VI. Spirit

8 of 10 chapters in The Phenomenology of Spirit by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Original German

1807 376

VI. Der Geist.

438 Die Vernunft ist Geist, indem die Gewiſsheit, alle Realität zu seyn, zur Wahrheit erhoben, und sie sich ihrer selbst als ihrer Welt, und der Welt als ihrer selbst bewuſst ist. — Das Werden des Geistes zeigte die unmittelbar vorhergehende Bewegung auf, worin der Gegenstand des Bewuſstseyns, die reine Kategorie, zum Begriffe der Vernunft sich erhob. In der beobachtenden Vernunft ist diese reine Einheit des Ich und des Seyns, des Fürsich und des Ansichseyns, als das Ansich oder als Seyn bestimmt, und das Bewuſstseyn der Vernunft findet sich. Aber die Wahrheit des Beobachtens ist vielmehr das Aufheben dieses unmittelbaren findenden Instinkts, dieses bewuſstlosen Daseyns derselben. Die angeschaute Kategorie, das gefundne Ding tritt in das Bewuſstseyn als das Fürsichseyn des Ich, welches sich nun im gegenständlichen Wesen als das Selbst weiſs. Aber diese Bestimmung der Kategorie, als des Fürsichseyns entgegengesetzt dem Ansichseyn, ist ebenso einseitig und ein sich selbst aufhebendes Moment. Die Kategorie wird daher für das Bewuſstseyn bestimmt, wie sie in ihrer allgemeinen Wahrheit ist, 1807 377 als an und fürsichseyendes Wesen. Diese noch abstracte Bestimmung, welche die Sache selbst ausmacht, ist erst das geistige Wesen, und sein Bewuſstseyn ein formales Wissen von ihm, das sich mit mancherley Inhalt desselben herumtreibt; es ist von der Substanz in der That noch als ein einzelnes unterschieden, gibt entweder willkührliche Gesetze, oder meynt die Gesetze, wie sie an und für sich sind, in seinem Wissen als solchem zu haben; und hält sich für die beurtheilende Macht derselben. — Oder von der Seite der Substanz betrachtet, so ist diese das an und fürsichseyende geistige Wesen, welches noch nicht Bewuſstseyn seiner selbst ist. — Das an und fürsichseyende Wesen aber, welches sich zugleich als Bewuſstseyn wirklich und sich sich selbst vorstellt, ist der Geist.

439 Sein geistiges Wesen ist schon als die sittliche Substanz bezeichnet worden; der Geist aber ist die sittliche Wirklichkeit. Er ist das Selbst des wirklichen Bewuſstseyns, dem er oder vielmehr das sich als gegenständliche wirkliche Welt gegenübertritt, welche aber ebenso für das Selbst alle Bedeutung eines Fremden, so wie das Selbst alle Bedeutung eines von ihr getrennten, abhängigen oder unabhängigen Fürsichseyns verloren hat. Die Substanz und das allgemeine, sichselbstgleiche, bleibende Wesen, — ist er der unverrückte und unaufgelöste Grund und Ausgangspunkt des Thuns Aller, — und ihr Zweck und Ziel, als das gedachte Ansich aller Selbstbewuſstseyn. — Diese Substanz ist ebenso das allgemeine Werk, das 1807 378 sich durch das Thun Aller und Jeder als ihre Einheit und Gleichheit erzeugt, denn sie ist das Fursichseyn, das Selbst, das Thun. Als die Substanz ist der Geist die unwankende gerechte Sichselbstgleichheit; aber als Fürsichseyn ist sie das aufgelöste, das sich aufopfernde gütige Wesen, an dem Jeder sein eignes Werk vollbringt, das allgemeine Seyn zerreiſst und sich seinen Theil davon nimmt. Diese Auflösung und Vereinzelung des Wesens ist eben das Moment des Thuns und Selbsts Aller; es ist die Bewegung und Seele der Substanz, und das bewirkte allgemeine Wesen. Gerade darin daſs sie das im Selbst aufgelöste Seyn ist, ist sie nicht das todte Wesen, sondern wirklich und lebendig.

440 Der Geist ist hiemit das sich selbsttragende absolute reale Wesen. Alle bisherigen Gestalten des Bewuſstseyns sind Abstractionen desselben; sie sind diſs, daſs er sich analysirt, seine Momente unterscheidet, und bey einzelnen verweilt. Diſs Isoliren solcher Momente hat ihn selbst zur Voraussetzung und zum Bestehen, oder es existirt nur in ihm, der die Existenz ist. Sie haben so isolirt den Schein, als ob sie als solche wären; aber wie sie nur Momente oder verschwindende Gröſsen sind, zeigte ihre Fortwälzung und Rückgang in ihren Grund und Wesen; und diſs Wesen eben ist diese Bewegung und Auflösung dieser Momente. Hier, wo der Geist, oder die Reflexion derselben in sich selbst gesetzt ist, kann unsre Reflexion an sie nach dieser Seite kurz 1807 379 erinnern; sie waren Bewuſstseyn, Selbstbewuſstseyn und Vernunft. Der Geist ist also Bewuſstseyn überhaupt, was sinnliche Gewiſsheit, Wahrnehmen und den Verstand in sich begreifft, insofern er in der Analyse seiner selbst, das Moment festhält, daſs er sich gegenständliche, seyende Wirklichkeit ist, und davon abstrahirt, daſs diese Wirklichkeit sein eignes Fürsichseyn ist. Hält er im Gegentheil das andre Moment der Analyse fest, daſs sein Gegenstand sein Fürsichseyn ist, so ist er Selbstbewuſstseyn. Aber als unmittelbares Bewuſstseyn des an und fürsichseyns, als Einheit des Bewuſstseyns und des Selbstbewuſstseyns ist er das Bewuſstseyn, das Vernunft hat, das, wie das Haben es bezeichnet, den Gegenstand hat als an sich vernünftig bestimmt, oder vom Werthe der Kategorie, aber so, daſs er noch für das Bewuſstseyn desselben den Werth der Kategorie nicht hat. Er ist das Bewuſstseyn, aus dessen Betrachtung wir so eben herkommen. Diese Vernunft, die er hat, endlich als eine solche von ihm angeschaut, die Vernunft ist, oder die Vernunft, die in ihm wirklich und die seine Welt ist, so ist er in seiner Wahrheit; er ist der Geist, er ist das wirkliche sittliche Wesen.

441 Der Geist ist das sittliche Leben eines Volks, insofern er die unmittelbare Wahrheit ist; das Individuum, das eine Welt ist. Er muſs zum Bewuſstseyn über das, was er unmittelbar ist, fortgehen, das schöne sittliche Leben aufheben, und 1807 380 durch eine Reihe von Gestalten zum Wissen seiner selbst gelangen. Diese unterscheiden sich aber von den vorhergehenden dadurch, daſs sie die realen Geister sind, eigentliche Wirklichkeiten, und statt Gestalten nur des Bewuſstseyns, Gestalten einer Welt.

442 Die lebendige sittliche Welt ist der Geist in seiner Wahrheit; wie er zunächst zum abstracten Wissen seines Wesens kommt, geht die Sittlichkeit in der formalen Allgemeinheit des Rechts unter. Der in sich selbst nunmehr entzweyte Geist beschreibt in seinem gegenständlichen Elemente als in einer harten Wirklichkeit die eine seiner Welten, das Reich der Bildung, und ihr gegenüber im Elemente des Gedankens die Welt des Glaubens, das Reich des Wesens. Beyde Welten aber von dem Geiste, der aus diesem Verluste seiner selbst in sich geht, von dem Begriffe erfaſst, werden durch die Einsicht und ihre Verbreitung, die Aufklärung, verwirrt und revolutionirt, und das in das Disseits und Jenseits vertheilte und ausgebreitete Reich kehrt in das Selbstbewuſstseyn zurück, das nun in der Moralität sich als die Wesenheit, und das Wesen als wirkliches Selbst erfaſst, seine Welt und ihren Grund nicht mehr aus sich heraussetzt, sondern alles in sich verglimmen läſst, und als Gewissen der seiner selbst gewisse Geist ist.

1807 381

443 Die sittliche Welt, die in das Disseits und Jenseits zerrissene Welt und die moralische Weltanschauung sind also die Geister, deren Bewegung und Rückgang in das einfache fürsichseyende Selbst des Geistes sich entwickeln, und als deren Ziel und Resultat das wirkliche Selbstbewuſstseyn des absoluten Geistes hervortreten wird.

1807 382

A. Der wahre Geist, die Sittlichkeit.

444 Der Geist ist in seiner einfachen Wahrheit Bewuſstseyn, und schlägt seine Momente auseinander. Die Handlung trennt ihn in die Substanz und das Bewuſstseyn derselben; und trennt ebensowohl die Substanz als das Bewuſstseyn. Die Substanz tritt als allgemeines Wesen und Zweck, sich als der vereinzelnten Wirklichkeit gegenüber; die unendliche Mitte ist das Selbstbewuſstseyn, welches an sich Einheit seiner und der Substanz, es nun für sich wird, das allgemeine Wesen und seine vereinzelnte Wirklichkeit vereint, diese zu jenem erhebt, und sittlich handelt, — und jenes zu dieser herunterbringt, und den Zweck, die nur gedachte Substanz ausführt; es bringt die Einheit seines Selbsts und der Substanz als sein Werk und damit als Wirklichkeit hervor.

445 In dem Auseinandertreten des Bewuſstseyns hat die einfache Substanz den Gegensatz theils gegen das Selbstbewuſstseyn erhalten, theils stellt sie damit ebensosehr an ihr selbst die Natur des Bewuſstseyns, 1807 383 sich in sich selbst zu unterscheiden, als eine in ihre Massen gegliederte Welt dar. Sie spaltet sich also in ein unterschiednes sittliches Wesen, in ein menschliches und göttliches Gesetz. Ebenso das ihr gegenübertretende Selbstbewuſstseyn theilt sich nach seinem Wesen der einen dieser Mächte zu, und als Wissen in die Unwissenheit dessen, was es thut, und in das Wissen desselben, das deſswegen ein betrognes Wissen ist. Es erfährt also in seiner That sowohl den Widerspruch jener Mächte, worein die Substanz sich entzweyte, und ihre gegenseitige Zerstörung, wie den Widerspruch seines Wissens von der Sittlichkeit seines Handelns — mit dem, was an und für sich sittlich ist, und findet seinen eignen Untergang. In der That aber ist die sittliche Substanz durch diese Bewegung zum wirklichen Selbstbewuſstseyn geworden, oder dieses Selbst zum an und fürsichseyenden, aber darin ist eben die Sittlichkeit zu Grunde gegangen.

a. Die sittliche Welt, das menschliche und göttliche Gesetz, der Mann und das Weib.

446 Die einfache Substanz des Geistes theilt sich als Bewuſstseyn. Oder wie das Bewuſstseyn des abstracten, des sinnlichen Seyns in die Wahrnehmung übergeht, 1807 384 so auch die unmittelbare Gewiſsheit des realen, sittlichen Seyns; und wie für die sinnliche Wahrnehmung das einfache Seyn ein Ding von vielen Eigenschafften wird, so ist für die sittliche der Fall des Handelns eine Wirklichkeit von vielen sittlichen Beziehungen. Jener zieht sich aber die unnütze Vielheit der Eigenschafften in den wesentlichen Gegensatz der Einzelnheit und Allgemeinheit zusammen, und noch mehr dieser, die das gereinigte, substantielle Bewuſstseyn ist, wird die Vielheit der sittlichen Momente das Zwiefache eines Gesetzes der Einzelnheit und eines der Allgemeinheit. Jede dieser Massen der Substanz bleibt aber der ganze Geist; wenn in der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung die Dinge keine andre Substanz als die beyden Bestimmungen der Einzelnheit und der Allgemeinheit haben, so drücken sie hier nur den oberflächlichen Gegensatz der beyden Seiten gegeneinander aus.

447 Die Einzelnheit hat an dem Wesen, das wir hier betrachten, die Bedeutung des Selbstbewuſstseyns überhaupt, nicht eines einzelnen zufälligen Bewuſstseyns. Die sittliche Substanz ist also in dieser Bestimmung die wirkliche Substanz, der absolute Geist in der Vielheit des daseyenden Bewuſstseyns realisirt; er ist das Gemeinwesen, welches für uns bey dem Eintritt in die praktische Gestaltung der Vernunft überhaupt das absolute Wesen war, und hier in seiner Wahrheit für sich selbst als bewuſstes sittliches Wesen, und als das Wesen für das Bewuſstseyn, das 1807 385 wir zum Gegenstande haben, hervorgetreten ist. Es ist Geist, welcher für sich, indem er im Gegenschein der Individuen sich, — und an sich oder Substanz ist, indem er sie in sich erhält. Als die wirkliche Substanz ist er ein Volk, als wirkliches Bewuſstseyn, Bürger des Volkes. Diſs Bewuſstseyn hat an dem einfachen Geiste sein Wesen, und die Gewiſsheit seiner selbst in der Wirklichkeit dieses Geistes, dem ganzen Volke, und unmittelbar darin seine Wahrheit, also nicht in etwas, das nicht wirklich ist, sondern in einem Geiste, der existirt und gilt.

448 Dieser Geist kann das menschliche Gesetz genannt werden, weil er wesentlich in der Form der ihrer selbstbewuſsten Wirklichkeit ist. Er ist in der Form der Allgemeinheit das bekannte Gesetz und die vorhandene Sitte; in der Form der Einzelnheit ist er die wirkliche Gewiſsheit seiner selbst in dem Individuum überhaupt, und die Gewiſsheit seiner als einfacher Individualität ist er als Regierung; seine Wahrheit ist die offene an dem Tag liegende Gültigkeit; eine Existenz, welche für die unmittelbare Gewiſsheit in die Form des freyentlassenen Daseyns tritt.

449 Dieser sittlichen Macht und Offenbarkeit tritt aber eine andere Macht, das göttliche Gesetz, gegenüber. Denn die sittliche Staatsmacht hat als die Bewegung des sich bewuſsten Thuns an dem einfachen und unmittelbaren Wesen der Sittlichkeit ihren Gegensatz; als wirkliche Allgemeinheit ist sie eine Gewalt gegen das individuelle fürsichseyn; und als 1807 386 Wirklichkeit überhaupt hat sie an dem innern Wesen noch ein Anders, als sie ist.

450 Es ist schon erinnert worden, daſs jede der entgegengesetzten Weisen der sittlichen Substanz zu existiren sie ganz und alle Momente ihres Inhalts enthält. Wenn also das Gemeinwesen sie als das seiner bewuſste wirkliche Thun ist, so hat die andere Seite die Form der unmittelbaren oder seyenden Substanz. Diese ist so einerseits der innre Begriff oder die allgemeine Möglichkeit der Sittlichkeit überhaupt, hat aber anderseits das Moment des Selbstbewuſstseyns ebenso an ihr. Dieses in diesem Elemente der Unmittelbarkeit oder des Seyns die Sittlichkeit ausdrückend, oder ein unmittelbares Bewuſstseyn seiner wie als Wesens so als dieses Selbsts in einem Andern, das heiſst, ein natürliches sittliliches Gemeinwesen, — ist die Familie. Sie steht als der bewuſstlose noch innre Begriff, seiner sich bewuſsten Wirklichkeit, als das Element der Wirklichkeit des Volks, dem Volke selbst, als unmittelbares sittliches Seyn, — der durch die Arbeit für das Allgemeine sich bildenden und erhaltenden Sittlichkeit, die Penaten dem allgemeinen Geiste gegenüber.

451 Ob sich aber wohl das sittliche Seyn der Familie als das unmittelbare bestimmt, so ist sie innerhalb ihrer, sittliches Wesen nicht insofern sie das Verhältniſs der Natur ihrer Glieder, oder deren Beziehung die unmittelbare einzelner wirklicher ist; denn 1807 387 das sittliche ist an sich allgemein, und diſs Verhältniſs der Natur ist wesentlich ebensosehr ein Geist, und nur als geistiges Wesen sittlich. Es ist zu sehen, worin seine eigenthümliche Sittlichkeit besteht. — Zunächst, weil das Sittliche das an sich allgemeine ist, ist die sittliche Beziehung der Familienglieder nicht die Beziehung der Empfindung oder das Verhältniſs der Liebe. Das Sittliche scheint nun in das Verhältniſs des einzelnen Familiengliedes zur ganzen Familie als der Substanz gelegt werden zu müssen; so daſs sein Thun und Wirklichkeit nur sie zum Zweck und Inhalt hat. Aber der bewuſste Zweck, den das Thun dieses Ganzen, insofern er auf es selbst geht, hat, ist selbst das Einzelne. Die Erwerbung und Erhaltung von Macht und Reichthum geht theils nur auf das Bedürfniſs und gehört der Begierde an; theils wird sie in ihrer höhern Bestimmung etwas nur mittelbares. Diese Bestimmung fällt nicht in die Familie selbst, sondern geht auf das wahrhafft Allgemeine, das Gemeinwesen; sie ist vielmehr negativ gegen die Familie, und besteht darin, den Einzelnen aus ihr herauszusetzen, seine Natürlichkeit und Einzelnheit zu unterjochen, und ihn zur Tugend, zum Leben in und fürs Allgemeine zu ziehen. Der der Familie eigenthümliche, positive Zweck ist der Einzelne als solcher. Daſs nun diese Beziehung sittlich sey, kann er nicht, weder der, welcher handelt, noch der, auf welchen sich die Handlung bezieht, nach 1807 388 einer Zufälligkeit auftreten, wie etwa in irgend einer Hülffe oder Dienstleistung geschieht. Der Inhalt der sittlichen Handlung muſs substantiell oder ganz und allgemein seyn; sie kann sich daher nur auf den ganzen Einzelnen, oder auf ihn als allgemeinen beziehen. Auch diſs wieder nicht etwa so, daſs sich nur vorgestellt wäre, eine Dienstleistung fördere sein ganzes Glück, während sie so, wie sie unmittelbare und wirkliche Handlung ist, nur etwas einzelnes an ihm thut; — noch daſs sie auch wirklich als Erziehung, in einer Reihe von Bemühungen, ihn als Ganzes zum Gegenstand hat und als Werk hervorbringt; wo auſser dem gegen die Familie negativen Zwecke die wirkliche Handlung nur einen beschränkten Inhalt hat; — ebensowenig endlich, daſs sie eine Nothhülffe ist, wodurch in Wahrheit der ganze Einzelne errettet wird; denn sie ist selbst eine völlig zufällige That, deren Gelegenheit eine gemeine Wirklichkeit ist, welche seyn und auch nicht seyn kann. Die Handlung also, welche die ganze Existenz des Blutsverwandten umfaſst, und ihn, — nicht den Bürger, denn dieser gehört nicht der Familie an, noch den, der Bürger werden und aufhören soll, als dieser Einzelne zu gelten, — sondern ihn, diesen der Familie angehörigen Einzelnen, als ein allgemeines, der sinnlichen, d. i. einzelnen Wirklichkeit enthobenes Wesen zu ihrem Gegenstande und Inhalt hat, betrifft nicht mehr den Lebenden, sondern den Todten, der aus der langen Reihe seines zerstreuten Daseyns sich 1807 389 in die vollendete Eine Gestaltung zusammengefaſst, und aus der Unruhe des zufälligen Lebens sich in die Ruhe der einfachen Allgemeinheit erhoben hat. — Weil er nur als Bürger wirklich und substantiell ist, so ist der Einzelne, wie er nicht Bürger ist, und der Familie angehört, nur der Unwirkliche marklose Schatten.

452 Diese Allgemeinheit, zu der der Einzelne als solcher gelangt, ist das reine Seyn, der Tod; es ist das unmittelbare natürliche Gewordenseyn, nicht das Thun eines Bewuſstseyns. Die Pflicht des Familiengliedes ist deſswegen, diese Seite hinzuzufügen, damit auch sein letztes Seyn, diſs allgemeine Seyn, nicht allein der Natur angehöre und etwas unvernünftiges bleibe, sondern daſs es ein gethanes, und das Recht des Bewuſstseyns in ihm behauptet sey. Oder der Sinn der Handlung ist vielmehr, daſs, weil in Wahrheit die Ruhe und Allgemeinheit des seiner selbstbewuſsten Wesens nicht der Natur angehört, der Schein eines solchen Thuns hinwegfalle, den sich die Natur angemaſst, und die Wahrheit hergestellt werde. — Was die Natur an ihm that, ist die Seite, von welcher sein Werden zum Allgemeinen sich als die Bewegung eines Seyenden darstellt. Sie fällt zwar selbst innerhalb des sittlichen Gemeinwesens und hat dieses zum Zwecke; der Tod ist die Vollendung und höchste Arbeit, welche das Individuum als solches für es übernimmt. Aber insofern es wesentlich einzelnes ist, ist es zufällig, daſs sein Tod 1807 390 unmittelbar mit seiner Arbeit fürs Allgemeine zusammenhing, und Resultat derselben war, theils wenn ers war, ist er die natürliche Negativität und die Bewegung des Einzelnen als Seyenden, worin das Bewuſstseyn nicht in sich zurückkehrt, und Selbstbewuſstseyn wird; oder indem die Bewegung des Seyenden diese ist, daſs es aufgehoben wird und zum Fürsichseyn gelangt, ist der Tod die Seite der Entzweyung, worin das Fürsichseyn, das erlangt wird, ein Anderes ist, als das Seyende, welches in die Bewegung eintrat. — Weil die Sittlichkeit der Geist in seiner unmittelbaren Wahrheit ist, so fallen die Seiten, in die sein Bewuſstseyn auseinandertritt, auch in diese Form der Unmittelbarkeit, und die Einzelnheit tritt in diese abstracte Negativität herüber, welche ohne Trost und Versöhnung an sich selbst, sie wesentlich durch eine wirkliche und äuſserliche Handlung empfangen muſs. — Die Blutsverwandschafft ergänzt also die abstracte natürliche Bewegung dadurch, daſs sie die Bewegung des Bewuſstseyns hinzufügt, das Werk der Natur unterbricht, und den Blutsverwandten der Zerstörung entreiſst, oder besser, weil die Zerstörung, sein Werden zum reinen Seyn, nothwendig ist, selbst die That der Zerstörung über sich nimmt. — Es kömmt hiedurch zu Stande, daſs auch das todte, das allgemeine Seyn ein in sich zurückgekehrtes, ein Fürsichseyn, oder die krafftlose reine einzelne Einzelnheit zur allgemeinen Individualität erhoben wird. Der Todte, da er sein Seyn von seinem 1807 391 Thun oder negativen Eins frey gelassen, ist die leere Einzelnheit, nur ein passives Seyn für anderes, aller niedrigen vernunftlosen Individualität und den Kräfften abstracter Stoffe preisgegeben, wovon jene um des Lebens willen, das sie hat, diese um ihrer negativen Natur willen itzt mächtiger sind, als er. Diſs ihn entehrende Thun bewuſstloser Begierde und abstracter Wesen hält die Familie von ihm ab, setzt das ihrige an die Stelle, und vermahlt den Verwandten dem Schoſse der Erde, der elementarischen unvergänglichen Individualität; sie macht ihn hierdurch zum Genossen eines Gemeinwesens, welches vielmehr die Kräffte der einzelnen Stoffe und die niedrigen Lebendigkeiten, die gegen ihn frey werden und ihn zerstören wollten, überwältigt und gebunden hält.

453 Diese letzte Pflicht macht also das vollkommene göttliche Gesetz, oder die positive sittliche Handlung gegen den Einzelnen aus. Alles andre Verhältniſs gegen ihn, das nicht in der Liebe stehen bleibt, sondern sittlich ist, gehört dem menschlichen Gesetze an, und hat die negative Bedeutung, den Einzelnen über die Einschlieſsung in das natürliche Gemeinwesen zu erheben, dem er als wirklicher angehört. Wenn nun aber schon das menschliche Recht zu seinem Inhalte und Macht die wirkliche ihrer bewuſste sittliche Substanz, das ganze Volk, hat; das göttliche Recht und Gesetz aber den Einzelnen, der jenseits der Wirklichkeit ist, so ist er nicht ohne Macht; 1807 392 seine Macht ist das abstracte rein Allgemeine; das elementarische Individuum, welches die Individualität, die sich von dem Elemente losreiſst, und die ihrer bewuſste Wirklichkeit des Volks ausmacht, in die reine Abstraction als in sein Wesen ebenso zurückreiſst, als es ihr Grund ist. — Wie diese Macht am Volke selbst sich darstellt, wird sich noch weiter entwickeln.

454 Es gibt nun in dem einen Gesetze, wie in dem andern, auch Unterschiede und Stuffen. Denn indem beyde Wesen das Moment des Bewuſstseyns an ihnen haben, entfaltet sich innerhalb ihrer selbst der Unterschied; was ihre Bewegung und eigenthümliches Leben ausmacht. Die Betrachtung dieser Unterschiede zeigt die Weise der Bethätigung und des Selbstbewuſstseyns der beyden allgemeinen Wesen der sittlichen Welt, so wie ihren Zusammenhang und Uebergang ineinander.

455 Das Gemeinwesen, das obere und offenbar an der Sonne geltende Gesetz hat seine wirkliche Lebendigkeit in der Regierung, als worin es Individuum ist. Sie ist der in sich reflectirte wirkliche Geist, das einfache Selbst der ganzen sittlichen Substanz. Diese einfache Krafft erlaubt dem Wesen zwar in seine Gegliederung sich auszubreiten, und jedem Theile Bestehen und eigenes Fürsichseyn zu geben. Der Geist hat hieran seine Realität oder sein Daseyn, und die Familie ist das Element dieser Realität. Aber er ist zugleich die Krafft des Ganzen, welche diese Theile 1807 393 wieder in das negative Eins zusammenfaſst, ihnen das Gefühl ihrer Unselbstständigkeit gibt, und sie in dem Bewuſstseyn erhält, ihr Leben nur im Ganzen zu haben. Das Gemeinwesen mag sich also einerseits in die Systeme der persönlichen Selbstständigkeit und des Eigenthums, des persönlichen und dinglichen Rechts, organisiren; ebenso die Weisen des Arbeitens für die zunächst einzelnen Zwecke, — des Erwerbs und Genusses, — zu eigenen Zusammenkünften, gliedern und verselbstständigen. Der Geist der allgemeinen Zusammenkunft ist die Einfachheit und das negative Wesen dieser sich isolirenden Systeme. Um sie nicht in dieses Isoliren einwurzeln und festwerden, hiedurch das Ganze auseinanderfallen und den Geist verfliegen zu lassen, hat die Regierung sie in ihrem Innern von Zeit zu Zeit durch die Kriege zu erschüttern, ihre sich zurechtgemachte Ordnung und Recht der Selbstständigkeit dadurch zu verletzen und zu verwirren, den Individuen aber, die sich darin vertieffend vom Ganzen losreiſsen und dem unverletzbaren Fürsichseyn und Sicherheit der Person zustreben, in jener auferlegten Arbeit ihren Herrn, den Tod, zu fühlen zu geben. Der Geist wehrt durch diese Auflösung der Form des Bestehens das Versinken in das natürliche Daseyn aus dem sittlichen ab, und erhält und erhebt das Selbst seines Bewuſstseyns in die Freyheit und in seine Krafft. — Das negative Wesen zeigt sich als die eigentliche Macht des Gemeinwesens und die Krafft 1807 394 seiner Selbsterhaltung; dieses hat also die Wahrheit und Bekräfftigung seiner Macht an dem Wesen des göttlichen Gesetzes und dem unterirdischen Reiche.

456 Das göttliche Gesetz, das in der Familie waltet, hat seinerseits gleichfalls Unterschiede in sich, deren Beziehung die lebendige Bewegung seiner Wirklichkeit ausmacht. Unter den drey Verhältnissen aber, des Mannes und der Frau, der Eltern und der Kinder, der Geschwister als Bruder und Schwester, ist zuerst das Verhältniſs des Mannes und der Frau, das unmittelbare sich Erkennen des einen Bewuſstseyns im andern, und das Erkennen des gegenseitigen Anerkanntseyns. Weil es das natürliche sich Erkennen, nicht das sittliche ist, ist es nur die Vorstellung und das Bild des Geistes, nicht der wirkliche Geist selbst. — Die Vorstellung oder das Bild hat aber seine Wirklichkeit an einem andern, als es ist; diſs Verhältniſs hat daher seine Wirklichkeit nicht an ihm selbst, sondern an dem Kinde, — einem andern, dessen Werden es ist, und worin es selbst verschwindet; und dieser Wechsel der sich fortwälzenden Geschlechter hat seinen Bestand in dem Volke. — Die Pietät des Mannes und der Frau gegeneinander ist also mit natürlicher Beziehung und mit Empfindung vermischt, und ihr Verhältniſs hat seine Rückkehr in sich nicht an ihm selbst; ebenso das zweyte, die Pietät der Eltern und Kinder gegeneinander. Die der Eltern 1807 395 gegen ihre Kinder ist eben von dieser Rührung afficirt, das Bewuſstseyn seiner Wirklichkeit in dem andern zu haben, und das Fürsichseyn in ihm werden zu sehen, ohne es zurück zu erhalten; sondern es bleibt eine fremde, eigne Wirklichkeit; — die der Kinder aber gegen die Eltern umgekehrt mit der Rührung, das Werden seiner selbst oder das Ansich an einem andern verschwindenden zu haben, und das Fürsichseyn und eigene Selbstbewuſstseyn zu erlangen, nur durch die Trennung von dem Ursprung, — eine Trennung, worin dieser versiegt.

457 Diese beyden Verhältnisse bleiben innerhalb des Uebergehens und der Ungleichheit der Seiten stehen, die an sie vertheilt sind. — Das unvermischte Verhältniſs aber findet zwischen Bruder und Schwester statt. Sie sind dasselbe Blut, das aber in ihnen in seine Ruhe und Gleichgewicht gekommen ist. Sie begehren daher einander nicht, noch haben sie diſs Fürsichseyn eins dem andern gegeben, noch empfangen, sondern sie sind freye Individualität gegeneinander. Das Weibliche hat daher als Schwester die höchste Ahndung des sittlichen Wesens; zum Bewuſstseyn und der Wirklichkeit desselben kommt es nicht, weil das Gesetz der Familie das ansichseyende, innerliche Wesen ist, das nicht am Tage des Bewuſstseyns liegt, sondern innerliches Gefühl und das der Wirklichkeit enthobne Göttliche bleibt. An diese Penaten ist das Weibliche 1807 396 geknüpft, welches in ihnen theils seine allgemeine Substanz, theils aber seine Einzelnheit anschaut, so jedoch daſs diese Beziehung der Einzelnheit zugleich nicht die natürliche der Lust sey. — Als Tochter muſs nun das Weib die Eltern mit natürlicher Bewegung und mit sittlicher Ruhe verschwinden sehen, denn nur auf Unkosten dieses Verhältnisses kommt sie zu dem Fürsichseyn, dessen sie fähig ist; sie schaut in den Eltern also ihr Fürsichseyn nicht auf positive Weise an. — Die Verhältnisse der Mutter und der Frau aber haben die Einzelnheit theils als etwas natürliches, das der Lust angehört, theils als etwas negatives, das nur sein Verschwinden darin erblickt, theils ist sie ebendarum etwas zufälliges, das durch eine andere ersetzt werden kann. Im Hause der Sittlichkeit ist es nicht dieser Mann, nicht dieses Kind, sondern ein Mann, Kinder überhaupt, — nicht die Empfindung, sondern das Allgemeine, worauf sich diese Verhältnisse des Weibes gründen. Der Unterschied seiner Sittlichkeit von der des Mannes besteht eben darin, daſs es in seiner Bestimmung für die Einzelnheit und in seiner Lust unmittelbar allgemein und der Einzelnheit der Begierde fremd bleibt; dahingegen in dem Manne diese beyden Seiten auseinandertreten, und indem er als Bürger die selbstbewuſste Krafft der Allgemeinheit besitzt, erkauft er sich dadurch das Recht der Begierde, und erhält sich zugleich die Freyheit von derselben. Indem also in diſs Verhältniſs der Frau die Einzelnheit 1807 397 eingemischt ist, ist seine Sittlichkeit nicht rein; insofern sie aber diſs ist, ist die Einzelnheit gleichgültig, und die Frau entbehrt das Moment, sich als dieses Selbst im andern zu erkennen. — Der Bruder aber ist der Schwester das ruhige gleiche Wesen überhaupt, ihre Anerkennung in ihm rein und unvermischt mit natürlicher Beziehung; die Gleichgültigkeit der Einzelnheit und die sittliche Zufälligkeit derselben ist daher in diesem Verhältnisse nicht vorhanden; sondern das Moment des anerkennenden und anerkannten einzelnen Selbsts darf hier sein Recht behaupten, weil es mit dem Gleichgewichte des Blutes und begierdeloser Beziehung verknüpft ist. Der Verlust des Bruders ist daher der Schwester unersetzlich, und ihre Pflicht gegen ihn die höchste.

458 Diſs Verhältniſs ist zugleich die Gräntze, an der sich die in sich beschlossene Familie auflöst, und auſser sich geht. Der Bruder ist die Seite, nach welcher ihr Geist zur Individualität wird, die gegen anderes sich kehrt, und in das Bewuſstseyn der Allgemeinheit übergeht. Der Bruder verläſst diese unmittelbare, elementarische und darum eigentlich negative Sittlichkeit der Familie, um die ihrer selbsthewuſste, wirkliche Sittlichkeit zu erwerben und hervorzubringen.

459 Er geht aus dem göttlichen Gesetz, in dessen Sphäre er lebte, zu dem menschlichen über. Die Schwester aber wird, oder die Frau bleibt der Vorstand des Hauses und die Bewahrerin des göttlichen 1807 398 Gesetzes. Auf diese Weise überwinden die beyden Geschlechter ihr natürliches Wesen, und treten in ihrer sittlichen Bedeutung auf, als Verschiedenheiten, welche die beyden Unterschiede, die die sittliche Substanz sich gibt, unter sich theilen. Diese beyden allgemeinen Wesen der sittlichen Welt haben ihre bestimmte Individualität darum an natürlich unterschiedenen Selbstbewuſstseyn, weil der sittliche Geist die unmittelbare Einheit der Substanz mit dem Selbstbewuſstseyn ist; — eine Unmittelbarkeit, welche also nach der Seite der Realität und des Unterschieds zugleich als das Daseyn eines natürlichen Unterschieds erscheint. — Es ist diejenige Seite, welche sich an der Gestalt der sich selbst realen Individualität, in dem Begriffe des geistigen Wesens, als ursprünglich bestimmte Natur zeigte. Diſs Moment verliert die Unbestimmtheit, die es dort noch hat, und die zufällige Verschiedenheit von Anlagen und Fähigkeiten. Es ist itzt der bestimmte Gegensatz der zwey Geschlechter, deren Natürlichkeit zugleich die Bedeutung ihrer sittlichen Bestimmung erhält.

460 Der Unterschied der Geschlechter und ihres sittlichen Inhalts bleibt jedoch in der Einheit der Substanz, und seine Bewegung ist eben das bleibende Werden derselben. Der Mann wird vom Familiengeiste in das Gemeinwesen hinausgeschickt, und findet in diesem sein selbstbewuſstes Wesen; wie die Familie hiedurch in ihm ihre allgemeine Substanz und Bestehen hat, so umgekehrt das Gemeinwesen 1807 399 an der Familie das formale Element seiner Wirklichkeit und an dem göttlichen Gesetze seine Krafft und Bewährung. Keins von beyden ist allein an und für sich; das menschliche Gesetz geht in seiner lebendigen Bewegung von dem göttlichen, das auf Erden geltende von dem unterirdischen, das bewuſste vom bewuſstlosen, die Vermittlung von der Unmittelbarkeit aus, und geht ebenso dahin zurück, wovon es ausging. Die unterirdische Macht dagegen hat auf der Erde ihre Wirklichkeit; sie wird durch das Bewuſstseyn Daseyn und Thätigkeit.

461 Die allgemeinen sittlichen Wesen sind also die Substanz als allgemeines, und sie als einzelnes Bewuſstseyn; sie haben das Volk und die Familie zu ihrer allgemeinen Wirklichkeit, den Mann aber und das Weib zu ihrem natürlichen Selbst und der bethätigenden Individualität. In diesem Inhalt der sittlichen Welt sehen wir die Zwecke erreicht, welche die vorhergehenden substanzlosen Gestalten des Bewuſstseyn sich machten; was die Vernunft nur als Gegenstand auffaſste, ist Selbstbewuſstseyn geworden, und was dieses nur in ihm selbst hatte, als wahre Wirklichkeit vorhanden. — Was die Beobachtung als ein vorgefundenes wuſste, an dem das Selbst keinen Theil hätte, ist hier vorgefundene Sitte, aber eine Wirklichkeit, die zugleich That und Werk des Findenden ist. — Der Einzelne die Lust des Genusses seiner Einzelnheit suchend, findet sie in der Familie, und die Nothwendigkeit, worin die Lust vergeht, ist sein eignes 1807 400 Selbstbewuſstseyn als Bürgers seines Volks; — oder es ist dieses, das Gesetz des Herzens als das Gesetz aller Herzen, das Bewuſstseyn des Selbsts als die anerkannte allgemeine Ordnung zu wissen; — es ist die Tugend, welche der Früchte ihrer Aufopferung genieſst; sie bringt zu Stande, worauf sie geht, nemlich das Wesen zur wirklichen Gegenwart herauszuheben, und ihr Genuſs ist diſs allgemeine Leben. — Endlich das Bewuſstseyn der Sache selbst wird in der realen Substanz befriedigt, die auf eine positive Weise die abstracten Momente jener leeren Kategorie enthält und erhält. Sie hat an den sittlichen Mächten einen wahrhafften Inhalt, der an die Stelle der substanzlosen Gebote getreten, die die gesunde Vernunft geben und wissen wollte; — so wie hiedurch einen inhaltsvollen, an ihm selbstbestimmten Maſsstab der Prüffung nicht der Gesetze, sondern dessen, was gethan wird.

462 Das Ganze ist ein ruhiges Gleichgewicht aller Theile, und jeder Theil ein einheimischer Geist, der seine Befriedigung nicht jenseits seiner sucht, sondern sie in sich darum hat, weil er selbst in diesem Gleichgewichte mit dem Ganzen ist. — Diſs Gleichgewicht kann zwar nur dadurch lebendig seyn, daſs Ungleichheit in ihm entsteht, und von der Gerechtigkeit zur Gleichheit zurückgebracht wird. Die Gerechtigkeit ist aber weder ein fremdes jenseits sich befindendes Wesen, noch die seiner unwürdige Wirklichkeit einer gegenseitigen Tücke, Verraths, 1807 401 Undanks u. s. f., die in der Weise des gedankenlosen Zufalls als ein unbegriffner Zusammenhang und ein bewuſstloses Thun und Unterlassen das Gericht vollbrächte, sondern als Gerechtigkeit des menschlichen Rechts, welche das aus dem Gleichgewichte tretende Fürsichseyn, die Selbstständigkeit der Stände und Individuen in das Allgemeine zurückbringt, ist sie die Regierung des Volks, welche die sich gegenwärtige Individualität des allgemeinen Wesens und der eigne selbstbewuſste Willen Aller ist. — Die Gerechtigkeit aber, welche das über den Einzelnen übermächtig werdende Allgemeine zum Gleichgewichte zurückbringt, ist ebenso der einfache Geist desjenigen, der Unrecht erlitten; — nicht zersetzt in ihn, der es erlitten, und ein jenseitiges Wesen; er selbst ist die unterirrdische Macht, und es ist seine Erinnye, welche die Rache betreibt; denn seine Individualität, sein Blut, lebt im Hause fort; seine Substanz hat eine dauernde Wirklichkeit. Das Unrecht, welches im Reiche der Sittlichkeit dem Einzelnen zugefügt werden kann, ist nur dieses, daſs ihm rein etwas geschieht. Die Macht, welche diſs Unrecht an dem Bewuſstseyn verübt, es zu einem reinen Dinge zu machen, ist die Natur, es ist die Allgemeinheit nicht des Gemeinwesens, sondern die abstracte des Seyns; und die Einzelnheit wendet sich in der Auflösung des erlittenen Unrechts nicht gegen jenes, denn von ihm hat es nicht gelitten, sondern gegen dieses. Das Bewuſstseyn des Bluts des Individuums löst diſs 1807 402 Unrecht, wie wir gesehen, so auf, daſs was geschehen ist, vielmehr ein Werk wird, damit das Seyn, das Letzte, auch ein gewolltes und hiemit erfreulich sey.

463 Das sittliche Reich ist auf diese Weise in seinem Bestehen eine unbefleckte durch keinen Zwiespalt verunreinigte Welt. Ebenso ist seine Bewegung ein ruhiges Werden der einen Macht desselben zur andern, so daſs jede die andere selbst erhält und hervorbringt. Wir sehen sie zwar in zwey Weseen und deren Wirklichkeit sich theilen; aber ihr Gegensatz ist vielmehr die Bewährung des Einen durch das Andere, und, worin sie sich unmittelbar als wirkliche berühren, ihre Mitte und Element ist die unmittelbare Durchdringung derselben. Das eine Extrem, der allgemeine sich bewuſste Geist, wird mit seinem andern Extrem, seiner Krafft und seinem Element, mit dem bewuſstlosen Geiste, durch die Individualitat des Mannes zusammen geschlossen. Dagegen hat das göttliche Gesetz seine Individualisirung, oder der bewuſstlose Geist des Einzelnen sein Daseyn an dem Weibe, durch welches als die Mitte er aus seiner Unwirklichkeit in die Wirklichkeit, aus dem Unwissenden und Ungewuſsten in das bewuſste Reich herauftritt. Die Vereinigung des Mannes und des Weibes macht die thätige Mitte des Ganzen und das Element aus, das, in diese Extreme des göttlichen und menschlichen Gesetzes entzweyt, ebenso ihre unmittelbare Vereinigung ist, welche jene beyden ersten Schlüsse zu demselben Schlusse 1807 403 macht, und die entgegengesetzte Bewegung, der Wirklichkeit hinab zur Unwirklichkeit, — des menschlichen Gesetzes, das sich in selbstständige Glieder organisirt, herunter zur Gefahr und Bewährung des Todes; — und des unterirdischen Gesetzes herauf zur Wirklichkeit des Tages und zum bewuſsten Daseyn, — deren jene dem Manne, diese dem Weibe zukommt, — in Eine vereinigt.

b. Die sittliche Handlung, das menschliche und göttliche Wissen, die Schuld und das Schicksal.

464 Wie aber in diesem Reiche der Gegensatz beschaffen ist, so ist das Selbstbewuſstseyn noch nicht in seinem Rechte als einzelne Individualität aufgetreten; sie gilt in ihm auf der einen Seite nur als allgemeiner Willen, auf der andern als Blut der Familie; dieser Einzelne gilt nur als der unwirkliche Schatten. — Es ist noch keine That begangen; die That aber ist das wirkliche Selbst. — Sie stört die ruhige Organisation und Bewegung der sittlichen Welt. Was in dieser als Ordnung und Uebereinstimmung ihrer beyden Wesen erscheint, deren eins das andere bewährt und vervollständigt, wird durch die That zu einem Uebergange entgegengesetzter, worin jedes sich vielmehr als die Nichtigkeit seiner selbst 1807 404 und des andern beweiſst, denn als die Bewährung; — es wird zu der negativen Bewegung oder der ewigen Nothwendigkeit des furchtbaren Schicksals, welche das göttliche, wie das menschliche Gesetz, so wie die beyden Selbstbewuſstseyn, in denen diese Mächte ihr Daseyn haben, in den Abgrund seiner Einfachheit verschlingt, — und für uns in das absolute Fürsichseyn des rein einzelnen Selbstbewuſstseyns übergeht.

465 Der Grund, von dem diese Bewegung aus — und auf dem sie vorgeht, ist das Reich der Sittlichkeit; aber die Thätigkeit dieser Bewegung ist das Selbstbewuſstseyn. Als sittliches Bewuſstseyn ist es die einfache reine Richtung auf die sittliche Wesenheit, oder die Pflicht. Keine Willkühr, und ebenso kein Kampf, keine Unentschiedenheit ist in ihm, indem das Geben und das Prüffen der Gesetze aufgegeben worden, sondern die sittliche Wesenheit ist ihm das Unmittelbare, Unwankende, Widerspruchslose. Es gibt daher nicht das schlechte Schauspiel, sich in einer Collision von Leidenschafft und Pflicht, noch das Komische, in einer Collision von Pflicht und Pflicht zu befinden, — einer Collision, die dem Inhalte nach dasselbe ist, als die zwischen Leidenschafſt und Pflicht; denn die Leidenschafft ist ebenso fähig als Pflicht vorgestellt zu werden, weil die Pflicht, wie sich das Bewuſstseyn aus ihrer unmittelbaren substantiellen Wesenheit in sich zurückzieht, zum formell-allgemeinen wird, in das jeder Inhalt gleich gut paſst, wie sich oben ergab. Komisch aber ist die Collision 1807 405 der Pflichten, weil sie den Widerspruch, nemlich eines entgegengesetzten Absoluten, also Absolutes und unmittelbar die Nichtigkeit dieses sogenannten Absoluten oder Pflicht, ausdrückt. — Das sittliche Bewuſstseyn aber weiſs, was es zu thun hat; und ist entschieden, es sey dem göttlichen oder dem menschlichen Gesetze anzugehören. Diese Unmittelbarkeit seiner Entschiedenheit ist ein ansich seyn, und hat daher zugleich die Bedeutung eines natürlichen Seyns wie wir gesehen; die Natur, nicht das Zufällige der Umstände oder der Wahl, theilt das eine Geschlecht dem einen, das andere dem andern Gesetze zu, — oder umgekehrt, die beyden sittlichen Mächte selbst geben sich an den beyden Geschlechtern ihr individuelles Daseyn und Verwirklichung.

466 Hiedurch nun daſs einestheils die Sittlichkeit wesentlich in dieser unmittelbaren Entschiedenheit besteht, und darum für das Bewuſstseyn nur das Eine Gesetz das Wesen ist, anderntheils daſs die sittlichen Mächte in dem Selbst des Bewuſstseyns wirklich sind, erhalten sie die Bedeutung, sich auszuschliessen und sich entgegengesetzt zu seyn; — sie sind in dem Selbstbewuſstseyn für sich, wie sie im Reiche der Sittlichkeit nur an sich sind. Das sittliche Bewuſstseyn, weil es für Eins derselben entschieden ist, ist wesentlich Charakter; es ist für es nicht die gleiche Wesenheit beyder; der Gegensatz erscheint darum als eine unglückliche Collision der Pflicht nur mit der rechtlosen Wirklichkeit. Das sittliche 1807 406 Bewuſstseyn ist als Selbstbewuſstseyn in diesem Gegensatze, und als solches geht es zugleich darauf, dem Gesetze, dem es angehört, diese entgegengesetzte Wirklichkeit durch Gewalt zu unterwerfen, oder sie zu täuschen. Indem es das Recht nur auf seiner Seite, das Unrecht aber auf der andern sieht, so erblickt von beyden dasjenige, welches dem göttlichen Gesetze angehört, auf der andern Seite menschliche zufällige Gewaltthätigkeit; das aber dem menschlichen Gesetze zugetheilt ist, auf der andern den Eigensinn und den Ungehorsam des innerlichen Fürsichseyns; denn die Befehle der Regierung sind der allgemeine, am Tage liegende öffentliche Sinn; der Willen des andern Gesetzes aber ist, der unterirrdische, ins Innre verschlossne Sinn, der in seinem Daseyn als Willen der Einzelnheit erscheint, und im Widerspruche mit dem ersten der Frevel ist.

467 Es entsteht hiedurch am Bewuſstseyn der Gegensatz des Gewuſsten und des Nichtgewuſsten, wie in der Substanz, des Bewuſsten und Bewuſstlosen; und das absolute Recht des sittlichen Selbstbewuſstseyns kommt mit dem göttlichen Rechte des Wesens in Streit. Für das Selbstbewuſstseyn als Bewuſstseyn hat die gegenständliche Wirklichkeit als solche Wesen; nach seiner Substanz aber ist es die Einheit seiner und dieses Entgegengesetzten; und das sittliche Selbstbewuſstseyn ist das Bewuſstseyn der Substanz; der Gegenstand als dem Selbstbewuſstseyn entgegengesetzt, hat darum gänzlich die Bedeutung verloren, 1807 407 für sich Wesen zu haben. Wie die Sphären, worinn er nur ein Ding ist, längst verschwunden, so auch diese Sphären, worin das Bewuſstseyn etwas aus sich befestiget und ein einzelnes Moment zum Wesen macht. Gegen solche Einseitigkeit hat die Wirklichkeit eine eigene Krafft; sie steht mit der Wahrheit im Bunde gegen das Bewuſstseyn, und stellt diesem erst dar, was die Wahrheit ist. Das sittliche Bewuſstseyn aber hat aus der Schaale der absoluten Substanz die Vergessenheit aller Einseitigkeit des Fürsichseyns, seiner Zwecke und eigenthümlichen Begriffe getrunken, und darum in diesem stygischen Wasser zugleich alle eigne Wesenheit und selbststandige Bedeutung der gegenständlichen Wirklichkeit ertränkt. Sein absolutes Recht ist daher, daſs es, indem es nach dem sittlichen Gesetze handelt, in dieser Verwirklichung nicht irgend etwas anderes finde, als nur die Vollbringung dieses Gesetzes selbst, und die That nichts anders zeige, als das sittliche Thun ist. — Das Sittliche, als das absolute Wesen und die absolute Macht zugleich kann keine Verkehrung seines Inhalts erleiden. Wäre es nur das absolute Wesen ohne die Macht, so könnte es eine Verkehrung durch die Individualität erfahren; aber diese als sittliches Bewuſstseyn hat mit dem Aufgeben des einseitigen Fürsichseyns dem Verkehren entsagt; so wie die bloſse Macht umgekehrt vom Wesen verkehrt werden würde, wenn sie noch ein solches Fürsichseyn wäre. Um dieser Einheit 1807 408 willen ist die Individualität reine Form der Substanz, die der Inhalt ist, und das Thun ist das Uebergehen aus dem Gedanken in die Wirklichkeit, nur als die Bewegung eines wesenlosen Gegensatzes, dessen Momente keine besondern von einander verschiedenen Inhalt und Wesenheit haben. Das absolute Recht des sittlichen Bewuſstseyns ist daher, daſs die That, die Gestalt seiner Wirklichkeit, nichts anders sey, als es weiſs.

468 Aber das sittliche Wesen hat sich selbst in zwey Gesetze gespalten, und das Bewuſstseyn als unentzweytes Verhalten zum Gesetze, ist nur Einem zugetheilt. Wie diſs einfache Bewuſstseyn auf dem absoluten Rechte besteht, daſs ihm als sittlichem das Wesen erschienen sey, wie es an sich ist, so besteht dieses Wesen auf dem Rechte seiner Realität, oder darauf gedoppeltes zu seyn. Diſs Recht des Wesens steht aber zugleich dem Selbstbewuſstseyn nicht gegenüber, daſs es irgendwo anders wäre, sondern es ist das eigne Wesen des Selbstbewuſstseyns; es hat darin allein sein Daseyn und seine Macht, und sein Gegensatz ist die That des letztern. Denn dieses, eben indem es sich als Selbst ist und zur That schreitet, erhebt sich aus der einfachen Unmittelbarkeit und setzt selbst die Entzweyung. Es gibt durch die That die Bestimmtheit der Sittlichkeit auf, die einfache Gewiſsheit der unmittelbaren Wahrheit zu seyn, und setzt die Trennung seiner selbst, in sich als das Thätige und in die gegenüberstehende für es negative 1807 409 Wirklichkeit. Es wird also durch die That zur Schuld. Denn sie ist sein Thun, und das Thun sein eigenstes Wesen; und die Schuld erhält auch die Bedeutung des Verbrechens: denn als einfaches sittliches Bewuſstseyn hat es sich dem einen Gesetze zugewandt, dem andern aber abgesagt, und verletzt dieses durch seine That. — Die Schuld ist nicht das gleichgültige doppelsinnige Wesen, daſs die That, wie sie wirklich am Tage liegt, Thun ihres Selbsts seyn könne oder auch nicht, als ob mit dem Thun sich etwas Aeuſserliches und Zufälliges verknüpfen könnte, das dem Thun nicht angehörte, von welcher Seite das Thun also unschuldig wäre. Sondern das Thun ist selbst diese Entzweyung, sich für sich, und diesem gegenüber eine fremde äuſserliche Wirklichkeit zu setzen: daſs eine solche ist, gehört dem Thun selbst an und ist durch dasselbe. Unschuldig ist daher nur das Nichtthun wie das Seyn eines Steines, nicht einmal eines Kindes. — Dem Inhalte nach aber hat die sittliche Handlung das Moment des Verbrechens an ihr, weil sie die natürliche Vertheilung der beyden Gesetze an die beyden Geschlechter nicht aufhebt, sondern vielmehr als unentzweyte Richtung auf das Gesetz innerhalb der natürlichen Unmittelbarkeit bleibt, und als Thun diese Einseitigkeit zur Schuld macht, nur die eine der Seiten des Wesens zu ergreifen, und gegen die andre sich negativ zu verhalten, d. h. sie zu verletzen. Wohin in dem allgemeinen sittlichen Leben 1807 410 Schuld und Verbrechen, Thun und Handeln fällt, wird nachher bestimmter ausgedrückt werden; es erhellt unmittelbar soviel, daſs es nicht dieser Einzelne ist, der handelt und schuldig ist; denn er als dieses Selbst ist nur der unwirkliche Schatten, oder er ist nur als allgemeines Selbst, und die Individualität rein das formale Moment des Thuns überhaupt, und der Inhalt die Gesetze und Sitten, und bestimmt für den Einzelnen, die seines Standes; er ist die Substanz als Gattung, die durch ihre Bestimmtheit zwar zur Art wird, aber die Art bleibt zugleich das Allgemeine der Gattung. Das Selbstbewuſstseyn steigt innerhalb des Volkes vom Allgemeinen nur bis zur Besonderheit, nicht bis zur einzelnen Individualität herab, welche ein ausschlieſsendes Selbst, eine sich negative Wirklichkeit in seinem Thun setzt; sondern seinem Handeln liegt das sichre Vertrauen zum Ganzen zu Grunde, worin sich nichts Fremdes, keine Furcht noch Feindschafft einmischt.

469 Die entwickelte Natur des wirklichen Handelns erfährt nun das sittliche Selbstbewuſstseyn an seiner That, ebensowohl wenn es dem göttlichen als wenn es dem menschlichen Gesetze sich ergab. Das ihm offenbare Gesetz ist im Wesen mit dem entgegengesetzten verknüpft; das Wesen ist die Einheit beyder; die That aber hat nur das Eine gegen das Andere ausgeführt. Aber im Wesen mit diesem verknüpft, rufft die Erfüllung des Einen das Andere hervor, und, wozu die That es machte, als ein verletztes, 1807 411 und nun feindliches, Rache forderndes Wesen. Dem Handeln liegt nur die eine Seite des Entschlusses überhaupt an dem Tage; er ist aber an sich das Negative, das ein ihm Anderes, ein ihm, der das Wissen ist, Fremdes gegenüberstellt. Die Wirklichkeit hält daher die andere dem Wissen fremde Seite in sich verborgen, und zeigt sich dem Bewuſstseyn nicht, wie sie an und für sich ist, — dem Sohne nicht den Vater in seinem Beleidiger, den er erschlägt; — nicht die Mutter in der Königin, die er zum Weibe nimmt. Dem sittlichen Selbstbewuſstseyn stellt auf diese Weise eine lichtschene Macht nach, welche erst, wenn die That geschehen, hervorbricht und es bey ihr ergreifft; denn die vollbrachte That ist der aufgehobne Gegensatz des wissenden Selbst, und der ihm gegenüberstehenden Wirklichkeit. Das Handelnde kann das Verbrechen und seine Schuld nicht verleugnen; — die That ist dieses, das Unbewegte zu bewegen und das nur erst in der Möglichkeit verschlossene hervor zu bringen, und hiemit das Unbewuſste dem Bewuſsten, das Nichtseyende dem Seyn zu verknüpfen. In dieser Wahrheit tritt also die That an die Sonne; — als ein solches, worin ein Bewuſstes einem Unbewuſsten, das Eigne einem Fremden verbunden ist, als das entzweyte Wesen, dessen andere Seite das Bewuſstseyn, und auch als die seinige erfährt, aber als die von ihm verletzte und feindlich erregte Macht.

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470 Es kann seyn, daſs das Recht, welches sich im Hinterhalte hielt, nicht in seiner eigenthümlichen Gestalt für das handelnde Bewuſstseyn, sondern nur an sich, in der innern Schuld des Entschlusses und des Handelns vorhanden ist. Aber das sittliche Bewuſstseyn ist vollständiger, seine Schuld reiner, wenn es das Gesetz und die Macht vorher kennt, der es gegenüber tritt, sie für Gewalt und Unrecht, für eine sittliche Zufälligkeit nimmt, und wissentlich, wie Antigone, das Verbrechen begeht. Die vollbrachte That verkehrt seine Ansicht; die Vollbringung spricht es selbst aus, daſs was sittlich ist, wirklich seyn müsse; denn die Wirklichkeit des Zwecks ist der Zweck des Handelns. Das Handeln spricht gerade die Einheit der Wirklichkeit und der Substanz aus, es spricht aus, daſs die Wirklichkeit dem Wesen nicht zufällig ist, sondern mit ihm im Bunde keinem gegeben wird, das nicht wahres Recht ist. Das sittliche Bewuſstseyn muſs sein Entgegengesetztes um dieser Wirklichkeit willen, und um seines Thuns willen, als die seinige, es muſs seine Schuld anerkennen; weil wir leiden, anerkennen wir, daſs wir gefehlt —

471 Diſs Anerkennen drückt den aufgehobenen Zwiespalt des sittlichen Zweckes und der Wirklichkeit, es drückt die Rückkehr zur sittlichen Gesinnung aus, die weiſs, daſs nichts gilt, als das Rechte. Damit aber gibt das Handelnde seinen Charakter und die Wirklichkeit seines Selbsts auf, und ist zu Grunde 1807 413 gegangen. Sein Seyn ist dieses, seinem sittlichen Gesetze als seiner Substanz anzugehören; in dem Anerkennen des Entgegengetzten hat diſs aber aufgegehört, ihm Substanz zu seyn; und statt seiner Wirklichkeit hat es die Unwirklichkeit, die Gesinnung, erreicht. — Die Substanz erscheint zwar an der Individualität, als das Pathos derselben, und die Individualität als das, was sie belebt, und daher über ihr steht; aber sie ist ein Pathos, das zugleich sein Charakter ist; die sittliche Individualität ist unmittelbar, und an sich eins mit diesem seinem Allgemeinen, sie hat ihre Existenz nur in ihm, und vermag den Untergang, den diese sittliche Macht durch die entgegengesetzte leidet, nicht zu überleben.

