die Bewegung iſt in es zurückgegangen.
781 Der Geiſt iſt alſo in dem dritten Elemente, im allgemeinen Selbſtbewuſstseyn geſetzt; er iſt seine Gemeinde. Die Bewegung der Gemeinde als des Selbſtbewuſstſeyns, das ſich von ſeiner Vorſtellung unterſcheidet, iſt das hervorzubringen, was an ſich geworden iſt. Der geſtorbne göttliche Menſch, oder menſchliche Gott iſt an ſich das allgemeine 1807 733 Selbſtbewuſstſeyn; er hat diſs für diſs Selbſtbewuſstseyn zu werden. Oder indem es die Eine Seite des Gegenſatzes der Vorstellung ausmacht, nemlich die Böſe, der das natürliche Daſeyn und das einzelne Fürſichſeyn als das Wesen gilt, so hat diese, die als selbstständig, noch nicht als Moment vorgeſtellt ist, um ihrer Selbſtſtändigkeit willen an und für ſie ſelbſt ſich zum Geiſte zu erheben, oder die Bewegung deſſelben an ihr darzuſtellen.
782 Sie iſt der natürliche Geiſt; das Selbſt hat aus dieſer Natürlichkeit ſich zurückzuziehen und in ſich zu gehen, das hieſſe, böſe zu werden. Aber ſie iſt ſchon an ſich böſe; das inſichgehen beſteht daher darin ſich zu überzeugen, daſs das natürliche Daſeyn das Böse iſt. In das vorstellende Bewuſstſeyn fällt das daseyende Bösewerden und Böseseyn der Welt, so wie die daseyende Versöhnung des absoluten Wesens; in das Selbſtbewuſstseyn aber als solches, fällt der Form nach dieses Vorgestellte nur als aufgehobnes Moment, denn das Selbſt ist das Negative; also das Wiſſen, — ein Wissen, das ein reines Thun des Bewuſstseyns in sich selbst ist. — An dem Inhalte muſs diſs Moment des Negativen gleichfalls sich ausdrücken. Indem nemlich das Wesen an ſich mit sich schon versöhnt, und geistige Einheit ist, worin die Theile der Vorstellung aufgehobne oder Momente sind, so stellt sich diſs dar, daſs jeder Theil der Vorstellung hier die entgegengesetzte Bedeutung erhält, als er vorher hatte; jede Bedeutung vervollständigt sich dadurch an der andern, und der 1807 734 Inhalt ist erst dadurch ein geistiger; indem die Bestimmtheit ebensosehr ihre entgegengesetzte ist, ist die Einheit im Andersſeyn, das geistige, vollendet; wie sich für uns oder an ſich vorhin die entgegengesetzten Bedeutungen vereinigten, und selbst die abstracten Formen des deſſelben und des nicht deſſelben, der Identität und Nichtidentität aufhoben.
783 Wenn also in dem vorstellenden Bewuſstſeyn das Innerlichwerden des natürlichen Selbſtbewuſstseyns, das daseyende Böse war, so ist das Innerlichwerden im Elemente des Selbstbewuſstſeyns das Wiſſen von dem Bösen als einem solchen, das anſich im Daseyn ist, Diſs Wiſſen ist also allerdings ein Bösewerden, aber nur Werden des Gedankens des Bösen, und ist darum als das erste Moment der Versöhnung anerkannt. Denn als ein Zurückgehen in ſich aus der Unmittelbarkeit der Natur, die als das Böse bestimmt ist, ist es ein Verlaſſen derselben, und das Absterben der Sünde. Nicht das natürliche Daseyn als solches wird von dem Bewuſstſeyn verlaſſen, sondern es zugleich als ein solches, das als Böses gewuſst wird. Die unmittelbare Bewegung des insichgehens ist ebensosehr eine vermittelte; — sie setzt sich selbst voraus oder ist ihr eigner Grund; der Grund des insichgehens ist nemlich, weil die Natur schon an sich insichgegangen ist; um des Bösen willen muſs der Mensch in sich gehen, aber das Böse ist selbst das insichgehen. — Diese erste Bewegung ist eben darum selbst nur die unmittelbare, oder ihr einfacher Begriff, weil sie daſſelbe, was ihr 1807 735 Grund ist. Die Bewegung oder das Anderswerden muſs daher in seiner eigentlichern Form erst noch eintreten.
784 Auſſer dieser Unmittelbarkeit ist also die Vermittlung der Vorstellung nothwendig. Anſich ist das Wissen von der Natur als dem unwahren Daseyn des Geistes, und diese insich gewordne Allgemeinheit des Selbsts die Versöhnung des Geistes mit sich selbst. Diſs Anſich erhält für das nicht begreiffende Selbstbewuſstſeyn die Form eines Seyenden und ihm vorgeſtellten. Das Begreiffen also ist ihm nicht ein Ergreiſſen dieses Begriffes, der die aufgehobne Natürlichkeit als allgemeine also als mit sich selbst versöhnte weiſs, sondern ein Ergreiffen jener Vorstellung, daſs durch das Geschehen der eignen Entäuſſerung des göttlichen Wesens, durch seine geschehene Menschwerdung und seinen Tod das göttliche Wesen mit seinem Daseyn versöhnt ist. — Das Ergreiffen dieser Vorstellung drückt nun bestimmter dasjenige aus, was vorhin in ihr das geistige Auferstehen genannt wurde, oder das Werden seines einzelnen Selbſtbewuſstseyns zum allgemeinen oder zur Gemeinde. — Der Tod des göttlichen Menschen als Tod ist die abstracte Negativität, das unmittelbare Resultat der Bewegung, die nur in die natürliche Allgemeinheit sich endigt. Diese natürliche Bedeutung verliert er im geistigen Selbstbewuſstseyn, oder er wird sein so eben angegebner Begriff; der Tod wird von dem, was er unmittelbar bedeutet, von dem Nichtseyn dieses Einzelnen 1807 736 verklärt zur Allgemeinheit des Geistes, der in seiner Gemeine lebt, in ihr täglich stirbt und aufersteht.
785 Dasjenige, was dem Elemente der Vorstellung angehört, daſs der absolute Geist, als ein einzelner oder vielmehr als ein besonderer an seinem Daseyn die Natur des Geistes vorstellt, ist also hier in das Selbſtbewuſstseyn selbst versetzt, in das in seinem Andersseyn sich erhaltende Wiſſen; diſs ſtirbt daher nicht wirklich, wie der Besondere vorgeſtellt wird, wirklich gestorben zu seyn, sondern seine Besonderheit erstirbt in seiner Allgemeinheit, das heiſst, in seinem Wiſſen, welches das sich mit sich versöhnende Wesen ist. Das zunächst vorhergehende Element des Vorſtellens ist also hier als aufgehobnes gesetzt, oder es ist in das Selbst, in seinen Begriff, zurückgegangen; das in jenem nur Seyende ist zum Subjecte geworden. — Ebendamit ist auch das erſte Element, das reine Denken und der in ihm ewige Geist nicht mehr jenſeits des vorstellenden Bewuſstseyns noch des Selbſts, sondern die Rückkehr des Ganzen in sich ist ebendiſs alle Momente in sich zu enthalten. — Der vom Selbſt ergriffne Tod des Mittlers ist das Aufheben seiner Gegenſtändlichkeit oder seines besondern Fürſichseyns; diſs besondre Fürsichseyn ist allgemeines Selbſtbewuſstseyn geworden. — Auf der andern Seite ist das Allgemeine ebendadurch Selbſtbewuſstseyn, und der reine oder unwirkliche Geiſt des bloſſen Denkens wirklich geworden. — Der Tod des Mittlers ist Tod nicht nur der natürlichen Seite deſſelben oder seines 1807 737 besondern Fürſichſeyns, es ſtirbt nicht nur die vom Wesen abgezogne schon todte Hülle, sondern auch die Abſtraction des göttlichen Wesens. Denn er ist, inſofern ſein Tod die Verſöhnung noch nicht vollendet hat, das einseitige, welches das einfache des Denkens als das Wesen weiſs im Gegensatze gegen die Wirklichkeit; diſs Extrem des Selbſts hat noch nicht gleichen Werth mit dem Wesen; diſs hat das Selbſt erſt im Geiſte. Der Tod dieser Vorstellung enthält also zugleich den Tod der Abſtraction des göttlichen Weſens, das nicht als Selbst gesetzt iſt. Er iſt das schmerzliche Gefühl des unglücklichen Bewuſstſeyns, daſs Gott ſelbſt geſtorben ist. Dieser harte Ausdruck ist der Ausdruck des innerſten ſich einfach Wiſſens, die Rückkehr des Bewuſstſeyns in die Tiefe der Nacht des Ich = Ich, die nichts auſſer ihr mehr unterscheidet und weiſs. Diſs Gefühl ist also in der That der Verluſt der Subſtanz und ihres Gegenübertretens gegen das Bewuſstseyn; aber zugleich iſt es die reine Subjectivität der Subſtanz, oder die reine Gewiſsheit ſeiner ſelbst, die ihr als dem Gegenſtande oder dem Unmittelbaren oder dem reinen Wesen fehlte. Diſs Wiſſen also iſt die Begeiſtung, wodurch die Substanz Subject, ihre Abſtraction und Lebloſigkeit gestorben, ſie also wirklich und einfaches und allgemeines Selbſtbewuſstſeyn geworden iſt.
786 So ist also der Geiſt ſich ſelbſt wiſſender Geiſt; er weiſs ſich, das was ihm Gegenſtand iſt, iſt, oder seine 1807 738 Vorſtellung ist der wahre absolute Inhalt; er drückt, wie wir sahen, den Geist selbst aus. Er ist zugleich nicht nur Inhalt des Selbſtbewuſstseyns und nicht nur für es Gegenſtand, ſondern er ist auch wirklicher Geiſt. Er ist diſs, indem er die drey Elemente seiner Natur durchlaufft; diese Bewegung durch sich selbſt hindurch macht seine Wirklichkeit aus; — was sich bewegt, iſt er, er ist das Subject der Bewegung, und er ist ebenso das Bewegen ſelbſt, oder die Subſtanz, durch welche das Subject hindurchgeht. Wie uns der Begriff des Geistes geworden war, als wir in die Religion eintraten, nemlich als die Bewegung des seiner ſelbſt gewiſſen Geistes, der dem Bösen verzieht und darin zugleich von seiner eignen Einfachheit und harten Unwandelbarkeit abläſst, oder die Bewegung, daſs das absolut entgegengeſetzte ſich als daſſelbe erkennt und diſs Erkennen als das Ja zwischen dieſen Extremen hervorbricht, — dieſen Begriff schaut das religiöse Bewuſstseyn, dem das absolute Wesen offenbar, an, und hebt die Unterſcheidung ſeines Selbſts von ſeinem Angeſchauten auf, ist wie es das Subject ist, so auch die Substanz, und iſt also selbſt der Geiſt, eben weil und inſofern es diese Bewegung ist.
787 Vollendet aber ist diese Gemeinde noch nicht in diesem ihrem Selbſtbewuſstseyn; ihr Inhalt iſt überhaupt in der Form des Vorſtellens für ſie, und dieſe Entzweyung hat auch die wirkliche Geiſtigkeit derſelben, ihre Rückkehr aus ihrem Vorſtellen, noch an ihr, wie das Element des reinen Denkens ſelbſt damit behaftet 1807 739 war, Sie hat nicht auch das Bewuſstseyn über das, was ſie iſt; ſie iſt das geiſtige Selbſtbewuſstseyn, das ſich nicht als dieſes Gegenſtand iſt, oder ſich nicht zum Bewuſstſeyn ſeiner ſelbſt aufschlieſst; ſondern insofern ſie Bewuſstseyn iſt, hat sie Vorſtellungen, die betrachtet wurden. — Wir ſehen das Selbſtbewuſstseyn auf ſeinem letzten Wendungspunkte ſich innerlich werden und zum Wiſſen des Inſichſeyns gelangen; wir ſehen es sein natürliches Daseyn entäuſſern, und die reine Negativität gewinnen. Aber die poſitive Bedeutung, daſs nemlich diese Negativität oder reine Innerlichkeit des Wiſſens ebensosehr das ſichſelbſtgleiche Weſen iſt, — oder daſs die Subſtanz hierin dazu gelangt, abſolutes Selbſtbewuſstseyn zu seyn, diſs iſt ein anderes für das andächtige Bewuſstseyn. Es ergreifft diese Seite, daſs das reine Innerlichwerden des Wiſſens anſich die abſolute Einfachheit oder die Substanz ist, als die Vorstellung von Etwas, das nicht dem Begriffe nach so iſt, ſondern als die Handlung einer fremden Genugthuung. Oder es ist nicht diſs für es, daſs diese Tiefe des reinen Selbſts die Gewalt ist, wodurch das abſtracte Weſen aus seiner Abſtraction herabgezogen und durch die Macht dieſer reinen Andacht zum Selbſt erhoben wird. — Das Thun des Selbsts behält dadurch diese negative Bedeutung gegen es, weil die Entäuſſerung der Subſtanz von ihrer Seite ein Anſich für jenes iſt, das es nicht ebenso erfaſst und begreift, oder nicht in seinem Thun als solchem findet. — Indem anſich dieſe 1807 740 Einheit des Weſens und des Selbſts zu Stande gekommen, so hat das Bewuſstſeyn auch noch diese Vorſtellung seiner Verſöhnung, aber als Vorſtellung. Es erlangt die Befriedigung dadurch, daſs es seiner reinen Negativität die poſitive Bedeutung der Einheit ſeiner mit dem Wesen äuſſerlich hinzufügt; ſeine Befriedigung bleibt also ſelbſt mit dem Gegenſatze eines Jenſeits behafftet. Seine eigne Versöhnung tritt daher als ein Fernes in ſein Bewuſstseyn ein, als ein Fernes der Zukunft, wie die Verſöhnung, die das andere Selbſt vollbrachte, als eine Ferne der Vergangenheit erſcheint. So wie der einzelne göttliche Mensch, einen anſichſeyenden Vater, und nur eine wirkliche Mutter hat, ſo hat auch der allgemeine göttliche Menſch die Gemeinde, ihr eignes Thun und Wiſſen zu ihrem Vater, zu ihrer Mutter aber die ewige Liebe, die sie nur fühlt, nicht aber in ihrem Bewuſstseyn als wirklichen unmittelbaren Gegenſtand anschaut. Ihre Verſöhnung iſt daher in ihrem Herzen, aber mit ihrem Bewuſstseyn noch entzweyt, und ihre Wirklichkeit noch gebrochen. Was als das Anſich oder die Seite der reinen Vermittlung, in ihr Bewuſstſezu tritt, iſt die jenseits liegende Verſöhnung; was aber als gegenwärtig, als die Seite der Unmittelbarkeit und des Daſeyns, ist die Welt, die ihre Verklärung noch zu gewarten hat. Sie iſt wohl anſich versöhnt mit dem Weſen; und vom Weſen wird wohl gewuſst, daſs es den Gegenſtand nicht mehr als ſich entfremdet erkennt, ſondern in ſeiner Liebe als ſich gleich. Aber 1807 741 für das Selbſtbewuſstſeyn hat diese unmittelbare Gegenwart noch nicht Geiſtsgeſtalt. Der Geiſt der Gemeinde iſt so in seinem unmittelbaren Bewuſstsseyn getrennt von seinem religiösen, das zwar es ausspricht, daſs sie anſich nicht getrennt seyen, aber ein Anſich, das nicht realifirt, oder noch nicht ebenso abſolutes Fürſichseyn geworden.
Musean translation
Mouseia's complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the 1807 first edition, all 808 standard paragraphs in eight chapters plus Preface and Introduction, for fidelity, Hegel's argument, clarity and structure. German witness: Deutsches Textarchiv, CC BY-SA 4.0; page markers keep the 1807 pagination.
1807 625
VII. *Religion*.
672 In the shapes considered hitherto, distinguished in general as consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit, religion has indeed also occurred as consciousness of absolute essence in general, but from the standpoint of the consciousness that is conscious of absolute essence. Absolute essence in and for itself, however, the self-consciousness of spirit, has not appeared in those forms.
673 Even consciousness, insofar as it is understanding, becomes consciousness of the supersensible, or the interior of objective existence. But the supersensible, the eternal, or whatever else it may be called, is selfless. It is as yet only the universal, still far from being spirit knowing itself as spirit.—Then self-consciousness, which reaches its completion in the shape of unhappy consciousness, was only the pain of spirit struggling to rise again to objectivity but failing to attain it. The unity of individual self-consciousness and 1807 626 its unchangeable essence, to which it brings itself, therefore remains a beyond for it.—The immediate existence of reason, which for us emerged from that pain, and its distinctive shapes have no religion, because their self-consciousness knows or seeks itself in the immediate present.
674 In the ethical world, by contrast, we saw a religion, specifically the religion of the underworld. It is faith in the terrible, unknown night of fate and in the Eumenid of the departed spirit: the former, pure negativity in the form of universality; the latter, the same negativity in the form of singularity. In the latter form absolute essence is therefore indeed the self, and a present self, as the self can be nothing else. Yet the individual self is this individual shade, with the universality that is fate separated from it. It is indeed a shade, a sublated this, and thus a universal self; but that negative meaning has not yet turned into this positive one, and therefore the sublated self still immediately means this particular and essenceless self.—Fate without the self, however, remains the unconscious night that attains neither distinction within itself nor the clarity of self-knowledge.
675 This faith in the nothingness of necessity and in the underworld becomes faith in heaven, because the departed self must unite with its 1807 627 universality, unfold within it what it contains, and thus become clear to itself. Yet we saw this realm of faith unfold its content only in the element of thought, without the concept, and therefore perish in its fate, namely the religion of enlightenment. In this, the supersensible beyond of understanding is restored, but in such a way that self-consciousness stands satisfied on this side and knows the supersensible—the empty beyond, neither to be known nor feared—neither as self nor as power.
676 Finally, in the religion of morality, absolute essence is restored as a positive content, but united with the negativity of enlightenment. It is a being that equally remains taken back into the self and enclosed within it, and a differentiated content whose parts are negated as immediately as they are posited. But the fate in which this contradictory movement founders is the self conscious of itself as the fate of essence and actuality.
677 In religion, self-knowing spirit is immediately its own pure self-consciousness. The shapes of spirit that have been considered—true spirit, self-alienated spirit, and spirit certain of itself—together constitute spirit in its consciousness, which confronts its world and does not recognize itself in it. But in conscience spirit subjugates not only its objective world 1807 628 in general but also its representation and its determinate concepts, and is now self-consciousness at home with itself. In this self-consciousness, represented as an object for itself, it has the meaning of being universal spirit, containing all essence and all actuality within itself; yet it does not exist in the form of free actuality, or of nature appearing independently. It indeed has shape, or the form of being, insofar as it is the object of its consciousness; but because in religion this consciousness is posited in the essential determination of being self-consciousness, the shape is perfectly transparent to itself. And the actuality spirit contains is enclosed or sublated within it, precisely as when we say all actuality: it is thought, universal actuality.
678 Since, then, in religion the determination of spirit's consciousness proper does not have the form of free otherness, its existence is distinct from its self-consciousness, and its actuality proper falls outside religion. The spirit of both is indeed one, but its consciousness does not embrace both at once, and religion appears as one part of its existence, doing, and activity, the other part being life in its actual world. Now just as we know that spirit in its world and spirit conscious of itself as spirit, or spirit in religion, are the same, so the perfection of religion consists in 1807 629 the two becoming equal to one another: not only in its actuality being embraced by religion, but conversely in its becoming actual to itself as self-conscious spirit and becoming the object of its consciousness.—Insofar as spirit represents itself to itself in religion, it is indeed consciousness, and the actuality enclosed within religion is the shape and clothing of its representation. But in this representation actuality does not receive its full due, namely to be not merely clothing but independent, free existence. Conversely, because it lacks completion within itself, it is a determinate shape that does not attain what it is supposed to present, namely self-conscious spirit. For its shape to express spirit itself, the shape would itself have to be nothing other than spirit, and spirit would have to appear to itself, or be actual, as it is in its essence. Only thereby would what may seem to be the opposite demand also be attained: namely, that the object of its consciousness at the same time have the form of free actuality. But only spirit that is its own object as absolute spirit is for itself an actuality as free as it remains self-conscious within it.
679 When self-consciousness and consciousness proper, religion and spirit in its world, or the existence of spirit, are initially distinguished, the latter consists in the whole of spirit 1807 630 insofar as its moments present themselves as separating and each existing for itself. These moments, however, are consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit—spirit, namely, as immediate spirit that is not yet consciousness of spirit. Their collected totality constitutes spirit in its worldly existence in general. Spirit as such contains the preceding shapes in the universal determinations, the moments just named. Religion presupposes their entire course and is their simple totality, or absolute self.—Their course, moreover, must not be represented in time in relation to religion. Only the whole spirit is in time, and the shapes that are shapes of the whole spirit as such present themselves in a succession. For only the whole has actuality proper, and therefore the form of pure freedom in relation to another that expresses itself as time. But its moments—consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit—have, because they are moments, no existence distinct from one another.—Just as spirit was distinguished from its moments, so, third, the isolated determination of these moments must be distinguished from the moments themselves. For we saw each of those moments again differentiate itself within itself in a course of its own and assume different shapes, as, for example, within consciousness sensuous certainty 1807 631 and perception were distinguished. These latter aspects separate in time and belong to a particular whole.—For spirit descends from its universality, through determination, to singularity. The determination or middle term is consciousness, self-consciousness, and so on. Singularity, however, is constituted by the shapes of these moments. These therefore present spirit in its singularity or actuality, and are distinguished in time, yet so that the succeeding shape retains the preceding ones within it.
680 If, therefore, religion is the perfection of spirit, in which its individual moments—consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit—return and have returned into their ground, then together they constitute the existent actuality of the whole spirit, which is only as the movement of differentiating these aspects of itself and returning into itself. The becoming of religion in general is contained in the movement of the universal moments. But since each of these attributes was presented not merely as it determines itself in general, but as it is in and for itself—that is, as it runs its course within itself as a whole—not only has the becoming of religion in general thereby emerged: those complete courses of the individual aspects also contain the determinations of religion itself. The whole spirit, the spirit of religion, is again the movement 1807 632 of attaining, from its immediacy, knowledge of what it is in itself or immediately, and of achieving a perfect equality between the shape in which it appears for its consciousness and its essence, so that it intuits itself as it is.—In this becoming, therefore, spirit itself exists in determinate shapes constituting the differences of this movement; at the same time, determinate religion thereby also has a determinate actual spirit. If, then, consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit belong to self-knowing spirit in general, the determinate shapes of self-knowing spirit have belonging to them the determinate forms that developed separately within consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit. For its actual spirit, the determinate shape of religion selects from the shapes of each of its moments the one corresponding to it. The one determinacy of religion penetrates all aspects of its actual existence and stamps them with this common character.
681 In this way the shapes that have appeared up to this point now arrange themselves differently from the sequence in which they appeared; a brief preliminary remark on this is still necessary.—In the sequence considered, each moment, deepening itself within itself, developed into a whole in its distinctive principle; and cognition was the depth, or 1807 633 spirit, in which these moments, which have no subsistence for themselves, had their substance. This substance, however, has now emerged. It is the depth of spirit certain of itself, which does not permit the individual principle to isolate itself and make itself a whole within itself. Instead, gathering and holding all these moments together within itself, it advances in this entire wealth of its actual spirit, and all its particular moments jointly take up and receive the same determinacy of the whole.—This spirit certain of itself and its movement are their true actuality and the being-in-and-for-itself belonging to each individual moment.—If, therefore, the previous single sequence marked its returns into itself by nodes as it advanced, but continued from them again in a single line, it is now, as it were, broken at these nodes, the universal moments, and divided into many lines. Gathered into one bundle, these at the same time unite symmetrically, so that the same distinctions into which each particular line shaped itself within itself coincide.—Moreover, the entire presentation makes clear of itself how this coordination of universal directions presented here is to be understood, so that it becomes superfluous to remark that these distinctions are essentially to be grasped only as moments of becoming, not as parts. 1807 634 In actual spirit they are attributes of its substance; in religion, rather, only predicates of the subject.—Likewise, in themselves or for us, all forms are indeed contained in spirit in general and in each spirit; but as regards its actuality, the sole issue is which determinacy exists for it in its consciousness, in which it has expressed its self, or in which shape it knows its essence.
682 The distinction made between actual spirit and spirit knowing itself as spirit, or between itself as consciousness and as self-consciousness, is sublated in spirit knowing itself in its truth: its consciousness and self-consciousness are reconciled. But since religion here is initially immediate, this distinction has not yet returned into spirit. Only the concept of religion is posited; in this, the essence is self-consciousness, which is all truth to itself and contains all actuality within this truth. As consciousness, this self-consciousness has itself as its object. Spirit initially knowing itself only immediately is therefore spirit to itself in the form of immediacy, and the determinacy of the shape in which it appears to itself is that of being. This being is indeed filled neither with sensation or manifold material nor with other one-sided moments, purposes, and determinations, but with spirit, and is known by itself 1807 635 as all truth and actuality. In this way, this filling is not equal to its shape, nor spirit as essence to its consciousness. Spirit is actual as absolute spirit only insofar as it is for itself in its truth as it is in its certainty of itself, or insofar as the extremes into which it divides itself as consciousness exist for one another in the shape of spirit. The shape that spirit assumes as the object of its consciousness remains filled with the certainty of spirit as its substance. Through this content, the possibility of the object sinking to pure objectivity, to the form of the negativity of self-consciousness, disappears. Spirit's immediate unity with itself is the foundation, or pure consciousness, within which consciousness separates. Thus enclosed within its pure self-consciousness, spirit does not exist in religion as the creator of a nature in general. Rather, what it produces in this movement are its shapes as spirits, which together constitute the completeness of its appearance; and this movement itself is the becoming of its perfect actuality through its individual aspects, or its imperfect actualities.
683 Its first actuality is the concept of religion itself, or religion as immediate and thus natural religion: in this, spirit knows itself as its object in natural or immediate 1807 636 shape. The second, however, is necessarily that of knowing itself in the shape of sublated naturalness, or of the self. It is therefore the religion of art; for the shape rises to the form of the self through consciousness's production, by which consciousness intuits its doing, or the self, in its object. Finally, the third sublates the one-sidedness of the first two: the self is just as much immediate as immediacy is self. If in the first spirit is in the form of consciousness in general, and in the second in that of self-consciousness, in the third it is in the form of the unity of both. It has the shape of being-in-and-for-itself; and since it is thus represented as it is in and for itself, this is revealed religion. Yet although in this it attains its true shape, precisely shape itself and representation remain the unsurmounted aspect from which it must pass over into the concept, in order entirely to dissolve the form of objectivity in the concept, which equally encloses this opposite of itself. Spirit has then grasped the concept of itself as we have so far alone grasped it, and its shape, or the element of its existence, being the concept, is spirit itself.
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A. *Natural religion*.
684 Spirit knowing spirit is consciousness of itself and exists for itself in the form of the objective: it is. And it is at the same time being-for-itself. It is for itself: it is the side of self-consciousness, indeed as against the side of its consciousness, or its relating to itself as object. Its consciousness contains opposition, and thereby the determinacy of the shape in which it appears to itself and knows itself. This alone concerns us in this consideration of religion, for its unshaped essence, or pure concept, has already emerged. Yet the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness falls at the same time within the latter. The shape of religion contains the existence of spirit neither as nature free of thought nor as thought free of existence; rather, it is existence preserved in thought, as well as something thought that exists for itself.—One 1807 638 religion differs from another according to the determinacy of this shape in which spirit knows itself. But it must also be remarked that presenting its knowledge of itself according to this individual determinacy does not in fact exhaust the whole of an actual religion. The sequence of different religions that will emerge equally presents, once again, only the different aspects of a single religion—and indeed of each individual religion—and the representations that seem to distinguish one actual religion from another occur in each. Yet at the same time the difference must also be considered as a difference of religion. For since spirit finds itself in the distinction between its consciousness and its self-consciousness, the movement has as its goal to sublate this principal distinction and give the shape that is the object of consciousness the form of self-consciousness. But this distinction is not already sublated by the fact that the shapes contained in consciousness also possess the moment of the self, and that God is represented as self-consciousness. The represented self is not the actual self. For it, like any other closer determination of the shape, truly to belong to the shape, it must partly be posited within it through the doing of self-consciousness, and partly the lower determination must show itself to have been sublated and comprehended by the higher. For what is represented ceases to be represented and alien to its knowledge only through the self's having produced it, and thus intuiting the 1807 639 determination of the object as its own, and hence itself in the object.—Through this activity the lower determination has at the same time disappeared; for doing is the negative that carries itself out at the expense of an other. Insofar as the lower determination still occurs, it has receded into inessentiality; conversely, where the lower still rules but the higher also occurs, one has a selfless place alongside the other. Thus, although the different representations within a single religion present the entire movement of its forms, the character of each religion is determined by the particular unity of consciousness and self-consciousness: that is, by self-consciousness having grasped within itself the determination of the object of consciousness, having completely appropriated it through its doing, and knowing it as essential as against the others.—The truth of faith in a determination of religious spirit shows itself in actual spirit's being constituted like the shape in which it intuits itself in religion. Thus, for example, the incarnation of God that occurs in Eastern religion has no truth, because its actual spirit lacks this reconciliation.—It is not appropriate here to return from the totality of determinations to an individual one and show in what shape the completeness of the others is contained within it and its particular religion. The higher form, set back under a lower one, 1807 640 lacks its significance for self-conscious spirit and belongs to it only superficially and in its representation. It must be considered in its distinctive significance and where it is the principle of this particular religion and is borne out by its actual spirit.
a, *The being of light*.