472 Sie hat aber dabey die Gewiſsheit, daſs diejenige Individualität, deren Pathos diese entgegengesetzte Macht ist, — nicht mehr Uebel erleidet, als sie zugefügt. Die Bewegung der sittlichen Mächte gegeneinander, und der sie in Leben und Handlung setzenden Individualitäten hat nur darin ihr wahres Ende erreicht, daſs beyde Seiten denselben Untergang erfahren. Denn keine der Mächte hat etwas vor der andern voraus, um wesentlicheres Moment der Substanz zu seyn. Die gleiche Wesentlichkeit und das gleichgültige Bestehen beyder nebeneinander ist ihr selbstloses Seyn; in der That sind sie als Selbstwesen, aber ein verschiedenes, was der Einheit des Selbsts widerspricht, und ihre Rechtlosigkeit 1807 414 und nothwendigen Untergang ausmacht. Der Charakter gehört ebenso theils nach seinem Pathos oder Substanz nur der Einen an, theils ist nach der Seite des Wissens der eine wie der andere in ein Bewuſstes und Unbewuſstes entzweyt; und indem jeder selbst diesen Gegensatz hervorrufft, und durch die That auch das Nichtwissen sein Werk ist, setzt er sich in die Schuld, die ihn verzehrt. Der Sieg der einen Macht und ihres Charakters, und das Unterliegen der andern Seite wäre also nur der Theil und das unvollendete Werk, das unaufhaltsam zum Gleichgewichte beyder fortschreitet. Erst in der gleichen Unterwerfung beyder Seiten ist das absolute Recht vollbracht, und die sittliche Substanz als die negative Macht, welche beyde Seiten verschlingt, oder das allmächtige und gerechte Schicksal aufgetreten.

473 Werden beyde Mächte nach ihrem bestimmten Inhalte und dessen Individualisation genommen, so bietet sich das Bild ihres gestalteten Widerstreits, nach seiner formellen Seite, als der Widerstreit der Sittlichkeit und des Selbstbewuſstseyns mit der bewuſstlosen Natur und einer durch sie vorhandenen Zufälligkeit, — diese hat ein Recht gegen jenes, weil es nur der wahre Geist, nur in unmittelbarer Einheit mit seiner Substanz ist; — und seinem Inhalte nach, als der Zwiespalt des göttlichen und menschlichen Gesetzes dar. — Der Jüngling tritt aus dem bewuſstlosen Wesen, aus dem Familiengeiste, und wird die Individualität des Gemeinwesens; daſs 1807 415 er aber der Natur, der er sich entriſs, noch angehöre, erweiſst sich so, daſs er in der Zufälligkeit zweyer Brüder heraustritt, welche mit gleichem Rechte sich desselben bemächtigen; die Ungleichheit der frühern und spätern Geburt hat für sie, die in das sittliche Wesen eintreten, als Unterschied der Natur, keine Bedeutung. Aber die Regierung, als die einfache Seele oder das Selbst des Volksgeistes, verträgt nicht eine Zweyheit der Individualität; und der sittlichen Nothwendigkeit dieser Einheit tritt die Natur als der Zufall der Mehrheit gegenüber auf. Diese beyden werden darum uneins, und ihr gleiches Recht an die Staatsgewalt zertrümmert beyde, die gleiches Unrecht haben. Menschlicher Weise angesehen, hat derjenige das Verbrechen begangen, welcher, nicht im Besitze, das Gemeinwesen, an dessen Spitze der andere stand, angreifft; derjenige dagegen hat das Recht auf seiner Seite, welcher den andern nur als Einzelnen, abgelöſst von dem Gemeinwesen, zu fassen wuſste und in dieser Machtlosigkeit vertrieb; er hat nur das Individuum als solches, nicht jenes, nicht das Wesen des menschlichen Rechts, angetastet. Das von der leeren Einzelnheit angegriffene und vertheidigte Gemeinwesen erhält sich, und die Brüder finden beyde ihren wechselseitigen Untergang durcheinander; denn die Individualität, welche an ihr für sich seyn die Gefahr des Ganzen knüpft, hat sich selbst vom Gemeinwesen ausgestossen, und löſst sich in sich auf. Den 1807 416 einen aber, der auf seiner Seite sich fand, wird es ehren; den andern hingegen, der schon auf den Mauern seine Verwüstung aussprach, wird die Regierung, die wiederhergestellte Einfachheit des Selbsts des Gemeinwesens, um die letzte Ehre bestraffen; wer an dem höchsten Geiste des Bewuſstseyns, der Gemeine, sich zu vergreiffen kam, muſs der Ehre seines ganzen vollendeten Wesens, der Ehre des abgeschiedenen Geistes, beraubt werden.

474 Aber wenn so das Allgemeine die reine Spitze seiner Pyramide leicht abstöſst, und über das sich empörende Princip der Einzelnheit, die Familie, zwar den Sieg davon trägt, so hat es sich dadurch mit dem göttlichen Gesetze, der seiner selbstbewuſste Geist sich mit dem Bewuſstlosen nur in Kampf eingelassen; denn dieser ist die andre wesentliche und darum von jener unzerstörte, und nur beleidigte Macht. Er hat aber gegen das gewalthabende, am Tage liegende Gesetz, seine Hülffe zur wirklichen Ausführung nur an dem blutlosen Schatten. Als das Gesetz der Schwäche und der Dunkelheit unterliegt er daher zunächst dem Gesetze des Tages und der Krafft, denn jene Gewalt gilt unten, nicht auf Erden. Allein das Wirkliche, das dem Innerlichen seine Ehre und Macht genommen, hat damit sein Wesen aufgezehrt. Der offenbare Geist hat die Wurzel seiner Kraft in der Unterwelt; die ihrer selbst sichere und sich versichernde Gewiſsheit des Volkes hat die Wahrheit ihres Alle in Eins bindenden Eydes, nur in der 1807 417 bewuſstlosen und stummen Substanz Aller, in den Wässern der Vergessenheit. Hiedurch verwandelt sich die Vollbringung des offenbaren Geistes in das Gegentheil, und er erfährt, daſs sein höchstes Recht das höchste Unrecht, sein Sieg vielmehr sein eigener Untergang ist. Der Todte, dessen Recht gekränkt ist, weiſs darum für seine Rache Werkzeuge zu finden, welche von gleicher Wirklichkeit und Gewalt sind mit der Macht, die ihn verletzt. Diese Mächte sind andere Gemeinwesen, deren Altäre die Hunde oder Vögel mit der Leiche besudelten, welche nicht durch die ihr gebührende Zurückgabe an das elementarische Individuum in die bewuſstlose Allgemeinheit erhoben, sondern über der Erde im Reiche der Wirklichkeit geblieben, und als die Krafft des göttlichen Gesetzes, nun eine selbstbewuſste wirkliche Allgemeinheit erhält. Sie machen sich feindlich auf, und zerstören das Gemeinwesen, das seine Krafft, die Pietät der Familie, entehrt und zerbrochen hat.

475 In dieser Vorstellung hat die Bewegung des menschlichen und göttlichen Gesetzes den Ausdruck ihrer Nothwendigkeit an Individuen, an denen das Allgemeine als ein Pathos und die Thätigkeit der Bewegung als individuelles Thun erscheint, welches der Nothwendigkeit derselben den Schein der Zufälligkeit gibt. Aber die Individualität und das Thun macht das Princip der Einzelnheit überhaupt aus, das in seiner reinen Allgemeinheit, das innere 1807 418 göttliche Gesetz genannt wurde. Als Moment des offenbaren Gemeinwesens hat es nicht nur jene unterirrdische oder — in seinem Daseyn äuſserliche Wirksamkeit, sondern ein eben so offenbares an dem wirklichen Volke wirkliches Daseyn und Bewegung. In dieser Form genommen, erhält das was als einfache Bewegung der individualisirten Pathos vorgestellt wurde, ein anderes Aussehen, und das Verbrechen und die dadurch begründete Zerstörung des Gemeinwesens die eigentliche Form ihres Daseyns. — Das menschliche Gesetz also in seinem allgemeinen Daseyn, das Gemeinwesen, in seiner Bethätigung überhaupt die Männlichkeit, in seiner wirklichen Bethätigung, die Regierung ist, bewegt und erhalt sich dadurch, daſs es die Absonderung der Penaten oder die selbstständige Vereinzelung in Familien, welchen die Weiblichkeit vorsteht, in sich aufzehrt, und sie in der Continuität seiner Flüssigkeit aufgelöſst erhält. Die Familie ist aber zugleich überhaupt sein Element, das einzelne Bewuſstseyn allgemeiner bethätigender Grund. Indem das Gemeinwesen sich nur durch die Störung der Familienglückseligkeit und die Auflösung des Selbstbewuſstseyns in das allgemeine, sein Bestehen gibt, erzeugt es sich an dem, was es unterdrückt und was ihm zugleich wesentlich ist, an der Weiblichkeit überhaupt seinen innern Feind. Diese, — die ewige Ironie des Gemeinwesens — verändert durch die Intrigue den allgemeinen Zweck der Regierung 1807 419 in einen Privatzweck, verwandelt ihre allgemeine Thätigkeit in ein Werk dieses bestimmten Individuums, und verkehrt das allgemeine Eigenthum des Staats zu einem Besitz und Putz der Familie. Sie macht hiedurch die ernsthaffte Weisheit des reifen Alters, das, der Einzelnheit, — der Lust und dem Genusse, so wie der wirklichen Thätigkeit — abgestorben, nur das Allgemeine denkt und besorgt, zum Spotte für den Muthwillen der unreifen Jugend, und zur Verachtung für ihren Enthusiasmus; erhebt überhaupt die Krafft der Jugend zum Geltenden, — des Sohnes, an dem die Mutter ihren Herrn geboren, des Bruders, an dem die Schwester den Mann als ihres gleichen hat, des Jünglings, durch den die Tochter ihrer Unselbstständigkeit entnommen, den Genuſs und die Würde der Frauenschaft erlangt. — Das Gemeinwesen kann sich aber nur durch Unterdrückung dieses Geistes der Einzelnheit erhalten, und, weil er wesentliches Moment ist, erzeugt es ihn zwar eben so, und zwar durch die unterdrükende Haltung gegen denselben als ein feindseliges Princip. Dieses würde jedoch, da es vom allgemeinen Zwecke sich trennend, nur böse und in sich nichtig ist, nichts vermögen, wenn nicht das Gemeinwesen selbst die Krafft der Jugend, die Männlichkeit, welche nicht reiff noch innerhalb der Einzelnheit steht, als die Krafft des Ganzen anerkännte. Denn es ist ein Volk, es ist selbst Individualität und wesentlich nur so für sich, daſs 1807 420 andern Individualitäten für es sind, daſs es sie von sich ausschlieſst und sich unabhängig von ihnen weiſs. Die negative Seite des Gemeinwesens, nach innen die Vereinzelung der Individuen unterdrückend, nach aussen aber selbstthätig, hat an der Individualität seine Waffen. Der Krieg ist der Geist und die Form, worin das wesentliche Moment der sittlichen Substanz, die absolute Freyheit des sittlichen Selbstwesens von allem Daseyn, in ihrer Wirklichkeit und Bewährung vorhanden ist. Indem er einerseits den einzelnen Systemen des Eigenthums und der persönlichen Selbstständigkeit wie auch der einzelnen Persönlichkeit selbst, die Krafft des negativen zu fühlen gibt, erhebt andererseits in ihm eben diſs negative Wesen sich als das erhaltende des Ganzen; der tapfre Jüngling, an welchem die Weiblichkeit ihre Lust hat, das unterdrückte Princip des Verderbens tritt an den Tag und ist das Geltende. Nun ist es die natürliche Krafft, und das, was als Zufall des Glücks erscheint, welche über das Daseyn des sittlichen Wesens und die geistige Nothwendigkeit entscheiden; weil auf Stärke und Glück das Daseyn des sittlichen Wesens beruht, so ist schon entschieden, daſs es zu Grunde gegangen. — Wie vorhin nur Penaten im Volksgeiste, so gehen die lebendigen Volksgeister durch ihre Individualität, itzt in einem allgemeinen Gemeinwesen zu Grunde, dessen einfache Allgemeinheit geistlos und todt, und dessen Lebendigkeit das einzelne Individuum, als einzelnes, ist. Die sittliche Gestalt des Geistes 1807 421 ist verschwunden, und es tritt eine andere an ihre Stelle.

476 Dieser Untergang der sittlichen Substanz, und ihr Uebergang in eine andere Gestalt ist also dadurch bestimmt, daſs das sittliche Bewuſstseyn auf das Gesetz wesentlich unmittelbar gerichtet ist; in dieser Bestimmung der Unmittelbarkeit liegt, daſs in die Handlung der Sittlichkeit die Natur überhaupt hereinkommt. Ihre Wirklichkeit offenbart nur den Widerspruch und den Keim des Verderbens, den die schöne Einmüthigkeit und das ruhige Gleichgewicht des sittlichen Geistes eben an dieser Ruhe und Schönheit selbst hat; denn die Unmittelbarkeit hat die widersprechende Bedeutung, die bewuſstlose Ruhe der Natur, und die selbstbewuſste unruhige Ruhe des Geistes zu seyn. — Um dieser Natürlichkeit willen ist überhaupt dieses sittliche Volk eine durch die Natur bestimmte und daher beschränkte Individualität, und findet also ihre Aufhebung an einer andern. Indem aber diese Bestimmtheit, die im Daseyn gesetzt, Beschränkung, aber ebenso das Negative überhaupt, und das Selbst der Individualität ist, — verschwindet, ist das Leben des Geistes und diese in Allen ihrer selbstbewuſste Substanz, verloren. Sie tritt als eine formelle Allgemeinheit an ihnen heraus, ist ihnen nicht mehr als lebendiger Geist inwohnend, sondern die einfache Gediegenheit ihrer Individualität ist in viele Punkte zersprungen.

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c. Rechtszustand.

477 Die allgemeine Einheit, in welche die lebendige unmittelbare Einheit der Individualität und der Substanz zurückgeht, ist das geistlose Gemeinwesen, das aufgehört hat, die selbstbewuſstlose Substanz der Individuen zu seyn, und worin sie itzt nach ihrem einzelnen Fürsichseyn als Selbstwesen und Substanzen gelten. Das Allgemeine in die Atome der absolut vielen Individuen zersplittert, dieser gestorbene Geist ist eine Gleichheit, worin Alle als Jede, als Personen gelten. — Was in der Welt der Sittlichkeit das verborgene göttliche Gesetz genannt wurde, ist in der That aus seinem Innern in die Wirklichkeit getreten; in jener galt und war der Einzelne wirklich, nur als das allgemeine Blut der Familie. Als dieser Einzelne war er der selbstlose abgeschiedene Geist; nun aber ist er aus seiner Unwirklichkeit hervorgetreten. Weil die sittliche Substanz nur der wahre Geist ist, darum geht er in die Gewiſsheit seiner selbst zurück; jene ist er als das positive allgemeine, aber seine Wirklichkeit ist negatives allgemeines Selbst zu seyn. — Wir sahen die Mächte und die Gestalten der sittlichen Welt in der einfachen Nothwendigkeit des leeren Schicksals versinken. Diese ihre Macht ist die in ihre Einfachheit sich reflectirende Substanz; aber das in sich reflectirende absolute Wesen, eben jene Nothwendigkeit des leeren 1807 423 Schicksals, ist nichts anders als das Ich des Selbstbewuſstseyns.

478 Dieses gilt hiemit nunmehr als das an und für sich seyende Wesen; diſs anerkanntseyn ist seine Substantialität; aber sie ist die abstracte Allgemeinheit, weil ihr Inhalt dieses spröde Selbst, nicht das in der Substanz aufgelöſste ist.

479 Die Persönlichkeit ist also hier aus dem Leben der sittlichen Substanz herausgetreten; sie ist die wirklich geltende Selbstständigkeit des Bewuſstseyns. Der unwirkliche Gedanke derselben, der sich durch Verzichtthun auf die Wirklichkeit wird, ist früher als stoisches Selbstbewuſstseyn vorgekommen; wie dieses aus der Herrschafft und Knechtschafft, als dem unmittelbaren Daseyn des Selbstbewuſstseyn, so ist die Persönlichkeit aus dem unmittelbaren Geiste — der der allgemeine herrschende Willen Aller und ebenso ihr dienender Gehorsam ist, hervorgegangen. Was dem Stoicismus nur in der Abstraction das Ansich war, ist nun wirkliche Welt. Er ist nichts anderes, als das Bewuſstseyn, welches das Princip des Rechtszustands, die geistlose Selbstständigkeit, auf seine abstracte Form bringt; durch seine Flucht aus der Wirklichkeit erreichte es nur den Gedanken der Selbstständigkeit; es ist absolut für sich dadurch, daſs es sein Wesen nicht an irgend ein Daseyn knüpft, sondern jedes Daseyn aufgeben, und sein Wesen allein in die Einheit des reinen Denkens, setzt. Auf dieselbe Weise ist das Recht der Person weder an ein 1807 424 reicheres oder mächtigeres Daseyn des Individuums als eines solchen, noch auch an einen allgemeinen lebendigen Geist geknüpft, sondern vielmehr an das reine Eins seiner abstracten Wirklichkeit oder an es als Selbstbewuſstseyn überhaupt.

480 Wie nun die abstracte Selbstständigkeit des Stoicismus ihre Verwirklichung darstellte, so wird auch diese letztere die Bewegung jener ersten wiederholen. Jene geht in die skeptische Verwirrung des Bewuſstseyns über, in eine Faseley des Negativen, welche gestaltlos von einer Zufälligkeit des Seyns und Gedankens zur andern irrt, sie zwar in der absoluten Selbstständigkeit auflöſst, aber eben so sehr wieder erzeugt; und in der That nur der Widerspruch der Selbstständigkeit und Unselbstständigkeit des Bewuſstseyns ist. — Ebenso ist die persönliche Selbstständigkeit des Rechts vielmehr diese gleiche allgemeine Verwirrung und gegenseitige Auflösung. Denn was als das absolute Wesen gilt, ist das Selbstbewuſstseyn als das reine leere Eins der Person. Gegen diese leere Allgemeinheit hat die Substanz die Form der Erfüllung und des Inhalts, und dieser ist nun völlig frey gelassen und ungeordnet; denn der Geist ist nicht mehr vorhanden, der ihn unterjochte, und in seiner Einheit zusammenhielt. — Diſs leere Eins der Person ist daher in seiner Realität ein zufälliges Daseyn und wesenloses Bewegen und Thun, welches zu keinem Bestand kommt. Wie der Skepticismus, ist der Formalismus des Rechts 1807 425 also durch seinen Begriff ohne eigenthümlichen Inhalt, findet ein mannichfaltiges Bestehen, den Besitz, vor, und drückt ihm dieselbe abstracte Allgemeinheit, wodurch er Eigenthum heiſst, auf, wie jener. Wenn aber die so bestimmte Wirklichkeit im Skepticismus Schein überhaupt heiſst, und nur einen negativen Werth hat, so hat sie im Rechte einen positiven. Jener negative Werth besteht darin, daſs das Wirkliche die Bedeutung des Selbsts als Denkens, als des ansich allgemeinen hat, dieser positive aber darin, daſs es Mein in der Bedeutung der Kategorie, als ein anerkanntes und wirkliches Gelten ist. — Beydes ist dasselbe abstracte Allgemeine; der wirkliche Inhalt oder die Bestimmtheit des Meinen — es sey nun eines äusserlichen Besitzes, oder auch des innern Reichthums oder Armuth des Geistes und Charakters, ist nicht in dieser leeren Form enthalten und geht sie nichts an. Er gehört also einer eignen Macht an, die ein anderes als das formal allgemeine, die der Zufall und die Willkühr ist. — Das Bewuſstseyn des Rechts erfährt darum in seinem wirklichen Gelten selbst, vielmehr den Verlust seiner Realität und seine vollkommne Unwesentlichkeit, und ein Individuum als eine Person bezeichnen ist Ausdruck der Verachtung.

481 Die freye Macht des Inhalts bestimmt sich so, daſs die Zerstreuung in die absolute Vielheit der persönlichen Atome durch die Natur dieser Bestimmtheit zugleich in Einen ihnen fremden und ebenso 1807 426 geistlosen Punct gesammelt ist, der eines Theils gleich der Sprödigkeit ihrer Personalität rein einzelne Wirklichkeit ist, aber im Gegensatze gegen ihre leere Einzelnheit, zugleich die Bedeutung alles Inhalts, dadurch des realen Wesens für sie hat, und gegen ihre vermeynte absolute, an sich aber wesenlose Wirklichkeit die allgemeine Macht und absolute Wirklichkeit ist. Dieser Herr der Welt ist sich auf diese Weise die absolute zugleich alles Daseyn in sich befassende Person, für deren Bewuſstseyn kein höherer Geist existirt. Er ist Person; aber die einsame Person, welche Allen gegenübergetreten; diese Alle machen die geltende Allgemeinheit der Person aus, denn das Einzelne als solches ist wahr nur als allgemeine Vielheit der Einzelnheit, von dieser abgetrennt ist das einsame Selbst in der That das unwirkliche, krafftlose Selbst. — Zugleich ist es das Bewuſstseyn des Inhalts, der jener allgemeinen Persönlichkeit gegen übergetreten ist. Dieser Inhalt aber von seiner negativen Macht befreyt, ist das Chaos der geistigen Mächte, die entfesselt als elementarische Wesen in wilder Ausschweifung sich gegeneinander toll und zerstörend bewegen; ihr kraftloses Selbstbewuſstseyn ist die machtlose Umschliessung und der Boden ihres Tumultes. Sich so als den Inbegriff aller wirklichen Mächte wissend, ist dieser Herr der Welt das ungeheure Selbstbewuſstseyn, das sich als den wirklichen Gott weiſs; indem er aber nur das 1807 427 formale Selbst ist, das sie nicht zu bändigen vermag, ist seine Bewegung und Selbstgenuſs die ebenso ungeheure Ausschweifung.

482 Der Herr der Welt hat das wirkliche Bewuſstseyn dessen, was er ist, der allgemeinen Macht der Wirklichkeit, in der zerstörenden Gewalt, die er gegen das ihm gegenüberstehende Selbst seiner Unterthanen ausübt. Denn seine Macht ist nicht die Einigkeit des Geistes, worin die Personen ihr eigenes Selbstbewuſstseyn erkennten, vielmehr sind sie als Personen für sich und schliessen die Continuität mit Andern aus der absoluten Sprödigkeit ihrer Punctualität aus; sie sind also in einem nur negativen Verhältnisse wie zu einander so zu ihm, der ihre Beziehung oder Continuität ist. Als diese Continuität ist er das Wesen und der Inhalt ihres Formalismus; aber der ihnen fremde Inhalt, und das feindliche Wesen, welches gerade dasjenige, was für sie als ihr Wesen gilt, das inhaltsleere fürsichseyn, vielmehr aufhebt; — und als die Continuität ihrer Persönlichkeit eben diese zerstört. Die rechtliche Persönlichkeit erfährt also, indem der ihr fremde Inhalt sich in ihr geltend macht, und er macht sich in ihnen geltend, weil er ihre Realität ist, — vielmehr ihre Substanzlosigkeit. Das zerstörende Wühlen in diesem wesenlosen Boden gibt sich dagegen das Bewuſstseyn seiner Allherrschafft, aber dieses Selbst ist bloses Verwüsten, daher nur auſser sich, und vielmehr das Wegwerfen seines Selbstbewuſstseyns.

1807 428

483 So ist die Seite beschaffen, in welcher das Selbstbewuſstseyn als absolutes Wesen wirklich ist. Das aus dieser Wirklichkeit aber in sich zurückgetriebene Bewuſstseyn denkt diese seine Unwesenheit; wir sahen früher die stoische Selbstständigkeit des reinen Denkens, durch den Skepticismus hindurch gehen und in dem unglücklichen Bewuſstseyn ihre Wahrheit finden, — die Wahrheit, welche Bewandniſs es mit seinem an und für sich seyn hat. Wenn diſs Wissen damals nur als die einseitige Ansicht des Pewuſstseyns als eines solchen erschien, so ist hier ihre wirkliche Wahrheit eingetreten. Sie besteht darin, daſs diſs allgemeine Gelten des Selbstbewuſstseyns, die ihm entfremdete Realität ist. Diſs Gelten ist die allgemeine Wirklichkeit des Selbsts, aber sie ist unmittelbar eben so die Verkehrung; sie ist der Verlust seines Wesens. — Die in der sittlichen Welt nicht vorhandne Wirklichkeit des Selbsts ist durch ihr Zurückgehen in die Person gewonnen worden, was in jener einig war, tritt nun entwickelt aber sich entfremdet auf.

1807 429

B. Der sich entfremdete Geist; die Bildung.

484 Die sittliche Substanz erhielt den Gegensatz in ihr einfaches Bewuſstseyn eingeschlossen, und dieses in unmittelbarer Einheit mit seinem Wesen. Das Wesen hat darum die einfache Bestimmtheit des Seyns für das Bewuſstseyn, das unmittelbar darauf gerichtet, und dessen Sitte es ist; weder gilt das Bewuſstseyn sich als dieses ausschlieſsende Selbst, noch hat die Substanz die Bedeutung eines aus ihm ausgeschlossenen Daseyns, mit dem es sich nur durch die Entfremdung seiner selbst eins zu setzen und sie zugleich hervorzubringen hätte. Aber derjenige Geist, dessen Selbst das absolut discrete ist, hat seinen Inhalt sich als eine ebenso harte Wirklichkeit gegenüber, und die Welt hat hier die Bestimmung, ein äuſserliches, das negative des Selbstbewuſstseyns, zu seyn. Aber diese Welt ist geistiges Wesen, sie ist an sich die Durchdringung des Seyns und der Individualität; diſs ihr Daseyn ist das Werk des Selbstbewuſstseyns; aber ebenso eine unmittelbar vorhandne ihm fremde Wirklichkeit, welche eigenthümliches Seyn hat, und worin es sich nicht erkennt. Sie ist das 1807 430 äuſserliche Wesen, und der freye Inhalt des Rechts; aber diese äuſserliche Wirklichkeit, welche der Herr der Welt des Rechts in sich befaſst, ist nicht nur dieses zufällig für das Selbst vorhandne elementarische Wesen, sondern sie ist seine aber nicht positive Arbeit, — vielmehr seine negative. Sie erhält ihr Daseyn durch die eigne Entäuſserung und Entwesung des Selbstbewuſssteyns, welche ihm in der Verwüstung, die in der Welt des Rechts herrscht, die äuſserliche Gewalt der losgebundnen Elemente anzuthun scheinet. Diese für sich, sind nur das reine Verwüsten, und die Auflösung ihrer selbst; diese Auflösung aber, diſs ihr negatives Wesen ist eben das Selbst; es ist ihr Subject, ihr Thun und Werden. Diſs Thun und Werden aber, wodurch die Substanz wirklich wird, ist die Entfremdung der Persönlichkeit, denn das unmittelbar d. h. ohne Entfremdung an und für sich geltende Selbst ist ohne Substanz, und das Spiel jener tobenden Elemente; seine Substanz ist also seine Entäuſserung selbst, und die Entäuſserung ist die Substanz, oder die zu einer Welt sich ordnenden und sich dadurch erhaltenden geistigen Mächte.

485 Die Substanz ist auf diese Weise Geist, selbstbewuſste Einheit des Selbsts und des Wesens, aber beydes hat auch die Bedeutung der Entfremdung für einander. Er ist Bewuſstseyn einer für sich freyen gegenständlichen Wirklichkeit; diesem Bewuſstseyn aber steht jene Einheit des Selbst und des 1807 431 Wesens gegenüber, dem wirklichen das reine Bewuſstseyn. Einerseits geht das wirkliche Selbstbewuſstseyn durch seine Entäuſserung in die wirkliche Welt über, und diese in jenes zurück; andrerseits aber ist eben diese Wirklichkeit, ſowohl die Person, wie die Geständlichkeit, aufgehoben; sie sind rein allgemeine. Diese ihre Entfremdung ist das reine Bewuſstseyn, oder das Wesen. Die Gegenwart hat unmittelbar den Gegensatz an ihrem Jenseits, das ihr Denken und Gedachtseyn; so wie diſs am Diesseits, das seine ihm entfremdete Wirklichkeit ist.

486 Dieser Geist bildet sich daher nicht nur Eine Welt, sondern eine gedoppelte, getrennte und entgegengesetzte aus. — Die Welt des sittlichen Geistes ist seine eigne Gegenwart; und daher jede Macht derselben in dieser Einheit, und insofern beyde sich unterscheiden, im Gleichgewichte mit dem Ganzen. Nichts hat die Bedeutung des negativen des Selbstbewuſstseyns; selbst der abgeschiedne Geist ist im Blute der Berwandtschafft, im Selbst der Familie gegenwärtig, und die allgemeine Macht der Regierung ist der Willen, das Selbst des Volks. Hier aber bedeutet das Gegenwärtige nur gegenständliche Wirklichkeit, die ihr Bewuſstseyn jenseits hat; jedes einzelne Moment als Wesen empfängt diſs und damit die Wirklichkeit von einem andern, und insofern es wirklich ist, ist sein Wesen ein andres als seine Wirklichkeit. Nichts hat einen in ihm selbst gegründeten und inwohnenden Geist, 1807 432 sondern ist auſser sich in einem fremden, -das Gleichgewicht des Ganzen nicht die bey sich selbst bleibende Einheit und ihre in sich zurückgekehrte Beruhigung, sondern beruht auf der Entfremdung des Entgegengesetzten. Das Ganze ist daher, wie jedes einzelne Moment, eine sich entfremdete Realität; es zerfällt in ein Reich, worin das Selbstbewuſstseyn wirklich sowohl es als sein Gegenstand ist, und in ein anderes, das Reich des reinen Bewuſstseyns, welches jenselts des Ersten nicht wirkliche Gegenwart hat, sondern im Glauben ist. Wie nun die sittliche Welt aus der Trennung des göttlichen und menschlichen Gesetzes und ihrer Gestalten, und ihr Bewuſstseyn aus der Trennung in das Wissen und in die Bewuſstlosigheit zurück in sein Schicksal, in das Selbst als die negative Macht dieses Gegensatzes geht, so werden auch diese beyden Reiche des sich entfremdeten Geistes in das Selbst zurückkehren; aber wenn jenes das erste unmittelbar geltende Selbst, die einzelne Person, war; so wird diſs zweyte, das aus seiner Entäuſserung in sich zurückkehrt, das allgemeine Selbst, das den Begriff erfassende Bewuſstseyn seyn; und diese geistigen Welten, deren alle Momente eine fixirte Wirklichkeit und ungeistiges Bestehen von sich behaupten, werden sich in der reinen Einsicht auflösen. Sie als das sich selbst erfassende Selbst vollendet die Bildung; sie faſst nichts als das Selbst, und alles als das Selbst auf, d. h. sie begreifft alles, tilgt alle Gegenständlichkeit, und 1807 433 verwandelt alles Ansichseyn in ein Fürsichseyn. Gegen den Glauben als das fremde jenseits liegende Reich des Wesens gekehrt, ist sie die Aufklärung. Diese vollendet auch an diesem Reiche, wohin sich der entfremdete Geist, als in das Bewuſstseyn der sich selbst gleichen Ruhe rettet, die Entfremdung; sie verwirrt ihm die Haushaltung, die er hier führt, dadurch, daſs sie die Geräthschafften der disseitigen Welt hineinbringt, die er als sein Eigenthum nicht verläugnen kann, weil sein Bewuſstseyn ihr gleichfalls angehört. — In diesem negativen Geschäffte realisirt zugleich die reine Einsicht sich selbst, und bringt ihren eignen Gegenstand, das unerkennbare absolute Wesen, und das Nützliche hervor. Indem auf diese Weise die Wirklichkeit alle Substantialität verloren, und nichts mehr an sich in ihr ist, so ist wie das Reich des Glaubens, so auch der realen Welt gestürzt, und diese Revolution bringt die absolute Freyheit hervor, womit der vorher entfremdete Geist vollkommen in sich zurückgegangen ist, diſs Land der Bildung verlaſst, und in ein anderes Land, in das Land des moralischen Bewuſstseyns übergeht.

1807 434

I. Die Welt des sich entfremdeten Geistes.

487 Die Welt dieses Geistes zerfällt in die gedoppelte; die erste ist die Welt der Wirklichkeit oder seiner Entfremdung selbst; die andre aber die, welche er, über die erste sich erhebend, im Aether des reinen Bewuſstseyns sich erbaut. Diese, jener Entfremdung entgegengesetzt, ist eben darum nicht frey davon, sondern vielmehr nur die andre Form der Entfremdung, welche eben darin besteht, in zweyerley Welten das Bewuſstseyn zu haben, und beyde umfaſst. Es ist also nicht das Selbstbewuſstseyn des absoluten Wesens, wie es an und für sich ist, nicht die Religion, welche hier betrachtet wird, sondern der Glauben, insofern er die Flucht aus der wirklichen Welt und also nicht an und für sich ist. Diese Flucht aus dem Reiche der Gegenwart ist daher an ihr selbst unmittelbar die gedoppelte. Das reine Bewuſstseyn ist das Element, in welches der Geist sich erhebt; aber es ist nicht nur das Element des Glaubens, sondern ebenso des Begriffs; beyde treten daher zugleich miteinander ein, und jener kömmt nur in Betracht im Gegensatze gegen diesen.

1807 435

a. Die Bildung und ihr Reich der Wirklichkeit.

488 Der Geist dieser Welt ist das von einem Selbstbewuſstseyn durchdrungne geistige Wesen, das sich als dieses für sich seyende unmittelbar gegenwärtig, und das Wesen als eine Wirklichkeit sich gegenüber weiſs. Aber das Daseyn dieser Welt, so wie die Wirklichkeit des Selbstbewuſstseyns beruht auf der Bewegung, daſs dieses seiner Persönlichkeit sich entäussert, hiedurch seine Welt hervorbringt, und sich gegen sie als eine Fremde so verhält, daſs es sich ihrer nunmehr zu bemächtigen hat. Aber die Entsagung seines Fürsichseyns ist selbst die Erzeugung der Wirklichkeit, und durch sie bemächtigt es sich also unmittelbar derselben. — Oder das Selbstbewuſstseyn ist nur Etwas, es hat nur Realität, insofern es sich selbst entfremdet; hiedurch setzt es sich als allgemeines, und diese seine Allgemeinheit ist sein Gelten und Wirklichkeit. Diese Gleichheit mit Allen ist daher nicht jene Gleichheit des Rechts, nicht jenes unmittelbare Anerkanntseyn und Gelten des Selbstbewuſstseyns, darum weil es ist; sondern daſs es gelte, ist durch die entfremdende Vermittlung, sich dem Allgemeinen gemäſs gemacht zu haben. Die geistlose Allgemeinheit des Rechts nimmt jede natürliche Weise des Charakters wie des 1807 436 Daseyns in sich auf, und berechtigt sie. Die Allgemeinheit aber, welche hier gilt, ist die gewordne, und darum ist sie wirklich.

489 Wodurch also das Individuum hier Gelten und Wirklichkeit hat, ist die Bildung. Seine wahre ursprüngliche Natur und Substanz ist der Geist der Entfremdung des natürlichen Seyns. Diese Entäusserung ist daher ebenso Zweck als Daseyn desselben; sie ist zugleich das Mittel oder der Uebergang sowohl der gedachten Substanz in die Wirklichkeit, als umgekehrt der bestimmten Individualität in die Wesentlichkeit. Diese Individualität bildet sich zu dem, was sie ansich ist, und erst dadurch ist sie an sich, und hat wirkliches Daseyn; soviel sie Bildung hat, soviel Wirklichkeit und Macht. Obwohl das Selbst als dieses sich hier wirklich weiſs, so besteht doch seine Wirklichkeit allein in dem Aufheben des natürlichen Selbsts; die ursprünglich bestimmte Natur reducirt sich daher auf den unwesentlichen Unterschied der Gröſse, auf eine gröſsere oder geringere Energie des Willens. Zweck und Inhalt aber desselben gehört allein der allgemeinen Substanz selbst an, und kann nur ein Allgemeines seyn; die Besonderheit einer Natur, die Zweck und Inhalt wird, ist etwas unmächtiges und unwirkliches; sie ist eine Art, die sich vergeblich und lächerlich abmüht, sich ins Werk zu setzen; sie ist der Widerspruch dem Besondern die Wirklichkeit zu geben, die unmittelbar das Allgemeine ist. Wenn daher fälschlicher Weise die Individualität in die 1807 437 *Besonderheit der Natur und des Charakters gesetzt wird, so finden sich in der realen Welt keine Individualitäten und Charaktere, sondern die Individuen haben ein gleiches Daseyn für einander; jene vermeintliche Individualität ist eben nur das gemeinte Daseyn, welches in dieser Welt, worin nur das sich selbst entäussernde und darum nur das Allgemeine Wirklichkeit erhält, kein Bleiben hat. — Das Gemeynte gilt darum für das, was es ist, für eine Art. Art ist nicht ganz dasselbe, was Espece, „von allen Spitznahmen der fürchterlichste, denn er bezeichnet die Mittelmäſsigkeit, und drückt die höchste Stuffe der Verachtung aus.“ Art und in seiner Art gut seyn ist aber ein deutscher Ausdruck, welcher dieser Bedeutung die ehrliche Miene hinzufügt, als ob es nicht so schlimm gemeynt sey, oder auch in der That das Bewuſstseyn, was Art, und was Bildung und Wirklichkeit ist, noch nicht in sich schlieſst.

490 Was in Beziehung auf das einzelne Individuum als seine Bildung erscheint, ist das wesentliche Moment der Substanz selbst, nemlich das unmittelbare Uebergehen ihrer gedachten Allgemeinheit in die Wirklichkeit, oder die einfache Seele derselben, wodurch das Ansich Anerkanntes und Daseyn ist. Die Bewegung der sich bildenden Individualität ist daher unmittelbar das Werden derselben, als des allgemeinen gegenständlichen Wesens, d. h. das Werden der wirklichen Welt. Diese, obwohl geworden durch die Individualität, ist für das Selbstbewuſstseyn ein 1807 438 unmittelbar entfremdetes, und hat für es die Form unverrückter Wirklichkeit. Aber gewiſs zugleich daſs sie seine Substanz ist, geht es sich derselben zu bemächtigen; es erlangt diese Macht über sie durch die Bildung, welche von dieser Seite so erscheint, daſs es sich der Wirklichkeit gemäſs macht, und soviel als die Energie des ursprünglichen Charakters und Talents ihm zuläſst. Was hier als die Gewalt des Individuums erscheint, unter welche die Substanz komme, und hiemit aufgehoben werde, ist dasselbe, was die Verwirklichung der letztern ist. Denn die Macht des Individuums besteht darin, daſs es sich ihr gemäſs macht, d. h. daſs es sich seines Selbsts entäuſsert, also sich als die gegenständliche seyende Substanz setzt. Seine Bildung und seine eigne Wirklichkeit ist daher die Verwirklichung der Substanz selbst.

491 Das Selbst ist sich nur als aufgehobnes wirklich. Es macht daher für es nicht die Einheit des Bewuſstseyns seiner selbst, und des Gegenstandes aus; sondern dieser ist ihm das Negative seiner. — Durch das Selbst als die Seele wird die Substanz also so in ihren Momenten ausgebildet, daſs das Entgegengesetzte das Andre begeistet, jedes durch seine Entfremdung dem Andern Bestehen gibt, und es ebenso von ihm erhält. Zugleich hat jedes Moment seine Bestimmtheit als ein unüberwindliches Gelten, und eine feste Wirklichkeit gegen das Andre. Das Denken fixirt diesen Unterschied auf die allgemeinste 1807 439 Weise durch die absolute Entgegensetzung von Gut und Schlecht, die, sich fliehend, auf keine Weise dasselbe werden können. Aber dieses feste Seyn hat zu seiner Seele den unmittelbaren Uebergang in das Entgegengesetzte; das Daseyn ist vielmehr die Verkehrung jeder Bestimmtheit in ihre entgegengesetzte, und nur diese Entfremdung ist das Wesen und Erhaltung des Ganzen. Diese verwircklichende Bewegung und Begeistung der Momente ist nun zu betrachten; die Entfremdung wird sich selbst entfremden, und das Ganze durch sie in seinen Begriff sich zurücknehmen.

492 Zuerst ist die einfache Substanz selbst in der unmittelbaren Organisation ihrer daseyenden noch unbegeisteten Momente zu betrachten. — Wie die Natur sich in die allgemeinen Elemente auslegt, worunter die Luft das bleibende rein allgemeine durchsichtige Wesen ist, — das Wasser aber das Wesen, das immer aufgeopfert wird, — das Feuer ihre beseelende Einheit, welche ihren Gegensatz ebenso immer auflöst als ihre Einfachheit in ihn entzweyt, — die Erde endlich der feste Knoten dieser Gegliederung und das Subject dieser Wesen wie ihres Processes, ihr Ausgehen und ihre Rükkehr ist, — so legt sich in eben solche allgemeine aber geistige Massen das innere Wesen oder der einfache Geist der selbstbewuſsten Wirklichkeit als eine Welt aus, — in die erste Masse, das an sich Allgemeine, sich selbstgleiche geistige Wesen; — in die andere, das fürsichseyende 1807 440 in sich ungleich gewordene, sich aufopfernde und hingebende Wesen, und in das dritte, welches als Selbstbewuſstseyn Subject ist, und die Krafft des Feuers unmittelbar an ihm selbst hat; — im ersten Wesen ist es seiner als des Ansichseyns bewuſst; in dem Zweyten aber hat es das Werden des Fürsichseyns durch die Aufopferung des Allgemeinen. Der Geist aber selbst ist das an und fürsichseyn des Ganzen, das sich in die Substanz als Bleibende, und in sie als sich Aufopfernde entzweyt, und ebenso sie auch wieder in seine Einheit zurücknimmt, sowohl als die ausbrechende sie verzehrende Flamme, wie als die bleibende Gestalt derselben. — Wir sehen, daſs diese Wesen dem Gemeinwesen und der Familie der sittlichen Welt entsprechen, ohne aber den heimischen Geist zu besitzen, den diese haben; dagegen, wenn diesem das Schicksal fremde ist, so ist und weiſs sich hier das Selbstbewuſstseyn als die wirkliche Macht derselben.

493 Diese Glieder sind sowohl wie sie zunächst innerhalb des reinen Bewuſstseyns als Gedanken oder ansichseyende, als auch wie sie im wirklichen Bewuſstseyn als gegenständliche Wesen vorgestellt werden, zu betrachten. — In jener Form der Einfachheit ist das erste, als das sich selbst gleiche, unmittelbare und unwandelbare Wesen aller Bewuſstseyn, das Gute, — die unabhängige geistige Macht des Ansich, bey der die Bewegung des fürsichseyenden Bewuſstseyns nur beyherspielt. Das Andere dagegen 1807 441 ist das passive geistige Wesen, oder das Allgemeine, insofern es sich preiſsgibt und die Individuen das Bewuſstseyn ihrer Einzelnheit sich an ihm nehmen läſst; es ist das nichtige Wesen, das Schlechte. — Dieses absolute Aufgelöſstwerden des Wesens ist selbst bleibend; wie das erste Wesen, Grundlage, Ausgangspunkt und Resultat der Individuen und diese rein allgemein darin sind, so ist das zweyte dagegen einerseits das sich aufopfernde Seyn für anderes, andererseits eben darum deren beständige Rückkehr zu sich selbst als das Einzelne und ihr bleibendes Fürsichwerden.

494 Aber diese einfachen Gedanken des Guten und Schlechten sind ebenso unmittelbar sich entfremdet; sie sind wirklich und im wirklichen Bewuſstseyn als gegenständliche Momente. So ist das erste Wesen, die Staatsmacht, das andere der Reichthum. — Die Staatsmacht ist, wie die einfache Substanz, so das allgemeine Werk; — die absolute Sache selbst, worin den Individuen ihr Wesen ausgesprochen und ihre Einzelnheit schlechthin nur Bewuſstseyn ihrer Allgemeinheit ist; — sie ist ebenso das Werk und einfache Resultat, aus welchem diſs, daſs es aus ihrem Thun herkommt, verschwindet; es bleibt die absolute Grundlage und Bestehen alles ihres Thuns. — Diese einfache ätherische Substanz ihres Lebens ist durch diese Bestimmung ihrer unwandelbaren Sichselbstgleichheit Seyn, und damit nur Seyn für anderes. Sie ist also an sich unmittelbar das entgegengesetzte 1807 442 ihrer selbst, Reichthum. Ob er zwar das passive oder nichtige ist, ist er ebenfalls allgemeines geistiges Wesen, ebenso das beständig werdende Resultat der Arbeit und des Thuns Aller, wie es sich wieder in den Genuſs Aller auflöſst. In dem Genuſse wird die Individualität zwar für sich oder als einzelne, aber dieser Genuſs selbst ist Resultat des allgemeinen Thuns; so wie er gegenseitig die allgemeine Arbeit und den Genuſs aller hervorbringt. Das Wirkliche hat schlechthin die geistige Bedeutung unmittelbar allgemein zu seyn. Es meynt wohl in diesem Momente jeder Einzelne eigennützig zu handeln; denn es ist das Moment, worin er sich das Bewuſstseyn gibt, für sich zu seyn, und er nimmt es deswegen nicht für etwas geistiges; allein auch nur äuſserlich angesehen, zeigt es sich, daſs in seinem Genuſse jeder Allen zu geniessen gibt, in seiner Arbeit ebenso für Alle arbeitet als für sich, und alle für ihn. Sein fürsichseyn ist daher an sich allgemein und der Eigennutz etwas nur gemeyntes, das nicht dazu kommen kann, dasjenige wirklich zu machen, was es meynt, nemlich etwas zn thun, das nicht Allen zu gut käme.

495 In diesen beyden geistigen Mächten erkennt also das Selbstbewuſstseyn seine Substanz, Inhalt und Zweck; es schaut sein Doppelwesen darin an, in der einen sein Ansichseyn, in der andern sein Fürsichseyn. — Es ist aber zugleich als der Geist, die negative Einheit ihres Bestehens und der Trennung der Individualität und des Allgemeinen, oder der 1807 443 Wirklichkeit und des Selbsts. Herrschafft und Reichthum sind daher für das Individuum als Gegenstände vorhanden, d. h. als solche, von denen es sich frey weiſs und zwischen ihnen und selbst keines von beyden wählen zu können meynt. Es tritt als dieses freye und reine Bewuſstseyn dem Wesen als einem solchen gegen über, das nur für es ist. Es hat alsdenn das Wesen als Wesen in sich. — In diesem remen Bewuſstseyn sind ihm die Momente der Substanz nicht Staatsmacht und Reichthum, sondern die Gedanken von Gut und Schlecht. — Das Selbstbewuſstseyn ist aber ferner die Beziehung seines reinen Bewuſstseyns auf sein wirkliches, des Gedachten auf das gegenstandliche Wesen, es ist wesentlich das Urtheil. — Es hat sich zwar schon für die beyden Seiten des wirklichen Wesens durch ihre unmittelbaren Bestimmungen ergeben, welche das Gute, und welche das Schlechte sey; jenes die Staatsmacht, diſs der Reichthum. Allein diſs erste Urtheil kann nicht als ein geistiges Urtheil angesehen werden; denn in ihm ist die eine Seite nur als das ansichseyende oder positive, die andre nur als das fürsichseyende und negative bestimmt worden. Aber sie sind als geistige Wesen, jedes die Durchdringung beyder Momente, also in jenen Bestimmungen nicht erschöpft; und das Selbstbewuſstseyn, das sich auf sie bezieht, ist an und für sich; es muſs daher sich auf jedes auf die gedoppelte Weise beziehen, wodurch sich ihre Natur, sich selbst entfremdete Bestimmungen zu seyn, herauskehren wird.

1807 444

496 Dem Selbstbewuſstseyn ist nun derjenige Gegenstand gut und an sich, worin es sich selbst, derjenige aber schlecht, worin es das Gegentheil seiner findet; das Gute ist die Gleichheit der gegenständlichen Realität mit ihm; das Schlechte aber ihre Ungleichheit. Zugleich was für es gut und schlecht ist, ist an sich gut und schlecht, denn es ist eben dasjenige, worin diese beyden Momente des an sich und des für es seyn dasselbe sind; es ist der wirkliche Geist der gegenständlichen Wesen, und das Urtheil der Erweis seiner Macht an ihnen, die sie zu dem macht, was sie an sich sind. Nicht diſs, wie sie unmittelbar an sich selbst das Gleiche oder Ungleiche d. h. das abstracte Ansich oder Fürsichseyn sind, ist ihr Kriterium und ihre Wahrheit, sondern was sie in der Beziehung des Geistes auf sie sind; ihre Gleichheit oder Ungleichheit mit ihm. Seine Beziehung auf sie, die zuerst als Gegenstände gesetzt, durch ihn zum Ansich werden, wird zugleich ihre Reflexion in sich selbst, durch welche sie wirkliches geistiges Seyn erhalten, und was ihr Geist ist, hervortritt. Aber wie ihre erste unmittelbare Bestimmung sich von der Beziehung des Geistes auf sie unterscheidet, so wird auch das dritte, der eigne Geist derselben, sich von dem zweyten unterscheiden. — Das zweyte Ansich derselben zunächst, das durch die Beziehung des Geistes auf sie hervortritt, muſs schon anders ausfallen als das unmittelbare; denn diese Vermittlung des Geistes bewegt vielmehr die unmittelbare Bestimmtheit, und macht sie zu etwas Anderem.

1807 445

497 Hiernach findet nun das an und fürsichseyende Bewuſstseyn in der Staatsmacht wohl sein einfaches Wesen und Bestehen überhaupt, allein nicht seine Individualität als solche, wohl sein Ansich, nicht sein Fürsichseyn, es findet darin vielmehr das Thun als einzelnes Thun verleugnet und zum Gehorsam unterjocht. Das Individuum reflectirt sich also vor dieser Macht in sich selbst; sie ist ihm das unterdrückende Wesen, und das Schlechte; denn statt das Gleiche zu seyn, ist sie das der Individualität schlechthin Ungleiche. — Hingegen der Reichthum ist das Gute; er geht auf allgemeinen Genuſs, gibt sich preiſs, und verschafft allen das Bewuſstseyn ihres Selbsts. Er ist ansich allgemeines Wohlthun; wenn er irgend eine Wohlthat versagt, und nicht jedem Bedürfnisse gefällig ist, so ist diſs eine Zufälligkeit, welche seinem allgemeinen nothwendigen Wesen, sich allen Einzelnen mitzutheilen und tausendhändiger Geber zu seyn, keinen Eintrag thut.

498 Diese beyden Urtheile geben den Gedanken von Gut und Schlecht einen Inhalt, welcher das Gegentheil von dem ist, den sie für uns hatten. — Das Selbstbewuſstseyn hat sich aber nur erst unvollständig auf seine Gegenstände bezogen, nemlich nur nach dem Maſsstabe des für sich seyns. Aber das Bewuſstseyn ist ebenso ansichseyendes Wesen, und muſs diese Seite gleichfalls zum Maſsstabe machen, wodurch sich erst das geistige Urtheil vollendet. Nach dieser Seite spricht ihm die 1807 446 Staatsmacht sein Wesen aus; sie ist theils ruhendes Gesetz, theils Regierung und Befehl, welcher die einzelnen Bewegungen des allgemeinen Thuns anordnet; das eine die einfache Substanz selbst, das andere ihr sich selbst und Alle belebendes und erhaltendes Thun. Das Individuum findet also darin seinen Grund und Wesen ausgedrückt, organisirt und bethätigt. — Hingegen durch den Genuſs des Reichthums erfährt es nicht sein allgemeines Wesen, sondern erhält nur das vergängliche Bewuſstseyn und den Genuſs seiner selbst als einer fürsichseyenden Einzelnheit, und der Ungleichheit mit seinem Wesen. — Die Begriffe von Gut und Schlecht erhalten also hier den entgegengesetzten Inhalt gegen den vorherigen.

499 Diese beyden Weisen des Urtheilens finden jede eine Gleichheit und eine Ungleichheit; das erste urtheilende Bewuſstseyn findet die Staatsmacht ungleich, den Genuſs des Reichthums gleich mit ihm; das zweyte hingegen die erstere gleich, und den letztern ungleich mit ihm. Es ist ein zweyfaches gleichfinden, und ein zweyfaches ungleichfinden, eine entgegengesetzte Beziehung auf die beyden realen Wesenheiten vorhanden. — Wir müssen dieses verschiedene Urtheilen selbst beurtheilen, wozu wir den aufgestellten Maſsstab anzulegen haben. Die gleichfindende Beziehung des Bewuſstseyns ist hienach das Gute, die ungleichfindende das Schlechte; und diese beyden Weisen der Beziehung sind nunmehr selbst als verschiedene Gestalten des Bewuſstseyns 1807 447 festzuhalten. Das Bewuſstseyn kommt dadurch, daſs es sich auf verschiedene Weise verhält, selbst unter die Bestimmung der Verschiedenheit gut oder schlecht zu seyn, nicht darnach, daſs es entweder das für sich seyn oder das reine Ansichseyn zum Princip hätte, denn beyde sind gleich wesentliche Momente; das gedoppelte Urtheilen, das betrachtet wurde, stellte die Principien getrennt vor, und enthält daher nur abstracte Weisen des Urtheilens. Das wirkliche Bewuſstseyn hat beyde Principien an ihm und der Unterschied fällt allein in sein Wesen, nemlich in die Beziehung seiner selbst auf das reale.

500 Die Weise dieser Beziehung ist die entgegengesetzte, die eine ist Verhalten zu Staatsmacht und Reichthum als zu einem Gleichen, das andere als zu einem Ungleichen. — Das Bewuſstseyn der gleichfindenden Beziehung ist das edelmüthige. In der öffentlichen Macht betrachtet es das mit ihm Gleiche, daſs es in ihr sein einfaches Wesen und dessen Bethätigung hat, und im Dienste des wirklichen Gehorsams, wie der innern Achtung gegen es steht Ebenso in dem Reichthume, daſs er ihm das Bewuſstseyn seiner andern wesentlichen Seite, des Fürsichseyns, verschafft; daher es ihn ebenfalls als Wesen in Beziehung auf sich betrachtet, und denjenigen, von welchem es genieſst, als Wohlthäter anerkennt und sich zum Danke verpflichtet hält.

501 Das Bewuſstseyn der andern Beziehung dagegen ist das niederträchtige, das die Ungleichheit mit 1807 448 den beyden Wesenheiten festhält; in der Herrschergewalt also eine Fesel und Unterdrückung des Fürsichseyns sieht, und daher den Herrscher haſst, nur mit Heimtücke gehorcht, und immer auf dem Sprunge zum Aufruhr steht, — im Reichthum, durch den es zum Genuſse seines Fürsichseyns gelangt, ebenso nur die Ungleichheit, nemlich mit dem bleibenden Wesen betrachtet; indem es durch ihn nur zum Bewuſstseyn der Einzelnheit und des vergänglichen Genusses kommt, ihn liebt aber verachtet, und mit dem Verschwinden des Genusses, des an sich verschwindenden, auch sein Verhältniſs zu dem Reichen für verschwunden ansieht.

502 Diese Beziehungen drücken nun erst das Urtheil aus, die Bestimmung dessen, was die beyden Wesen als Gegenstände für das Bewuſstseyn sind, noch nicht an und für sich. Die Reflexion, die im Urtheil vorgestellt ist, ist theils erst für uns ein Setzen der einen so wie der andern Bestimmung und daher ein gleiches Aufheben beyder, noch nicht die Reflexion derselben für das Bewuſstseyn selbst. Theils sind sie erst unmittelbar Wesen, weder diſs geworden, noch an ihnen Selbstbewuſstseyn; dasjenige, für welches sie sind, ist noch nicht ihre Belebung; sie sind Prädicate, die noch nicht selbst Subject sind. Um dieser Trennung willen fällt auch das Ganze des geistigen Urtheilens noch an zwey Bewuſstseyn auseinander, deren jedes unter einer einseitigen Bestimmung liegt. — Wie sich nun zuerst die 1807 449 Gleichgültigkeit der beyden Seiten der Entfremdung — der einen, des Ansich des reinen Bewuſstseyns nemlich der beſtimmten Gedanken von Gut und Schlecht — der andern ihres Daseyns als Staatsmacht und Reichthum, zur Beziehung beyder, zum Urtheil erhob; so hat sich diese äuſsere Beziehung zur innern Einheit, oder als Beziehung des Denkens zur Wirklichkeit zu erheben, und der Geist der beyden Gestalten des Urtheils hervorzutreten. Diſs geſchieht, indem das Urtheil zum Schluſſe wird, zur vermittelnden Bewegung, worin die Nothwendigkeit und Mitte der beyden Seiten des Urtheils hervortritt.

503 Das edelmüthige Bewuſstseyn findet also im Urtheil sich so der Staatsmacht gegenüber, daſs sie zwar noch nicht ein Selbst, sondern erst die allgemeine Substanz, deren es aber als seines Wesens, als des Zwecks und abſoluten Inhalts sich bewuſst ist. Sich so positiv auf sie beziehend, verhält es sich negativ gegen seine eignen Zwecke, seinen besondern Inhalt und Daseyn, und läſst sie verschwinden. Es ist der Heroismus des Dienstes, — die Tugend, welche das einzelne Seyn dem Allgemeinen aufopfert, und diſs dadurch ins Daſeyn bringt, — die Person, welche dem Besitze und Genuſse von selbſt entſagt, und für die vorhandene Macht handelt und wirklich ist.

504 Durch diese Bewegung wird das Allgemeine mit dem Daseyn überhaupt zuſammengeſchloſsen, wie das daſeyende Bewuſstseyn durch dieſe Entäuſserung sich zur Weſentlichkeit bildet. Weſſen dieſes im 1807 450 Dienſte sich entfremdet, ist sein in das Daſeyn verſenkte Bewuſstseyn; das sich entfremdete Seyn ist aber das Ansich; es bekommt alſo durch dieſe Bildung Achtung vor sich selbſt und bey den Andern. — Die Staatsmacht aber, die nur erſt das gedachte Allgemeine, das Ansich war, wird durch eben diese Bewegung zum seyenden Allgemeinen, zur wirklichen Macht. Sie ist dieſe nur in dem wirklichen Gehorſam, welchen sie durch das Urtheil des Selbstbewuſstseyns, daſs sie das Wesen ist, und durch die freye Aufopferung deſſelben erlangt. Dieſes Thun, das das Weſen mit dem Selbst zuſammenſchlieſst, bringt die gedoppelte Wirklichkeit hervor, sich als das, welches wahre Wirklichkeit hat, und die Staatsmacht als das Wahre, welches gilt.

505 Dieſe ist aber durch dieſe Entfremdung noch nicht ein sich als Staatsmacht wiſſendes Selbstbewuſstseyn; es ist nur ihr Gesetz, oder ihr Ansich, das gilt; sie hat noch keinen besondern Willen; denn noch hat das dienende Selbstbewuſstseyn nicht sein reines Selbſt entäuſsert und die Staatsmacht damit begeiſtet, sondern erſt mit seinem Seyn; ihr nur sein Daseyn aufgeopfert, nicht sein Ansichseyn. — Diſs Selbstbewuſstseyn gilt als ein solches, das dem Wesen gemäſs ist, es ist anerkannt um seines Ansichseyns willen. Die andern finden in ihm ihr Wesen bethätigt, nicht aber ihr Fürsichseyn, — ihr Denken oder reines Bewuſstseyn erfüllt, nicht ihre Individualität. Es gilt daher in ihren Gedanken, und 1807 451 genieſst der Ehre. Es ist der stolze Vasall, der für die Staatsmacht thätig ist, insofern sie nicht eigner Willen, sondern wesentlicher ist, und der sich nur in dieser Ehre gilt, nur in dem wesentlichen Vorſtellen der allgemeinen Meynung, nicht in dem dankbaren der Individualität, denn dieſer hat er nicht zu ihrem Fürstchseyn verholffen. Seine Sprache, wenn es sich zum eignen Willen der Staatsmacht verhielte, der noch nicht geworden ist, wäre der Rath, den er zum allgemeinen Beſten ertheilt.

506 Die Staatsmacht ist daher noch willenlos gegen den Rath, und nicht entſcheidend zwiſchen den verſchiedenen Meynungen über das allgemeine Beſte. Sie ist noch nicht Regierung, und somit noch nicht in Wahrheit wirkliche Staatsmacht. — Das Fürsichseyn, der Willen, der als Willen noch nicht aufgeopfert ist, ist der innre abgeschiedne Geist der Stände, der ſeinem Sprechen vom allgemeinen Besten gegenüber sich sein besondres Bestes vorbehält, und diſs Geſchwätze vom allgemeinen Beſten zu einem Surrogate für das Handeln zu machen geneigt ist. Die Aufopferung des Daseyns, die im Dienſte geschieht, ist zwar vollſtändig, wenn sie bis zum Tode fortgegangen ist; aber die beſtandne Gefahr des Todes selbſt, der überlebt wird, läſst ein beſtimmtes Daseyn, und damit ein besonderes Fürsich übrig, welches den Rath fürs allgemeine Beſste zweydeutig und verdächtig macht, und sich in der That die eigne Meynung und den besondern Willen gegen die 1807 452 Staatsgewalt vorbehält. Es verhält sich daher noch ungleich gegen dieselbe, und fällt unter die Bestimmung des niederträchtigen Bewuſstseyns, immer auf dem Sprunge zur Empörung zu stehen.

507 Dieſer Widerſpruch, den es aufzuheben hat, enthält in dieſer Form, in der Ungleichheit des Fürsichseyns gegen die Allgemeinheit der Staatsmacht zu ſtehen, zugleich die Form, daſs jene Entäuſserung des Daseyns, indem sie sich, im Tode nemlich, vollendet, selbſt eine seyende, nicht eine ins Bewuſstseyn zurückkehrende ist, — daſs dieſes sie nicht überlebt, und an und für sich ist, sondern nur ins unverſöhnte Gegentheil übergeht. Die wahre Aufopferung des Fürsichseyns ist daher allein die, worin es sich so vollkommen als im Tode hingibt, aber in dieser Entäuſserung sich ebensosehr erhält; es wird dadurch als das wirklich, was es an sich ist, als die identische Einheit seiner selbſt und seiner als des Entgegengesetzten. Dadurch daſs der abgeſchiedne innre Geiſt, das Selbſt als solches, hervortritt und sich entfremdet, wird zugleich die Staatsmacht zu eignem Selbst erhoben; so wie ohne dieſe Entfremdung die Handlungen der Ehre, des edeln Bewuſstseyns und die Rathschläge seiner Einsicht das Zweydeutige bleiben würden, das noch jenen abgeſchiednen Hinterhalt der beſondern Absicht und des Eigenwillens hätte.

508 Diese Entfremdung aber geschieht allein in der Sprache, welche hier in ihrer eigenthümlichen 1807 453 Bedeutung auftritt. — In der Welt der Sittlichkeit, Gesetz und Befehl, — in der Welt der Wirklichkeit, erst Rath, hat sie das Wesen zum Inhalte, und ist deſſen Form; hier aber erhält sie die Form, welche sie ist, selbst zum Inhalte, und gilt als Sprache; es ist die Krafft des Sprechens, als eines solchen, welche das ausführt, was auszuführen ist. Denn sie ist das Daseyn des reinen Selbsts, als Selbsts; in ihr tritt die für sichseyende Einzelnheit des Selbstbewuſstseyns als solche in die Existenz, so daſs sie für andre ist. Ich als dieses reine Ich ist sonſt nicht da; in jeder andern Aeuſserung ist es in eine Wirklichkeit verſenkt, und in einer Geſtalt, aus welcher es sich zurückziehen kann; es ist aus seiner Handlung, wie aus seinem physiognomischen Ausdrucke in sich reflectirt, und läſst solches unvollſtändiges Daseyn, worin immer ebensosehr zu viel als zu wenig ist, entseelt liegen. Die Sprache aber enthält es in seiner Reinheit, sie allein spricht Ich aus, es selbſt. Diſs sein Daseyn ist als Daseyn eine Gegenſtändlichkeit, welche seine wahre Natur an ihr hat. Ich ist dieses Ich — aber ebenso allgemeines; sein Erscheinen ist ebenso unmittelbar die Entäuſserung und das Verschwinden dieses Ichs, und dadurch sein Bleiben in seiner Allgemeinheit. Ich, das sich ausspricht, ist vernommen; es ist eine Anſteckung, worin es unmittelbar in die Einheit mit denen, für welche es da ist, übergegangen und allgemeines Selbstbewuſstseyn ist. — Daſs es vernommen wird, darin ist sein 1807 454 Daseyn selbſt unmittelbar verhallt; diſs sein Andersseyn ist in sich zurückgenommen; und eben diſs ist sein Daseyn, als selbſtbewuſstes Jetzt, wie es da ist, nicht da zu seyn, und durch diſs Verschwinden da zu seyn. Diſs Verſchwinden ist also selbst unmittelbar sein Bleiben; es ist sein eignes Wissen von sich, und sein Wissen von sich als einem, das in anderes Selbst übergegangen, das vernommen worden und allgemeines ist.

509 Der Geist erhält hier dieſe Wirklichkeit, weil die Extreme, deren Einheit er ist, ebenso unmittelbar die Beſtimmung haben, für sich eigne Wirklichkeiten zu seyn. Ihre Einheit ist zerſetzt in spröde Seiten, deren jede für die andre wirklicher von ihr ausgeſchloſſener Gegenſtand ist. Die Einheit tritt daher als eine Mitte hervor, welche von der abgeschiedenen Wirklichkeit der Seiten ausgeſchloſſen und unterschieden wird; sie hat daher selbſt eine wirkliche von ihren Seiten unterschiedne Gegenſtändlichkeit, und ist für sie, d. h. sie ist daseyendes. Die geistige Substanz tritt als solche in die Exiſtenz, erst indem sie zu ihren Seiten solche Selbstbewuſstseyn gewonnen hat, welche dieſes reine Selbst als unmittelbar geltende Wirklichkeit wiſſen, und darin ebenso unmittelbar wiſſen, diſs nur durch die entfremdende Vermittlung zu seyn. Durch jenes sind die Momente zu der sich selbſt wiſſenden Kategorie und damit bis dahin geläutert, daſs sie Momente des Geiſtes sind; durch dieſes tritt er als Geiſtigkeit in 1807 455 das Daseyn. — Er ist so die Mitte, welche jene Extreme vorausſetzt, und durch ihr Daseyn erzeugt wird, — aber ebenſo das zwiſchen ihnen hervorbrechende geistige Ganze, das sich in sie entzweyt und jedes erſt durch dieſe Berührung zum Ganzen in seinem Principe erzeugt. — Daſs die beyden Extreme schon an sich aufgehoben und zerſetzt sind, bringt ihre Einheit hervor, und dieſe ist die Bewegung, welche beyde zuſammenſchlieſst, ihre Beſtimmungen austauſcht, und sie, und zwar in jedem Extreme zuſammenſchlieſst. Dieſe Vermittlung ſetzt hiemit den Begriff eines jeden der beyden Extreme in seine Wirklichkeit, oder sie macht das, was jedes an sich ist, zu seinem Geiste.

510 Die beyden Extreme, die Staatsmacht und das edelmüthige Bewuſstseyn, sind durch dieſes zerſetzt, jene in das abſtracte Allgemeine, dem gehorcht wird, und in den fürsichſeyenden Willen, welcher ihm aber noch nicht selbst zukömmt; — dieſes in den Gehorsam des aufgehobnen Daſeyns oder in das Ansichseyn der Selbſtachtung und der Ehre, — und in das noch nicht aufgehobene reine Fürsichſeyn, den im Hinterhalte noch bleibenden Willen. Die beyden Momente, zu welchen beyde Seiten gereinigt, und die daher Momente der Sprache sind, sind das abstracte Allgemeine, welches das allgemeine Beſte heiſst, und in das reine Selbst, das im Dienſte seinem ins vielfache Daſeyn verſenkten Bewuſstseyn abſagte. Beyde sind im Begriffe daſſelbe, denn reines 1807 456 Selbſt ist eben das abſtract allgemeine, und daher ist ihre Einheit als ihre Mitte geſetzt. Aber das Selbst ist nur erst am Extreme des Bewuſstseyns wirklich, — das Ansich aber erst am Extreme der Staatsmacht; dem Bewuſstseyn fehlt diſs, daſs die Staatsmacht nicht nur als Ehre, sondern wirklich an es übergegangen wäre, — der Staatsmacht, daſs ihr nicht nur als dem sogenannten allgemeinen Besten gehorcht würde, sondern als Willen, oder daſs sie das entscheidende Selbst ist. Die Einheit des Begriffes, in welchem die Staatsmacht noch steht, und zu dem das Bewuſstseyn sich geläutert hat, wird in dieſer vermittelnden Bewegung wirklich, deren einfaches Daſeyn, als Mitte, die Sprache ist. — Sie hat jedoch zu ihren Seiten noch nicht zwey als Selbst vorhandene Selbst; denn die Staatsmacht wird erst zum Selbst begeiſtet; dieſe Sprache ist daher noch nicht der Geist, wie er sich vollkommen weiſs und ausſpricht.

511 Das edelmüthige Bewuſstseyn, weil es das Extrem des Selbsts ist, erſcheint als dasjenige, von dem die Sprache ausgeht, durch welche sich die Seiten des Verhältniſſes zu beſeelten Ganzen geſtalten. — Der Heroismus des stummen Dienſtes wird zum Heroismus der Schmeicheley. Dieſe ſprechende Reflexion des Dienſtes macht die geiſtige sich zerſetzende Mitte aus, und reflectirt nicht nur ihr eigenes Extrem in sich ſelbſt, sondern auch das Extrem der allgemeinen Gewalt in dieſes ſelbſt zurück, und macht 1807 457 sie, die erſt an sich ist, zum fürsichseyn und zur Einzelnheit des Selbstbewuſstseyns. Es wird hiedurch der Geiſt dieſer Macht, — ein unumschränkter Monarch zu seyn; — unumschränkt, die Sprache der Schmeicheley erhebt die Macht in ihre geläuterte Allgemeinheit; — das Moment als Erzeugniſs der Sprache, des zum Geiſte geläuterten Daſeyns, ist eine gereinigte Sichselbſtgleichheit; — Monarch, sie erhebt ebenso die Einzelnheit auf ihrer Spitze; dasjenige, dessen das edelmüthige Bewuſstseyn sich nach dieſer Seite der einfachen geiſtigen Einheit entäuſſert, ist das reine Ansich seines Denkens, sein Ich ſelbſt. Beſtimmter erhebt sie die Einzelnheit, die ſonſt nur ein Gemeyntes iſt, dadurch in ihre daſeyende Reinheit, daſs sie dem Monarchen den eignen Nahmen gibt; denn es ist allein der Nahme, worin der Unterschied des Einzelnen von allen andern nicht gemeynt ist, sondern von allen wirklich gemacht wird; in dem Nahmen gilt der Einzelne als rein Einzelner nicht mehr nur in seinem Bewuſstseyn, sondern im Bewuſstseyn Aller. Durch ihn alſo wird der Monarch ſchlechthin von Allen abgesondert, ausgenommen und einſam; in ihm ist er das Atom, das von seinem Wesen nichts mittheilen kann und nicht ſeines Gleichen hat. — Dieſer Nahme ist hiemit die Reflexion in sich oder die Wirklichkeit, welche die allgemeine Macht an ihr selbst hat; durch ihn ist sie der Monarch. Er, dieser Einzelne, weiſs umgekehrt dadurch sich diesen Einzelnen 1807 458 als die allgemeine Macht, daſs die Edeln, nicht nur als zum Dienſt der Staatsmacht bereit, sondern als Zierrathen sich um den Thron ſtellen, und daſs sie dem, der darauf sitzt, es immer sagen, was er ist.

512 Die Sprache ihres Preiſses ist auf diese Weiſe der Geiſt, der in der Staatsmacht selbst die beyden Extreme zuſammenschlieſst; sie reflectirt die abſtracte Macht in sich und gibt ihr das Moment des andern Extrems, das wollende und entſcheidende fürsichseyn, und hiedurch selbſtbewuſste Exiſtenz; oder dadurch kommt diſs einzelne wirkliche Selbstbewuſstseyn dazu, sich als die Macht gewiſs zu wissen. Sie ist der Punkt der Selbsts, in den durch die Entäuſserung der innern Gewiſsheit die vielen Punkte zusammengefloſſen sind. — Indem aber dieser eigne Geiſt der Staatsmacht darin beſteht, seine Wirklichkeit und Nahrung an dem Opfer des Thuns und des Denkens des edelmüthigen Bewuſstseyns zu haben, ist sie die sich entfremdete Selbstſtändigkeit; das edelmüthige Bewuſstseyn, das Extrem des fürsichseyns erhält das Extrem der wirklichen Allgemeinheit für die Allgemeinheit des Denkens, der es sich entäuſſerte, zurück; die Macht des Staats ist auf es übergegangen. An ihm wird die Staatsgewalt erſt wahrhaft bethätigt; in seinem Fürsichseyn hört sie auf, das träge Wesen, wie sie als Extrem des abstracten Ansichseyns erschien, zu seyn. — An sich betrachtet heiſst die in sich reflectirte Staatsmacht, oder diſs, daſs sie Geiſt geworden, nichts anderes, 1807 459 als daſs sie Moment des Selbstbewuſstseyns geworden, d. h. nur als aufgehobne ist. Hiemit ist sie nun das Wesen als ein solches, dessen Geist es ist, aufgeopfert und preiſsgegeben zu seyn, oder sie existirt als Reichthum. — Sie bleibt zwar dem Reichthume, zu welchem sie dem Begriffe nach immer wird, gegenüber zugleich als eine Wirklichkeit bestehen; aber eine solche, deren Begriff eben diese Bewegung ist, durch den Dienſt und die Verehrung, wodurch sie wird, in ihr Gegentheil, in die Entäuſſerung der Macht, überzugehen. Für sich wird also das eigenthümliche Selbst, das ihr Willen ist, durch die Wegwerfung des edelmüthigen Bewuſstseyns, zur sich entäuſſernden Allgemeinheit, zu einer vollkommnen Einzelnheit und Zufälligkeit, die jedem mächtigern Willen preiſsgegeben ist; was ihm an allgemein anerkannter und nicht mittheilbarer Selbstständigkeit bleibt, ist der leere Nahmen.

513 Wenn also das edelmüthige Bewuſstseyn sich als dasjenige beſtimmte, welches sich auf die allgemeine Macht auf eine gleiche Weise bezöge, so ist die Wahrheit deſſelben vielmehr, in seinem Dienſte sein eignes Fürsichseyn sich zu behalten, in der eigentlichen Entſagung seiner Persönlichkeit aber das wirkliche Aufheben und Zerreiſſen der allgemeinen Subſtanz zu seyn. Sein Geiſt ist das Verhältniſs der völligen Ungleichheit, einerseits in seiner Ehre seinen Willen zu behalten; andererseits in dem Aufgeben deſſelben theils seines Innern sich zu 1807 460 entfremden, und zur höchſten Ungleichheit mit sie selbſt zu werden, theils die allgemeine Subſtanz darin sich zu unterwerfen und diese sich selbſt völlig ungleich zu machen. — Es erhellt, daſs damit seine Beſtimmtheit, die es im Urtheile gegen das hatte, welches niederträchtiges Bewuſstseyn hieſs, und hiedurch auch dieſes verschwunden ist. Das letztere hat seinen Zweck erreicht, nemlich die allgemeine Macht unter das Fürsichseyn zu bringen.

514 So durch die allgemeine Macht bereichert, exiſtirt das Selbstbewuſstseyn als die allgemeine Wohlthat, oder sie ist der Reichthum, der sellbſt wieder Gegenſtand für das Bewuſstseyn ist. Denn er ist dieſem das zwar unterworfne Allgemeine, das aber durch diſs erſte Aufheben, noch nicht abſolut in das Selbſt zurückgegangen ist. — Das Selbst hat noch nicht sich als Selbst, sondern das aufgehobne allgemeine Wesen zum Gegenſtande. Indem dieſer erſt geworden, ist die unmittelbare Beziehung des Bewuſstseyns auf ihn geſetzt das also noch nicht seine Ungleichheit mit ihm dargeſtellt hat; es ist das edelmüthige Bewuſstseyn, welches an dem unweſentlich gewordenen Allgemeinen sein Fürsichseyn erhält, daher ihn anerkennt und gegen den Wohlthäter dankbar ist.

515 Der Reichthum hat an ihm selbst schon das Moment des Fürsichseyns. Er ist nicht das selbstlose Allgemeine der Staatsmacht, oder die unbefangene unorganische Natur des Geistes, sondern sie, 1807 461 wie sie durch den Willen an ihr selbst feſthält gegen den, der sich ihrer zum Genuſs bemächtigen will. Aber indem der Reichthum nur die Form des Wesens hat, ist diſs einseitige Fürsichseyn, das nicht an sich, sondern vielmehr das aufgehobne Ansich ist, die in seinem Genuſse wesenlose Rückkehr des Individuums in sich selbſt. Er bedarf also selbst der Belebung; und die Bewegung seiner Reflexion beſteht darin, daſs er, der nur für sich ist, zum An und Fürsichseyn, daſs er, der das aufgehobene Wesen ist, zum Wesen werde; so erhält er seinen eigenen Geiſt an ihm selbst. — Da vorhin die Form dieſer Bewegung auseinandergeſetzt worden, so ist es hinreichend, hier den Inhalt derſelben zu beſtimmen.

516 Das edelmüthige Bewuſstseyn bezieht sich also hier nicht auf den Gegenſtand als Wesen überhaupt, sondern es ist das Fürsichseyn selbſt, das ihm ein Fremdes ist; es findet sein Selbſt als solches entfremdet vor, als eine gegenſtändliche feſte Wirklichkeit, die es von einem andern feſten Fürsichseyn zu empfangen hat. Sein Gegenſtand ist das Fürsichseyn; also das seinige; aber dadurch, daſs es Gegenſtand ist, ist es zugleich unmittelbar eine fremde Wirklichkeit, welche eigenes Fürsichseyn, eigner Willen ist, das heiſst, es sieht sein Selbst in der Gewalt eines fremden Willens, von dem es ab, hängt, ob er ihm daſſelbe ablaſſen will.

1807 462

517 Von jeder einzelnen Seite kann das Selbstbewuſstseyn abſtrahiren, und behält darum in einer Verbindlichkeit, die eine ſolche betrifft, sein Anerkanntseyn und Ansichgelten als für sich seyenden Weſens. Hier aber sieht es sich von der Seite seiner reinen eigenſten Wirklichkeit, oder seines Ichs auſſer sich und einem Andern angehörig, sieht seine Persönlichkeit als solche abhängig von der zufälligen Perſönlichkeit eines andern, von dem Zufall eines Augenbliks, einer Willkühr oder ſonſt des gleichgültigſten Umſtandes. — Im Rechtszuſtande erscheint, was in der Gewalt des gegenſtändlichen Wesens ist, als ein zufalliger Inhalt, von dem abſtrahirt werden kann, und die Gewalt betrifft nicht das Selbst als solches, sondern dieſes ist vielmehr anerkannt. Allein hier sieht es die Gewiſsheit seiner als solche das weſenloseſte, die reine Persönlichkeit abſolute Unpersönlichkeit zu seyn. Der Geiſt seines Dankes ist daher das Gefühl wie dieſer tiefſten Verworfenheit so auch der tiefſten Empörung. Indem das reine Ich selbſt sich auſſer sich und zerriſſen anschaut, ist in dieser Zerriſſenheit zugleich alles, was Continuität und Allgemeinheit hat, was Gesetz, gut und recht heiſst, auseinander und zu Grunde gegangen; alles gleiche ist aufgelöſt, denn die reinste Ungleichheit, die absolute Unwesentlichkeit des absolut weſentlichen, das auſſer sich seyn des Fürsichseyns ist vorhanden; das reine Ich selbſt ist absolut zersetzt.

1807 463

518 Wenn alſo von dem Reichthum diſs Bewuſstseyn wohl die Gegenſtändlichkeit des Fürsichseyns zurückerhält und sie aufhebt, so ist es nicht nur seinem Begriffe nach; wie die vorhergehende Reflexion nicht vollendet, sondern für es selbſt unbefriedigt; die Reflexion, da das Selbſt sich als ein gegenſtändliches empfängt, ist der unmittelbare Widerspruch im reinen Ich selbſt gesetzt. Als Selbſt ſteht es aber zugleich unmittelbar über dieſem Widerspruche, ist die absolute Elaſticität, welche diſs äufgehoben seyn des Selbſts wieder aufhebt, diese Verworfenheit, daſs ihm sein fürsichseyn als ein fremdes werde, verwirft, und gegen diſs Empfangen seiner selbſt empört, im Empfangen selbſt für sich iſt.

519 Indem also das Verhältniſs dieses Bewuſstseyns mit dieser absoluten Zerriſſenheit verknüpft ist, fällt in seinem Geiſte der Unterschied deſſelben, als edelmüthiges gegen das niederträchtige beſtimmt zu seyn, hinweg, und beyde sind daſſelbe. — Der Geiſt des wohlthuenden Reichthums kann ferner von dem Geiſte des die Wohlthat empfangenden Bewuſstseyns unterschieden werden, und ist besonders zu betrachten. — Er war das wesenlose Fürsichseyn, das preiſsgegebne Wesen. Durch seine Mittheilung aber wird er zum Ansich; indem er seine Beſtimmung erfüllte, sich aufzuopfern, hebt er die Einzelnheit, für sich nur zu genieſſen, auf, und als aufgehobne Einzelnheit ist er Allgemeinheit oder Wesen. — Was er mittheilt, was er Andern gibt, ist das Fürsichseyn. Er 1807 464 gibt sich aber nicht hin als eine selbstlose Natur, als die unbefangen sich preiſsgebende Bedingung des Lebens, sondern als selbſtbewuſstes, sich für sich haltendes Wesen: er ist nicht die unorganische Macht des Elements, welche von dem empfangenden Bewuſstseyn als an sich vergänglich gewuſst wird, sondern die Macht über das Selbſt, die sich unabhängig und willkührlich weiſs, und die zugleich weiſs, daſs was sie ausſpendet, das Selbſt eines Andern ist. — Der Reichthum theilt also mit dem Klienten die Verworfenheit, aber an die Stelle der Empörung tritt der Uebermuth. Denn er weiſs nach der einen Seite, wie der Klient, das Fürsichseyn als ein zufälliges Ding; aber er selbſt ist diese Zufälligkeit, in deren Gewalt die Persönlichkeit steht. In diesem Uebermuthe, der durch eine Mahlzeit ein fremdes Ichselbſt erhalten, und sich dadurch die Unterwerfung von deſſen innerſtem Wesen erworben zu haben meynt, übersieht er die innere Empörung des andern; er übersieht die vollkommene Abwerfung aller Feſſel, diese reine Zerriſſenheit, welcher, indem ihr die Sichselbſtgleichheit des Fürsichseyns schlechthin ungleich geworden, alles Gleiche, alles Beſtehen zerriſſen ist, und die daher die Meynung und Ansicht des Wohlthäters an meiſten zerreiſst. Er ſteht unmittelbar vor diesem innerſten Abgrunde, vor dieser bodenlosen Tiefe, worinn aller Halt und Subſtanz verschwunden ist; und er sieht in dieser Tiefe nichts als ein gemeines Ding, ein Spiel seiner 1807 465 Laune, einen Zufall seiner Willkühr; ſein Geiſt ist die ganz wesenlose Meynung, die geiſtverlaſſne Oberfläche zu seyn.

520 Wie das Selbstbewuſstseyn gegen die Staatsmacht seine Sprache hatte, oder der Geiſt zwischen diesen Extremen als wirkliche Mitte hervortrat, so hat es auch Sprache gegen den Reichthum, noch mehr aber hat seine Empörung ihre Sprache. Jene, welche dem Reichthum das Bewuſstseyn seiner Wesenheit gibt, und sich seiner dadurch bemächtigt, ist gleichfalls die Sprache der Schmeicheley, aber der unedeln; — denn was sie als Wesen ausſpricht, weiſs sie als das preiſsgegebne, das nicht an sich seyende Wesen. Die Sprache der Schmeicheley aber ist, wie vorhin schon erinnert, der noch einseitige Geist. Denn seine Momente sind zwar das durch die Bildung des Dienſtes zur reinen Exiſtenz geläuterte Selbſt, und das Ansichseyn der Macht. Allein der reine Begriff, in welchem das einfache Selbſt und das Ansich, jenes reine Ich und diſs reine Weſen oder Denken daſſelbe sind, — dieſe Einheit beyder Seiten, zwischen welchen die Wechselwirkung ſtatt findet, ist nicht in dem Bewuſstseyn dieſer Sprache; der Gegenſtand ist ihm noch das Ansich im Gegenſatze gegen das Selbſt; oder der Gegenſtand ist ihm nicht zugleich sein eignes Selbst als solches. — Die Sprache der Zerriſſenheit aber ist die vollkommne Sprache und der wahre exiſtirende Geiſt dieſer ganzen Welt der Bildung. Diſs Selbstbewuſstseyn, dem 1807 466 die seine Verworfenheit verwerfende Empörung zukömmt, ist unmittelbar die absolute Sichselbſtgleichheit in der absoluten Zerriſſenheit, die reine Vermittlung des reinen Selbstbewuſstseyns mit sich selbſt. Es ist die Gleichheit des identischen Urtheils, worin eine und dieſelbe Perſönlichkeit ſowohl Subject als Pradicat ist. Aber diſs identische Urtheil ist zugleich das unendliche; denn diese Perſönlichkeit ist absolut entzweyt, und Subject und Prädicat schlechthin gleichgültige Seyende, die einander nichts angehen, ohne nothwendige Einheit, sogar daſs jedes die Macht einer eignen Perſönlichkeit ist. Das Fürsichseyn hat sein Fürsichseyn zum Gegenſtande, als ein schlechthin Anderes und zugleich ebenso unmittelbar als sich selbſt, — sich als ein Anderes, nicht daſs dieſes einen andern Inhalt hätte, sondern der Inhalt ist daſſelbe Selbſt in der Form absoluter Entgegensetzung und vollkommen eignen gleichgültigen Daſeyns. — Es ist alſo hier der seiner in seiner Wahrheit und seines Begriffes bewuſste Geiſt dieſer realen Welt der Bildung vorhanden.

521 Er ist dieſe abſolute und allgemeine Verkehrung und Entfremdung der Wirklichkeit und des Gedankens; die reine Bildung. Was in dieſer Welt erfahren wird, ist, daſs weder die wirklichen Wesen der Macht und des Reichthums, — noch ihre beſtimmten Begriffe, Gut und Schlecht, oder das Bewuſstseyn des Guten und Schlechten, das edelmüthige und niederträchtige Wahrheit haben; sondern alle dieſe 1807 467 Momente verkehren sich vielmehr eins im Andern, und jedes ist das Gegentheil seiner selbſt. — Die allgemeine Macht, welche die Subſtanz ist, indem sie durch das Princip der Individualität zur eigenen Geiſtigkeit gelangt, empfängt das eigne Selbſt nur als den Nahmen an ihr, und ist, indem sie wirkliche Macht ist, vielmehr das unmächtige Wesen, das sich selbst aufopfert. — Aber diſs preiſsgegebene selbstlose Wesen, oder das zum Dinge gewordne Selbſt ist vielmehr die Rückkehr des Wesens in sich selbſt; es ist das fürsichseyende Fürsichseyn, die Existenz des Geiſtes. — Die Gedanken dieser Wesen, des Guten und Schlechten verkehren sich ebenso in dieſer Bewegung; was als gut beſtimmt ist, ist schlecht; was als schlecht, ist gut. Das Bewuſstseyn eines jeden dieſer Momente als das edle und niederträchtige Bewuſstseyn beurtheilt, sind in ihrer Wahrheit vielmehr ebensosehr das verkehrte deſſen, was diese Beſtimmungen seyn sollen, das edelmüthige ebenso niederträchtig und verworfen, als die Verworfenheit zum Adel der gebildesten Freyheit des Selbstbewuſstseyns umschlägt. — Alles ist ebenso, formell betrachtet, nach auſſen das verkehrte deſſen, was es für sich ist; und wieder was es für sich ist, ist es nicht in Wahrheit, sondern etwas anderes als es seyn will, das Fürsichseyn vielmehr der Verluſt seiner selbſt, und die Entfremdung seiner vielmehr die Selbſterhaltung. — Was vorhanden ist, ist also diſs, daſs alle Momente eine allgemeine Gerechtigkeit 1807 468 gegen einander ausüben, jedes ebensosehr an sich selbſt sich entfremdet, als es sich in sein Gegentheil einbildet und es auf diese Weise verkehrt. — Der wahre Geist aber ist eben dieſe Einheit der abſolut getrennten, und zwar kommt er eben durch die freye Wirklichkeit dieſer selbſtlosen Extreme selbſt als ihre Mitte zur Exiſtenz. Sein Daseyn ist das allgemeine Sprechen und zerreiſſende Urtheilen, welchem alle jene Momente, die als Wesen und wirkliche Glieder des Ganzen gelten sollen, sich auflöſen, und welches ebenso diſs sich auflösende Spiel mit sich selbſt iſt. Diſs Urtheilen und Sprechen ist daher das Wahre und Unbezwingbare, während es alles überwältigt; dasjenige, um welches es in dieser realen Welt allein wahrhafft zu thun ist. Jeder Theil dieſer Welt kommt darin dazu, daſs sein Geiſt ausgesprochen, oder daſs mit Geiſt von ihm gesprochen und von ihm geſagt wird, was er ist. — Das ehrliche Bewuſstseyn nimmt jedes Moment als eine bleibende Wesenheit und ist die ungebildete Gedankenlosigkeit nicht zu wiſſen, daſs es ebenso das verkehrte thut. Das zerriſſene Bewuſstseyn aber ist das Bewuſstseyn der Verkehrung, und zwar der absoluten Verkehrung; der Begriff ist das herrſchende in ihm, der die Gedanken zusammenbringt, welche der Ehrlichkeit weit auseinander liegen, und deſſen Sprache daher geiſtreich ist.

522 Der Inhalt der Rede des Geiſtes von und über sich selbſt ist also die Verkehrung aller Begriffe und 1807 469 Realitäten, der allgemeine Betrug seiner selbſt und der andern, und die Schamlosigkeit, dieſen Betrug zu ſagen, ist ebendarum die gröſste Wahrheit. Dieſe Rede ist die Verrüktheit des Musikers, „der dreiſsig Arien, italienische, französiſche, tragische, komische, von aller Art Charakter, häuffte und vermischte; bald mit einem tiefen Baſſe ſtieg er bis in die Hölle, dann zog er die Kehle zuſammen, und mit einem Fiſtelton zerriſs er die Höhe der Lüffte, wechſelsweiſe raſend, beſänftigt, gebieterisch und ſpöttisch.” — Dem ruhigen Bewuſstseyn, das ehrlicherweise die Melodie des Guten und Wahren in die Gleichheit der Töne, d. h. in Eine Note ſetzt, erſcheint dieſe Rede als „eine Faſeley von Weisheit und Tollheit, als ein Gemische von eben soviel Geſchik als Niedrigkeit, von ebenso richtigen als falſchen Ideen, von einer so völligen Verkehrtheit der Empfindung, so vollkommener Schändlichkeit, als gänzlicher Offenheit und Wahrheit. Es wird es nicht versagen können, in alle diese Töne einzugehen, und die ganze Scale der Gefühle von der tiefſten Verachtung und Verwerfung bis zur höchſten Bewunderung und Rührung auf und nieder zu lauffen; in dieſe wird ein lächerlicher Zug verſchmolzen seyn, der ihnen ihre Natur benimmt;” jene werden an ihrer Offenheit selbſt einen verſöhnenden, an ihrer erschütternden Tiefe den allgewaltigen Zug haben, der den Geiſt sich selbſt gibt.

1807 470

523 Betrachten wir der Rede dieser sich selbſt klaren Verwirrung gegenüber die Rede jenes einfachen Bewuſstseyns des Wahren und Guten, so kann sie gegen die offene und ihrer bewuſste Beredsamkeit des Geiſtes der Bildung nur einsylbig seyn; denn es kann diesem nichts ſagen, was er nicht selbſt weiſs und sagt. Geht es über seine Einsylbigkeit hinaus, so ſagt es daher daſſelbe, was er ausſpricht, begeht aber darin noch dazu die Thorheit zu meynen, daſs es etwas neues und anderes sage. Selbſt seine Sylben, ſchändlich, niederträchtig, sind schon diese Thorheit, denn jener sagt sie von sich selbſt. Wenn dieſer Geiſt in seiner Rede alles eintönige verkehrt, weil dieſes sich gleiche nur eine Abſtraction, in seiner Wirklichkeit aber die Verkehrung an sich selbſt ist, und wenn dagegen das gerade Bewuſstseyn, das Gute und Edle, d. h. das sich in seiner Aeuſſerung gleichhaltende, auf die einzige Weise, die hier möglich ist, in Schutz nimmt, — daſs es nemlich seinen Werth nicht darum verliere, weil es an das Schlechte geknüpft oder mit ihm gemiſcht ſey; denn diſs sey seine Bedingung und Nothwendigkeit, hierin beſtehe die Weisheit der Natur; — so hat diſs Bewuſstseyn, indem es zu widerſprechen meynte, damit nur den Inhalt der Rede des Geistes in eine triviale Weiſe zusammengefaſst, welche gedankenlos, indem sie das Gegentheil des Edeln und Guten zur Bedingung und Nothwendigkeit des Edeln und Guten macht, etwas anderes zu sagen meynt, als diſs, daſs das Edel und 1807 471 Gut genannte in seinem Wesen das Verkehrte seiner selbſt, so wie das Schlechte umgekehrt das Vortreffliche ist.

524 Ersetzt das einfache Bewuſstseyn diesen geistlosen Gedanken durch die Wirklichkeit des Vortrefflichen, indem es daſſelbe in dem Beyspiele eines fingirten Falles, oder auch einer wahren Anekdote aufführt, und so zeigt, daſs es kein leerer Nahme, sondern vorhanden ist, so ſteht die allgemeine Wirklichkeit des verkehrten Thuns der ganzen realen Welt entgegen, worin jenes Beyspiel alſo nur etwas ganz vereinzelntes, eine Espece ausmacht; und das Daseyn des Guten und Edeln als eine einzelne Anekdote, sie sey fingirt oder wahr, darſtellen, ist das bitterſte, was von ihm gesagt werden kann. — Fordert das einfache Bewuſstseyn endlich die Auflöſung dieſer ganzen Welt der Verkehrung, so kann es nicht an das Individuum die Entfernung aus ihr fodern, denn Diogenes im Faſſe ist durch sie bedingt, und die Foderung an den Einzelnen ist gerade das, was für das Schlechte gilt, nemlich für sich als einzelnen zu sorgen. An die allgemeine Individualität aber gerichtet kann die Foderung dieſer Entfernung nicht die Bedeutung haben, daſs die Vernunft das geistige gebildete Bewuſstseyn, zu dem sie gekommen ist, wieder aufgebe, den ausgebreiteten Reichthum ihrer Momente in die Einfachheit des natürlichen Herzens zurückverſenke, und in die Wildniſs und Nähe des thierischen Bewuſstseyns, welche 1807 472 Natur, auch Unschuld genannt wird, zurückfalle; ſondern die Foderung dieſer Auflösung kann nur an den Geist der Bildung selbst gehen, daſs er aus ſeiner Verwirrung als Geist zu sich zurückkehre, und ein noch höheres Bewuſstseyn gewinne.

525 In der That aber hat der Geist diſs schon an sich vollbracht. Die ihrer selbſtbewuſste und sich ausſprechende Zerriſſenheit des Bewuſstseyns ist das Hohngelächter über das Daseyn so wie über die Verwirrung des Ganzen und über sich selbſt; es ist zugleich das sich noch vernehmende Verklingen dieser ganzen Verwirrung. — Dieſe sich selbſt vernehmende Eitelkeit aller Wirklichkeit, und alles beſtimmten Begrifſs, ist die gedoppelte Reflexion der realen Welt in sich selbſt; einmal in diesem Selbst des Bewuſstseyns, als diesem, das andermal in der reinen Allgemeinheit deſſelben oder im Denken. Nach jener Seite hat der zu sich gekommene Geiſt den Blick in die Welt der Wirklichkeit hineingerichtet, und sie noch zu seinem Zwecke und unmittelbaren Inhalt; nach der andern aber ist sein Blick theils nur in sich und negativ gegen sie, theils von ihn weg gen Himmel gewendet und das Jenseits derselben sein Gegenſtand.

526 In jener Seite der Rükkehr in das Selbst ist die Eitelkeit aller Dinge seine eigene Eitelkeit, oder es ist eitel. Es ist das fürsichseyende Selbst, das alles nicht nur zu beurtheilen und zu beschwatzen, sondern geiſtreich die feſten Wesen der Wirklichkeit 1807 473 wie die feſten Beſtimmungen, die das Urtheil setzt, in ihrem Widerspruche zu sagen weiſs, und dieſer Widerspruch ist ihre Wahrheit. — Nach der Form betrachtet, weiſs es Alles sich ſelbſt entfremdet; das Fürsichseyn vom Ansichseyn getrennt; das Gemeynte und den Zweck von der Wahrheit; und von beyden wieder das Seyn für anderes, das Vorgegebne von der eigentlichen Meynung und der wahren Sache und Absicht. — Es weiſs also jedes Moment gegen das andere, überhaupt die Verkehrung Aller, richtig auszusprechen, es weiſs beſſer, was jedes ist, als es ist, es sey beſtimmt wie es wolle. Indem es das Subſtantielle nach der Seite der Uneinigkeit und des Widerſtreits, den es in sich einigt, aber nicht nach der Seite dieser Einigkeit kennt, verſteht es das Subſtantielle sehr gut zu beurtheilen, aber hat die Fähigkeit verloren es zu faſſen. — Dieſe Eitelkeit bedarf dabey der Eitelkeit aller Dinge, um aus ihnen sich das Bewuſstseyn des Selbſts zu geben, erzeugt sie daher ſelbſt, und ist die Seele, welche sie trägt. Macht und Reichthum sind die höchsten Zwecke ſeiner Anſtrengung, es weiſs, daſs es durch Entsagung und Aufopferung sich zum Allgemeinen bildet, zum Besitze deſſelben gelangt, und in diesem Besitze allgemeine Gültigkeit hat; sie sind die wirklichen anerkannten Mächte. Aber dieſes sein Gelten ist selbſt eitel, und eben indem es sich ihrer bemächtigt, weiſs es sie nicht Selbſtweſen zu ſeyn, sondern vielmehr sich als ihre Macht, sie aber als eitel. Daſs es so in 1807 474 ihrem Besitze selbſt daraus heraus ist, ſtellt es in der geiſtreichen Sprache dar, die daher sein höchstes Intereſſe und die Wahrheit des Ganzen ist; in ihr wird dieses Selbſt, als diſs reine nicht den wirklichen noch gedachten Beſtimmungen angehörige Selbſt, sich zum geiſtigen, wahrhafft allgemeingültigen. Es ist die sich selbſt zerreiſſende Natur aller Verhältniſſe und das bewuſste Zerreiſſen derselben; nur als empörtes Selbstbewuſstseyn aber weiſs es seine eigne Zerriſſenheit, und in dieſem Wiſſen derselben hat es sich unmittelbar darüber erhoben. In jener Eitelkeit wird aller Inhalt zu einem negativen, welches nicht mehr positiv gefaſst werden kann; der positive Gegenſtand ist nur das reine Ich selbſt, und das zerriſſne Bewuſstseyn ist an sich dieſe reine Sichſelbſtgleichheit des zu sich zurückgekommnen Selbstbewuſstseyns.

b. Der Glauben und die reine Einsicht.

527 Der Geiſt der Entfremdung seiner ſelbſt hat in der Welt der Bildung sein Daseyn; aber indem dieſes Ganze sich selbſt entfremdet worden, ſteht jenseits ihrer die unwirkliche Welt des reinen Bewuſstseyns oder des Denkens. Ihr Inhalt ist das rein Gedachte, das Denken ihr abſolutes Element. Indem aber das Denken zunächſt das Element dieser Welt ist, hat das Bewuſstseyn nur dieſe Gedanken, aber 1807 475 es denkt sie noch nicht, oder weiſs nicht, daſs es Gedanken sind; sondern sie sind für es in der Form der Vorſtellung. Denn es tritt aus der Wirklichkeit in das reine Bewuſstseyn, aber es ist selbſt überhaupt noch in der Sphäre und Beſtimmtheit der Wirklichkeit. Das zerriſſne Bewuſstseyn ist an sich erſt die Sichselbſtgleichheit des reinen Bewuſstseyns, für uns, nicht für sich selbſt. Es ist alſo nur die unmittelbare noch nicht in sich vollendete Erhebung, und hat sein entgegengesetztes Princip, wodurch es bedingt ist, noch in sich, ohne durch die vermittelte Bewegung darüber Meiſter geworden zu seyn. Daher gilt ihm das Weſen seines Gedankens nicht als Wesen nur in der Form des abstracten Ansich, sondern in der Form eines gemeinwirklichen, einer Wirklichkeit, die nur in ein anderes Element erhoben worden, ohne in dieſem die Beſtimmtheit einer nicht gedachten Wirklichkeit verloren zu haben. — Es ist weſentlich von dem Ansich zu unterſcheiden, welches das Weſen des stoiſchen Bewuſstseyns ist; diesem galt nur die Form des Gedankens, als solchen, der dabey irgend einen ihm fremden, aus der Wirklichkeit genommnen Inhalt hat; jenem Bewuſstseyn ist aber nicht die Form des Gedankens das Geltende; — ebenso von dem Ansich des tugendhafften Bewuſstseyns, dem das Wesen zwar in Beziehung auf die Wirklichkeit ſteht, dem es Weſen der Wirklichkeit selbst, — aber nur erſt unwirkliches Weſen ist; — jenem Bewuſstseyn gilt es, ob zwar jenseits 1807 476 der Wirklichkeit doch wirkliches Weſen zu seyn. Ebenso hat das an sich Rechte und Gute der geſetzgebenden Vernunft und das Allgemeine des gesetzprüffenden Bewuſstseyns nicht die Beſtimmung der Wirklichkeit. — Wenn daher innerhalb der Welt der Bildung selbſt das reine Denken, als eine Seite der Entfremdung fiel, nemlich als der Maſsſtab des abſtracten Guten und Schlechten im Urtheilen, ſo ist es, hindurchgegangen durch die Bewegung des Ganzen, um das Moment der Wirklichkeit und dadurch des Inhalts bereichert worden. Dieſe Wirklichkeit des Weſens ist aber zugleich nur eine Wirklichkeit des reinen, nicht des wirklichen Bewuſstseyns; in das Element des Denkens zwar erhoben, gilt sie dieſem Bewuſstseyn noch nicht als ein Gedanke, sondern vielmehr ist sie ihm jenseits seiner eignen Wirklichkeit; denn jene ist die Flucht aus dieſer.

528 Wie hier die Religion — denn es erhellt, daſs von ihr die Rede ist, — als der Glauben der Welt der Bildung auftritt, tritt sie noch nicht auf, wie sie an und für sich ist. — Sie ist uns schon in andern Bestimmtheiten erſchienen, als unglückliches Bewuſstseyn nemlich, als Gestalt der subſtanzloſen Bewegung des Bewuſstseyns ſelbſt. — Auch an der sittlichen Subſtanz erschien sie als Glauben an die Unterwelt, aber das Bewuſstseyn des abgeschiednen Geistes ist eigentlich nicht Glauben, nicht das Weſen im Elemente des reinen Bewuſstseyns jenseits des wirklichen geſetzt, sondern er hat selbſt 1807 477 unmittelbare Gegenwart; sein Element ist die Familie. — Hier aber ist die Religion theils aus der Substanz hervorgegangen, und ist reines Bewuſstseyn derselben; theils ist diſs reine Bewuſstseyn seinem wirklichen, das Wesen seinem Daseyn entfremdet. Sie ist alſo zwar nicht mehr die ſubſtanzlose Bewegung des Bewuſstseyns, aber hat noch die Beſtimmtheit des Gegenſatzes gegen die Wirklichkeit als dieſe überhaupt, und gegen die des Selbstbewuſstseyns insbeſondere, sie ist daher wesentlich nur ein Glauben.

529 Diſs reine Bewuſstseyn des abſoluten Wesens ist ein entfremdetes. Es ist näher zu sehen, wie dasjenige sich beſtimmt, deſſen anderes es ist, und es ist nur in Verbindung mit dieſem zu betrachten. Zunächſt nemlich scheint diſs reine Bewuſstseyn nur die Welt der Wirklichkeit sich gegenüber zu haben; aber indem es die Flucht aus dieſer, und dadurch die Beſtimmtheit des Gegensatzes ist, so hat es dieſe an ihm ſelbſt; das reine Bewuſstseyn ist daher weſentlich an ihm selbſt sich entfremdet, und der Glauben macht nur eine Seite deſſelben aus. Die andre Seite ist uns zugleich schon entſtanden. Das reine Bewuſstseyn ist nemlich so die Reflexion aus der Welt der Bildung, daſs die Subſtanz derſelben, so wie die Maſſen, in welche sie sich gliedert, sich als das zeigten, was sie an sich sind, als geiſtige Weſenheiten, als abſolut unruhige Bewegungen oder Beſtimmungen, die sich unmittelbar in ihrem Gegentheil aufheben. Ihr Weſen, das einfache 1807 478 Bewuſstseyn ist alſo die Einfachheit des absoluten Unterschiedes, der unmittelbar kein Unterschied ist. Es ist hiemit das reine Fürsichseyn, nicht als dieſes Einzelnen, sondern das in sich allgemeine Selbſt als unruhige Bewegung, die das ruhige Weſen der Sache angreifft, und durchdringt. In ihm ist alſo die Gewiſsheit, welche sich selbſt unmittelbar als Wahrheit weiſs, das reine Denken, als der abſolute Begriff in der Macht seiner Negativität vorhanden, die alles gegenſtändliche, dem Bewuſstseyn gegenüberseyn sollende Wesen vertilgt, und es zu einem Seyn des Bewuſstseyns macht. — Diſs reine Bewuſstseyn ist zugleich ebenſoſehr einfach, weil eben sein Unterſchied kein Unterſchied ist. Als dieſe Form der einfachen Reflexion in sich aber ist es das Element des Glaubens, worin der Geiſt die Beſtimmtheit der poſitiven Allgemeinheit, des Anſichseyns gegen jenes Fürsichſeyn des Selbstbewuſstſeyns hat. — Aus der weſenloſen ſich nur auflöſenden Welt in sich zurück gedrängt, ist der Geiſt, nach der Wahrheit, in ungetrennter Einheit ſowohl die abſolute Bewegung und Negativität ſeines Erſcheinens, wie ihr in sich befriedigtes Weſen, und ihre poſitive Ruhe. Aber überhaupt unter der Beſtimmtheit der Entfremdung liegend, treten dieſe beyden Momente als ein gedoppeltes Bewuſstseyn auseinander. Jenes ist die reine Einsicht, als der sich im Selbſtbewuſstseyn zuſammenfaſſende geiſtige Proceſs, welcher das Bewuſstſeyn des poſitiven, die Form der Gegenſtändlichkeit 1807 479 oder des Vorſtellens sich gegenüber hat und sich dagegen richtet; ihr eigner Gegenſtand aber ist nur das reine Ich. — Das einfache Bewuſstseyn des positiven oder der ruhigen Sichſelbſtgleichheit hat hingegen das innere Wesen als Weſen zum Gegenſtande. Die reine Einsicht hat daher zunächſt an ihr ſelbſt keinen Inhalt, weil sie das negative Fürsichſeyn ist; dem Glauben dagegen gehört der Inhalt an, ohne Einsicht. Wenn jene nicht aus dem Selbſtbewuſstseyn heraustritt, so hat dieſer ſeinen Inhalt zwar ebenfalls im Element des reinen Selbſtbewuſstſeyns, aber im Denken, nicht in Begriffen, im reinen Bewuſstſeyn, nicht im reinen Selbſtbewuſstſeyn. Er ist hiemit zwar reines Bewuſstſeyn des Wesens, das heiſst, des einfachen Innern und ist alſo Denken; — das Hauptmoment in der Natur des Glaubens, das gewöhnlich überſehen wird. Die Unmittelbarkeit, mit der das Weſen in ihm ist, liegt darin, daſs sein Gegenſtand Wesen, das heiſst, reiner Gedanke ist. Dieſe Unmittelbarkeit aber, inſofern das Denken ins Bewuſstſeyn oder das reine Bewuſstſeyn in das Selbſtbewuſstseyn eintritt, erhält die Bedeutung eines gegenſtändlichen Seyns, das jenſeits des Bewuſstseyns des Selbſts liegt. Durch dieſe Bedeutung, welche die Unmittelbarkeit und Einfachheit des reinen Denkens im Bewuſstseyn erhält, ist es, daſs das Weſen des Glaubens in die Vorstellung aus dem Denken herabfällt, und zu einer überſinnlichen Welt wird, welche weſentlich ein Anders des Selbſtbewuſstseyns 1807 480 ſey. — In der reinen Einsicht hingegen hat der Uebergang des reinen Denkens ins Bewuſstſeyn die entgegengeſetzte Beſtimmung; die Gegenſtändlichkeit hat die Bedeutung eines nur negativen, sich aufhebenden und in das Selbſt zurückkehrenden Inhalts, d. h. nur das Selbſt ist sich eigentlich der Gegenſtand, oder der Gegenſtand hat nur Wahrheit, inſofern er die Form des Selbſts hat.

530 Wie der Glauben und die reine Einsicht gemeinſchafftlich dem Elemente des reinen Bewuſstſeyns angehören, so sind sie auch gemeinſchafftlich die Rückkehr aus der wirklichen Welt der Bildung. Sie bieten sich daher nach drey Seiten dar. Das einemal ist jedes auſſer allem Verhältniſſe an und für sich; das andremal bezieht jedes sich auf die wirkliche dem reinen Bewuſstseyn entgegengeſetzte Welt, und zum dritten bezieht sich jedes innerhalb des reinen Bewuſstseyns auf das andre.

531 Die Seite des an und für sich seyns im glaubenden Bewuſstseyn ist sein abſoluter Gegenſtand, deſſen Inhalt und Beſtimmung sich ergeben hat. Denn er ist nach dem Begriffe des Glaubens nichts anders als die in die Allgemeinheit des reinen Bewuſstseyns erhobne reale Welt. Die Gegliederung der letztern macht daher auch die Organiſation der erſtern aus, nur daſs die Theile in dieſer in ihrer Begeiſtung sich nicht entfremden, ſondern an und für sich seyende Weſen, in sich zurückgekehrte und bey sich ſelbſt bleibende Geiſter sind. — Die Bewegung 1807 481 ihres Uebergehens ist daher nur für uns eine Entfremdung der Beſtimmtheit, in der sie in ihrem Unterſchiede sind, und nur für uns eine nothwendige Reihe; für den Glauben aber ist ihr Unterſchied eine ruhige Verſchiedenheit, und ihre Bewegung ein Geschehen.

532 Sie nach der äuſſern Beſtimmung ihrer Form kurz zu nennen, so ist, wie in der Welt der Bildung die Staatsmacht oder das Gute das erſte war, auch hier das Erſte, das absolute Wesen, der an und für sichseyende Geiſt, inſofern er die einfache ewige Substanz ist. In der Realiſirung ihres Begriffes, Geiſt zu seyn, aber geht sie in das Seyn für anderes über; ihre Sichſelbſtgleichheit wird zum wirklichen sich aufopfernden abſoluten Weſen; es wird zum Selbſt, aber zum vergänglichen Selbſt. Daher ist das Dritte die Rükkehr dieſes entfremdeten Selbſts und der erniedrigten Substanz in ihre erſte Einfachheit, erſt auf dieſe Weiſe ist sie als Geiſt vorgeſtellt. —

533 Dieſe unterſchiednen Weſen, aus dem Wandel der wirklichen Welt durch das Denken in sich zurückgenommen, sind sie wandelloſe ewige Geiſter, deren Seyn ist, die Einheit, welche sie ausmachen, zu denken. So entrükt dem Selbstbewuſstseyn, greiffen dieſe Weſen jedoch in es ein; wäre das Wesen unverrükt in der Form der erſten einfachen Subſtanz, so bliebe es ihm fremde. Aber die Entäuſſerung dieſer Substanz und dann ihr Geiſt hat das Moment der Wirklichkeit an ihm, und macht sich hiedurch des 1807 482 glaubenden Selbstbewuſstseyns theilhafftig, oder das glaubende Bewuſstseyn gehört der realen Welt an.

534 Nach dieſem zweyten Verhältniſſe hat das glaubende Bewuſstseyn theils selbſt seine Wirklichkeit in der realen Welt der Bildung, und macht ihren Geiſt und ihr Daſeyn aus, das betrachtet worden ist; theils aber tritt es dieſer ſeiner Wirklichkeit als dem Eiteln gegenüber, und ist die Bewegung sie aufzuheben. Dieſe Bewegung beſteht nicht darin, daſs es ein geiſtreiches Bewuſstseyn über ihre Verkehrung hätte; denn es ist das einfache Bewuſstseyn, welches das Geiſtreiche zum Eiteln zählt, weil dieſes noch die reale Welt zu seinem Zwecke hat. Sondern dem ruhigen Reiche ſeines Denkens ſteht die Wirklichkeit als ein geiſtloſes Daseyn gegenüber, das daher auf eine äuſſerliche Weiſe zu überwinden ist. Dieſer Gehorſam des Dienſtes und des Preiſses bringt durch das Aufheben des sinnlichen Wiſſens und Thuns, das Bewuſstseyn der Einheit mit dem an und fürsichseyenden Wesen hervor, doch nicht als angeſchaute wirkliche Einheit, ſondern dieſer Dienſt ist nur das fortwährende Hervorbringen, das sein Ziel in der Gegenwart nicht vollkommen erreicht. Die Gemeine gelangt zwar dazu, denn sie ist das allgemeine Selbſtbewuſstſeyn; aber dem einzelnen Selbſtbewuſstseyn bleibt nothwendig das Reich des reinen Denkens ein Jenseits seiner Wirklichkeit, oder indem dieſes durch die Entäuſſerung des ewigen Wesens in die Wirklichkeit getreten, ist sie eine unbegriffne 1807 483 sinnliche Wirklichkeit; eine sinnliche Wirklichkeit aber bleibt gleichgültig gegen die andre, und das Jenseits hat nur die Bestimmung der Entfernung in Raum und Zeit noch dazu erhalten. — Der Begriff aber, die sich selbſt gegenwärtige Wirklichkeit des Geiſtes, bleibt im glaubenden Bewuſstseyn das Innre, welches Alles ist und wirkt, aber nicht selbſt hervortritt.

535 In der reinen Einsicht aber ist der Begriff das allein wirkliche; und dieſe dritte Seite des Glaubens, Gegenſtand für die reine Einsicht zu ſeyn, ist das eigentliche Verhältniſs, in welchem er hier auftritt. — Die reine Einsicht selbſt ist ebenso theils an und für sich, theils im Verhältniſſe zur wirklichen Welt, insofern sie noch positiv, nemlich als eitles Bewuſstseyn, vorhanden ist, theils endlich in jenem Verhältniſſe zum Glauben zu betrachten.

536 Was die reine Einsicht an und für sich ist, haben wir gesehen; wie der Glauben das ruhige reine Bewuſstseyn des Geistes, als des Wesens, so ist sie das Selbstbewuſstseyn deſſelben; sie weiſs das Wesen daher nicht als Wesen, sondern als absolutes Selbſt. Sie geht also darauf, alle dem Selbstbewuſstseyn andre Selbstständigkeit, es sey des Wirklichen oder Ansichseyenden, aufzuheben, und sie zum Begriffe zu machen. Sie ist nicht nur die Gewiſsheit der selbstbewuſsten Vernunft, alle Wahrheit zu seyn; sondern sie weiſs, daſs sie diſs ist.

1807 484

537 Wie aber der Begriff derselben auftritt, ist er noch nicht realisirt. Sein Bewuſstseyn erscheint hiernach noch als ein zufälliges, einzelnes, und das, was ihm das Wesen ist, als Zweck, den es zu verwirklichen hat. Es hat erst die Absicht, die reine Einsicht allgemein, das heiſst, alles, was wirklich ist, zum Begriffe, und zu einem Begriffe in allen Selbstbewuſstseyn zu machen. Die Absicht ist rein, denn sie hat die reine Einsicht zum Inhalte; und diese Einsicht ist ebenso rein, denn ihr Inhalt ist nur der absolute Begriff, der keinen Gegensatz an einem Gegenstande hat, noch an ihm selbst beschränkt istIn dem unbeschränkten Begriffe liegen unmittelbar die beyden Seiten, daſs alles gegenständliche nur die Bedeutung des fürsichseyns, des Selbstbewuſstseyns, und daſs dieses die Bedeutung eines allgemeinen habe, daſs die reine Einsicht Eigenthum aller Selbſtbewuſstseyn werde. Diese zweyte Seite der Absicht ist insofern Resultat der Bildung, als darin, wie die Unterschiede des gegenſtändlichen Geistes, die Theile und Urtheilsbestimmungen seiner Welt, so auch die Unterschiede, welche als ursprünglich beſtimmte Naturen erscheinen, zu Grunde gegangen sind. Genie, Talent, die besondern Fähigkeiten überhaupt, gehören der Welt der Wirklichkeit an, insofern sie an ihr noch die Seite hat, geistiges Thierreich zu seyn, welches in gegenseitiger Gewaltthätigkeit und Verwirrung sich um die Wesen der realen Welt bekämpft und betrügt. — Die Unterschiede haben 1807 485 in ihr zwar nicht als ehrliche Especen Platz; weder begnügt sich die Individualität mit der unwirklichen Sache selbſt, noch hat sie besondern Inhalt und eigne Zwecke. Sondern sie gilt nur als ein allgemeingültiges, nemlich als gebildetes; und der Unterschied reducirt sich auf die geringere oder gröſſere Energie; — einen Unterschied der Gröſse, d. h. den unwesentlichen. Diese letzte Verschiedenheit aber ist darin zu Grunde gegangen, daſs der Unterschied in der vollkommnen Zerriſſenheit des Bewuſstseyns zum absolutqualitativen umschlug. Was darin dem Ich das Andre ist, ist nur das Ich selbst. In diesem unendlichen Urtheile ist alle Einseitigkeit und Eigenheit des ursprünglichen Fürsichseyns getilgt; das Selbst weiſs sich als reines Selbſt sein Gegenſtand zu seyn; und diese absolute Gleichheit beyder Seiten ist das Element der reinen Einsicht. — Sie ist daher das einfache in sich ununterschiedne Wesen, und ebenso das allgemeine Werk und allgemeiner Besitz. In dieser einfachen geiſtigen Subſtanz gibt und erhält sich das Selbſtbewuſstseyn ebenso in allem Gegenſtande das Bewuſstseyn dieser seiner Einzelnheit oder des Thuns, als umgekehrt die Individualität deſſelben darin sich selbſt gleich und allgemein ist. — Diese reine Einsicht ist also der Geiſt, der allem Bewuſstseyn zurufft: seyd für euch selbſt, was ihr Alle an euch selbſt seyd, — vernünftig.