685 Spirit as the essence that is self-consciousness—or the self-conscious essence that is all truth and knows all actuality as itself—is as yet, in comparison with the reality it gives itself in the movement of its consciousness, only its concept. Compared with the day of this unfolding, this concept is the night of its essence; compared with the existence of its moments as independent shapes, it is the creative mystery of its birth. This mystery has its revelation within itself; for existence has its necessity in this concept, because the concept is self-knowing spirit and thus has in its essence the moment of being consciousness and representing itself objectively.—It is the pure I that possesses certainty of itself in its externalization, in itself as universal object; or this object is for it the interpenetration of all thought and all actuality.
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686 In the immediate first division of self-knowing absolute spirit, its shape has the determination belonging to immediate consciousness, or sensuous certainty. It intuits itself in the form of being, yet not the spiritless being, filled with contingent determinations of sensation, that belongs to sensuous certainty, but being filled with spirit. This equally contains the form that occurred in immediate self-consciousness: the form of the lord confronting spirit's self-consciousness as it retreats from its object.—This being filled with the concept of spirit is therefore the shape of spirit's simple relation to itself, or the shape of shapelessness. By virtue of this determination, it is the pure being of light of the dawn, containing and filling everything, preserving itself in its formless substantiality. Its otherness is the equally simple negative, darkness. The movements of its own externalization, its creations in the unresisting element of its otherness, are outpourings of light; in their simplicity they are at the same time its becoming-for-itself and return from its existence, streams of fire consuming shape. The difference it gives itself does indeed proliferate in the substance of existence and shape itself into the forms of nature; but the essential simplicity of its thought ranges restlessly and without understanding through them, 1807 642 extends their bounds beyond measure, and dissolves their beauty, heightened into splendor, in its sublimity.
687 The content this pure being develops, or its perceiving, is therefore an insubstantial play alongside this substance, which only rises without descending into itself, becoming subject, and stabilizing its differences through the self. Its determinations are only attributes that do not mature into independence but remain merely names of the many-named One. This One is clothed with the manifold powers of existence and the shapes of actuality as with a selfless adornment. They are only messengers of its might, lacking a will of their own, intuitions of its glory and voices of its praise.
688 But this reeling life must determine itself as being-for-itself and give its vanishing shapes subsistence. The immediate being in which it confronts its consciousness is itself the negative power that dissolves its differences. In truth, therefore, it is the self; and spirit accordingly passes over to knowing itself in the form of the self. Pure light scatters its simplicity into an infinity of forms and offers itself as a sacrifice to being-for-itself, so that the individual may take subsistence for itself from its substance.
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b. *The plant and the animal*.
689 Self-conscious spirit, which has withdrawn from shapeless essence into itself, or raised its immediacy to self in general, determines its simplicity as a manifoldness of being-for-itself and is the religion of spiritual perception, in which it breaks apart into the countless multiplicity of weaker and stronger, richer and poorer spirits. This pantheism, initially the tranquil subsistence of these atoms of spirit, becomes hostile movement within itself. The innocence of the religion of flowers, which is only a selfless representation of the self, passes over into the seriousness of embattled life, into the guilt of the religion of animals; the repose and powerlessness of intuiting individuality passes into destructive being-for-itself.—It is no help to have taken the death of abstraction away from the things of perception and raised them to beings of spiritual perception: the animating life of this realm of spirits contains death through its determinacy and negativity, which encroaches upon their innocent indifference. Through this negativity, dispersion into the manifoldness of tranquil plant shapes becomes a hostile movement in which the hatred of their being-for-itself consumes them.—The actual self-consciousness of this dispersed spirit 1807 644 is a multitude of isolated, unsociable national spirits that in their hatred fight one another to the death and become conscious of determinate animal shapes as their essence. For they are nothing other than animal spirits, self-isolating animal lives conscious of themselves without universality.
690 In this hatred, however, the determinacy of purely negative being-for-itself wears itself away, and through this movement of the concept spirit enters another shape. Sublated being-for-itself is the form of the object produced through the self, or rather is the self produced and wearing itself away—that is, becoming a thing. The worker, whose doing is not merely negative but pacified and positive, therefore gains the upper hand over animal spirits that merely tear one another apart. The consciousness of spirit is thus now the movement that has gone beyond immediate being-in-itself as well as abstract being-for-itself. Since the in-itself has been reduced through opposition to a determinacy, it is no longer the proper form of absolute spirit, but an actuality that spirit's consciousness finds confronting it as ordinary existence and sublates. Consciousness is equally not merely this sublating being-for-itself, but also produces its representation, being-for-itself set outside itself in the form of an object. Yet this production is not yet perfect production, but a conditioned activity and the forming of something given.
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c. *The master craftsman*.
691 Spirit thus appears here as the master craftsman, and its doing, through which it produces itself as object without yet having grasped the thought of itself, is an instinctive working, like bees building their cells.
692 The first form, because it is immediate, is the abstract form of understanding, and the work is not yet filled with spirit in itself. The crystals of pyramids and obelisks—simple combinations of straight lines, with flat surfaces and equal proportions among their parts, in which the incommensurability of the round has been eradicated—are the works of this master craftsman of strict form. Because of the form's merely intellectual character, it does not possess its meaning within itself, is not the spiritual self. The works therefore either merely receive spirit within them as an alien, departed spirit that has abandoned its living interpenetration with actuality and, itself dead, enters these lifeless crystals; or they relate externally to spirit as something itself external, not existing as spirit—as the rising light that casts its meaning upon them.
693 The separation from which working spirit begins—between being-in-itself, which becomes the material it 1807 646 works upon, and being-for-itself, which is the side of working self-consciousness—has become objective to it in its work. Its further effort must aim to sublate this separation of soul and body, to clothe and shape the soul in itself and to animate the body. As the two sides are brought closer together, they retain against one another the determinacy of represented spirit and of its surrounding shell; spirit's unity with itself contains this opposition of singularity and universality. As the work draws nearer to itself in its sides, the other result also comes about: it draws nearer to working self-consciousness, and self-consciousness attains in the work knowledge of itself as it is in and for itself. Yet in this way it initially constitutes only the abstract side of spirit's activity, which does not yet know its content within itself, but in its work, which is a thing. The master craftsman himself, the whole spirit, has not yet appeared, but is the still inward, hidden essence that exists as a whole only divided into active self-consciousness and its produced object.
694 The surrounding habitation, then, the external actuality initially raised only to the abstract form of understanding, is worked by the master craftsman into a more animated form. For this he uses plant life, which is no longer holy as it was for the earlier powerless 1807 647 pantheism, but is taken by him, who grasps himself as the essence being-for-itself, as something usable, and reduced to an exterior and an ornament. Yet it is not used unchanged: the worker in self-conscious form at the same time eradicates the transience belonging to this life's immediate existence and brings its organic forms closer to the stricter and more universal forms of thought. Organic form, which when left free proliferates in particularity, is for its part subjugated by the form of thought, while on the other hand raising these straight-lined and flat shapes into more animated curves—a blending that becomes the root of free architecture.
695 This dwelling, the side of the universal element or spirit's inorganic nature, now also encloses a shape of singularity that brings spirit—previously separated from existence, inward or external to it—closer to actuality, and thereby makes the work more like active self-consciousness. The worker first reaches for the form of being-for-itself in general, the animal shape. He proves that he is no longer immediately conscious of himself in animal life by constituting himself against it as the productive power and knowing himself in it as his work; through this, the animal shape at the same time becomes sublated and the hieroglyph of another meaning, a 1807 648 thought. Accordingly, the worker no longer uses it alone and entire, but blends it with the shape of thought, the human shape. Yet the work still lacks the shape and existence in which the self exists as self. It still lacks the ability to express in itself that it encloses an inward meaning; it lacks language, the element in which the informing sense itself is present. Thus even when the work has purified itself entirely of the animal and bears only the shape of self-consciousness, it is the still soundless shape that needs the ray of the rising sun to have a tone—a tone which, produced by light, is also only sound and not language, showing only an external self, not the inward one.
696 Opposed to this external self of the shape stands the other shape, which indicates that it has an inwardness within it. Nature returning into its essence reduces its living manifoldness, which individuates itself and becomes entangled in its movement, to an inessential casing, the covering of the inward; and this inwardness is initially still simple darkness, the motionless, black, formless stone.
697 Both presentations contain inwardness and existence, the two moments of spirit; and both contain both at once in an opposite relation, the self as both 1807 649 inward and outward. The two must be united.—The soul of the human-shaped statue does not yet emerge from within; it is not yet language, the existence that is inward in itself. And the inwardness of multiform existence is still soundless, not differentiating itself within itself, and still separated from its exterior, to which all differences belong.—The master craftsman therefore unites the two in the blending of natural and self-conscious shape; and these ambiguous beings, riddles to themselves, in which the conscious wrestles with the unconscious, pairing simple inwardness with the multiform exterior, the darkness of thought with the clarity of expression, break into the language of profound, scarcely intelligible wisdom.
698 In this work the instinctive labor that produced the unconscious work confronting self-consciousness comes to an end; for in it an equally self-conscious, self-expressing inwardness comes to meet the master craftsman's activity that constitutes self-consciousness. He has worked his way up within it to the division of his consciousness in which spirit encounters spirit. In this unity of self-conscious spirit with itself, insofar as it is to itself the shape and object of its consciousness, its mixtures with the unconscious mode of immediate natural shape are therefore purified away. These monstrosities of shape, 1807 650 speech, and deed dissolve into spiritual shape—an exterior that has gone into itself, an inwardness expressing itself out of itself and in itself—into thought that is self-engendering, clear existence, preserving its shape in conformity with itself. Spirit is artist.
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B. *The religion of art*.
699 Spirit has raised the shape in which it exists for its consciousness into the form of consciousness itself, and produces such a shape for itself. The master craftsman has given up synthetic working, the blending of the heterogeneous forms of thought and nature. As the shape has acquired the form of self-conscious activity, he has become a spiritual worker.
700 If we ask which actual spirit has in the religion of art the consciousness of its absolute essence, it emerges that this is ethical, or true, spirit. It is not merely the universal substance of all individuals; rather, because this substance has the shape of consciousness for actual consciousness, this means that, possessing individualization, it is known by them as their own essence and work. Thus for them it is neither the being of light, in whose unity the being-for-itself of self-consciousness is contained only negatively, only 1807 652 as passing away, and intuits the lord of its actuality; nor the restless mutual devouring of peoples who hate one another; nor their subjugation into castes that together make up the semblance of the organization of a perfected whole, but a whole lacking the universal freedom of individuals. Rather, it is the free people among whom ethical custom constitutes the substance of all, whose actuality and existence everyone, and each individual, knows as his will and deed.
701 The religion of ethical spirit, however, is its elevation above its actuality, its return from its truth into pure knowledge of itself. Since the ethical people lives in immediate unity with its substance and does not contain the principle of the pure singularity of self-consciousness, its religion appears in its perfection only in its departure from its subsistence. For the actuality of ethical substance rests partly on its tranquil unchangeability against the absolute movement of self-consciousness, and thus on self-consciousness's not yet having withdrawn from its tranquil custom and firm trust into itself; partly on its organization into a multiplicity of rights and duties, as well as its distribution among the bodies of the estates and their particular activities that work together toward the whole; and thus on the individual's being satisfied with the limitation of his existence and not yet having grasped the unbounded 1807 653 thought of his free self. But that tranquil immediate trust in substance returns into trust in oneself and into certainty of oneself; and the multiplicity of rights and duties, like limited activity, is the same dialectical movement of the ethical as is the multiplicity of things and their determinations—a movement finding its rest and stability only in the simplicity of spirit certain of itself.—The perfection of ethical life into free self-consciousness, and the fate of the ethical world, is therefore individuality withdrawn into itself, the absolute lightheartedness of ethical spirit, which has dissolved within itself all the fixed distinctions of its subsistence and the bodies of its organic articulation, and, perfectly secure in itself, attained unbounded joy and the freest enjoyment of itself. This simple certainty of spirit within itself has the ambiguous character of being tranquil subsistence and firm truth, as well as absolute unrest and the passing away of ethical life. But it turns into the latter, for the truth of ethical spirit is still only this substantial essence and trust in which the self does not know itself as free singularity, and which therefore perishes in this inwardness, or in the self's becoming free. Thus, when trust is broken and the substance of the people is fractured within itself, spirit, which was the middle term of unstable extremes, has now 1807 654 emerged into the extreme of self-consciousness grasping itself as essence. This is spirit certain within itself, mourning the loss of its world and now producing its essence, elevated above actuality, from the purity of the self.
702 In such an epoch absolute art emerges. Earlier, it is the instinctive working that, immersed in existence, works out of existence and into it, not having its substance in free ethical life and therefore not having free spiritual activity as its working self. Later, spirit has gone beyond art to attain its higher presentation: namely, to be in its presentation as object not only the substance born from the self, but this self; not merely to engender itself out of its concept, but to have its concept itself as its shape, so that the concept and the artwork produced know one another as one and the same.
703 Since, then, ethical substance has withdrawn from its existence into its pure self-consciousness, this self-consciousness is the side of the concept, or of the activity through which spirit produces itself as object. It is pure form because, in ethical obedience and service, the individual has worked away all unconscious existence and fixed determination within himself, just as substance itself has become this fluid essence. This form is the night in which substance was betrayed and made itself subject. From 1807 655 this night of pure certainty of itself, ethical spirit rises again as the shape freed from nature and its immediate existence.
704 The existence of the pure concept into which spirit has fled from its body is an individual whom it chooses as the vessel of its sorrow. Spirit is present in this individual as his universal and his power, from which he suffers violence—as his pathos, surrendered to which his self-consciousness loses its freedom. But that positive power of universality is subdued by the pure self of the individual as the negative power. This pure activity, conscious of its inalienable force, wrestles with unshaped essence; mastering it, the activity has made pathos its material and given itself its content, and this unity emerges as a work: universal spirit individualized and represented.
a. *The abstract artwork*.
705 The first artwork, as immediate, is abstract and individual. On its side, it must move out of its immediate and objective mode toward self-consciousness, just as, on the other side, self-consciousness for itself works in worship to sublate the 1807 656 distinction it initially gives itself from its spirit, and thereby to produce the artwork animated within itself.
706 The first mode, in which artistic spirit sets its shape and its active consciousness farthest apart, is the immediate mode in which the shape exists as a thing in general.—Within it, this divides into the distinction between singularity, which has the shape of the self within it, and universality, which presents inorganic essence in relation to the shape, as its surroundings and habitation. Through the elevation of the whole into the pure concept, this habitation acquires its pure form belonging to spirit. It is neither the crystal of understanding that houses the dead or is illuminated by an external soul, nor the mixture of the forms of nature and thought that first emerges from the plant, in which thought's activity is still an imitation. Rather, the concept strips away what still clings to the forms from roots, branches, and foliage, and purifies them into structures in which the straight lines and flat planes of the crystal are raised into incommensurable proportions, so that the animation of the organic is taken up into the abstract form of understanding, while its essence, incommensurability for the understanding, is at the same time preserved.
707 The indwelling god, however, is the black stone drawn out of its animal casing and penetrated with the 1807 657 light of consciousness. The human shape strips off the animal with which it was mixed; for the god, the animal is only a contingent disguise. It takes its place beside his true shape and no longer counts for anything in itself, but has sunk to meaning an other, to a mere sign. Precisely thereby, the god's shape also strips away within itself dependence on the natural conditions of animal existence, and indicates the internal arrangements of organic life as fused into its surface and belonging only to it.—The essence of the god, however, is the unity of nature's universal existence and self-conscious spirit, which in its actuality appears confronting nature. Initially also an individual shape, his existence is one of the elements of nature, just as his self-conscious actuality is an individual national spirit. But in this unity the former is the element reflected into spirit, nature transfigured through thought and united with self-conscious life. The divine shape therefore has its natural element within it as sublated, as a dim memory. The savage essence and confused struggle of the elements' free existence, the unethical realm of the Titans, is vanquished and banished to the edge of actuality that has become clear to itself, to the murky borders of the world that has found and pacified itself in spirit. These 1807 658 ancient gods into which the being of light, begetting with darkness, first particularizes itself—heaven, earth, ocean, sun, the blind Typhonic fire of the earth, and so on—are replaced by shapes that retain only a dimly reminiscent echo of those Titans and are no longer natural beings but the clear ethical spirits of self-conscious peoples.
708 This simple shape has thus eradicated within itself the unrest of infinite individuation and gathered it into tranquil individuality: both its individuation as the natural element, which is necessary only as universal essence but contingent in its existence and movement, and its individuation as the people, which, dispersed into the particular bodies of activity and the individual points of self-consciousness, has an existence of manifold meaning and doing. The moment of unrest therefore confronts it: self-consciousness confronts it, the essence, self-consciousness that, as the birthplace of this shape, retained nothing for itself but being pure activity. Everything belonging to substance the artist gave entirely to his work, but gave no actuality in the work to himself as a determinate individuality. He could bestow perfection upon it only by externalizing his particularity, disembodying himself and raising himself to the abstraction of pure doing.—In this first immediate production, the separation of the work and his 1807 659 self-conscious activity has not yet been reunited; the work is therefore not for itself actually animated, but is a whole only together with its becoming. What is commonplace about the artwork—that it is produced in consciousness and made by human hands—is the moment of the concept existing as concept, which confronts the work. And if this concept, as artist or spectator, is selfless enough to declare the artwork absolutely animated in itself and to forget itself as the one doing or looking, then against this we must hold fast to the concept of spirit, which cannot dispense with the moment of being conscious of itself. This moment, however, stands opposed to the work, because in this first division spirit gives both sides their abstract determinations of doing and being a thing against one another, and their return into the unity from which they proceeded has not yet come about.
709 In his work, then, the artist experiences that he has produced no essence equal to himself. A consciousness does indeed return to him from it, in that an admiring crowd reveres it as the spirit that is their essence. Yet because this animation returns his self-consciousness to him only as admiration, it is rather a confession that this animation makes to the artist of not being his equal. As it returns to him as joy in general, 1807 660 he does not find in it the pain of his forming and begetting, nor the effort of his labor. They may also judge the work, or bring it sacrifices, or place their consciousness in it in whatever way: if they set themselves above it with their knowledge, he knows how much more his deed is than their understanding and talk; if they place themselves beneath it and recognize in it the essence that rules them, he knows himself as its master.
710 The artwork therefore requires another element of existence, the god another emergence than this one in which, out of the depths of his creative night, he falls into the opposite, into externality, the determination of the thing devoid of self-consciousness. This higher element is language: an existence that is immediately self-conscious existence. Just as individual self-consciousness exists in it, so it is immediately present as a universal contagion. The complete particularization of being-for-itself is at the same time the fluidity and universally communicated unity of the many selves; language is the soul existing as soul. The god, then, who has language as the element of his shape is the artwork animated in itself, possessing immediately in its existence the pure activity that stood opposed to it when it existed as a thing. Or, in the becoming-objective of its essence, self-consciousness remains immediately at home with itself. Thus 1807 661 at home with itself in its essence, it is pure thought, or devotion, whose inwardness at the same time has existence in the hymn. The hymn retains within itself the singularity of self-consciousness, and, when heard, this singularity is at the same time present as universal. Devotion, kindled in all, is the spiritual stream that, in the multiplicity of self-consciousness, is conscious of itself as the same doing of all and as simple being. As this universal self-consciousness of all, spirit possesses its pure inwardness, as well as being-for-others and the being-for-itself of individuals, in a single unity.
711 This language differs from another language of the god that is not the language of universal self-consciousness. The oracle, of the god of the religion of art as well as of earlier religions, is his necessary first language. For his concept contains equally that he is the essence of nature and of spirit, and therefore has not only natural but also spiritual existence. Insofar as this moment initially lies only in his concept and is not yet realized in religion, the language is for religious self-consciousness the language of an alien self-consciousness. The self-consciousness still alien to its community does not yet exist in the way its concept demands. The self is simple and thereby absolutely universal being-for-itself; but the self-consciousness separated from that of the community is as yet only an individual.—The content of this particular and 1807 662 individual language results from the universal determinacy in which absolute spirit is posited in its religion generally.—The universal spirit of the dawn, which has not yet particularized its existence, therefore utters equally simple and universal propositions about essence, whose substantial content is sublime in its simple truth, yet because of this universality at the same time appears trivial to self-consciousness developing further.
712 The further cultivated self, which rises to being-for-itself, masters the pure pathos of substance, the objectivity of the dawning being of light, and knows that simplicity of truth as what is in itself, which does not have the form of contingent existence through an alien language, but is the sure and unwritten law of the gods, which lives forever, and no one knows from where it appeared.—Just as the universal truth revealed by the being of light has here withdrawn into the inward or lower realm, and thereby been freed of the form of contingent appearance, so, conversely, in the religion of art, because the shape of the god has assumed consciousness and thereby singularity in general, the god's own language—the god who is the spirit of the ethical people—is the oracle that knows its particular affairs and declares what is useful concerning them. Universal truths, however, because they are known as what is in itself, are claimed by knowing thought, and their language is 1807 663 no longer alien to it but its own. Just as that sage of antiquity sought what is good and beautiful in his own thought, while leaving to his daemon knowledge of the paltry, contingent content—whether it was good for him to associate with this or that person, or good for an acquaintance to undertake this journey, and similarly insignificant things—so universal consciousness obtains knowledge of the contingent from birds, or trees, or the fermenting earth whose vapor deprives self-consciousness of its composure. For the contingent is what lacks reflection and is alien, and ethical consciousness accordingly lets itself be determined about it in an unreflective and alien way, as by a throw of dice. If the individual determines himself through his understanding and deliberately chooses what is useful to him, this self-determination is grounded in the determinacy of his particular character; this is itself contingent. Hence that knowledge of understanding concerning what is useful to the individual is a knowledge just like that of those oracles or of the lot, except that the one consulting the oracle or lot thereby expresses the ethical disposition of indifference toward the contingent, whereas the former treats what is in itself contingent as an essential interest of his thought and knowledge. Higher than both, however, is indeed to make deliberation the oracle of contingent doing, but to know this deliberate action itself, because of its relation to the 1807 664 particular and its usefulness, as something contingent.
713 The true self-conscious existence that spirit receives in language which is not the language of an alien, and thus contingent, nonuniversal self-consciousness is the artwork we saw above. It stands opposed to the thinglike artwork of the statue. Just as the latter is existence at rest, the former is vanishing existence; just as in the latter objectivity, set free, lacks its own immediate self, so in the former it remains too enclosed within the self, attains too little shape, and, like time, immediately no longer exists in the very act of existing.
714 Worship constitutes the movement of both sides in which the divine shape moving in the pure feeling element of self-consciousness and the divine shape resting in the element of thinghood reciprocally give up their different determinations, and the unity that is the concept of their essence comes into existence. In worship, the self gives itself the consciousness of divine essence descending to it from its beyond; and this essence, previously nonactual and merely objective, thereby receives the actuality proper to self-consciousness.
715 This concept of worship is already implicitly contained and present in the stream of hymnal song. This devotion is the immediate pure satisfaction of the self through and within itself. It 1807 665 is the purified soul, which in this purity is immediately only essence and one with essence. Because of its abstraction, it is not consciousness distinguishing its object from itself, and thus is only the night of the object's existence and the prepared place for its shape. Abstract worship therefore raises the self to being this pure divine element. The soul accomplishes this purification consciously; yet it is not the self that, having descended into its depths, knows itself as evil, but is a self that is: a soul that cleanses its exterior by washing, clothes it in white garments, and leads its inwardness along the represented path of labors, punishments, and rewards, the path of cultivation externalizing particularity in general, through which it attains the dwellings and community of the blessed.
716 This worship is as yet only a secret—that is, merely represented, nonactual—accomplishment. It must be actual action; a nonactual action contradicts itself. Through this, consciousness proper rises into its pure self-consciousness. Within it, essence has the meaning of a free object; through actual worship this object returns into the self. And insofar as in pure consciousness it has the meaning of pure essence dwelling beyond actuality, this essence descends from its universality through this 1807 666 mediation to singularity and thus joins itself with actuality.
717 The way both sides enter action is determined as follows: for the self-conscious side, insofar as it is actual consciousness, essence presents itself as actual nature. On the one hand, nature belongs to it as possession and property and counts as existence that is not in itself; on the other, nature is its own immediate actuality and singularity, likewise regarded by it as nonessence and sublated. At the same time, however, for its pure consciousness that external nature has the opposite meaning, namely of being the essence that is in itself, before which the self sacrifices its inessentiality, just as, conversely, it sacrifices nature's inessential side to itself. The action is spiritual movement because it is this twofold movement: to sublate the abstraction of essence, as devotion determines the object, and make it actual; and to sublate the actual, as the agent determines the object and itself, and elevate it into universality.
718 The action of worship itself therefore begins with the pure surrender of a possession, which the owner pours out or lets rise in smoke, apparently to no use for himself. In this he renounces, before the essence of his pure consciousness, possession and the right of property and its enjoyment, personality and the return of doing 1807 667 into the self, and reflects the action into the universal, or into essence, rather than into himself.—Conversely, however, existent essence equally perishes in this. The animal sacrificed is the sign of a god; the fruits consumed are the living Ceres and Bacchus themselves. In the former die the powers of the upper right, which has blood and actual life; in the latter die the powers of the lower right, which, bloodless, possesses secret, cunning power.—Insofar as the sacrifice of divine substance is doing, it belongs to the self-conscious side; for this actual doing to be possible, essence must already have sacrificed itself in itself. It has done so by giving itself existence and making itself the individual animal and the fruit. This renunciation, already accomplished in itself by essence, is presented by the acting self in existence and for its consciousness; and it replaces that immediate actuality of essence with the higher actuality, namely its own. For the unity that has arisen as the result of the sublation of the singularity and separation of both sides is not merely negative fate, but has positive meaning. Only to abstract subterranean essence is what is sacrificed wholly surrendered, thereby marking the reflection of possession and being-for-itself into the universal as distinct from the self as such. At the same time, however, this is only 1807 668 a small part, and the other sacrificing is merely the destruction of the unusable, and rather the preparation of the sacrifice for a meal whose feast cheats the action of its negative meaning. In that first sacrifice, the sacrificer reserves the greater part, and in this one the useful part, for his enjoyment. This enjoyment is the negative power that sublates essence as well as singularity, and at the same time it is the positive actuality in which the objective existence of essence is transformed into self-conscious existence, and the self has consciousness of its unity with essence.
719 This worship is indeed an actual action, yet its meaning lies more in devotion alone; what belongs to devotion is not objectively produced, just as the result deprives itself of existence in enjoyment. Worship therefore goes further and initially remedies this deficiency by giving its devotion an objective subsistence, as the common labor, or individual labor possible for everyone, that produces the dwelling and adornment of the god in his honor.—Through this the objectivity of the statue is partly sublated, for by this consecration of his gifts and labors the worker makes the god favorable to him and intuits his self as belonging to the god; partly, too, this doing is not the individual labor of the artist, but this particularity is dissolved in universality. Yet it is not only the 1807 669 god's honor that is brought about, nor does the blessing of his favor flow to the worker only in representation; rather, labor also has the reverse meaning to its first meaning of externalization and the honor of another. The god's dwellings and halls are for human use, the treasures preserved in them belong in times of need to human beings; the honor the god enjoys in his adornment is the honor of the people skilled in art and generous in spirit. At the festival this people likewise adorns its own dwellings and clothing, as well as its activities, with elegant equipment. In this way, for its gifts it receives recompense from the grateful god and proofs of his favor, in which it joined itself with him through labor—not in hope and a distant actuality, but in the honoring and offering of gifts it immediately enjoys its own wealth and adornment.
b. *The living artwork*.
720 The people that approaches its god in the worship of the religion of art is the ethical people, which knows its state and the state's actions as the will and accomplishment of itself. This spirit, confronting the self-conscious people, 1807 670 is therefore not the being of light, which, selfless, does not contain the certainty of individuals within itself, but is rather only their universal essence and the imperious power in which they vanish… The worship of the religion of this simple, shapeless essence therefore returns to its adherents only this in general: that they are the people of their god. It obtains for them only their subsistence and simple substance in general, not their actual self, which is instead rejected. For they revere their god as empty depth, not as spirit. Yet the worship of the religion of art, on the other hand, lacks that abstract simplicity of essence, and therefore its depth. But the essence that is immediately united with the self is in itself spirit and knowing truth, although not yet truth known, or knowing itself in its depths. Because essence here thus contains the self, its appearance is friendly to consciousness; and in worship consciousness receives not only the universal warrant for its subsistence but also its self-conscious existence within essence. Conversely, essence has its actuality not as a selfless actuality in a rejected people whose substance alone is recognized, but in the people whose self is recognized in its substance.