1807 486

II. Die Aufklärung.

538 Der eigenthümliche Gegenſtand, gegen welchen die reine Einsicht die Krafft des Begriffes richtet, ist der Glauben, als die ihr in demselben Elemente gegenüberſtehende Form des reinen Bewuſstseyns. Sie hat aber auch Beziehung auf die wirkliche Welt, denn sie ist wie jener, die Rückkehr aus derselben in das reine Bewuſstseyn. Es ist zuerſt zu sehen, wie ihre Thätigkeit gegen die unlautern Absichten und verkehrten Einsichten derſelben beschaffen ist.

539 Oben wurde schon des ruhigen Bewuſstseyns erwähnt, das diesem sich in sich auflösenden und wieder erzeugenden Wirbel gegenüberſteht; es macht die Seite der reinen Einsicht und Absicht aus. In diſs ruhige Bewuſstseyn fällt aber, wie wir sahen, keine besondere Einsicht über die Welt der Bildung; diese hat vielmehr selbſt das schmerzlichſte Gefühl und die wahrſte Einsicht über sich selbſt, — das Gefühl, die Auflösung alles sich befeſtigenden, durch alle Momente ihres Daseyns hindurch gerädert, und an allen Knochen zerschlagen zu seyn; — ebenso ist sie die Sprache dieses Gefühls und die beurtheilende 1807 487 geiſtreiche Rede über alle Seiten ihres Zuſtands. Die reine Einsicht kann daher hier keine eigene Thätigkeit und Inhalt haben, und sich also nur als das formelle treue Auffaſſen dieser eignen geistreichen Einsicht der Welt und ihrer Sprache verhalten. Indem diese Sprache zerſtreut, die Beurtheilung eine Faſeley des Augenbliks, die sich sogleich wieder vergiſst, und ein Ganzes nur für ein drittes Bewuſstseyn ist, so kann sich dieses als reine Einsicht nur dadurch unterscheiden, daſs es jene sich zerſtreuenden Züge in ein allgemeines Bild zusammenfaſst, und sie dann zu einer Einsicht aller macht.

540 Sie wird durch diſs einfache Mittel die Verwirrung dieser Welt zur Auflösung bringen. Denn es hat sich ergeben, daſs nicht die Maſſen, und die bestimmten Begriffe und Individualitäten das Wesen dieser Wirklichkeit sind, sondern daſs sie ihre Subſtanz und Halt allein in dem Geiſte hat, der als Urtheilen und Besprechen exiſtirt, und daſs das Indreſſe, für diſs Räsonniren und Schwatzen einen Inhalt zu haben, allein das Ganze und die Maſſen seiner Gegliederung erhält. In dieser Sprache der Einsicht ist ihr Selbstbewuſstseyn sich noch ein für sich seyendes, dieſes Einzelne; aber die Eitelkeit des Inhalts ist zugleich Eitelkeit des ihn eitel wiſſenden Selbſts. Indem nun das ruhig auffaſſende Bewuſstseyn von diesem ganzen geistreichen Geschwätze der Eitelkeit die treffendſten und die Sache durchschneidenden Faſſungen in eine Sammlung bringt, geht zu der 1807 488 übrigen Eitelkeit des Daseyns die das Ganze noch erhaltende Seele, die Eitelkeit des geiſtreichen Beurtheilens, zu Grunde. Die Sammlung zeigt den Meiſten einen beſſern, oder allen wenigſtens einen vielfachern Witz, als der ihrige ist, und das Beſſerwiſſen und Beurtheilen überhaupt, als etwas allgemeines und nun allgemein bekanntes; damit tilgt sich das einzige Intereſſe, das noch vorhanden war, und das einzelne Einsehen löſst sich in die allgemeine Einsicht auf.

Noch aber ſteht über dem eiteln Wiſſen das Wiſſen von dem Wesen feſt, und die reine Einsicht erscheint erſt in eigentlicher Thätigkeit, insofern sie gegen den Glauben auftritt.

a. Der Kampf der Aufklärung mit dem Aberglauben.

541 Die verschiednen Weisen des negativen Verhaltens des Bewuſstseyns, theils des Skepticismus, theils des theoretischen und praktischen Idealismus sind untergeordnete Geſtalten gegen diese der reinen Einsicht, und ihrer Verbreitung, der Aufklärung; denn sie ist aus der Subſtanz geboren, weiſs das reine Selbſt des Bewuſstseyns als absolut, und nimmt es mit dem reinen Bewuſstseyn des absoluten Wesens aller Wirklichkeit auf. — Indem Glauben und 1807 489 Einsicht daſſelbe reine Bewuſstseyn, der Form nach aber entgegengesetzt sind, dem Glauben das Wesen als Gedanke, nicht als Begriff, und daher ein dem Selbſtbewuſstseyn schlechthin entgegengesetztes — der reinen Einsicht aber das Wesen das Selbſt ist — sind sie füreinander das Eine das schlechthin negative des Andern. — Dem Glauben kommt, wie beyde gegen einander auftreten, aller Inhalt zu, denn in seinem ruhigen Elemente des Denkens gewinnt jedes Moment Beſtehen; — die reine Einsicht aber ist zunächst ohne Inhalt, und vielmehr reines Verschwinden deſſelben; durch die negative Bewegung gegen das ihr Negative aber wird sie sich realisiren und einen Inhalt geben.

542 Sie weiſs den Glauben als das ihr, der Vernunft und Wahrheit, entgegengesetzte. Wie er ihr im Allgemeinen ein Gewebe von Aberglauben, Vorurtheilen und Irrthümern ist, so organisirt sich ihr weiter das Bewuſstseyn dieses Inhalts in ein Reich des Irrthums, worin die falsche Einsicht einmal als die allgemeine Maſſe des Bewuſstseyns, unmittelbar, unbefangen, und ohne Reflexion in sich selbſt ist; aber das Moment der Reflexion in sich oder des Selbſtbewuſstseyns, getrennt von der Unbefangenheit, auch an ihr hat, als eine im Hintergrunde für sich bleibende Einsicht und böse Absicht, von welcher jenes bethört wird. Jene Maſſe ist das Opfer des Betrugs einer Prieſterschafft, die ihre neidische Eitelkeit, allein im Besitze der Einsicht zu bleiben, 1807 490 so wie ihren sonſtigen Eigennutz ausführt, und zugleich mit dem Despotismus sich verschwört, der als die synthetische, begrifflose Einheit des realen und dieses idealen Reichs, — ein seltsam inconsequentes Wesen, — über der schlechten Einsicht der Menge, und der schlechten Absicht der Prieſter ſteht, und beydes auch in sich vereinigt, aus der Dummheit und Verwirrung des Volks durch das Mittel der betriegenden Prieſterschafft, beyde verachtend, den Vortheil der ruhigen Beherrschung und der Vollführung seiner Lüfte und Willkühr zieht, zugleich aber dieselbe Dumpfheit der Einsicht, der gleiche Aberglauben und Irrthum ist.

543 Gegen dieſe drey Seiten des Feindes läſst die Aufklärung sich nicht ohne Unterschied ein; denn indem ihr Wesen reine Einsicht, das an und für sich allgemeine ist, so ist ihre wahre Beziehung auf das andere Extrem diejenige, in welcher sie auf das Gemeinschafftliche und Gleiche beyder geht. Die Seite der aus dem allgemeinen unbeſangenen Bewuſstseyn sich isolirenden Einzelnheit ist das ihr entgegengesetzte, das sie nicht unmittelbar berühren kann. Der Willen der betriegenden Priesterschafft und des unterdrückenden Despoten ist daher nicht unmittelbarer Gegenſtand ihres Thuns, sondern die willenlose, nicht zum Fürsichseyn sich vereinzelnde Einsicht, der Begriff des vernünftigen Selbstbewuſstseyns, der an der Maſſe sein Daseyn hat, aber in ihr noch nicht als Begriff vorhanden ist. Indem 1807 491 aber die reine Einsicht diese ehrliche Einsicht und ihr unbefangenes Wesen den Vorurtheilen und Irrthümern entreiſst, windet sie der schlechten Absicht die Realität und Macht ihres Betrugs aus den Händen, deren Reich an dem begrifflosen Bewuſstseyn der allgemeinen Masse seinen Boden und Material — das Fürsichseyn an dem einfachen Bewuſstseyn überhaupt seine Subſtanz hat.

544 Die Beziehung der reinen Einsicht auf das unbefangene Bewuſstseyn des absoluten Wesens hat nun die gedoppelte Seite, daſs sie eines Theils an sich daſſelbe mit ihm ist, andern Theils aber daſs dieſes in dem einfachen Elemente seines Gedankens das absolute Wesen so wie seine Theile gewähren, und sich Beſtehen geben, und sie nur als sein Ansich und darum in gegenſtändlicher Weise gelten läſst, sein Fürsichseyn aber in diesem Ansich verleugnet. — Insofern nach der erſten Seite dieser Glauben an sich für die reine Einsicht reines Selbſtbewuſstseyn ist, und er diſs nur für sich werden soll, so hat sie an diesem Begriffe deſſelben das Element, worin sie statt der falschen Einsicht sich realisirt.

545 Von dieser Seite, daſs beyde wesentlich daſſelbe sind und die Beziehung der reinen Einsicht durch und in demselben Elemente geschieht, ist ihre Mittheilung eine unmittelbare, und ihr Geben und Empfangen ein ungeſtörtes Ineinanderflieſſen. Was auch sonſt weiter in das Bewuſstseyn für Pflöcke eingeschlagen seyen, es ist an sich diese Einfachheit, 1807 492 in welcher alles aufgelöſst, vergeſſen und unbefangen, und die daher des Begriffs schlechthin empfänglich ist. Die Mittheilung der reinen Einsicht ist deſswegen einer ruhigen Ausdehnung oder dem Verbreiten wie eines Dufftes in der widerſtandslosen Atmosphäre zu vergleichen. Sie ist eine durchdringende Anſteckung, welche sich nicht vorher gegen das gleichgültige Element, in das sie sich insinuirt, als entgegengesetztes bemerkbar macht, und daher nicht abgewehrt werden kann. Erſt wenn die Anstekkung sich verbreitet hat, ist sie für das Bewuſstseyn, das sich ihr unbesorgt überlieſs. Denn es war zwar das einfache sich und ihm gleiche Wesen, was es in sich empfing, aber zugleich die Einfachheit der in sich reflectirten Negativität, welche nachher auch sich nach ihrer Natur als entgegengeseztes entfaltet, und das Bewuſstseyn hiedurch an seine vorige Weise erinnert; sie ist der Begriff, der das einfache Wissen ist, welches sich selbst und zugleich sein Gegentheil, aber dieses in ihm als aufgehoben weiſs. So wie daher die reine Einsicht für das Bewuſstseyn ist, hat sie sich schon verbreitet; der Kampf gegen sie verräth die geschehene Anſteckung; er ist zu spät, und jedes Mittel verschlimmert nur die Krankheit, denn sie hat das Mark des geistigen Lebens ergriffen, nemlich das Bewuſstseyn in seinem Begriffe oder sein reines Wesen selbſt; es gibt darum auch keine Kraft in ihm, welche über ihr wäre. Weil sie im Wesen selbſt ist, laſſen sich ihre noch 1807 493 vereinzelnten Aeuſſerungen zurückdrängen und die oberflächlichen Symptome dämpfen. Es ist ihr diſs höchst vortheilhafft; denn sie vergeudet nun nicht unnütz die Krafft, noch zeigt sie sich ihres Wesens unwürdig, was dann der Fall ist, wenn sie in Symptome und einzelne Eruptionen gegen den Inhalt des Glaubens und gegen den Zuſammenhang seiner äussern Wirklichkeit hervorbricht. Sondern nun ein unsichtbarer und unbemerkter Geiſt, durchschleicht sie die edeln Theile durch und durch, und hat sich bald aller Eingeweide und Glieder des bewuſstlosen Götzen gründlich bemächtigt, und „an einem schönen Morgen gibt sie mit dem Ellbogen dem Kameraden einen Schubb und Bautz! Baradautz! der Götze liegt am Boden.“ — An einem schönen Morgen, deſſen Mittag nicht blutig ist, wenn die Anſteckung alle Organe des geiſtigen Lebens durchdrungen hat; nur das Gedächtniſs bewahrt dann noch als eine, man weiſs nicht wie, vergangene Geschichte, die todte Weise der vorigen Geſtalt des Geiſtes auf; und die neue für die Anbetung erhöhte Schlange der Weisheit hat auf dieſe Weiſe nur eine welke Haut schmerzlos abgeſtreifft.

546 Aber dieses ſtumme Fortweben des Geiſtes im einfachen Innern seiner Subſtanz, der sich sein Thun verbirgt, ist nur Eine Seite der Realisirung der reinen Einsicht. Ihre Verbreitung beſteht nicht nur darin, daſs Gleiches mit Gleichem zusammengeht; und ihre Verwirklichung ist nicht nur eine gegensatzlose Ausdehnung. Sondern das Thun des 1807 494 negativen Wesens ist ebenso wesentlich eine entwickelte sich in sich unterſcheidende Bewegung, welche als bewuſstes Thun ihre Momente in beſtimmtem offenbarem Daseyn aufſtellen, und als ein lauter Lärm und gewaltsamer Kampf mit Entgegengesetztem als solchem vorhanden ſeyn muſs.

547 Es ist daher zu sehen, wie die reine Einsicht und Absicht gegen das andere ihr entgegengesetzte, das sie vorfindet, sich negativ verhält. — Die reine Einsicht und Absicht, welche sich negativ verhält, kann, da ihr Begriff alle Wesenheit, und nichts auſser ihr ist, nur das negative ihrer selbſt seyn. Sie wird daher als Einsicht zum negativen der reinen Einsicht, sie wird Unwahrheit und Unvernunft, und als Absicht zum negativen der reinen Absicht, zur Lüge und Unlauterkeit des Zwecks.

548 In dieſen Widerspruch verwickelt sie sich dadurch, daſs sie sich in Streit einläſst, und etwas Anderes zu bekämpfen meynt. — Sie meynt diſs nur, denn ihr Wesen als die absolute Negativität ist dieſes, das Andersſeyn an ihr ſelbſt zu haben. Der absolute Begriff ist die Kategorie; er ist diſs, daſs das Wiſſen und der Gegenſtand des Wiſſens daſſelbe ist. Was hiemit die reine Einsicht als ihr Andres, was sie als Irrthum oder Lüge ausſpricht, kann nichts andres seyn, als sie selbſt; sie kann nur das verdammen, was sie ist. Was nicht vernünftig ist, hat keine Wahrheit, oder was nicht begriffen ist, ist nicht; indem also die Vernunft von einem Andern 1807 495 ſpricht, als sie ist, ſpricht sie in der That nur von sich ſelbſt; sie tritt darin nicht aus sich heraus. — Dieſer Kampf mit dem Entgegengeſetzten vereinigt darum die Bedeutung in sich, ihre Verwirklichung zu seyn. Dieſe beſteht nemlich eben in der Bewegung, die Momente zu entwickeln, und sie in sich zurückzunehmen; ein Theil dieſer Bewegung ist die Unterscheidung, in welcher die begreiffende Einsicht sich selbſt als Gegenſtand gegenüberſtellt; so lange sie in dieſem Momente verweilt, ist sie sich entfremdet. Als reine Einsicht ist sie ohne allen Inhalt; die Bewegung ihrer Realisirung beſteht darin, daſs sie selbſt sich als Inhalt wird, denn ein anderer kann ihr nicht werden, weil sie das Selbstbewuſstseyn der Kategorie ist. Aber indem sie ihn zuerſt in dem Entgegenſetzen nur als Inhalt, und ihn noch nicht als sich selbſt weiſs, verkennt sie sich in ihm. Ihre Vollendung hat daher diesen Sinn, den ihr zuerſt gegenſtändlichen Inhalt als den ihrigen zu erkennen. Ihr Reſultat wird dadurch aber weder die Wiederherſtellung der Irrthümer, welche sie bekämpft, noch nur ihr erſter Begriff seyn, sondern eine Einsicht welche die absolute Negation ihrer selbſt als ihre eigne Wirklichkeit, als sich selbſt erkennt, oder ihr sich selbſt erkennender Begriff. — Dieſe Natur des Kampfs der Aufklärung mit den Irrthümern, in ihnen sich selbſt zu bekämpfen, und das darin zu verdammen, was sie behauptet, ist für uns, oder was sie und ihr Kampf ansich ist. Die erſte Seite 1807 496 deſſelben aber, ihre Verunreinigung durch die Aufnahme des negativen Verhaltens in ihre sichſelbſtgleiche Reinheit ist es, wie sie für den Glauben Gegenſtand ist; der sie alſo als Lüge, Unvernunft und schlechte Absicht erfährt, so wie er für sie Irrthum und Vorurtheil iſt. — In Rücksicht auf ihren Inhalt ist sie zunächst die leere Einsicht, der ihr Inhalt als ein Anderes erſcheint, sie findet ihn daher in dieser Geſtalt, daſs er noch nicht der ihrige ist, vor, als ein von ihr ganz unabhängiges Daseyn, in dem Glauben.

549 Die Aufklärung faſst alſo ihren Gegenſtand zuerſt und allgemein so auf, daſs sie ihn als reine Einsicht nimmt und ihn so, sich selbst nicht erkennend, für Irrthum erklärt. In der Einsicht als solcher faſst das Bewuſstseyn einen Gegenſtand so, daſs er ihm zum Wesen des Bewuſstseyns oder zu einem Gegenſtande wird, den es durchdringt, worin es sich erhält, bey sich selbſt und sich gegenwärtig bleibt, und indem es hiemit seine Bewegung ist, ihn hervorbringt. Als eben dieses spricht die Aufklärung den Glauben richtig aus, indem sie von ihm sagt, daſs das, was ihm das abſolute Wesen ist, ein Seyn seines eignen Bewuſstseyns, sein eigner Gedanke, ein vom Bewuſstseyn hervorgebrachtes sey. Sie erklärt ihn hiemit für Irrthum und Erdichtung über daſſelbe, was sie ist. — Sie, die den Glauben die neue Weisheit lehren will, sagt ihm damit nichts neues; denn sein Gegenſtand ist ihm auch gerade 1807 497 dieſes, nemlich reines Weſen seines eignen Bewuſstseyns, so daſs dieses darin sich nicht verloren und negirt setzt, sondern ihm vielmehr vertraut, das heiſst eben, in ihm sich als dieſes Bewuſstseyn, oder als Selbſtbewuſstseyn findet. Wem ich vertraue, deſſen Gewiſsheit seiner selbſt, ist mir die Gewiſsheit meiner selbſt; ich erkenne mein Fürmichseyn in ihm, daſs er es anerkennt, und es ihm Zweck und Wesen ist. Vertrauen ist aber der Glauben, weil sein Bewuſstseyn sich unmittelbar auf seinen Gegenſtand bezieht, und alſo auch diſs anſchaut, daſs es eins mit ihm, in ihm ist. — Ferner indem dasjenige mir Gegenſtand ist, worin ich mich selbſt erkenne, bin ich mir darin zugleich überhaupt als anderes Selbstbewuſstseyn, das heiſst, als ein solches, welches darin seiner beſondern Einzelnheit, nemlich seiner Natürlichkeit und Zufälligkeit entfremdet worden, aber theils darin Selbstbewuſstseyn bleibt, theils eben darin weſentliches Bewuſstseyn, wie die reine Einsicht ist. — In dem Begriffe der Einsicht liegt nicht nur diſs, daſs das Bewuſstseyn in seinem eingesehenen Gegenſtande sich selbſt erkennt, und ohne das Gedachte zu verlaſſen und daraus in sich erſt zurück zu gehen, sich unmittelbar darin hat, sondern es ist seiner selbſt als auch der vermittelnden Bewegung oder seiner als des Thuns oder Hervorbringens bewuſst; dadurch ist in dem Gedanken für es dieſe Einheit seiner als des Selbſts und des Gegenſtandes. — Eben diſs Bewuſstseyn ist auch der Glauben; der Gehorſam 1807 498 und das Thun ist ein nothwendiges Moment, durch welches die Gewiſsheit des Seyns in dem absoluten Wesen, zu Stande kommt. Diſs Thun des Glaubens erſcheint zwar nicht so, daſs das abſolute Wesen selbſt dadurch hervorgebracht werde. Aber das abſolute Wesen des Glaubens ist weſentlich nicht das abſtracte Wesen, das jenſeits des glaubenden Bewuſstseyns ſey, ſondern es ist der Geist der Gemeinde, es ist die Einheit des abſtracten Wesens und des Selbstbewuſstseyns. Daſs es dieſer Geiſt der Gemeine sey, darin ist das Thun der Gemeine ein wesentliches Moment; er ist es nur durch das Hervorbringen des Bewuſstseyns; — oder vielmehr nicht ohne vom Bewuſstseyn hervorgebracht zu ſeyn; denn so weſentlich das Hervorbringen ist, so wesentlich ist es auch nicht der einzige Grund des Wesens, sondern es ist nur ein Moment. Das Wesen ist zugleich an und für sich selbſt.

550 Von der andern Seite ist der Begriff der reinen Einsicht, sich ein Anderes als sein Gegenſtand; denn eben dieſe negative Bestimmung macht den Gegenſtand aus. So ſpricht sie also von der andern Seite auch das Wesen des Glaubens aus, als ein dem Selbstbewuſstseyn Fremdes, das nicht sein Wesen, sondern als ein Wechſelbalg ihm unterſchoben sey. Allein die Aufklärung ist hier völlig thör icht; der Glauben erfährt sie als ein Sprechen, das nicht weiſs, was es ſagt, und die Sache nicht verſteht, wenn es von Pfaffenbetrug und Volkstäuſchung redet. 1807 499 Sie ſpricht hievon, als ob durch ein Hokuspokus der taſchenſpielerischen Prieſter dem Bewuſstseyn etwas abſolut Fremdes und Anderes für das Wesen untergeſchoben würde, und ſagt zugleich, daſs diſs ein Wesen des Bewuſstseyns ſey, daſs es daran glaube, ihm vertraue und sich es geneigt zu machen suche; — das heiſst, daſs es darin sein reines Wesen ebensosehr als seine einzelne und allgemeine Individualität anſchaue, und durch sein Thun dieſe Einheit seiner selbſt mit seinem Wesen, hervorbringe. Sie sagt unmittelbar das, was sie als ein dem Bewuſstseyn Fremdes ausſagt, als das eigenſte deſſelben aus. — Wie mag alſo sie von Betrug und Täuſchung ſprechen? Indem sie unmittelbar das Gegentheil dessen, was sie vom Glauben behauptet, selbſt von ihm ausſpricht, zeigt sie diesem vielmehr sich als die bewuſste Lüge. Wie soll Täuſchung und Betrug da ſtatt finden, wo das Bewuſstseyn in seiner Wahrheit unmittelbar die Gewiſsheit seiner selbſt hat; wo es in seinem Gegenſtande sich selbſt besitzt, indem es sich ebensowohl darin findet als hervorbringt. Der Unterſchied ist sogar in den Worten nicht mehr vorhanden. — Wenn die allgemeine Frage aufgeſtellt worden ist: ob es erlaubt sey, ein Volk zu täuſchen, so müſste in der That die Antwort ſeyn, daſs die Frage nichts tauge; weil es unmöglich ist, hierin ein Volk zu täuſchen. — Meſsing ſtatt Golds, nachgemachte Wechsel ſtatt ächter mögen wohl einzeln verkauft, eine verlorne Schlacht als eine 1807 500 gewonnene Mehrern aufgehefftet, und ſonſtige Lügen über ſinnliche Dinge und einzelne Begebenheiten auf eine Zeitlang glaubhaft gemacht werden; aber in dem Wiſſen von dem Weſen, worin das Bewuſstſeyn die unmittelbare Gewiſsheit ſeiner ſelbſt hat, fällt der Gedanke der Täuſchung ganz hinweg.

551 Sehen wir weiter, wie der Glauben die Aufklärung in den unterſchiedenen Momenten ſeines Bewuſstſeyns erfährt, auf welches die aufgezeigte Anſicht nur erſt im Allgemeinen ging. Dieſe Momente aber ſind, das reine Denken, oder als Gegenſtand, das abſolute Weſen an und für ſich ſelbſt; dann ſeine Beziehung als ein Wiſſen darauf, der Grund ſeines Glaubens, und endlich ſeine Beziehung darauf in ſeinem Thun, oder ſein Dienſt. Wie die reine Einſicht ſich im Glauben überhaupt verkennt und verleugnet hat’ ſo wird ſie in dieſen Momenten ebenſo verkehrt ſich verhalten.

552 Die reine Einſicht verhält ſich zu dem abſoluten Weſen des glaubenden Bewuſstſeyns negativ. Diſs Weſen iſt reines Denken, und das reine Denken innerhalb ſeiner ſelbſt als Gegenſtand oder als das Weſen geſetzt; im glaubenden Bewuſstſeyn erhält diſs Anſich des Denkens zugleich für das für ſich ſeyende Bewuſstſeyn die Form, aber auch nur die leere Form der Gegenſtändlichkeit; es iſt in der Beſtimmung eines Vorgeſtellten. Der reinen Einſicht aber, indem ſie das reine Bewuſstſeyn nach der Seite des für ſich ſeyenden Selbſts iſt, erſcheint das Andre als ein negatives des 1807 501 Selbſtbewuſstſeyns. Diſs könnte noch entweder als das reine Anſich des Denkens oder auch als das Seyn der ſinnlichen Gewiſsheit genommen werden. Aber indem es zugleich für das Selbſt, und dieſes als Selbſt, das einen Gegenſtand hat, wirkliches Bewuſstſeyn iſt, ſo iſt ihr eigenthümlicher Gegenſtand als ſolcher ein ſeyendes gemeines Ding der ſinnlichen Gewiſsheit. Dieſer ihr Gegenſtand erſcheint ihr an der Vorſtellung des Glaubens. Sie verdammt dieſe und in ihr ihren eignen Gegenſtand. Gegen den Glauben aber begeht ſie ſchon darin das Unrecht, ſeinen Gegenſtand ſo aufzufaſſen, daſs er der ihrige iſt. Sie ſagt hiernach über den Glauben, daſs ſein abſolutes Weſen ein Steinſtück, ein Holzblock ſey, der Augen habe und nicht ſehe, oder auch etwas Brodteig, der auf dem Acker gewachſen, von Menſchen verwandelt darauf zurückgeſchickt werde; — oder nach welchen Weiſen ſonſt der Glauben’ das Weſen anthropomorphoſire, ſich gegenſtändlich und vorſtellig mache.

553 Die Aufklärung, die ſich für das reine ausgiebt, macht hier das, was dem Geiſte ewiges Leben und heiliger Geiſt iſt, zu einem wirklichen vergänglichen Dinge, und beſudelt es mit der an ſich nichtigen Anſicht der ſinnlichen Gewiſsheit, — mit einer Anſicht, welche dem anbetenden Glauben gar nicht vorhanden iſt, ſo daſs ſie ihm dieſelbe rein anlügt. Was er verehrt, iſt ihm durchaus weder Stein, oder Holz, oder Brodteig’ noch ſonſt ein zeitliches ſinnliches Ding. Wenn es der Aufklärung einfällt, zu ſagen, ſein Gegenſtand 1807 502 ſey doch diſs auch, oder gar, er ſey dieſes an ſich und in Wahrheit, ſo kennt theils der Glauben eben ſo wohl jenes Auch, aber es iſt ihm auſſer ſeiner Anbetung; theils aber iſt ihm überhaupt nicht ſo etwas, wie ein Stein und ſofort an ſich, ſondern an ſich iſt ihm allein das Weſen des reinen Denkens.

554 Das zweyte Moment iſt die Beziehung des Glaubens als wiſſenden Bewuſstſeyns auf dieſes Weſen. Als denkendem reinem Bewuſstſeyn iſt ihm diſs Weſen unmittelbar; aber das reine Bewuſstſeyn iſt ebenſoſehr vermittelte Beziehung der Gewiſsheit auf die Wahrheit; eine Beziehung, welche den Grund des Glaubens ausmacht. Dieſer Grund wird für die Aufklärung eben ſo zu einem zufälligen Wiſſen von zufälligen Begebenheiten. Der Grund des Wiſſens aber iſt das wiſſende Allgemeine, und in ſeiner Wahrheit der abſolute Geiſt, der in dem abſtracten reinen Bewuſstſeyn, oder dem Denken als ſolchem nur abſolutes Weſen, als Selbſtbewuſstſeyn aber das Wiſſen von ſich iſt. Die reine Einſicht ſetzt diſs wiſſende Allgemeine, den einfachen ſich ſelbſt wiſſenden Geiſt, ebenſo als negatives des Selbſtbewuſstſeyns. Sie iſt zwar ſelbſt das reine vermittelte, d. h. ſich mit ſich vermittelnde Denken, ſie iſt das reine Wiſſen; aber indem ſie reine Einſicht, reines Wiſſen iſt, das ſich ſelbſt noch nicht weiſs, d. h. für welches es noch nicht iſt, daſs ſie dieſe reine vermittelnde Bewegung iſt, erſcheint ſie ihr, wie alles, was ſie ſelbſt iſt, als ein Anderes. In ihrer Verwirklichung alſo begriffen, entwickelt ſie diſs ihr weſentliches 1807 503 Moment, aber es erſcheint ihr als dem Glauben angehörend, und in ſeiner Beſtimmtheit, ein ihr äuſſeres zu ſeyn, als ein zufälliges Wiſſen eben ſolcher gemein wirklicher Geſchichten. Sie dichtet alſo hier dem religiöſen Glauben an, daſs ſeine Gewiſsheit ſich auf einige einzelne hiſtoriſche Zeugniſſe gründe, welche als hiſtoriſche Zeugniſſe betrachtet, freylich nicht den Grad von Gewiſsheit über ihren Inhalt gewähren würden, den uns Zeitungsnachrichten über irgend eine Begebenheit geben; — daſs ſeine Gewiſsheit ferner auf dem Zufall der Aufbewahrung dieſer Zeugniſſe beruhe, — der Aufbewahrung durch Papier einerſeits, und andererſeits durch die Geſchicklichkeit und Ehrlichkeit der Uebertragung von einem Papier auf ein anderes, und endlich auf der richtigen Auffaſſung des Sinnes todter Worte und Buchſtaben. In der That aber fällt es dem Glauben nicht ein, an ſolche Zeugniſſe und Zufälligkeiten seine Gewiſsheit zu knüpfen; er iſt in ſeiner Gewiſsheit unbefangenes Verhältniſs zu ſeinem abſoluten Gegenſtande, ein reines Wiſſen deſſelben, welches nicht Buchſtaben, Papier und Abſchreiber in ſein Bewuſstſeyn des abſoluten Weſens einmiſcht, und nicht durch ſolcherley Dinge ſich damit vermittelt Sondern diſs Bewuſstſeyn iſt der ſich ſelbſt vermittelnde Grund ſeines Wiſſens; es iſt der Geiſt ſelbſt, der das Zeugniſs von ſich iſt, eben ſo im Innern des einzelnen Bewuſstſeyns, als durch die allgemeine Gegenwart des Glaubens Aller an ihn. Wenn der Glauben ſich aus dem Geſchichtlichen auch jene Weiſe von 1807 504 Begründung oder wenigſtens Beſtättigung ſeines Inhaltes, von der die Aufklärung ſpricht, ſich geben will, und ernſthaft meynt und thut, als ob es darauf ankäme, ſo hat er ſich ſchon von der Aufklärung verführen laſſen; und ſeine Bemühungen ſich auf ſolche Weiſe zu begründen oder zu befeſtigen, ſind nur Zeugniſſe, die er von ſeiner Anſteckung gibt.

555 Noch iſt die dritte Seite übrig, die Beziehung des Bewuſstſeyns auf das abſolute Weſen, als ein Thun. Diſs Thun iſt das Aufheben der Beſonderheit des Individuums oder der natürlichen Weiſe ſeines fürſichſeyns, woraus ihm die Gewiſsheit hervorgeht, reines Selbſtbewuſstſeyn, nach ſeinem Thun d. h. als fürſichſeyendes einzelnes Bewuſstſeyn eins mit dem Weſen zu ſeyn. — Indem an dem Thun Zweckmäſſigkeit und Zweck ſich unterſcheidet, und die reine Einſicht ebenſo in Beziehung auf dieſes Thun ſich negativ verhält, und wie in den andern Momenten ſich ſelbſt verleugnet, ſo muſs ſie in Anſehung der Zweckmäſſigkeit als Unverſtand ſich darſtellen, indem die Einſicht mit der Abſicht verbunden, Uebereinſtimmung des Zwecks und des Mittels, ihr als Anderes, vielmehr als das Gegentheil erſcheint, — in Anſehung des Zwecks aber das Schlechte, Genuſs und Beſitz zum Zwecke machen, und ſich hiemit als die unreinſte Abſicht beweiſen, indem die reine Abſicht ebenſo, als Andres, unreine Abſicht iſt.

556 Hienach ſehen wir in Anfehung der Zweckmäſſigkeit die Aufklärung es thörigt finden, wenn das glaubende Individuum ſich das höhere Bewuſstſeyn, nicht 1807 505 un den natürlichen Genuſs und Vergnügen gefeſſelt zu ſeyn, dadurch gibt, daſs es ſich natürlichen Genuſs und Vergnügen wirklich verſagt, und durch die That erweiſst, daſs es die Verachtung derſelben nicht lügt, ſondern daſs ſie wahr iſt. — Eben ſo findet ſie es thörigt, daſs das Individuum von ſeiner Beſtimmtheit, abſolut einzelnes, alle andern ausſchlieſſendes und Eigenthum beſitzendes zu ſeyn, ſich dadurch abſolvirt, daſs es von ſeinem Eigenthume ſelbſt abläſst; womit es in Wahrheit zeigt, daſs es mit ſeinem Iſoliren nicht Ernſt, ſondern daſs es über die Naturnothwendigkeit, ſich zu vereinzeln, und in dieſer abſoluten Vereinzelung des Fürſichſeyns die Andern als daſſelbe mit ſich zu verleugnen, erhaben iſt. — Die reine Einſicht findet beydes ſowohl unzweckmäſſig, als unrecht, — unzweckmäſſig, um von Vergnügen und Beſitz ſich frey zu erweiſen, ſich Vergnügen zu verſagen und einen Beſitz weg zu geben; ſie wird alſo im Gegentheil den für einen Thoren erklären, der um zu eſſen, das Mittel ergreift, wirklich zu eſſen. — Sie findet es auch unrecht, ſich eine Mahlzeit zu verſagen, und Butter, Eyer nicht gegen Geld, oder Geld nicht gegen Butter und Eyer, ſondern geradezu, ohne ſo was dafür zurück zu erhalten, wegzugeben; ſie erklärt eine Mahlzeit oder den Beſitz von dergleichen Dingen für einen Selbſtzweck, und ſich damit in der That für eine ſehr unreine Abſicht, der es um ſolchen Genuſs und Beſitz ganz weſentlich zu thun iſt. Sie behauptet als reine Abſicht auch wieder die Nothwendigkeit der Erhebung 1807 506 über die natürliche Exiſtenz und über die Habſucht um ihre Mittel; nur findet ſie es thörigt und unrecht, daſs dieſe Erhebung durch die That bewieſen werden ſoll, oder dieſe reine Abſicht iſt in Wahrheit Betrug, welcher eine innerliche Erhebung vorgibt und fodert, aber Ernſt daraus zu machen, ſie wirklich ins Werk zu richten, und ihre Wahrheit zu erweiſen für überflüſſig, thörigt, und ſelbſt für unrecht ausgibt. — Sie verleugnet ſich alſo ſowohl als reine Einſicht, denn ſie verläugnet das unmittelbar zweckmäſſiige Thun, wie als reine Abſicht, denn ſie verleugnet die Abſicht, ſich von den Zwecken der Einzelnheit befreyt zu erweiſen.

557 So gibt die Aufklärung ſich dem Glauben zu erfahren. Sie tritt in dieſem ſchlechten Ausſehen auf, weil ſie eben durch das Verhältniſs zu einem andern ſich eine negative Realität gibt, oder ſich als das Gegentheil ihrer ſelbſt darſtellt; die reine Einſicht und Abſicht muſs ſich aber diſs Verhältniſs geben, denn es iſt ihre Verwirklichung. — Dieſe erſchien zunächſt als negative Realität. Vielleicht iſt ihre poſitive Realität beſſer beſchaffen; ſehen wir, wie dieſe ſich verhält. — Wenn alles Vorurtheil und Aberglauben verbannt worden, ſo tritt die Frage ein, was nun weiter? Welches iſt die Wahrheit, welche die Aufklärung ſtatt jener verbreitet hat? — Sie hat dieſen poſitiven Inhalt in ihrem Ausrotten des Irrthums ſchon ausgeſprochen, denn jene Entfremdung ihrer ſelbſt iſt ebenſoſehr ihre poſitive Realität. — An demjenigen, was dem Glauben abſoluter 1807 507 Geiſt iſt, faſst ſie, was ſie von Beſtimmung daran entdeckt, als Holz, Stein und ſo fort, als einzelne wirkliche Dinge auf; indem ſie überhaupt alle Beſtimmtheit, das heiſst, allen Innhalt und Erfüllung deſſelben auf dieſe Weiſe als eine Endlichkeit, als menſchliches Weſen und Vorſtellung begreifft, wird ihr das abſolute Weſen zu einen Vacuum, dem keine Beſtimmungen, keine Prädicate beygelegt werden können. Ein ſolches Beylager wäre an ſich ſträflich, und es iſt es eben, in welchem die Ungeheuer des Aberglaubens erzeugt worden ſind. Die Vernunft, die reine Einſicht iſt wohl ſelbſt nicht leer, indem das negative ihrer ſelbſt für ſie und ihr Inhalt iſt, ſondern reich, aber nur an Einzelnheit und Schranke; dem abſoluten Weſen dergleichen nichts zukommen zu laſſen noch beyzulegen, iſt ihre einſichtsvolle Lebensart, welche ſich und ihren Reichthum der Endlichkeit an ihren Ort zu ſtellen, und das abſolute würdig zu behandeln weiſs.

558 Dieſem leeren Weſen gegenüber ſteht als zweytes Moment der poſitiven Wahrheit der Aufklärung, die aus einem abſoluten Weſen ausgeſchloſſene Einzelnheit überhaupt, des Bewuſstſeyns und alles Seyns, als abſolutes an und für ſich ſeyn. Das Bewuſstſeyn, welches in ſeiner allererſten Wirklichkeit ſinnliche Gewiſsheit und Meynung iſt, kehrt hier aus dem ganzen Wege ſeiner Erfahrung dahin zurück, und iſt wieder ein Wiſſen von rein negativem ſeiner ſelbſt, oder von ſinnlichen Dingen, d. h. ſeyenden, welche ſeinem Fürſichſeyn gleichgültig gegenüberſtehen. Es iſt hier aber nicht 1807 508 unmittelbares natürliches Bewuſstſeyn, ſondern es iſt ſich ſolches geworden. Zuerſt preisgegeben aller Verwicklung, worein es durch ſeine Entfaltung geſtürzt wird, itzt durch die reine Einſicht auf ſeine erſte Geſtalt zurückgeführt, hat es ſie als das Reſultat erfahren. Auf die Einſicht der Nichtigkeit aller andern Geſtalten des Bewuſstſeyns, und ſomit alles Jenſeits der ſinnlichen Gewiſsheit gegründet, iſt dieſe ſinnliche Gewiſsheit nicht mehr Meynung, ſondern ſie iſt vielmehr die abſolute Wahrheit. Dieſe Nichtigkeit alles deſſen, was über die ſinnliche Gewiſsheit hinausgeht, iſt zwar nur ein negativer Beweis dieſer Wahrheit; aber ſie iſt keines andern fähig, denn die poſitive Wahrheit der ſinnlichen Gewiſsheit an ihr ſelbſt, iſt eben das unvermittelte fürſichſeyn des Begriffes ſelbſt als Gegenſtands, und zwar in der Form des Andersſeyns, — daſs es jedem Bewuſstſeyn ſchlechthin gewiſs iſt, daſs es iſt, und andere wirkliche Dinge auſſer ihm, und daſs es in ſeinem natürlichen Seyn, ſo wie dieſe Dinge, an und für ſich oder abſolut iſt.

559 Das dritte Moment der Wahrheit der Aufklärung endlich iſt das Verhältniſs der einzelnen Weſen zum abſoluten Weſen, die Beziehung der beyden erſten. Die Einſicht als reine Einſicht des Gleichen oder Unbeſchränkten geht auch über das ungleiche, nemlich die endliche Wirklichkeit, oder über ſich als bloſſes Andersſeyn hinaus. Sie hat zum Ienſeits deſſelben das Leere, auf welches ſie alſo die ſinnliche 1807 509 Wirklichkeit bezieht. In die Beſtimmung dieſes Verhältniſſes treten nicht die beyden Seiten als Inhalt ein, denn die eine iſt das Leere, und ein Inhalt iſt alſo nur durch die andere, die ſinnliche Wirklichkeit, vorhanden. Die Form der Beziehung aber, in deren Beſtimmung die Seite des Anſich mithilft, kann nach Belieben gemacht werden; denn die Form iſt das an ſich negative, und darum das ſich entgegengeſetzte; Seyn ſowohl als Nichts; Anſich, wie das Gegentheil; oder was daſſelbe, die Beziehung der Wirklichkeit auf Anſich als das Jenſeits iſt eben ſowohl ein Negiren als ein Setzen derſelben. Die endliche Wirklichkeit kann daher eigentlich, wie man es gerade braucht, genommen werden. Das Sinnliche wird alſo itzt auf das Abſolute als auf das Anſich poſitiv bezogen, und die ſinnliche Wirklichkeit iſt ſelbſt an ſich; das Abſolute macht, hegt und pflegt ſie. Wiederum iſt ſie auch darauf als auf das Gegentheil, als auf ihr Nichtſeyn bezogen; nach dieſem Verhältniſſe iſt ſie nicht an ſich, ſondern nur für ein anderes. Wenn in der vorhergehenden Geſtalt des Bewuſstſeyns die Begriffe des Gegenſatzes ſich als Gut und Schlecht beſtimmten, ſo werden ſie dagegen der reinen Einſicht zu den reinern Abſtractionen, des an ſich und für ein anderes ſeyn.

560 Beyde Betrachtungsweiſen, der poſitiven wie der negativen Beziehung des Endlichen auf das Anſich, ſind aber in der That gleichnothwendig, und alles iſt alſo ſo ſehr an ſich, als es für ein anderes iſt; oder alles iſt 1807 510 *nützlich. — Alles gibt ſich andern preis, läſst ſich itzt von andern gebrauchen, und iſt für ſie; und itzt ſtellt es ſich, es ſo zu ſagen, wieder auf die Hinterbeine, thut ſpröde gegen anderes, iſt für ſich und gebraucht das andere ſeinerſeits. — Für den Menſchen, als das dieſer Beziehung bewuſste Ding, ergibt ſich daraus ſein Weſen und ſeine Stellung. Er iſt, wie er unmittelbar iſt, als natürliches Bewuſstſyen an ſich, gut, als einzelnes abſolut, und anderes iſt für ihn; und zwar da für ihn als das ſeiner bewuſste Thier die Momente die Bedeutung der Allgemeinheit haben, iſt Alles für ſein Vergnügen und Ergötzlichkeit, und er geht, wie er aus Gottes Hand gekommen, in der Welt als einem für ihn gepflanzten Garten umher. — Er muſs auch vom Baume der Erkenntniſs des Guten und des Böſen gepflückt haben; er beſitzt darin einen Nutzen, der ihn von allem Andern unterſcheidet, denn zufälligerweiſe iſt ſeine an ſich gute Natur auch ſo beſchaffen, daſs ihr das Uebermaſs der Ergötzlichkeit Schaden thut, oder vielmehr ſeine Einzelnheit hat auch ihr Jenſeits an ihr, kann über ſich ſelbſt hinausgehen und ſich zerſtören. Hiegegen iſt ihm die Vernunft ein nützliches Mittel, diſs Hinausgehen gehörig zu beſchränken, oder vielmehr im Hinausgehen über das Beſtimmte ſich ſelbſt zu erhalten; denn diſs iſt die Kraft des Bewuſstſeyns. Der Genuſs des bewuſsten an ſich allgemeinen Weſens muſs nach Mannichfaltigkeit und Dauer ſelbſt nicht ein beſtimmtes, ſondern allgemein ſeyn; das Maſs hat daher die Beſtimmung, zu 1807 511 verhindern, daſs das Vergnügen in ſeiner Mannigfaltigkeit und Dauer abgebrochen werde; das heiſst die Beſtimmung des Maſses iſt die Unmäſſigkeit. — Wie dem Menſchen alles nützlich iſt, ſo iſt er es ebenfalls, und ſeine Beſtimmung ebenſoſehr ſich zum gemeinnützlichen und allgemein brauchbaren Mitgliede des Trupps zu machen. So viel er für ſich ſorgt, gerade ſo viel muſs er ſich auch hergeben für die Andern, und ſo viel er ſich hergibt, ſo viel ſorgt er für ſich ſelbſt, eine Hand wäſcht die andere. Wo er aber ſich befindet, iſt er recht daran, er nützt andern und wird genützt.

561 Anders iſt auf andere Weiſe einander nützlich; alle Dinge aber haben dieſe nützliche Gegenſeitigkeit durch ihr Weſen, nemlich auf das Abſolute auf die gedoppelte Weiſe bezogen zu ſeyn, die poſitive, — dadurch an und für ſich ſelbſt zu ſeyn, die negative, dadurch für andere zu ſeyn. Die Beziehung auf das abſolute Weſen oder die Religion iſt daher unter aller Nützlichkeit, das allernützlichſte; denn ſie iſt der reine Nutzen ſelbſt, ſie iſt diſs Beſtehen aller Dinge, oder ihr An und für ſich ſeyn, und das Fallen aller Dinge, oder ihr Seyn für anderes.

562 Dem Glauben freylich iſt dieſes poſitive Reſultat der Aufklärung, ſo ſehr ein Greuel, als ihr negatives Verhalten gegen ihn. Dieſe Einſicht in das abſolute Weſen, die nichts in ihm ſieht, als eben das abſolute Weſen, das être ſupreme, oder das Leere, — dieſe Abſicht, daſs alles in ſeinem unmittelbaren Daſeyn an ſich oder 1807 512 gut iſt, daſs endlich die Beziehung des einzelnen bewuſsten Seyns auf das abſolute Weſen, die Religion, der Begriff der Nützlichkeit erſchöpfend ausdrückt, iſt dem Glauben ſchlechthin abſcheulich. Dieſe eigne Weisheit der Aufklärung erſcheint ihm nothwendig zugleich als die Plattheit ſelbſt, und als das Geſtändniſs der Plattheit; weil ſie darin beſteht, vom abſoluten Weſen nichts oder was daſſelbe iſt, von ihm dieſe ganz ebne Wahrheit zu wiſſen, daſs es eben nur das abſolute Weſen iſt, dagegen nur von der Endlichkeit und zwar ſie als das Wahre und diſs Wiſſen von derſelben als dem Wahren, als das Höchſte zu wiſſen.

563 Der Glauben hat das göttliche Recht, das Recht der abſoluten Sichſelbſtgleichheit oder des reinen Denkens, gegen die Aufklärung, und erfährt von ihr durchaus Unrecht; denn ſie verdreht ihn in allen ſeinen Momenten, und macht ſie zu etwas anderem, als ſie in ihm ſind. Sie aber hat nur menſchliches Recht gegen ihn und für ihre Wahrheit; denn das Unrecht das ſie begeht, iſt das Recht der Ungleichheit, und beſteht in dem Verkehren und Verändern, ein Recht, das der Natur des Selbſtbewuſstſeyns im Gegenſatze gegen das einfache Weſen oder das Denken angehört Aber indem ihr Recht, das Recht des Selbſtbewuſstſeyns iſt, wird ſie nicht nur auch ihr Recht behalten, ſo daſs zwey gleiche Rechte des Geiſtes einander gegenüber ſtehen blieben, und keins das andere befriedigen könnte, ſondern ſie wird das abſolute Recht behaupten, weil das Selbſtbewuſstſeyn die Negativität 1807 513 des Begriffs iſt, die nicht nur für ſich iſt, ſondern auch über ihr Gegentheil übergreifft; und der Glauben ſelbſt, weil er Bewuſstſeyn iſt, wird ihr ihr Recht nicht verweigern können.

564 Denn die Aufklärung verhält ſich gegen das glaubende Bewuſstſeyn nicht mit eigenthümlichen Principien, ſondern mit ſolchen, welche dieſes ſelbſt an ihm hat. Sie bringt ihm nur ſeine eigenen Gedanken zuſammen, die ihm bewuſstlos auseinanderfallen; ſie erinnert es nur bey der einen ſeiner Weiſen an die andern, die es auch hat, aber deren eine es immer bey der andern vergiſst. Sie erweiſst ſich eben dadurch gegen es als reine Einſicht, daſs ſie bey einem beſtimmten Momente das Ganze ſieht, alſo das auf jenes Moment ſich beziehende Entgegengeſetzte herbeybringt, und eines im andern verkehrend das negative Weſen beyder Gedanken, den Begriff, hervortreibt. Sie erſcheint dem Glauben darum als Verdrehung und Lüge, weil ſie das Andersſeyn ſeiner Momente aufzeigt; ſie ſcheint ihm damit unmittelbar etwas anderes aus ihnen zu machen, als ſie in ihrer Einzelnheit ſind; aber diſs Andere iſt ebenſo weſentlich, und es iſt in Wahrheit in dem glaubenden Bewuſstſeyn ſelbſt vorhanden, nur daſs dieſes daran nicht denkt, ſondern es ſonſt wo hat; daher iſt es ihm weder fremde noch kann es von ihm abgeleugnet werden.

565 Die Aufklärung ſelbſt aber, welche den Glauben an das entgegengeſetzte ſeiner abgeſonderten Momente 1807 514 erinnert, iſt eben ſo wenig über ſich ſelbſt aufgeklärt. Sie verhält ſich rein negativ gegen den Glauben, inſofern ſie ihren Inhalt aus ihrer Reinheit ausſchlieſst, und ihn für das negative ihrer ſelbſt nimmt. Sie erkennt daher weder in dieſem negativen, in dem Inhalte des Glaubens ſich ſelbſt, noch bringt auch ſie aus dieſem Grunde, die beyden Gedanken zuſammen, den welchen ſie herbeybringt, und den, gegen welchen ſie ihn herbeybringt. Indem ſie nicht erkennt, daſs dasjenige, was ſie am Glauben verdammt, unmittelbar ihr eigener Gedanken iſt, ſo iſt ſie ſelbſt in der Entgegenſetzung der beyden Momente, deren eines, nemlich jedesmal das dem Glauben entgegengeſetzte, ſie nur anerkennt, das andere aber gerade wie der Glauben thut, davon trennt. Sie bringt daher nicht die Einheit beyder als Einheit derſelben, d. i. den Begriff hervor; aber er entſteht ihr für ſich oder ſie findet ihn nur als vorhanden. Denn an ſich iſt ebendiſs die Realiſirung der reinen Einſicht, daſs ſie, deren Weſen der Begriff iſt, zuerſt ſich ſelbſt als ein abſolut Anderes wird und ſich verleugnet, denn der Gegenſatz des Begriffes iſt der abſolute, und aus dieſem Andersſeyn zu ſich ſelbſt, oder zu ihrem Begriffe kommt. — Die Aufklärung iſt aber nur dieſe Bewegung, ſie iſt die noch bewuſstloſe Thätigkeit des reinen Begriffes, die zwar zu ſich ſelbſt, als Gegenſtand kommt, aber dieſen für ein Anderes nimmt, auch die Natur des Begriffes nicht kennt, daſs nemlich das Nichtunterſchiedne es iſt, was ſich abſolut trennt. — Gegen den Glauben alſo iſt die Einſicht 1807 515 inſofern die Macht des Begriffes als ſie die Bewegung und das Beziehen der in ſeinem Bewuſstseyn auseinander liegenden Momente ist, ein Beziehen, worin der Widerſpruch derſelben zum Vorſchein kömmt. Hierin liegt das abſolute Recht der Gewalt, welche sie über ihn ausübt; die Wirklichkeit aber, zu der sie dieſe Gewalt bringt, ebendarin, daſs das glaubende Bewuſstseyn ſelbſt der Begriff ist, und alſo das Entgegengeſetzte, das ihm die Einsicht herbeybringt, ſelbſt anerkennt. Sie behält darum gegen es Recht, weil sie an ihm das geltend macht, was ihm ſelbſt nothwendig ist, und was es an ihm ſelbſt hat.

566 Zuerſt behauptet die Aufklärung das Moment des Begriffs, ein Thun des Bewuſstſeyns zu ſeyn; sie behauptet diſs gegen den Glauben, — daſs ſein abſolutes Wesen, Wesen ſeines Bewuſstseyn als eines Selbſts, oder daſs es durch das Bewuſstseyn hervorgebracht ſey. Dem glaubenden Bewuſstseyn ist sein abſolutes Wesen, ebenſo wie es ihm Ansich ist, zugleich nicht wie ein fremdes Ding, welches darin, man weiſs nicht wie und woher, ſtünde, ſondern ſein Vertrauen beſteht gerade darin, sich als dieſes perſönliche Bewuſstseyn darin zu finden, und sein Gehorſam und Dienſt darin, es als sein abſolutes Wesen durch sein Thun hervorzubringen. Hieran erinnert eigentlich nur den Glauben die Aufklärung, wenn er rein das Ansich des abſoluten Weſens jenseits des Thuns des Bewuſstseyns ausſpricht. — Aber indem sie zwar der Einseitigkeit des Glaubens das 1807 516 entgegengeſetzte Moment des Thuns deſſelben gegen das Seyn, an das er hier allein denkt, herbey, ſelbſt aber ihre Gedanken ebenso nicht zuſammenbringt, iſolirt sie das reine Moment des Thuns, und ſpricht von dem Ansich des Glaubens aus, daſs es nur ein hervorgebrachtes des Bewuſstseyns ſey. Das iſolirte dem Ansich entgegengeſetzte Thun ist aber ein zufälliges Thun, und als ein vorſtellendes ein Erzeugen von Fictionen, — Vorſtellungen, die nicht an sich sind; und ſo betrachtet sie den Inhalt des Glaubens. — Umgekehrt aber ſagt die reine Einsicht ebenso das Gegentheil. Indem sie das Moment des Andersſeyns, das der Begriff an ihm hat, behauptet, ſpricht sie das Weſen des Glaubens als ein solches aus, welches das Bewuſstseyn nichts angehe, jenſeits deſſelben, ihm fremd und unerkannt ſey. Dem Glauben, ist es ebenſo wie er einerſeits ihm vertraut, und darin die Gewiſsheit seiner selbſt hat, andererſeits in ſeinen Wegen unerforſchlich, und in ſeinem Seyn unerreichbar.

567 Ferner behauptet die Aufklärung gegen das glaubende Bewuſstseyn darin ein Recht, das es ſelbſt einräumt, wenn sie den Gegenſtand seiner Verehrung, als Stein und Holz, oder ſonſt als eine endliche anthropomorphiſche Beſtimmtheit betrachtet. Denn da es diſs entzweyte Bewuſstseyn ist, ein Jenseits der Wirklichkeit und ein reines Diſſeits von jenem Jenſeits zu haben, ſo ist in ihm in der That auch dieſe Ansicht des sinnlichen Dinges vorhanden, 1807 517 nach welcher es an und für sich gilt; es bringt aber dieſe beyden Gedanken des an und für sich seyenden das ihm einmal das reine Weſen, das anderemal ein gemeines sinnliches Ding ist, nicht zuſammen. — Selbſt sein reines Bewuſstseyn ist von der letztern Ansicht afficirt, denn die Unterſchiede seines übersinnlichen Reichs sind, weil es des Begriffs entbehrt, eine Reihe von ſelbstſtändigen Geſtalten und ihre Bewegung ein Geſchehen, das heiſst, sie sind nur in der Vorſtellung, und haben die Weiſe des sinnlichen Seyns an ihnen. — Die Aufklärung iſolirt ihrerſeits ebenſo die Wirklichkeit, als ein vom Geiſte verlaſſenes Weſen, die Beſtimmtheit als eine unverrückte Endlichkeit, welche nicht in der geiſtigen Bewegung des Weſens ſelbſt ein Moment wäre, nicht Nichts, auch nicht ein an und für sichseyendes Etwas, ſondern ein verschwindendes.

568 Es ist klar, daſs daſſelbe bey dem Grunde des Wiſſens der Fall ist. Das glaubende Bewuſstseyn anerkennt ſelbſt ein zufälliges Wiſſen, denn es hat ein Verhältniſs zu Zufälligkeiten, und das abſolute Wesen selbſt ist ihm in der Form einer vorgeſtellten gemeinen Wirklichkeit; hiemit ist das glaubende Bewuſstseyn auch eine Gewiſsheit, welche nicht die Wahrheit an ihr ſelbſt hat, und es bekennt sich als ein ſolches unweſentliches Bewuſstseyn, diſſeits des sich selbſt vergewiſſernden und bewährenden Geistes. — Diſs Moment vergiſst es aber in seinem geiſtigen unmittelbaren Wiſſen von dem abſoluten 1807 518 Weſen. — Die Aufklärung aber, welche es daran erinnert, denkt wieder nur an das zufällige Wissen, und vergiſst das andere, — denkt nur an die Vermittlung, welche durch ein fremdes Drittes geſchieht, nicht an die, worin das Unmittelbare sich selbſt das Dritte ist, wodurch es sich mit dem Andern, nemlich mit sich ſelbſt, vermittelt.

569 Endlich findet sie in ihrer Ansicht des Thuns des Glaubens das Wegwerfen des Genuſſes und der Habe unrecht und unzweckmäſsig. — Was das Unrecht betrifft, ſo erhält sie die Uebereinſtimmung des glaubenden Bewuſstseyns darin, daſs dieſes ſelbſt dieſe Wirklichkeit anerkennt, Eigenthum zu besitzen, feſtzuhalten, und zu genieſsen; es beträgt sich in der Behauptung des Eigenthums um so isolirter und hartnackiger, so wie in seinem Genuſse um ſo roher dahingegeben, da jenseits dieſer Wirklichkeit sein religiöſes — Besitz und Genuſs aufgebendes — Thun fällt und ihm die Freyheit für jene Seite erkaufft. Dieſer Dienſt der Aufopferung des natürlichen Treibens und Genieſſens hat durch dieſen Gegenſatz in der That keine Wahrheit; die Beybehaltung hat neben der Aufopferung ſtatt; dieſe ist nur ein Zeichen, das die wirkliche Aufopferung nur an einem kleinen Theile vollbringt, und sie daher in der That nur vorſtellt.

570 In Ansehung der Zweckmäſsigkeit findet die Aufklärung das Wegwerfen einer Habe, um von der Habe, die Verſagung eines Genuſſes, um von dem 1807 519 Genuſſe sich befreyt zu wiſſen und zu erweiſen, für ungeſchickt. Das glaubende Bewuſstseyn ſelbſt faſst das abſolute Thun als ein allgemeines Thun; nicht nur das Handeln ſeines abſoluten Weſens als seines Gegenſtandes ist ihm ein allgemeines, ſondern auch das einzelne Bewuſstseyn ſoll sich ganz und allgemein von seinem sinnlichen Wesen befreyt erweiſen. Das Wegwerfen einer einzelnen Habe oder das Verzichtthun auf einen einzelnen Genuſs ist aber nicht dieſe allgemeine Handlung; und indem in der Handlung weſentlich der Zweck, der ein allgemeiner, und die Ausführung, die eine einzelne ist, vor dem Bewuſstseyn in ihrer Unangemeſſenheit ſtehen müſste, so erweiſst sie sich als ein solches Handeln, woran das Bewuſstseyn keinen Antheil hat, und hiemit diſs Handeln eigentlich als zu naiv, um eine Handlung zu ſeyn; es ist zu naiv zu faſten, um von der Luſt der Mahlzeit sich befreyt, — zu naiv, sich, wie Origines, andere Luſt vom Leibe wegzuſchaffen, um sie abgethan zu erweiſen. Die Handlung ſelbſt erweiſst sich als ein äuſſerliches und einzelnes Thun; die Begierde aber ist innerlich eingewurzelt, und ein allgemeines; ihre Luſt verſchwindet weder mit dem Werkzeuge, noch durch einzelne Entbehrung.

571 Die Aufklärung aber iſolirt ihrerſeits hier das innerliche, unwirkliche gegen die Wirklichkeit, wie sie gegen die Innerlichkeit des Glaubens in seiner Anschauung und Andacht, die Aeuſſerlichkeit der 1807 520 Dingheit feſthielt. Sie legt das Weſentliche in die Absicht, in den Gedanken, und erſpart dadurch das wirkliche Vollbringen der Befreyung von den natürlichen Zwecken; im Gegentheil ist dieſe Innerlichkeit ſelbſt das formale, das an den natürlichen Trieben ſeine Erfüllung hat, welche eben dadurch gerechtfertigt sind, daſs sie innerlich, daſs sie dem allgemeinen Seyn, der Natur angehören.

572 Die Aufklärung hat alſo über den Glauben darum eine unwiderſtehliche Gewalt, daſs sich in ſeinem Bewuſstseyn ſelbſt die Momente finden, welche sie geltend macht. Die Wirkung dieſer Krafft näher betrachtet, ſo ſcheint ihr Verhalten gegen ihn die schöne Einheit des Vertrauens und der unmittelbaren Gewiſsheit zu zerreiſſen, sein geiſtiges Bewuſstseyn durch niedrige Gedanken der sinnlichen Wirklichkeit zu verunreinigen, sein in seiner Unterwerfung beruhigtes und sicheres Gemüth durch die Eitelkeit des Verſtandes und des eigenen Willens und Vollbringens zu zerſtören. Aber in der That leitet sie vielmehr die Aufhebung der gedankenloſen oder vielmehr begrifflosen Trennung ein, welche in ihm vorhanden ist. Das glaubende Bewuſstseyn führt doppeltes Maſs und Gewicht, es hat zweyerley Augen, zweyerley Ohren, zweyerley Zunge und Sprache, es hat alle Vorſtellungen vordoppelt, ohne dieſe Doppelsinnigkeit zu vergleichen. Oder der Glauben lebt in zweyerley Wahrnehmungen, der einen, der Wahrnehmung des schlaffenden rein in 1807 521 begrifflosen Gedanken, der andern des wachen, rein in der sinnlichen Wirklichkeit lebenden Bewuſstseyns, und in jeder führt er eine eigene Haushaltung. — Die Aufklärung beleuchtet jene himmlische Welt mit den Vorſtellungen der sinnlichen; und zeigte jener dieſe Endlichkeit auf, die der Glauben nicht verleugnen kann, weil er Selbstbewuſstseyn und hiemit die Einheit ist, welcher beyde Vorſtellungsweiſen angehören, und worin sie nicht auseinander fallen, denn sie gehören demſelben untrennbaren einfachen Selbſt an, in welches er übergegangen iſt.

573 Der Glauben hat hiedurch den Inhalt, der sein Element erfüllte, verloren, und sinkt in ein dumpfes Weben des Geiſtes in ihm ſelbſt zuſammen. Er ist aus ſeinem Reiche vertrieben, oder diſs Reich ist ausgeplündert, indem alle Unterscheidung und Ausbreitung deſſelben das wache Bewuſstseyn an sich riſs, und ſeine Theile alle der Erde als ihr Eigenthum vindicirte und zurückgab. Aber befriedigt ist er darum nicht, denn durch dieſe Beleuchtung ist allenthalben nur einzelnes Weſen entſtanden, so daſs den Geiſt nur weſenloſe Wirklichkeit und von ihm verlaſſne Endlichkeit anſpricht. — Indem er ohne Inhalt ist und in dieſer Leere nicht bleiben kann, oder indem er über das Endliche, das der einzige Inhalt iſt, hinausgehend nur das Leere findet, ist er ein reines Sehnen; seine Wahrheit ein leeres Jenseits, dem sich kein gemäſser Inhalt mehr finden läſst, 1807 522 denn alles ist anders verwandt. — Der Glauben ist in der That hiemit daſſelbe geworden, was die Aufklärung, nemlich das Bewuſstseyn der Beziehung des ansichseyenden Endlichen auf das prädicatlose, unerkannte und unerkennbare Abſolute; nur daſs sie die befriedigte, er aber die unbefriedigte Aufklärung ist. Es wird sich jedoch an ihr zeigen, ob sie in ihrer Befriedigung bleiben kann; jenes Sehnen des trüben Geiſtes, der über den Verluſt seiner geiſtigen Welt trauert, ſteht im Hinterhalte. Sie ſelbſt hat dieſen Makel des unbefriedigten Sehnens an ihr, — als reinen Gegenſtand, an ihrem leeren abſoluten Wesen, — als Thun und Bewegung, an dem Hinausgehen über ihr Einzelweſen zum unerfüllten Jenseits, — als erfüllten Gegenſtand an der Selbſtlosigkeit des Nützlichen. Sie wird diesen Makel aufheben; aus der nähern Betrachtung des positiven Resultates, das ihr die Wahrheit ist, wird sich ergeben, daſs er an sich darin schon aufgehoben ist.

b. Die Wahrheit der Aufklärung.

574 Das dumpfe nichts mehr in sich unterscheidende Weben des Geiſtes ist alſo in sich ſelbſt jenseits des Bewuſstseyns getreten, welches dagegen sich klar geworden ist. — Das erſte Moment dieser Klarheit ist in seiner Nothwendigkeit und Bedingung dadurch 1807 523 beſtimmt, daſs die reine Einsicht, oder sie, die an sich Begriff ist, sich verwirklicht; sie thut diſs, indem sie das Andersſeyn oder die Beſtimmtheit an ihr setzt. Auf diese Weiſe ist sie negative reine Einsicht, d. i. Negation des Begriffs; diese ist ebenſo rein; und es ist damit das reine Ding, das abſolute Weſen, das ſonſt keine weitere Beſtimmung hat, geworden. Diſs näher beſtimmt, ſo ist sie als abſoluter Begriff, ein Unterſcheiden von Unterſchieden, die keine mehr sind, von Abſtractionen oder reinen Begriffen, die sich selbſt nicht mehr tragen, sondern nur durch das Ganze der Bewegung Halt und Unterſcheidung haben. Dieſes Unterſcheiden des Nichtunterſchiednen beſteht gerade darin, daſs der abſolute Begriff sich ſelbſt zu seinem Gegenſtande macht, und jener Bewegung gegenüber sich als das Wesen ſetzt. Diſs entbehrt hiedurch der Seite, worin die Abſtractionen oder Unterschiede auseinandergehalten werden, und wird daher das reine Denken als reines Ding. — Diſs ist alſo eben jenes dumpfe bewuſstlose Weben des Geiſtes in ihm ſelbſt, zu dem der Glauben herabſank, indem er den unterſchiednen Inhalt verlor; — es ist zugleich jene Bewegung des reinen Selbstbewuſstseyns, der es das abſolut fremde Jenseits ſeyn soll. Denn weil diſs reine Selbstbewuſstseyn die Bewegung in reinen Begriffen, in Unterſcheiden ist, die keine sind, ſo fällt es in der That in das bewuſst lose Weben, d. i. in das reine Fühlen oder in die reine Dingheit zuſammen. — Der sich ſelbſt 1807 524 entfremdete Begriff — denn er ſteht hier noch auf der Stuffe dieſer Entfremdung — aber erkennt nicht diſs gleiche Wesen beyder Seiten, der Bewegung des Selbstbewuſstseyns und seines abſoluten Weſens, — nicht das gleiche Wesen derſelben, welches in der That ihre Substanz und Beſtehen ist. Indem er dieſe Einheit nicht erkennt, ſo gilt ihm das Weſen nur in der Form des gegenſtändlichen Jenseits, das unterſcheidende Bewuſstseyn aber, das auf dieſe Weiſe das Ansich auſser ihm hat, als ein endliches Bewuſstseyn.

575 Ueber jenes abſolute Weſen geräth die Aufklärung ſelbſt mit sich in den Streit, den sie vorher mit dem Glauben hatte, und theilt sich in zwey Partheyen. Eine Parthey bewährt sich erst dadurch als die Siegende, daſs sie in zwey Partheyen zerfällt; denn darin zeigt sie das Princip, das sie bekämpfte, an ihr ſelbſt zu besitzen, und hiemit die Einseitigkeit aufgehoben zu haben, in der sie vorher auftrat. Das Intereſſe, das sich zwiſchen ihr und der andern theilte, fällt nun ganz in sie und vergiſst der andern, weil es in ihr ſelbſt den Gegenſatz findet, der es beſchäfftigt. Zugleich aber ist er in das höhere siegende Element erhoben worden, worin er geläutert sich darſtellt. So daſs alſo die in einer Parthey entſtehende Zwietracht, welche ein Unglück ſcheint, vielmehr ihr Glück beweiſst.

576 Das reine Weſen ſelbſt hat keinen Unterſchied an ihm, daher kommt er ſo an daſſelbe, daſs sich zwey ſolche reine Weſen für das Bewuſstseyn, oder 1807 525 ein zweyfaches Bewuſstseyn desſelben hervorthut. — Das reine abſolute Weſen ist nur in dem reinen Denken, oder vielmehr es ist das reine Denken ſelbſt, alſo ſchlechthin jenseits des endlichen, des Selbſtbewuſstseyns, und nur das negative Weſen. Aber auf dieſe Weiſe ist es eben das Seyn, das negative des Selbſtbewuſstseyns. Als negatives deſſelben ist es auch darauf bezogen; es ist das äuſsere Seyn, welches auf es, worin die Unterſchiede und Bestimmungen fallen, bezogen die Unterſchiede an ihm erhält, geſchmeckt, geſehen, und ſo fort zu werden; und das Verhältniſs ist die sinnliche Gewiſsheit und Wahrnehmung.

577 Wird von dieſem sinnlichen Seyn, worein jenes negative Jenſeits nothwendig übergeht, ausgegangen, aber von dieſen beſtimmten Weiſen der Beziehung des Bewuſstseyns abſtrahirt, ſo bleibt die reine Materie übrig als das dumpfe Weben und Bewegen in sich ſelbſt. Es ist hiebey weſentlich, daſs zu betrachten, daſs die reine Materie nur das ist, was übrig bleibt, wenn wir vom Sehen, Fühlen, Schmecken und ſo fort abſtrahiren, das heiſst, sie ist nicht das geſehene, geſchmeckte, gefühlte, und ſo fort; es ist nicht die Materie, die geſehen, gefühlt, geſchmeckt wird, ſondern die Farbe, ein Stein, ein Salz u. ſ. f.; sie ist vielmehr die reine Abſtraction; und dadurch ist das reine Weſen des Denkens, oder das reine Denken ſelbſt vorhanden, als das nicht in sich unterſchiedene, nicht beſtimmte, prädicatloſe Abſolute.

1807 526

578 Die eine Aufklärung nennt das abſolute Weſen jenes prädicatloſe Abſolute, das jenſeits des wirklichen Bewuſstseyns im Denken ist, von welchem ausgegangen wurde; — die andere nennt es Materie. Wenn sie als Natur, und Geiſt oder Gott unterſchieden würden, ſo würde, dem bewuſstloſen Weben in sich ſelbſt, um Natur zu ſeyn, der Reichthum des entfalteten Lebens fehlen; — dem Geiſte oder Gotte das sich in sich unterſcheidende Bewuſstseyn. Beydes ist, wie wir geſehen, ſchlechthin derſelbe Begriff; der Unterſchied liegt nicht in der Sache, ſondern rein nur in dem verſchiedenen Ausgangspunkte beyder Bildungen, und darin, daſs jede auf einem eigenen Punkte in der Bewegung des Denkens ſtehen bleibt. Wenn sie darüber hinwegſetzten, würden sie zuſammentreffen und als daſſelbe erkennen, was der einen, wie sie vorgibt, ein Greuel, der andern eine Thorheit ist. Denn der einen ist das abſolute Weſen in ihrem reinen Denken oder unmittelbar für das reine Bewuſstseyn, auſſer dem endlichen Bewuſstseyn, das negative Jenseits deſſelben. Würde sie darauf reflectiren, daſs theils jene einfache Unmittelbarkeit des Denkens nichts anderes ist als das reine Seyn, theils das was negativ für das Bewuſstseyn ist, sich zugleich darauf bezieht, daſs im negativen Urtheile das ist (copula) beyde getrennten ebenſo zuſammenhält, — ſo würde sich die Beziehung dieſes Jenseits in der Bestimmung eines äuſſern Seyenden auf das Bewuſstseyn ergeben, 1807 527 und hiemit als daſſelbe, was reine Materie genannt wird; das fehlende Moment der Gegenwart wäre gewonnen. — Die andere Aufklärung geht von dem sinnlichen Seyn aus, abſtrahirt dann von der sinnlichen Beziehung des Schmeckens, Sehens und so fort, und macht es zum reinen Ansich, zur abſoluten Materie, dem nicht gefühlten, noch geſchmeckten; diſs Seyn ist auf dieſe Weise das prädicatlose Einfache, Wesen des reinen Bewuſstseyns geworden; es ist der reine Begriff als an sich seyend, oder das reine Denken in sich selbſt. Diese Einsicht macht in ihrem Bewuſstseyn nicht den entgegengesetzten Schritt vom Seyenden, welches rein seyendes ist, zum Gedachten, das daſſelbe ist, als das reinſeyende, oder nicht vom rein Positiven zum rein Negativen; indem doch das Positive rein schlechthin nur durch die Negation ist; das rein Negative aber als reines, sich in sich selbſt gleich und eben dadurch positiv ist. — Oder beyde sind nicht zum Begriffe der Cartesiſchen Metaphysik gekommen, daſs an sich Seyn und Denken daſſelbe ist, nicht zu dem Gedanken, daſs Seyn, reines Seyn, nicht ein concretes wirkliches ist, sondern die reine Abſtraction; und umgekehrt das reine Denken, die Sichselbstgleichheit, oder das Wesen, theils das Negative des Selbstbewuſstseyns und hiemit Seyn, theils als unmittelbare Einfachheit ebenso nichts anderes als Seyn ist; das Denken ist Dingheit, oder Dingheit ist Denken.

1807 528

579 Das Weſen hat hier die Entzweyung erſt ſo an ihm, daſs es zwey Arten der Betrachtungsweise angehört; theils muſs das Wesen den Unterſchied an ihm selbst haben, theils gehen eben darin die beyden Betrachtungsarten in Eine zusammen; denn die abſtracten Momente des reinen Seyns und des Negativen, wodurch sie sich unterscheiden, sind alsdenn in dem Gegenſtande dieſer Betrachtungsweiſen vereinigt. — Das gemeinschafftliche Allgemeine ist die Abſtraction des reinen Erzitterns in sich ſelbſt, oder des reinen sich ſelbſt Denkens. Diese einfache achsendrehende Bewegung muſs sich auseinander werfen, weil sie ſelbſt nur Bewegung ist, indem sie ihre Momente unterscheidet. Diese Unterscheidung der Momente läſst das Unbewegte als die leere Hülſe des reinen Seyns, das kein wirkliches Denken, kein Leben in sich selbst mehr ist, zurück; denn sie ist als der Unterſchied aller Inhalt. Sie, die sich auſſer jener Einheit setzt, ist aber hiemit der nicht in sich zurückkehrende Wechsel der Momente, des ansich und des für ein anderes und des fürsichſeyns; — die Wirklichkeit, wie sie Gegenſtand für das wirkliche Bewuſstseyn der reinen Einsicht ist, — die Nützlichkeit.

580 So schlecht die Nützlichkeit dem Glauben, oder der Empfindſamkeit, oder auch der sich Speculation nennenden Abſtraction, welche sich das ansich fixirt, ausſehen mag, so ist sie es, worin die reine Einsicht ihre Realisirung vollendet, und sich selbſt ihr 1807 529 *Gegenſtand ist, den sie nun nicht mehr verleugnet, und der auch nicht den Werth des Leeren oder des reinen Jenseits für sie hat. Denn die reine Einsicht ist, wie wir ſahen, der seyende Begriff selbſt, oder die sich selbſt gleiche reine Persönlichkeit, so sich in sich unterscheidend, daſs jedes der unterſchiedenen selbst reiner Begriff, das heiſst unmittelbar nicht unterschieden ist; sie ist einfaches reines Selbſtbewuſstseyn, welches ebensowohl für sich als an sich in einer unmittelbaren Einheit ist. Sein Ansichseyn ist daher nicht bleibendes Seyn, sondern hört unmittelbar auf, in ſeinem Unterschiede etwas zu ſeyn; ein solches Seyn aber, das unmittelbar keinen Halt hat, ist nicht an sich, sondern weſentlich für ein anders, das die Macht ist, die es abſorbirt. Aber diſs zweyte dem ersten, dem Ansichseyn, entgegengesetzte Moment verschwindet ebenso unmittelbar als das erſte, oder als Seyn nur für anderes ist es vielmehr das Verſchwinden ſelbſt, und es ist das in sich zurückgekehrt, das für sich seyn geſetzt. Diſs einfache für sich seyn ist aber als die Sichselbſtgleichheit vielmehr ein Seyn, oder damit für ein anderes. — Dieſe Natur der reinen Einsicht in der Entfaltung ihrer Momente, oder sie als Gegenſtand drückt das Nützliche aus. Es ist ein an sich beſtehendes oder Ding, diſs Ansichseyn ist zugleich nur reines Moment; es ist somit abſolut für ein anderes, aber es ist ebenso nur für ein anderes, als es an sich ist; dieſe entgegengeſetzten Momente sind in die unzertrennliche Einheit des 1807 530 Fürsichseyns zurückgekehrt. Wenn aber das Nützliche wohl den Begriff der reinen Einsicht ausdrückt, so ist es jedoch nicht als solche, ſondern sie als Vorſtellung oder als ihr Gegenſtand; es ist nur der raſtloſe Wechsel jener Momente, deren eines zwar das in sich ſelbſt zurückgekehrtseyn ſelbſt ist, aber nur als fürsichseyn, d. h. als ein abſtractes gegen die andern auf die Seite tretendes Moment. Das nützliche selbſt ist nicht das negative Wesen, diese Momente in ihrer Entgegensetzung zugleich ungetrennt in ein und derselben Rücksicht, oder als ein Denken an sich zu haben, wie sie als reine Einsicht sind; das Moment des Fürsichseyns ist wohl an dem Nützlichen, aber nicht ſo, daſs es über die andern Momente, das Ansich und das Seyn für anderes, übergreift, und somit das Selbst wäre. Die reine Einsicht hat alſo an dem Nützlichen ihren eigenen Begriff in ſeinen reinen Momenten zum Gegenſtande; sie ist das Bewuſstseyn dieser Metaphysik, aber noch nicht das Begreiffen derselben; es ist noch nicht zu der Einheit des Seyns und des Begriffs selbst gekommen. Weil das Nützliche noch die Form eines Gegenſtandes für sie hat, hat sie eine zwar nicht mehr an und für sich seyende, aber doch noch eine Welt, welche sie von sich unterscheidet. Allein indem die Gegensätze auf die Spitze des Begriffes herausgetreten sind, wird diſs die nächste Stuffe seyn, daſs sie zuſammenſtürzen, und die Aufklärung die Früchte ihrer Thaten erfährt.

1807 531

581 Den erreichten Gegenſtand in Beziehung auf dieſe ganze Sphäre betrachtet, ſo hatte die wirkliche Welt der Bildung sich in die Eitelkeit des Selbstbewuſstseyns zuſammengefaſst, — in das Fürsichseyn, das ihre Verworrenheit noch zu ſeinem Inhalte hat, und noch der einzelne Begriff, noch nicht der für sich allgemeine ist. In sich aber zurückgekehrt ist er die reine Einsicht, — das reine Bewuſstseyn als das reine Selbſt, oder die Negativität, wie der Glauben ebendaſſelbe als das reine Denken oder die Positivität. Der Glauben hat in jenem Selbſt das ihn vervollſtändigende Moment; — aber durch diese Ergäntzung untergehend, ist es nun an der reinen Einsicht, daſs wir die beyden Momente ſehen, als das abſolute Weſen, das rein gedacht oder negatives — und als Materie, die das positive seyende ist. — Es fehlt dieser Vollständigkeit noch jene Wirklichkeit des Selbſtbewuſstſeyns, welche dem eiteln Bewuſstseyn angehört, — die Welt, aus welcher das Denken sich zu sich erhob. Diſs Fehlende ist in der Nützlichkeit insofern erreicht, als die reine Einsicht daran die positive Gegenſtändlichkeit erlangte; sie ist dadurch wirkliches in sich befriedigtes Bewuſstseyn. Diese Gegenſtändlichkeit macht nun ihre Welt aus; sie ist die Wahrheit der vorhergehenden ganzen der ideellen wie der reellen Welt geworden. Die erste Welt des Geiſtes ist das ausgebreitete Reich seines sich zerſtreuenden Daſeyns und der vereinzelnten Gewiſsheit ſeiner ſelbſt; wie die Natur ihr Leben in 1807 532 unendlich mannichfaltige Geſtalten zerſtreut, ohne daſs die Gattung derſelben vorhanden wäre. Die zweyte enthält die Guttung, und ist das Reich des Ansichseyns, oder der Wahrheit entgegengeſetzt jener Gewiſsheit. Das dritte aber, das Nützliche ist die Wahrheit, welche ebenſo die Gewiſsheit ſeiner ſelbſt ist. Dem Reiche der Wahrheit des Glaubens fehlt das Princip der Wirklichkeit oder Gewiſsheit ſeiner ſelbſt als dieſes Einzelnen. Der Wirklichkeit aber oder Gewiſsheit ſeiner selbſt als dieſes einzelnen fehlt das Ansich. In dem Gegenſtande der reinen Einsicht sind beyde Welten vereinigt. Das Nützliche ist der Gegenſtand, inſofern das Selbſtbewuſstſeyn ihn durchſchaut, und die einzelne Gewiſsheit seiner selbſt, seinen Genuſs, (sein Fürsichseyn) in ihm hat; es sicht ihn auf dieſe Weiſe ein, und dieſe Einsicht enthält das wahre Weſen des Gegenſtandes; (ein durchſchautes oder für ein anderes zu ſeyn) sie ist alſo selbſt wahres Wissen, und das Selbſtbewuſstseyn hat ebenſo unmittelbar die allgemeine Gewiſsheit ſeiner selbst, sein reines Bewuſstseyn in diesem Verhältniſſe, in welchem also ebenso Wahrheit, wie Gegenwart und Wirklichkeit vereinigt sind. Beyde Welten sind versöhnt, und der Himmel auf die Erde herunter verpflanzt.

1807 533

III. Die abſolute Freyheit und der Schrecken.

582 Das Bewuſstſeyn hat in der Nützlichkeit ſeinen Begriff geſunden. Aber er iſt theils noch Gegenſtand, theils ebendarum noch Zweck, in deſſen Beſitze es ſich noch nicht unmittelbar befindet. Die Nützlichkeit iſt noch Prädicat des Gegenſtandes, nicht Subject ſelbſt, oder ſeine unmittelbare und einzige Wirklichkeit. Es iſt daſſelbe, was vorhin ſo erſchien; daſs das Fürſichſeyn noch nicht ſich als die Subſtanz der übrigen Momente erwieſen, wodurch das Nützliche unmittelbar nichts anderes als das Selbſt des Bewuſstſeyns und dieſes hiedurch in ſeinem Beſitze wäre. — Dieſe Rücknahme der Form der Gegenſtändlichkeit des Nützlichen iſt aber an ſich ſchon geſchehen, und aus dieſer innern Umwälzung tritt die wirkliche Umwälzung der Wirklichkeit, die neue Geſtalt des Bewuſstſeyns, die abſolute Freyheit hervor.

583 Es iſt nemlich in der That nicht mehr als ein leerer Schein von Gegenſtändlichkeit vorhanden, der das 1807 534 Selbſtbewuſstſeyn von dem Beſitze trennt. Denn theils iſt überhaupt alles Beſtehen und Gelten der beſtimmten Glieder der Organiſation der wirklichen und geglaubten Welt in dieſe einfache Beſtimmung als in ihren Grund und Geiſt zurückgegangen; theils aber hat dieſe nichts eignes mehr für ſich, ſie iſt vielmehr reine Metaphyſik, reiner Begriff oder Wiſſen des Selbstbewuſstseyns. Von dem an und für ſich ſeyn des Nützlichen als Gegenſtandes erkennt nemlich das Bewuſstseyn, daſs ſein Anſichſeyn weſentlich Seyn für anderes iſt; des Anſichſeyn als das Selbſtloſe iſt in Wahrheit das paſſive, oder was für ein anderes Selbſt iſt. Der Gegenſtand iſt aber für das Bewuſstseyn in dieſer abſtracten Form des reinen Anſichſeyns, denn es iſt reines Einſehen, deſſen Unterſchiede in der reinen. Form der Begriffe ſind. — Das Fürſichſeyn aber, in welches das Seyn für anderes zurückgeht, das Selbſt, iſt nicht ein von dem Ich verſchiednes, eignes Selbſt deſſen, was Gegenſtand heiſst; denn das Bewuſstseyn als reine Einſicht iſt nicht einzelnes Selbſt, dem der Gegenſtand ebenſo als eignes Selbſt gegenüberſtünde, ſondern es iſt der reine Begriff, das Schauen des Selbſts in das Selbſt, das abſolute ſich ſelbſt doppelt ſehen; die Gewiſsheit ſeiner iſt das allgemeine Subject und ſein wiſſender Begriff das Weſen aller Wirklichkeit. Wenn alſo das Nützliche nur der nicht in ſeine eigne Einheit zurückkehrende Wechsel der Momente, und daher noch Gegenſtand für das Wiſſen war, ſo hört er auf dieſes zu ſeyn, denn das Wiſſen 1807 535 iſt ſelbſt die Bewegung jener abſtracten Momente, es iſt das allgemeine Selbſt, das Selbſt ebenſo ſeiner als des Gegenſtandes, und als allgemeines, die in ſich zurückkehrende Einheit dieſer Bewegung.

584 Hiemit iſt der Geiſt als abſolute Freyheit vorhanden; er iſt das Selbstbewuſstseyn, welches ſich erfaſst, daſs ſeine Gewiſsheit ſeiner ſelbſt, das Weſen aller geiſtigen Maſſen der realen ſo wie der überſinnlichen Welt, oder umgekehrt, daſs Weſen und Wirklichkeit das Wiſſen des Bewuſstseyns von ſich iſt. — Es iſt ſeiner reinen Perſönlichkeit und darinn aller geiſtigen Realität bewuſst, und alle Realität iſt nur geiſtiges; die Welt iſt ihm ſchlechthin ſein Willen, und dieſer iſt allgemeiner Willen. Und zwar iſt er nicht der leere Gedanke des Willens, der in ſtillſchweigende oder repreſentirte Einwilligung geſetzt wird, ſondern reell allgemeiner Willen, Willen aller einzelner als ſolcher. Denn der Willen iſt an ſich das Bewuſstſeyn der Perſönlichkeit oder eines Jeden, und als dieſer wahrhafte wirkliche Willen ſoll er ſeyn, als ſelbſtbewuſstes Weſen aller und jeder Perſönlichkeit, ſo daſs jeder immer ungetheilt Alles thut, und was als Thun des Ganzen auftritt, das unmittelbare und bewuſste Thun eines Jeden iſt.

585 Dieſe ungetheilte Subſtanz der abſoluten Freyheit erhebt ſich auf den Thron der Welt, ohne daſs irgend eine Macht ihr Widerſtand zu leiſten vermöchte. Denn indem in Wahrheit das Bewuſstseyn allein das Element iſt, worinn die geiſtigen Weſen oder 1807 536 Mächte ihre Subſtanz haben, ſo iſt ihr ganzes Syſtem, das ſich durch die Theilung in Maſſen organiſirte und erhielt, zuſammengefallen, nachdem das einzelne Bewuſstseyn den Gegenſtand ſo erfaſst, daſs er kein anderes Weſen habe, als das Selbſtbewuſstseyn ſelbſt, oder daſs er abſolut der Begriff iſt. Was den Begriff zum ſeyenden Gegenſtande machte, war ſeine Unterſcheidung in abgeſonderte beſtehende Maſſen; indem aber der Gegenſtand zum Begriffe wird, iſt nichts beſtehendes mehr an ihm; die Negativität hat alle ſeine Momente durchdrungen. Er tritt ſo in die Exiſtenz, daſs jedes einzelne Bewuſstſeyn aus der Sphäre, der es zugetheilt war, ſich erhebt, nicht mehr in dieſer beſonderten Maſſe ſein Weſen und ſein Werk findet, ſondern ſein Selbſt als den Begriff des Willens, alle Maſſen als Weſen dieſes Willens erfaſst, und ſich hiemit auch nur in einer Arbeit verwirklichen kann, welche ganze Arbeit iſt. In dieſer abſoluten Freyheit ſind alſo alle Stände, welche die geiſtigen Weſen ſind, worein ſich das Ganze gliedert, getilgt; das einzelne Bewuſstſeyn, das einem ſolchen Gliede angehörte, und in ihm wollte und vollbrachte, hat ſeine Schranke aufgehoben; ſein Zweck iſt der allgemeine Zweck, ſeine Sprache das allgemeine Geſetz, ſein Werk das allgemeine Werk.

586 Der Gegenſtand und der Unterſchied hat hier die Bedeutung der Nützlichkeit, die Prädicat alles realen Seyns war, verloren; das Bewuſstseyn fängt ſeine Bewegung nicht an ihm an als einem fremden, von dem aus es 1807 537 erſt in ſich zurückkehrte, ſondern der Gegenſtand iſt ihm das Bewuſstseyn ſelbſt; der Gegenſatz beſteht alſo allein in dem Unterſchiede des einzelnen und allgemeinen Bewuſstseyns; aber das einzelne iſt ſich unmittelbar ſelbſt dasjenige, was nur den Schein des Gegenſatzes hatte, es iſt allgemeines Bewuſstſeyn und Willen. Das Jenſeits dieſer ſeiner Wirklichkeit ſchwebt über dem Leichname der verſchwundnen Selbſtſtändigkeit des realen oder geglaubten Seyns nur als die Ausdünſtung eines faden Gaſes, des leeren Etre ſuprême.

587 Es iſt nach Aufhebung der unterſchiedeneu geiſtigen Maſſen, und des beſchränkten Lebens der Individuen, ſo wie ſeiner beyden Welten alſo nur die Bewegung des allgemeinen Selbſtbewuſstseyns in ſich ſelbſt vorhanden, als eine Wechſelwirkung deſſelben in der Form der Allgemeinheit und des perſönlichen Bewuſstſeyns; der allgemeine Willen geht in ſich, und iſt einzelner Willen, dem das allgemeine Geſetz und Werk gegenüberſteht. Aber diſs einzelne Bewuſstſeyn iſt ſich ſeiner ebenſo unmittelbar als allgemeinen Willens bewuſst; es iſt ſich bewuſst, daſs ſein Gegenſtand von ihm gegebenes Geſetz und von ihm vollbrachtes Werk iſt; in Thätigkeit übergehend und Gegenſtändlichkeit erſchaffend, macht es alſo nichts einzelnes, ſondern nur Geſetze, und Staatsactionen.

588 Dieſe Bewegung iſt hiedurch die Wechſelwirkung des Bewuſstseyns mit ſich ſelbſt, worinn es nichts in der Geſtalt eines freyen ihm gegenüber tretenden 1807 538 *Gegenſtandes entläſst. Es folgt daraus, daſs es zu keinem poſitiven Werke, weder zu allgemeinen Werken der Sprache noch der Wirklichkeit, weder zu Geſetzen und allgemeinen Einrichtungen der bewuſsten — noch zu Thaten und Werken der wollenden Freyheit kommen kann. — Das Werk, zu welchem die ſich Bewuſstſeyn gebende Freyheit ſich machen könnte, würde darin beſtehen, daſs ſie als allgemeine Subſtanz ſich zum Gegenſtande und bleibenden Seyn machte. Diſs Andersſeyn wäre der Unterſchied an ihr, wornach ſie ſich in beſtehende geiſtige Maſſen und in die Glieder verſchiedener Gewalten theilte; theils daſs dieſe Maſſen die Gedankendinge einer geſonderten geſetzgebenden, richterlichen und ausübenden Gewalt wären, theils aber die realen Weſen, die ſich in der realen Welt der Bildung ergaben, und indem der Inhalt des allgemeinen Thuns näher beachtet würde, die beſondern Maſſen des Arbeitens, welche weiter als ſpeciellere Stände unterſchieden werden. — Die allgemeine Freyheit, die ſich auf dieſe Weiſe in ihre Glieder geſondert, und ebendadurch zur ſeyenden Subſtanz gemacht hätte, wäre dadurch frey von der einzelnen Individualität und theilte die Menge der Individuen unter ihre verſchiedenen Glieder. Das Thun und Seyn der Perſönlichkeit ſande ſich aber dadurch auf einen Zweig des Ganzen, auf eine Art des Thuns und Seyns beſchränkt; in das Element des Seyns geſetzt, erhielte ſie die Bedeutung einer beſtimmten; ſie hörte auf in Wahrheit allgemeines Selbſtbewuſstseyn zu ſeyn. Dieſes läſst ſich 1807 539 dabey nicht durch die Vorſtellung des Gehorſams unter ſelbſtgegebenen Geſetzen, die ihm einen Theil zuwieſen, noch durch ſeine Repreſentation beym Geſetzgeben und allgemeinen Thun um die Wirklichkeit betriegen, — nicht um die Wirklichkeit, ſelbſt das Geſetz zu geben, und nicht ein einzelnes Werk, ſondern das allgemeine ſelbſt zu vollbringen; denn wobey dae Selbſt nur repreſentirt und vorgeſtellt iſt, da iſt es nicht wirklich; wo es vertreten iſt, iſt es nicht.

589 Wie in dieſem allgemeinen Werke der abſoluten Freyheit als daſeyender Subſtanz ſich das einzelne Selbſtbewuſstſeyn nicht findet, eben ſo wenig in eigentlichen Thaten und individuellen Handlungen ihres Willens. Daſs das Allgemeine zu einer That komme, muſs es ſich in das Eins der Individualität zuſammennehmen, und ein einzelnes Selbſtbewuſstſeyn an die Spitze ſtellen; denn der allgemeine Willen iſt nur in einem Selbſt, das Eines iſt, wirklicher Willen. Dadurch aber ſind alle andern Einzelnen von dem Ganzen dieſer That ausgeſchloſſen, und haben nur einen beſchränkten Antheil an ihr, ſo daſs die That nicht That des wirklichen allgemeinen Selbſtbewuſstſeyns seyn würde. — Kein poſitives Werk noch That kann alſo die allgemeine Freyheit hervorbringen; es bleibt ihr nur das negative Thun; ſie iſt nur die Furie des Verſchwindens.

590 Aber die höchſte und der allgemeinen Freyheit entgegengeſetzteſte Wirklichkeit oder vielmehr der einzige Gegenſtand, der für ſie noch wird, iſt die 1807 540 Freyheit und Einzelnheit des wirklichen Selbſtbewuſstſeyns ſelbſt. Denn jene Allgemeinheit, die ſich nicht zu der Realität der organiſchen Gegliederung kommen läſst, und in der ungetheilten Continuität ſich zu erhalten den Zweck hat, unterſcheidet ſich in ſich zugleich, weil ſie Bewegung oder Bewuſstſeyn überhaupt iſt. Und zwar um ihrer eignen Abſtraction willen, trennt ſie ſich in eben ſo abſtracte Extreme, in die einfache unbiegſame kalte Allgemeinheit, und in die discrete abſolute harte Sprödigkeit und eigenſinnige Punctualität des wirklichen Selbſtbewuſstſeyns. Nachdem ſie mit der Vertilgung der realen Organiſation fertig geworden, und nun für ſich beſteht, iſt diſs ihr einziger Gegenſtand; — ein Gegenſtand, der keinen andern Inhalt, Beſitz, Daſeyn und äuſſerliche Ausdehnung mehr hat, ſondern er iſt nur diſs Wiſſen von ſich als abſolut reinem und freyem einzelnem Selbſt. An was er erfaſst werden kann, iſt allein ſein abſtractes Daſeyn überhaupt. — Das Verhältniſs alſo dieſer beyden, da ſie untheilbar abſolut für ſich ſind, und alſo keinen Theil in die Mitte ſchicken können, wodurch ſie ſich verknüpften, iſt die ganz unvermittelte reine Negation; und zwar die Negation des Einzelnen als Seyenden in dem Allgemeinen. Das einzige Werk und That der allgemeinen Freyheit iſt daher der Tod, und zwar ein Tod, der keinen innern Umfang und Erfüllung hat, denn was negirt wird, iſt der unerfüllte Punkt des abſolutfreyen Selbſts; er iſt alſo der 1807 541 kälteſte, platteſte Tod, ohne mehr Bedeutung, als das Durchhauen eines Kohlhaupts oder ein Schluck Waſſers.

591 In der Plattheit dieſer Sylbe beſteht die Weisheit der Regierung, der Verſtand des allgemeinen Willens ſich zu vollbringen. Die Regierung iſt ſelbſt nichts anders, als der ſich feſtſetzende Punkt oder die Individualität des allgemeinen Willens. Sie, ein Wollen und Vollbringen, das aus einem Punkte ausgeht, will und vollbringt zugleich eine beſtimmte Anordnung und Handlung. Sie ſchlieſst damit einerſeits die übrigen Individuen aus ihrer That aus, andererſeits conſtituirt ſie ſich dadurch als eine ſolche, die ein beſtimmter Willen, und dadurch dem allgemeinen Willen entgegengeſetzt iſt; ſie kann daher ſchlechterdings nicht anders, denn als eine Faction ſich darſtellen. Die ſiegende Faction nur heiſst Regierung, und ebendarin daſs ſie Faction iſt, liegt unmittelbar die Nothwendigkeit ihres Untergangs; und daſs ſie Regierung iſt, diſs macht ſie umgekehrt zur Faction und ſchuldig. Wenn der allgemeine Willen ſich an ihr wirkliches Handeln als an das Verbrechen hält, das ſie gegen ihn begeht, ſo hat ſie dagegen nichts Beſtimmtes und Aeuſſeres, wodurch die Schuld des ihr entgegengeſetzten Willens ſich darſtellte; denn ihr als dem wirklichen allgemeinen Willen ſteht nur der unwirkliche reine Willen, die Abſicht, gegenuber. Verdächtig werden tritt daher an die Stelle, oder hat die Bedeutung und Wirkung 1807 542 des Schuldigſeyns, und die äuſſerliche Reaction gegen dieſe Wirklichkeit, die in dem einfachen Innern der Abſicht liegt, beſteht in dem trocknen Vertilgen dieſes ſeyenden Selbſts, an dem nichts ſonſt wegzunehmen iſt, als nur ſein Seyn ſelbſt.

592 In dieſem ihrem eigenthümlichen Werke wird die abſolute Freyheit ſich zum Gegenſtande, und das Selbſtbewuſstſeyn erfahrt, was ſie iſt. Anſich iſt ſie eben diſs abſtracte Selbſtbewuſstseyn, welches allen Unterſchied und alles Beſtehen des Unterſchiedes in ſich vertilgt. Als dieſes iſt ſie ſich der Gegenſtand; der Schrecken des Todes iſt die Anſchauung dieſes ihres negativen Weſens. Dieſe ſeine Realitat findet aber das abſolutfreye Selbſtbewuſstſeyn ganz anders als ihr Begriff von ihr ſelbſt war, daſs nemlich der allgemeine Willen nur das poſitive Weſen der Perſönlichkeit ſey, und dieſe in ihm ſich nur poſitiv oder erhalten wiſſe. Sondern hier iſt für es, das als reine Einſicht ſein poſitives und negatives Weſen, — das prädicatloſe Abſolute als reines Denken, und als reine Materie ſchlechthin trennt, — der abſolute Uebergang von dem einen in das andere, in ſeiner Wirklichkeit vorhanden. — Der allgemeine Willen, als abſolut poſitives wirkliches Selbſtbewuſstſeyn, ſchlagt, weil es dieſe zum reinen Denken oder zur abſtracten Materie geſteigerte selbſtbewuſste Wirklichkeit iſt, in das negative Weſen um, und erweiſst ſich ebenſo Aufheben des ſich ſelbſt Denkens oder des Selbſtbewuſstſeyns zu ſeyn.

1807 543

593 Die abſolute Freyheit hat alſo als reine Sichſelbſtgleichheit des allgemeinen Willens die Negation, damit aber den Unterſchied überhaupt an ihr, und entwickelt dieſen wieder als wirklichen Unterſchied. Denn die reine Negativität hat an dem ſich ſelbſtgleichen allgemeinen Willen das Element des Beſtehens oder die Subſtanz, worin ihre Momente ſich realiſiren, ſie hat die Materie welche ſie in ihre Beſtimmtheit verwenden kann; und inſofern dieſe Subſtanz ſich als das negative für das einzelne Bewuſstseyn gezeigt hat, bildet ſich alſo wieder die Organiſation der geiſtigen Maſſen aus, denen die Menge der individuellen Bewuſstseyn zugetheilt wird. Dieſe, welche die Furcht ihres abſoluten Herrn, des Todes empfunden, laſſen ſich die Negation und die Unterſchiede wieder gefallen, ordnen ſich unter die Maſſen, und kehren zu einem getheilten und beſchrankten Werke, aber dadurch zu ihrer ſubſtantiellen Wirklichkeit zurück.

594 Der Geiſt wäre aus dieſem Tumulte zu ſeinem Ausgangspunkte, der ſittlichen und realen Welt der Bildung, zurückgeſchleudert, welche durch die Furcht des Herrn, die wieder in die Gemüther gekommen, nur erfriſcht und verjüngt worden. Der Geiſt müſste dieſen Kreislauf der Nothwendigkeit von neuem durchlauffen und immer wiederhohlen, wenn nur die vollkommne Durchdringung des Selbſtbewuſstseyns und der Subſtanz, das Reſultat wäre, — eine Durchdringung, worin das Selbſtbewuſstseyn, das die gegen es 1807 544 negative Krafft ſeines allgemeinen Weſens erfahren, ſich nicht als dieſes Beſondre, ſondern nur als Allgemeines wiſſen und finden wollte, und daher auch die gegenſtändliche es als Beſonders ausſchlieſſende Wirklichkeit des allgemeinen Geiſtes ertragen könnte. — Aber in der abſoluten Freyheit war nicht, weder das Bewuſstseyn, das in mannichfaltiges Daſeyn verſenkt iſt, oder das ſich beſtimmte Zwecke und Gedanken feſtſetzt, — noch eine äuſſere geltende Welt, es ſey der Wirklichkeit oder des Denkens, miteinander in Wechſelwirkung, ſondern die Welt ſchlechthin in der Form des Bewuſstseyns, als allgemeiner Willen und ebenſo das Selbſtbewuſstseyn zuſammengezogen aus allem ausgedehnten Daſeyn oder mannichfaltigem Zweck und Urtheil in das einfache Selbſt. Die Bildung, die es in der Wechſelwirkung mit jenem Weſen erlangt, iſt daher die erhabenſte und letzte, ſeine reine einfache Wirklichkeit unmittelbar verſchwinden und in das leere Nichts übergehen zu ſehen. In der Welt der Bildung ſelbſt, kommt es nicht dazu, ſeine Negation oder Entfremdung in dieſer Form der reinen Abſtraction anzuſchauen; ſondern ſeine Negation iſt die erfüllte; entweder die Ehre oder der Reichthum, die es an die Stelle des Selbſts, deſſen es ſich entfremdete, gewinnt; — oder die Sprache des Geiſtes und der Einſicht, die das zerriſſene Bewuſstſeyn erlangt, oder ſie iſt der Himmel des Glaubens, oder das Nützliche der Aufklärung. Alle dieſe Beſtimmungen ſind in dem Verluſte, den das Selbſt in der abſoluten 1807 545 Freyheit erfährt, verloren; ſeine Negation iſt der bedeutungslose Tod, der reine Schrecken des Negativen, das nichts poſitives, nichts erfüllendes in ihm hat. — Zugleich aber iſt dieſe Negation in ihrer Wirklichkeit nicht ein Fremdes, ſie iſt weder die allgemeine jenſeits liegende Nothwendigkeit, worin die ſittliche Welt untergeht, noch der einzelne Zufall des eignen Beſitzes oder der Laune des Beſitzenden, von dem das zerriſſne Bewuſstſeyn ſich abhängig ſieht, — ſondern ſie iſt der allgemeine Willen, der in dieser seiner letzten Abſtraction nichts poſitives hat, und daher nichts für die Aufopferung zurückgeben kann, — aber ebendarum iſt er unvermittelt eins mit dem Selbstbewuſstseyn, oder er iſt das rein poſitive, weil er das rein negative iſt; und der bedeutungslose Tod, die unerfüllte Negativität des Selbſts schlägt im innern Begriffe zur absoluten Poſitivität um. Für das Bewuſstſeyn verwandelt ſich die unmittelbare Einheit seiner mit dem allgemeinen Willen, seine Foderung ſich als diesen beſtimmten Punkt im allgemeinen Willen zu wiſſen, in die schlechthin entgegengesetzte Erfahrung um. Was ihm darin verschwindet, ist das abstracte Seyn oder die Unmittelbarkeit des subſtanzlosen Punkts, und diese verschwundne Unmittelbarkeit ist der allgemeine Willen selbst, als welchen es sich nun weiſs, insofern es aufgehobne Unmittelbarkeit, insofern es reines Wissen oder reiner Willen iſt. Hiedurch weiſs es ihn als sich selbst und sich als Wesen, aber nicht 1807 546 als das unmittelbarſeyende Wesen, weder ihn als die revolutionäre Regierung oder als die die Anarchie zu constituiren strebende Anarchie, noch sich als Mittelpunkt dieser Faction oder der ihr entgegengesetzten, sondern der allgemeine Willen ist sein reines Wissen und Wollen, und es ist allgememer Willen, als dieses reine Wissen und Wollen. Es verliert darin nicht sich selbst, denn das reine Wissen und Wollen iſt vielmehr es, als der atome Punkt des Bewuſstseyns. Es ist also die Wechselwirkung des reinen Wissens mit sich selbst; das reine Wissen als Wesen ist der allgemeine Willen; aber dieses Wesen ist schlechthin nur das reine Wissen. Das Selbstbewuſstseyn ist also das reine Wissen von dem Wesen als reinem Wissen. Es ferner als einzelnes Selbst ist nur die Form des Subjects oder wirklichen Thuns, die von ihm als Form gewuſst wird; ebenso ist für es die gegenständliche Wirklichkeit, das Seyn, schlechthin selbstlose Form; denn sie wäre das nicht gewuſste; diſs Wissen aber weiſs das Wissen als das Wesen.

595 Die abſolute Freyheit hat also den Gegenſatz des allgemeinen und einzelnen Willens mit sich ſelbst ausgeglichen; der sich entfremdete Geiſt, auf die Spitze seines Gegensatzes getrieben, in welchem das reine Wollen und das rein Wollende noch unterschieden sind, setzt ihn zur durchsichtigen Form herab, und findet darin sich selbst. — Wie das Reich der wirklichen Welt in das Reich des Glaubens und der Einsicht übergeht, so geht die absolute Freyheit aus ihrer sich 1807 547 selbst zerstörenden Wirklichkeit in ein anderes Land des selbſtbewuſtsen Geiſtes über, worin sie in dieser Unwirklichkeit als das Wahre gilt, an dessen Gedanken er sich labt, insofern er Gedanke iſt und bleibt, und dieses in das Selbstbewuſstseyn eingeschlossene Seyn als das vollkommne und vollſtändige Wesen weiſs. Es ist die neue Gestalt des moralischen Geistes entstanden.

1807 548

C. Der seiner selbst gewiſse Geist. Die Moralität.

596 Die sittliche Welt zeigte den in ihr nur abgeschiednen Geiſt, das einzelne Selbſt, als ihr Schicksal und ihre Wahrheit. Dieſe Person des Rechts aber hat ihre Subſtanz und Erfüllung auſſer ihr. Die Bewegung der Welt der Bildung und des Glaubens hebt diese Abſtraction der Person auf, und durch die vollendete Entfremdung, durch die höchſte Abſtraction, wird dem Selbſt des Geiſtes die Subſtanz zuerſt zum allgemeinen Willen, und endlich zu seinem Eigenthum. Hier also scheint das Wissen endlich seiner Wahrheit vollkommen gleich geworden zu seyn; denn seine Wahrheit ist diſs Wissen selbſt, und aller Gegensatz beyder Seiten verschwunden; und zwar nicht für uns, oder an sich, sondern für das Selbstbewuſstseyn selbſt. Es ist nemlich über den Gegensatz des Bewuſstseyns selbſt Meister geworden, Dieses beruht auf dem Gegensatze der Gewiſsheit seiner selbſt und des Gegenſtandes; nun aber ist der Gegenſtand ihm selbſt die Gewiſsheit seiner, das Wiſien — so wie die Gewiſsheit seiner selbst als 1807 549 solche nicht mehr eigne Zwecke hat, also nicht mehr in der Bestimmtheit, sondern reines Wiſſen ist.

597 Das Wiſſen des Selbstbewuſstseyns ist ihm alſo die Subſtanz selbſt. Sie ist für es ebenso unmittelbar als abſolut vermittelt in einer ungetrennten Einheit. Unmittelbar — wie das sittliche Bewuſstseyn weiſs und thut es selbſt die Pflicht und gehört ihr als seiner Natur an; aber es ist nicht Charakter, wie dieses, das um seiner Unmittelbarkeit willen ein beſtimmter Geiſt ist, nur Einer der sittlichen Wesenheiten angehört, und die Seite hat, nicht zu wiſſen. — Es ist absolute Vermittlung, wie das sich bildende und das glaubende Bewuſstseyn; denn es ist weſentlich die Bewegung des Selbſts, die Abstraction des unmittelbaren Daseyns aufzuheben, und sich allgemeines zu werden; — aber weder durch reine Entfremdung und Zerreiſſung seines Selbſts und der Wirklichkeit, — noch durch die Flucht. Sondern es ist sich unmittelbar in seiner Subſtanz gegenwärtig, denn sie ist sein Wiſſen, sie ist die angeschaute reine Gewiſsheit seiner selbſt; und eben dieſe Unmittelbarkeit, die seine eigne Wirklichkeit ist, ist alle Wirklichkeit, denn das Unmittelbare ist das Seyn selbſt, und als die reine durch die absolute Negativität geläuterte Unmittelbarkeit ist sie reines, ist sie Seyn überhaupt oder alles Seyn.

598 Das abſolute Wesen ist daher nicht in der Beſtimmung erschöpft, das einfache Wesen des Denkens 1807 550 zu seyn, sondern es ist alle Wirklichkeit, und dieſe Wirklichkeit ist nur als Wiſſen; was das Bewuſstseyn nicht wüſste, hätte keinen Sinn und kann keine Macht für es seyn; in seinen wiſſenden Willen hat sich alle Gegenſtändlichkeit und Welt zurückgezogen. Es ist abſolut frey, darin daſs es seine Freyheit weiſs, und eben diſs Wiſſen seiner Freyheit ist seine Subſtanz und Zweck und einziger Inhalt.

a. Die moralische Weltanschauung.

599 Das Selbſtbewuſstſeyn weiſs die Pflicht, als das abſolute Wesein; es ist nur durch sie gebunden, und dieſe Subſtanz ist sein eignes reines Bewuſstseyn; die Pflicht kann nicht die Form eines Fremden für es erhalten. So aber in sich selbſt beschloſſen ist das moralische Selbſtbewuſstseyn noch nicht als Bewuſstseyn gesetzt und betrachtet. Der Gegenſtand ist unmittelbares Wiſſen, und so rein von dem Selbſt durchdrungen ist er nicht Gegenſtand. Aber weſentlich die Vermittlung und Negativität, hat es in seinem Begriffe die Beziehung auf ein Andersſeyn; und ist Bewuſstseyn. Diſs Andersſeyn ist einerseits, weil die Pflicht seinen einzigen wesentlichen Zweck und Gegenſtand ausmacht, für es eine völlig bedeutungslose Wirklichkeit. Weil diſs Bewuſstseyn aber so vollkommen in sich beſchloſſen ist, so verhält es sich gegen diſs Audersſeyn vollkommen frey und 1807 551 gleichgültig, und das Daseyn ist daher andererseits ein vom Selbstbewuſstseyn völlig freygelaſſenes, sich ebenso nur auf sich beziehendes Daſeyn; je freyer das Selbſtbewuſstseyn wird, deſto freyer auch der negative Gegenſtand ſeines Bewuſstseyns. Er ist hiedurch eine zur eignen Individualität in sich vollendete Welt, ein selbſtständiges Ganzes eigenthümlicher Gesetze, so wie ein selbſtständiger Gang und freye Verwirklichung derselben, — eine Natur überhaupt, deren Geſetze wie ihr Thun ihr ſelbſt angehören, als einem Weſen, das unbekümmert um das moralische Selbstbewuſstseyn ist, wie dieſes um sie.

600 Von dieſer Beſtimmung an bildet sich eine moralische Weltanschauung aus, die in der Beziehung des moralischen An ‒ und Fürsichſeyns und des natürlichen An ‒ und Fürsichſeyns beſteht. Dieſer Beziehung liegt zum Grunde ſowohl die völlige Gleichgültigkeit und eigne Selbſtständigkeit der Natur, und der moralischen Zwecke und Thätigkeit gegeneinander, als auf der andern Seite das Bewuſstseyn der alleineinigen Weſenheit der Pflicht und der völligen Unselbſtständigkeit und Unweſenheit der Natur. Die moralische Weltanschauung enthält die Entwicklung der Momente, die in dieſer Beziehung so ganz widerſtreitender Vorausſetzungen enthalten sind.

601 Zuerſt also ist das moralische Bewuſstseyn überhaupt vorausgeſetzt; die Pflicht gilt ihm als das Weſen, ihm, das wirklich und thatig ist, und in ſeiner Wirklichkeit und That die Pflicht erfüllt. Für diſs 1807 552 moraliſche Bewuſstseyn ist aber zugleich die vorausgeſetzte Freyheit der Natur, oder es erfährt, daſs die Natur unbekümmert darum ist, ihm das Bewuſstseyn der Einheit ſeiner Wirklichkeit mit der ihrigen zu geben, und es alſo vielleicht glücklich werden läſst, vielleicht auch nicht. Das unmoralische Bewuſstseyn dagegen findet vielleicht zufälligerweiſe ſeine Verwirklichung, wo das moralische nur Veranlaſſung zum Handeln, aber durch daſſelbe nicht das Glück der Ausführung und des Genuſſes der Vollbringung ihm zu Theil werden sieht. Es findet daher vielmehr Grund zu Klagen über ſolchen Zuſtand der Unangemeſſenheit ſeiner und des Daſeyns, und der Ungerechtigkeit, die es darauf einſchränkt, ſeinen Gegenſtand nur als reine Pflicht zu haben, aber ihm denſelben, und sich verwirklicht zu ſehen verſagt.