721 From worship, then, self-consciousness emerges satisfied in its essence, and the god has entered it as his dwelling. This dwelling is for itself the night of substance, or its pure individuality, 1807 671 but no longer the strained individuality of the artist, not yet reconciled with his essence becoming objective. Rather, it is the satisfied night that has its pathos within it without need, because it returns from intuition, from sublated objectivity.—This pathos is for itself the essence of dawn, but an essence that has now set within itself and has its setting—self-consciousness, and thereby existence and actuality—within itself.—Here it has traversed the movement of its actualization. Lowering itself from its pure essentiality to an objective power of nature and that power's manifestations, it is an existence for the other, for the self by which it is consumed. The silent essence of selfless nature attains in its fruit the stage at which, preparing and digesting itself, it offers itself to self-endowed life. In its usefulness, its capacity to be eaten and drunk, it reaches its highest perfection; for therein it is the possibility of a higher existence and touches spiritual existence. Partly as quietly potent substance, partly as spiritual fermentation, the spirit of earth has developed in its metamorphosis, in the former case into the feminine principle of nourishment, in the latter into the masculine principle of the self-impelling force of self-conscious existence.
722 In this enjoyment, then, that dawning being of light is disclosed for what it is; enjoyment is its mystery 1807 672. For the mystical is not the concealment of a secret, or ignorance, but consists in the self's knowing itself as one with essence, which is thus revealed. Only the self is manifest to itself, or what is manifest is so only in the immediate certainty of itself. But through worship simple essence has been posited in this certainty. As a useful thing it has not merely the existence that is seen, felt, smelled, and tasted, but is also the object of desire; through actual enjoyment it becomes one with the self and thereby wholly disclosed and manifest to it.—What is said to be manifest to reason or to the heart is in fact still secret, for it still lacks the actual certainty of immediate existence, both objective certainty and the certainty of enjoyment, which in religion is not merely thoughtless immediate certainty but at the same time the purely knowing certainty of the self.
723 What has thus become manifest within self-conscious spirit itself through worship is simple essence as the movement partly of emerging from its nocturnal concealment into consciousness, to be consciousness's quietly nourishing substance, and partly of losing itself again in the subterranean night, in the self, and lingering above only with a mother's silent yearning.—The more clamorous impulse, however, is the many-named being of light of the dawn 1807 673 and its reeling life, which likewise relinquishes its abstract being, first gathers itself into the objective existence of the fruit, then surrenders itself to self-consciousness and attains actuality proper within it—now roaming about as a throng of frenzied women, the unbridled revel of nature in self-conscious shape.
724 Yet what has been disclosed to consciousness is still only absolute spirit as this simple essence, not spirit as it is in itself as spirit: only immediate spirit, the spirit of nature. Its self-conscious life is therefore only the mystery of bread and wine, of Ceres and Bacchus, not of the other, properly higher gods, whose individuality contains self-consciousness as such as an essential moment. Spirit has therefore not yet sacrificed itself to consciousness as self-conscious spirit, and the mystery of bread and wine is not yet the mystery of flesh and blood.
725 This unsettled revel of the god must quiet itself into an object, and the inspiration that did not attain consciousness must produce a work confronting it—as the statue confronted the inspiration of the preceding artist—as an equally perfected work, but not as something lifeless within itself, rather as a living self.—Such a worship is the festival that the human being gives in his own honor, though 1807 674 he does not yet invest such a human being with the meaning of absolute essence. For essence alone is manifest to him as yet, not spirit—not as something that essentially assumes human shape. Yet this worship lays the ground for that revelation and lays out its moments separately: here the abstract moment of essence's living bodiliness, as previously the unity of both in unconscious frenzy. The human being therefore places himself in the position of the statue, as a shape trained and worked into perfectly free movement, just as the statue is perfectly free repose. While every individual knows how to present himself at least as a torchbearer, one among them stands out who is movement given shape, the polished finish and fluid strength of every limb—an animated living artwork that couples strength with its beauty and receives, as the prize of its strength, the adornment with which the statue was honored, and the honor among its people of being, in place of the stone god, the highest bodily presentation of their essence.
726 In the two presentations just encountered, the unity of self-consciousness and spiritual essence is present, but they still lack their equilibrium. In Bacchic inspiration the self is outside itself, while in beautiful bodiliness spiritual essence is outside itself. The former's stupor of consciousness and wild stammering must be taken up into the 1807 675 clear existence of the latter, and the latter's spiritless clarity into the inwardness of the former. The perfect element in which inwardness is as much outward as outwardness is inward is once again language—but neither the language of the oracle, wholly contingent and individual in content, nor the feeling hymn praising only the individual god, nor the contentless stammering of Bacchic frenzy. Rather, language has acquired its clear and universal content: its clear content, because the artist has worked his way out of the first wholly substantial inspiration into a shape that is an existence of its own, penetrated in all its movements by the self-conscious soul and living along with it; its universal content, because in this festival, which honors the human being, the one-sidedness of statues containing only one national spirit, one determinate character of divinity, disappears. The beautiful athlete is indeed the honor of his particular people, but he is a bodily singularity in which the fullness and seriousness of meaning, and the inward character of spirit bearing the particular life, concerns, needs, and customs of his people, have perished. In this externalization into complete bodiliness, spirit has laid aside the particular impressions and echoes of nature that it contained as the actual spirit of the people. Its people is 1807 676 therefore no longer conscious in him of its particularity, but rather of the laying aside of that particularity and of the universality of its human existence.
c. *The spiritual artwork*.
727 The national spirits that become conscious of the shape of their essence in a particular animal merge into one; so the particular beautiful national spirits unite into one pantheon whose element and dwelling is language. The pure intuition of itself as universal humanity takes, in the actuality of the national spirit, the form of its joining with the others, with whom it constitutes one nation by nature, in a common enterprise, and forming for this work a collective people and thereby a collective heaven. Yet this universality attained by spirit in its existence is only this first universality, which initially proceeds from the individuality of ethical life, has not yet overcome its immediacy, and has not formed one state out of these peoples. The ethical life of the actual national spirit rests partly on the immediate trust of individuals in the whole of their people, partly on the immediate share that all, regardless of differences of estate, take in the 1807 677 decisions and actions of government. In the union, initially not into a permanent order but merely for a common action, that freedom of participation of each and all is temporarily set aside. This first commonality is therefore more an assembly of individualities than the rule of abstract thought that would deprive individuals of their self-conscious share in the will and deed of the whole.
728 The assembly of national spirits constitutes a circle of shapes now embracing the whole of nature as well as the whole ethical world. They too stand more under the supreme command of one than under his sovereignty. For themselves they are the universal substances of what the self-conscious essence is and does in itself. This essence, however, constitutes the power and initially at least the center about which those universal beings busy themselves, a center that as yet seems to connect their affairs only contingently. Yet the return of divine essence into self-consciousness already contains the ground for self-consciousness's constituting the center for those divine powers, and initially conceals the essential unity beneath the form of a friendly external relation between the two worlds.
729 The same universality belonging to this content necessarily also belongs to the form of 1807 678 consciousness in which it appears. It is no longer the actual doing of worship, but a doing raised, though not yet into the concept, at least into representation, into the synthetic connection of self-conscious and external existence. The existence of this representation, language, is the first language, the epic as such, containing the universal content at least as the completeness of the world, though not as the universality of thought. The singer is the individual and actual being from whom, as the subject of this world, it is produced and sustained. His pathos is not the stupefying power of nature but Mnemosyne, recollection and inwardness that has come to be, the remembrance of the previously immediate essence. He is the organ that vanishes in its content; what counts is not his own self but his Muse, his universal song. Yet what is in fact present is the syllogism in which the extreme of universality, the world of the gods, is linked through the middle term of particularity with singularity, the singer. The middle term is the people in its heroes, who are individual human beings like the singer, but only represented and thereby at the same time universal, like the free extreme of universality, the gods.
730 In this epic, then, what comes about in itself in worship is in general presented to consciousness: the relation of the divine to the human. The content is an action of self-conscious essence. Acting disturbs the repose of 1807 679 substance and stirs essence, through which its simplicity is divided and opened into the manifold world of natural and ethical powers. Action is the violation of the tranquil earth, the pit that, animated by blood, summons the departed spirits, which, thirsting for life, receive it in the doing of self-consciousness. The undertaking about which the universal effort turns acquires two sides: the self-endowed side of being accomplished by a totality of actual peoples and the individualities standing at their head, and the universal side of being accomplished by their substantial powers. But the relation between the two was determined above as the synthetic connection of universal and individual, or as representation. The judgment of this world depends on this determinacy.—The relation between the two is consequently a mixture that inconsistently divides the unity of doing and needlessly tosses the action from one side to the other. The universal powers possess the shape of individuality and thereby the principle of action; their operation therefore appears as a doing as free and wholly originating from themselves as human doing. One and the same thing has therefore been done by gods and human beings alike. The seriousness of those powers is a ridiculous excess, since human beings are in fact the force of acting individuality; and the exertion and 1807 680 labor of the latter is an equally useless effort, since the former instead direct everything.—The mortals of a day, who are nothing, are at the same time the mighty self that subjects universal beings to itself, wounds the gods, and in general provides them with actuality and an interest in doing. Conversely, these powerless universalities, which feed on human gifts and only thereby receive something to do, are the natural essence and material of all events, and likewise the ethical material and pathos of doing. If their elemental natures are first brought into actuality and active relation through the free self of individuality, they are just as much the universal withdrawing from this connection, remaining unlimited in its determination, and through the invincible elasticity of its unity effacing the punctuality of the agent and its configurations, maintaining itself in purity, and dissolving everything individual in its fluidity.
731 Just as they fall into this contradictory relation with the opposing self-endowed nature, so their universality comes into conflict with their own determination and its relation to others. They are the eternal, beautiful individuals that, resting in their own existence, are removed from transience and alien violence.—Yet at the same time they are determinate elements, particular 1807 681 gods, and thus relate to others. But relation to others, which in its opposition is a conflict with them, is a comic self-forgetting of their eternal nature.—Determinacy is rooted in divine subsistence and has, in its limitation, the independence of the whole individuality; through this their characters at the same time lose the sharpness of their distinctive traits and mingle in their ambiguity.—A purpose of their activity, and their activity itself, since it is directed against an other and thus against an invincible divine power, is a contingent, empty swagger that equally dissolves, turning the apparent seriousness of the action into a harmless, self-assured play without result or success. Yet if, in the nature of their divinity, the negative or their determinacy appears only as the inconsistency of their activity and the contradiction of purpose and outcome, and that independent security retains the upper hand over determinacy, then precisely thereby the pure force of the negative confronts them as their ultimate power, over which they have no power. They are the universal and positive against the individual self of mortals, which cannot withstand their might; but the universal self therefore hovers over them and over this entire world of representation to which the whole content belongs, as the conceptless emptiness of necessity: an event before 1807 682 which they behave selflessly and mournfully, for these determinate natures do not find themselves in this purity.
732 This necessity, however, is the unity of the concept to which the contradictory substantiality of individual moments is subject, in which the inconsistency and contingency of their doing is ordered and the play of their actions receives its seriousness and worth within those actions themselves. The content of the world of representation plays out its movement, released and for itself, in the middle, gathered about the individuality of a hero who, however, in his strength and beauty feels his life broken and mourns as he looks toward an early death. For singularity stable within itself and actual is excluded to the extremity and divided into its moments, which have not yet found and united with one another. The one individual, the abstract, nonactual individual, is necessity, which has no share in the life of the middle, any more than the other, the actual individual, the singer, who keeps himself outside it and disappears in his representation. Both extremes must approach the content: the one, necessity, must fill itself with the content; the other, the singer's language, must share in it; and the content, previously left to itself, must acquire within itself the certainty and firm determination of the negative.
1807 683
733 This higher language, tragedy, thus draws closer together the dispersion of the moments of the essential and acting world. The substance of the divine separates into its shapes according to the nature of the concept, and its movement likewise conforms to the concept. As regards form, language, by entering into the content, ceases to be narrative, just as the content ceases to be represented. The hero is himself the speaker, and the representation shows the listener, who is at the same time a spectator, self-conscious human beings who know their right and their purpose, the power and will of their determinacy, and know how to say it. They are artists who do not, like the language accompanying ordinary doing in actual life, unconsciously, naturally, and naively express the exterior of their decision and enterprise. Rather, they utter the inner essence, demonstrate the right of their action, and thoughtfully maintain and determinately express the pathos to which they belong in its universal individuality, free of contingent circumstances and the particularity of personalities. Finally, the existence of these characters is actual human beings who assume the persons of the heroes and present them in actual speech that is not narrative but their own. Just as it is essential to the statue to be made by human hands, so the actor is essential to his mask—not as an external condition from which the contemplation of art must abstract; or, insofar 1807 684 as it must indeed abstract from it, this says precisely that art does not yet contain within itself the true, proper self.
734 The universal ground on which the movement of these shapes produced from the concept takes place is the consciousness of the first representational language and its selfless content left dispersed. It is the common people in general, whose wisdom finds speech in the chorus of old age. The people has its representative in the chorus's powerlessness, because it itself constitutes only the positive and passive material of the individuality of government confronting it. Lacking the power of the negative, it cannot hold together and tame the wealth and colorful fullness of divine life, but lets it scatter, praising each individual moment as an independent god, now this one, now another, in its reverent hymns. But where it senses the seriousness of the concept striding over these shapes and shattering them, and sees how badly its praised gods fare when they venture onto this ground where the concept rules, it is not itself the negative power intervening in action. Rather, it remains in the selfless thought of that power, in the consciousness of alien fate, and contributes the empty wish for peace and the weak speech of appeasement. In fear before the higher powers, the immediate arms of 1807 685 substance, before their conflict with one another and before the simple self of necessity that crushes them too, like the living beings bound to them; in pity for these beings, whom it knows at the same time to be the same as itself, there is for it only inactive terror at this movement, equally helpless lament, and, as the end, the empty repose of resignation to necessity. Necessity's work is grasped neither as the necessary action of character nor as the doing of absolute essence within itself.
735 Upon this observing consciousness, as upon the indifferent ground of representation, spirit appears not in its dispersed manifoldness but in the simple division of the concept. Its substance therefore shows itself torn apart only into its two extreme powers. These elemental universal essences are at the same time self-conscious individualities: heroes who place their consciousness in one of these powers, have in it the determinacy of their character, and constitute its activity and actuality.—This universal individualization, as noted, descends still further to the immediate actuality of existence proper and presents itself to a crowd of spectators that has in the chorus its counterpart, or rather its own self-expressing representation.
736 The content and movement of spirit that is here its own object have already been considered as the nature and 1807 686 realization of ethical substance. In its religion spirit attains consciousness of itself, or presents itself to its consciousness in its purer form and simpler shape. Thus, if ethical substance divided through its concept, according to its content, into the two powers determined as divine and human, or subterranean and upper right—the former the family, the latter state power, the first having the female, the other the male character—then the circle of gods, previously multiform and wavering in its determinations, is restricted to these powers, which through this determination have been brought nearer to individuality proper. For the earlier dispersion of the whole into manifold, abstract powers appearing as substantialized is the dissolution of the subject, which comprehends them only as moments within its self, and individuality is therefore merely the superficial form of those beings. Conversely, any further distinction of characters beyond the one named must be reckoned as contingent personality, external in itself.
737 At the same time, essence divides according to its form, or knowledge. Acting spirit, as consciousness, confronts the object upon which it acts and which is thus determined as the negative of the knower. The agent thereby finds himself in the opposition of knowing and not-knowing. He takes his purpose from his character and knows it 1807 687 as ethical essence; but through the determinacy of his character he knows only the one power of substance, while the other is hidden from him. Present actuality is therefore one thing in itself and another for consciousness. In this relation upper and lower right acquire the meaning of the power that knows and reveals itself to consciousness and the power that conceals itself and lies in ambush. The one is the side of light, the god of the oracle who, in his natural moment sprung from the sun that illuminates everything, knows and reveals all—Phoebus, and Zeus, his father. Yet the commands of this truth-speaking god and his announcements of what is are, rather, deceptive. For in its concept this knowledge is immediately not-knowing, because consciousness in action is this opposition within itself. The one who could himself solve the riddle of the enigmatic Sphinx, as well as the one who trusts with a child's confidence, is therefore sent to ruin by what the god reveals to him. This priestess through whom the beautiful god speaks is nothing other than the equivocal sisters of fate, who drive to crime through their promises and, through the double meaning of what they offered as security, deceive whoever relied on the obvious sense. Thus the consciousness purer than the latter, which believes the witches, and more reflective 1807 688 and thorough than the former, which trusts the priestess and the beautiful god, hesitates over revenge after the revelation made by his father's spirit itself concerning the crime that murdered him, and arranges for further proofs—on the ground that this revealing spirit might also be the devil.
738 This mistrust is grounded because knowing consciousness places itself in the opposition between certainty of itself and objective essence. The right asserted by ethical consciousness—that actuality is nothing in itself as opposed to absolute law—meets with the experience that its knowledge is one-sided, its law only the law of its character, and that it has grasped only one power of substance. Action itself is this inversion of the known into its opposite, being; it is the overturning of the right of character and knowledge into the right of the opposite, with which the former is linked in the essence of substance—into the Erinys of the other power and character, stirred to hostility. This lower right sits on the throne with Zeus and enjoys equal standing with manifest right and the knowing god.
739 Acting individuality restricts the chorus's world of gods to these three essences. The one is substance, equally the power of the hearth and the spirit of familial piety and the universal power of state and 1807 689 government. Since this distinction belongs to substance as such, it does not individualize itself for representation into two distinct shapes, but has in actuality the two persons of its characters. By contrast, the distinction between knowing and not-knowing falls within each actual self-consciousness, and only in abstraction, in the element of universality, is it distributed between two individual shapes. For the self of the hero has existence only as whole consciousness and is therefore essentially the whole distinction belonging to form; but his substance is determinate, and only one side of the distinction of content belongs to him. Thus the two sides of consciousness, which in actuality have no separate individuality of their own, each receive their particular shape in representation: the one that of the revealing god, the other of the Erinys who keeps herself hidden. The two partly enjoy equal honor; partly, the shape of substance, Zeus, is the necessity of their relation to one another. Substance is the relation in which knowledge is for itself but has its truth in the simple; the difference through which actual consciousness exists has its ground in the inner essence that effaces it; and the self-clear assurance of certainty has its confirmation in forgetfulness.
740 Consciousness opened up this opposition through action. Acting according to manifest knowledge, 1807 690 it experiences that knowledge's deception; and, devoted in content to one attribute of substance, it violated the other and thereby gave it a right against itself. Following the knowing god, it grasped instead the unmanifest, and pays for having trusted knowledge, whose ambiguity, since it is knowledge's nature, had also to be present for it as a warning. The priestess's frenzy, the witches' inhuman shape, the voice of the tree or bird, the dream, and so on, are not the modes in which truth appears but warning signs of deception, thoughtlessness, the singularity and contingency of knowledge. Or, what is the same, the opposing power it violates is present as expressed law and valid right, whether the law of the family or of the state; against this, consciousness followed its own knowledge and concealed the manifest from itself. But the truth of the powers of content and consciousness confronting one another is the result that both have equal right and therefore, in their opposition produced by action, equal wrong. The movement of doing demonstrates their unity in the mutual downfall of both powers and of the self-conscious characters. The opposition's reconciliation with itself is the Lethe of the underworld in death, or the Lethe of the upper world as acquittal—not from guilt, for consciousness, because it 1807 691 acted, cannot deny this, but from crime—and its atoning peace. Both are forgetfulness, the vanishedness of the actuality and doing of the powers of substance, of their individualities, and of the powers of the abstract thought of good and evil. For neither power for itself is the essence; rather, essence is the repose of the whole within itself, the motionless unity of fate, tranquil existence and thereby the inactivity and lifelessness of family and government, the equal honor and thereby indifferent nonactuality of Apollo and the Erinys, and the return of their inspiration and activity into simple Zeus.
741 This fate completes the depopulation of heaven—the thoughtless mixture of individuality and essence, a mixture through which the doing of essence appears inconsistent, contingent, and unworthy of it; for individuality, attached to essence only superficially, is inessential. The expulsion of such essenceless representations demanded by philosophers of antiquity therefore begins already in tragedy in general, insofar as the division of substance is governed by the concept, individuality is thus essential, and the determinations are absolute characters. The self-consciousness represented in tragedy therefore knows and recognizes 1807 692 only one highest power, and this Zeus only as the power of state or hearth, and, in the opposition of knowledge, only as the father of the knowledge of the particular taking shape, and as the Zeus of the oath and of the Erinys, of the universal, inwardness dwelling in concealment. By contrast, the moments that disperse further out of the concept into representation and that the chorus successively accepts are not the hero's pathos but sink for him into passion—into contingent, essenceless moments that the selfless chorus indeed praises, but that are incapable of constituting the heroes' character or of being expressed and esteemed by them as their essence.
742 Yet the persons of divine essence itself, like the characters of its substance, also converge into the simplicity of the unconscious. In relation to self-consciousness, this necessity has the determination of being the negative power of all appearing shapes, in which self-consciousness does not recognize itself but instead perishes. The self appears only as allotted to the characters, not as the middle term of the movement. But self-consciousness, the simple certainty of itself, is in fact the negative power, the unity of Zeus, the substantial essence, and abstract necessity; it is the spiritual unity into which everything returns. Because actual self-consciousness is still distinguished from substance and fate, it is partly the chorus 1807 693, or rather the observing crowd, which this movement of divine life fills with fear as something alien, or in which, as something close at hand, it produces only the emotion of inactive pity. Partly, insofar as consciousness participates in action and belongs to the characters, this union—because the true union of self, fate, and substance is not yet present—is external, a playacting. The hero appearing before the spectator divides into his mask and the actor, into the person and the actual self.
743 The self-consciousness of the heroes must emerge from its mask and present itself as it knows itself to be the fate both of the gods of the chorus and of the absolute powers themselves, and as no longer separated from the chorus, universal consciousness.
744 Comedy, then, has first of all the aspect that actual self-consciousness presents itself as the fate of the gods. As universal moments, these elemental essences are neither self nor actual. They are indeed equipped with the form of individuality, but this is only imagined for them and does not belong to them in and for themselves. The actual self does not have such an abstract moment as its substance and content. It, the subject, is therefore raised above such a moment as above an individual property; and, wearing this mask, it expresses the irony of that property which wants to be something 1807 694 for itself. The pretensions of universal essence are exposed to the self: it shows itself caught in an actuality and drops its mask precisely when it wants to be something proper. Appearing here in its meaning as actual, the self plays with the mask it once puts on to be its person—but just as quickly emerges again from this semblance in its own nakedness and ordinariness, which it shows to be indistinguishable from the proper self, the actor, as well as from the spectator.
745 This universal dissolution of shaped essence in general in its individuality becomes more serious in its content, and thereby more mischievous and bitter, insofar as the content has its more serious and necessary meaning. Divine substance unites within itself the meaning of natural and ethical essence. As regards the natural, actual self-consciousness already shows itself, in using nature for its adornment, dwelling, and so on, and in the feast of its sacrifice, to be the fate to which the secret of nature's selfhood has been disclosed. In the mystery of bread and wine, self-consciousness appropriates nature together with the meaning of inner essence, and in comedy it is conscious of the irony of this meaning in general.—Now insofar as this meaning contains ethical essence, it is partly the people in its 1807 695 two aspects, the state or demos proper and familial singularity; partly, however, self-conscious pure knowledge, or rational thought of the universal.—That demos, the universal mass that knows itself as lord and ruler and as the understanding and insight to be respected, constrains and deludes itself through the particularity of its actuality, presenting the ridiculous contrast between its opinion of itself and its immediate existence, its necessity and contingency, its universality and vulgarity. When the principle of its singularity separated from the universal emerges in actuality's proper shape and openly lays claim to and organizes the commonwealth whose secret injury it is, the contrast is more immediately disclosed between the universal as a theory and what matters in practice: the complete liberation of the purposes of immediate singularity from universal order and the mockery of the latter by the former.
746 Rational thought frees divine essence from its contingent shape and, opposed to the chorus's conceptless wisdom, which brings forth various moral sayings and accepts a multitude of laws and determinate concepts of duty and right, raises them to the simple ideas of the beautiful and the good.—The movement of this 1807 696 abstraction is consciousness of the dialectic these maxims and laws have within themselves, and thereby of the disappearance of the absolute validity in which they previously appeared. As the contingent determination and superficial individuality that representation lent divine essences disappears, on their natural side they retain only the nakedness of their immediate existence: they are clouds, a vanishing vapor, like those representations. In their thought essentiality, having become the simple thoughts of the beautiful and the good, they permit themselves to be filled with any content at will. The force of dialectical knowledge hands determinate laws and maxims of action over to the pleasure and frivolity of youth, which is thereby led astray, and places weapons of deception in the hands of the anxiety and care of old age, confined to life's singularity. The pure thoughts of the beautiful and the good thus offer the comic spectacle of becoming empty through liberation from opinion—which contains both their determinacy as content and their absolute determinacy, consciousness's holding fast—and thereby becoming the plaything of opinion and the caprice of contingent individuality.
747 Here, then, the previously unconscious fate, which consists in empty repose and forgetfulness 1807 697 and is separated from self-consciousness, is united with it. The individual self is the negative power through and in which the gods and their moments, existent nature and the thoughts of its determinations, disappear. At the same time it is not the emptiness of vanishing, but preserves itself in this nullity, is at home with itself, and is the sole actuality. The religion of art has perfected itself in this self and returned completely into itself. Because it is individual consciousness in its certainty of itself that presents itself as this absolute power, this power has lost the form of something represented, separated from consciousness in general and alien to it, as were the statue, the living beautiful body, the content of the epic, and the powers and persons of tragedy. Nor is the unity the unconscious unity of worship and the mysteries; rather, the actor's proper self coincides with his person, as does the spectator, who is completely at home in what is presented to him and sees himself playing. What this self-consciousness intuits is that whatever assumes the form of essence against it instead dissolves and is surrendered within its thinking, existence, and doing. It is the return of everything universal into certainty of itself, which is thereby complete fearlessness, the 1807 698 essencelessness of everything alien, and a well-being and ease of consciousness unlike any to be found outside this comedy.
1807 699
C. *Revealed religion*.
748 Through the religion of art spirit has passed from the form of substance into that of the subject, for this religion produces its shape and thus posits within it doing, or self-consciousness, which merely vanishes in the terrible substance and does not grasp itself in trust. This incarnation of divine essence begins with the statue, which has only the external shape of the self, while the inward, its activity, falls outside it. In worship, however, both sides have become one; in the result of the religion of art, this unity in its perfection has also passed over to the extreme of the self. In spirit perfectly certain of itself in the singularity of consciousness, all essence has submerged. The proposition expressing this lightheartedness reads: the self is absolute essence. The essence that was substance, and in 1807 700 which the self was accidentality, has sunk to a predicate; and in this self-consciousness, confronted by nothing in the form of essence, spirit has lost its consciousness.
749 This proposition, the self is absolute essence, belongs, as is evident, to nonreligious, actual spirit, and we must recall the shape of spirit that expresses it. This shape will also contain the movement and reversal of the proposition, which lowers the self to a predicate and elevates substance to subject. This occurs in such a way that the reversed proposition does not make substance into subject in itself or for us—or, what is the same, restore substance so that spirit's consciousness is led back to its beginning, natural religion—but brings about this reversal for and through self-consciousness itself. By giving itself up consciously, self-consciousness is preserved in its externalization and remains the subject of substance; but, as equally externalized, it has at the same time consciousness of substance. Or, by producing substance as subject through its sacrifice, this subject remains its own self. Thus, whereas in the two propositions—in the first, that of substantiality, the subject merely vanishes, and in the second substance is only a predicate, so that both sides are present in each with an opposite inequality of value—the 1807 701 union and interpenetration of both natures emerges, in which both, with equal value, are equally essential and yet only moments. Spirit is thereby equally consciousness of itself as its objective substance and simple self-consciousness remaining within itself.
750 The religion of art belongs to ethical spirit, which we earlier saw perish in the condition of right: that is, in the proposition that the self as such, the abstract person, is absolute essence. In ethical life the self is immersed in the spirit of its people; it is fulfilled universality. But simple singularity rises out of this content, and its lightheartedness purifies it into the person, into the abstract universality of right. In this, the reality of ethical spirit is lost; the contentless spirits of individual peoples are assembled into one pantheon—not a pantheon of representation, whose powerless form lets each have its way, but the pantheon of abstract universality, of pure thought, which disembodies them and bestows being-in-and-for-itself upon the spiritless self, the individual person.
751 Yet through its emptiness this self has let the content go free. Consciousness is the essence only within itself; its own existence, the legal recognition of the person, is unfulfilled abstraction. It therefore possesses rather only the thought of itself; or, as it exists and knows itself as object, it is the nonactual. It is therefore only the Stoic 1807 702 *independence of thought; and this, passing through the movement of skeptical consciousness, finds its truth in the shape called unhappy self-consciousness.
752 This consciousness knows what the actual validity of the abstract person amounts to, and likewise its validity in pure thought. It knows such validity, rather, as complete loss; it is itself this loss conscious of itself and the externalization of its knowledge of itself.—We see that this unhappy consciousness constitutes the counterpart and completion of comic consciousness, which is perfectly happy within itself. Into the latter all divine essence returns, or it is the complete externalization of substance. The former, conversely, is the tragic fate of the certainty of itself that is supposed to be in and for itself. It is the consciousness of the loss of all essence in this certainty of itself, and of the loss of this very knowledge of itself—of substance as well as self. It is the pain that expresses itself in the harsh words, God has died.