602 Das moralische Bewuſstſeyn kann nicht auf die Glückseligkeit Verzicht thun, und diſs Moment aus ſeinem abſoluten Zwecke weglaſſen. Der Zweck, der als reine Pflicht ausgeſprochen wird, hat weſentlich diſs an ihm, dies einzelne Selbſtbewuſstſeyn zu enthalten; die individuelle Ueberzeugung und das Wiſſen von ihr machten ein abſolutes Moment der Moralität aus. Dieſes Moment an dem gegenſtändlich gewordenen Zwecke, an der erfüllten Pflicht, iſt das sich als verwirklicht anſchauende einzelne Bewuſstseyn, oder der Genuſs, der hiemit im Begriffe zwar nicht unmittelbar der Moralität als Gesinnung 1807 553 betrachtet liegt, allein im Begriffe der Verwirklichung derſelben. Hiedurch aber liegt er auch in ihr als Gesinnung; denn dieſe geht darauf, nicht Gesinnung im Gegenſatze des Handelns zu bleiben, ſondern zu handeln, oder sich zu verwirklichen. Der Zweck als das Ganze mit dem Bewuſstſeyn ſeiner Momente ausgeſprochen, ist alſo diſs, daſs die erfüllte Pflicht ebenſowohl reinmoraliſche Handlung, als realisirte Individualität ſey, und die Natur, als die Seite der Einzelnheit gegen den abſtracten Zweck, eins ſey mit dieſem. — So nothwendig die Erfahrung von der Disharmonie beyder Seiten iſt, weil die Natur frey ist, ebenſo iſt auch die Pflicht allein das Weſentliche, und die Natur gegen sie das Selbſtloſe. Jener ganze Zweck, den die Harmonie ausmacht, enthält die Wirklichkeit ſelbſt in sich. Er ist zugleich der Gedanke der Wirklichkeit. Die Harmonie der Moralität und der Natur, — oder indem die Natur nur inſofern in Betracht kömmt, als das Bewuſstseyn ihre Einheit mit ihm erfährt, — die Harmonie der Moralität und der Glückſeligkeit ist gedacht als nothwendig ſeyend, oder sie ist poſtulirt. Denn Fodern drückt aus, daſs etwas ſeyend gedacht wird, das noch nicht wirklich iſt; eine Nothwendigkeit nicht des Begriffes, als Begriffes, ſondern des Seyns. Aber die Nothwendigkeit ist zugleich weſentlich die Beziehung durch den Begriff. Das gefoderte Seyn gehört alſo nicht dem Vorſtellen des zufälligen Bewuſstseyns an, ſondern es liegt im Begriffe der Moralität ſelbſt, deſſen 1807 554 wahrer Inhalt die Einheit des reinen und einzelnen Bewuſstseyns iſt; dem letztern gehört diſs an, daſs dieſe Einheit für es als eine Wirklichkeit ſey, was im Inhalte des Zwecks Glückſeligkeit, in seiner Form aber Daſeyn überhaupt iſt. — Diſs gefoderte Daſeyn oder die Einheit beyder iſt darum nicht ein Wunſch, oder als Zweck betrachtet, nicht ein ſolcher, deſſen Erreichung noch ungewiſs wäre, ſondern er iſt eine Foderung der Vernunft, oder unmittelbare Gewiſsheit und Vorausſetzung derſelben.

603 Jene erste Erfahrung und diſs Poſtulat iſt nicht das einzige, ſondern es thut sich ein ganzer Kreis von Poſtulaten auf. Die Natur ist nemlich nicht nur diese ganz freye äuſſerliche Weise, in welcher als einem reinen Gegenſtan e das Bewuſstseyn ſeinen Zweck zu realisiren hätte. Dieſes ist an ihm selbſt weſentlich ein ſolches, für welches diſs andere freye Wirkliche ist, d. h. es ist selbst ein zufälliges und natürliches. Diese Natur, die ihm die seinige ist, ist die Sinnlichkeit, die in der Geſtalt des Wollens, als Triebe und Neigungen, für sich eigene beſtimmte Wesenheit oder einzelne Zwecke hat, also dem reinen Willen und seinem reinen Zwecke entgegengeſetzt ist. Gegen dieſe Entgegensetzung aber ist dem reinen Bewuſstseyn vielmehr die Beziehung der Sinnlichkeit auf es, ihre absolute Einheit mit ihm das Wesen. Beydes, das reine Denken und die Sinnlichkeit des Bewuſstseyns, sind an sich Ein Bewuſtseyn, und das reine Denken ist eben dieses, für 1807 555 welches und in welchem diese reine Einheit ist; für es aber als Bewuſstseyn ist der Gegensatz seiner selbst und der Triebe. In diesem Widerſtreit der Vernunft und der Sinnlichkeit ist für jene diſs das Wesen, daſs er sich auflöse, und als Reſultat die Einheit beyder hervorgehe, die nicht jene ursprüngliche, daſs beyde in Einem Individuum sind, sondern eine solche ist, die aus dem gewuſsten Gegenſatze beyder hervorgeht. Solche Einheit erst ist die wirkliche Moralität, denn in ihr ist der Gegensatz, wodurch das Selbst Bewuſstseyn oder erst wirkliches und in der That Selbſt und zugleich allgemeines iſt, enthalten; oder es ist diejenige Vermittlung darin ausgedrückt, welche der Moralität, wie wir ſehen, wesentlich ist. — Indem unter den beyden Momenten des Gegenſatzes die Sinnlichkeit ſchlechthin das Andersſeyn oder das Negative, hingegen das reine Denken der Pflicht das Weſen ist, von welchem nichts aufgegeben werden kann, ſo ſcheint die hervorgebrachte Einheit nur durch das Aufheben der Sinnlichkeit zu Stande kommen zu können. Da sie aber ſelbſt Moment dieſes Werdens, das Moment der Wirklichkeit ist, so wird man sich für die Einheit zunächst mit dem Ausdrucke begnügen müſſen, daſs die Sinnlichkeit der Moralität gemäſs ſey. — Diese Einheit ist gleichfalls ein poſtulirtes Seyn, sie ist nicht da; denn was da ist, ist das Bewuſstſeyn, oder der Gegensatz der Sinnlichkeit und des reinen Bewuſstſeyns. Sie ist aber zugleich nicht ein An sich, wie 1807 556 das erſte Poſtulat, worin die freye Natur eine Seite ausmacht, und die Harmonie derſelben mit dem moraliſchen Bewuſstſeyn daher auſſer dieſem fällt; ſondern die Natur ist hier diejenige, welche an ihm ſelbſt, und es ist hier um die Moralität als ſolche zu thun, um eine Harmonie, welche die eigne des thnenden Selbsts ist; das Bewuſstſeyn hat sie daher selbst zu Stande zu bringen, und in der Moralität immer Fortſchritte zu machen. Die Vollendung derſelben aber ist ins unendliche hinauszuſchieben; denn wenn sie wirklich einträte, so höhe sich das moralische Bewuſstseyn auf. Denn die Moralität ist nur moraliſches Bewuſstseyn als das negative Weſen, für deſſen reine Pflicht die Sinnlichkeit nur eine negative Bedeutung, nur nicht gemäſs ist. In der Harmonie aber verſchwindet die Moralität als Bewuſstseyn oder ihre Wirklichkeit, wie in dem moraliſchen Bewuſstſeyn oder der Wirklichkeit ihre Harmonie verſchwindet. Die Vollendung ist darum nicht wirklich zu erreichen, sondern nur als eine abſolute Aufgabe zu denken, das heiſst als eine ſolche, welche ſchlechthin Aufgabe bleibt. Zugleich ist jedoch ihr Inhalt als ein ſolcher zu denken, der ſchlechthin ſeyn müſſe, und nicht Aufgabe bleibe; es ſey nun, daſs man sich in dieſem Ziele das Bewuſstseyn ganz aufgehoben, oder auch nicht, vorſtelle; wie es eigentlich damit zu halten, läſst sich in der dunkeln Ferne der Unendlichkeit, wohin eben deſswegen die Erreichung des Ziels zu ſchieben ist, nicht mehr 1807 557 deutlich unterſcheiden. Es wird eigentlich gesagt werden müſſen, daſs die beſtimmte Vorſtellung nicht intereſſiren und nicht geſucht werden ſoll, weil diſs auf Widerſprüche führt, — einer Aufgabe, die Aufgabe bleiben, und doch erfüllt werden, — einer Moralität, die nicht Bewuſstseyn, nicht wirklich mehr ſeyn ſoll. Durch die Betrachtung aber, daſs die vollendete Moralität einen Widerſpruch enthielte, würde die Heiligkeit der moraliſchen Weſenheit leiden, und die abſolute Pflicht als etwas unwirkliches erſcheinen.

604 Das erſte Poſtulat war die Harmonie der Moralität und der gegenſtändlichen Natur, der Endzweck der Welt; das andere die Harmonie der Moralität und des sinnlichen Willens, der Endzweck des Selbſtbewuſstseyns als ſolchen; das erſte alſo die Harmonie in der Form des Ansich, das andere in der Form des Fürsichſeyns. Was aber dieſe beyden extremen Endzwecke, die gedacht sind, als Mitte verbindet, ist die Bewegung des wirklichen Handelns ſelbſt. Sie sind Harmonien, deren Momente in ihrer abſtracten Unterſchiedenheit noch nicht zum Gegenſtande geworden; diſs geſchieht in der Wirklichkeit, worin die Seiten im eigentlichen Bewuſstseyn, jede als die Andre der Andern auftritt. Die hiedurch entſtehenden Poſtulate enthalten, wie vorher nur die getrennten an sich und für sich ſeyende Harmonien, itzt an und fürsichſeyende.

605 Das moraliſche Bewuſstseyn ist als das einfache Wiſſen und Wollen der reinen Pflicht im Handeln 1807 558 auf den ſeiner Einfachheit entgegengeſetzten Gegenſtand — auf die Wirklichkeit des mannichfaltigen Falles bezogen, und hat dadurch ein mannichfaltiges moraliſches Verhaltniſs. Es entſtehen hier dem Inhalte nach die vielen Geſetze überhaupt, und der Form nach die widerſprechenden Mächte des wiſſenden Bewuſstſeyns und des Bewuſstlosen. — Was fürs erſte die vielen Pflichten betrifft, ſo gilt dem moraliſchen Bewuſstſeyn überhaupt nur die reine Pflicht in ihnen; die vielen Pflichten als viele, sind beſtimmte und daher als ſolche für das moraliſche Bewuſstſeyn nichts heiliges. Zugleich aber durch den Begriff des Handelns, das eine mannichfaltige Wirklichkeit, und daher eine mannichfaltige moraliſche Beziehung in sich ſchlieſst, nothwendig, müſſen sie als an und für sich ſeyend betrachtet werden. Da sie ferner nur in einem moraliſchen Bewuſstſeyn ſeyn können, sind sie zugleich in einem andern als jenem, dem nur die reine Pflicht als die reine an und für sich und heilig ist.

606 Es ist alſo poſtulirt, daſs ein anderes Bewuſstſeyn ſey, welches sie heiligt, oder welches sie als Pflichten weiſs und will. Das erſte erhält die reine Pflicht gleichgültig gegen allen beſtimmten Inhalt, und die Pflicht ist nur dieſe Gleichgültigkeit gegen ihn. Das andere aber enthält die ebenſo weſentliche Beziehung auf das Handeln, und die Nothwendigkeit des beſtimmten Inhalts; indem ihm die Pflichten als beſtimmte Pflichten gelten, ſo ist ihm damit der Inhalt als 1807 559 ſolcher ebenſo weſentlich als die Form, wodurch er Pflicht iſt. Diſs Bewuſstſeyn ist hiedurch ein ſolches, worin das Allgemeine und das Beſondere ſchlechthin eins ist, ſein Begriff alſo derſelbe, als der Begriff der Harmonie der Moralität und Glückſeligkeit. Denn dieſer Gegenſatz drückt ebenſo die Trennung des ſich ſelbſt gleichen moraliſchen Bewuſstſeyns von der Wirklichkeit aus, die als das vielfache Seyn dem einfachen Weſen der Pflicht widerſtreitet. Wenn aber das erſte Poſtulat nur die ſeyende Harmonie der Moralität und der Natur ausdrückt, weil die Natur darin diſs negative des Selbſtbewuſstſeyns, das Moment des Seyns ist, ſo ist hingegen itzt diſs Ansich weſentlich als Bewuſstſeyn geſetzt. Denn das Seyende hat nun die Form des Inhalts der Pflicht, oder ist die Beſtimmtheit an der beſtimmten Pflicht. Das Ansich ist alſo die Einheit ſolcher, welche als einfache Weſenheiten, Weſenheiten des Denkens, und daher nur in einem Bewuſstseyn sind. Dieſes iſt alſo nunmehr ein Herr und Beherrſcher der Welt, der die Harmonie der Moralität und der Glückſeligkeit hervorbringt, und zugleich die Pflichten als Viele heiligt. Das letztere heiſst ſoviel, daſs dem Bewuſstseyn der reinen Pflicht die beſtimmte nicht unmittelbar heilig ſeyn kann; weil sie aber um des wirklichen Handelns, das ein beſtimmtes iſt, gleichfalls nothwendig iſt, ſo fällt ihre Nothwendigkeit auſſer jenem Bewuſstseyn in ein anderes, das ſomit das vermittelnde der beſtimmten und reinen Pflicht und der Grund ist, daſs jene auch gilt.

1807 560

607 In der wirklichen Handlung aber verhält ſich das Bewuſstseyn als dieſes Selbſt, als ein vollkommen einzelnes; es ist auf die Wirklichkeit als ſolche gerichtet, und hat sie zum Zwecke; denn es will vollbringen. Es fällt alſo die Pflicht überhaupt auſſer es in ein anderes Weſen, das Bewuſstseyn und der heilige Geſetzgeber der reinen Pflicht ist. Dem handelnden, eben weil es Handelndes ist, gilt das Andere der reinen Pflicht unmittelbar, dieſe iſt alſo Inhalt eines andern Bewuſstseyns und nur mittelbar, nemlich in dieſem, jenem heilig.

608 Weil es hiemit geſetzt iſt, daſs das Gelten der Pflicht als des an und für sich heiligen, auſſerhalb des wirklichen Bewuſstseyns fallt, ſo ſteht dieſes hiedurch überhaupt als das unvollkommne moraliſche Bewuſstseyn auf der einen Seite. Sowohl seinem Wiſſen nach weiſs es sich alſo als ein ſolches, deſſen Wiſſen und Ueberzeugung unvollſtändig und zufällig iſt; ebenſo ſeinem Wollen nach als ein ſolches, deſſen Zwecke mit Sinnlichkeit afficirt ſind. Um ſeiner Unwürdigkeit willen kann es daher die Glückseligkeit nicht nothwendig, ſondern als etwas Zufälliges anſehen, und sie nur aus Gnade erwarten.

609 Ob aber ſchon seine Wirklichkeit unvollkommen iſt, so gilt doch ſeinem reinen Willen und Wiſſen die Pflickt als das Weſen; im Begriffe, inſofern er der Realität entgegengeſetzt iſt, oder im Denken iſt es alſo vollkommen. Das abſolute Weſen aber iſt eben diſs Gedachte, und jenſeits der Wirklichkeit 1807 561 poſtulirte; es iſt daher der Gedanke, in welchem das moraliſch unvollkommne Wiſſen und Wollen für vollkommen gilt, hiemit auch, indem es daſſelbe für vollwichtig nimmt, die Glückseligkeit nach der Würdigkeit, nemlich nach dem ihm zugeſchriebenen Verdienſt ertheilt.

610 Die Weltanschauung iſt hierin vollendet; denn in dem Begriffe des moraliſchen Selbstbewuſstseyns sind die beyden Seiten reine Pflicht und Wirklichkeit in Einer Einheit geſetzt, und dadurch die eine wie andre nicht als an und für sich seyend, ſondern als Moment oder als aufgehoben. Diſs wird in dem letzten Theile der moraliſchen Weltanschauung für das Bewuſstseyn; die reine Pflicht nemlich ſetzt es in ein andres Weſen, als es ſelbſt ist, d. h. es ſetzt sie theils als ein vorgeſtelltes, theils als ein ſolches, das nicht das ist, was an und für sich gilt, ſondern das nichtmoraliſche gilt vielmehr als vollkommen. Ebenso sich selbst ſetzt es als ein ſolches, deſſen Wirklichkeit, die der Pflicht unangemeſſen ist, aufgehoben, und als aufgehobne oder in der Vorſtellung des absoluten Weſens, der Moralität nicht mehr widerſpricht.

611 Für das moraliſche Bewuſstseyn ſelbſt hat jedoch seine moralische Weltanſchauung nicht die Bedeutung, daſs es in ihr seinen eignen Begriff entwickelt, und ihn sich zum Gegenſtande macht; es hat weder ein Bewuſstſeyn über diesen Gegensatz der Form, noch auch über den Gegenſatz dem Inhalte nach, 1807 562 deſſen Theile es nicht untereinander bezieht und vergleicht, ſondern in ſeiner Entwicklung sich, ohne der zuſammenhaltende Begriff der Momente zu ſeyn, fortwälzt. Denn es weiſs nur das reine Weſen, oder den Gegenſtand, inſofern er Pflicht, inſofern er abſtracter Gegenſtand ſeines reinen Bewuſstseyns ist, als reines Wiſſen oder als sich ſelbſt. Es verhält sich alſo nur denkend, nicht begreiffend. Daher iſt ihm der Gegenſtand ſeines wirklichen Bewuſstseyns noch nicht durchsichtig; es iſt nicht der abſolute Begriff, der allein das Andersſeyn als ſolches, oder sein absolutes Gegentheil als sich selbst erfaſst. Seine eigne Wirklichkeit, ſo wie alle gegenſtändliche Wirklichkeit gilt ihm zwar als das unweſentliche; aber ſeine Freyheit ist die Freyheit des reinen Denkens, welcher darum zugleich die Natur gegenüber als ein ebenſo freyes entſtanden iſt. Weil beydes auf gleiche Weiſe in ihm ist, die Freyheit des Seyns und das Eingeſchloſſenſeyn deſſelben in das Bewuſstseyn, ſo wird ſein Gegenſtand als ein ſeyender, der zugleich nur gedacht; in dem letzten Theile seiner Anſchauung wird der Inhalt weſentlich ſo geſetzt, daſs ſein Seyn ein vorgeſtelltes iſt, und dieſe Verbindung des Seyns und des Denkens als das ausgeſprochen, was sie in der That ist, das Vorſtellen.

612 Indem wir die moraliſche Weltanſchauung ſo betrachten, daſs dieſe gegenſtändliche Weiſe nichts anderes ist, als der Begriff des moraliſchen Selbstbewuſstseyns ſelbſt, den es sich gegenſtändlich macht, 1807 563 ſo ergibt sich durch diſs Bewuſstseyn über die Form ihres Urſprungs eine andere Geſtalt ihrer Darſtellung. — Das Erſte nemlich, wovon ausgegangen wird, ist das wirkliche moraliſche Selbſtbewuſstſeyn, oder daſs es ein ſolches gibt. Denn der Begriff ſetzt es in der Beſtimmung, daſs ihm alle Wirklichkeit überhaupt Weſen nur inſofern hat, als sie der Pflicht gemäſs iſt, und er ſetzt diſs Weſen als Wiſſen, d. h. in unmittelbarer Einheit mit dem wirklichen Selbſt; dieſe Einheit ist ſomit ſelbſt wirklich, sie iſt ein moraliſches wirkliches Bewuſstseyn. — Dieſes nun als Bewuſstseyn ſtellt sich ſeinen Inhalt als Gegenſtand vor, nemlich als Endzweck der Welt, als Harmonie der Moralität und aller Wirklichkeit. Indem es aber dieſe Einheit als Gegenſtand vorſtellt, und noch nicht der Begriff ist, der die Macht über den Gegenſtand als solchen hat, so ist sie ihm ein Negatives des Selbstbewuſstseyns, oder sie fällt auſſer ihm, als ein Jenseits seiner Wirklichkeit, aber zugleich als ein ſolches, das auch als ſeyend, aber nur gedacht wird.

613 Was ihm, das als Selbſtbewuſstseyn ein anderes, denn der Gegenſtand iſt, hiemit übrig bleibt, iſt die Nichtharmonie des Pflichtbewuſstseyns und der Wirklichkeit, und zwar seiner eignen. Der Satz lautet hiemit itzt ſo; es gibt kein moraliſch vollendetes wirkliches Selbſtbewuſstseyn; — und da das moraliſche überhaupt nur iſt, inſofern es vollendet iſt, denn die Pflicht iſt das reine unvermiſchte Ansich, und die Moralität beſteht nur in der Angemeſſenheit zu 1807 564 dieſem Reinen, — ſo heiſst der zweyte Satz überhaupt ſo, daſs es kein moralisch wirkliches gibt.

614 Indem es aber drittens Ein Selbſt iſt, ſo iſt es an sich die Einheit der Pflicht und der Wirklichkeit; diese Einheit wird ihm alſo Gegenſtand, als die vollendete Moralität, — aber als ein Jenseits seiner Wirklichkeit, — aber das doch wirklich seyn soll.

615 In diesem Ziele der ſynthetischen Einheit der beyden erſten Sätze, ist die selbstbewuſste Wirklichkeit ſowohl als die Pflicht nur als aufgehobnes Moment gefetzt; denn keines iſt einzeln, aber ſie, in deren weſentlichen Beſtimmung ist, frey von dem andern zu ſeyn, sind somit jedes in der Einheit nicht mehr frey von dem andern, also jedes aufgehoben, und ſomit werden sie dem Inhalt nach als ſolche Gegenſtand, deren jedes für das andre gilt, und der Form nach, ſo daſs dieſe Austauschung derſelben zugleich nur vorgeſtellt ist. — Oder das wirklich nicht moralische, weil es ebenso reines Denken und über seine Wirklichkeit erhaben ist, ist in der Vorſtellung doch moraliſch, und wird für vollgültig genommen. Es wird hiedurch der erſte Satz, daſs es ein moraliſches Selbſtbewuſstseyn gibt, hergeſtellt, aber verbunden mit dem zweyten, daſs es keines gibt, nemlich es gibt eines, aber nur in der Vorſtellung; oder es gibt zwar keines, aber es wird von einem andern doch dafür gelten gelaſſen.

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b. Die Verstellung.

616 In der moralischen Weltanschauung sehen wir einestheils das Bewuſstseyn ſelbſt ſeinen Gegenſtand mit Bewuſstseyn erzeugen; wir sehen es denselben weder als ein Fremdes vorfinden, noch auch ihn bewuſstlos ihm werden, ſondern es verfährt überall nach einem Grunde, aus welchem es das gegenſtändliche Weſen ſetzt; es weiſs daſſelbe alſo als sich ſelbſt, denn es weiſs sich als das thätige, das es erzeugt. Es scheint somit hier zu seiner Ruhe und Befriedigung zu kommen, denn diese kann es nur da finden, wo es über seinen Gegenſtand nicht mehr hinauszugehen braucht, weil dieser nicht mehr über es hinausgebt. Auf der andern Seite aber ſetzt es selbst ihn vielmehr auſſer sich hinaus, als ein Jenseits seiner. Aber diſs an und fürsichseyende ist ebenso als ein solches gesetzt, das nicht frey vom Selbſtbewuſstseyn, sondern zum Behuf des letztern und durch daſſelbe ſey.

617 Die moralische Weltanschauung ist daher in der That nichts anderes, als die Ausbildung dieses zum Grunde liegenden Widerspruchs nach seinen verschiedenen Seiten; sie ist, um einen kantischen Ausdruck hier, wo er am paſſendſten ist, zu gebrauchen, ein ganzes Neſt gedankenloser Widersprüche. Das Bewuſstseyn verhält sich in dieser Entwicklung so, daſs es ein Moment feſtsetzt, und von da 1807 566 unmittelbar zum andern übergeht, und das erſte aufhebt; wie es aber nun diſs zweyte aufgeſtellt hat, verſtellt es auch daſſelbe wieder, und macht vielmehr das Gegentheil zum Wesen. Zugleich ist es sich seines Widerſpruches und Verſtellens auch bewuſst, denn es geht von einem Momente unmittelbar in Beziehung auf dieſes ſelbſt zu dem entgegengesetzten über; weil ein Moment keine Realität für es hat, setzt es eben daſſelbe als reell, oder was daſſelbe iſt, um ein Moment als an sich seyend zu behaupten, behauptet es das entgegengeſetzte als das ansichseyende. Es bekennt damit, daſs es ihm in der That mit keinen derselben Ernst ist. Diſs ist in den Momenten dieser schwindelnden Bewegung näher zu betrachten.

618 Laſſen wir die Voraussetzung, daſs es ein wirkliches moralisches Bewuſstseyn gibt, zuerſt auf sich beruhen, weil sie unmittelbar nicht in Beziehung auf etwas vorhergehendes gemacht wird, und wenden uns an die Harmonie der Moralität und der Natur, das erste Poſtulat. Sie soll ansich seyn, nicht für das wirkliche Bewuſstseyn, nicht gegenwärtig, sondern die Gegenwart ist vielmehr nur der Widerspruch beyder. In der Gegenwart ist die Moralität als vorhanden angenommen, und die Wirklichkeit so geſtellt, daſs sie nicht in Harmonie mit ihr sey. Das wirkliche moralische Bewuſstseyn aber ist ein handelndes; darin beſteht eben die Wirklichkeit seiner Moralität. Im Handeln selbſt aber ist jene Stellung unmittelbar verſtellt; denn das Handeln ist nichts 1807 567 anderes als die Verwirklichung des innern moralischen Zwecks, nichts anderes, als die Hervorbringung einer durch den Zweck beſtimmten Wirklichkeit, oder der Harmonie des moralischen Zwecks und der Wirklichkeit selbſt. Zugleich iſt die Vollbringung der Handlung für das Bewuſstseyn, sie ist die Gegenwart dieser Einheit der Wirklichkeit und des Zweckes; und weil in der vollbrachten Handlung das Bewuſstseyn sich als dieſes Einzelne verwirklicht’ oder das Daseyn in es zurückgekehrt anschaut, und der Genuſs hierin beſteht, so iſt in der Wirklichkeit des moralischen Zwecks zugleich auch diejenige Form derselben enthalten, welche Genuſs und Glückseligkeit genannt wird. — Das Handeln erfüllt also in der That unmittelbar dasjenige, was nicht ſtatt zu finden aufgeſtellt war, und nur ein Poſtulat, nur Jenseits seyn sollte. Das Bewuſstseyn spricht es also durch die That aus, daſs es mit dem Poſtuliren nicht Ernſt iſt, weil der Sinn des Handelns vielmehr dieſer iſt, das zur Gegenwart zu machen, was nicht in der Gegenwart seyn sollte. Und indem um des Handelns willen die Harmonie poſtulirt wird, — was nemlich durch das Handeln wirklich werden soll, muſs an sich so seyn, sonst wäre die Wirklichkeit nicht möglich, so ist der Zuſammenhang des Handelns und des Poſtulats so beschaffen, daſs um des Handelns d. h. um der wirklichen Harmonie des Zwecks und der Wirklichkeit willen diese Harmonie als nicht wirklich, als jenſeits, gesetzt wird.

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619 Indem gehandelt wird, iſt es alſo mit der Unangemeſſenheit des Zwecks und der Wirklichkeit überhaupt nicht Ernſt; dagegen ſcheint es mit dem Hanpeln ſelbſt Ernſt zu seyn. Aber in der That iſt die wirkliche Handlung, nur Handlung des einzelnen Bewuſstseyns, alſo selbſt nur etwas einzelnes und das Werk zufällig. Der Zweck der Vernunfft aber als der allgemeine, alles umfaſſende, Zweck iſt nichts geringeres als die ganze Welt; ein Endzweck, der weit über den Inhalt dieser einzelnen Handlung hinausgeht, und daher überhaupt über alles wirkliche handeln hinauszuſtellen ist. Weil das allgemeine Beſte ausgeführt werden ſoll, wird nichts Gutes gethan. In der That aber iſt die Nichtigkeit des wirklichen Handelns, und die Realität nur des ganzen Zwecks, die itzt aufgeſtellt sind, nach allen Seiten auch wieder verſtellt. Die moralische Handlung iſt nicht etwas zufälliges, und beſchränktes, denn sie hat die reine Pflicht zu ihrem Wesen; diese macht den einzigen ganzen Zweck aus; und die Handlung also als Verwirklichung deſſelben iſt bey aller ſonſtigen Beschränkung des Inhalts die Vollbringung des ganzen absoluten Zwecks. Oder wenn wieder die Wirklichkeit als Natur, die ihre eignen Geſetze hat and der reinen Pflicht entgegengeſetzt ist, genommen wird, ſo daſs also die Pflicht ihr Geſetz nicht in ihr realisiren kann, ſo ist es, indem die Pflicht als solche das Weſen iſt, in der That nicht um die Vollbringung der reinen Pflicht, welche der ganze 1807 569 Zweck iſt, zu thun; denn die Vollbringung hätte vielmehr nicht die reine Pflicht, ſondern das ihr entgegengeſetzte, die Wirklichkeit, zum Zwecke. Aber daſs es nicht um die Wirklichkeit zu thun sey, iſt wieder verſtellt; denn nach dem Begriffe des moralischen Handelns, iſt die reine Pflicht wesentlich thätiges Bewuſstseyn; es soll also allerdings gehandelt, die absolute Pflicht in der ganzen Natur ausgedrückt und das Moralgesetz Naturgesetz werden.

620 Laſſen wir also dieſes höchste Gut als das Weſen gelten, ſo iſt es dem Bewuſstseyn mit der Moralität überhaupt nicht Ernſt. Denn in dieſem höchsten Gute hat die Natur nicht ein anderes Geſetz, als die Moralität hat. Somit fällt das moralische Handeln ſelbſt hinweg, denn das Handeln iſt nur unter der Vorausſetzung eines negativen, das durch die Handlung aufzuheben iſt. Iſt aber die Natur dem Sittengeſetze gemäſs, ſo würde ja dieſes durch das Handeln, durch das Aufheben des Seyenden verletzt. — Es wird alſo in jener Annahme als der weſentliche Zuſtand ein ſolcher eingeſtanden, worin das moralische Handeln überflüſsig iſt, und gar nicht ſtatt findet. Das Poſtulat der Harmonie der Moralität und der Wirklichkeit, einer Harmonie, die durch den Begriff des moraliſchen Handelns, beyde in Uebereinſtimmung zu bringen, geſetzt iſt, — drückt sich alſo auch von dieſer Seite ſo aus: weil das moraliſche Handeln der abſolute Zweck iſt, ſo iſt der abſolute Zweck, daſs das moraliſche Handeln gar nicht vorhanden ſey.

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621 Stellen wir diese Momente, durch die das Bewuſstseyn sich in seinem moralischen Vorſtellen fortwälzte, zusammen, so erhellt, daſs es jedes wieder in seinem Gegentheile aufhebt. Es geht davon aus, daſs für es die Moralität und Wirklichkeit nicht harmonire, aber es ist ihm damit nicht Ernſt, denn in der Handlung ist für es die Gegenwart dieser Harmonie. Es ist ihm aber auch mit diesem Handeln, da es etwas einzelnes ist, nicht Ernst; denn es hat einen so hohen Zweck, das höchste Gut. Diſs ist aber wieder nur eine Verstellung der Sache, denn darin fiele alles Handeln und alle Moralität hinweg. Oder es iſt ihm eigentlich mit dem moralischen Handeln nicht Ernst, sondern das wünschenswertheste, absolute ist, daſs das höchſte Gut ausgeführt und das moralische Handeln überflüſſig wäre.

622 Von diesem Resultate muſs das Bewuſstſeyn in seiner widersprechenden Bewegung sich weiter fortwälzen, und das Aufheben des moralischen Handelns nothwendig wieder verstellen. Die Moralität ist das Ansich; daſs sie statt habe, kann der Endzweck der Welt nicht ausgeführt ſeyn, sondern das moralische Bewuſstseyn muſs fürsich seyn, und eine ihm entgegengesetzte Natur vorfinden. Aber es an ihm selbst muſs vollendet seyn. Diſs führt zum zweyten Postulate der Harmonie seiner und der Natur, welche an ihm unmittelbar ist, der Sinnlichkeit. Das moralische Selbstbewuſstseyn stellt seinen Zweck als rein, als von Neigungen und Trieben unabhängig auf, so daſs er 1807 571 die Zwecke der Sinnlichkeit in sich vertilgt hat. — Allein diese aufgestellte Aufhebung des sinnlichen Wesens verstellt es wieder. Es handelt, bringt seinen Zweck zur Wirklichkeit, und die selbstbewuſste Sinnlichkeit, welche aufgehoben seyn soll, ist gerade diese Mitte zwischen dem reinen Bewuſstseyn, und der Wirklichkeit, — sie ist das Werkzeug des erstern zu seiner Verwirklichung oder das Organ, und das, was Trieb, Neigung genannt wird. Es ist daher nicht Ernst mit dem Aufheben der Neigungen und Triebe, denn eben sie sind das sich verwirklichende Selbstbewuſstseyn. Aber sie sollen auch nicht unterdrückt, sondern der Vernunft nur gemäſs seyn. Sie sind ihr auch gemäſs, denn das moralische Handeln iſt nichts anderes, als das sich verwirklichende, also sich die Gestalt eines Triebes gebende Bewuſstseyn, das heiſst, es ist unmittelbar die gegenwärtige Harmonie des Triebs und der Moralität. Aber in der That ist der Trieb nicht nur diese leere Gestalt, die eine andere Feder, als er selbst ist, in sich haben und von ihr getrieben werden könnte. Denn die Sinnlichkeit ist eine Natur, die ihre eigenen Gesetze und Springfedern an ihr selbst hat; es kann der Moralität daher nicht Ernst damit seyn, die Triebfeder der Triebe, der Neigungswinkel der Neigungen zu seyn. Denn indem diese ihre eigne feſte Bestimmtheit und eigenthümlichen Inhalt haben, so wäre vielmehr das Bewuſstseyn, dem sie gemäſs wären, ihnen gemäſs; eine Gemäſsheit, welche sich das moralische Selbstbewuſstseyn verbittet. Die 1807 572 Harmonie beyder ist also nur an sich und poſtulirt. — In dem moralischen Handeln war so eben die gegenwärtige Harmonie der Moralität und der Sinnlichkeit aufgeſtellt, diſs aber ist nun verstellt; sie iſt jenseits des Bewuſstseyns in einer neblichten Ferne, worin nichts mehr genau zu unterscheiden noch zu begreiffen ist; denn mit dem Begreiffen dieser Einheit, das wir so eben versuchten, ging es nicht. — In diesem Ansich gibt aber überhaupt das Bewuſstseyn sich auf. Dieses Ansich ist seine moralische Vollendung, worin der Kampf der Moralität und der Sinnlichkeit aufgehört hat, und die letztere der erstern auf eine Weise gemäſs ist, die nicht zu fassen iſt. — Darum ist diese Vollendung wieder nur eine Verstellung der Sache, denn in der That gäbe in ihr vielmehr die Moralität selbst sich auf, denn sie ist nur Bewuſstseyn des abſoluten Zwecks als des reinen, also im Gegensatze gegen alle andern Zwecke; sie ist ebenso die Thatigkeit dieses reinen Zwecks, als sie sich der Ernebung über die Sinnlichkeit, der Einmischung derselben und ihres Gegensatzes und Kampfes mit ihr bewuſst ist. — Daſs es mit der moralischen Vollendung nicht Ernſt ist, ſpricht das Bewuſstseyn unmittelbar selbst darin aus, daſs es sie in die Unendlichkeit hinausverstellt, das heiſst, sie als niemals vollendet behauptet.

623 Vielmehr ist ihm also nur dieser Zwischenzustand der Nichtvollendung das gültige; ein Zustand, der aber doch ein Fortſchreiten zur Vollendung wenigſtens seyn soll. Allein er kann auch diſs nicht seyn, denn 1807 573 das Fortschreiten in der Moralität wäre vielmehr ein Zugehen zum Untergang derselben. Das Ziel nemlich wäre das obige Nichts oder Aufheben der Moralität und des Bewuſstseyns selbst; dem Nichts aber immer näher und näher kommen, heiſst abnehmen. Ausserdem nähme Fortschreiten überhaupt ebenso, wie Abnehmen, Unterschiede der Gröſſe in der Moralität an; allein von diesen kann in ihr keine Rede seyn. In ihr als dem Bewuſstseyn, welchem der sittliche Zweck die reine Pflicht ist, ist an eine Verschiedenheit überhaupt nicht, am wenigsten an den oberflächlichen der Grösse zu denken; es gibt nur Eine Tugend, nur Eine reine Pflicht, nur Eine Moralität.

624 Indem es also mit der moralischen Vollendung nicht Ernst iſt, sondern vielmehr mit dem Mittelzustande, d. h. wie so eben erörtert, mit der Nichtmoralität, so kommen wir von einer andern Seite auf den Inhalt des ersten Postulats zurück. Es ist nemlich nicht abzusehen, wie Glückseligkeit für diſs moralische Bewuſstseyn um seiner Würdigkeit willen zu fodern ist. Es ist seiner Nichtvollendung sich bewuſst, und kann daher die Glückseligkeit in der That nicht als Verdienst, nicht als etwas, dessen es würdig wäre, fodern, sondern sie nur aus einer freyen Gnade, das heiſst, die Glückseligkeit als solche an und für sich selbst verlangen, und nicht aus jenem abſoluten Grunde, sondern nach Zufall und Willkühr erwarten. — Die Nichtmoralität ſpricht eben hierin aus, was sie ist, — daſs es nicht um die Moralität, sondern um die 1807 574 Glückseligkeit an und für sich ohne Beziehung auf jene zu thun ist.

625 Durch diese zweyte Seite der moralischen Weltanschauung wird auch noch die andere Behauptung der erstern aufgehoben, worin die Disharmonie der Moralität und Glückseligkeit vorausgesetzt wird. — Es will nemlich die Erfahrung gemacht werden, daſs es in dieser Gegenwart dem Moralischen oft ſchlecht, dem Unmoralischen hingegen oft glücklibh gehe. Allein der Zwischenzustand der unvollendeten Moralität, der sich als das wesentliche ergeben hat, zeigt offenbar, daſs diese Wahrnehmung und seynsollende Erfahrung nur eine Verstellung der Sache ist. Denn da die Moralität unvollendet, das heiſst, die Moralität in der That nicht ist, was kann an der Erfahrung seyn, daſs es ihr schlecht gehe? — Indem es zugleich herausgekommen, daſs es um die Glückseligkeit an und für sich zu thun ist, so zeigt es sich, daſs bey Beurtheilung, es gehe dem unmoralischen gut, nicht ein Unrecht gemeynt war, das hier statt finde. Die Bezeichnung eines Individuums als eines unmoralischen fällt, indem die Moralität überhaupt unvollendet ist, an sich hinweg, hat also nur einen willkührlichen Grund. Der Sinn und Inhalt des Urtheils der Erfahrung ist dadurch allein dieser, daſs einigen die Glückseligkeit an und für sich nicht zukommen sollte, das heiſst, er ist Neid, der sich zum Deckmantel die Moralität nimmt. Der Grund aber, warum Andern das sogenannte Glück zu Theil werden sollte, ist die 1807 575 gute Freundschaft, die ihnen und sich selbst, diese Gnade d. h. diesen Zufall gönnt und wünscht.

626 Die Moralität also im moralischen Bewuſstseyn ist unvollendet, diſs ist es, was itzt aufgestellt wird, aber es ist ihr Wesen nur das vollendete reine zu seyn; die unvollendete Moralität ist daher unrein, oder sie ist Immoralität. Die Moralität selbst ist also in einem andern Wesen, als in dem wirklichen Bewuſstseyn; es ist ein heiliger moralischer Gesetzgeber. — Die im Bewuſstseyn unvollendete Moralität, welche der Grund dieses Postulirens iſt, hat zunächst die Bedeutung, daſs die Moralitat, indem sie im Bewuſstseyn als wirklich gesetzt wird, in der Beziehung auf ein Anderes, auf ein Daseyn steht, also selbst an ihr das Andersseyn oder den Unterschied erhält, wodurch eine vielfache Menge von moralischen Geboten entsteht. Das moralische Selbstbewuſstseyn hält aber zugleich diese vielen Pflichten für unwesentlich; denn es ist nur um die Eine reine Pflicht zu thun, und für es haben sie, insofern sie beſtimmte sind, keine Wahrheit. Sie können ihre Wahrheit also nur in einem Andern haben, und sind, was sie für es nicht sind, heilig durch einen heiligen Gesetzgeber. — Allein diſs ist selbst wieder nur eine Verstellung der Sache. Denn das moralische Selbstbewuſstseyn ist sich das absolute, und Pflicht schlechthin nur das, was es als Pflicht weiſs. Es weiſs aber nur die reine Pflicht als Pflicht; was ihm nicht heilig ist, ist an sich nicht heilig, und was an sich nicht heilig iſt, kann durch 1807 576 das heilige Wesen nicht geheiliget werden. Es ist dem moralischen Bewuſstſeyn auch überhaupt damit nicht Ernst, etwas durch ein anderes Bewuſstseyn, als es selbst ist, heiligen zu laſſen; denn es ist ihm schlechthin nur das heilig, was ihm durch sich selbst und in ihm heilig ist. — Es ist also ebensowenig damit Ernst, daſs diſs andere Wesen ein heiliges sey, denn in ihm sollte etwas zur Wesenheit gelangen, was für das moralische Bewuſstseyn d. h. an sich keine Wesenheit hat.

627 Wenn das heilige Wesen postulirt wurde, daſs in ihm die Pflicht nicht als reine Pflicht, sondern als eine Vielheit bestimmter Pflichten ihre Gültigkeit hätte, so muſs also dieses wieder verstellt, und das andere Wesen allein insofern heilig seyn, als in ihm nur die reine Pflicht Gültigkeit hat. Die reine Pflicht hat auch in der That Gültigkeit nur in einem andern Wesen, nicht in dem moralischen Bewuſstseyn. Obschon in ihm die reine Moralität allein zu gelten scheint, so muſs doch dieses anders gestellt werden, denn es ist zugleich natürliches Bewuſstseyn. Die Moralität ist in ihm von der Sinnlichkeit afficirt und bedingt, also nicht an und für sich, sondern eine Zufälligkeit des freyen Willens; in ihm aber als reinem Willen eine Zufälligkeit des Wiſſens; an und für sich ist die Moralität daher in einem andern Wesen.

628 Dieses Wesen ist also hier die rein vollendete Moralität darum, weil sie in ihm nicht in 1807 577 Beziehung auf Natur und Sinnlichkeit steht. Allein die Realität der reinen Pflicht ist ihre Verwirklichung in Natur und Sinnlichkeit. Das moralische Bewuſstseyn setzt seine Unvollkommenheit darein, daſs in ihm die Moralität eine positive Beziehung auf die Natur und Sinnlichkeit hat, da ihm diſs für ein wesentliches Moment derselben gilt, daſs sie schlechthin nur eine negative Beziehung darauf habe. Das reine moralische Wesen dagegen, weil es erhaben über den Kampf mit der Natur und Sinnlichkeit ist, steht nicht in einer negativen Beziehung darauf. Es bleibt ihm also in der That nur die positive Beziehung darauf übrig, d. h. eben dasjenige, was so eben als das unvollendete, als das unmoralische galt. Die reine Moralität aber ganz getrennt von der Wirklichkeit, so daſs sie ebensosehr ohne positive Beziehung auf diese wäre, wäre eine bewuſstlose, unwirkliche Abstraction, worinn der Begriff der Moralität, Denken der reinen Pflicht und ein Willen und Thun zu ſeyn, schlechthin aufgehoben wäre. Dieses so rein moralische Wesen ist daher wieder eine Verstellung der Sache, und aufzugeben.

629 In diesem rein moralischen Wesen aber nähern sich die Momente des Widerspruchs, in welchem diſs synthetische Vorstellen sich herumtreibt, und die entgegengesetzten Auchs, die es, ohne diese seine Gedanken zusammenzubringen, aufeinander folgen, und ein Gegentheil immer durch das andere ablösen läſst, so 1807 578 sehr, daſs das Bewuſstseyn hier seine moralische Weltanschauung aufgeben, und in sich zurückfliehen muſs.

630 Es erkennt seine Moralität darum als nicht vollendet, weil es von einer ihr entgegengesetzten Sinnlichkeit und Natur afficirt ist, welche theils die Moralität selbst als solche trübt, theils eine Menge von Pflichten entſtehen macht, durch die es im concreten Falle des wirklichen Handeln in Verlegenheit geräth; denn jeder Fall ist die Concretion vieler moralischen Beziehungen, wie ein Gegenstand der Wahrnehmung überhaupt, ein Ding von vielen Eigenschaften ist; und indem die bestimmte Pflicht Zweck ist, hat sie einen Inhalt, und ihr Inhalt ist ein Theil des Zwecks, und die Moralität nicht rein. — Diese hat also in einem andern Wesen ihre Realität. Aber diese Realität heiſst nichts anderes, als daſs die Moralität hier an und für sich sey, — für sich d. h. Moralität eines Bewuſstseyns sey, an sich, das heiſst, Daseyn und Wirklichkeit habe. — In jenem ersten unvollendeten Bewuſstseyn ist die Moralität nicht ausgeführt; sie ist darin das Ansich im Sinne eines Gedankendinges; denn sie ist mit Natur und Sinnlichkeit, mit der Wirklichkeit des Seyns und des Bewuſstseyns vergesellschaftet, die ihren Innhalt ausmacht, und Natur und Sinnlichkeit ist das moralisch nichtige. — In dem zweyten ist die Moralität als vollendet, und nicht als ein unausgeführtes Gedankending vorhanden. Aber diese Vollendung besteht eben darin, daſs die Moralität in einem Bewuſstseyn, Wirklichkeit, so wie freye 1807 579 Wirklichkeit, Daseyn überhaupt hat, nicht das leere, sondern erfüllte inhaltsvolle ist; — das heiſst, die Vollendung der Moralität wird darin gesetzt, daſs das, was so eben als das moralischnichtige bestimmt wurde, in ihr und an ihr vorhanden ist. Sie soll das einemal schlechthin nur als das unwirkliche Gedankending der reinen Abstraction Gültigkeit, aber ebensowohl in dieser Weise keine Gültigkeit haben; ihre Wahrheit soll darin bestehen, der Wirklichkeit entgegengesetzt, und von ihr ganz frey und leer, und wieder darin, Wirklichkeit zu seyn.

631 Der Synkretismus dieser Widersprüche, der in der moralischen Weltanschauung auseinandergelegt ist, fallt in sich zusammen, indem der Unterschied, worauf er beruht, von solchem, das nothwendig gedacht und gesetzt werden müſſe, und doch zugleich unwesentlich sey, zu einem Unterschiede wird, der nicht einmal mehr in den Worten liegt. Was am Ende als ein verschiedenes geſetzt wird, sowohl als das Nichtige, wie als das Reelle iſt ein und eben dasselbe, das Daseyn und die Wirklichkeit; und was absolut nur als das Jenseits des wirklichen Seyns und Bewuſstseyns, und ebensowohl nur in ihm und als ein Jenseits das nichtige seyn soll, ist die reine Pflicht, und das Wiſſen derselben als des Wesens. Das Bewuſstseyn, das diesen Unterschied macht, der keiner ist, die Wirklichkeit, für das nichtige und das reale zugleich, — die reine Moralität ebenso für das wahre 1807 580 Wesen so wie für das wesenlose ausſagt, spricht die Gedanken, die es vorher trennte, zusammen aus, spricht es selbst aus, daſs es ihm mit dieser Bestimmung und der Auseinanderstellung der Momente des Selbſts, und des Anſichs nicht Ernst ist, sondern daſs es das, was es als das absolute auſſer dem Bewuſstseyn Seyende ausſagt, vielmehr in dem Selbst des Selbstbewuſstseyns eingeschloſſen behält, und was es als das absolut Gedachte oder das absolute Anſich ausſagt, eben darum für ein nicht Wahrheit habendes nimmt. — Es wird für das Bewuſstseyn, daſs das Auseinanderstellen dieser Momente eine Verstellung ist, und es wäre Heucheley, wenn es sie doch beybehielte. Aber als moralisches reines Selbstbewuſstseyn flieht es aus dieser Ungleichheit seines Vorſtellens mit dem, was sein Wesen ist, aus dieser Unwahrheit, welche das für wahr ausſagt, was ihm für unwahr gilt, mit Abscheu in sich zurück. Es ist reines Gewiſſen, welches eine solche moralische Weltvorstellung verschmäht; es ist in ſich ſelbſt der einfache seiner gewiſſe Geiſt, der ohne die Vermittlung jener Vorstellungen unmittelbar gewiſſenhafft handelt, und in dieser Unmittelbarkeit seine Wahrheit hat. — Wenn aber diese Welt der Verstellung nichts anders als die Entwiklung des moralischen Selbſtbewuſstseyns in seinen Momenten, und hiemit seine Realität ist, so wird es durch sein Zurückgehen in sich, seinem Wesen nach nichts anderes werden; sein Zurückgehen, in sich ist vielmehr nur das erlangte Bewuſstseyn, daſs 1807 581 seine Wahrheit eine vorgegebene ist. Es müſste sie noch immer für seine Wahrheit ausgeben, denn es müſste sich als gegenständliche Vorstellung ausſprechen und darstellen, aber wüſste, daſs diſs nur eine Verstellung ist; er wäre hiemit in der That die Heucheley, und jenes Verschmähen jener Verstellung schon die erste Aeuſſerung der Heucheley.

c. Das Gewiſſen, die ſchöne Seele, das Böſe und ſeine Verzeyhung.

632 Die Antinomie der moralischen Weltanschauung, daſs es ein moralisches Bewuſstseyn gibt, und daſs es keines gibt, — oder das das Gelten der Pflicht ein Jenseits des Bewuſstseyns ist, und umgekehrt nur in ihm statt findet, war in die Vorstellung zusammengefaſst worden, worin das nichtmoralische Bewuſstseyn für moralisch gelte, sein zufälliges Wissen und Wollen für vollwichtig angenommen, und die Glückseligkeit ihm aus Gnade zu Theil werde. Diese sich selbst widersprechende Vorstellung nahm das moralische Selbſtbewuſstseyn nicht über sich, sondern verlegte sie in ein ihm andres Wesen. Aber diſs Hinausſetzen deſſen, was es als nothwendig denken muſs, auſſer sich selbst, ist ebenso der Widerspruch der Form nach, wie jener es dem Inhalte 1807 582 nach ist. Weil aber an sich eben das, was als widersprechend erscheint, und in deſſen Tronnung und Wiederauflösung die moralische Weltanschäuung sich herumtreibt, daſſelbe ist, die reine Pflicht nemlich als das reine Wiſſen, nichts anders als das Selbſt des Bewuſstseyns, und das Selbst des Bewuſstseyns das Seyn und Wirklichkeit; — ebenso was jenseits des wirklichen Bewuſstſeyns seyn soll, nicht anders als das reine Denken, also in der That das Selbst ist, so geht für uns oder an ſich das Selbſtbewuſstſeyn in sich zurück, und weiſs dasjenige Wesen als sich selbst, worin das Wirkliche zugleich reines Wiſſen und reine Pflicht ist. Es selbst ist sich das in seiner Zufälligkeit vollgültige, das seine unmittelbare Einzelnheit als das reine Wiſſen und Handeln, als die wahre Wirklichkeit und Harmonie weiſs.

633 Diſs Selbſt des Gewiſſens, der seiner unmittelbar als der absoluten Wahrheit und des Seyns gewiſſe Geist, ist das dritte Selbſt, das uns aus der dritten Welt des Geistes geworden ist, und ist mit den vorherigen kurz zu vergleichen. Die Totalität oder Wirklichkeit, welche sich als die Wahrheit der sittlichen Welt darstellt, ist das Selbſt der Perſon; ihr Dasein ist das Anerkanntſeyn. Wie die Person das substanzleere Selbst ist, so ist diſs ihr Daseyn ebenso die abstracte Wirklichkeit; die Person gilt und zwar unmittelbar; das Selbſt ist der in dem Elemente seines Seyns unmittelbar ruhende Punkt; er ist ohne die Abtrennung von seiner Allgemeinheit, beyde daher nicht 1807 583 in Bewegung und Beziehung aufeinander, das allgemeine ist ohne Unterscheidung in ihm, und weder Inhalt des Selbſts, noch ist das Selbſt durch sich selbst erfüllt. — Das zweyte Selbſt ist die zu ihrer Wahrheit gekommne Welt der Bildung oder der sich wiedergegebne Geist der Entzweyung, — die absolute Freyheit. In diesem Selbſt tritt jene erſte unmittelbare Einheit der Einzelnheit und Allgemeinheit auseinander; das Allgemeine, das ebenso rein geistiges Wesen, Anerkanntseyn oder allgemeiner Willen und Wiſſen bleibt, ist Gegenſtand und Inhalt des Selbſts und seine allgemeine Wirklichkeit. Aber es hat nicht die Form des vom Selbſt freyen Daseyns; es kommt in diesem Selbſt daher zu keiner Erfüllung und zu keinem positiven Inhalt, zu keiner Welt. Das moralische Selbſtbewuſstſeyn läſst seine Allgemeinheit zwar frey, so daſs sie eine eigne Natur wird, und ebenso hält es sie in sich als aufgehoben fest. Aber es ist nur das verstellende Spiel der Abwechslung dieser beyden Bestimmungen. Als Gewiſſen erst hat es in seiner Selbſtgewiſsheit den Inhalt für die vorhin leere Pflicht so wie für das leere Recht und den leeren allgemeinen Willen; und weil diese Selbſtgewiſsheit ebenso das unmittelbare ist, das Daseyn selbst.

634 Zu dieser seiner Wahrheit gelangt verläſst also oder hebt das moralische Selbstbewuſstseyn vielmehr die Trennung in sich selbstauf, woraus die Verstellung entsprungen, die Trennung des Anſich und des Selbſts, der reinen Pflicht als des reinen Zwecks, 1807 584 und der Wirklichkeit als einer dem reinen Zwecke entgegengesetzten Natur und Sinnlichkeit. Es ist so in sich zurückgekehrt, concreter moralischer Geist, der nicht am Bewuſstseyn der reinen Pflicht sich einen leeren Maſsſtab gibt, welcher dem wirklichen Bewuſstseyn entgegengesetzt wäre, sondern die reine Pflicht ebenso wie die ihr entgegengesetzte Natur sind aufgehobne Momente; er ist in unmittelbarer Einheit sich verwirklichendes moralisches Wesen, und die Handlung unmittelbar concrete moralische Gestalt.

635 Es ist ein Fall des Handelns vorhanden; er ist eine gegenſtändliche Wirklichkeit für das wiſſende Bewuſstſeyn. Dieses als Gewiſſen weiſs ihn auf unmittelbare concrete Weise, und er ist zugleich nur wie es ihn weiſs. Zufällig ist das Wiſſen, insofern es ein anderes ist, als der Gegenſtand; der seiner selbſt gewiſſe Geiſt aber iſt nicht mehr ein solches zufälliges Wiſſen und Erschaffen von Gedanken in sich, von denen die Wirklichkeit verschieden wäre, sondern indem die Trennung des Anſich und des Selbſts aufgehoben ist, so ist der Fall unmittelbar in der sinnlichen Gewiſsheit des Wiſſens, wie er anſich ist, und er ist nur so anſich, wie er in diesem Wiſſen ist. — Das Handeln als die Verwirklichung ist hiedurch die reine Form des Willens; die bloſſe Umkehrung der Wirklichkeit als eines seyenden Falles, in eine gethane Wirklichkeit, der bloſſen Weise des gegenſtändlichen Wiſſens in die Weise des Wiſſens 1807 585 von der Wirklichkeit als einem von Bewuſstſeyn hervorgebrachten. Wie die sinnliche Gewiſsheit unmittelbar in das Anſich des Geiſtes aufgenommen oder vielmehr umgekehrt ist, so ist auch diese Umkehrung einfach und unvermittelt, ein Uebergang durch den reinen Begriff ohne Aenderung des Inhalts, der durch das Intereſſe des von ihm wiſſenden Bewuſstseyns beſtimmt ist. — Das Gewiſſen ſondert ferner die Umſtände des Falles nicht in verschiedene Pflichten ab. Es verhält sich nicht als poſitives allgemeines Medium, worin die vielen Pflichten, jede für ſich, unverrückte Subſtantialität erhielten, so daſs entweder gar nicht gehandelt werden könnte, weil jeder concrete Fall die Entgegensetzung überhaupt, und als moralischer Fall die Entgegensetzung der Pflichten enthält, in der Beſtimmung des Handelns also Eine Seite, Eine Pflicht immer verletzt würde; — oder daſs, wenn gehandelt wird, die Verletzung einer der entgegengesetzten Pflichten wirklich einträte. Das Gewiſſen ist vielmehr das negative Eins oder absolute Selbſt, welches diese verschiedenen moralischen Subſtanzen vertilgt; es ist einfaches pflichtmäſſiges Handeln, das nicht diese oder jene Pflicht erfüllt, sondern das concrete Rechte weiſs und thut. Es ist daher überhaupt erst das moralische Handeln als Handeln; worein das vorhergehende thatlose Bewuſstseyn der Moralität übergegangen ist. — Die concrete Geſtalt der That mag vom unterscheidenden Bewuſstſeyn in verschiedene Eigenschafften, d. h. hier 1807 586 in verschiedene moralische Beziehungen analysirt, und diese entweder jede, wie es seyn muſs, wenn sie Pflicht seyn soll, für absolut geltend ausgesagt, oder auch verglichen und geprüft werden. In der einfachen moralischen Handlung des Gewiſſens sind die Pflichten so verschüttet, daſs allen diesen einzelnen Wesen unmittelbar Abbruch gethan wird, und das prüffende Rütteln an der Pflicht in der unwankenden Gewiſsheit des Gewiſſens gar nicht ſtatt findet.

636 Ebensowenig ist im Gewiſſen jene hin und hergehende Ungewiſsheit des Bewuſstseyns vorhanden, welches bald die sogenannte reine Moralität auſſer sich in ein anderes heiliges Wesen setzt, und sich selbst als das unheilige gilt, bald aber auch wieder die moralische Reinheit in sich, und die Verknüpfung des Sinnlichen mit dem Moralischen in das andere Wesen setzt.

637 Es entsagt allen diesen Stellungen und Verſtellungen der moralischen Weltanschauung, indem es dem Bewuſstseyn entsagt, das die Pflicht und die Wirklichkeit als widersprechend faſst. Nach diesem letztern handle ich moralisch, indem ich mir bewuſst bin, nur die reine Pflicht zu vollbringen, nicht irgend etwas anders, diſs heiſst in der That, indem ich nicht handle. Indem ich aber wirklich handle, bin ich mir eines andern, einer Wirklichkeit, die vorhanden ist, und einer die ich hervorbringen will, bewuſst, habe einen beſtimmten Zweck und erfülle eine beſtimmte Pflicht; es 1807 587 ist was anderes darin, als die reine Pflicht, die allein beabsichtiget werden sollte. — Das Gewiſſen ist dagegen das Bewuſstseyn darüber, daſs, wenn das moralische Bewuſstseyn die reine Pflicht als das Wesen seines Handelns ausſagt, dieser reine Zweck eine Verstellung der Sache ist; denn die Sache selbst ist, daſs die reine Pflicht in der leeren Abſtraction des reinen Denkens besteht, und ihre Realität und Inhalt nur an einer bestimmten Wirklichkeit hat, einer Wirklichkeit, welche Wirklichkeit des Bewuſstseyns selbst, und desſelben nicht als eines Gedankendings, sondern als eines Einzelnen ist. Das Gewiſſen hat für ſich ſelbſt, seine Wahrheit an der unmittelbaren Gewiſsheit seiner selbst. Diese unmittelbare concrete Gewiſsheit seiner selbst ist das Wesen; sie nach dem Gegensatze des Bewuſstseyns betrachtet, so ist die eigne unmittelbare Einzelnheit der Inhalt des moralischen Thuns; und die Form deſſelben ist eben dieses Selbſt als reine Bewegung, nemlich als das Wiſſen oder die eigne Ueberzeugung.