753 In the condition of right, then, the ethical world and its religion have sunk into comic consciousness, and unhappy consciousness is the knowledge of this entire loss. It has lost the intrinsic worth both of its immediate personality and of its mediated, thought personality. Likewise 1807 703 trust in the eternal laws of the gods has fallen silent, as have the oracles that claimed to know the particular. The statues are now corpses from which the animating soul has fled, just as the hymn is words from which faith has fled. The tables of the gods lack spiritual food and drink, and from its games and festivals consciousness no longer receives the joyful unity of itself with essence. The works of the Muse lack the power of spirit for which certainty of itself emerged from the crushing of gods and human beings. They are now what they are for us—beautiful fruits broken from the tree; a friendly fate offered them to us as a girl presents those fruits. It does not give the actual life of their existence, not the tree that bore them, not the earth and the elements that constituted their substance, nor the climate that constituted their determinacy, or the change of seasons that governed the process of their becoming.—So, with the works of that art, fate gives us not their world, not the spring and summer of ethical life in which they blossomed and ripened, but only the veiled remembrance of that actuality.—Our doing in enjoying them is therefore not worship, through which our consciousness would attain its perfect truth filling it completely. Rather, it is external doing that perhaps wipes 1807 704 raindrops or specks of dust from these fruits and, in place of the inner elements of the ethical actuality that surrounded, produced, and inspired them, erects the elaborate scaffolding of the dead elements of their external existence—language, history, and so on—not to live its way into them, but merely to represent them within itself. Yet just as the girl offering the plucked fruits is more than their nature spread out into its conditions and elements—the tree, air, light, and so on—which immediately offered them, because in a higher manner she gathers all this into the ray of the self-conscious eye and the offering gesture, so the spirit of fate offering us those artworks is more than the ethical life and actuality of that people. For it is the inward re-collection of spirit still externalized in them; it is the spirit of tragic fate gathering all those individual gods and attributes of substance into the one pantheon, into spirit conscious of itself as spirit.
754 All the conditions of its emergence are present, and this totality of its conditions constitutes its becoming, its concept, or its emergence in itself.—The circle of art's productions embraces the forms of the externalizations of absolute substance. Substance exists in the form of individuality as a thing, as an existent object 1807 705 of sensuous consciousness; as pure language, or the becoming of the shape whose existence does not step outside the self and which is a purely vanishing object; as immediate unity with universal self-consciousness in its inspiration and as mediated unity in the doing of worship; as beautiful self-endowed bodiliness; and finally as existence raised into representation and expanded into a world that ultimately gathers itself into universality, which is equally pure certainty of itself.—These forms, and on the other side the world of the person and of right, the devastating savagery of the elements of content set free, likewise the thought person of Stoicism and the unstable unrest of skeptical consciousness, constitute the circumference of shapes that stand expectantly and urgently about the birthplace of spirit becoming self-consciousness. The all-pervading pain and yearning of unhappy self-consciousness is their center and the common birth pang of spirit's emergence—the simplicity of the pure concept containing those shapes as its moments.
755 Spirit has within it the two sides presented above as the two reversed propositions. One is that substance externalizes itself and becomes self-consciousness; the other, conversely, that self-consciousness externalizes 1807 706 itself and makes itself thinghood, or universal self. Both sides have thus approached one another, and their true union has thereby arisen. Substance's externalization, its becoming self-consciousness, expresses the transition into the opposite, the unconscious transition of necessity, or the fact that substance is self-consciousness in itself. Conversely, self-consciousness's externalization expresses its being universal essence in itself; or, because the self is pure being-for-itself that remains at home with itself in its opposite, it expresses that for it substance is self-consciousness, and precisely thereby spirit. Of this spirit, therefore, which has left the form of substance and enters existence in the shape of self-consciousness, it may be said—if one wishes to use relations taken from natural generation—that it has an actual mother but a father being in himself. For actuality, or self-consciousness, and the in-itself as substance are its two moments, through whose reciprocal externalization, each becoming the other, spirit enters existence as their unity.
756 Insofar as self-consciousness one-sidedly grasps only its own externalization, even though its object is thus being as well as self and it knows all existence as spiritual essence, true spirit has nevertheless not yet come to be for it: namely, insofar as being in general, or 1807 707 substance, has not equally for its part externalized itself in itself and become self-consciousness. For then all existence is spiritual essence only from the standpoint of consciousness, not in itself. Spirit is in this way merely imagined into existence. This imagining is the enthusiasm that supplies nature and history, the world and the mythical representations of preceding religions, with an inner sense other than what they immediately offer to consciousness in their appearance, and, as regards religions, other than what the self-consciousness whose religions they were knew in them. Yet this meaning is borrowed, a garment that does not cover the nakedness of appearance or win faith and reverence, but remains the murky night and private ecstasy of consciousness.
757 For this meaning of the objective not to be mere imagination, it must be in itself: that is, first, it must spring for consciousness from the concept and emerge in its necessity. Thus, through cognition of immediate consciousness, or consciousness of the existent object, self-knowing spirit has arisen for us through consciousness's necessary movement. Second, this concept, which as immediate also had the shape of immediacy for its consciousness, has given itself the shape of self-consciousness in itself: that is, according to precisely the 1807 708 necessity of the concept by which being or immediacy, the contentless object of sensuous consciousness, externalizes itself and becomes I for consciousness.—But the thinking in-itself, or the cognition of necessity, differs from the immediate in-itself, or existent necessity itself—a distinction that nevertheless does not lie outside the concept, for the simple unity of the concept is immediate being itself. The concept is just as much self-externalization, or the becoming of intuited necessity, as it is at home with itself in that necessity, knowing and comprehending it.—The immediate in-itself of spirit giving itself the shape of self-consciousness means nothing other than that the actual world-spirit has attained this knowledge of itself; only then does this knowledge also enter its consciousness, and enter as truth. How that happened has emerged above.
758 That absolute spirit has given itself the shape of self-consciousness in itself, and thereby also for its consciousness, now appears as the faith of the world that spirit exists as a self-consciousness, that is, as an actual human being; that it is present for immediate certainty; that believing consciousness sees and feels and hears this divinity. Thus it is not imagination, but actually so. Consciousness then does not proceed from its inwardness, from thought, and join within itself the thought of God with 1807 709 existence, but proceeds from immediate, present existence and recognizes God in it.—The moment of immediate being is present in the content of the concept in such a way that religious spirit, in the return of all essence into consciousness, has become a simple positive self, just as actual spirit as such in unhappy consciousness is precisely this simple, self-conscious negativity. The self of existent spirit thereby has the form of complete immediacy. It is posited neither as thought or represented nor as produced, as is the case with the immediate self partly in natural religion, partly in the religion of art. Rather, this God is immediately sensuously intuited as self, as an actual individual human being; only thus is he self-consciousness.
759 This incarnation of divine essence, or its essentially and immediately having the shape of self-consciousness, is the simple content of absolute religion. In it essence is known as spirit, or religion is spirit's consciousness of itself as spirit. For spirit is knowledge of itself in its externalization, the essence that is the movement of retaining equality with itself in its otherness. This, however, is substance insofar as in its accidentality it is equally reflected into itself, not indifferent toward accidentality as something inessential and thus finding itself in something alien, 1807 710 but within itself therein—that is, insofar as it is subject or self.—In this religion divine essence is therefore revealed. Its being manifest evidently consists in its being known for what it is. But it is known precisely by being known as spirit, as essence that is essentially self-consciousness.—For consciousness, something in its object is secret when the object is an other or alien to it, and when it does not know the object as itself. This secrecy ceases when absolute essence as spirit is the object of consciousness; for in this way spirit is self in its relation to consciousness. That is, consciousness immediately knows itself in spirit, or is manifest to itself in it. Consciousness is manifest to itself only in its own certainty of itself. Its object is the self, but the self is nothing alien; it is inseparable unity with itself, the immediately universal. It is the pure concept, pure thought or being-for-itself, which is immediately being and thereby being-for-another and, as this being-for-another, is immediately returned into itself and at home with itself. It is therefore what is truly and solely manifest. The good, the just, the holy, creator of heaven and earth, and so on, are predicates of a subject—universal moments that find their support at this point and exist initially only in consciousness's return into thought.—When they are known, their ground and essence, the subject itself, is not yet manifest 1807 711; and likewise they are the determinations of the universal, not this universal itself. The subject itself, and thereby also this pure universal, is manifest, however, as self. For the self is precisely this inwardness reflected into itself that immediately exists and is the very certainty of the self for which it exists. This—to be manifest according to its concept—is therefore the true shape of spirit; and this shape of its, the concept, is equally its sole essence and substance. Spirit is known as self-consciousness and is immediately manifest to self-consciousness, for it is self-consciousness itself. Divine nature is the same as human nature, and it is this unity that is intuited.
760 Here, then, consciousness—or the way essence is for itself, its shape—is in fact equal to its self-consciousness. This shape is itself a self-consciousness; it is thereby at the same time an existent object, and this being equally immediately has the meaning of pure thought, of absolute essence.—Absolute essence existing as an actual self-consciousness seems to have descended from its eternal simplicity, but in fact it has only thereby attained its highest essence. For the concept of essence, only when it has attained its simple purity, is absolute abstraction, which is pure thought and thereby the pure singularity of the self, and, because of its simplicity, the immediate, or being.—What is called sensuous consciousness is precisely this pure abstraction: 1807 712 it is this thought for which being is the immediate. The lowest is therefore at the same time the highest; the manifest, which has emerged entirely onto the surface, is precisely therein the deepest. That the highest essence is seen, heard, and so on as an existent self-consciousness is therefore in fact the perfection of its concept; and through this perfection essence exists as immediately as it is essence.
761 This immediate existence is at the same time not solely and merely immediate consciousness, but religious consciousness. Immediacy inseparably has the meaning not only of an existent self-consciousness but of purely thought, or absolute, essence. Religious consciousness is conscious of what we are conscious of in our concept: that being is essence. This unity of being and essence, of thought that is immediately existence, is as much its immediate knowledge as it is the thought of this religious consciousness, or its mediated knowledge. For this unity of being and thought is self-consciousness and itself exists, or the thought unity has at the same time this shape of what it is. God is therefore manifest here as he is; he exists as he is in himself: he exists as spirit. God is attainable only in pure speculative knowledge, exists only in it, and is only this knowledge itself, for he is spirit; and this speculative knowledge is the knowledge of revealed religion. The former knows him as thought or pure essence, and this thought as being and as 1807 713 existence, and existence as the negativity of itself, hence as self, this self and universal self; revealed religion knows precisely this.—The hopes and expectations of the preceding world pressed solely toward this revelation: to intuit what absolute essence is and to find oneself in it. This joy comes to self-consciousness and seizes the whole world—the joy of seeing itself in absolute essence. For absolute essence is spirit, the simple movement of those pure moments which itself expresses precisely this: that essence is known as spirit only through being intuited as immediate self-consciousness.
762 This concept of spirit itself knowing itself as spirit is itself immediate and not yet developed. Essence is spirit, or it has appeared, it is manifest; this first manifestation is itself immediate. But immediacy is equally pure mediation, or thought; it must therefore display this within itself as such.—More determinately considered, spirit in the immediacy of self-consciousness is this individual self-consciousness opposed to the universal. It is an exclusive one that, for the consciousness for which it exists, still has the unresolved form of a sensuous other. This consciousness does not yet know spirit as its own, or spirit does not yet exist equally as universal self, as the self of all, as it exists as individual self. Or the shape does not yet have the form of the concept: that is, of the 1807 714 universal self, the self that in its immediate actuality is equally sublated, thought, universality, without losing that actuality in universality.—Yet the next and itself immediate form of this universality is not already the form of thought itself, of the concept as concept, but the universality of actuality, the totality of selves, and the elevation of existence into representation. Thus everywhere—and to give a determinate example—the sublated sensuous this is initially the thing of perception, not yet the universal of understanding.
763 This individual human being, then, as whom absolute essence is manifest, carries out within himself as an individual the movement of sensuous being. He is the immediately present God; thereby his being passes into having-been. The consciousness for which he has this sensuous presence ceases to see and hear him; it has seen and heard him. And only through its merely having seen and heard him does it itself become spiritual consciousness; or, as he previously arose for it as sensuous existence, he has now arisen in spirit.—For as something that sees and hears him sensuously, it is itself merely immediate consciousness, which has not sublated the inequality of objectivity or taken it back into pure thought, but knows this objective individual, not itself, as spirit. In the vanishing of the immediate existence of what is known as 1807 715 absolute essence, the immediate acquires its negative moment. Spirit remains the immediate self of actuality, but as the universal self-consciousness of the community, resting in its own substance, just as this substance is universal subject within it. Not the individual for himself, but the individual together with the consciousness of the community, and what he is for this community, is his complete whole.
764 Yet pastness and distance are only the imperfect form in which the immediate mode is mediated or posited as universal. This mode is only superficially immersed in the element of thought, preserved in it as sensuous mode, and not united with the nature of thought itself. It is raised only into representation, for representation is the synthetic connection of sensuous immediacy and its universality, or thought.
765 This form of representation constitutes the determinacy in which spirit becomes conscious of itself in this community of its. It is not yet spirit's self-consciousness that has matured to its concept as concept; mediation is still incomplete. This connection of being and thought therefore contains the defect that spiritual essence is still burdened with an unreconciled division into a here and a beyond. The content is true, but all its moments, posited in the element of representation, have the character of not being comprehended, but appearing as 1807 716 completely independent sides relating externally to one another. For the true content also to receive its true form for consciousness, consciousness requires the higher cultivation of raising its intuition of absolute substance into the concept and reconciling for itself its consciousness with its self-consciousness, as has happened for us or in itself.
766 This content must be considered in the way it exists in its consciousness.—Absolute spirit is content; thus it is in the shape of its truth. But its truth is not merely to be the substance of the community, or its in-itself, nor merely to emerge from this inwardness into the objectivity of representation, but to become actual self, to reflect itself into itself and be subject. This, then, is the movement it carries out in its community, or this is its life. What this self-revealing spirit is in and for itself is therefore not brought out by, as it were, unwinding its rich life in the community and tracing it back to its first thread—perhaps to the representations of the first imperfect community, or even to what the actual human being said. This reduction is grounded in the instinct to reach the concept; but it confuses the origin as the immediate existence of the first appearance with the simplicity of the 1807 717 *concept. Through this impoverishment of the life of spirit, through removing the community's representation and its doing in relation to that representation, what arises instead of the concept is therefore rather mere externality and singularity, the historical mode of immediate appearance and the spiritless recollection of an individual shape merely meant, and of its past.
767 Spirit is first the content of its consciousness in the form of pure substance, or is the content of its pure consciousness. This element of thought is the movement of descending into existence, or singularity. The middle term between them is their synthetic connection, consciousness of becoming-other, or representation as such. The third is the return from representation and otherness, or the element of self-consciousness itself.—These three moments constitute spirit; its separation in representation consists in being in a determinate way, but this determinacy is nothing other than one of its moments. Its fully unfolded movement is thus to spread out its nature in each of its moments as in an element. As each of these circles completes itself within itself, this reflection into itself is at the same time the transition into the other. Representation constitutes the middle term between pure thought and self-consciousness as such, and is only one of the determinations; yet at the same time, 1807 718 as has been shown, its character of being the synthetic connection extends over all these elements and is their common determinacy.
768 The content itself that must be considered has already appeared in part as the representation of unhappy and believing consciousness: in the former, however, as a content produced from consciousness and yearned for, in which spirit can neither find satisfaction nor rest because it is not yet its content in itself, or as its substance; in the latter, by contrast, it was considered as the selfless essence of the world, or as the essentially objective content of representation—a representation that flees actuality altogether and therefore lacks the certainty of self-consciousness, which separates itself from representation partly as the vanity of knowledge, partly as pure insight.—The consciousness of the community, by contrast, has this content as its substance, just as it is the community's certainty of its own spirit.
769 Spirit, first represented as substance in the element of pure thought, is thereby immediately simple, self-identical, eternal essence, having, however, not this abstract meaning of essence but the meaning of absolute spirit. Yet spirit is precisely this: to be not meaning, not inwardness, but actuality. Simple eternal essence would therefore be spirit only as an empty word if it remained at the representation and expression of 1807 719 simple eternal essence. But because simple essence is abstraction, it is in fact the negative within itself, specifically the negativity of thought, or negativity as it is in essence in itself. That is, it is absolute difference from itself, or its pure becoming-other. As essence it is only in itself, or for us; but because this purity is precisely abstraction, or negativity, it is for itself, or the self, the concept.—It is therefore objective; and since representation apprehends and expresses the necessity of the concept just stated as an event, it will be said that eternal essence begets an other for itself. Yet in this otherness it has equally immediately returned into itself. For the difference is difference in itself: that is, it is immediately distinguished only from itself; it is therefore unity returned into itself.
770 Thus the three moments are distinguished: essence; being-for-itself, which is essence's otherness and for which essence is; and being-for-itself, or self-knowing, in the other. Essence intuits only itself in its being-for-itself; in this externalization it is only at home with itself. The being-for-itself that excludes itself from essence is the knowledge of essence about itself. It is the word that, when spoken, leaves the speaker externalized and emptied, but is equally immediately heard; and only this hearing of 1807 720 itself is the word's existence. Thus the differences made are as immediately dissolved as they are made, and as immediately made as they are dissolved; and the true and actual is precisely this movement circling within itself.
771 This movement within itself expresses absolute essence as spirit. Absolute essence not grasped as spirit is only the abstract void, just as spirit not grasped as this movement is only an empty word. When its moments are grasped in their purity, they are the restless concepts that exist only in being their opposite within themselves and having their rest in the whole. But the community's representation is not this comprehending thought; rather, it has the content without its necessity, and instead of the form of the concept introduces the natural relations of father and son into the realm of pure consciousness. Because it thus behaves representationally in thought itself, essence is indeed manifest to it, but on account of this synthetic representation the moments of essence partly separate from one another, so that they do not relate through their own concept; partly representation retreats from this pure object of its and relates to it only externally. The object is revealed to it by an alien being, and in this thought of spirit it recognizes neither itself nor the nature of pure self-consciousness. 1807 721 Insofar as one must go beyond the form of representation and those relations taken from nature—and thus especially beyond taking the moments of the movement that spirit is for isolated, unshakable substances or subjects instead of passing moments—this going-beyond, as remarked above in another connection, must be seen as an urging of the concept. Yet because it is only instinct, it misunderstands itself, rejects the content along with the form, and, what is the same, reduces it to a historical representation and an inheritance of tradition. Here only the purely external aspect of faith is retained, as something dead and without cognition; its inward aspect, however, has disappeared, because this would be the concept knowing itself as concept.
772 Absolute spirit, represented in pure essence, is indeed not abstract pure essence; rather, precisely because pure essence is only a moment in spirit, it has sunk to an element. Yet the presentation of spirit in this element has the same formal deficiency that essence has as essence. Essence is the abstract, and therefore the negative of its simplicity, an other; likewise, spirit in the element of essence is the form of simple unity, which is therefore equally essentially a becoming-other.—Or, what is the same, the relation of eternal essence to its being-for-itself is 1807 722 the immediately simple relation of pure thought. In this simple intuition of itself in the other, otherness is therefore not posited as such; it is difference as it is immediately no difference in pure thought—a recognition of love, in which the two did not oppose one another in their essence.—Spirit expressed in the element of pure thought is itself essentially this: to exist not only in pure thought but to be actual, for its concept itself contains otherness, that is, the sublation of the pure, merely thought concept.
773 Because the element of pure thought is abstract, it is itself, rather, the other of its simplicity and therefore passes over into the proper element of representation: the element in which the moments of the pure concept acquire a substantial existence against one another, while equally being subjects that do not possess for a third party the indifference of being toward one another, but, reflected into themselves, separate themselves from one another and stand opposed.
774 Spirit that is thus merely eternal, or abstract, becomes an other to itself, or enters existence, and immediately immediate existence. It therefore creates a world. This creating is representation's word for the concept itself in its absolute movement, or for the fact that the simple, or pure thought, pronounced as absolute, because it is abstract, is rather the negative and hence what is opposed to itself, the other; or, to say the same in yet another 1807 723 form, because what is posited as essence is simple immediacy, or being, but as immediacy or being lacks the self, and thus, lacking inwardness, is passive, or being-for-another.—This being-for-another is at the same time a world. Spirit in the determination of being-for-another is the tranquil subsistence of the moments previously enclosed in pure thought, thus the dissolution of their simple universality and their separation into their own particularity.
775 But the world is not merely this spirit scattered into completeness and its external order. Rather, because spirit is essentially the simple self, this self is equally present in the world: existent spirit, the individual self that has consciousness and distinguishes itself from itself as an other, or as world.—As this individual self is initially posited so immediately, it is not yet spirit for itself; it therefore does not exist as spirit. It may be called innocent, but hardly good. For it actually to be self and spirit, just as eternal essence presents itself as the movement of being equal to itself in its otherness, it must first become an other to itself. Since this spirit is determined as initially existing immediately, or as dispersed into the manifoldness of its consciousness, its becoming-other is the withdrawal into itself of knowledge in general. Immediate existence turns into thought, or 1807 724 merely sensuous consciousness into consciousness of thought; and because this is thought emerging from immediacy, or conditioned thought, it is not pure knowledge but thought containing otherness, and thus the self-opposed thought of good and evil. The human being is represented as having lost the form of equality with himself by plucking from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and as having been driven out of the state of innocent consciousness, out of nature offering itself without labor and out of paradise, the garden of animals; this is represented as something that happened, as something not necessary.
776 Since this withdrawal into itself of existent consciousness is immediately determined as becoming unequal to itself, evil appears as the first existence of consciousness that has withdrawn into itself; and because the thoughts of good and evil are absolutely opposed and this opposition is not yet resolved, this consciousness is essentially only evil. Yet at the same time, precisely because of this opposition, good consciousness also exists against it, along with their relation to one another.—Insofar as immediate existence turns into thought, and being-within-itself is thereby more closely determined partly as thought itself, partly as the moment of essence's becoming-other, becoming evil can be transferred farther backward, out of the existent world and already into the first realm of thought. Thus it may 1807 725 be said that the firstborn son of light himself, by withdrawing into himself, fell away, but another was at once begotten in his place. Such a form belonging only to representation, not to the concept, as falling away, like son, conversely lowers the moments of the concept into representation, or carries representation over into the realm of thought.—It is equally indifferent whether one places a manifoldness of other shapes beside the simple thought of otherness in eternal essence and transfers the withdrawal into itself to these. This addition must at the same time be approved, because the moment of otherness thereby also expresses diversity, as it should—not multiplicity in general, but determinate diversity as well. Thus one part, the son, is the simple being knowing itself as essence, while the other part is the externalization of being-for-itself that lives only in praise of essence; in this part, the taking back of externalized being-for-itself and the withdrawal of evil into itself can then also be placed. Insofar as otherness divides into two, spirit would be more determinate in its moments and, if they were counted, expressed as a quaternity, or, because the multitude itself again divides into two parts, those that remained good and those that became evil, even as a quintinity.—But counting the moments may in general be regarded as useless, partly because what is distinguished 1807 726 is itself just as much only one, namely the thought of difference, which is only one thought, as it is this distinguished term, the second against the first; partly because the thought that gathers the many into one must be dissolved out of its universality and distinguished into more than three or four distinct terms. Against the absolute determinacy of the abstract one, the principle of number, this universality appears as indeterminacy in relation to number itself, so that one could speak only of numbers in general, that is, not of a number of differences. Thus thinking here of number and counting at all is entirely superfluous, just as elsewhere the mere difference of magnitude and multitude is conceptless and says nothing.
777 Good and evil were the determinate differences of thought that emerged. Since their opposition has not yet resolved itself and they are represented as essences of thought, each independent for itself, the human being is the essenceless self and the synthetic ground of their existence and struggle. Yet these universal powers belong just as much to the self, or the self is their actuality. According to this moment, then, just as evil is nothing other than the withdrawal into itself of spirit's natural existence, conversely good enters actuality and appears as an existent self-consciousness.—What in purely thought spirit is merely indicated as the divine essence's becoming-other 1807 727 in general here approaches its realization for representation; for representation, this consists in divine essence's self-abasement, its renunciation of its abstraction and nonactuality.—Representation takes the other side, evil, as an event alien to divine essence. To grasp it in divine essence itself, as its wrath, is the highest and hardest effort of representation wrestling with itself, an effort that remains fruitless because it lacks the concept.
778 The alienation of divine essence is thus posited in its twofold manner. The self of spirit and its simple thought are the two moments whose absolute unity is spirit itself; its alienation consists in their separating and one having an unequal value in relation to the other. This inequality is therefore twofold, and two connections arise whose common moments are those stated. In the one, divine essence counts as essential, natural existence and the self as inessential and to be sublated; in the other, conversely, being-for-itself counts as essential and the simple divine as inessential. Their still empty middle term is existence in general, the mere commonality of their two moments.
779 The dissolution of this opposition occurs not so much through the struggle of the two represented as 1807 728 separate and independent essences. Their independence entails that in itself, through its concept, each must dissolve itself within itself. Struggle occurs only where both cease to be these mixtures of thought and independent existence and stand opposed merely as thoughts. For then, as determinate concepts, they exist essentially only in their opposed relation; as independent, by contrast, they have their essentiality outside the opposition. Their movement is therefore their own free movement. Thus, just as the movement of both is movement in itself, because it must be considered in the terms themselves, so the one determined as being-in-itself against the other also begins it. This is represented as a voluntary doing; but the necessity of its externalization lies in the concept that what is in itself, being so determined only in opposition, precisely for that reason has no true subsistence. Thus the one for which not being-for-itself but the simple counts as essence is what externalizes itself, goes into death, and thereby reconciles absolute essence with itself. For in this movement it presents itself as spirit. Abstract essence is alienated from itself; it has natural existence and self-endowed actuality. This otherness of its, or its sensuous presence, is taken back through the second becoming-other and posited as sublated, as universal. Essence has thereby become itself in this otherness 1807 729; the immediate existence of actuality has ceased to be alien or external to essence, since it is sublated, universal. This death is therefore essence's arising as spirit.
780 The sublated immediate presence of self-conscious essence is that essence as universal self-consciousness. This concept of the sublated individual self that is absolute essence therefore immediately expresses the constitution of a community, which, hitherto remaining in representation, now returns into itself as into the self; and spirit thus passes from the second element of its determination, representation, into the third, self-consciousness as such.—If we consider further how that representation behaves in its advance, we see first the expression that divine essence assumes human nature. In this it is already expressed that in themselves the two are not separate; just as, in divine essence's externalizing itself from the beginning, its existence withdrawing into itself and becoming evil, it is not expressed but contained that in itself this evil existence is not alien to divine essence. Absolute essence would have only this empty name if there were in truth an other to it, if there were a falling away from it; rather, the moment of being-within-itself constitutes the essential moment of the self of spirit.—That being-within-itself, and only thereby actuality, belongs to essence itself—what for us is concept, and insofar as it is concept—1807 730 appears to representational consciousness as an incomprehensible event; the in-itself assumes for it the form of indifferent being. Yet the thought that those apparently mutually fleeing moments, absolute essence and the self being-for-itself, are not separate also appears to this representation—for it possesses the true content—but afterward, in the externalization of divine essence becoming flesh. This representation, which in this way is still immediate and therefore not spiritual, or knows essence's human shape only as particular, not yet universal, becomes spiritual for this consciousness in the movement of the shaped essence sacrificing its immediate existence again and returning to essence. Essence as reflected into itself is first spirit.—The reconciliation of divine essence with the other in general, and specifically with the thought of the other, evil, is thus represented here.—If this reconciliation is expressed according to its concept by saying it consists in evil being in itself the same as good, or divine essence being the same as nature in its entire compass, while nature separated from divine essence is only nothing, this must be regarded as an unspiritual manner of expression that must necessarily provoke misunderstandings.—When evil is the same as good, precisely evil is not evil, and good is not good either, but both are instead sublated: evil in general is 1807 731 being-for-itself that is within itself, and good the selfless simple. Expressed thus according to their concept, their unity becomes clear at once; for being-for-itself that is within itself is simple knowledge, and the selfless simple is equally pure being-for-itself within itself.—Thus, however much it must be said that according to this concept of them good and evil—that is, insofar as they are not good and evil—are the same, it must just as much be said that they are not the same, but absolutely different. For simple being-for-itself, or pure knowledge, are equally pure negativity, or absolute difference within themselves.—Only these two propositions complete the whole, and the assertion and assurance of the first must be confronted with invincible obstinacy by adherence to the other. Since both have equal right, both have equal wrong; and their wrong consists in taking such abstract forms as the same and not the same, identity and nonidentity, for something true, fixed, and actual, and resting upon them. Neither the one nor the other has truth; rather, their movement does: the simple same is abstraction and thereby absolute difference, while difference, as difference in itself, is distinguished from itself and is therefore equality with itself. Precisely the same holds of the sameness of divine essence and nature in general and 1807 732 human nature in particular. The former is nature insofar as it is not essence; the latter is divine according to its essence. But it is spirit in which both abstract sides are posited as they are in truth, namely as sublated—a positing that cannot be expressed through the judgment and its spiritless is, its copula.—Likewise nature is nothing outside its essence; but this nothing itself equally is. It is absolute abstraction, hence pure thought or being-within-itself, and, with the moment of its opposition to spiritual unity, it is evil. The difficulty in these concepts consists solely in holding fast to the is and forgetting the thinking in which the moments both are and are not—are only the movement that spirit is.—This spiritual unity, or the unity in which the differences exist only as moments, or as sublated, is what has come to be for representational consciousness in that reconciliation; and since it is the universality of self-consciousness, this consciousness has ceased to be representational. The movement has returned into it.
781 Spirit is therefore posited in the third element, in universal self-consciousness: it is its community. The movement of the community as self-consciousness distinguishing itself from its representation is to produce what has come to be in itself. The divine human being, or human God, who has died is in himself universal 1807 733 self-consciousness; he must become this for this self-consciousness. Or, since self-consciousness constitutes one side of the opposition of representation, namely the evil side for which natural existence and individual being-for-itself count as essence, this side, represented as independent and not yet as a moment, must because of its independence raise itself in and for itself to spirit, or display spirit's movement within itself.
782 It is natural spirit. The self must withdraw from this naturalness and go into itself, which would mean becoming evil. But it is already evil in itself; withdrawing into itself therefore consists in convincing itself that natural existence is evil. The existent becoming-evil and being-evil of the world, as well as the existent reconciliation of absolute essence, falls within representational consciousness. Within self-consciousness as such, however, what is represented falls, in form, only as a sublated moment; for the self is the negative, hence knowledge—a knowledge that is a pure doing of consciousness within itself.—This moment of the negative must likewise express itself in the content. Since essence is already reconciled with itself in itself and is spiritual unity in which the parts of representation are sublated, or moments, this presents itself in each part of representation receiving here the opposite meaning from the one it had before. Each meaning thereby completes itself in the other, and only thereby is the 1807 734 content spiritual. Because determinacy is just as much its opposite, unity in otherness, the spiritual, is perfected—just as for us or in itself the opposite meanings united above and sublated even the abstract forms of the same and not the same, identity and nonidentity.
783 If, therefore, in representational consciousness the inwardizing of natural self-consciousness was existent evil, then inwardizing in the element of self-consciousness is knowledge of evil as something that is in itself in existence. This knowledge is therefore indeed a becoming-evil, but only a becoming of the thought of evil, and is consequently recognized as the first moment of reconciliation. For as a return into itself out of the immediacy of nature, which is determined as evil, it is an abandonment of nature and the dying away of sin. Consciousness abandons not natural existence as such, but natural existence at the same time as something known as evil. The immediate movement of withdrawing into itself is equally mediated: it presupposes itself, or is its own ground. For the ground of withdrawal into itself is that nature has already withdrawn into itself in itself; the human being must withdraw into himself on account of evil, but evil is itself this withdrawal into oneself.—This first movement is therefore itself only immediate, or its simple concept, because it is the same as its 1807 735 ground. Movement, or becoming-other, must therefore still enter in its more proper form.
784 Besides this immediacy, therefore, the mediation of representation is necessary. In itself, knowledge of nature as spirit's untrue existence, and this universality of the self that has come to be within itself, is spirit's reconciliation with itself. For self-consciousness that does not comprehend, this in-itself receives the form of something existent and represented to it. Comprehension for it is therefore not the grasping of this concept, which knows sublated naturalness as universal and thus reconciled with itself, but the grasping of that representation according to which, through the event of divine essence's own externalization, through its incarnation and death that have occurred, divine essence is reconciled with its existence.—The grasping of this representation now expresses more determinately what was previously called spiritual resurrection within it, or the becoming of its individual self-consciousness into universal self-consciousness, or the community.—The death of the divine human being as death is abstract negativity, the immediate result of the movement ending only in natural universality. In spiritual self-consciousness, death loses this natural meaning, or becomes its concept just given. From what it immediately means, the nonbeing of this individual, 1807 736 death is transfigured into the universality of spirit, which lives in its community and daily dies and rises again within it.
785 What belongs to the element of representation—that absolute spirit, as an individual, or rather as a particular, presents the nature of spirit in its existence—is therefore here transferred into self-consciousness itself, into knowledge preserving itself in its otherness. This knowledge therefore does not actually die, as the particular is represented as having actually died; rather, its particularity dies away in its universality, that is, in its knowledge, which is essence reconciling itself with itself. The immediately preceding element of representation is thus posited here as sublated, or has returned into the self, into its concept; what was merely existent in that element has become subject.—Precisely thereby the first element, pure thought, and spirit eternal within it, is no longer beyond representational consciousness or the self; rather, the return of the whole into itself is precisely its containing all moments within itself.—The death of the mediator grasped by the self is the sublation of his objectivity, or his particular being-for-itself; this particular being-for-itself has become universal self-consciousness.—On the other side, precisely thereby the universal has become self-consciousness, and the pure or nonactual spirit of mere thought has become actual.—The death of the mediator is the death not only of his natural side, or his 1807 737 particular being-for-itself; not only does the already dead shell withdrawn from essence die, but also the abstraction of divine essence. For insofar as his death has not yet completed reconciliation, he is the one-sided being that knows the simplicity of thought as essence in opposition to actuality. This extreme of the self does not yet have equal worth with essence; the self has this only in spirit. The death of this representation therefore contains at the same time the death of the abstraction of divine essence, which is not posited as self. It is the painful feeling of unhappy consciousness that God himself has died. This harsh expression expresses the innermost simple self-knowing, the return of consciousness into the depths of the night of I = I, which no longer distinguishes or knows anything outside itself. This feeling is thus in fact the loss of substance and of its confronting consciousness; yet at the same time it is the pure subjectivity of substance, or pure certainty of itself, which substance lacked as object, or the immediate, or pure essence. This knowledge is therefore the inspiration through which substance has become subject, its abstraction and lifelessness have died, and it has thus become actual, simple and universal self-consciousness.
786 Thus spirit is spirit knowing itself: it knows itself; what is its object—or its 1807 738 representation—is the true absolute content. As we saw, this content expresses spirit itself. At the same time spirit is not merely content of self-consciousness and not merely an object for it, but is also actual spirit. It is this by traversing the three elements of its nature; this movement through itself constitutes its actuality. What moves is spirit; it is the subject of the movement, and equally it is the moving itself, or the substance through which the subject passes. When we entered religion, the concept of spirit had emerged for us as the movement of spirit certain of itself, forgiving evil and therein relinquishing at the same time its own simplicity and hard immutability; or as the movement in which the absolutely opposed recognizes itself as the same, and this recognition breaks forth as the Yes between these extremes. Religious consciousness, to which absolute essence is manifest, intuits this concept and sublates the distinction between its self and what it intuits. Just as it is the subject, so it is also the substance, and thus itself is spirit, precisely because and insofar as it is this movement.
787 Yet this community is not perfected in this self-consciousness of its. Its content is in general in the form of representation for it, and its actual spirituality too, its return from its representation, still contains this division, just as the element of pure thought itself was burdened with it 1807 739. The community does not also possess consciousness of what it is. It is spiritual self-consciousness that is not its own object as such, or does not open itself into consciousness of itself; rather, insofar as it is consciousness, it has the representations considered above.—We see self-consciousness at its final turning point become inward and attain knowledge of being-within-itself; we see it externalize its natural existence and gain pure negativity. But the positive meaning—that this negativity, or pure inwardness of knowledge, is just as much self-identical essence, or that substance herein attains being absolute self-consciousness—is an other for devout consciousness. It grasps this side, that knowledge's pure inwardizing is in itself absolute simplicity or substance, as the representation of something that is so not according to the concept, but as an act of atonement performed by an other. Or, it is not for it that this depth of the pure self is the power by which abstract essence is drawn down from its abstraction and raised to self through the force of this pure devotion.—The doing of the self thereby retains this negative meaning for it, because substance's externalization on its own side is an in-itself for the self, which the self does not equally grasp and comprehend, or does not find in its doing as such.—Since in itself this 1807 740 unity of essence and self has come about, consciousness also still has this representation of its reconciliation, but as representation. It attains satisfaction by externally adding to its pure negativity the positive meaning of its unity with essence; its satisfaction thus itself remains burdened with the opposition of a beyond. Its own reconciliation therefore enters its consciousness as something distant, distant in the future, just as the reconciliation accomplished by the other self appears as distant in the past. Just as the individual divine human being has a father being in himself and only an actual mother, so the universal divine human being, the community, has its own doing and knowing as its father, but eternal love as its mother—a love it only feels, but does not intuit in its consciousness as an actual immediate object. Its reconciliation is therefore in its heart, but still divided from its consciousness, and its actuality still fractured. What enters its consciousness as the in-itself, or the side of pure mediation, is reconciliation lying beyond; but what exists as present, as the side of immediacy and existence, is the world that still awaits its transfiguration. The world is indeed reconciled with essence in itself; and essence is indeed known no longer to recognize the object as alienated from itself, but as equal to itself in its love. Yet 1807 741 for self-consciousness this immediate present does not yet have the shape of spirit. The spirit of the community is thus, in its immediate consciousness, separated from its religious consciousness, which indeed declares that in themselves they are not separate, but this is an in-itself not realized, or not yet equally become absolute being-for-itself.
Plain English translation
Mouseia's complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German, paragraph by paragraph, in shorter sentences and everyday words.
1807 625
VII. *Religion*.
672 In the shapes considered so far, distinguished in general as consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit, religion has also appeared as consciousness of the absolute essence in general. But it appeared from the standpoint of consciousness aware of the absolute essence. The absolute essence itself in and for itself, the self-consciousness of spirit, has not appeared in those forms.
673 Already consciousness, insofar as it is understanding, becomes consciousness of the supersensible, or the inner aspect of objective existence. But the supersensible, the eternal, or whatever else it may be called, is selfless. It is initially only the universal, still far from being spirit knowing itself as spirit.—Then self-consciousness, which reaches completion in the shape of unhappy consciousness, was only the pain of spirit struggling back toward objectivity but failing to reach it. The unity of individual self-consciousness and 1807 626 its unchanging essence, toward which it brings itself, therefore remains beyond it.—The immediate existence of reason, which emerged for us from that pain, and reason's distinctive shapes have no religion, because their self-consciousness knows or seeks itself in the immediate present.
674 In the ethical world, however, we saw a religion: the religion of the underworld. It is faith in the terrible, unknown night of fate, and in the Eumenid of the departed spirit. The former is pure negativity in the form of universality, the latter the same negativity in the form of individuality. In the latter form, then, the absolute essence is indeed the self, and is present, as the self can be nothing else. But the individual self is this individual shade, with universality, which is fate, separated from it. It is indeed a shade, a sublated this, and thus a universal self. But that negative meaning has not yet turned into this positive one. So the sublated self also still immediately means this particular self without essence.—Fate without the self, however, remains the unconscious night that never reaches distinction within itself or the clarity of self-knowing.
675 This faith in the nothingness of necessity and in the underworld becomes faith in heaven, because the departed self must unite with its 1807 627 universality, unfold within it what it contains, and so become clear to itself. But we saw this realm of faith develop its content only in the element of thought, without the concept, and therefore perish in its fate, namely in the religion of enlightenment. In enlightenment, understanding's supersensible beyond is restored, but in such a way that self-consciousness remains satisfied on this side. It knows the supersensible—the empty beyond, neither knowable nor to be feared—as neither self nor power.
676 Finally, the religion of morality restores the absolute essence as a positive content, but combines this content with enlightenment's negativity. It is a being equally taken back into the self and kept enclosed there, and a differentiated content whose parts are negated as immediately as they are posited. But the fate in which this contradictory movement sinks is the self conscious of itself as the fate of essence and actuality.
677 In religion, self-knowing spirit is immediately its own pure self-consciousness. The shapes of it already considered—true spirit, self-alienated spirit, and spirit certain of itself—together constitute spirit in its consciousness, which confronts its world and does not recognize itself in it. But in conscience spirit brings under its control its objective world 1807 628 in general, and also its representation and determinate concepts. It is now self-consciousness at home with itself. In this self-consciousness it has for itself, represented as an object, the meaning of being universal spirit, containing all essence and all actuality within itself. But it does not exist in the form of free actuality or of nature appearing independently. It does have shape, or the form of being, since it is the object of its consciousness. But because in religion this consciousness is posited with the essential determination of being self-consciousness, the shape is entirely transparent to itself. The actuality it contains is enclosed or sublated within it, precisely as when we say all actuality: it is thought, universal actuality.
678 In religion, then, the determination of spirit's consciousness proper does not have the form of free otherness. Its existence is therefore distinct from its self-consciousness, and its actual reality falls outside religion. Both indeed belong to one spirit, but its consciousness does not embrace both at once. Religion appears as one part of its existence, activity, and pursuits, whose other part is life in its actual world. We know that spirit in its world and spirit conscious of itself as spirit—or spirit in religion—are the same. Religion's completion therefore consists in 1807 629 the two becoming equal to one another. Not only must religion encompass its actuality; conversely, spirit as self-conscious spirit must become actual to itself and the object of its consciousness.—Insofar as in religion spirit represents itself to itself, it is indeed consciousness, and the actuality enclosed in religion is the shape and clothing of its representation. But in this representation actuality does not receive its full due: to be not only clothing but independent, free existence. Conversely, because it lacks completion within itself, it is a determinate shape that does not attain what it is supposed to present, namely self-conscious spirit. For its shape to express spirit itself, it would have to be nothing other than spirit; spirit would have to appear to itself, or be actual to itself, as it is in its essence. Only through this would it also achieve what may seem to demand the opposite: that the object of its consciousness also have the form of free actuality. But only spirit that is an object to itself as absolute spirit is for itself an equally free actuality while remaining conscious of itself within it.
679 At first we distinguish self-consciousness from consciousness proper, religion from spirit in its world, or the existence of spirit. The latter consists in the whole of spirit 1807 630 insofar as its moments present themselves as separating and each existing for itself. These moments are consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit—spirit, that is, as immediate spirit, which is not yet consciousness of spirit. Their combined totality constitutes spirit in its worldly existence in general. Spirit as such contains the previous shapes in the universal determinations, the moments just named. Religion presupposes their entire course and is their simple totality or absolute self.—Their course in relation to religion, however, must not be represented as occurring in time. Only the whole spirit is in time, and the shapes that are shapes of the whole spirit as such present themselves in succession. For only the whole has actuality proper, and thus the form of pure freedom in relation to an other, which expresses itself as time. But spirit's moments—consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit—have no existence distinct from one another, because they are moments.—Just as spirit was distinguished from its moments, so, third, the individualized determination of these moments themselves must be distinguished from them. For we saw each moment differentiate itself again within itself in a course of its own, taking different shapes: for example, sense-certainty 1807 631 and perception were distinguished within consciousness. These latter aspects separate in time and belong to a particular whole.—For spirit descends from its universality, through determination, to individuality. The determination, or middle term, is consciousness, self-consciousness, and so forth. But individuality consists in the shapes of these moments. These therefore present spirit in its individuality or actuality, and differ in time, yet in such a way that the later shape retains the earlier ones within itself.
680 Religion is therefore the completion of spirit, in which its individual moments—consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit—return, and have returned, into their ground. Together these moments make up the existing actuality of the whole spirit, which only is as the movement of these sides of itself that differentiates them and returns into itself. The coming-to-be of religion in general is contained in the movement of the universal moments. But each of these attributes was presented not merely as determined in general, but as it is in and for itself: that is, as it runs its course within itself as a whole. This has produced not only the coming-to-be of religion in general. Those complete courses of its individual sides also contain the determinations of religion itself. The whole spirit, the spirit of religion, is in turn the movement 1807 632 from its immediacy to knowing what it is in itself, or immediately. It moves toward making the shape in which it appears to its consciousness completely equal to its essence, so that it intuits itself as it is.—In this coming-to-be it therefore itself exists in determinate shapes, which constitute the differences of this movement. At the same time, a determinate religion thus also has a determinate actual spirit. Consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit belong to self-knowing spirit in general. Correspondingly, to the determinate shapes of self-knowing spirit belong the determinate forms that developed separately within each of consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit. For its actual spirit, the determinate shape of religion selects, from the shapes of each of its moments, the one that corresponds to it. The one determinacy of religion reaches through every side of its actual existence and stamps them with this shared character.
681 The shapes that have appeared so far now arrange themselves differently from the order in which they appeared. First we must briefly make the necessary observations about this.—In the series considered, each moment deepened into itself and developed into a whole within its own distinctive principle. Knowing was the depth, or the 1807 633 spirit, in which these moments, which have no subsistence for themselves, had their substance. But this substance has now emerged. It is the depth of spirit certain of itself, which does not allow an individual principle to isolate itself and make itself into a whole within itself. Instead, gathering and holding all these moments together within itself, it advances in this collective wealth of its actual spirit. All its particular moments jointly take on and receive within themselves the same determinacy of the whole.—This spirit certain of itself and its movement are their true actuality, and the being-in-and-for-itself belonging to each individual moment.—The previous single series, then, marked its returns into itself by nodes as it advanced, but continued from them again in a single line. It is now, as it were, broken at these nodes, the universal moments, and has fallen into many lines. Gathered into one bundle, these also unite symmetrically, so that the same distinctions into which each particular line shaped itself internally meet one another.—The whole presentation makes clear on its own how to understand this coordination of universal directions presented here. It is therefore unnecessary to observe that these differences must essentially be grasped only as moments of becoming, not as parts. 1807 634 In actual spirit they are attributes of its substance; in religion, rather, they are only predicates of the subject.—Likewise, in themselves or for us, all forms in general are indeed contained in spirit and in every spirit. But for its actuality in general, the only thing that matters is which determinacy exists for it in its consciousness, in which it has expressed its self, or in which shape it knows its essence.
682 The distinction made between actual spirit and spirit knowing itself as spirit, or between itself as consciousness and as self-consciousness, is sublated in spirit knowing itself in its truth. Its consciousness and self-consciousness are reconciled. But here religion is initially immediate, so this distinction has not yet returned into spirit. Only the concept of religion is posited. In this concept, the essence is self-consciousness, which is all truth for itself and contains all actuality in this truth. As consciousness, this self-consciousness has itself for its object. Spirit that initially knows itself only immediately is therefore spirit to itself in the form of immediacy, and the determinacy of the shape in which it appears to itself is being. This being is indeed filled not with sensation or manifold material, nor with other one-sided moments, purposes, and determinations, but with spirit; and spirit knows it 1807 635 as all truth and actuality. In this way this fulfillment is not equal to its shape: spirit as essence is not equal to its consciousness. It is actual as absolute spirit only when it exists for itself in its truth as it does in its self-certainty, or when the extremes into which it divides as consciousness exist for one another in the shape of spirit. The shape spirit assumes as the object of its consciousness remains filled with spirit's certainty as its substance. Through this content, the possibility that the object might sink into pure objectivity, into the form of self-consciousness's negativity, disappears. Spirit's immediate unity with itself is the foundation, or pure consciousness, within which consciousness divides. Enclosed within its pure self-consciousness in this way, spirit does not exist in religion as the creator of a nature in general. What it produces in this movement are instead its shapes as spirits, which together constitute the completeness of its appearance. This movement itself is the coming-to-be of its complete actuality through the individual sides of that actuality, or through its incomplete actualities.
683 Its first actuality is the concept of religion itself, or religion as immediate, and therefore natural religion. In it, spirit knows itself as its object in natural or immediate 1807 636 shape. But its second actuality is necessarily knowing itself in the shape of sublated naturalness, or of the self. This is therefore the religion of art. For the shape rises to the form of the self through consciousness's production, by which consciousness intuits its doing, or the self, in its object. Finally, the third sublates the one-sidedness of the first two: the self is just as much something immediate as immediacy is self. In the first, spirit is in the form of consciousness in general; in the second, in that of self-consciousness; in the third, in the form of their unity. It has the shape of being-in-and-for-itself. Since it is thus represented as it is in and for itself, this is revealed religion. Yet although spirit reaches its true shape in it, shape itself and representation remain the unovercome side from which it must pass into the concept, in order entirely to dissolve the form of objectivity within the concept, which equally contains this opposite within itself. Spirit will then have grasped its own concept as we alone have so far grasped it. And because its shape, or the element of its existence, is the concept, that shape is spirit itself.
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A. *Natural Religion*.
684 Spirit knowing spirit is consciousness of itself and exists for itself in the form of objectivity: it is. At the same time it is being-for-itself. It is for itself; it is the side of self-consciousness as opposed to the side of its consciousness, or of its relating to itself as object. Its consciousness contains opposition, and thereby the determinacy of the shape in which it appears to itself and knows itself. This alone concerns us in this consideration of religion, since its unshaped essence, or its pure concept, has already emerged. But the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness also falls within the latter. The shape of religion contains neither spirit's existence as nature free from thought nor as thought free from existence. It is instead existence preserved in thought, as well as something thought that exists for itself.—One 1807 638 religion differs from another according to the determinacy of this shape in which spirit knows itself. Yet we must also note that presenting its self-knowledge according to this single determinacy does not in fact exhaust the whole of an actual religion. The series of different religions that will emerge equally presents only the different sides of one religion—indeed, of each individual religion. Representations that seem to distinguish one actual religion from another occur in every one. Yet the difference must also be considered as a difference of religion. For since spirit exists in the distinction between its consciousness and its self-consciousness, the movement aims to sublate this principal distinction and give the shape that is consciousness's object the form of self-consciousness. But this distinction is not already sublated because the shapes contained in consciousness also have the moment of self within them, and the god is represented as self-consciousness. The represented self is not the actual self. For the self, like any further determination of the shape, truly to belong to that shape, it must in part be placed there through self-consciousness's doing; in part, the lower determination must prove to be sublated and comprehended by the higher. For something represented ceases to be merely represented and foreign to its knowing only when the self has produced it, and thus intuits the 1807 639 object's determination as its own, and so itself in the object.—Through this activity the lower determination has also disappeared. For doing is the negative that accomplishes itself at the expense of another. Insofar as the lower determination still occurs, it has retreated into inessentiality. Conversely, where the lower still rules but the higher also occurs, one has a place beside the other without selfhood. Thus although the different representations within a single religion present the entire movement of its forms, the character of each religion is determined by the particular unity of consciousness and self-consciousness. That is, self-consciousness has taken the determination of consciousness's object into itself, fully appropriated it through its doing, and knows it as essential in contrast to the others.—The truth of faith in a determination of religious spirit shows itself in actual spirit's being constituted like the shape in which it intuits itself in religion. For example, the incarnation of God that occurs in Eastern religion has no truth, because its actual spirit lacks this reconciliation.—This is not the place to return from the totality of determinations to an individual one and show the shape in which it and its particular religion contain the completeness of the others. The higher form placed back under a lower one 1807 640 loses its meaning for self-conscious spirit and belongs to it only superficially and in its representation. It must be considered in its own distinctive meaning, and where it is the principle of this particular religion and is confirmed by its actual spirit.
a, *The Being of Light*.
685 Spirit as the essence that is self-consciousness—or the self-conscious essence that is all truth and knows all actuality as itself—is initially only its concept in relation to the reality it gives itself in the movement of its consciousness. Against the daylight of this unfolding, this concept is the night of its essence; against the existence of its moments as independent shapes, it is the creative mystery of its birth. This mystery contains its revelation within itself. For existence has its necessity in this concept, because the concept is self-knowing spirit and therefore has within its essence the moment of being consciousness and representing itself objectively.—It is the pure I that has self-certainty in its externalization, in itself as universal object. Or this object is for it the interpenetration of all thought and all actuality.
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686 In the immediate first division of self-knowing absolute spirit, its shape has the determination belonging to immediate consciousness, or sense-certainty. It intuits itself in the form of being, but not the spiritless being filled with contingent determinations of sensation that belongs to sense-certainty. It is being filled with spirit. It also includes the form that appeared in immediate self-consciousness: the form of the lord in relation to spirit's self-consciousness retreating from its object.—This being filled with the concept of spirit is therefore the shape of spirit's simple relation to itself, or the shape of shapelessness. By this determination it is the pure being of light of the sunrise, containing and filling everything and preserving itself in its formless substantiality. Its otherness is the equally simple negative, darkness. The movements of its own externalization, its creations in the unresisting element of its otherness, are outpourings of light. In their simplicity they are also its becoming-for-itself and return from its existence: streams of fire consuming shape. The difference it gives itself does proliferate in the substance of existence and develop into the forms of nature. But the essential simplicity of its thought wanders through them without stability or understanding, 1807 642 expands their limits into measurelessness, and dissolves their beauty, heightened to magnificence, in its sublimity.
687 The content this pure being develops, or its perceiving, is therefore an inessential play alongside this substance. The substance only rises, without descending into itself, becoming subject, and giving its distinctions stability through the self. Its determinations are only attributes that do not grow into independence but remain only names of the many-named One. This One is clothed in the manifold powers of existence and shapes of actuality as in selfless ornaments. They are only messengers of its power, lacking their own will, intuitions of its glory, and voices of its praise.
688 But this reeling life must determine itself as being-for-itself and give its vanishing shapes subsistence. The immediate being in which it confronts its consciousness is itself the negative power dissolving its distinctions. It is therefore in truth the self, and spirit accordingly moves on to knowing itself in the form of self. Pure light scatters its simplicity into an infinity of forms and offers itself as a sacrifice to being-for-itself, so that the individual may take subsistence for itself from its substance.
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b. *The Plant and the Animal*.
689 Self-conscious spirit has withdrawn into itself from shapeless essence, or raised its immediacy to self in general. It determines its simplicity as a multiplicity of being-for-itself, and is the religion of spiritual perception, in which it breaks up into countless spirits, weaker and stronger, richer and poorer. This pantheism, initially the peaceful subsistence of these spirit-atoms, becomes hostile movement within itself. The innocence of the religion of flowers, which is only a selfless representation of the self, passes into the seriousness of struggling life, into the guilt of the religion of animals. The peace and powerlessness of intuiting individuality pass into destructive being-for-itself.—It is no help to have taken the death of abstraction away from perceived things and raised them to beings of spiritual perception. The animation of this realm of spirits carries that death within it through its determinacy and negativity, which overreach their innocent indifference. Through this, dispersal into the multiplicity of peaceful plant shapes becomes a hostile movement in which the hatred of their being-for-itself wears them away.—The actual self-consciousness of this dispersed spirit 1807 644 is a multitude of isolated, unsociable national spirits that fight one another to the death in their hatred, and become conscious of determinate animal shapes as their essence. For they are nothing other than animal spirits, separate animal lives conscious of themselves without universality.
690 But in this hatred the determinacy of purely negative being-for-itself wears itself away, and through this movement of the concept spirit enters another shape. Sublated being-for-itself is the form of the object produced through the self, or rather is the produced self wearing itself away—that is, becoming a thing. The worker therefore gains the upper hand over the animal spirits that merely tear apart. The worker's doing is not merely negative but peaceful and positive. Spirit's consciousness is now the movement beyond immediate being-in-itself as well as abstract being-for-itself. The in-itself has been reduced by opposition to a determinacy. It is therefore no longer absolute spirit's own form, but an actuality that its consciousness finds confronting it as ordinary existence and sublates. This consciousness is equally not only this sublating being-for-itself. It also produces its representation, being-for-itself placed outside itself in the form of an object. Yet this production is not complete: it is a conditioned activity, shaping something already there.
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c. *The Master Craftsman*.
691 Spirit thus appears here as the master craftsman. Its doing, through which it produces itself as an object but has not yet grasped the thought of itself, is an instinctive kind of work, like bees building their cells.
692 Because the first form is immediate, it is the abstract form of understanding, and the work is not yet filled with spirit within itself. The crystals of pyramids and obelisks are the works of this craftsman of strict form: simple combinations of straight lines, with flat surfaces and equal proportions between parts, in which the incommensurability of the round has been eliminated. Because the form belongs merely to understanding, it does not contain its meaning within itself; it is not the spiritual self. The works therefore only receive spirit within them as a foreign, departed spirit that has left its living interpenetration with actuality and, itself dead, enters these lifeless crystals. Or they relate externally to spirit as something itself external and not existing as spirit—as to the rising light that casts its meaning upon them.
693 The separation from which working spirit starts has become objective to it in its work: the separation between being-in-itself, which becomes the material it 1807 646 works on, and being-for-itself, which is the side of working self-consciousness. Its further effort must aim to sublate this separation of soul and body, clothing and shaping the soul in itself and animating the body. As the two sides are brought closer, they retain against one another the determinacy of represented spirit and of its surrounding covering. Spirit's unity with itself contains this opposition of individuality and universality. As the work approaches itself in its sides, it also comes closer to working self-consciousness, and self-consciousness reaches knowledge of itself in the work as it is in and for itself. But it thus initially constitutes only the abstract side of spirit's activity, which does not yet know its content within itself but in its work, which is a thing. The craftsman himself, the whole spirit, has not yet appeared. He is still the inward, hidden essence, which as a whole is present only divided into active self-consciousness and its produced object.
694 The master craftsman therefore works the surrounding dwelling, the external actuality initially raised only to understanding's abstract form, into a more animated form. He uses plant life for this. It is no longer sacred, as it was to the earlier powerless 1807 647 pantheism. Instead, he grasps himself as the essence existing for itself, takes plant life as something useful, and reduces it to an exterior and decoration. But it is not used unchanged. The worker of self-conscious form also eliminates the perishability inherent in this life's immediate existence, and brings its organic forms closer to the stricter, more universal forms of thought. Left free, organic form proliferates in particularity. Subjugated on one side by the form of thought, it in turn raises these straight-lined and flat shapes into a more animated roundness—a mixture that becomes the root of free architecture.