638 Diſs in seiner Einheit und in der Bedeutung der Momente näher betrachtet, so erfaſste das moralische Bewuſstseyn sich nur als das Anſich oder Wesen; als Gewiſſen aber erfaſst es sein Fürſichseyn oder sein Selbſt. — Der Widerspruch der moralischen Weltanschauung löst sich auf, d. h. der Unterschied, der ihm zu Grunde liegt, zeigt sich kein Unterschied zu seyn, und er läufft in die reine Negativität zusammen; diese aber ist eben das Selbſt; ein einfaches Selbſt, 1807 588 welches ebensowohl reines Wiſſen, als Wiſſen seiner als dieses einzelnen Bewuſstseyns ist. Diſs Selbſt macht daher den Inhalt des vorher leeren Wesens aus, denn es ist das wirkliche, welches nicht mehr die Bedeutung hat, eine dem Wesen fremde und in eignen Gesetzen selbstständige Natur zu seyn. Es ist als das Negative der Unterſchied der reines Wesens, ein Inhalt und zwar ein solcher, welcher an und für sich gilt.

639 Ferner ist diſs Selbſt als reines sich selbstgleiches Wiſſen das schlechthin Allgemeine, so daſs eben diſs Wiſſen als sein eignes Wiſſen, als Ueberzeugung die Pflicht ist. Die Pflicht ist nicht mehr das dem Selbſt gegenübertretende Allgemeine, sondern ist gewuſst, in dieser Getrenntheit kein Gelten zu haben; es ist itzt das Gesetz, das um des Selbſts willen, nicht um dessen willen das Selbſt ist. Das Gesetz und die Pflicht hat aber darum nicht allein die Bedeutung des Furſichſeyns, sondern auch des Anſichſeyns, denn diſs Wiſſen ist um seiner Sichselbſtgleichheit willen eben das Anſich. Diſs Anſich trennt sich auch im Bewuſstseyn von jener unmittelbaren Einheit mit dem Fürſichseyn; so gegenübertretend ist es Seyn, Seyn für anderes. — Die Pflicht eben wird itzt als Pflicht, die vom Selbſt verlaſſen iſt, gewuſst, nur Moment zu seyn, ſie iſt von ihrer Bedeutung, abſolutes Wesen zu seyn, zum Seyn, das nicht Selbſt, nicht für ſich iſt, herabgesunken und also Seyn für anderes. Aber diſs Seyn für anderes bleibt ebendarum wesentliches Moment, weil das Selbſt als Bewuſstseyn den Gegensatz des Fürſichseyns und des 1807 589 Seyns für anderes ausmacht, und itzt die Pflicht an ihr unmittelbar wirkliches, nicht mehr bloſs das abſtracte reine Bewuſstseyn iſt.

640 Diſs Seyn für anderes ist also die anſichseyende vom Selbſt unterschiedne Subſtanz. Das Gewiſſen hat die reine Pflicht oder das abſtracte Anſich nicht aufgegeben, sondern sie ist das wesentliche Moment, als Allgemeinheit sich zu andern zu verhalten. Es ist das gemeinschaftliche Element der Selbstbewuſstseyn, und dieses die Subſtanz, worin die That Beſtehen und Wirklichkeit hat; das Moment des Anerkanntwerdens von den andern. Das moralische Selbſtbewuſstseyn hat diſs Moment des Anerkanntseyns, des reinen Bewuſstſeyns, welches da iſt, nicht; und ist dadurch überhaupt nicht handelndes, nicht verwirklichendes. Sein Anſich ist ihm entweder das abſtracte unwirkliche Wesen, oder das Seyn als eine Wirklichkeit, welche nicht geiſtig iſt. Die seyende Wirklichkeit des Gewiſsens aber ist eine solche, welche Selbſt iſt, d. h. das seiner bewuſste Daseyn, das geiſtige Element des Anerkanntwerdens. Das Thun ist daher nur das Uebersetzen seines einzelnen Inhalts in das gegenſtändliche Element, worin er allgemein und anerkannt ist, und eben diſs, daſs er anerkanrt ist, macht die Handlung zur Wirklichkeit. Anerkannt und dadurch wirklich ist die Handlung’ weil die daseyende Wirklichkeit unmittelbar mit der Ueberzeugung oder dem Wiſſen verknüpft, oder das Wiſſen von seinem Zwecke unmittelbar das Element des Daseyns, das allgemeine Anerkennen iſt. Denn 1807 590 das Weſen der Handlung, die Pflicht beſteht in der Ueberzeugung des Gewiſſens von ihr; diese Ueberzeugung iſt eben das Anſich selbſt; es iſt das an ſich allgemeine Selbſtbewuſstseyn, oder das Anerkanntseyn und hiemit die Wirklichkeit. Das mit der Ueberzeugung von der Pflicht gethane iſt also unmittelbar ein solches, das Beſtand und Daseyn hat. Es iſt also da keine Rede mehr davon, daſs die gute Abſicht nicht zu Stande komme, oder daſs es dem Guten schlecht geht; sondern das als Pflicht gewuſste vollführt ſich und kommt zur Wirklichkeit, weil eben das Pflichtmäſſige das Allgemeine aller Selbſtbewuſstseyn, das anerkannte und also Seyende iſt. Getrennt und allein genommen, ohne den Inhalt des Selbſts aber iſt diese Pflicht das Seyn für anderes, das durchſichtige, das nur die Bedeutung gehaltloser Wesenheit überhaupt hat.

641 Sehen wir auf die Sphäre zurück, mit der überhaupt die geiſtige Realität eintrat, so war es der Begriff, daſs das Ausſprechen der Individualität das Anund für ſich ſey. Aber die Geſtalt, welche diesen Begriff unmittelbar ausdrückte, war das ehrliche Bewuſstseyn, das ſich mit der abſtracten Sache ſelbſt herumtrieb. Diese Sache selbſt, war dort Prädicat; im Gewiſſen aber erſt iſt ſie Subject, das alle Momente des Bewuſstseyns an ihm gesetzt hat, und für welches alle diese Momente, Subſtantialität überhaupt, äuſſeres Daseyn und Wesen des Denkens, in dieser Gewiſsheit seiner selbſt enthalten sind. Subſtantialität überhaupt hat die Sache selbſt in der Sittlichkeit, äuſſeres Daseyn in der 1807 591 Bildung, ſich ſelbſtwiſſende Weſenheit des Denkens in der Moralität, und im Gewiſſen iſt ſie das Subject, das dieſe Momente an ihm ſelbſt weiſs. Wenn das ehrliche Bewuſstseyn nur immer die leere Sache ſelbſt ergreifft, ſo gewinnt dagegen das Gewiſſen ſie in ihrer Erfüllung, die es ihr durch ſich gibt. Es iſt dieſe Macht dadurch, daſs es die Momente des Bewuſstseyns als Momente weiſs, und als ihr negatives Weſen, ſie beherrſcht.

642 Das Gewiſſen in Beziehung auf die einzelnen Beſtimmungen des Gegenſatzes, der am Handeln erſcheint, und ſein Bewuſstſeyn über die Natur derſelben betrachtet, ſo verhält es sich zuerſt als Wiſſendes zur Wirklichkeit des Falles, worin zu handeln iſt. Insofern das Moment der Allgemeinheit an dieſem Wiſſen ist, gehört zum Wiſſen des gewiſſenhafften Handelns, die vorliegende Wirklichkeit auf uneingeſchränkte Weiſe zu umfaſſen, und alſo die Umſtände des Falles genau zu wiſſen und in Erwägung zu ziehen. Diſs Wiſſen aber, da es die Allgemeinheit als ein Moment kennt, iſt daher ein ſolches Wiſſen von dieſen Umſtänden, das sich bewuſst ist, sie nicht zu umfaſſen oder darin nicht gewiſſenhafft zu ſeyn. Die wahrhafft allgemeine und reine Beziehung des Wiſſens wäre eine Beziehung auf ein nicht entgegengeſetztes, auf sich ſelbſt; aber das Handeln durch den Gegenſatz, der in ihm weſentlich ist, bezieht sich auf ein Negatives des Bewuſstseyns, auf eine an sich ſeyende Wirklichkeit. Gegen die Einfachheit des 1807 592 reinen Bewuſstseyns, das abſolut andere, oder die Mannichfaltigkeit an sich, ist sie eine abſolute Vielheit der Umſtände, die sich rückwärts in ihre Bedingungen, seitwärts in ihrem Nebeneinander, vorwärts in ihren Folgen unendlich theilt und ausbreitet. — Das gewiſſenhaffte Bewuſstseyn iſt dieſer Natur der Sache und ſeines Verhältniſſes zu ihr bewuſst, und weiſs, daſs es den Fall, in dem es handelt, nicht nach dieſer gefoderten Allgemeinheit kennt, und daſs ſein Vorgeben dieſer gewiſſenhafften Erwägung aller Umſtände nichtig iſt. Dieſe Kenntniſs und Erwägung aller Umſtände aber iſt nicht gar nicht vorhanden; allein nur als Moment, als etwas, das nur für andere ist; und sein unvollſtändiges Wiſſen, weil es ſein Wiſſen ist, gilt ihm als hinreichendes vollkommenes Wiſſen.

643 Auf gleiche Weiſe verhält es sich mit der Allgemeinheit des Weſens, oder der Beſtimmung des Inhalts durchs reine Bewuſstseyn. — Das zum Handeln schreitende Gewiſſen bezieht sich auf die vielen Seiten des Falles. Dieſer schlägt sich auseinander, und ebenso die Beziehung des reinen Bewuſstseyns auf ihn, wodurch die Mannichfaltigkeit des Falles eine Mannichfaltigkeit von Pflichten ist. — Das Gewiſſen weiſs, daſs es unter ihnen zu wählen und zu entſcheiden hat; denn keine ist in ihrer Beſtimmtheit oder in ihrem Inhalte abſolut, ſondern nur die reine Pflicht. Aber diſs Abſtractum hat in ſeiner Realität die Bedeutung des selbstbewuſsten Ich erlangt. Der 1807 593 seiner ſelbſt gewiſſe Geiſt ruht als Gewiſſen in sich, und ſeine reale Allgemeinheit, oder ſeine Pflicht liegt in ſeiner reinen Ueberzeugung von der Pflicht. Dieſe reine Ueberzeugung iſt als ſolche ſo leer als die reine Pflicht, rein in dem Sinne, daſs nichts in ihr, kein beſtimmter Inhalt Pflicht ist. Es ſoll aber gehandelt, es muſs von dem Individuum beſtimmt werden; und der ſeiner ſelbſt gewiſſe Geiſt, in dem das Ansich die Bedeutung des ſelbſtbewuſsten Ich erlangt hat, weiſs dieſe Beſtimmung und Inhalt in der unmittelbaren Gewiſsheit ſeiner ſelbſt zu haben. Dieſe ist als Beſtimmung und Inhalt das natürliche Bewuſstseyn, das heiſst, die Triebe und Neigungen. — Das Gewiſſen erkennt keinen Inhalt für es als abſolut, denn es iſt abſolute Negativität alles Beſtimmten. Es beſtimmt aus sich ſelbſt; der Kreis des Selbsts aber, worein die Beſtimmtheit als solche fällt, iſt die ſogenannte Sinnlichkeit; einen Inhalt aus der unmittelbaren Gewiſsheil ſeiner ſelbſt zu haben, findet sich nichts bey der Hand, als sie. — Alles, was in frühern Geſtalten, als Gut oder Schlecht, als Geſetz und Recht sich darſtellte, iſt ein Anderes als die unmittelbare Gewiſsheit ſeiner ſelbſt; es iſt ein Allgemeines, das jetzt ein Seyn für anderes iſt; oder anders betrachtet, ein Gegenſtand, welcher das Bewuſstseyn mit sich selbſt vermittelnd, zwiſchen es und ſeine eigene Wahrheit tritt und es vielmehr von sich abſondert, als daſs er ſeine Unmittelbarkeit wäre. — Dem Gewiſſen aber iſt die Gewiſsheit ſeiner ſelbſt die reine unmittelbare 1807 594 Wahrheit; und dieſe Wahrheit iſt alſo ſeine als Inhalt vorgeſtellte unmittelbare Gewiſsheit ſeiner ſelbſt, das heiſst, überhaupt die Willkühr des Einzelnen und die Zufälligkeit ſeines bewuſstlosen natürlichen Seyns.

644 Dieſer Inhalt gilt zugleich als moraliſche Weſenheit oder als Pflicht. Denn die reine Pflicht ist, wie ſchon bey dem Prüffen der Geſetze sich ergab, ſchlechthin gleichgültig gegen jeden Inhalt, und verträgt jeden Inhalt. Hier hat sie zugleich die weſentliche Form des Fürsichſeyns, und dieſe Form der individuellen Ueberzeugung ist nichts anderes als das Bewuſstseyn von der Leerheit der reinen Pflicht, und davon daſs sie nur Moment, daſs ſeine Subſtantialität ein Prädicat ist, welches ſein Subject an dem Individuum hat, deſſen Willkühr ihr den Inhalt gibt, jeden an dieſe Form knüpfen, und ſeine Gewiſſenhafftigkeit an ihn heſſten kann. — Ein Individuum vermehrt ſein Eigenthum auf eine gewiſſe Weiſe; es iſt Pflicht, daſs jedes für die Erhaltung ſeiner ſelbſt wie auch ſeiner Familie, nicht weniger für die Möglichkeit ſorgt, ſeinen Nebenmenschen nützlich zu werden, und Hülfsbedürftigen gutes zu thun. Das Individuum ist sich bewuſst, daſs diſs Pflicht iſt, denn dieſer Inhalt iſt unmittelbar in der Gewiſsheit ſeiner ſelbſt enthalten; es sieht ferner ein, daſs es dieſe Pflicht in dieſem Falle erfüllt. Andere halten vielleicht dieſe gewiſſe Weiſe für Betrug; ſie halten ſich an andere Seiten des concreten Falles, es aber hält 1807 595 dieſe Seite dadurch feſt, daſs es ſich der Vermehrung des Eigenthums als reiner Pflicht bewuſst ist. — So erfüllt das, was andere Gewaltthätigkeit und Unrecht nennen, die Pflicht gegen Andere ſeine Selbſtständigkeit zu behaupten, was sie Feigheit nennen, — die Pflicht, sich das Leben und die Möglichkeit der Nützlichheit für die Nebenmenſchen zu erhalten; was sie aber die Tapferkeit nennen, verletzt vielmehr beyde Pflichten. Die Feigheit darf aber nicht ſo ungeſchickt ſeyn, nicht zu wiſſen, daſs die Erhaltung des Lebens und der Möglichkeit, andern nützlich zu ſeyn, Pflichten sind, nicht von der Pflichtmäſsigkeit ihres Handels überzeugt zu ſeyn und nicht zu wiſſen, daſs in dem Wiſſen das Pflichtmäſsige beſteht; ſonſt begienge ſie die Ungeſchicklichkkeit, unmoralisch zu ſeyn. Da die Moralität in dem Bewuſstseyn, die Pflicht erfüllt zu haben, liegt, ſo wird dem Handeln, das Feigheit, eben ſo wenig als dem, das Tapferkeit genannt wird, diſs nicht fehlen; das Abſtractum, das Pflicht heiſst, iſt wie jedes, ſo auch dieſes Inhalts fähig, es weiſs alſo, was es thut, als Pflicht, und indem es diſs weiſs und die Ueberzeugung von der Pflicht das Pflichtmäſsige ſelbſt iſt, ſo iſt es anerkannt von den Andern; die Handlung gilt dadurch und hat wirkliches Daſeyn.

645 Gegen dieſe Freyheit, die jeden beliebigen Inhalt in das allgemeine paſſive Medium der reinen Pflicht und Wiſſens einlegt, ſo gut als einen andern, hilfft es nichts, zu behaupten, daſs ein anderer 1807 596 Inhalt eingelegt werden ſollte; denn welcher es ſey, jeder hat den Makel der Beſtimmtheit an ihm, von der das reine Wiſſen frey iſt, die es verſchmähen, ebenſo wie es jede aufnehmen kann. Aller Inhalt ſteht darin, daſs er ein beſtimmter iſt, auf gleicher Linie mit dem andern, wenn er auch gerade den Charakter zu haben ſcheint, daſs in ihm das Beſondere aufgehoben ſey. Es kann ſcheinen, daſs indem an dem wirklichen Falle die Pflicht sich überhaupt in den Gegenſatz und dadurch den der Einzelnheit und Allgemeinheit entzweyt, diejenige Pflicht, deren Inhalt das Allgemeine ſelbſt iſt, dadurch unmittelbar die Natur der reinen Pflicht an ihr habe, und Form und Inhalt hiemit sich ganz gemäſs werden; ſo daſs alſo z. B. die Handlung für das allgemeine Beſte, der für das individuelle vorzuziehen ſey. Allein dieſe allgemeine Pflicht iſt überhaupt dasjenige, was als an und für sich seyende Subſtanz, als Recht und Geſetz vorhanden iſt, und unabhängig von dem Wiſſen und der Ueberzeugung wie von dem unmittelbaren Intereſſe des Einzelnen gilt; es iſt alſo gerade dasjenige, gegen deſſen Form die Moralität überhaupt gerichtet iſt. Was aber ſeinen Inhalt betrifft, ſo iſt auch er ein beſtimmter, inſofern das allgemeine Beſte dem einzelnen entgegengeſetzt iſt; hiemit iſt ſein Geſetz ein ſolches, von welchem das Gewiſſen ſich ſchlechthin frey weiſs und hinzu und davonzuthun, es zu unterlaſſen, ſo wie zu erfüllen, ſich die abſolute Befugniſs gibt. — Alsdenn iſt ferner jene 1807 597 Unterſcheidung der Pflicht gegen dzs Einzelne und gegen das Allgemeine, der Natur des Gegenſatzes überhaupt nach nichts feſtes. Sondern vielmehr was der Einzelne für sich thut, kommt auch dem Allgemeinen zu gute; je mehr er für sich geſorgt hat, deſto gröſſer iſt nicht nur ſeine Möglichkeit, andern zu nützen; ſondern ſeine Wirklichkeit ſelbſt iſt nur diſs, im Zuſammenhange mit andern zu ſeyn und zu leben; ſein einzelner Genuſs hat weſentlich die Bedeutung, damit andern das ſeinige preiszugeben, und ihnen zum Erwerb ihres Genuſſes zu verhelffen. In der Erfüllung der Pflicht gegen den Einzelnen, alſo gegen ſich, wird alſo auch die gegen das Allgemeine erfüllt. — Die Erwägung und Vergleichung der Pflichten, welche hier einträte, lieffe auf die Berechnung des Vortheils hinaus, den das Allgemeine von einer Handlung hätte, aber theils fällt die Moralität hiedurch der nothwendigen Zufälligkeit der Einsicht anheim, theils iſt es gerade das Weſen des Gewiſſens diſs Berechnen und Erwägen abzuſchneiden, und ohne ſolche Gründe aus ſich zu entſcheiden.

646 Auf dieſe Weiſe handelt und erhält ſich alſo das Gewiſſen in der Einheit des Anſich und des Fürſichſeyns, in der Einheit des reinen Denkens und der Individualität, und iſt der ſeiner gewiſſe Geiſt, der ſeine Wahrheit an ihm ſelbſt, in ſeinem Selbſt, in ſeinem Wiſſen, und darin als dem Wiſſen von der Pflicht hat. Er erhält sich eben dadurch darin, daſs was poſitives in der Handlung iſt, ſowohl der 1807 598 Inhalt, als die Form der Pflicht und das Wiſſen von ihr, dem Selbſt, der Gewiſsheit ſeiner, angehört; was aber dem Selbſt als eignes Anſich gegenübertreten will, als nicht wahres, nur als aufgehobnes, nur als Moment gilt. Es gilt daher nicht das allgemeine Wiſſen überhaupt, ſondern ſeine Kenntniſs von den Umſtänden. In die Pflicht, als das allgemeine Anſichſeyn, legt es den Inhalt ein, den es aus ſeiner natürlichen Individualität nimmt; denn er iſt der an ihm ſelbſt vorhandne; dieſer wird durch das allgemeine Medium, worin er iſt, die Pflicht, die es ausübt, und die leere reine Pflicht iſt ebenhiedurch als aufgehobnes oder als Moment geſetzt; dieſer Inhalt iſt ihre aufgehobne Leerheit oder die Erfüllung. — Aber ebenſo iſt das Gewiſſen von jedem Inhalt überhaupt frey; es abſolvirt ſich von jeder beſtimmten Pflicht, die als Geſetz gelten ſoll; in der Krafft der Gewiſsheit ſeiner ſelbſt, hat es die Majeſtät der abſoluten Avtarkie, zu binden und zu löſen. — Dieſe Selbſtbeſtimmung iſt darum unmittelbar das ſchlechthin pflichtmäſſiige; die Pflicht iſt das Wiſſen ſelbſt; dieſe einfache Selbſtheit aber iſt das Anſich; denn das Anſich ist die reine Sichſelbſtgleichheit; und dieſe iſt in dieſem Bewuſstſeyn. —

647 Diſs reine Wiſſen iſt unmittelbar Seyn für anderes; denn als die reine Sichſelbſtgleichheit iſt es die Unmittelbarkeit, oder das Seyn. Diſs Seyn iſt aber zugleich das reine Allgemeine, die Selbſtheit Aller; oder das Handeln iſt anerkannt und daher wirklich. 1807 599 Diſs Seyn iſt das Element, wodurch das Gewiſſen unmittelbar mit allen Selbſtbewuſstseyn in der Bezichung der Gleichheit ſteht; und die Bedeutung dieſer Beziehung iſt nicht das ſelbſtloſe Geſetz, ſondern das Selbſt des Gewiſſens.

648 Darin aber, daſs diſs Rechte, was das Gewiſſen thut, zugleich Seyn für anderes iſt, ſcheint eine Ungleichheit an es zu kommen. Die Pflicht, die es vollbringt, iſt ein beſtimmter Inhalt; er iſt zwar das Selbſt des Bewuſstſeyns, und darin ſein Wiſſen von ſich, ſeine Gleichheit mit ſich ſelbſt. Aber vollbracht, in das allgemeine Medium des Seyns geſtellt, iſt dieſe Gleichheit nicht mehr Wiſſen, nicht mehr dieſes Unterſcheiden, welches ſeine Unterſchiede ebenſo unmittelbar aufhebt; ſondern im Seyn iſt der Unterſchied beſtehend geſetzt, und die Handlung eine beſtimmte, ungleich mit dem Elemente des Selbſtbewuſstseyns Aller, alſo nicht nothwendig anerkannt. Beyde Seiten, das handelnde Gewiſſen und das allgemeine dieſe Handlung als Pflicht anerkennende Bewuſstſeyn sind gleich frey von der Beſtimmtheit dieſes Thuns. Um dieſer Freyheit willen iſt die Beziehung in dem gemeinſchafftlichen Medium des Zuſammenhangs vielmehr ein Verhältniſs der vollkommen Ungleichheit; wodurch das Bewuſstseyn, für welches die Handlung iſt, ſich in vollkommner Ungewiſsheit über den handelnden ſeiner ſelbſt gewiſſen Geiſt befindet. Er handelt, er ſetzt eine Beſtimmtheit als ſeyend; an diſs Seyn als an ſeine 1807 600 Wahrheit halten ſich die andern, und ſind darin ſeiner gewiſs; er hat darin ausgeſprochen, was ihm als Pflicht gilt. Allein er iſt frey von irgend einer beſtimmten Pflicht; er iſt da heraus, wo ſie meynen, daſs er wirklich ſey; und diſs Medium des Seyns ſelbſt, und die Pflicht als an ſich ſeyend, gilt ihm nur als Moment. Was er ihnen alſo hinſtellt, verſtellt er auch wieder, oder vielmehr hat es unmittelbar verſtellt. Denn ſeine Wirklichkeit iſt ihm nicht dieſe hinausgeſtellte Pflicht und Beſtimmung, ſondern diejenige, welche er in der abſoluten Gewiſsheit ſeiner ſelbſt hat.

649 Sie wiſſen alſo nicht, ob diſs Gewiſſen moraliſch gut oder ob es böſe iſt, oder vielmehr ſie können es nicht nur nicht wiſſen, ſondern müſſen es auch für böſe nehmen. Denn wie es frey von der Beſtimmtheit der Pflicht, und von der Pflicht als an ſich ſeyender iſt, sind sie es gleichfalls. Was es ihnen hinſtellt, wiſſen ſie ſelbſt zu verſtellen; es iſt ein ſolches, wodurch nur das Selbſt eines andern ausgedrückt iſt, nicht ihr eignes; ſie wiſſen ſich nicht nur frey davon, ſondern müſſen es in ihrem eignen Bewuſstſeyn auflöſen, durch Urtheilen und Erklären zu nichte machen, um ihr Selbſt zu erhalten.

650 Allein die Handlung des Gewiſſens iſt nicht nur dieſe von dem reinen Selbſt verlaſſne Beſtimmung des Seyns. Was als Pflicht gelten und anerkannt werden ſoll, iſt es allein durch das Wiſſen und die Ueberzeugung davon als von der Pflicht, durch das 1807 601 Wiſſen ſeiner Selbſt in der That. Wenn die That aufhört, dieſes Selbſt an ihr zu haben, hört ſie auf das zu ſeyn, was allein ihr Weſen iſt. Ihr Daſeyn von dieſem Bewuſstſeyn verlaſſen, wäre eine gemeine Wirklichkeit, und die Handlung erſchiene uns als ein Vollbringen ſeiner Luſt und Begierde. Was da ſeyn ſoll, iſt hier allein Weſenheit dadurch, daſs es als sich ſelbſt ausſprechende Individualität gewuſst wird; und diſs gewuſstſeyn iſt es, was das anerkannte iſt, und was als ſolches, Daſeyn haben ſoll.

651 Das Selbſt tritt ins Daſeyn, als Selbſt; der ſeiner gewiſſe Geiſt exiſtirt als ſolcher für andre; ſeine unmittelbare Handlung iſt nicht das, was gilt und wirklich ist; nicht das beſtimmte, nicht das anſichſeyende iſt das anerkannte, ſondern allein das ſich wiſſende Selbſt als ſolches. Das Element des Beſtehens iſt das allgemeine Selbſtbewuſstseyn; was in dieſes Element tritt, kann nicht die Wirkung der Handlung ſeyn, dieſe hält nicht darin aus, und erhält kein Bleiben, ſondern nur das Selbſtbewuſstſeyn iſt das anerkannte und gewinnt die Wirklichkeit.

652 Wir ſehen hiemit wieder die Sprache als das Daſeyn des Geiſtes. Sie iſt das für andre ſeyende Selbſtbewuſstſeyn, welches unmittelbar als ſolches vorhanden und als dieſes allgemeines iſt. Sie iſt das ſich von ſich ſelbſt abtrennende Selbſt, das als reines Ich — Ich sich gegenſtändlich wird, in dieſer Gegenſtändlichkeit ſich ebenſo als dieſes Selbſt erhält, wie es unmittelbar mit den Andern zuſammenflieſst und ihr 1807 602 Selbstbewuſstseyn iſt; es vernimmt ebenſo ſich, als es von den andern vernommen wird, und das Vernehmen iſt eben das zum Selbſt gewordne Daſeyn.

653 Der Inhalt, den die Sprache hier gewonnen, iſt nicht mehr das verkehrte und verkehrende und zerriſſne Selbſt der Welt der Bildung; ſondern der in ſich zurückgekehrte, ſeiner und in ſeinem Selbſt ſeiner Wahrheit oder seines Anerkennens gewiſſe, und als dieſes Wiſſen anerkannte Geiſt. Die Sprache des sittlichen Geiſtes iſt das Geſetz und der einfache Befehl, und die Klage, die mehr eine Thräne über die Nothwendigkeit iſt; das moralische Bewuſstseyn hingegen iſt noch ſtumm, bey ſich in seinem Innern verschloſſen, denn in ihm hat das Selbſt noch nicht Daseyn, sondern das Daseyn und das Selbſt ſtehen erſt in äusserer Beziehung aufeinander. Die Sprache aber tritt nur als die Mitte selbſtſtändiger und anerkannter Selbſtbewuſstseyn hervor, und das daseyende Selbſt iſt unmittelbar allgemeines, vielfaches und in dieser Vielheit einfaches Anerkanntseyn. Der Inhalt der Sprache des Gewiſſens iſt das ſich als Wesen wiſſende Selbſt. Diſs allein spricht sie aus, und dieses Ausſprechen iſt die wahre Wirklichkeit des Thuns und das Gelten der Handlung. Das Bewuſstseyn spricht seine Ueberzeugung aus; diese Ueberzeugung ist es, worin allein die Handlung Pflicht iſt; ſie gilt auch allein dadurch als Pflicht, daſs die Ueberzeugung ausgesprochen wird. Denn das allgemeine Selbſtbewuſstseyn iſt frey von der nur seyenden beſtimmten Handlung; ſie als Daſeyn 1807 603 gilt ihm nichts, sondern die Ueberzeugung, daſs ſie Pflicht iſt; und diese iſt in der Sprache wirklich. — Die Handlung verwirklichen heiſst hier nicht ihren Inhalt aus der Form des Zwecks oder Fürſichſeyns in die Form der abſtracten Wirklichkeit übersetzen, sondern aus der Form der unmittelbaren Gewiſsheit seiner selbſt, die ihr Wiſſen oder Fürſichseyn als das Wesen weiſs, in die Form der Verſicherung, daſs das Bewuſstseyn von der Pflicht überzeugt iſt, und die Pflicht als Gewiſſen aus ſich ſelbſt weiſs; diese Verſicherung verſichert also, daſs es davon überzeugt iſt, daſs seine Ueberzeugung das Wesen iſt.

654 Ob die Verſicherung, aus Ueberzeugung von der Pflicht zu handeln, wahr iſt, ob es wirklich die Pflicht iſt, was gethan wird, — diese Fragen oder Zweifel haben keinen Sinn gegen das Gewiſſen. — Bey jener Frage, ob die Verſicherung wahr iſt, würde vorausgesetzt, daſs die innere Abſicht von der vorgegebnen verschieden sey, d. h. daſs das Wollen des einzelnen Selbſts, ſich von der Pflicht, von dem Willen des allgemeinen und reinen Bewuſstſeyns trennen könne; der letztre wäre in die Rede gelegt, das erſtere aber eigentlich die wahre Triebfeder der Handlung. Allein dieser Unterschied des allgemeinen Bewuſstseyns und des einzelnen Selbſts iſt es eben, der ſich aufgehoben, und deſſen Aufheben das Gewiſſen ist. Das unmittelbare Wiſſen des seiner gewiſſen Selbſts iſt Gesetz und Pflicht; seine Abſicht iſt dadurch, daſs ſie seine Abſicht iſt, das Rechte; es wird nur erfodert, 1807 604 daſs es diſs wiſſe und diſs, daſs es die Ueberzeugung davon, sein Wiſſen und Wollen sey das Rechte, sage. Das Ausſprechen dieser Verſicherung hebt an ſich selbſt die Form seiner Besonderheit auf; es anerkennt darinn die nothwendige Allgemeinheit des Selbſts; indem es ſich Gewiſſen nennt, nennt es ſich reines ſich selbſt Wiſſen und reines abſtractes Wollen, d. h. es nennt ſich ein allgemeines Wiſſen und Wollen, das die Andern anerkennt, ihnen gleich iſt, denn ſie ſind eben diſs reine ſich Wiſſen und Wollen, und das darum auch von ihnen anerkannt wird. In dem Wollen des ſeiner gewiſſen Selbſts, in dieſem Wiſſen, daſs das Selbſt das Weſen iſt, liegt das Weſen des Rechten. — Wer alſo ſagt, er handle ſo aus Gewiſſen, der ſpricht wahr, denn ſein Gewiſſen iſt das wiſſende und wollende Selbſt. Er muſs diſs aber weſentlich ſagen, denn diſs Selbſt muſs zugleich allgemeines Selbſt ſeyn. Diſs iſt es nicht in dem Inhalt der Handlung, denn dieſer iſt um ſeiner Beſtimmtheit willen an ſich gleichgültig: ſondern die Allgemeinheit liegt in der Form derſelben; dieſe Form iſt es, welche als wirklich zu ſetzen iſt; ſie iſt das Selbſt, das als ſolches in der Sprache wirklich iſt, ſich als das Wahre ausſagt, eben darin alle Selbſt anerkennt und von ihnen anerkannt wird.

655 Das Gewiſſen alſo, in der Majeſtät ſeiner Erhabenheit über das beſtimmte Geſetz und jeden Inhalt der Pflicht, legt den beliebigen Inhalt in ſein Wiſſen und Wollen; es iſt die moraliſche Genialität, 1807 605 welche die innere Stimme ihres unmittelbaren Wiſſens als göttliche Stimme weiſs, und indem ſie an dieſem Wiſſen ebenſo unmittelbar das Daſeyn weiſs, iſt ſie die göttliche Schöpferkrafft, die in ihrem Begriffe die Lebendigkeit hat. Sie iſt ebenſo der Gottesdienſt in ſich ſelbſt; denn ihr Handeln iſt das Anſchauen dieſer ihrer eignen Göttlichkeit.

656 Dieſer einſame Gottesdienſt iſt zugleich weſentlich der Gottesdienſt einer Gemeinde, und das reine innere ſich ſelbſt Wiſſen und Vernehmen geht zum Momente des Bewuſstseyns fort. Die Anſchauung ſeiner iſt ſein gegenſtändliches Daſeyn, und diſs gegenſtändliche Element iſt das Ausſprechen ſeines Wiſſens und Wollens als eines Allgemeinen. Durch diſs Ausſprechen wird das Selbſt zum geltenden und die Handlung zur ausführenden That. Die Wirklichkeit und das Beſtehen ſeines Thuns iſt das allgemeine Selbſtbewuſstseyn; das Ausſprechen des Gewiſſens aber ſetzt die Gewiſsheit ſeiner ſelbſt als reines und dadurch als allgemeines Selbſt; die andern laſſen die Handlung um dieſer Rede willen, worin das Selbſt als das Weſen ausgedrückt und anerkannt iſt, gelten. Der Geiſt und die Subſtanz ihrer Verbindung iſt alſo die gegenſeitige Verſicherung von ihrer Gewiſſenhafftigkeit, guten Abſichten, das Erfreuen über dieſe wechſelſeitige Reinheit und das Laben an der Herrlichkeit des Wiſſens und Ausſprechens, des Hegens und Pflegens ſolcher Vortrefflichkeit. — Inſofern diſs Gewiſſen ſein abſtractes 1807 606 Bewuſstſeyn noch von ſeinem Selbſtbewuſstſeyn unterſcheidet, hat es ſein Leben nur verborgen in Gott; er iſt zwar unmittelbar ſeinem Geiſt und Herzen, ſeinem Selbſt gegenwärtig; aber das offenbare, ſein wirkliches Bewuſstseyn und die vermittelnde Bewegung deſſelben iſt ihm ein Anderes als jenes verborgene Innere und die Unmittelbarkeit des gegenwärtigen Weſens. Allein in der Vollendung des Gewiſſens hebt ſich der Unterſchied ſeines abſtracten und ſeines Selbſtbewuſstſeyns auf. Es weiſs, daſs das abſtracte Bewuſstseyn eben dieſes Selbſt, dieſes ſeiner gewiſſe Fürsichſeyn iſt, daſs in der Unmittelbarkeit der Beziehung des Selbſts auf das Ansich, das auſſer dem Selbſt geſetzt das abſtracte Weſen und das ihm verborgene iſt, eben die Verſchiedenheit aufgehoben iſt. Denn diejenige Beziehung iſt eine vermittelnde, worin die bezognen nicht ein und daſſelbe, ſondern ein Anderes für einander und nur in einem dritten eins sind; die unmittelbare Beziehung aber heiſst in der That nichts anderes als die Einheit. Das Bewuſstseyn über die Gedankenloſigkeit, dieſe Unterſchiede, die keine sind, noch für Unterſchiede zu halten, erhoben, weiſs die Unmittelbarkeit der Gegenwart des Weſens in ihm als Einheit des Weſens und ſeines Selbſts, ſein Selbſt also als das lebendige Ansich, und diſs ſein Wiſſen als die Religion, die als angeſchautes oder daſeyendes Wiſſen das Sprechen der Gemeinde über ihren Geiſt iſt.

1807 607

657 Wir ſehen hiemit hier das Selbstbewuſstseyn in ſein Innerſtes zurückgegangen, dem alle Aeuſſerlichkeit als ſolche verschwindet, — in die Anschauung des Ich = Ich, worin dieſes Ich alle Wesenheit und Daseyn iſt. Es verſinkt in dieſem Begriffe seiner selbſt, denn es iſt auf die Spitze seiner Extreme getrieben, und zwar so daſs die unterschiednen Momente, wodurch es real oder noch Bewuſstſeyn iſt, nicht für uns nur diese reinen Extreme ſind, sondern das, was es für sich, und was ihm an ſich und was ihm Daſeyn iſt, zu Abſtractionen verflüchtigt, die keinen Halt, keine Subſtanz mehr für diſs Bewuſstseyn selbſt haben; und alles, was bisher für das Bewuſstseyn Wesen war, iſt in diese Abſtractionen zurückgegangen. — Zu dieser Reinheit geläutert, iſt das Bewuſstseyn seine ärmſte Geſtalt, und die Armuth, die seinen einzigen Beſitz ausmacht, iſt selbſt ein Verschwinden; diese abſolute Gewiſsheit, in welche ſich die Subſtanz aufgelöſt hat, iſt die absolute Unwahrheit, die in sich zusammenfallt; es iſt das absolute Selbſtbewuſstseyn, in dem das Bewuſstseyn verſinkt.

658 Diſs Verſinken innerhalb ſeiner ſelbſt betrachtet, ſo iſt für das Bewuſstseyn die anſichſeyende Subſtanz das Wiſſen als ſein Wiſſen. Als Bewuſstseyn iſt es in den Gegenſatz ſeiner und des Gegenſtandes, der für es das Weſen iſt, getrennt; aber dieser Gegenſtand eben iſt das vollkommen durchſichtige, es iſt sein Selbſt, und sein Bewuſstſeyn iſt nur das Wiſſen von ſich. Alles Leben, und alle geiſtige Weſenheit iſt in diſs 1807 608 Selbſt zurückgegangen, und hat ſeine Verſchiedenheit von dem Ichſelbſt verloren. Die Momente des Bewuſstſeyns ſind daher dieſe extremen Abſtractionen, deren keine ſteht, ſondern in der andern ſich verliert, und ſie erzeugt. Es iſt der Wechsel des unglücklichen Bewuſstseyns mit ſich, der aber für es ſelbſt innerhalb ſeiner vorgeht, und der Begriff der Vernunft zu ſeyn ſich bewuſst iſt, der jenes nur an ſich iſt. Die abſolute Gewiſsheit ſeiner ſelbſt ſchlägt ihr alſo als Bewuſstſeyn unmittelbar in ein Austönen, in Gegenſtändlichkeit ſeines Fürſichſeyns um; aber dieſe erſchaffne Welt iſt ſeine Rede, die es ebenſo unmittelbar vernommen, und deren Echo nur zu ihm zurückkommt. Dieſe Rückkehr hat daher nicht die Bedeutung, daſs es an und für ſich darin iſt; denn das Weſen iſt ihm kein anſich, ſondern es ſelbſt; ebenſowenig hat es Daſeyn, denn das Gegenſtändliche kommt nicht dazu ein Negatives des wirklichen Selbſts zu ſeyn; ſo wie dieſes nicht zur Wirklichkeit. Es fehlt ihm die Kraft der Entäuſſerung, die Kraft ſich zum Dinge zu machen, und das Seyn zu ertragen. Es lebt in der Angſt die Herrlichkeit ſeines Innern durch Handlung und Daſeyn zu beflecken, und um die Reinheit ſeines Herzens zu bewahren, flieht es die Berührung der Wirklichkeit, und beharret in der eigenſinnigen Kraftloſigkeit, ſeinem zur letzten Abſtraction zugeſpitzten Selbſt zu entſagen, und ſich Subſtantialität zu geben, oder ſein Denken in Seyn zu verwandeln, und ſich dem abſoluten Unterſchiede anzuvertrauen. Der hohle 1807 609 Gegenſtand, den es ſich erzeugt, erfüllt es daher nun mit dem Bewuſstseyn der Leerheit; ſein Thun iſt das Sehnen, das in dem Werden ſeiner ſelbſt zum weſenloſen Gegenſtande ſich nur verliert, und über dieſen Verluſt hinaus und zurück zu ſich fallend, ſich nur als verlornes findet; — in dieſer durchſichtigen Reinheit ſeiner Momente eine unglückliche ſogenannte ſchöne Seele, verglimmt ſie in ſich, und ſchwindet als ein geſtaltloſer Dunſt, der ſich in Luft auflöſt.

659 Diſs ſtille Zuſammenflieſſen der marklosen Weſenheiten des verflüchtigten Lebens iſt aber noch in der andern Bedeutung der Wirklichkeit des Gewiſſens, und in der Erſcheinung ſeiner Bewegung zu nehmen, und das Gewiſſen als handelnd zu betrachten — Das gegenſtändliche Moment in dieſem Bewuſstseyn hat ſich oben als allgemeines Bewuſstseyn beſtimmt; das ſich ſelbſtwiſſende Wiſſen iſt als dieſes Selbſt unterſchieden von andern Selbſt; die Sprache, in der ſich alle gegenſeitig als gewiſſenhaft handelnd anerkennen, dieſe allgemeine Gleichheit, zerfällt in die Ungleichheit des einzelnen Fürſichſeyns, jedes Bewuſstſeyn iſt aus ſeiner Allgemeinheit ebenſo ſchlechthin in ſich reflectirt; hiedurch tritt der Gegenſatz der Einzelnheit gegen die andern Einzelnen und gegen das Allgemeine nothwendig ein, und dieſes Verhältniſs und ſeine Bewegung iſt zu betrachten. — Oder dieſe Allgemeinheit und die Pflicht hat die ſchlechthin entgegengeſetzte Bedeutung der beſtimmten von dem Allgemeinen ſich 1807 610 ausnehmenden Einzelnheit, für welche die reine Pflicht nur die an die Oberfläche getretene und nach auſſen gekehrte Allgemeinheit iſt; die Pflicht liegt nur in den Worten, und gilt als ein Seyn für anderes. Das Gewiſſen zunächſt nur negativ gegen die Pflicht als dieſe beſtimmte vorhandne gerichtet, weiſs ſich frey von ihr; aber indem es die leere Pflicht mit einem beſtimmten Inhalte aus ſich ſelbſt anfüllt, hat es das poſitive Bewuſstſeyn darüber, daſs es als dieſes Selbſt ſich den Inhalt macht; ſein reines Selbſt, als leeres Wiſſen iſt das inhalts- und beſtimmungslose; der Inhalt, den es ihm gibt, iſt aus ſeinem Selbſt als dieſem beſtimmten, aus ſich als natürlicher Individualität genommen, und in dem Sprechen von der Gewiſſenhaftigkeit ſeines Handelns iſt es ſich wohl ſeines reinen Selbſts, aber, im Zwecke ſeines Handelns als wirklichem Inhalt, ſeiner als dieſes beſondern Einzelnen und des Gegenſatzes desjenigen bewuſst, was es für ſich und was es für andere iſt, des Gegenſatzes der Allgemeinheit oder Pflicht und ſeines Reflectirtſeyns aus ihr.

660 Wenn ſich ſo der Gegenſatz, in den das Gewiſſen als handelnd eintritt, in ſeinem Innern ausdrückt, ſo iſt er zugleich die Ungleichheit nach Auſſen in dem Elemente des Daſeyns, die Ungleichheit ſeiner beſondern Einzelnheit gegen anderes Einzelnes. — Seine Beſonderheit beſteht darin, daſs die beyden ſein Bewuſstseyn conſtituirenden Momente, das Selbſt und das Anſich mit ungleichem Werthe und zwar mit der Beſtimmung in ihm gelten, daſs die Gewiſsheit ſeiner 1807 611 ſelbſt das Weſen iſt, gegen das Anſich oder das Allgemeine, das nur als Moment gilt. Dieſer innerlichen Beſtimmung ſteht alſo das Element des Daſeyns oder das allgemeine Bewuſstseyn gegenüber, welchem vielmehr die Allgemeinheit, die Pflicht, das Weſen, dagegen die Einzelnheit, die gegen das Allgemeine für ſich iſt, nur als aufgehobnes Moment gilt. Dieſem Feſthalten an der Pflicht gilt das erſte Bewuſstſeyn als das Böſe, weil es die Ungleichheit ſeines Inſichſeyns mit dem Allgemeinen iſt, und indem dieſes zugleich ſein Thun als Gleichheit mit ſich ſelbſt, als Pflicht und Gewiſſenhaftigkeit ausſpricht, als Heu cheley.

661 Die Bewegung dieſes Gegenſatzes iſt zunächſt die formelle Herſtellung der Gleichheit zwiſchen dem, was das Böſe in ſich iſt, und was es ausſpricht; es muſs zum Vorſchein kommen, daſs es böſe und ſo ſein Daſeyn ſeinem Weſen gleich, die Heucheley muſs entlarvt werden. — Dieſe Rückkehr der in ihr vorhandnen Ungleichheit in die Gleichheit iſt nicht darin ſchon zu Stande gekommen, daſs die Heucheley, wie man zu ſagen pflegt, ebendadurch ihre Achtung für Pflicht und Tugend beweiſe, daſs ſie den Schein derſelben annehme und als Maske für ihr eignes nicht weniger als für fremdes Bewuſstſeyn gebrauche; in welchem Anerkennen des Entgegengeſetzten an ſich die Gleichheit und Uebereinſtimmung enthalten ſey. — Allein ſie iſt zugleich aus dieſem Anerkennen der Sprache 1807 612 ebenſoſehr heraus und in ſich reflectirt, und darin, daſs ſie das Anſichſeyende nur als ein Seyn für anderes gebraucht, iſt vielmehr die eigne Verachtung deſſelben und die Darſtellung ſeiner Weſenloſigkeit für Alle enthalten. Denn was ſich als ein äuſſerliches Werkzeug gebrauchen läſst, zeigt ſich als ein Ding, das keine eigne Schwere in ſich hat.

662 Auch kommt dieſe Gleichheit weder durch das einſeitige Beharren des böſen Bewuſstseyns auf ſich, noch durch das Urtheil des allgemeinen zu Stande. — Wenn jenes ſich gegen das Bewuſstseyn der Pflicht verleugnet, und was dieſes für Schlechtigkeit, für abſolute Ungleichheit mit dem Allgemeinen, ausſagt, als ein Handeln nach dem innern Geſetze und Gewiſſen behauptet, ſo bleibt in dieser einſeitigen Verſicherung der Gleichheit ſeine Ungleichheit mit dem Andern, da ja dieſes ſie nicht glaubt und nicht anerkennt. — Oder da das einſeitige Beharren auf Einem Extreme ſich ſelbſt auflöſt, ſo würde das Böſe ſich zwar dadurch als Böſes eingeſtehen, aber darin, ſich unmittelbar aufheben und nicht Heucheley ſeyn noch als ſolche ſich entlarven. Es geſteht ſich in der That als Böſes durch die Behauptung ein, daſs es, dem anerkannten Allgemeinen entgegengeſetzt, nach ſeinem innern Geſetze und Gewiſſen handle. Denn wäre diſs Geſetz und Gewiſſen nicht das Geſetz ſeiner Einzelnheit und Willkühr, ſo wäre es nicht etwas Innres, Eignes, ſondern das allgemein anerkannte. Wer darum ſagt, daſs er nach ſeinem Geſetze und 1807 613 Gewiſſen gegen die Andern handle, ſagt in der That, daſs er ſie mishandle. Aber das wirkliche Gewiſſen iſt nicht dieſes Beharren auf dem Wiſſen und Willen, der dem Allgemeinen ſich entgegenſetzt, ſondern das Allgemnine iſt das Element ſeines Daſeyns, und ſeine Sprache ſagt ſein Thun als die anerkannte Pflicht aus.

663 Ebenſowenig iſt das Beharren des allgemeinen Bewuſstseyns auf ſeinem Urtheile Entlarvung und Auflösung der Heucheley. — Indem es gegen ſie, ſchlecht, niederträchtig u. ſ. f. ausruft, beruft es ſich in ſolchem Urtheil auf ſein Geſetz, wie das böſe Bewuſstſeyn auf das ſeinige. Denn jenes tritt im Gegenſatz gegen dieſes, und dadurch als ein beſonderes Geſetz auf. Es hat alſo nichts vor dem andern voraus, legitimirt vielmehr dieſes, und dieſer Eifer thut gerade das Gegentheil deſſen, was er zu thun meynt — nemlich das, was er wahre Pflicht nennt und das allgemein anerkannt ſeyn ſoll, als ein nichtanerkanntes zu zeigen, und hiedurch dem andern das gleiche Recht des Fürſichſeyns einzuräumen.

664 Diſs Urtheil aber hat zugleich eine andre Seite, von welcher es die Einleitung zur Auflöſung des vorhandnen Gegenſatzes wird. — Das Bewuſstseyn des Allgemeinen verhält ſich nicht als wirkliches und handelndes gegen das Erſte, denn dieſes iſt vielmehr das wirkliche, — ſondern ihm entgegengeſetzt, als dasenige, das nicht in dem Gegenſatze der Einzelnheit und Allgemeinheit befangen iſt, welcher in dem 1807 614 Handeln eintritt. Es bleibt in der Allgemeinheit des Gedankens, verhält ſich als auffaſſendes, und ſeine erſte Handlung iſt nur das Urtheil. — Durch diſs Urtheil ſtellt es ſich nun, wie ſo eben bemerkt wurde, neben das Erſte, und dieſes kommt durch dieſe Gleichheit zur Anſchauung ſeiner ſelbſt in dieſem andern Bewuſstseyn. Denn das Bewuſstſeyn der Pflicht verhält ſich auffaſſend, paſſiv; es iſt aber hiedurch im Widerſpruche mit ſich als dem abſoluten Willen der Pflicht, mit ſich, dem ſchlechthin aus ſich ſelbſt beſtimmenden. Es hat gut ſich in der Reinheit bewahren, denn es handelt nicht; es iſt die Heucheley, die das Urtheilen für wirkliche That genommen wiſſen will, und ſtatt durch Handlung, durch das Ausſprechen vortrefflicher Geſinnungen die Rechtſchaffenheit beweiſst. Es iſt alſo ganz ſo beſchaffen wie dasjenige, dem der Vorwurf gemacht wird, daſs es nur in ſeine Rede die Pflicht legt. In beyden iſt die Seite der Wirklichkeit gleich unterſchieden von der Rede, in dem einen durch den eigennützigen Zweck der Handlung, in dem andern durch das Fehlen des Handelns überhaupt, deſſen Nothwendigkeit in dem Sprechen von der Pflicht ſelbſt liegt, denn dieſe hat ohne That gar keine Bedeutung.

665 Das Urtheilen iſt aber auch als poſitive Handlung des Gedankens zu betrachten und hat einen poſitiven Inhalt; durch dieſe Seite wird der Widerſpruch, der in dem auffaſſenden Bewuſstseyn vorhanden iſt, und ſeine Gleichheit mit dem Erſten noch 1807 615 vollſtändiger. — Das handelnde Bewuſstseyn ſpricht diſs ſein beſtimmtes Thun als Pflicht aus, und das beurtheilende kann ihm diſs nicht ableugnen; denn die Pflicht ſelbſt iſt die jeden Inhalts fähige, inhaltsloſe Form, — oder die concrete Handlung, in ihrer Vielſeitigkeit an ihr ſelbſt verſchieden, hat die allgemeine Seite, welche die iſt, die als Pflicht genommen wird, ebenſoſehr an ihr, als die beſondere, die den Antheil und das Intereſſe des Individuums ausmacht. Das beurtheilende Bewuſstseyn bleibt nun nicht bey jener Seite der Pflicht und bey dem Wiſſen des Handelnden davon, daſs diſs ſeine Pflicht, das Verhältniſs und der Stand ſeiner Wirklichkeit ſey, ſtehen. Sondern es hält ſich an die andre Seite, ſpielt die Handlung in das Innre hinein, und erklärt ſie aus ihrer von ihr ſelbſt verſchiednen Abſicht und eigennützigen Triebfeder. Wie jede Handlung der Betrachtung ihrer Pflichtgemäſsheit fähig iſt, ebenſo dieſer andern Betrachtung der Beſonderheit; denn als Handlung iſt ſie die Wirklichkeit des Individuums. — Dieſes Beurtheilen ſetzt alſo die Handlung aus ihrem Daſeyn heraus und reflectirt ſie in das Innre oder in die Form der eignen Beſonderheit. — Iſt ſie von Ruhme begleitet, ſo weiſs es diſs Innre als Ruhmſucht; — iſt ſie dem Stande des Individuums überhaupt angemeſſen, ohne über dieſen hinauszugehen, und ſo beſchaffen, daſs die Individualität den Stand nicht als eine äuſſere Beſtimmung an ihr hängen hat, ſondern dieſe Allgemeinheit durch 1807 616 ſich ſelbſt ausfüllt und ebendadurch ſich als eines höhern fähig zeigt, ſo weiſs das Urtheil ihr Innres als Ehrbegierde u. ſ. f. Indem in der Handlung überhaupt das Handelnde zur Anſchauung ſeiner ſelbſt in der Gegenſtändlichkeit, oder zum Selbſtgefühl ſeiner in ſeinem Daseyn und also zum Genuſſe gelangt; ſo weiſs das Urtheil das Innre als Trieb nach eigner Glückſeligdeit, beſtünde ſie auch nur in der innern moralischen Eitelkeit, dem Genuſſe des Bewuſstſeyns der eignen Vortrefflichkeit, und dem Vorschmacke der Hoffnung einer künftigen Glückseligkeit. — Es kann ſich keine Handlung ſolchem Beurtheilen entziehen, denn die Pflicht um der Pflicht willen, dieser reine Zweck, iſt das unwirkliche; ſeine Wirklichkeit hat er in dem Thun der Individualität, und die Handlung dadurch die Seite der Besondernheit an ihr. — Es gibt keinen Helden für den Kammerdiener; nicht aber weil jener nicht ein Held, ſondern weil dieser — der Kammerdiener iſt, mit welchem jener nicht als Held, ſondern als eſſender, trinkender, ſich kleidender, überhaupt in der Einzelnheit des Bedürfniſſes und der Vorſtellung zu thun hat. So gibt es für das Beurtheilen keine Handlung, in welcher es nicht die Seite der Einzelnheit der Individualität, der allgemeinen Seite der Handlung entgegensetzen, und gegen den Handelnden den Kammerdiener der Moralität machen könnte.

666 Diſs beurtheilende Bewuſstseyn iſt hiemit ſelbſt niederträchtig, weil es die Handlung theilt, und ihre 1807 617 Ungleichheit mit ihr ſelbſt hervorbringt und feſthält. Es iſt ferner Heucheley, weil es ſolches Beurtheilen nicht für eine andre Manier, böse zu seyn, sondern für das rechte Bewuſstseyn der Handlung ausgibt, in dieser seiner Unwirklichkeit und Eitelkeit des gut und beſſerwiſſens ſich selbſt über die heruntergemachten Thaten hinaufsetzt, und sein thatloses Reden für eine vortreffliche Wirklichkeit genommen wiſſen will. — Hiedurch also dem Handelnden, welches von ihm beurtheilt wird, ſich gleich machend, wird es von diesem als daſſelbe mit ihm erkannt. Dieses findet sich von jenem nicht nur aufgefaſst als ein Fremdes und mit ihm Ungleiches, sondern vielmehr jenes nach deſſen eigner Beſchaffenheit mit ihm gleich. Diese Gleichheit anschauend und sie ausſprechend, geſteht es ſich ihm ein, und erwartet ebenso, daſs das Andre, wie es ſich in der That ihm gleich geſtellt hat, so auch seine Rede erwiedern, in ihr seine Gleichheit ausſprechen und das anerkennende Daseyn eintreten werde. Sein Geſtändniſs iſt nicht eine Erniedrigung, Demüthigung, Wegwerfung im Verhältniſſe gegen das Andre; denn dieses Ausſprechen iſt nicht das einseitige, wodurch es seine Ungleichheit mit ihm setzte, sondern allein um der Anschauung der Gleichheit des andern willen mit ihm spricht es sich, es spricht ihre Gleichheit von seiner Seite in seinem Geſtändniſſe aus, und spricht sie darum aus, weil die Sprache das Daseyn des Geiſtes als unmittelbaren Selbſts iſt; es erwartet also, daſs das Andre das seinige zu diesem Daseyn beytrage.

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667 Allein auf das Eingeſtändniſs des Bösen: Ich bins, erfolgt nicht diese Erwiederung des gleichen Geſtändniſſes. So war es mit jenem Urtheilen nicht gemeynt; im Gegentheil! Es ſtöſst diese Gemeinschaft von ſich, und iſt das harte Herz, das für ſich iſt und die Continuität mit dem andern verwirſt. — Hiedurch kehrt ſich die Scene um. Dasjenige, das ſich bekannte, ſieht ſich zurückgeſtoſſen, und das andere im Unrecht, welches das Heraustreten seines Innern in das Daseyn der Rede verweigert, und dem Bösen die Schönheit seiner Seele, dem Bekenntniſſe aber den ſteifen Nacken des ſich gleich bleibenden Charakters und die Stummheit, ſich in ſich zu behalten und ſich nicht gegen einen andern wegzuwerfen, entgegensetzt. Es iſt hier die höchſte Empörung des seiner selbſt gewiſſen Geiſtes gesetzt; denn er schaut sich als dieses einfache Wiſſen des Selbſts im Andern an, und zwar so, daſs auch die äuſſere Geſtalt dieses Andern nicht wie ein Reichthume das Wesenlose, nicht ein Ding iſt, sondern es ist der Gedanke, das Wiſſen selbſt, was ihm entgegengehalten, es ist diese absolutflüſſige Continuität des reinen Wiſſens, die ſich verweigert, ihre Mittheilung mit ihm zu setzen, — mit ihm, der schon in seinem Bekenntniſſe dem abgeſonderten Fürſichseyn entsagte, und ſich als aufgehobne Besonderheit und hiedurch als die Continuität mit dem Andern, als Allgemeines setzte. Das Andre aber behält an ihm selbſt sich sein sich nicht mittheilendes Fürſichseyn bevor; an dem bekennenden behält 1807 619 es ebendaſſelbe, was aber von diesem schon abgeworfen iſt. Es zeigt sich dadurch als das geiſtverlaſſne und den Geiſt verleugnende Bewuſstseyn, denn es erkennt nicht, daſs der Geiſt in der absoluten Gewiſsheit seiner selbst über alle That und Wirklichkeit Meister, und sie abwerfen und ungeschehen machen kann. Zugleich erkennt es nicht den Widerspruch, den es begeht, die Abwerfung, die in der Rede geschehen ist, nicht für das wahre Abwerfen gelten zu laſſen, während es selbst die Gewiſsheit seines Geistes nicht in einer wirklichen Handlung, sondern in seinem Innern und dessen Daseyn in der Rede seines Urtheils hat. Es ist es also selbst, das die Rückkehr des Andern aus der That in das geiſtige Daseyn der Rede und in die Gleichheit des Geistes hemmt und durch diese Härte die Ungleichheit hervorbringt, welche noch vorhanden ist.