695 This dwelling, the side of the universal element or spirit's inorganic nature, now also encloses a shape of individuality. This brings spirit—previously separated from existence, inward or external to it—closer to actuality, and thereby makes the work more like active self-consciousness. The worker first reaches for the form of being-for-itself in general, the animal shape. He proves that he is no longer immediately conscious of himself in animal life by setting himself against it as the productive power and knowing himself in it as his work. Through this, the animal shape also becomes a sublated shape, the hieroglyph of another meaning, of a 1807 648 thought. The worker therefore no longer uses it alone and whole, but mixes it with the shape of thought, with the human shape. Yet the work still lacks the shape and existence in which the self exists as self. It still lacks the capacity to express within itself that it encloses an inner meaning. It lacks language, the element in which the meaning that fills it is itself present. So even when the work has entirely purified itself of the animal and bears only the shape of self-consciousness, it is still a soundless shape. It needs the ray of the rising sun to have a sound, and this, produced by light, is only a tone, not language, showing only an external self, not the inward one.
696 Opposed to this external self of the shape stands the other shape, indicating that it has something inward within it. Nature returning into its essence reduces its living multiplicity, which individualizes itself and becomes confused in its movement, to an inessential shell, the covering of the inward. And this inward is at first still simple darkness, the motionless, black, formless stone.
697 Both presentations contain inwardness and existence, the two moments of spirit. Both contain both moments at once, in opposite relations: the self both as 1807 649 inward and as outward. The two must be united.—The soul of the human-shaped statue does not yet come from within. It is not yet language, the existence that is inward in itself. And the inward of multiform existence is still soundless, not differentiating itself within itself, and still separated from its exterior, to which all differences belong.—The master craftsman therefore unites the two in a mixture of natural and self-conscious shape. These ambiguous beings, riddles to themselves, join the conscious struggling with the unconscious, the simple inward with the multiform exterior, the darkness of thought with the clarity of expression, and burst into the language of profound, hard-to-understand wisdom.
698 In this work, the instinctive labor that produced an unconscious work opposite self-consciousness comes to an end. For in it, an equally self-conscious inwardness expressing itself meets the craftsman's activity, which constitutes self-consciousness. He has worked his way up to the division of his consciousness in which spirit encounters spirit. In this unity of self-conscious spirit with itself, insofar as it is its own shape and the object of its consciousness, its mixtures with the unconscious mode of immediate natural shape are therefore purified. These monstrosities of shape, 1807 650 speech, and deed dissolve into spiritual shaping: an exterior that has gone inward, an inwardness that expresses itself from itself and within itself; into thought that gives birth to itself, maintains its shape in conformity with itself, and is clear existence. Spirit is an artist.
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B. *The Religion of Art*.
699 Spirit has raised the shape in which it exists for its consciousness into the form of consciousness itself, and produces such a shape for itself. The master craftsman has abandoned synthetic work, the mixing of the heterogeneous forms of thought and nature. Since the shape has gained the form of self-conscious activity, he has become a spiritual worker.
700 If we ask which actual spirit has the consciousness of its absolute essence in the religion of art, it proves to be ethical, or true, spirit. It is not only the universal substance of all individuals. Since for actual consciousness this substance has the shape of consciousness, this also means that, having individualization, it is known by them as their own essence and work. For them it is neither the being of light, in whose unity self-consciousness's being-for-itself is contained only negatively, only 1807 652 in passing away, and intuits the lord of its actuality; nor is it the restless consumption of peoples hating one another; nor their subjugation into castes that together give the appearance of an organized, complete whole that lacks the universal freedom of individuals. Instead, it is the free people in which ethical custom constitutes the substance of all, whose actuality and existence all and each individual know as their own will and deed.
701 But the religion of ethical spirit is its elevation above its actuality, its return from its truth into pure knowing of itself. Since the ethical people lives in immediate unity with its substance and does not contain the principle of self-consciousness's pure individuality, its religion appears in its completion only as it departs from its subsistence. For the actuality of ethical substance rests partly on its peaceful unchangeability against the absolute movement of self-consciousness, and thus on self-consciousness's not yet having withdrawn into itself from its peaceful custom and firm trust. It rests partly on its organization into a multiplicity of rights and duties, and on its division into the groups of social estates and their particular activities, which cooperate toward the whole. It thus rests on the individual's satisfaction with the limitation of their existence, and on their not yet having grasped the unlimited 1807 653 thought of their free self. But that peaceful, immediate trust in substance returns into trust in oneself and into self-certainty. The multiplicity of rights and duties, like limited activity, is the same dialectical movement of ethical life as is the multiplicity of things and their determinations—a movement that finds peace and stability only in the simplicity of spirit certain of itself.—Ethical life's completion into free self-consciousness, and the fate of the ethical world, are therefore individuality withdrawn into itself: ethical spirit's absolute lightheartedness, which has dissolved within itself all the fixed distinctions of its subsistence and the groups of its organic structure. Perfectly sure of itself, it has reached unlimited joy and the freest enjoyment of itself. This simple certainty of spirit within itself is ambiguous: peaceful subsistence and fixed truth, as well as absolute unrest and the passing away of ethical life. But it turns into the latter. For ethical spirit's truth is still only this substantial essence and trust, in which the self does not know itself as free individuality, and which therefore perishes in this inwardness, or in the self's becoming free. Thus when trust is broken and the people's substance is fractured within itself, spirit, which was the middle term between unstable extremes, has now 1807 654 stepped out into the extreme of self-consciousness grasping itself as essence. This is spirit certain within itself, mourning the loss of its world and now producing its essence, raised above actuality, from the purity of the self.
702 In such an epoch absolute art emerges. Earlier, art is instinctive work, immersed in existence, working out of it and into it. Its substance is not free ethical life, and therefore its working self does not have free spiritual activity either. Later, spirit goes beyond art to gain its higher presentation: namely, to be not only the substance born from the self, but, in its presentation as object, this self. It must not only give birth to itself from its concept, but have its concept itself as its shape, so that the concept and the produced artwork mutually know themselves as one and the same.
703 Ethical substance has thus withdrawn from its existence into its pure self-consciousness. This self-consciousness is the side of the concept, or of the activity by which spirit produces itself as object. It is pure form, because in ethical obedience and service the individual has worked away all unconscious existence and fixed determination, just as substance itself has become this fluid essence. This form is the night in which substance was betrayed and made itself into subject. From 1807 655 this night of pure self-certainty, ethical spirit rises again as a shape freed from nature and its immediate existence.
704 The existence of the pure concept, into which spirit has fled from its body, is an individual whom spirit chooses as the vessel of its pain. Spirit is present in this individual as their universal and their power, by which they suffer violence—as their pathos, to which their self-consciousness surrenders and loses its freedom. But that positive power of universality is overcome by the individual's pure self as the negative power. Aware of its strength that cannot be lost, this pure activity struggles with unshaped essence. Becoming master of it, it makes pathos its material and gives itself its content. This unity emerges as a work: universal spirit individualized and represented.
a. *The Abstract Artwork*.
705 As immediate, the first artwork is abstract and individual. For its part, it must move out of its immediate and objective mode toward self-consciousness, just as self-consciousness, for its part, aims in worship to sublate the 1807 656 distinction it first gives itself against its spirit, and thereby produce the artwork alive within itself.
706 The first way in which artistic spirit places its shape and its active consciousness furthest apart is the immediate way: the shape exists as a thing in general.—Within itself it divides into the distinction between individuality, which has the shape of self, and universality, which presents inorganic essence in relation to the shape as its surroundings and dwelling. By raising the whole into the pure concept, this dwelling gains its pure form belonging to spirit. It is neither understanding's crystal, housing the dead or illuminated by an external soul, nor the mixture of the forms of nature and thought initially emerging from the plant, in which thought's activity is still imitation. Instead, the concept strips away what still clings to the forms from roots, branches, and leaves, and purifies them into structures in which the crystal's straight lines and flat surfaces are raised into incommensurable relations. Thus the animation of the organic is taken into understanding's abstract form, while its essence—incommensurability for understanding—is preserved.
707 But the god dwelling within is the black stone drawn out of the animal covering and penetrated by the 1807 657 light of consciousness. Human shape strips off the animal element with which it was mixed. For the god, the animal is only a contingent disguise. It steps beside the god's true shape and no longer counts for anything on its own, but sinks to meaning something else, to a mere sign. The god's shape thereby also strips off within itself dependence on the natural conditions of animal existence, and indicates the internal arrangements of organic life as fused into its surface and belonging only to it.—But the god's essence is the unity of nature's universal existence and self-conscious spirit, which in its actuality appears opposed to nature. At first also an individual shape, its existence is one of nature's elements, just as its self-conscious actuality is an individual national spirit. But in this unity that element is reflected into spirit: nature transfigured by thought and united with self-conscious life. The divine shape therefore contains its natural element as sublated, as a dim memory. The wild essence and confused struggle of the elements' free existence, the unethical realm of the Titans, have been defeated and banished to the edge of actuality become clear to itself, to the murky boundaries of the world that finds itself and rests in spirit. These 1807 658 old gods—heaven, earth, ocean, sun, the blind Typhon-like fire of the earth, and so forth—into which the being of light, begetting with darkness, first particularizes itself, are replaced by shapes containing only a dimly reminiscent echo of those Titans. These are no longer natural beings, but clear ethical spirits of self-conscious peoples.
708 This simple shape has therefore eliminated within itself the unrest of infinite individualization and gathered it into peaceful individuality. It has done so both as a natural element, which is necessary only as universal essence but contingent in its existence and movement, and as the people, which, dispersed into particular groups of activity and individual points of self-consciousness, exists in manifold senses and activities. The moment of unrest therefore stands opposed to it: self-consciousness stands opposed to the essence. As the birthplace of this shape, self-consciousness retained nothing for itself but being pure activity. The artist gave the work everything belonging to substance, but gave themselves as a determinate individuality no actuality in the work. They could give it completion only by externalizing their particularity, shedding their body and raising themselves to the abstraction of pure doing.—In this first immediate production, the separation between the work and its 1807 659 self-conscious activity has not yet been reunited. The work is therefore not actually animated on its own, but is a whole only together with its coming-to-be. What is ordinary about the artwork—that it is produced in consciousness and made by human hands—is the moment of the concept existing as concept, confronting the work. And if this concept, as artist or as viewer, is selfless enough to declare the artwork absolutely animated within itself and forget itself as maker or observer, we must insist against this on the concept of spirit, which cannot dispense with the moment of being conscious of itself. But this moment stands opposed to the work because, in this first division of itself, spirit gives both sides their abstract determinations of doing and being a thing against one another. Their return into the unity from which they started has not yet occurred.
709 The artist therefore experiences in the work that they have produced no being equal to themselves. A consciousness does indeed return to them from it, in that an admiring crowd reveres it as the spirit that is their essence. But since this animation returns the artist's self-consciousness only as admiration, it is instead the animation's confession to the artist that it is not their equal. When it returns as joy in general, 1807 660 the artist does not find in it the pain of forming and generating the work, or the effort of their labor. Others may also judge the work or offer sacrifices to it, putting their consciousness into it in whatever way they choose. If they set themselves above it with their knowledge, the artist knows how much more their deed is than those people's understanding and talk. If they place themselves below it and recognize in it their ruling essence, the artist knows themselves as its master.
710 The artwork therefore requires another element of existence, the god another emergence than this descent from the depths of its creative night into the opposite—into externality, into the determination of the thing without self-consciousness. This higher element is language: an existence that is immediately self-conscious existence. As individual self-consciousness exists in it, it is equally immediate as a universal contagion. The complete particularization of being-for-itself is at the same time fluidity and the universally communicated unity of many selves. Language is the soul existing as soul. The god whose shape has language as its element is therefore the artwork animated within itself. In its existence it immediately contains the pure activity that confronted it when it existed as a thing. Or, in its essence becoming objective, self-consciousness immediately remains with itself. Remaining with itself in its essence in this way, 1807 661 it is pure thought, or devotion, whose inwardness also has existence in the hymn. The hymn retains the individuality of self-consciousness within it; when heard, this individuality also exists as universal. Devotion kindled in all is the spiritual stream conscious of itself in the multiplicity of self-consciousness, as the same doing of all and as simple being. As this universal self-consciousness of all, spirit has its pure inwardness as well as being for others and the being-for-itself of individuals in one unity.
711 This language differs from another language of the god, which is not that of universal self-consciousness. The oracle of the god, in artistic religion as well as in earlier religions, is the god's necessary first language. For its concept equally entails that it is the essence of nature and of spirit, and therefore has not only natural but also spiritual existence. Insofar as this moment lies only in its concept and is not yet realized in religion, the language is, for religious self-consciousness, the language of a foreign self-consciousness. Self-consciousness still foreign to its community does not yet exist in the way its concept requires. The self is simple and therefore wholly universal being-for-itself. But self-consciousness separated from the community's self-consciousness is initially only an individual one.—The content of this particular and 1807 662 individual language follows from the universal determinacy in which absolute spirit is posited in its religion in general.—The universal spirit of the sunrise, which has not yet particularized its existence, thus expresses equally simple and universal propositions about essence. Their substantial content is sublime in its simple truth, but because of this universality also appears trivial to self-consciousness developing further.
712 The more cultivated self, raising itself to being-for-itself, is master over the pure pathos of substance, over the objectivity of the rising being of light. It knows that simplicity of truth as what exists in itself, not having the form of contingent existence through a foreign language, but as the sure and unwritten law of the gods, which lives forever, and no one knows where it came from.—Here the universal truth revealed by the being of light has withdrawn inward or below, and has thereby been raised out of the form of contingent appearance. In the religion of art, by contrast, because the god's shape has assumed consciousness and thus individuality in general, the god's own language is the oracle, which knows the particular affairs of its people and announces what is useful concerning them. For the god is the spirit of the ethical people. But knowing thought claims the universal truths for itself, since they are known as what exists in itself. Their language is 1807 663 no longer foreign to it, but its own. That sage of antiquity sought what is good and beautiful in his own thought, but left to his daemon the inferior, contingent content of knowledge: whether it was good for him to associate with this or that person, or good for an acquaintance to make this journey, and similar insignificant things. Likewise, universal consciousness obtains knowledge of contingent matters from birds, trees, or the fermenting earth, whose vapor takes away self-consciousness's sound judgment. For the contingent is what lacks judgment and is foreign. Ethical consciousness therefore also lets itself be determined about it in a thoughtless and foreign way, as by throwing dice. When an individual determines themselves through their understanding and deliberately chooses what is useful to them, this self-determination rests on the determinacy of their particular character. This is itself contingent. Understanding's knowledge of what is useful to the individual is therefore just the same sort of knowledge as that of those oracles or the lot. The only difference is that someone consulting an oracle or a lot expresses the ethical attitude of indifference toward the contingent, whereas understanding treats what is in itself contingent as the essential interest of its thought and knowledge. Higher than both, however, is to make deliberation the oracle of contingent action, but to know this deliberate action itself, because of its relation to the 1807 664 particular and its usefulness, as something contingent.
713 The true self-conscious existence spirit gains in language that is not the language of a foreign, and therefore contingent rather than universal, self-consciousness is the artwork we saw earlier. It stands opposed to the thing-like artwork of the statue. The latter is existence at rest; the former is vanishing existence. In the statue, objectivity released into freedom lacks its own immediate self. In the other work, by contrast, objectivity remains too enclosed within the self, reaches too little shaping, and, like time, immediately ceases to exist as it exists.
714 Worship constitutes the movement of the two sides in which the divine shape moving in the pure feeling element of self-consciousness and the divine shape resting in the element of thinghood mutually give up their different determinations. The unity that is the concept of their essence comes into existence. In worship, the self gives itself the consciousness of the divine essence descending to it from its beyond. Through this, the divine essence, previously nonactual and merely objective, gains the proper actuality of self-consciousness.
715 This concept of worship is already contained and present in itself in the stream of hymnic song. This devotion is the self's immediate pure satisfaction through and within itself. It 1807 665 is the purified soul, which in this purity is immediately only essence and one with essence. Because of its abstraction, it is not consciousness distinguishing its object from itself. It is therefore only the night of that object's existence and the prepared place of its shape. Abstract worship thus raises the self to being this pure divine element. The soul consciously accomplishes this purification. Yet it is not the self that has descended into its depths and knows itself as evil. It is something existing, a soul that purifies its exterior by washing and clothes it in white garments, and leads its inwardness through the represented path of labors, punishments, and rewards: the path of cultivation that externalizes particularity in general, through which the soul reaches the dwellings and community of blessedness.
716 This worship is initially only a secret accomplishment, that is, merely represented and nonactual. It must be actual action; nonactual action contradicts itself. Through it, consciousness proper rises into its pure self-consciousness. In consciousness proper, the essence has the meaning of a free object. Through actual worship this object returns into the self. And insofar as in pure consciousness it means the pure essence dwelling beyond actuality, this essence descends from its universality through this 1807 666 mediation into individuality, and so joins with actuality.
717 The two sides' entry into action is determined as follows. For the self-conscious side, insofar as it is actual consciousness, the essence presents itself as actual nature. On the one hand, nature belongs to it as possession and property, and counts as existence that does not exist in itself. On the other hand, nature is its own immediate actuality and individuality, which it likewise regards as nonessential and sublates. But for its pure consciousness that external nature also has the opposite meaning: it is the essence existing in itself, before which the self sacrifices its inessentiality, just as, conversely, it sacrifices nature's inessential side to itself. The action is thus a spiritual movement because it is two-sided. It sublates the abstraction of the essence, as devotion determines the object, and makes it actual; and it sublates the actual, as the agent determines the object and itself, raising it into universality.
718 The action of worship itself therefore begins with the pure surrender of a possession, which its owner pours away or lets go up in smoke, apparently quite uselessly for themselves. Before the essence of their pure consciousness, they thereby renounce possession, the right of property and its enjoyment, personality, and the return of doing 1807 667 into the self. They reflect the action into the universal, or the essence, rather than into themselves.—Conversely, however, the existing essence equally perishes in this. The sacrificed animal is the sign of a god; the fruits consumed are living Ceres and Bacchus themselves. In the animal die the powers of the higher right, which has blood and actual life; in the fruits die the powers of the lower right, which is bloodless and possesses secret, cunning power.—Insofar as the sacrifice of divine substance is doing, it belongs to the self-conscious side. For this actual doing to be possible, the essence must already have sacrificed itself in itself. It has done so by giving itself existence and making itself an individual animal and fruit. The acting self presents this relinquishment, already accomplished by the essence in itself, in existence and for its consciousness. It replaces the essence's immediate actuality with the higher actuality, namely its own. For the unity produced, the result of sublating the individuality and separation of both sides, is not merely negative fate but has a positive meaning. Only to the abstract underground essence is the sacrifice wholly surrendered, thereby marking the reflection of possession and being-for-itself into the universal as distinct from the self as such. But this is also only 1807 668 a small part. The other sacrifice is only the destruction of what cannot be used, and instead prepares the victim for a meal, whose feast cheats the action of its negative meaning. In the first sacrifice the sacrificer keeps most of it, and in the second the useful part, for their enjoyment. This enjoyment is the negative power sublating both the essence and individuality. At the same time it is the positive actuality in which the essence's objective existence is transformed into self-conscious existence, and the self is conscious of its unity with the essence.
719 Although this worship is an actual action, its meaning lies mostly in devotion. What belongs to devotion is not objectively produced, while the result deprives itself of existence in enjoyment. Worship therefore goes further and initially remedies this lack by giving its devotion objective subsistence. It does this as communal or individual work available to everyone, producing the god's dwelling and adornment in the god's honor.—This partly sublates the statue's objectivity, since through this consecration of gifts and labors the worker wins the god's favor and intuits their self as belonging to the god. Partly, too, this doing is not the artist's individual work; this particularity has dissolved into universality. But it is not only the 1807 669 god's honor that is achieved, and the blessing of divine favor does not flow to the worker only in representation. The work also has a meaning opposite to its first meaning of externalization and another's honor. The god's dwellings and halls are for human use; the treasures stored there belong to human beings in time of need. The honor the god enjoys in its adornment is the honor of the skilled and generous people. At the festival the people likewise adorn their own dwellings and clothes, and their activities with elegant equipment. In this way, in return for their gifts, they receive repayment from the grateful god and proofs of the favor through which they united with the god in work. They receive these not in hope and a later actuality, but have, in the act of honoring and offering gifts, immediate enjoyment of their own wealth and adornment.
b. *The Living Artwork*.
720 The people approaching its god in the worship of the religion of art is the ethical people, which knows its state and the state's actions as its own will and accomplishment. This spirit, confronting the self-conscious people, 1807 670 is therefore not the being of light, which, being selfless, does not contain the certainty of individuals within itself, but is instead only their universal essence and the ruling power in which they vanish… The worship of the religion of this simple, shapeless essence therefore gives its followers back only this in general: that they are their god's people. It gains for them only their subsistence and simple substance in general, not their actual self, which is instead rejected. For they worship their god as empty depth, not as spirit. But the worship of the religion of art, on the other hand, lacks that abstract simplicity of essence, and thus its depth. Yet the essence immediately united with the self is in itself spirit and knowing truth, although not yet truth known, or knowing itself in its depth. Because the essence here thus has the self within it, its appearance is friendly to consciousness. In worship consciousness gains not only the general authorization of its subsistence, but also its existence self-conscious within that essence. Conversely, the essence has its actuality not selflessly in a rejected people whose substance alone is recognized, but in the people whose self is recognized in its substance.
721 From worship, then, emerge self-consciousness satisfied in its essence and the god returned into it as its dwelling. This dwelling, considered on its own, is the night of substance, or its pure individuality. 1807 671 But it is no longer the artist's tense individuality, still unreconciled with its essence becoming objective. It is the satisfied night, which has its pathos within it without need, because it returns from intuition, from sublated objectivity.—This pathos, considered on its own, is the essence of the sunrise, but it has now set within itself, and has its setting—self-consciousness, and thus existence and actuality—within itself.—Here it has passed through the movement of its realization. Lowering itself from its pure essence to an objective natural force and its expressions, it is an existence for the other, for the self that consumes it. In its fruit, the silent essence of selfless nature reaches the stage at which, preparing and digesting itself, it offers itself to self-endowed life. It reaches its highest perfection in the usefulness of being edible and drinkable. For in this it is the possibility of a higher existence and touches spiritual existence. In its metamorphosis, the earth-spirit has developed partly into quietly powerful substance, partly into spiritual fermentation: there into the feminine principle of nourishment, here into the masculine principle of the self-driving force of self-conscious existence.
722 In this enjoyment, then, that rising being of light is disclosed for what it is. Enjoyment is its mystery. 1807 672 For the mystical is not the concealment of a secret or ignorance, but consists in the self knowing itself as one with the essence, so that the essence is revealed. Only the self is manifest to itself; or what is manifest is so only in immediate self-certainty. But worship has posited simple essence within this certainty. As a useful thing it has not only existence that is seen, felt, smelled, and tasted; it is also the object of desire. Through actual enjoyment it becomes one with the self and is thereby completely disclosed and revealed to it.—What is said to be revealed to reason or the heart is in fact still secret. For it still lacks the actual certainty of immediate existence, both objective certainty and the certainty of enjoyment. In religion this certainty is not merely thoughtless and immediate, but also the self's purely knowing certainty.
723 What worship has thus revealed within self-conscious spirit is the simple essence as movement: partly emerging from its nocturnal concealment into consciousness to be consciousness's quietly nourishing substance; partly losing itself again in the underground night, in the self, and lingering above only with a mother's quiet longing.—But the louder drive is the many-named being of light of the sunrise 1807 673 and its reeling life. This too has relinquished its abstract being, first gathered itself into the objective existence of fruit, and then, surrendering to self-consciousness, reached actuality proper within it. Now it roams about as a band of frenzied women: nature's unrestrained intoxication in self-conscious shape.
724 Yet what has been disclosed to consciousness is only absolute spirit as this simple essence, not spirit as spirit within itself: only immediate spirit, the spirit of nature. Its self-conscious life is therefore only the mystery of bread and wine, of Ceres and Bacchus, not of the other, properly higher gods, whose individuality includes self-consciousness as such as an essential moment. Spirit has therefore not yet sacrificed itself to consciousness as self-conscious spirit, and the mystery of bread and wine is not yet the mystery of flesh and blood.
725 This unstable intoxication of the god must settle into an object. Inspiration that did not reach consciousness must produce a work that confronts it as a work just as complete as the statue confronted the earlier artist's inspiration, but not as lifeless within itself: as a living self.—Such worship is the festival that human beings give in their own honor, though they do 1807 674 not yet put the meaning of absolute essence into such a person. For only the essence has been revealed to them, not spirit—not as something that essentially takes human shape. But this worship lays the ground for that revelation and sets out its moments separately. Here it presents the abstract moment of the essence's living bodily existence, just as earlier it presented the unity of both in unconscious frenzy. The human being therefore takes the statue's place as a shape trained and developed into perfectly free movement, just as the statue is perfectly free rest. While every individual knows how to present themselves at least as a torchbearer, one stands out among them as movement given shape, the smooth development and fluid strength of every limb: an animated, living artwork joining beauty with strength. The adornment that honored the statue is awarded to this person as the prize of their strength, together with the honor among their people of being, in place of the stone god, the highest bodily presentation of their essence.
726 The two presentations just considered contain the unity of self-consciousness and spiritual essence, but still lack their equilibrium. In Bacchic inspiration the self is outside itself; in beautiful bodily existence the spiritual essence is outside itself. That dullness of consciousness and its wild stammering must be taken into the 1807 675 clear existence of the latter, and the latter's spiritless clarity into the former's inwardness. The complete element in which inwardness is as outward as outwardness is inward is again language. But it is neither the oracle's language, entirely contingent and individual in content, nor the feeling hymn praising only an individual god, nor the contentless stammering of Bacchic frenzy. Instead, language has gained its clear and universal content. Its clear content, because the artist has worked their way out of the first wholly substantial inspiration into a shape that is their own existence, penetrated in all its movements by the self-conscious soul and living with it. Its universal content, because in this festival honoring the human being the one-sidedness of statues disappears: they contain only one national spirit, one determinate character of divinity. The beautiful athlete is indeed the honor of their particular people, but is a bodily individuality in which the detailed fullness and seriousness of meaning, and the inward character of spirit bearing the particular life, concerns, needs, and customs of that people, have perished. In this externalization into complete bodily existence, spirit has cast off the particular impressions and echoes of nature that it contained as the people's actual spirit. Its people is 1807 676 therefore no longer conscious in it of its particularity, but rather of having cast this off and of the universality of its human existence.
c. *The Spiritual Artwork*.
727 The national spirits that become conscious of the shape of their essence in a particular animal merge into one. Similarly, the particular beautiful national spirits unite in one pantheon, whose element and dwelling are language. Pure intuition of itself as universal humanity has this form in the national spirit's actuality: it joins with others, with whom it forms one nation by nature, in a common undertaking, and for this work forms a collective people and thus a collective heaven. Yet this universality, which spirit reaches in its existence, is only the first universality. It has only just departed from ethical individuality, has not yet overcome its immediacy, and has not formed one state from these peoples. The ethical life of the actual national spirit rests partly on individuals' immediate trust in the whole of their people, partly on the immediate participation of everyone, despite differences of social estate, in the 1807 677 government's decisions and actions. In their union—initially not into a lasting order but only for a shared action—that freedom of participation of all and each is temporarily set aside. This first community is therefore more an assembly of individualities than the rule of abstract thought, which would deprive individuals of their self-conscious share in the will and deed of the whole.
728 The assembly of national spirits forms a circle of shapes now encompassing all of nature and the whole ethical world. They too stand under one's supreme command rather than his sovereignty. Considered on their own, they are the universal substances of what the self-conscious essence is and does in itself. But this essence constitutes the power, and initially at least the center, around which those universal beings busy themselves, a center that seems to connect their affairs only contingently. Yet the return of divine essence into self-consciousness already contains the ground for self-consciousness being the center of those divine powers. At first it hides the essential unity under the form of a friendly external relation between the two worlds.
729 The form of 1807 678 consciousness in which this content appears necessarily has the same universality as the content. It is no longer the actual doing of worship, but a doing raised not yet into the concept, but initially into representation, into the synthetic connection of self-conscious and external existence. The existence of this representation, language, is the first language, epic as such. It contains universal content at least as the completeness of the world, though not as the universality of thought. The singer is the individual and actual person from whom, as the subject of this world, it is produced and sustained. His pathos is not the stupefying power of nature but Mnemosyne: reflection and developed inwardness, the recollection of the previously immediate essence. He is the organ disappearing in his content. What counts is not his own self but his muse, his universal song. Yet what is in fact present is the syllogism in which the extreme of universality, the world of gods, is linked through the middle term of particularity with individuality, the singer. The middle term is the people in its heroes, who are individual human beings like the singer, but only represented and therefore also universal, like the free extreme of universality, the gods.
730 In this epic, then, what comes about in itself in worship is presented to consciousness: the relation of the divine to the human. The content is an action of the self-conscious essence. Acting disturbs the repose of 1807 679 substance and stirs the essence, thereby dividing its simplicity and opening it into the manifold world of natural and ethical powers. Action violates the peaceful earth; it is the pit which, animated by blood, calls forth the departed spirits. Thirsting for life, they receive it in self-consciousness's doing. The business toward which the universal effort is directed acquires two sides: the self-endowed side of being carried out by a collective body of actual peoples and the individuals at their head, and the universal side of being carried out by their substantial powers. But their relation was determined above as the synthetic connection of universal and individual, or representation. The judgment of this world depends on this determination.—The relation of the two is therefore a mixture that divides the unity of doing inconsistently and needlessly throws the action back and forth from one side to the other. The universal powers have the shape of individuality and thus the principle of action within them. Their activity therefore appears as a doing just as free and entirely originating in themselves as human action. Both gods and human beings have therefore done one and the same thing. The seriousness of those powers is a ridiculous excess, since human beings are in fact the force of acting individuality; and the effort and 1807 680 labor of human beings are equally useless, since the gods instead direct everything.—Mortals living for a day, who are nothing, are also the powerful self that subjects the universal essences to itself, wounds the gods, and gives them actuality and an interest in action at all. Conversely, these powerless universalities, which feed on human gifts and only through human beings get anything to do, are the natural essence and material of all events, and equally the ethical material and pathos of doing. Their elemental natures are brought into actuality and active relation only by individuality's free self. Yet they are equally the universal that withdraws from this connection, remains unrestricted in its determination, and through the invincible elasticity of its unity erases the point-like agent and its configurations, preserves itself pure, and dissolves everything individual in its fluidity.
731 Just as they fall into this contradictory relation with the opposing self-endowed nature, their universality also conflicts with their own determination and its relation to others. They are the eternally beautiful individuals, resting in their own existence, raised above transience and foreign force.—But they are also determinate elements, particular 1807 681 gods, and thus relate to others. Yet this relation to others, which through its opposition is a conflict with them, is a comic forgetting of their eternal nature.—Determinacy is rooted in divine subsistence and, in its limitation, has the independence of the whole individuality. Through this, their characters also lose the sharpness of their distinctive traits and mix in their ambiguity.—A purpose of activity, and their activity itself, directed against another and thus against an invincible divine force, is a contingent, empty display of bluster. It equally dissolves and turns the action's apparent seriousness into a harmless, self-assured game without result or outcome. But if the negative, or their determinacy, appears in the nature of their divinity only as the inconsistency of their activity and the contradiction between purpose and outcome, and that independent security retains its superiority over the determinate, then precisely through this the pure power of the negative confronts them as their ultimate power, over which they are powerless. They are the universal and positive against mortals' individual self, which cannot withstand their power. But the universal self therefore hovers above them and above this whole world of representation, to which all the content belongs: the conceptless emptiness of necessity. This is an occurrence before 1807 682 which they remain selfless and mourn, since these determinate natures do not find themselves in this purity.
732 But this necessity is the unity of the concept, to which the contradictory substantiality of the individual moments is subject. In it, the inconsistency and contingency of their doing fall into order, and the play of their actions gains its seriousness and value in the actions themselves. The content of the world of representation plays out its movement freely for itself in the middle, assembled around the individuality of a hero. Yet in his strength and beauty the hero feels his life broken and mourns as he faces an early death. For individuality firm within itself and actual has been excluded to the extremes and divided into its moments, which have not yet found and united with one another. One individual, the abstract, nonactual one, is necessity, which takes no part in the life of the middle, any more than does the other, actual individual, the singer, who keeps outside it and disappears in his representation. Both extremes must approach the content. One, necessity, must fill itself with content; the other, the singer's language, must take part in it. And the content, previously left to itself, must gain within itself the certainty and fixed determination of the negative.
1807 683
733 This higher language, tragedy, thus gathers more closely together the dispersed moments of the essential and acting world. The divine substance separates into its shapes according to the nature of the concept, and its movement likewise conforms to it. As for form, by entering into the content language ceases to narrate, just as the content ceases to be merely represented. The hero himself is the speaker. The presentation shows the listener, who is also a spectator, self-conscious human beings who know their right and purpose, the power and will of their determinacy, and know how to say them. They are artists. Unlike the language accompanying ordinary activity in actual life, they do not unconsciously, naturally, and naively express the external aspect of their decision and undertaking. They express the inner essence, demonstrate the right of their action, and thoughtfully maintain and clearly express the pathos to which they belong in its universal individuality, free from contingent circumstances and personal particularity. Finally, the existence of these characters consists in actual human beings who put on the persons of the heroes and present them in actual speech—not narration, but their own speaking. Just as being made by human hands is essential to the statue, the actor is essential to his mask—not as an external condition from which the consideration of art must abstract. Or insofar 1807 684 as it must indeed abstract from this, that says precisely that art does not yet contain the true, proper self within it.
734 The universal ground on which the movement of these shapes generated from the concept takes place is the consciousness of the first, representing language and of its selfless content let loose in its parts. It is the common people in general, whose wisdom comes to speech in the chorus of elders. The chorus represents the people in its powerlessness, since the people itself forms only the positive and passive material of the governing individuality confronting it. Lacking the power of the negative, it cannot hold together and restrain the wealth and colorful fullness of divine life. Instead it lets it run apart, and in its reverent hymns praises each individual moment as an independent god—now this one, now another. But when it senses the seriousness of the concept striding over these shapes and shattering them, and sees how badly its praised gods fare when they venture onto this ground where the concept rules, it is not itself the negative power that intervenes actively. Instead it remains in the selfless thought of that power, in the consciousness of foreign fate, and supplies the empty wish for peace and the weak words of appeasement. In its fear before the higher powers, the immediate arms of 1807 685 substance, before their struggle with one another, and before the simple self of necessity that crushes them too, like the living beings tied to them; and in its pity for these beings, whom it also knows as the same as itself, it has only the inactive terror of this movement, equally helpless regret, and finally the empty peace of submission to necessity. Necessity's work is grasped neither as the character's necessary action nor as the absolute essence's doing within itself.
735 On this observing consciousness, as on the indifferent ground of representation, spirit appears not in dispersed multiplicity but in the concept's simple division. Its substance therefore shows itself torn apart only into its two extreme powers. These elemental universal essences are also self-conscious individualities: heroes who place their consciousness in one of these powers, have in it the determinacy of their character, and constitute its activity and actuality.—As noted, this universal individualization descends further into the immediate actuality of existence proper and presents itself to a crowd of spectators. In the chorus, this crowd has its counterpart—or rather, its own representation expressing itself.
736 The content and movement of spirit that is its own object here have already been considered as the nature and 1807 686 realization of ethical substance. In its religion spirit gains consciousness of itself, or presents itself to its consciousness in a purer form and simpler shape. Through its concept, ethical substance divided in content into the two powers determined as divine and human, or underground and upper right—the former the family, the latter state power, with the female character belonging to the first and the male to the second. The circle of gods, previously multiform and unstable in its determinations, is therefore restricted to these powers, which through this determination approach individuality proper. For the earlier dispersal of the whole into manifold abstract powers appearing as substantial is the dissolution of the subject, which comprehends them only as moments within its self. Individuality is therefore only the superficial form of those essences. Conversely, any distinction of characters beyond the one named must be counted as contingent personality, external in itself.
737 At the same time the essence divides in its form, or knowing. Acting spirit, as consciousness, confronts the object on which it acts, and which is therefore determined as the knower's negative. The agent thus stands in the opposition of knowing and not knowing. It takes its purpose from its character and knows it 1807 687 as ethical essence. But because of its character's determinacy, it knows only one power of substance, while the other is hidden from it. Present actuality is therefore one thing in itself and another for consciousness. In this relation, upper and lower right take on the meaning of the power that knows and reveals itself to consciousness, and the power that conceals itself and lies in ambush. One is the side of light: the god of the oracle, who in his natural moment arose from the sun illuminating everything, and knows and reveals everything—Phoebus, and Zeus, his father. But this truth-speaking god's commands and announcements of what is are instead deceptive. For in its concept this knowing is immediately not knowing, because consciousness within itself is this opposition in acting. Both the one who could solve the riddle of the Sphinx himself and the one who trusts like a child are therefore sent to destruction by what the god reveals to them. This priestess through whom the beautiful god speaks is nothing other than the ambiguous sisters of fate, who drive people to crime through their promises and, through the double meaning of what they offered as security, deceive anyone relying on the apparent sense. Hence a consciousness purer than the latter, who believes witches, and more reflective 1807 688 and thorough than the former, who trusts the priestess and the beautiful god, delays revenge after his father's spirit itself reveals the crime that murdered him, and arranges further proofs—because this revealing spirit could also be the devil.
738 This distrust is justified because knowing consciousness places itself in the opposition between its self-certainty and objective essence. Ethical consciousness claims the right that actuality is nothing in itself against absolute law. But it experiences that its knowing is one-sided, its law only the law of its character, and that it has grasped only one power of substance. Action itself is this inversion of the known into its opposite, into being. It is the reversal of the right of character and knowing into the right of the opposite, with which the former is linked in substance's essence—into the Erinys of the other power and character, stirred to hostility. This lower right sits enthroned with Zeus and enjoys equal authority with manifest right and the knowing god.
739 Acting individuality restricts the chorus's world of gods to these three essences. One is substance, equally the power of the hearth and the spirit of family piety, and the universal power of state and 1807 689 government. Since this distinction belongs to substance as such, it does not individualize itself for representation into two distinct shapes, but in actuality has the two persons of its characters. By contrast, the distinction between knowing and not knowing falls within each actual self-consciousness, and divides between two individual shapes only in abstraction, in the element of universality. For the hero's self exists only as whole consciousness and is therefore essentially the whole distinction belonging to form. But its substance is determinate, and only one side of the distinction of content belongs to it. The two sides of consciousness, which in actuality do not each have a separate individuality of their own, therefore each receive a particular shape in representation: one that of the revealing god, the other that of the Erinys remaining hidden. In part they enjoy equal honor; in part the shape of substance, Zeus, is the necessity of their relation to one another. Substance is the relation in which knowing exists for itself but has its truth in the simple; the distinction through which actual consciousness exists has its ground in the inner essence that erases it; and certainty's assurance, clear to itself, has its confirmation in forgetfulness.
740 Consciousness opened up this opposition through action. Acting according to manifest knowing, 1807 690 it experiences that knowing's deception. Devoted in content to one attribute of substance, it violated the other and thereby gave it a right against itself. Following the knowing god, it instead grasped what was not manifest, and pays for having trusted knowing. Since ambiguity is knowing's nature, it had to be present for consciousness too, as a warning. The priestess's frenzy, the witches' inhuman shape, the voice of the tree or bird, the dream, and so forth are not the ways in which truth appears, but warning signs of deception, of the lack of reflection, of the individuality and contingency of knowing. Or, what amounts to the same thing, the opposed power consciousness violates is present as declared law and valid right, whether the law of family or of state. Against this, consciousness followed its own knowing and hid from itself what was manifest. But the truth of the powers of content and consciousness confronting one another is the result that both have equal right, and therefore, in the opposition action produces, equal wrong. The movement of doing proves their unity in the mutual downfall of both powers and self-conscious characters. The opposition's reconciliation with itself is the Lethe of the underworld in death—or the Lethe of the upper world as acquittal, not from guilt, which consciousness cannot 1807 691 deny because it acted, but from crime, and as its atoning peace. Both are forgetfulness: the disappearance of the actuality and doing of the powers of substance, their individualities, and the powers of the abstract thought of good and evil. For none is the essence for itself. Instead, the essence is the whole's repose within itself, fate's motionless unity, the peaceful existence and thus inactivity and lifelessness of family and government, the equal honor and thus indifferent nonactuality of Apollo and the Erinys, and the return of their inspiration and activity into simple Zeus.
741 This fate completes the depopulation of heaven—that thoughtless mixture of individuality and essence, a mixture through which the essence's doing appears inconsistent, contingent, and unworthy of it. For individuality, attached to essence only superficially, is inessential. The banishment of such representations without essence, demanded by ancient philosophers, thus already begins in tragedy in general: the concept governs the division of substance, individuality is thereby essential, and the determinations are absolute characters. The self-consciousness represented in tragedy therefore knows and recognizes 1807 692 only one supreme power, and knows this Zeus only as the power of state or hearth. In the opposition of knowing, it knows him only as the father of knowing the particular, which becomes a shape—and as Zeus of the oath and of the Erinys, of the universal inwardness dwelling in concealment. The moments dispersing further out of the concept into representation, which the chorus accepts one after another, are by contrast not the hero's pathos but sink for him into passion: contingent, inessential moments, praised by the selfless chorus but incapable of constituting the heroes' character or of being expressed and honored by them as their essence.
742 But the persons of the divine essence itself, as well as the characters of its substance, also merge into the simplicity of the unconscious. Against self-consciousness, this necessity is determined as the negative power of all appearing shapes. Self-consciousness does not recognize itself in this necessity but instead perishes there. The self appears only allotted to the characters, not as the center of the movement. But self-consciousness, the simple certainty of itself, is in fact the negative power, the unity of Zeus, the substantial essence, and abstract necessity. It is the spiritual unity into which everything returns. Since actual self-consciousness is still distinguished from substance and fate, it is partly the chorus, 1807 693 or rather the watching crowd. This movement of divine life fills the crowd with fear as something foreign, or as something close produces in it only the emotion of inactive pity. Partly, insofar as consciousness joins in the action and belongs to the characters, this union is external, a playing of a role, because the true union of self, fate, and substance is not yet present. The hero appearing before the spectator splits into mask and actor, person and actual self.
743 The heroes' self-consciousness must emerge from its mask and present itself as knowing itself to be the fate both of the chorus's gods and of the absolute powers themselves, and as no longer separated from the chorus, universal consciousness.
744 Comedy therefore initially has this side: actual self-consciousness presents itself as the fate of the gods. As universal moments, these elemental essences are not self and are not actual. They do have the form of individuality, but this is only imagined in them and does not belong to them in and for themselves. The actual self does not have such an abstract moment as its substance and content. It, the subject, is therefore raised above such a moment as above an individual property. Wearing this mask, it expresses the irony of the mask's wish to be something 1807 694 for itself. The posturing of universal essence is exposed to the self: it shows itself caught in an actuality and drops its mask precisely when it wants to be something proper. Appearing here in its meaning as actual, the self plays with the mask it puts on at one point to be its person. But just as quickly it emerges again from this appearance in its own nakedness and ordinariness, showing that these are not distinct from the proper self, the actor, or from the spectator.
745 This universal dissolution of shaped essence in general within its individuality becomes more serious in content, and thus more mischievous and bitter, insofar as that content has its more serious and necessary meaning. Divine substance unites the meaning of natural and ethical essence within itself. As regards nature, actual self-consciousness already shows itself as fate in using nature for its adornment, dwelling, and so forth, and in feasting on its sacrifice. To it the secret has been disclosed of how things stand with nature's essence as self. In the mystery of bread and wine it makes that essence its own, together with the meaning of inner essence; and in comedy it is conscious of the irony of this meaning in general.—Insofar as this meaning contains ethical essence, it is partly the people in its 1807 695 two sides, the state or demos proper, and family individuality; partly self-conscious pure knowing, or rational thought of the universal.—That demos, the universal mass knowing itself as lord and ruler and as the understanding and insight deserving respect, constrains and deceives itself through the particularity of its actuality. It presents the ridiculous contrast between its opinion of itself and its immediate existence, between its necessity and contingency, its universality and vulgarity. When the principle of its individuality separated from the universal steps forward in the proper shape of actuality, openly appropriating and managing the commonwealth whose secret injury it is, the contrast is exposed more directly: the universal as theory against what matters in practice, the complete release of the purposes of immediate individuality from universal order, and their mockery of it.
746 Rational thought removes divine essence from its contingent shape. Opposed to the chorus's conceptless wisdom, which offers various moral sayings and accepts a host of laws and determinate concepts of duty and right, it raises them into the simple ideas of the beautiful and the good.—The movement of this 1807 696 abstraction is consciousness of the dialectic that these maxims and laws have within themselves, and thereby of the disappearance of the absolute validity in which they previously appeared. When the contingent determination and superficial individuality that representation lent to divine essences disappear, on their natural side they have only the nakedness of their immediate existence. They are clouds, a vanishing mist, like those representations. In their thought essentiality, having become the simple thoughts of the beautiful and good, they accommodate being filled with any chosen content. The power of dialectical knowing abandons determinate laws and maxims of action to the pleasure and frivolity of the young, who are thereby seduced; and it puts weapons of fraud into the hands of old age, anxious and concerned and confined to life's individuality. The pure thoughts of the beautiful and good thus offer a comic spectacle. Freed from opinion—which contains both their determinacy as content and their absolute determinacy, consciousness's holding fast to them—they become empty, and thereby the plaything of opinion and the arbitrary choice of contingent individuality.
747 Here, then, the previously unconscious fate, consisting in empty repose and forgetfulness 1807 697 and separated from self-consciousness, is united with it. The individual self is the negative power through and in which the gods disappear, together with their moments: existing nature and the thoughts of its determinations. At the same time, the self is not the emptiness of disappearance. It preserves itself in this nothingness, is at home with itself, and is the only actuality. The religion of art has completed itself in it and returned completely into itself. Because individual consciousness in its self-certainty presents itself as this absolute power, that power has lost the form of something represented, separated from consciousness in general and foreign to it, as were the statue, the living beautiful body, the content of epic, and the powers and persons of tragedy. Nor is this unity the unconscious unity of worship and the mysteries. Instead, the actor's proper self coincides with his person, as does the spectator, who is completely at home in what is presented and sees himself playing. What this self-consciousness intuits is that whatever assumes the form of essence against it instead dissolves and is surrendered within its thinking, existence, and doing. It is the return of everything universal into self-certainty, which is thereby this complete freedom from fear and the 1807 698 absence of essence in anything foreign, a well-being and ease of consciousness found nowhere else outside this comedy.
1807 699
C. *Revealed Religion*.
748 Through the religion of art, spirit has passed from the form of substance into that of subject. For this religion produces its shape, and thus posits within it doing, or self-consciousness, which only disappears in the terrible substance and does not grasp itself in trust. This incarnation of divine essence begins with the statue, which has only the external shape of self within it, while the inward self, its activity, falls outside it. In worship, however, both sides have become one. In the result of the religion of art, this unity in its completion has also passed over to the extreme of the self. All essentiality has sunk into spirit completely certain of itself in the individuality of consciousness. The proposition expressing this lightheartedness reads: the self is the absolute essence. The essence that was substance, and in 1807 700 which the self was an accident, has sunk into a predicate. In this self-consciousness, which nothing confronts in the form of essence, spirit has lost its consciousness.
749 This proposition, the self is the absolute essence, clearly belongs to nonreligious, actual spirit. We must recall which shape of actual spirit expresses it. That shape will also contain the proposition's movement and reversal, reducing the self to a predicate and raising substance to subject. This must happen in such a way that the reversed proposition does not make substance subject merely in itself or for us, or, what is the same, restore substance so that spirit's consciousness is led back to its beginning, natural religion. Rather, the reversal must be accomplished for and through self-consciousness itself. By consciously giving itself up, self-consciousness is preserved in its externalization and remains the subject of substance. But as equally externalized, it also has consciousness of substance. Or, by producing substance as subject through its sacrifice, this subject remains its own self. In the two propositions, the subject merely disappears in the first substantiality, while in the second substance is merely predicate. Both sides are therefore present in each with an opposite inequality of worth. What is achieved is that the 1807 701 union and interpenetration of both natures emerge, in which both, with equal worth, are equally essential and also only moments. Through this, spirit is both consciousness of itself as its objective substance and simple self-consciousness remaining within itself.
750 The religion of art belongs to ethical spirit, which we earlier saw perish in the condition of legal right: that is, in the proposition the self as such, the abstract person, is absolute essence. In ethical life the self is immersed in the spirit of its people; it is fulfilled universality. But simple individuality rises out of this content, and its lightheartedness purifies it into the person, into the abstract universality of right. In this, the reality of ethical spirit is lost. The contentless spirits of individual peoples are assembled in one pantheon—not a pantheon of representation, whose powerless form leaves each to itself, but the pantheon of abstract universality, of pure thought, which strips them of body and grants being-in-and-for-itself to the spiritless self, the individual person.
751 But through its emptiness this self has released the content. Consciousness is essence only within itself. Its own existence, the person's legal recognition, is unfulfilled abstraction. It therefore possesses instead only the thought of itself; or, as it exists and knows itself as object, it is nonactual. It is therefore only the Stoic 1807 702 *independence of thought. Passing through the movement of skeptical consciousness, this independence finds its truth in the shape called unhappy self-consciousness.
752 This consciousness knows how things stand with the abstract person's actual validity, and equally with that person's validity in pure thought. It knows such validity instead as complete loss. It is itself this self-conscious loss and the externalization of its self-knowledge.—We see that this unhappy consciousness forms the opposite side and completion of comic consciousness, which is perfectly happy within itself. All divine essence returns into the latter; or it is the complete externalization of substance. The former, conversely, is the tragic fate of the self-certainty that is supposed to exist in and for itself. It is consciousness of the loss of all essentiality in this certainty of itself, and of the loss of this very self-knowledge—of substance as well as self. It is the pain that expresses itself in the harsh words: God is dead.
753 In the condition of legal right, then, the ethical world and its religion have sunk into comic consciousness, and unhappy consciousness is the knowledge of this entire loss. It has lost both the intrinsic worth of its immediate personality and that of its mediated, thought personality. Likewise, 1807 703 trust in the gods' eternal laws has fallen silent, as have the oracles that claimed to know the particular. The statues are now corpses whose animating soul has fled, just as the hymns are words whose faith has fled. The gods' tables lack spiritual food and drink, and from its games and festivals consciousness receives no joyful unity of itself with the essence. The works of the muse lack the power of spirit whose self-certainty arose from the crushing of gods and human beings. They are now what they are for us: beautiful fruits broken from the tree. A friendly fate offered them to us as a girl presents those fruits. It does not give the actual life of their existence, the tree that bore them, the earth and elements that made up their substance, the climate that constituted their determinacy, or the changing seasons that governed their coming-to-be.—Similarly, with those artworks fate gives us not their world, not the spring and summer of ethical life in which they bloomed and ripened, but only the veiled recollection of that actuality.—Our activity in enjoying them is therefore not worship, through which our consciousness would gain its complete, fulfilling truth. It is instead the external activity that wipes, perhaps, 1807 704 raindrops or specks of dust from these fruits. In place of the inward elements of the surrounding, generating, and inspiring actuality of ethical life, it erects the elaborate scaffolding of the dead elements of their external existence—language, history, and so forth—not to live its way into them, but only to represent them within itself. Yet the girl offering the picked fruits is more than their nature unfolded into its conditions and elements—tree, air, light, and so forth—which offered them immediately. For in a higher way she gathers all this into the gleam of her self-conscious eye and the gesture of offering. Likewise, the spirit of fate offering us those artworks is more than that people's ethical life and actuality. For it is the recollection that takes back inward the spirit still externalized in them. It is the spirit of tragic fate, gathering all those individual gods and attributes of substance into the one pantheon, into spirit self-conscious of itself as spirit.
754 All the conditions of its emergence are present. This totality of its conditions constitutes its coming-to-be, its concept, or its emergence in itself.—The circle of art's productions encompasses the forms of absolute substance's externalizations. Substance exists in the form of individuality as a thing, as an existing object 1807 705 of sensory consciousness; as pure language, or the coming-to-be of the shape whose existence does not step out of the self and is a purely vanishing object; as immediate unity with universal self-consciousness in its inspiration, and as mediated unity in the doing of worship; as beautiful self-endowed bodily existence; and finally as existence raised into representation and expanded into a world, which at last gathers itself into universality that is equally pure self-certainty.—These forms, and on the other side the world of the person and of right, the devastating savagery of the released elements of content, as well as the thought person of Stoicism and the unstable unrest of skeptical consciousness, form the circumference of shapes standing expectant and pressing around the birthplace of spirit coming to be as self-consciousness. The pain and longing of unhappy self-consciousness, penetrating them all, is their center and the shared birth pang of its emergence: the simplicity of the pure concept containing those shapes as its moments.
755 Spirit has within it the two sides represented above as the two reversed propositions. One is that substance externalizes itself and becomes self-consciousness; the other, conversely, that self-consciousness externalizes 1807 706 itself and makes itself thinghood, or the universal self. In this way both sides have come toward one another, and their true union has arisen. Substance's externalization, its becoming self-consciousness, expresses the transition into the opposite, the unconscious transition of necessity, or the fact that substance is self-consciousness in itself. Conversely, self-consciousness's externalization expresses its being the universal essence in itself. Or, because the self is pure being-for-itself remaining at home with itself in its opposite, it expresses that for it substance is self-consciousness, and precisely thereby spirit. Of this spirit, which has left the form of substance and enters existence in the shape of self-consciousness, we can therefore say—if we wish to use relations drawn from natural generation—that it has an actual mother but a father existing in itself. For actuality, or self-consciousness, and the in-itself as substance are its two moments. Through their mutual externalization, each becoming the other, spirit enters existence as their unity.
756 Insofar as self-consciousness one-sidedly grasps only its own externalization, true spirit has not yet come to be for it, even if its object is thus equally being and self and it knows all existence as spiritual essence. This is so insofar as being in general, or 1807 707 substance, has not equally on its side externalized itself in itself and become self-consciousness. For then all existence is spiritual essence only from the standpoint of consciousness, not in its own self. Spirit is in this way only imagined into existence. This imagining is fantasy, which puts into nature and history, into the world and the mythical representations of earlier religions, an inner meaning other than the one they immediately offer consciousness in their appearance—or, regarding religions, other than what the self-consciousness whose religions they were knew within them. But this meaning is borrowed, a garment that does not cover the nakedness of appearance or win faith and reverence. It remains consciousness's own murky night and ecstasy.
757 For this meaning of the objective not to be mere imagining, it must exist in itself. That is, first it must arise for consciousness from the concept and emerge in its necessity. In this way, through knowing immediate consciousness, or consciousness of the existing object, self-knowing spirit has arisen for us through that consciousness's necessary movement. Second, this concept, which as immediate also had the shape of immediacy for its consciousness, has given itself the shape of self-consciousness in itself: that is, according to the very same 1807 708 necessity of the concept by which being, or immediacy, the contentless object of sensory consciousness, externalizes itself and becomes I for consciousness.—But the thinking in-itself, or knowing necessity, differs from the immediate in-itself, or existing necessity itself. Yet this distinction also does not lie outside the concept, since the concept's simple unity is immediate being itself. The concept is equally what externalizes itself, or the coming-to-be of intuited necessity, and what remains with itself within necessity and knows and comprehends it.—The immediate in-itself of spirit giving itself the shape of self-consciousness means nothing other than that actual world-spirit has reached this knowledge of itself. Only then does this knowledge also enter its consciousness as truth. How that happened has emerged above.
758 Absolute spirit has given itself the shape of self-consciousness in itself and therefore also for its consciousness. This now appears as the world's faith that spirit exists as a self-consciousness, that is, as an actual human being; that it exists for immediate certainty; that believing consciousness sees, feels, and hears this divinity. Thus it is not imagining: it is actually the case. Consciousness then does not start from its own inwardness, from thought, and connect within itself the thought of God with 1807 709 existence. It starts from immediate present existence and recognizes God in it.—The moment of immediate being is present in the concept's content in this way: religious spirit, in the return of all essentiality into consciousness, has become a simple positive self, just as actual spirit as such, in unhappy consciousness, is this same simple self-conscious negativity. The self of existing spirit thus has the form of complete immediacy. It is posited neither as thought or represented nor as produced, as happens with the immediate self partly in natural religion and partly in the religion of art. Instead, this God is immediately intuited by the senses as self, as an actual individual human being. Only so is he self-consciousness.
759 This incarnation of divine essence, or its essentially and immediately having the shape of self-consciousness, is the simple content of absolute religion. In it, essence is known as spirit; or this religion is spirit's consciousness of itself as spirit. For spirit is the knowing of itself in its externalization: the essence that is the movement of retaining equality with itself in its otherness. But this is substance insofar as in its accidental being it is equally reflected into itself—not indifferent toward it as toward something inessential, and thus situated in something foreign, 1807 710 but within itself there; that is, insofar as it is subject or self.—In this religion the divine essence is therefore revealed. Its being revealed plainly consists in its being known for what it is. But it is known precisely by being known as spirit, as essence that is essentially self-consciousness.—For consciousness, something in its object is secret when that object is an other, or foreign, to it, and when it does not know it as itself. This secrecy ends when absolute essence as spirit is consciousness's object. For then in its relation to consciousness it is self: consciousness immediately knows itself in it, or is revealed to itself in it. It is revealed to itself only in its own self-certainty. That object of its is the self. But the self is not foreign; it is the inseparable unity with itself, the immediately universal. It is the pure concept, pure thought or being-for-itself, which is immediately being and thus being for another, and as this being for another is immediately returned into itself and at home with itself. It is therefore what is truly and solely revealed. The good, the just, the holy, creator of heaven and earth, and so forth are predicates of a subject—universal moments held at this point, and existing initially only in consciousness's return into thought.—When they are known, their ground and essence, the subject itself, is not yet revealed. 1807 711 Likewise, they are the determinations of the universal, not this universal itself. But the subject itself, and thus also this pure universal, is revealed as self. For the self is precisely this inwardness reflected into itself, which is immediately present and is the very certainty of the self to which it is present. To be revealed according to its concept is therefore spirit's true shape, and this shape of its, the concept, is likewise alone its essence and substance. It is known as self-consciousness and is immediately revealed to self-consciousness, since it is this itself. Divine nature is the same as human nature, and it is this unity that is intuited.
760 Here, then, consciousness—or the way the essence exists for itself, its shape—is in fact equal to its self-consciousness. This shape is itself a self-consciousness. It is therefore also an existing object, and this being equally immediately means pure thought, absolute essence.—Absolute essence existing as an actual self-consciousness seems to have descended from its eternal simplicity. In fact, however, only through this has it reached its highest essence. For only when the concept of essence has attained its simple purity is it absolute abstraction, which is pure thought and thus the self's pure individuality, and, because of its simplicity, the immediate, or being.—What is called sensory consciousness is precisely this pure abstraction. 1807 712 It is this thinking for which being is the immediate. The lowest is therefore also the highest; what is revealed, having come entirely out onto the surface, is precisely thereby the deepest. The highest essence being seen, heard, and so forth as an existing self-consciousness is therefore in fact the completion of its concept. Through this completion, the essence exists just as immediately as it is essence.
761 This immediate existence is also not solely and merely immediate consciousness, but religious consciousness. Its immediacy inseparably means not only an existing self-consciousness, but also the purely thought or absolute essence. Religious consciousness is conscious of what we are conscious of in our concept: that being is essence. This unity of being and essence, of thought that is immediately existence, is both this religious consciousness's thought, or mediated knowing, and its immediate knowing. For this unity of being and thought is self-consciousness, and itself exists; or the thought unity also has this shape of what it is. God is therefore revealed here as he is; he exists as he is in himself. He exists as spirit. God is accessible only in pure speculative knowing, exists only in it, and is only this knowing itself, since he is spirit. And this speculative knowing is the knowing of revealed religion. Speculative knowing knows him as thought, or pure essence, knows this thought as being and as 1807 713 existence, and knows existence as its own negativity, hence as self, this self and universal self. Revealed religion knows exactly this.—The hopes and expectations of the previous world pressed toward this revelation alone: to intuit what absolute essence is and find themselves in it. Self-consciousness receives this joy, and it seizes the whole world: to see itself in absolute essence. For absolute essence is spirit; it is the simple movement of those pure moments. This movement itself expresses that the essence is known as spirit only by being intuited as immediate self-consciousness.
762 This concept of spirit itself knowing itself as spirit is itself immediate and not yet developed. The essence is spirit, or it has appeared, it is revealed. This first being-revealed is itself immediate. But immediacy is equally pure mediation or thought, and must therefore display this within itself as such.—Considered more specifically, in the immediacy of self-consciousness spirit is this individual self-consciousness, opposed to universal self-consciousness. It is an excluding one, which for the consciousness for which it exists still has the unresolved form of a sensory other. That consciousness does not yet know spirit as its own; or spirit does not yet exist as universal, as all self, just as it exists as individual self. The shape does not yet have the form of the concept: that is, of the 1807 714 universal self, the self that in its immediate actuality is equally sublated, thought, universality, without losing that actuality in universality.—But the next, itself immediate form of this universality is not already the form of thought itself, of the concept as concept. It is the universality of actuality, the totality of selves, and the elevation of existence into representation. As everywhere else—to give a definite example—the sublated sensory this is first the thing of perception, not yet the universal of understanding.
763 This individual human being, as whom absolute essence is revealed, therefore accomplishes within himself as individual the movement of sensory being. He is the immediately present God; through this his being passes into having been. The consciousness for which he has this sensory presence ceases to see and hear him; it has seen and heard him. Only by its merely having seen and heard him does it itself become spiritual consciousness. Or, just as he previously rose for it as sensory existence, he has now risen in spirit.—For as a consciousness seeing and hearing him through the senses, it is itself only immediate consciousness. It has not sublated the inequality of objectivity, has not taken it back into pure thought, but knows this objective individual, not itself, as spirit. In the disappearance of the immediate existence of what is known as 1807 715 absolute essence, the immediate receives its negative moment. Spirit remains the immediate self of actuality, but as the community's universal self-consciousness, resting in its own substance, just as that substance is universal subject in it. Not the individual on his own, but the individual together with the community's consciousness and what he is for it, constitutes his complete whole.
764 But pastness and distance are only the incomplete form in which the immediate mode is mediated or posited as universal. This mode is only superficially dipped into the element of thought, preserved there as sensory mode, and not made one with the nature of thought itself. It is raised only into representation, since representation is the synthetic connection of sensory immediacy and its universality, or thought.
765 This form of representation constitutes the determinacy in which spirit becomes conscious of itself in this community of its own. The community is not yet spirit's self-consciousness developed to its concept as concept; mediation is still incomplete. In this connection of being and thought, then, there remains the defect that spiritual essence still carries an unreconciled division into a here and a beyond. The content is true, but all its moments, posited in the element of representation, have the character of not being comprehended. Instead, they appear as 1807 716 completely independent sides relating externally to one another. For the true content also to receive its true form for consciousness, consciousness needs the higher cultivation that raises its intuition of absolute substance into the concept and reconciles its consciousness with its self-consciousness for itself, as has happened for us or in itself.
766 We must consider this content in the way it is within spirit's consciousness.—Absolute spirit is content: thus it is in the shape of its truth. But its truth is not only to be the community's substance, or its in-itself, nor only to emerge from this inwardness into the objectivity of representation. It is to become actual self, reflect itself into itself, and be subject. This, then, is the movement it accomplishes in its community, or this is its life. What this self-revealing spirit is in and for itself is therefore not brought out by, as it were, unraveling its rich life in the community and tracing it back to its first thread—perhaps to the representations of the first imperfect community, or even to what the actual human being said. Underlying this reduction is the instinct to move toward the concept. But it confuses origin as the immediate existence of the first appearance with the simplicity of the 1807 717 *concept. Through this impoverishment of spirit's life, through clearing away the community's representation and its activity toward that representation, what arises is therefore not the concept but mere externality and individuality: the historical mode of immediate appearance and the spiritless recollection of a single intended shape and its past.
767 Spirit is initially the content of its consciousness in the form of pure substance, or is the content of its pure consciousness. This element of thought is the movement of descending to existence or individuality. The middle term between them is their synthetic connection, consciousness of becoming other, or representation as such. The third is the return from representation and otherness, or the element of self-consciousness itself.—These three moments constitute spirit. Its separation in representation consists in being in a determinate way; but this determinacy is nothing other than one of its moments. Its detailed movement is therefore to unfold its nature in each of its moments as in an element. As each of these circles completes itself within itself, this reflection into itself is also the transition into the other. Representation forms the middle between pure thought and self-consciousness as such, and is only one of the determinations. At the same time, 1807 718 however, as shown, its character as synthetic connection spreads over all these elements and is their shared determinacy.
768 The content itself that we must consider has already appeared in part as the representation of unhappy and believing consciousness. In the former, however, it was determined as content produced from consciousness and longed for, in which spirit can find neither fulfillment nor rest, because the content is not yet its content in itself, or as its substance. In the latter it was considered as the world's selfless essence, or as the essentially objective content of representation—a representation fleeing actuality in general and therefore lacking the certainty of self-consciousness, which separates itself from representation partly as the vanity of knowing and partly as pure insight.—The community's consciousness, by contrast, has this content as its substance, just as it is the community's certainty of its own spirit.
769 Spirit, initially represented as substance in the element of pure thought, is therefore immediately the simple, self-equal, eternal essence. Yet it has not this abstract meaning of essence but the meaning of absolute spirit. But spirit is precisely this: to be not meaning, not inwardness, but the actual. Simple eternal essence would therefore be spirit only in empty words if it remained at the representation and expression of 1807 719 simple eternal essence. Yet because simple essence is abstraction, it is in fact the negative within itself: the negativity of thought, or negativity as it is in itself in the essence. That is, it is absolute difference from itself, or its pure becoming-other. As essence it exists only in itself, or for us. But since this purity is precisely abstraction or negativity, it exists for itself, or is the self, the concept.—It is therefore objective. Since representation grasps and expresses the necessity of the concept just stated as an occurrence, it will be said that eternal essence generates an other for itself. But in this otherness it has equally immediately returned into itself. For the difference is difference in itself: it is immediately distinguished only from itself, and is therefore unity returned into itself.
770 Thus three moments are distinguished: essence; being-for-itself, which is the essence's otherness and for which the essence exists; and being-for-itself, or self-knowing in the other. The essence intuits only itself in its being-for-itself. In this externalization it is only at home with itself. Being-for-itself that excludes itself from essence is the essence's knowledge of itself. It is the word whose utterance leaves the speaker externalized and emptied, but which is equally immediately heard. Only this 1807 720 hearing of itself is the word's existence. The distinctions made are therefore dissolved as immediately as they are made, and made as immediately as they are dissolved. The true and actual is precisely this movement circling within itself.
771 This movement within itself expresses absolute essence as spirit. Absolute essence not grasped as spirit is only abstract emptiness, just as spirit not grasped as this movement is only an empty word. Grasped in their purity, its moments are restless concepts that exist only as being their opposite within themselves and having their rest in the whole. But the community's representation is not this comprehending thought. It has the content without its necessity, and instead of the concept's form it brings the natural relations of father and son into the realm of pure consciousness. Because it thus proceeds through representation within thought itself, the essence is indeed revealed to it, but through this synthetic representation its moments partly fall apart for it, so that they do not relate to one another through their own concept. Partly, too, it withdraws from this pure object of its own and relates to it only externally. The object is revealed to it by someone foreign, and in this thought of spirit it recognizes neither itself nor the nature of pure self-consciousness. 1807 721 We must go beyond the form of representation and those relations taken from nature, and therefore especially beyond treating the moments of the movement that spirit is as isolated, unchanging substances or subjects instead of transitional moments. As noted earlier in another respect, this going-beyond must be seen as the pressure of the concept. But insofar as it is only instinct, it misunderstands itself, rejects the content with the form, and, what is the same, reduces it to a historical representation and an inherited piece of tradition. Only faith's purely external aspect is retained here, and therefore as something dead without knowledge. Its inward aspect has disappeared, since this would be the concept knowing itself as concept.
772 Absolute spirit represented in pure essence is indeed not abstract pure essence. Rather, precisely because pure essence is only a moment in spirit, it has sunk into an element. But the presentation of spirit in this element has the same formal defect as essence as essence. Essence is the abstract and therefore the negative of its simplicity, an other. Likewise, spirit in the element of essence is the form of simple unity, which for that very reason is equally essentially a becoming-other.—Or, what amounts to the same thing, eternal essence's relation to its being-for-itself is 1807 722 the immediately simple relation of pure thought. In this simple intuition of itself in the other, otherness is therefore not posited as such. It is difference as immediately no difference in pure thought: a recognition of love, in which the two were not opposed in their essence.—Spirit expressed in the element of pure thought is essentially itself this: to exist not only in pure thought but as actual. For its concept itself contains otherness, that is, the sublation of the pure, merely thought concept.
773 Because the element of pure thought is abstract, it is itself instead the other of its simplicity, and therefore passes into the proper element of representation. In this element the moments of the pure concept acquire a substantial existence against one another, and are equally subjects. They do not possess for a third party the indifference of being toward one another, but, reflected into themselves, separate themselves from and oppose one another.
774 Spirit that is thus only eternal or abstract becomes an other to itself, or enters existence, and immediately immediate existence. It therefore creates a world. This creation is representation's word for the concept itself in its absolute movement: for the fact that the simple, or pure thought, declared absolute, is, because it is abstract, instead the negative and thus what is opposed to itself, or the other. Or, to say the same in yet another 1807 723 form: what is posited as essence is simple immediacy, or being. But as immediacy or being it lacks self, and thus, lacking inwardness, is passive, or being for another.—This being for another is also a world. Spirit in the determination of being for another is the peaceful subsistence of the moments previously enclosed in pure thought, hence the dissolution of their simple universality and their separation into their own particularity.
775 But the world is not only this spirit scattered into completeness and its external order. Since spirit is essentially the simple self, this self is equally present in the world: existing spirit, the individual self that has consciousness and distinguishes itself from itself as an other, or as world.—Since this individual self is initially posited so immediately, it is not yet spirit for itself. It therefore does not exist as spirit; it can be called innocent, but hardly good. To be self and spirit in fact, it must first become an other to itself, just as eternal essence presents itself as the movement of being equal to itself in its otherness. Since this spirit is determined as initially existing only immediately, or as dispersed into the multiplicity of its consciousness, its becoming-other is knowing's going into itself in general. Immediate existence turns into thought, or 1807 724 merely sensory consciousness into consciousness of thought. And because this thought comes from immediacy, or is conditioned, it is not pure knowing but thought with otherness within it, and thus thought opposed to itself: the thought of good and evil. The human being is represented as having lost the form of equality with himself by picking from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and as having been driven out of the condition of innocent consciousness, out of nature offering itself without labor, out of paradise, the garden of animals. This is represented as something that happened, as something not necessary.
776 Since this withdrawal into itself by existing consciousness immediately determines itself as becoming unequal to itself, evil appears as the first existence of consciousness withdrawn into itself. And because the thoughts of good and evil are wholly opposed, and this opposition is not yet dissolved, this consciousness is essentially only evil. Yet precisely because of this opposition, good consciousness also stands against it, together with their relation to one another.—Immediate existence turns into thought, and being-within-itself is thereby more closely determined partly as itself thinking, partly as the moment of the essence's becoming-other. Becoming evil can therefore be placed further back, outside the existing world, already in the first realm of thought. It can thus 1807 725 be said that the firstborn son of light himself fell by withdrawing into himself, but that another was immediately generated in his place. Incidentally, forms such as falling and son, belonging only to representation and not to the concept, conversely reduce the concept's moments to representation, or carry representation into the realm of thought.—It is equally indifferent whether a multiplicity of other shapes is placed beside the simple thought of otherness in eternal essence, and withdrawal into itself is placed within them. This addition must also be approved, because the moment of otherness thereby expresses difference as it should: not merely multiplicity in general, but determinate difference as well. One part, the son, is the simple essence knowing itself as essence; the other part is the externalization of being-for-itself that lives only in praise of the essence. In this latter part one can then also place the taking-back of externalized being-for-itself and evil's withdrawal into itself. Insofar as otherness divides in two, spirit would be more determinate in its moments and, if they are counted, expressed as a unity of four—or even, because the multitude itself divides again into two parts, those remaining good and those becoming evil, as a unity of five.—But counting the moments can be considered useless in general. For partly what is distinguished 1807 726 is itself equally only one: precisely the thought of difference, which is only one thought, just as it is this distinguished term, the second against the first. Partly, too, the thought gathering the many into one must be dissolved out of its universality and distinguished into more than three or four distinct terms. Against the absolute determinacy of the abstract one, the principle of number, this universality appears as indeterminacy in relation to number itself. Thus one could speak only of numbers in general, not of a number of distinctions. Thinking here of number and counting at all is therefore entirely superfluous, just as elsewhere the mere difference of magnitude and quantity is conceptless and says nothing.
777 Good and evil were the determinate distinctions of thought that emerged. Since their opposition is not yet dissolved, and they are represented as essences of thought each independent for itself, the human being is the self without essence and the synthetic ground of their existence and struggle. But these universal powers equally belong to the self, or the self is their actuality. According to this moment, then, just as evil is nothing other than the withdrawal into itself of spirit's natural existence, conversely good enters actuality and appears as an existing self-consciousness.—What in purely thought spirit is only indicated as the becoming-other of 1807 727 divine essence in general here approaches its realization for representation. For representation, this realization consists in divine essence's self-abasement, in which it renounces its abstraction and nonactuality.—Representation takes the other side, evil, as an occurrence foreign to divine essence. To grasp it within divine essence itself, as its wrath, is the highest and hardest effort of representation struggling with itself—an effort that remains fruitless because it lacks the concept.
778 The alienation of divine essence is therefore posited in its double manner. Spirit's self and its simple thought are the two moments whose absolute unity is spirit itself. Its alienation consists in their separation and in one's unequal worth against the other. This inequality is therefore double, producing two combinations whose common moments are those stated. In one, divine essence counts as essential, while natural existence and the self count as inessential and to be sublated. In the other, by contrast, being-for-itself counts as essential, and the simple divine as inessential. Their still empty middle is existence in general, the mere commonality of their two moments.
779 This opposition is dissolved not so much through the struggle of the two, represented as 1807 728 separate and independent essences. Their independence entails that in itself, through its concept, each must dissolve itself within itself. Struggle belongs only where both cease to be these mixtures of thought and independent existence, and confront one another only as thoughts. For then, as determinate concepts, they exist essentially only in their opposed relation. As independent, by contrast, they have their essentiality outside the opposition. Their movement is therefore their own free movement. Thus, just as the movement of both is movement in itself, since it must be considered within them themselves, so it is also begun by the one determined against the other as existing in itself. This is represented as voluntary doing. But the necessity of its externalization lies in the concept: what exists in itself, determined as such only in opposition, has for that very reason no true subsistence. Therefore the side for which not being-for-itself but the simple counts as essence externalizes itself, goes into death, and thereby reconciles absolute essence with itself. For in this movement it presents itself as spirit. Abstract essence is alienated from itself; it has natural existence and self-endowed actuality. This otherness, or its sensory presence, is taken back through the second becoming-other and posited as sublated, as universal. The essence has thereby become itself in it. 1807 729 The immediate existence of actuality has ceased to be foreign or external to it, since it is sublated, universal. This death is therefore its rising as spirit.
780 The sublated immediate presence of self-conscious essence is that essence as universal self-consciousness. This concept of the sublated individual self that is absolute essence therefore immediately expresses the constitution of a community. Having so far remained in representation, the community now returns into itself as into the self. Spirit thus passes from the second element of its determination, representation, into the third, self-consciousness as such.—If we consider further how that representation proceeds, we first see this expressed: divine essence assumes human nature. This already states that in themselves the two are not separate. Similarly, divine essence's externalizing itself from the beginning, its existence withdrawing into itself and becoming evil, does not state but contains that in itself this evil existence is not foreign to it. Absolute essence would have only this empty name if there truly were an other to it, if there were a falling away from it. The moment of being-within-itself instead constitutes the essential moment of spirit's self.—That being-within-itself, and thus only then actuality, belongs to the essence itself is concept for us. Insofar as it is concept, 1807 730 it appears to representing consciousness as an incomprehensible occurrence. For this consciousness the in-itself takes the form of indifferent being. Yet the thought that those seemingly mutually exclusive moments—absolute essence and the self existing for itself—are not separate also appears to this representation, since it possesses the true content. But it appears afterward, in the externalization of divine essence becoming flesh. This representation is in this way still immediate and therefore not spiritual, or knows the essence's human shape initially only as particular, not yet universal. For this consciousness it becomes spiritual in the movement of the shaped essence sacrificing its immediate existence again and returning to essence. Only essence as reflected into itself is spirit.—Here, then, is represented the reconciliation of divine essence with the other in general, and specifically with the thought of that other, evil.—If this reconciliation is expressed according to its concept as consisting in evil being in itself the same as good, or in divine essence being the same as nature in its full scope, while nature separated from divine essence is only nothing, this must be regarded as an unspiritual manner of expression, which necessarily produces misunderstandings.—Insofar as evil is the same as good, evil is precisely not evil and good not good; instead, both are sublated. Evil in general is 1807 731 being-for-itself within itself, and good the selfless simple. When both are expressed according to their concept, their unity is also evident. For being-for-itself within itself is simple knowing, and the selfless simple is equally pure being-for-itself within itself.—As much as we must therefore say that according to this concept good and evil—that is, insofar as they are not good and evil—are the same, we must equally say that they are not the same but utterly different. For simple being-for-itself, or pure knowing, is equally pure negativity, or absolute difference within itself.—Only these two propositions complete the whole. Against the assertion and assurance of the first must stand, with invincible stubbornness, insistence on the other. Both have equal right and therefore equal wrong. Their wrong consists in taking such abstract forms as the same and not the same, identity and nonidentity, as something true, fixed, and actual, and resting in them. Neither one nor the other has truth, but precisely their movement: the simply same is abstraction and thus absolute difference, while difference, as difference in itself, is distinguished from itself and is therefore equality with itself. Exactly the same applies to the sameness of divine essence and nature in general, and 1807 732 human nature in particular. Divine essence is nature insofar as it is not essence; nature is divine according to its essence. But spirit is where both abstract sides are posited as they truly are, namely as sublated—a positing that cannot be expressed through judgment and its spiritless is, its connecting word.—Likewise, nature is nothing outside its essence. But this nothing itself equally is. It is absolute abstraction, therefore pure thought or being-within-itself, and with the moment of its opposition to spiritual unity it is evil. The difficulty in these concepts is solely holding fast to the is and forgetting the thinking in which the moments both are and are not—are only the movement that spirit is.—This spiritual unity, or the unity in which distinctions exist only as moments or as sublated, is what has come to be for representing consciousness in that reconciliation. Since it is the universality of self-consciousness, this consciousness has ceased to be representing; the movement has returned into it.
781 Spirit is therefore posited in the third element, in universal self-consciousness. It is its community. The community's movement, as self-consciousness distinguishing itself from its representation, is to produce what has come to be in itself. The dead divine human being, or human God, is in himself universal 1807 733 self-consciousness; he must become this for this self-consciousness. Or self-consciousness constitutes one side of the opposition of representation: the evil side, for which natural existence and individual being-for-itself count as essence. This side, represented as independent, not yet as a moment, must because of its independence raise itself in and for itself to spirit, or display spirit's movement within itself.
782 It is natural spirit. The self must withdraw from this naturalness and go into itself; that would mean becoming evil. But it is already evil in itself. Going into itself therefore consists in convincing itself that natural existence is evil. The world's existing becoming-evil and being-evil, like the existing reconciliation of absolute essence, fall within representing consciousness. But in self-consciousness as such, this represented content falls, in form, only as a sublated moment. For the self is the negative, and thus knowing: a knowing that is a pure doing of consciousness within itself.—This moment of the negative must equally express itself in the content. Since the essence is already reconciled with itself in itself, and is spiritual unity in which the parts of representation are sublated, or moments, this presents itself in each part of representation here receiving the opposite meaning from the one it had before. Each meaning thereby completes itself in the other, and only thereby is the 1807 734 content spiritual. Since determinacy is equally its opposite, unity in otherness—the spiritual—is complete, just as earlier for us, or in itself, the opposed meanings united and themselves sublated the abstract forms of the same and not the same, identity and nonidentity.
783 Thus, whereas in representing consciousness natural self-consciousness's becoming inward was existing evil, in the element of self-consciousness becoming inward is knowledge of evil as something that exists in itself in existence. This knowing is therefore certainly a becoming-evil, but only the coming-to-be of the thought of evil. It is therefore recognized as the first moment of reconciliation. For as a return into itself from nature's immediacy, determined as evil, it is an abandonment of that immediacy and the dying-away of sin. Consciousness abandons not natural existence as such, but natural existence also as something known as evil. The immediate movement of going into itself is equally mediated: it presupposes itself, or is its own ground. The ground of going into itself is that nature has already gone into itself in itself. Because of evil, the human being must go into himself; but evil is itself this going-into-itself.—Precisely for this reason, this first movement is itself only immediate, or its simple concept, because it is the same as its 1807 735 ground. Movement, or becoming-other, must therefore still enter in its more proper form.
784 Beyond this immediacy, then, the mediation of representation is necessary. In itself, knowing nature as spirit's untrue existence, and this universality of the self that has gone into itself, are spirit's reconciliation with itself. For self-consciousness that does not comprehend, this in-itself receives the form of something existing and represented to it. Comprehension for it is therefore not grasping this concept, which knows sublated naturalness as universal and thus reconciled with itself. It is grasping that representation: through the occurrence of divine essence's own externalization, through its incarnation and death that have occurred, divine essence is reconciled with its existence.—Grasping this representation now expresses more precisely what was called spiritual resurrection within it earlier, or the becoming of its individual self-consciousness into universal self-consciousness, into the community.—The divine human being's death as death is abstract negativity, the immediate result of the movement ending only in natural universality. It loses this natural meaning in spiritual self-consciousness, or becomes its concept just stated. Death is transfigured from what it immediately means, the nonbeing of this individual, 1807 736 into the universality of spirit living in its community, dying and rising there daily.
785 What belongs to the element of representation—that absolute spirit as an individual, or rather as a particular, presents spirit's nature in its existence—is thus transferred here into self-consciousness itself, into knowing that preserves itself in its otherness. This knowing therefore does not actually die, as the particular is represented as having actually died. Instead its particularity dies away in its universality, that is, in its knowing, which is the essence reconciling itself with itself. The immediately preceding element of representation is thus posited here as sublated, or has returned into the self, into its concept. What in that element merely existed has become subject.—Precisely thereby the first element, pure thought, and eternal spirit within it are no longer beyond either representing consciousness or the self. Rather, the whole's return into itself is precisely its containing all moments within itself.—The mediator's death grasped by the self is the sublation of his objectivity, or his particular being-for-itself. This particular being-for-itself has become universal self-consciousness.—On the other side, precisely thereby the universal has become self-consciousness, and the pure or nonactual spirit of mere thought has become actual.—The mediator's death is the death not only of his natural side, or his 1807 737 particular being-for-itself. It is not only the already dead shell, stripped from essence, that dies, but also the abstraction of divine essence. For insofar as his death has not yet completed reconciliation, he is the one-sided being that knows the simplicity of thought as essence opposed to actuality. This extreme of the self does not yet have equal worth with the essence; the self has this only in spirit. The death of this representation therefore also contains the death of the abstraction of divine essence not posited as self. It is unhappy consciousness's painful feeling that God himself has died. This harsh expression expresses the innermost simple knowing of itself, consciousness's return into the depths of the night of I = I, which no longer distinguishes or knows anything outside itself. This feeling is therefore in fact the loss of substance and of its confrontation with consciousness. But it is also substance's pure subjectivity, or pure self-certainty, which substance lacked as object, as the immediate, or as pure essence. This knowing is therefore the inspiration through which substance becomes subject, its abstraction and lifelessness have died, and it has thus become actual, simple, and universal self-consciousness.
786 Thus spirit is spirit knowing itself. It knows itself: what is its object, or its 1807 738 representation, is the true absolute content. As we saw, this content expresses spirit itself. At the same time spirit is not only the content of self-consciousness and not only an object for it, but also actual spirit. It is this by passing through the three elements of its nature. This movement through itself constitutes its actuality. What moves is spirit; it is the subject of the movement, and it is equally the moving itself, or the substance through which the subject passes. The concept of spirit emerged for us as we entered religion as the movement of spirit certain of itself, forgiving evil and thereby also relinquishing its own simplicity and hard unchangeability. Or it emerged as the movement in which the absolutely opposed recognizes itself as the same, and this recognition breaks forth as the yes between these extremes. Religious consciousness, for which absolute essence is revealed, intuits this concept and sublates the distinction between its self and what it intuits. Just as it is subject, so it is also substance, and thus itself is spirit precisely because and insofar as it is this movement.
787 But this community is not yet complete in this self-consciousness of its own. Its content is for it generally in the form of representation. This division also still affects its actual spirituality, its return from representation, just as the element of pure thought itself was affected 1807 739 by it. The community does not also have consciousness of what it is. It is spiritual self-consciousness that does not have itself as such as its object, or does not open itself into consciousness of itself. Instead, insofar as it is consciousness, it has the representations considered.—We see self-consciousness at its final turning point becoming inward and reaching knowledge of being-within-itself. We see it externalize its natural existence and gain pure negativity. But the positive meaning—that this negativity, or pure inwardness of knowing, is equally the self-equal essence, or that substance here attains absolute self-consciousness—is an other for devotional consciousness. It grasps the side that pure knowing's becoming-inward is in itself absolute simplicity or substance as the representation of something that is so not according to the concept, but as an act of atonement by another. Or it does not see that this depth of the pure self is the force drawing abstract essence down from its abstraction and raising it to self through the power of this pure devotion.—The self's doing thereby retains this negative meaning toward the self, because substance's externalization on its own side is for the self an in-itself that it does not equally grasp and comprehend, or find in its own doing as such.—Since in itself this 1807 740 unity of essence and self has come about, consciousness also has this representation of its reconciliation, but as representation. It obtains satisfaction by externally adding to its pure negativity the positive meaning of its unity with essence. Its satisfaction itself therefore remains burdened with the opposition of a beyond. Its own reconciliation thus enters its consciousness as something distant, distant in the future, just as the reconciliation accomplished by the other self appears distant in the past. Just as the individual divine human being has a father existing in himself and only an actual mother, so the universal divine human being, the community, has its own doing and knowing as its father, but eternal love as its mother. It only feels this love; it does not intuit it in its consciousness as an actual immediate object. Its reconciliation is therefore in its heart, but still divided from its consciousness, and its actuality is still fractured. What enters its consciousness as the in-itself, or the side of pure mediation, is reconciliation lying beyond. What enters as present, as the side of immediacy and existence, is the world still awaiting its transfiguration. The world is indeed reconciled with essence in itself. And the essence is indeed known no longer to recognize the object as alienated from itself, but as equal to itself in its love. But 1807 741 for self-consciousness this immediate present does not yet have spirit's shape. Thus in its immediate consciousness the community's spirit is separated from its religious consciousness. The latter does declare that in themselves they are not separate, but this is an in-itself not realized, or not yet equally become absolute being-for-itself.
About this section
VII. Religion is part of The Phenomenology of Spirit by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 9 of 10 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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