668 Insofern nun der seiner selbst gewiſſe Geist, als schöne Seele, nicht die Krafft der Entäuſſerung des an sich haltenden Wiſſens ihrer selbst besitzt, kann sie nicht zur Gleichheit mit dem zurückgeſtoſſnen Bewuſstseyn und also nicht zur angeschauten Einheit ihrer selbst im Andern, nicht zum Daseyn gelangen; die Gleichheit kommt daher nur negativ, als ein geistloses Seyn, zu Stande. Die wirklichkeitslose schöne Seele, in dem Widerspruche ihres reinen Selbsts, und der Nothwendigkeit deſſelben, sich zum Seyn zu entäuſſern und in Wirklichkeit umzuschlagen, in der Unmittelbarkeit dieses feſtgehaltnen Gegensatzes, — einer Unmittelbarkeit, die allein die Mitte und 1807 620 Versöhnung des auf seine reine Abſtraction geſteigerten Gegensatzes, und die reines Seyn oder das leere Nichts iſt, — iſt also als Bewuſstseyn dieses Widerspruches in seiner unversöhnten Unmittelbarkeit, zur Verrüktheit zerrüttet, und zerflieſst in sehnsüchtiger Schwindsucht. Es gibt damit in der That das harte Feſthalten seines Fürsichseyns auf, bringt aber nur die geiſtlose Einheit des Seyns hervor.

669 Die wahre, nemlich die selbſtbewuſste und daseyende Ausgleichung ist nach ihrer Nothwendigkeit schon in dem vorhergehenden enthalten. Das Brechen des harten Herzens und seine Erhebung zur Allgemeinheit iſt dieselbe Bewegung, welche an dem Bewuſstseyn ausgedrükt war, das sich selbſt bekannte. Die Wunden des Geiſtes heilen, ohne daſs Narben bleiben; die That ist nicht das unvergängliche, sondern wird von dem Geiſte in sich zurückgenommen, und die Seite der Einzelnheit, die an ihr, es sey als Absicht oder als daseyende Negativität und Schranke derselben vorhanden iſt, iſt das unmittelbar verschwindende. Das verwirklichende Selbſt, die Form seiner Handlung, iſt nur ein Moment des Ganzen, und ebenso das durch Urtheil beſtimmende und den Unterschied der einzelnen und allgemeinen Seite des Handelns feſtsetzende Wiſſen. Jenes Böse setzt diese Entäuſſerung seiner oder sich als Moment, hervorgelockt in das bekennende Daseyn durch die Anschauung seiner selbſt im Andern. Diesem andern aber muſs, wie jenem sein einseitiges nicht anerkanntes Daseyn des besondern 1807 621 Fürsichseyns, so ihm sein einseitiges nicht anerkanntes Urtheil brechen; und wie jenes die Maeht des Geiſtes über seine Wirklichkeit darstellt, so diſs die Macht über seinen bestimmten Begriff.

670 Dieses entsagt aber dem theilenden Gedanken und der Härte des an ihm festhaltenden Fürsichseyns, darum weil es in der That sich selbst im Erſten anschaut. Diſs, das seine Wirklichkeit wegwirft, und sich zum aufgehobnen Diesen macht, ſtellt sich dadurch in der That als allgemeines dar; es kehrt aus seiner äuſſern Wirklichkeit in sich als Wesen zurück; das allgemeine Bewuſstseyn erkennt also darin sich selbſt. — Die Verzeyhung, die es dem erſten wiederfahren läſst, ist die Verzichtleistung auf sich, auf sein unwirkliches Wesen, dem es jenes andere, das wirkliches Handeln war, gleichsetzt, und es, das von der Bestimmung, die das Handeln im Gedanken erhielt, Böses genannt wurde, als gut anerkennt, oder vielmehr diesen Unterschied des bestimmten Gedankens und sein fürsichseyendes bestimmendes Urtheil fahren läſst, wie das Andre das fürsichseyende Beſtimmen der Handlung. — Das Wort der Versöhnung ist der daseyende Geist, der das reine Wiſſen seiner selbst als allgemeinen Wesens in seinem Gegentheile, in dem reinen Wiſſen seiner als der absolut in sich seyenden Einzelnheit anschaut, — ein gegenseitiges Anerkennen, welches der abſolute Geiſt iſt.

671 Er tritt ins Daseyn nur auf der Spitze, auf welcher sein reines Wiſſen von sich selbſt der Gegensatz und Wechsel mit sich selbst ist. Wiſſend, daſs sein 1807 622 reines Wiſſen das abstracte Wesen ist, ist er diese wis: sende Pflicht im absoluten Gegensatze gegen das Wissen, das sich als absolute Einzelnheit des Selbſts das Wesen zu seyn weiſs. Jenes ist die reine Continuität des Allgemeinen, welches die sich als Wesen wiſſende Einzelnheit, als das an sich nichtige, als das Böse weiſs. Diſs aber ist die absolute Diseretion, welche sich selbst in ihrem reinen Eins absolut, und jenes Allgemeine als das unwirkliche weiſs, das nur für andre iſt. Beyde Seiten sind zu dieser Reinheit geläutert, worin kein selbstloses Daseyn, kein negatives des Bewuſstseyns mehr an ihnen ist, sondern jene Pflicht ist der sich gleichbleibende Charakter seines sich selbſt Wiſſens, und dieses Böse hat ebenso seinen Zweck in seinem inſichſeyn, und seine Wirklichkeit in seiner Rede; der Inhalt dieser Rede, ist die Substanz seines Bestehens; sie ist die Versicherung von der Gewiſsheit des Geistes in sich selbst. — Beyde ihrer selbst gewiſſen Geiſter haben keinen andern Zweck als ihr reines Selbst, und keine andre Realität und Daseyn als eben dieses reine Selbst. Aber sie sind noch verschieden, und die Verschiedenheit ist die absolute, weil sie in diesem Elemente des reinen Begriffes gesetzt ist. Sie ist es auch nicht nur für uns, sondern für die Begriffe selbst, die in diesem Gegensatze ſtehen. Denn diese Begriffe sind zwar beſtimmte gegeneinander, aber zugleich an sich allgemeine, so daſs sie den ganzen Umfang des Selbsts ausfüllen, und diſs Selbst keinen andern Inhalt als diese seine 1807 623 Bestimmtheit hat, die weder über es hinausgeht, noch beschränkter ist, als es; denn die eine, das absolut Allgemeine, ist ebenso das reine sich selbst Wiſſen, als das andre, die absolute Discretion der Einzelnheit, und beyde sind nur diſs reine sich Wiſſen. Beyde Bestimmtheiten sind also die wiſſenden reinen Begriffe, deren Bestimmtheit selbst unmittelbar Wiſſen, oder deren Verhältniſs und Gegensatz das Ich ist. Hiedurch sind sie füreinander diese schlechthin Entgegengesetzten; es ist das vollkommen Innre, das so sich selbst gegenüber und ins Daseyn getreten ist; sie machen das reine Wiſſen aus, das durch diesen Gegensatz als Bewuſstseyn gesetzt ist. Aber noch ist es nicht Selbstbewuſstseyn. Diese Verwirklichung hat es in der Bewegung dieses Gegensatzes. Denn dieser Gegensatz ist vielmehr selbst die indiscrete Continuitat und Gleichheit des Ich = Ich; und jedes für sich eben durch den Widerspruch seiner reinen Allgemeinheit, welche zugleich seiner Gleichheit mit dem andern noch widerstrebt und sich davon absondert, hebt an ihm selbst sich auf. Durch diese Entäuſſerung kehrt diſs in seinem Daseyn entzweyte Wiſſen in die Einheit des Selbſts zurück; es ist das wirkliche Ich, das allgemeine ſich selbſt Wiſſen in seinem absoluten Gegentheile, in dem inſichſeyenden Wiſſen, das um der Reinheit seines abgesonderten Insichseyns willen selbſt das vollkommen allgemeine iſt. Das versöhnende Ja, worin beyde Ich von ihrem entgegengesetzten 1807 624 *Daseyn ablaſſen, ist das Daseyn des zur Zweyheit ausgedehnten Ichs, das darin sich gleich bleibt, und in seiner vollkommnen Entäuſſerung und Gegentheile die Gewiſsheit seiner selbst hst; — es ist der erscheinende Gott mitten unter ihnen, die sich als das reine Wiſſen wiſſen.

Musean translation

Mouseia's complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the 1807 first edition, all 808 standard paragraphs in eight chapters plus Preface and Introduction, for fidelity, Hegel's argument, clarity and structure. German witness: Deutsches Textarchiv, CC BY-SA 4.0; page markers keep the 1807 pagination.

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VI. Spirit.

438 Reason is spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its world and of the world as itself.—The movement immediately preceding this showed the becoming of spirit, in which the object of consciousness, the pure category, rose to the concept of reason. In observing reason, this pure unity of I and being, of being-for-itself and being-in-itself, is determined as the in-itself, or as being, and rational consciousness finds itself. But the truth of observation is, rather, the sublation of this immediate instinct of finding, of this unconscious existence of reason. The intuited category, the thing found, enters consciousness as the being-for-itself of the I, which now knows itself in objective essence as the self. But this determination of the category as being-for-itself opposed to being-in-itself is equally one-sided and a moment that sublates itself. The category is therefore determined for consciousness as it is in its universal truth, 1807 377 as essence existing in and for itself. This still abstract determination, which constitutes the matter itself, is as yet only spiritual essence, and consciousness of it is a formal knowing of it that busies itself with its various contents. This consciousness is in fact still distinguished from substance as an individual; it either gives arbitrary laws or supposes that in its knowing as such it possesses the laws as they are in and for themselves, and takes itself to be the power that judges them.—Or, considered from the side of substance, substance is spiritual essence existing in and for itself, which is not yet consciousness of itself.—But essence existing in and for itself, which is at the same time actual as consciousness and represents itself to itself, is spirit.

439 Its spiritual essence has already been designated as ethical substance; but spirit is ethical actuality. It is the self of actual consciousness; spirit—or rather, this self—stands over against consciousness as an objective actual world. Yet this world has equally lost for the self all significance of something alien, just as the self has lost all significance of a being-for-itself separated from that world, whether dependent or independent. As substance and the universal, self-equal, enduring essence, spirit is the immovable and indissoluble ground and starting point of everyone's action—and its purpose and goal, as the conceived in-itself of all self-consciousness.—This substance is equally the universal work that 1807 378 produces itself through the action of each and all as their unity and equality, for it is being-for-itself, the self, action. As substance, spirit is unwavering, just self-equality; but as being-for-itself, substance is the dissolved, self-sacrificing, benevolent essence in which each accomplishes their own work, tears universal being apart, and takes their share of it. This dissolution and individuation of essence is precisely the moment of the action and self of all; it is the movement and soul of substance and the universal essence brought into being. Precisely in being the being dissolved in the self, substance is not a dead essence, but actual and living.

440 Spirit is thus the self-sustaining, absolute, real essence. All previous shapes of consciousness are abstractions of it; they are its analysis of itself, its differentiation of its moments, and its lingering over particular ones. This isolation of such moments presupposes spirit itself and has its subsistence in spirit; or, it exists only in spirit, which is existence. Thus isolated, they have the appearance of being as such; but their onward movement and return into their ground and essence showed that they are only moments, or vanishing magnitudes; and this essence is precisely this movement and dissolution of these moments. Here, where spirit, or their reflection into themselves, is posited, our reflection may briefly 1807 379 recall them in this respect: they were consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason. Spirit is therefore consciousness in general, which includes sense-certainty, perception, and understanding, insofar as, in analyzing itself, it holds fast to the moment of being for itself an objective, existing actuality and abstracts from this actuality's being its own being-for-itself. If, conversely, it holds fast to the other moment of the analysis, that its object is its being-for-itself, it is self-consciousness. But as immediate consciousness of being-in-and-for-itself, as the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, it is consciousness that has reason, which, as the having indicates, has the object as determined to be rational in itself, or to have the standing of the category, but in such a way that for its consciousness the object does not yet have the standing of the category. It is the consciousness from whose examination we have just emerged. Finally, when this reason that spirit has is intuited by spirit as reason that is, or as reason that is actual within it and is its world, spirit is in its truth: it is spirit; it is actual ethical essence.

441 Spirit is the ethical life of a people insofar as it is immediate truth: the individual that is a world. It must advance to consciousness of what it immediately is, sublate beautiful ethical life, and 1807 380 attain knowledge of itself through a series of shapes. These differ from the preceding shapes, however, in being real spirits, actualities in the full sense, and, instead of shapes of consciousness alone, shapes of a world.

442 The living ethical world is spirit in its truth; as spirit first attains abstract knowledge of its essence, ethical life perishes in the formal universality of right. Spirit, now divided within itself, traces out one of its worlds in its objective element as a harsh actuality: the realm of cultivation; and, opposed to this in the element of thought, the world of faith, the realm of essence. But both worlds, grasped by the spirit that turns inward from this loss of itself—grasped by the concept—are thrown into confusion and revolutionized by insight and its spread, the Enlightenment. The realm divided and extended across this world and the beyond returns into self-consciousness, which now in morality grasps itself as essentiality and essence as actual self. It no longer sets its world and that world's ground outside itself, but lets everything fade within itself and, as conscience, is spirit certain of itself.

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443 The ethical world, the world torn between this world and the beyond, and the moral worldview are therefore the spirits whose movement and return into spirit's simple self existing for itself will unfold, and as whose goal and result the actual self-consciousness of absolute spirit will emerge.

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A. True Spirit: Ethical Life.

444 In its simple truth, spirit is consciousness and separates its moments from one another. Action divides it into substance and consciousness of substance, and divides both substance and consciousness themselves. As universal essence and purpose, substance confronts itself as individualized actuality; the infinite middle is self-consciousness, which, in itself the unity of itself and substance, now becomes this for itself, unites universal essence with its individualized actuality, raises the latter to the former, and acts ethically—and brings the former down to the latter, accomplishing the purpose, the substance that is only thought. It produces the unity of its self and substance as its work, and thereby as actuality.

445 In this separation of consciousness, simple substance has, on the one hand, acquired an opposition to self-consciousness; on the other, it thereby equally presents within itself the nature of consciousness, 1807 383 which is to differentiate itself within itself, as a world articulated into its spheres. It therefore splits into a differentiated ethical essence, into a human and a divine law. Likewise, the self-consciousness confronting it assigns itself, according to its essence, to one of these powers, and as knowing divides into ignorance of what it does and knowledge of it, which is for that very reason a deceived knowing. In its deed it therefore experiences both the contradiction between those powers into which substance divided, and their mutual destruction, as well as the contradiction between its knowledge of the ethical character of its action and what is ethical in and for itself; and it finds its own downfall. But in fact, through this movement ethical substance has become actual self-consciousness, or this self has become something existing in and for itself; yet precisely in this, ethical life has perished.

a. The Ethical World: Human and Divine Law, Man and Woman.

446 The simple substance of spirit divides itself as consciousness. Or, just as consciousness of abstract, sensuous being passes into perception, 1807 384 so too does the immediate certainty of real, ethical being; and just as for sense-perception simple being becomes a thing of many properties, so for ethical perception the occasion of action is an actuality of many ethical relations. For the former, however, the useless multiplicity of properties contracts into the essential opposition of individuality and universality; and still more, for the latter, which is purified, substantial consciousness, the multiplicity of ethical moments becomes the duality of a law of individuality and a law of universality. Yet each of these spheres of substance remains the whole spirit; whereas in sense-perception things have no substance other than the two determinations of individuality and universality, here these express only the superficial opposition of the two sides to one another.

447 In the essence we are considering here, individuality has the significance of self-consciousness in general, not of a contingent individual consciousness. Ethical substance in this determination is therefore actual substance, absolute spirit realized in the multiplicity of existing consciousness. It is the community, which for us, on entering the practical configuration of reason in general, was absolute essence, and has here emerged in its truth for itself as conscious ethical essence, and as the essence for the consciousness 1807 385 we have as our object. It is spirit that is for itself insofar as it sees itself in the mutual reflection of individuals, and is in itself, or substance, insofar as it preserves them within itself. As actual substance, it is a people; as actual consciousness, a citizen of the people. This consciousness has its essence in simple spirit, and its certainty of itself in the actuality of this spirit, the entire people, and immediately therein its truth—thus not in something unactual, but in a spirit that exists and holds good.

448 This spirit can be called human law, because it exists essentially in the form of actuality conscious of itself. In the form of universality it is the known law and the prevailing custom; in the form of individuality it is actual certainty of itself in the individual in general, and as government it is certainty of itself as simple individuality. Its truth is an open validity lying in the light of day: an existence that, for immediate certainty, takes the form of an existence freely released.

449 But another power, divine law, confronts this ethical power and its openness. For ethical state power, as the movement of self-conscious action, has its opposite in the simple and immediate essence of ethical life; as actual universality, it is a force directed against individual being-for-itself; and as 1807 386 actuality in general, it also has in inner essence something other than itself.

450 It has already been recalled that each of the opposed modes in which ethical substance exists contains the whole substance and all the moments of its content. If, therefore, the community is substance as actual action conscious of itself, the other side has the form of immediate or existing substance. On the one hand, this is thus the inner concept, or the universal possibility of ethical life in general; but on the other hand, it equally contains the moment of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness expressing ethical life in this element of immediacy or being, or an immediate consciousness of itself, both as essence and as this self, in another—that is, a natural ethical community—is the family. As the unconscious, still inward concept, it confronts its self-conscious actuality; as the element of the people's actuality, it confronts the people itself; as immediate ethical being, it confronts ethical life that forms and sustains itself through labor for the universal: the Penates, the household gods, confront universal spirit.

451 But although the family's ethical being is determined as immediate, within itself the family is an ethical essence not insofar as it is the relation of its members by nature, or their relationship is the immediate relationship of actual individuals. For 1807 387 the ethical is universal in itself, and this natural relationship is essentially just as much a spirit, and ethical only as spiritual essence. We must see in what its distinctive ethical character consists.—First, because the ethical is what is universal in itself, the ethical relationship of family members is not a relationship of feeling or the relation of love. The ethical would now seem to have to be placed in the relation of the individual family member to the whole family as substance, so that the individual's action and actuality have only the family as their purpose and content. But the conscious purpose of the action of this whole, insofar as it is directed toward itself, is itself the individual. The acquisition and preservation of power and wealth is partly directed only toward need and belongs to desire; partly, in its higher determination, it becomes merely a means. This determination does not fall within the family itself, but is directed toward the truly universal, the community; it is instead negative toward the family, and consists in taking the individual out of it, subjugating the individual's natural character and individuality, and drawing the individual toward virtue, toward life in and for the universal. The positive purpose peculiar to the family is the individual as such. For this relationship to be ethical, the individual—whether the one acting or the one toward whom the action is directed—cannot appear according to 1807 388 some contingency, as happens, for instance, in some act of assistance or service. The content of ethical action must be substantial, or whole and universal; it can therefore relate only to the whole individual, or to the individual as universal. Nor, again, can this mean that a service is merely imagined to advance the individual's entire happiness, while, as immediate and actual action, it does only something particular for the individual;—nor that, as education, in a series of efforts, it actually takes the individual as a whole as its object and produces that individual as its work, where, apart from the purpose negative toward the family, the actual action has only a limited content;—nor, finally, that it is emergency assistance through which the whole individual is in truth saved; for this is itself an entirely contingent deed, whose occasion is an ordinary actuality that may or may not be. The action, therefore, that embraces the blood relative's entire existence and takes as its object and content not the citizen, who does not belong to the family, nor the one who is to become a citizen and cease to count as this individual, but this individual belonging to the family, as a universal essence elevated above sensuous, that is, individual actuality, no longer concerns the living, but the dead, who has gathered himself from the long succession of his dispersed existence 1807 389 into a single completed shape and risen from the unrest of contingent life into the repose of simple universality.—Because the individual is actual and substantial only as a citizen, insofar as he is not a citizen and belongs to the family he is only the unactual, powerless shade.

452 This universality attained by the individual as such is pure being, death; it is immediate natural having-become, not the action of a consciousness. The duty of the family member is therefore to add this side, so that the individual's final being too, this universal being, may not belong to nature alone and remain something irrational, but may be something done, and the right of consciousness may be upheld in it. Or rather, the meaning of the action is that, since in truth the repose and universality of self-conscious essence do not belong to nature, the semblance of such an action that nature has arrogated to itself should fall away and the truth be established.—What nature did to the individual is the side on which his becoming universal presents itself as the movement of a being. This movement does indeed itself fall within the ethical community and has that community as its purpose; death is the completion and highest labor that the individual as such undertakes for it. But insofar as the individual is essentially single, it is contingent that his death 1807 390 should have been immediately connected with his labor for the universal and have resulted from it; and even if it was, death is natural negativity and the movement of the individual as a being, in which consciousness does not return into itself and become self-consciousness. Or, since the movement of a being is its being sublated and attaining being-for-itself, death is the side of division in which the being-for-itself attained is something other than the being that entered the movement.—Because ethical life is spirit in its immediate truth, the sides into which its consciousness separates also fall into this form of immediacy, and individuality passes over into this abstract negativity, which, without consolation or reconciliation within itself, must essentially receive these through an actual and external action.—Blood kinship therefore supplements the abstract natural movement by adding the movement of consciousness, interrupting nature's work, and rescuing the blood relative from destruction—or rather, because destruction, his becoming pure being, is necessary, taking upon itself the deed of destruction.—This brings it about that dead, universal being too becomes a being returned into itself, a being-for-itself, or that powerless, purely single individuality is raised to universal individuality. Since the dead man has released his being from his 1807 391 action, or negative one, he is empty individuality, only a passive being-for-another, surrendered to every low, irrational individuality and to the powers of abstract materials, of which the former, by virtue of the life it has, and the latter, by virtue of their negative nature, are now more powerful than he. The family keeps from him this dishonoring action of unconscious desire and abstract entities, puts its own action in their place, and weds the relative to the bosom of the earth, to elemental, imperishable individuality. It thereby makes him a member of a community that instead overcomes and binds the powers of the separate materials and the low forms of life that sought to break free against him and destroy him.

453 This last duty thus constitutes the complete divine law, or the positive ethical action toward the individual. Every other relation toward him that does not remain at the level of love but is ethical belongs to human law and has the negative significance of raising the individual above confinement within the natural community to which he belongs as actual. Now although human right has for its content and power actual, self-conscious ethical substance, the entire people, whereas divine right and law have the individual who is beyond actuality, he is not without power; 1807 392 his power is the abstract, purely universal: the elemental individual, which tears back into pure abstraction as into its essence the individuality that tears itself away from the element and constitutes the people's self-conscious actuality, just as it is that individuality's ground.—How this power presents itself in the people itself will unfold further.

454 Now in each of the laws there are also differences and gradations. For since both essences contain the moment of consciousness, difference unfolds within them; this constitutes their movement and distinctive life. Considering these differences shows the manner of activity and self-consciousness of the two universal essences of the ethical world, as well as their connection and transition into one another.

455 The community, the higher law whose validity stands openly in the sunlight, has its actual vitality in the government, in which it is an individual. Government is actual spirit reflected into itself, the simple self of the whole ethical substance. This simple force does indeed allow essence to expand into its articulation and give each part subsistence and a being-for-itself of its own. In this, spirit has its reality, or its existence, and the family is the element of this reality. But spirit is at the same time the force of the whole, which gathers these parts 1807 393 back into the negative one, makes them feel their lack of independence, and keeps them conscious of having their life only in the whole. The community may thus, on the one hand, organize itself into systems of personal independence and property, of the right of persons and of things; and likewise articulate and establish as independent associations the modes of labor for initially individual purposes—acquisition and enjoyment. The spirit of universal association is the simplicity and negative essence of these self-isolating systems. To prevent them from rooting themselves and hardening in this isolation, thereby letting the whole fall apart and spirit evaporate, the government must from time to time shake them to their core through wars, thereby violating and disrupting their established order and right to independence. In the labor thus imposed, it must make the individuals who, absorbed in these systems, tear themselves away from the whole and strive for inviolable being-for-itself and personal security, feel their master, death. Through this dissolution of the form of subsistence, spirit wards off the sinking of ethical into natural existence, and preserves and raises the self of its consciousness into freedom and into its force.—Negative essence shows itself as the community's true power and the force 1807 394 of its self-preservation; the community therefore has the truth and confirmation of its power in the essence of divine law and the underworld.

456 Divine law, which governs the family, likewise has within it differences whose relationship constitutes the living movement of its actuality. Of the three relationships—husband and wife, parents and children, siblings as brother and sister—the relationship of husband and wife is, first, the immediate recognition of one consciousness in the other, and the recognition that each is recognized by the other. Because it is natural, not ethical, self-recognition, it is only the representation and image of spirit, not actual spirit itself.—But representation or image has its actuality in something other than itself; this relationship therefore has its actuality not in itself but in the child—another being whose becoming it is and in whom it itself disappears; and this succession of generations, rolling onward, has its enduring basis in the people.—The piety of husband and wife toward one another is therefore mixed with natural relation and feeling, and their relationship does not have its return into itself within itself; nor does the second relationship, the piety of parents and children toward one another. The piety of parents 1807 395 toward their children is affected by this very emotion of having consciousness of their actuality in another and seeing being-for-itself come to be in that other without receiving it back; instead, it remains an alien actuality of its own. Conversely, the piety of children toward parents is affected by the emotion of having their own becoming, or their in-itself, in another who is passing away, and attaining being-for-itself and their own self-consciousness only through separation from their origin—a separation in which that origin dries up.

457 These two relationships remain within the transition and inequality of the sides distributed between them.—The unmixed relationship, however, exists between brother and sister. They are the same blood, which has, however, come to rest and equilibrium in them. They therefore do not desire one another, nor have they given or received this being-for-itself from one another; rather, they are free individualities toward one another. As sister, the feminine therefore has the highest intimation of ethical essence; it does not attain consciousness and actuality of this essence, because the law of the family is essence existing in itself, inward essence, which does not lie in the daylight of consciousness but remains inward feeling and the divine elevated above actuality. The feminine is bound to these Penates, these household gods, 1807 396 in which it intuits partly its universal substance, but partly also its individuality, yet so that this relation of individuality is not at the same time the natural relation of pleasure.—As daughter, the woman must now see her parents pass away with natural emotion and ethical composure, for only at the cost of this relationship does she attain the being-for-itself of which she is capable; she therefore does not intuit her being-for-itself positively in her parents.—But the relationships of mother and wife contain individuality partly as something natural belonging to pleasure, partly as something negative that sees only its own disappearance in them; partly, for that very reason, individuality is something contingent that can be replaced by another. In the house of ethical life, it is not this husband, not this child, but a husband, children in general—not feeling, but the universal—on which these relationships of the woman are founded. The difference between her ethical character and the man's consists precisely in her remaining immediately universal in her determination for individuality and in her pleasure, and alien to the individuality of desire. In the man, by contrast, these two sides separate; and since as a citizen he possesses the self-conscious force of universality, he thereby purchases the right of desire and at the same time preserves his freedom from it. Thus, insofar as individuality 1807 397 is mixed into this relationship of the woman, its ethical character is not pure; but insofar as it is pure, individuality is indifferent, and the woman lacks the moment of recognizing herself as this self in the other.—For the sister, however, the brother is the tranquil, equal essence in general; her recognition in him is pure and unmixed with natural relation. The indifference of individuality and its ethical contingency are therefore absent from this relationship; rather, the moment of the recognizing and recognized individual self may here assert its right, because it is bound to the equilibrium of blood and a relation without desire. The loss of a brother is therefore irreplaceable for the sister, and her duty toward him the highest.

458 This relationship is at the same time the boundary at which the family, enclosed within itself, dissolves and goes outside itself. The brother is the side through which its spirit becomes individuality that turns toward something else and passes into consciousness of universality. The brother leaves this immediate, elemental, and therefore properly negative ethical life of the family in order to acquire and bring forth actual ethical life conscious of itself.

459 He passes from divine law, in whose sphere he lived, to human law. The sister, however, becomes—or the wife remains—the head of the household and guardian of divine 1807 398 law. In this way the two sexes overcome their natural essence and appear in their ethical significance, as differences that divide between them the two distinctions ethical substance gives itself. These two universal essences of the ethical world have their determinate individuality in naturally distinct self-consciousnesses because ethical spirit is the immediate unity of substance with self-consciousness—an immediacy that thus appears, on the side of reality and difference, also as the existence of a natural difference.—This is the side that, in the shape of individuality real to itself, in the concept of spiritual essence, showed itself as originally determinate nature. This moment loses the indeterminacy it still has there, and the contingent diversity of dispositions and capacities. It is now the determinate opposition of the two sexes, whose natural character at the same time acquires the significance of their ethical determination.

460 Yet the difference between the sexes and their ethical content remains within the unity of substance, and its movement is precisely the substance's enduring becoming. The man is sent out by the family spirit into the community and finds in it his self-conscious essence; just as the family thereby has in him its universal substance and subsistence, so, conversely, the community 1807 399 has in the family the formal element of its actuality and in divine law its force and confirmation. Neither alone is in and for itself; in its living movement human law proceeds from divine law, the law valid on earth from the subterranean, the conscious from the unconscious, mediation from immediacy, and equally returns to where it began. The subterranean power, conversely, has its actuality on earth; through consciousness it becomes existence and activity.

461 The universal ethical essences are therefore substance as universal consciousness and substance as individual consciousness; they have the people and the family as their universal actuality, but man and woman as their natural self and active individuality. In this content of the ethical world we see achieved the purposes the preceding, substanceless shapes of consciousness set themselves. What reason grasped only as an object has become self-consciousness, and what self-consciousness had only within itself is present as true actuality.—What observation knew as something found, in which the self had no part, is here a custom found already existing, but an actuality that is at the same time the deed and work of the finder.—The individual seeking the pleasure of enjoying their individuality finds it in the family, and the necessity in which pleasure perishes is their own 1807 400 self-consciousness as a citizen of their people;—or it is this: knowing the law of the heart as the law of all hearts, consciousness of the self as the acknowledged universal order;—it is virtue enjoying the fruits of its sacrifice. Virtue accomplishes its aim, namely, to raise essence into actual presence, and its enjoyment is this universal life.—Finally, consciousness of the matter itself is satisfied in real substance, which positively contains and preserves the abstract moments of that empty category. In the ethical powers substance has a true content that has taken the place of the substanceless commandments sound reason wished to give and know;—and thereby also a content-filled standard, determined within itself, for testing not laws but what is done.

462 The whole is a tranquil equilibrium of all its parts, and each part a spirit at home, seeking its satisfaction not beyond itself but possessing it within itself precisely because it is itself in this equilibrium with the whole.—This equilibrium can indeed be living only through inequality arising within it and being brought back to equality by justice. Yet justice is neither an alien essence situated beyond, nor the actuality, unworthy of it, of mutual malice, treachery, 1807 401 ingratitude, and so forth, which would execute judgment through thoughtless chance, as an uncomprehended connection and an unconscious doing and leaving undone. Rather, as the justice of human right, which brings back into the universal the being-for-itself that steps out of equilibrium—the independence of estates and individuals—it is the government of the people, which is the self-present individuality of universal essence and the self-conscious will of all themselves.—But the justice that restores to equilibrium the universal becoming overpowerful against the individual is equally the simple spirit of the one who has suffered wrong—not divided into the sufferer and an essence beyond. He himself is the subterranean power, and it is his Fury that pursues vengeance; for his individuality, his blood, lives on in the household; his substance has an enduring actuality. The wrong that can be inflicted on the individual in the realm of ethical life is only this: that something merely happens to him. The power that perpetrates this wrong against consciousness, making it a mere thing, is nature; it is the universality not of the community, but the abstract universality of being. In undoing the wrong suffered, individuality turns not against the former, since it has not suffered from it, but against the latter. The consciousness belonging to the individual's blood undoes this 1807 402 wrong, as we have seen, by making what has happened instead into a work, so that being, the last thing, may also be something willed, and thus a source of joy.

463 In this way, in its subsistence, the ethical realm is a spotless world, unpolluted by any division. Its movement is likewise a tranquil becoming of one of its powers into the other, so that each itself preserves and produces the other. We do indeed see it divide into two essences and their actuality; but their opposition is, rather, the confirmation of one by the other, and where they immediately touch as actual, their middle and element is their immediate interpenetration. One extreme, universal self-conscious spirit, is joined to its other extreme, its force and its element, unconscious spirit, through the individuality of the man. Conversely, divine law has its individualization, or the unconscious spirit of the individual has its existence, in the woman, through whom, as the middle, it rises from its unactuality into actuality, from the unknowing and unknown into the conscious realm. The union of man and woman constitutes the active middle of the whole and the element that, divided into these extremes of divine and human law, is equally their immediate union. This makes those first two syllogisms into the same syllogism 1807 403 and unites into one the opposed movements: of actuality downward into unactuality—of human law, which organizes itself into independent members, down into the danger and trial of death—and of subterranean law upward into the actuality of daylight and conscious existence, the former belonging to the man, the latter to the woman.

b. Ethical Action: Human and Divine Knowledge, Guilt and Fate.

464 Given the constitution of opposition in this realm, self-consciousness has not yet appeared in its right as single individuality. On one side it counts in this realm only as universal will, on the other as the family's blood; this individual counts only as an unactual shade.—No deed has yet been committed; but the deed is the actual self.—It disturbs the tranquil organization and movement of the ethical world. What appears in this world as the order and accord of its two essences, each confirming and completing the other, becomes through the deed a transition of opposites in which each proves itself instead to be the nullity of itself 1807 404 and the other, rather than their confirmation. It becomes the negative movement, or the eternal necessity of terrible fate, which swallows divine and human law, together with the two self-consciousnesses in which these powers have their existence, into the abyss of its simplicity—and for us passes over into the absolute being-for-itself of purely individual self-consciousness.

465 The ground from which this movement proceeds and on which it advances is the realm of ethical life; but the activity of this movement is self-consciousness. As ethical consciousness, it is the simple, pure orientation toward ethical essentiality, or duty. There is no arbitrariness in it, and equally no struggle or indecision, since giving and testing laws have been relinquished; rather, ethical essentiality is for it immediate, unwavering, and without contradiction. It therefore offers neither the poor spectacle of finding itself in a collision between passion and duty, nor the comic spectacle of a collision between duty and duty—a collision that in content is the same as that between passion and duty. For passion is just as capable of being represented as duty, because duty, when consciousness withdraws into itself from duty's immediate substantial essentiality, becomes the formal universal into which every content fits equally well, as was shown above. But the collision 1807 405 of duties is comic because it expresses the contradiction of an opposed absolute, thus the absolute and immediately the nullity of this so-called absolute, or duty.—Ethical consciousness, however, knows what it has to do and is resolved to belong to either divine or human law. This immediacy of its resolve is a being-in-itself, and therefore at the same time has the significance of a natural being, as we have seen; nature, not the contingency of circumstances or choice, assigns one sex to one law, the other to the other—or, conversely, the two ethical powers themselves give themselves their individual existence and actualization in the two sexes.

466 Now because, on the one hand, ethical life consists essentially in this immediate resolve, and therefore only one law is essence for consciousness, and, on the other hand, the ethical powers are actual in the self of consciousness, they acquire the significance of excluding and being opposed to one another. In self-consciousness they are for themselves, whereas in the realm of ethical life they are only in themselves. Because ethical consciousness is resolved for one of them, it is essentially character; for it, the two do not have equal essentiality. The opposition therefore appears as an unhappy collision of duty only with an actuality devoid of right. Ethical 1807 406 consciousness, as self-consciousness, is within this opposition, and as such at the same time aims to subject this opposed actuality by force to the law to which it belongs, or to deceive it. Since it sees right only on its own side and wrong on the other, of the two consciousnesses the one belonging to divine law sees on the other side human, contingent violence; but the one assigned to human law sees on the other side the obstinacy and disobedience of inward being-for-itself. For the commands of the government are the universal, public meaning lying in the light of day; but the will of the other law is the subterranean meaning enclosed within, which in its existence appears as the will of individuality and, in contradiction to the first, is an outrage.

467 There thus arises in consciousness the opposition of the known and the unknown, as in substance that of the conscious and the unconscious; and the absolute right of ethical self-consciousness comes into conflict with the divine right of essence. For self-consciousness as consciousness, objective actuality as such has essentiality; but according to its substance it is the unity of itself and this opposite, and ethical self-consciousness is consciousness of substance. The object as opposed to self-consciousness has therefore entirely lost 1807 407 the significance of having essentiality for itself. Just as the spheres in which the object is only a thing have long since disappeared, so too have those spheres in which consciousness establishes something out of itself and makes a single moment into essence. Against such one-sidedness actuality has a force of its own; it is allied with truth against consciousness and first presents to consciousness what the truth is. But ethical consciousness has drunk from the cup of absolute substance forgetfulness of every one-sidedness of being-for-itself, of its purposes and distinctive concepts, and has therefore at the same time drowned in this Stygian water all the independent essentiality and significance of objective actuality. Its absolute right is therefore that, acting according to ethical law, it should find in this actualization nothing other than the accomplishment of this law itself, and that the deed should show nothing other than what ethical action is.—The ethical, as both absolute essence and absolute power, can suffer no perversion of its content. Were it only absolute essence without power, it could be perverted by individuality; but individuality, as ethical consciousness, has renounced perversion in relinquishing one-sided being-for-itself, just as mere power, conversely, would be perverted by essence if it were still such a being-for-itself. Because of this unity 1807 408 individuality is the pure form of substance, which is the content, and action is the passage from thought into actuality only as the movement of an opposition without essence, whose moments have no particular content and essentiality distinct from one another. The absolute right of ethical consciousness is therefore that the deed, the shape of its actuality, should be nothing other than what it knows.

468 But ethical essence has split itself into two laws, and consciousness, as an undivided relation to law, is assigned to only one. Just as this simple consciousness insists on its absolute right that, to it as ethical, essence should have appeared as it is in itself, so this essence insists on the right of its reality, or on being twofold. Yet this right of essence does not at the same time confront self-consciousness as something situated elsewhere; rather, it is self-consciousness's own essence. It has its existence and power in self-consciousness alone, and its opposition is the deed of the latter. For self-consciousness, precisely in being a self for itself and proceeding to the deed, rises out of simple immediacy and itself posits division. Through the deed it relinquishes the determination of ethical life as the simple certainty of immediate truth, and posits the separation of itself into itself as active and the confronting actuality that is negative for it 1807 409. Through the deed it therefore becomes guilt. For the deed is its action, and action its ownmost essence; and guilt also acquires the significance of crime, since, as simple ethical consciousness, it has turned toward one law but renounced the other, and violates the latter through its deed.—Guilt is not the indifferent, ambiguous essence by which the deed, as it actually lies in daylight, might or might not be the action of its self, as though something external and contingent, not belonging to the action, could be connected with it, from which side the action would therefore be innocent. Rather, action is itself this division: positing itself for itself and, opposed to this, an alien external actuality. That such an actuality exists belongs to action itself and comes about through it. Only non-action is therefore innocent, like the being of a stone, not even that of a child.—In content, however, ethical action contains the moment of crime because it does not sublate the natural distribution of the two laws between the two sexes, but instead, as an undivided orientation toward law, remains within natural immediacy. As action, it makes this one-sidedness into the guilt of grasping only one side of essence and relating negatively toward the other—that is, violating it. Where in universal ethical life 1807 410 guilt and crime, doing and acting, fall will be expressed more precisely later. This much is immediately clear: it is not this individual who acts and is guilty; for as this self the individual is only the unactual shade, or exists only as universal self, and individuality is purely the formal moment of action in general. The content is laws and customs, and, specifically for the individual, those of their estate; the individual is substance as genus, which through its determinacy indeed becomes species, but the species at the same time remains the universal of the genus. Within the people, self-consciousness descends from the universal only as far as particularity, not to single individuality, which posits in its action an exclusive self, an actuality negative to itself. Rather, its action is grounded in secure trust in the whole, unmixed with anything alien, with fear or hostility.

469 Ethical self-consciousness now experiences in its deed the developed nature of actual action, whether it devoted itself to divine or to human law. The law manifest to it is essentially bound to the opposed law; essence is the unity of both, but the deed has carried out only one against the other. Yet, essentially connected with the other, the fulfillment of one calls forth the other—and calls it forth as what the deed has made it: a violated 1807 411 and now hostile essence demanding vengeance. For action, only one side of the decision as such lies in daylight; but the decision in itself is the negative, which confronts itself with something other than itself, something alien to it as knowing. Actuality therefore keeps hidden within itself the other side, alien to knowing, and does not show itself to consciousness as it is in and for itself—not to the son the father in the offender he kills, nor the mother in the queen he takes as his wife. In this way a power that shuns the light lies in wait for ethical self-consciousness, bursting forth only when the deed is done and seizing it in the deed. For the accomplished deed is the sublated opposition between the knowing self and the actuality confronting it. The agent cannot deny the crime and its guilt;—the deed is this: moving the unmoved and bringing forth what was initially enclosed only in possibility, thereby joining the unconscious to the conscious, nonbeing to being. In this truth, then, the deed comes into the sunlight—as something in which a conscious element is joined to an unconscious one, what is one's own to something alien, as the divided essence whose other side consciousness experiences, and experiences also as its own, but as the power it has violated and aroused to hostility.

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470 It may be that the right lying in ambush is present not in its distinctive shape for the acting consciousness, but only in itself, in the inner guilt of the decision and action. Yet ethical consciousness is more complete, its guilt purer, when it knows beforehand the law and power it confronts, takes them for violence and wrong, for an ethical contingency, and knowingly, like Antigone, commits the crime. The accomplished deed reverses its view; accomplishment itself declares that what is ethical must be actual, for the actuality of the purpose is the purpose of action. Action expresses precisely the unity of actuality and substance; it declares that actuality is not contingent for essence but, allied with it, is granted to nothing that is not true right. For the sake of this actuality, and for the sake of its own action, ethical consciousness must acknowledge its opposite as its own; it must acknowledge its guilt: “because we suffer, we acknowledge that we have erred”—

471 This acknowledgment expresses the sublated division between ethical purpose and actuality; it expresses the return to the ethical disposition that knows that nothing holds good but what is right. But the agent thereby relinquishes its character and the actuality of its self, and has perished 1807 413. Its being consists in belonging to its ethical law as its substance; but in acknowledging the opposite, this law has ceased to be substance for it, and instead of its actuality it has attained unactuality, disposition.—Substance does indeed appear in individuality as its pathos, and individuality as what animates substance and therefore stands above it; but substance is a pathos that is at the same time individuality's character. Ethical individuality is immediately and in itself one with this universal of its own; it has its existence only in that universal and cannot survive the destruction this ethical power suffers through its opposite.

472 Yet it also has the certainty that the individuality whose pathos is this opposed power suffers no more evil than it has inflicted. The movement of the ethical powers against one another, and of the individualities that bring them into life and action, has reached its true end only when both sides experience the same destruction. For neither power has an advantage over the other that would make it a more essential moment of substance. Their equal essentiality and indifferent subsistence alongside one another are their being without a self; in the deed they exist as selves, but different selves, which contradicts the unity of the self and constitutes their lack of right 1807 414 and necessary destruction. Likewise, character, in respect of its pathos or substance, belongs only to one power; and in respect of knowing, each character alike is divided into a conscious and an unconscious element. Since each itself calls forth this opposition, and through the deed even its ignorance is its own work, it places itself in the guilt that consumes it. The victory of one power and its character, and the defeat of the other side, would therefore be only a part and an unfinished work, which advances irresistibly toward the equilibrium of both. Only in the equal subjection of both sides is absolute right accomplished, and ethical substance appears as the negative power that swallows both sides, or as almighty and just fate.

473 If both powers are taken according to their determinate content and its individualization, the image of their conflict in concrete shape presents itself, formally, as the conflict of ethical life and self-consciousness with unconscious nature and a contingency present through nature. This contingency has a right against self-consciousness because the latter is only true spirit, only in immediate unity with its substance. In content, the image presents itself as the division between divine and human law.—The young man leaves unconscious essence, the family spirit, and becomes the individuality of the community; but that 1807 415 he still belongs to the nature from which he tore himself is proved by his emerging in the contingency of two brothers who seize the community with equal right. The inequality of earlier and later birth has for them, who enter ethical essence, no significance as a natural difference. But government, as the simple soul or self of the spirit of the people, tolerates no duality of individuality; and nature, as the contingency of plurality, confronts the ethical necessity of this unity. The two therefore fall into discord, and their equal right to state power shatters both, who have equal wrong. Viewed humanly, the one who, not in possession, attacks the community at whose head the other stood has committed the crime; by contrast, the one who knew how to seize the other only as an individual detached from the community and expelled him in this powerlessness has right on his side. He has attacked only the individual as such, not the community, not the essence of human right. The community attacked and defended by empty individuality preserves itself, and the brothers each find their mutual destruction through one another; for the individuality that ties the danger of the whole to its own being-for-itself has expelled itself from the community and dissolves within itself. The 1807 416 one who was found on its side, however, the community will honor; but the other, who already on its walls proclaimed its devastation, will be punished by the government, the restored simplicity of the community's self, through deprivation of the final honor. Whoever came to assail the highest spirit of consciousness, the community, must be deprived of the honor of his whole completed essence, the honor of the departed spirit.

474 But although the universal thus easily strikes off the pure apex of its pyramid and indeed carries off the victory over the rebellious principle of individuality, the family, it has thereby only entered into combat with divine law, self-conscious spirit with unconscious spirit. For the latter is the other essential power and is therefore not destroyed by the former, but merely offended. Against the powerful law lying in daylight, however, it has only the bloodless shade to help it carry its purpose actually into effect. As the law of weakness and darkness, it therefore initially succumbs to the law of daylight and strength, for that power holds good below, not on earth. Yet the actual that has robbed the inward of its honor and power has thereby consumed its own essence. Manifest spirit has the root of its force in the underworld; the people's self-assured and self-confirming certainty has the truth of its oath binding all into one only in the 1807 417 unconscious and mute substance of all, in the waters of forgetfulness. Through this, the accomplishment of manifest spirit turns into its opposite, and spirit experiences that its highest right is the highest wrong, its victory instead its own downfall. The dead man whose right has been violated therefore knows how to find instruments for his vengeance that have the same actuality and force as the power that injured him. These powers are other communities whose altars dogs or birds have defiled with the corpse. Not raised into unconscious universality through the return owed it to the elemental individual, the corpse has instead remained above ground in the realm of actuality and, as the force of divine law, now receives a self-conscious, actual universality. These communities rise in hostility and destroy the community that has dishonored and shattered its force, the piety of the family.

475 In this representation the necessity of the movement of human and divine law is expressed through individuals in whom the universal appears as a pathos and the activity of the movement as individual action, which gives its necessity the semblance of contingency. But individuality and action constitute the principle of individuality in general, which in its pure universality was called inward 1807 418 divine law. As a moment of the manifest community, this principle has not only that subterranean efficacy—or an efficacy external in its mode of existence—but an equally manifest existence and movement, actual in the actual people. Taken in this form, what was represented as the simple movement of individualized pathos acquires another appearance, and the crime and the destruction of the community grounded in it acquire the proper form of their existence.—Human law, therefore—as community in its universal existence, as masculinity in its activity generally, and as government in its actual activity—is, moves, and preserves itself by consuming within itself the separation of the Penates, or the independent individuation into families over which femininity presides, and maintaining them dissolved in the continuity of its fluidity. Yet the family is at the same time its element in general, individual consciousness its universal active ground. Since the community gives itself subsistence only by disturbing family happiness and dissolving self-consciousness into the universal, it creates in what it suppresses and what is at the same time essential to it—in femininity in general—its internal enemy. Femininity—the eternal irony of the community—changes through intrigue the government's universal purpose 1807 419 into a private purpose, transforms its universal activity into a work of this particular individual, and perverts the universal property of the state into a family possession and adornment. It thereby makes the grave wisdom of mature age—which, dead to individuality, to pleasure and enjoyment as well as actual activity, thinks of and cares for only the universal—an object of mockery for the caprice of immature youth and of contempt for its enthusiasm. It raises the force of youth generally to authority: of the son, in whom the mother has borne her master; of the brother, in whom the sister has the man as her equal; of the young man, through whom the daughter, freed from her dependence, attains the enjoyment and dignity of wifehood.—But the community can preserve itself only by suppressing this spirit of individuality; and because this is an essential moment, it equally produces it, and specifically, through its suppressive attitude toward it, as a hostile principle. Yet this principle, which in separating itself from the universal purpose is only evil and intrinsically null, could accomplish nothing unless the community itself acknowledged the force of youth, masculinity that is not mature and still stands within individuality, as the force of the whole. For the community is a people; it is itself individuality and essentially exists for itself only because other individualities 1807 420 exist for it, because it excludes them from itself and knows itself independent of them. The negative side of the community, suppressing internally the isolation of individuals but outwardly active on its own account, has its weapons in individuality. War is the spirit and form in which the essential moment of ethical substance, the absolute freedom of the ethical self from all existence, is present in its actuality and confirmation. While, on the one hand, war makes the particular systems of property and personal independence, as well as the individual personality itself, feel the force of the negative, on the other hand this very negative essence rises within war as what preserves the whole. The brave young man in whom femininity takes pleasure, the suppressed principle of ruin, comes into daylight and is what holds sway. Now it is natural force, and what appears as the contingency of fortune, that decide the existence of ethical essence and spiritual necessity. Because the existence of ethical essence rests on strength and fortune, it is already decided that it has perished.—Just as previously only the Penates perished in the spirit of the people, so now the living spirits of peoples perish through their individuality in a universal community whose simple universality is spiritless and dead, and whose vitality is the single individual as individual. The ethical shape of spirit 1807 421 has disappeared, and another takes its place.

476 This downfall of ethical substance and its transition into another shape is therefore determined by ethical consciousness being essentially immediately directed toward law. This determination of immediacy entails that nature in general enters ethical action. Its actuality reveals only the contradiction and seed of ruin that the beautiful unanimity and tranquil equilibrium of ethical spirit contain precisely in this tranquility and beauty themselves; for immediacy has the contradictory significance of being the unconscious repose of nature and the self-conscious, restless repose of spirit.—Because of this natural character, this ethical people is in general an individuality determined by nature and therefore limited, and thus finds its sublation in another. But as this determinacy—which, posited in existence, is limitation, yet equally the negative in general and the self of individuality—disappears, the life of spirit and this substance conscious of itself in everyone are lost. Substance emerges in them as a formal universality; it no longer dwells within them as living spirit, but the simple solidity of their individuality has shattered into many points.

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c. The Condition of Right.

477 The universal unity into which the living, immediate unity of individuality and substance returns is the spiritless community, which has ceased to be the non-self-conscious substance of individuals, and in which they now count as selves and substances according to their individual being-for-themselves. The universal splintered into the atoms of absolutely many individuals, this dead spirit, is an equality in which all count as each, as persons.—What in the world of ethical life was called hidden divine law has in fact stepped out of its inwardness into actuality; in that world the individual counted and was actual only as the universal blood of the family. As this individual he was the departed spirit without a self; but now he has emerged from his unactuality. Because ethical substance is only true spirit, spirit returns into certainty of itself; it is that substance as the positive universal, but its actuality is to be the negative universal self.—We saw the powers and shapes of the ethical world sink into the simple necessity of empty fate. This power of theirs is substance reflecting itself into its simplicity; but absolute essence reflecting into itself, precisely that necessity of empty 1807 423 fate, is nothing other than the I of self-consciousness.

478 This I now thereby counts as essence existing in and for itself; this being-recognized is its substantiality. But this is abstract universality, because its content is this unyielding self, not the self dissolved in substance.

479 Personality has therefore here emerged from the life of ethical substance; it is the actually valid independence of consciousness. The unactual thought of this independence, which comes about through renouncing actuality, appeared earlier as Stoic self-consciousness. Just as Stoic self-consciousness emerged from lordship and bondage as the immediate existence of self-consciousness, so personality has emerged from immediate spirit, which is the universal ruling will of all and equally their serving obedience. What for Stoicism was the in-itself only in abstraction is now an actual world. Stoicism is nothing other than the consciousness that reduces the principle of the condition of right, spiritless independence, to its abstract form. Through its flight from actuality, it attained only the thought of independence; it is absolutely for itself by binding its essence to no existence, but relinquishing every existence and placing its essence solely in the unity of pure thought. In the same way the right of the person is bound neither to a 1807 424 richer or more powerful existence of the individual as such nor to a universal living spirit, but rather to the pure one of the individual's abstract actuality, or to the individual as self-consciousness in general.

480 Now just as the abstract independence of Stoicism presented its actualization, this latter actualization will also repeat the movement of the former. Stoic independence passes into the skeptical confusion of consciousness, into a rambling of the negative that wanders shapelessly from one contingency of being and thought to another, indeed dissolves them in absolute independence but just as much produces them anew, and is in fact only the contradiction of the independence and dependence of consciousness.—Likewise, the personal independence of right is instead this same universal confusion and mutual dissolution. For what counts as absolute essence is self-consciousness as the pure empty one of the person. Over against this empty universality, substance has the form of fulfillment and content, and this content is now left completely free and disordered; for the spirit that subjugated it and held it together in its unity is no longer present.—In its reality, this empty one of the person is therefore a contingent existence and an essenceless movement and action that attains no stability. Like skepticism, the formalism of right 1807 425 is thus by its concept without a content of its own; it finds a manifold subsistence, possession, and, like skepticism, stamps it with the same abstract universality through which it is called property. But whereas in skepticism actuality so determined is called semblance in general and has only a negative value, in right it has a positive value. The negative value consists in the actual having the significance of the self as thinking, as the universal in itself; the positive value consists in its being mine in the significance of the category, as an acknowledged and actual validity.—Both are the same abstract universal; the actual content, or determinacy, of what is mine—whether an external possession or the inner wealth or poverty of spirit and character—is not contained in this empty form and does not concern it. It therefore belongs to a power of its own, which is other than the formally universal: chance and arbitrary will.—In its actual validity itself, the consciousness of right therefore experiences instead the loss of its reality and its complete inessentiality, and to designate an individual as a person is an expression of contempt.

481 The free power of content determines itself in this way: by the nature of this determinacy, the dispersion into the absolute multiplicity of personal atoms is at the same time gathered into one point, alien to them and equally 1807 426 spiritless. This point is, on one side, purely individual actuality, like the unyielding rigidity of their personality; but in opposition to their empty individuality, it also has for them the significance of all content, and hence of real essence. Against their supposedly absolute, but intrinsically essenceless, actuality, it is universal power and absolute actuality. In this way this lord of the world is for himself the absolute person who at the same time encompasses all existence, for whose consciousness no higher spirit exists. He is a person, but the solitary person confronting all. These all constitute the valid universality of the person, for the individual as such is true only as the universal multiplicity of individuality; detached from this, the solitary self is in fact the unactual, powerless self.—At the same time it is consciousness of the content that has confronted that universal personality. But this content, freed from its negative power, is the chaos of spiritual powers that, unchained as elemental essences, move madly and destructively against one another in wild excess; their powerless self-consciousness is the impotent enclosure and ground of their tumult. Knowing himself thus as the sum of all actual powers, this lord of the world is the monstrous self-consciousness that knows itself as the actual God; but since he is only the 1807 427 formal self unable to tame these powers, his movement and self-enjoyment are equally monstrous excess.

482 The lord of the world has actual consciousness of what he is—the universal power of actuality—in the destructive force he exercises against the confronting self of his subjects. For his power is not the unity of spirit in which persons would recognize their own self-consciousness; rather, as persons they are for themselves, and exclude continuity with others from the absolute rigidity of their pointlike existence. They therefore stand in a merely negative relation both to one another and to him, who is their relation or continuity. As this continuity he is the essence and content of their formalism, but a content alien to them and a hostile essence that instead sublates precisely what counts for them as their essence, contentless being-for-itself—and, as the continuity of their personality, destroys that very personality. Thus, as the content alien to it asserts itself within it—and it asserts itself within them because it is their reality—legal personality experiences instead its lack of substance. Destructive burrowing in this essenceless ground, conversely, gives itself consciousness of its universal dominion; but this self is mere devastation and therefore only outside itself, and is instead the casting away of its self-consciousness.

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483 Such is the side on which self-consciousness as absolute essence is actual. But consciousness driven back into itself from this actuality thinks this its own lack of essence. We saw earlier the Stoic independence of pure thought pass through skepticism and find its truth in unhappy consciousness—the truth about its being-in-and-for-itself. Whereas this knowledge then appeared only as the one-sided view of consciousness as such, here its actual truth has appeared. This truth consists in this universal validity of self-consciousness being reality alienated from it. This validity is the universal actuality of the self, but is immediately just as much its inversion: it is the loss of its essence.—The actuality of the self, absent from the ethical world, has been gained through that world's return into the person; what was united there now appears developed, but alienated from itself.

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B. Spirit Alienated from Itself: Cultivation.

484 Ethical substance kept opposition enclosed within its simple consciousness, and this consciousness in immediate unity with its essence. Essence therefore has the simple determinacy of being for consciousness, which is immediately directed toward it and whose custom it is. Consciousness neither counts for itself as this exclusive self, nor does substance have the significance of an existence excluded from consciousness, with which consciousness would have to unite itself only through alienating itself, and which it would simultaneously have to produce. But the spirit whose self is absolutely discrete has its content confronting it as an equally hard actuality, and the world here has the determination of being something external, the negative of self-consciousness. Yet this world is spiritual essence; in itself it is the interpenetration of being and individuality. This existence of the world is the work of self-consciousness, but equally an immediately present actuality alien to it, which has a being of its own and in which it does not recognize itself. It is 1807 430 external essence and the free content of right; but this external actuality, which the lord of the world of right encompasses within himself, is not merely this elemental essence contingently present for the self, but is the self's labor—though not its positive labor, but rather its negative labor. It receives its existence through self-consciousness's own externalization and divestment of essence, which, in the devastation prevailing in the world of right, the external force of unbound elements seems to inflict on it. These elements, taken for themselves, are only pure devastation and their own dissolution; but this dissolution, this negative essence of theirs, is precisely the self. It is their subject, their action and becoming. Yet this action and becoming, through which substance becomes actual, is the alienation of personality; for the self that holds good in and for itself immediately, that is, without alienation, is without substance and the plaything of those raging elements. Its substance is therefore its externalization itself, and externalization is substance, or the spiritual powers ordering themselves into a world and thereby preserving themselves.

485 In this way substance is spirit, the self-conscious unity of self and essence; but both also have the significance of alienation from one another. Spirit is consciousness of an objective actuality free for itself; but this consciousness is confronted by that unity of self and 1807 431 essence, actual consciousness by pure consciousness. On the one hand, actual self-consciousness passes through its externalization into the actual world, and the actual world back into self-consciousness; on the other hand, however, precisely this actuality, both the person and objectivity, is sublated: they are purely universal. This alienation of theirs is pure consciousness, or essence. The present immediately has its opposite in its beyond, which is its thinking and being-thought, just as this beyond has its opposite in this world, which is its actuality alienated from it.

486 This spirit therefore develops not merely one world, but a doubled world, separated and opposed.—The world of ethical spirit is its own present, and therefore each of its powers is within this unity and, insofar as the two differ, in equilibrium with the whole. Nothing has the significance of the negative of self-consciousness; even the departed spirit is present in the blood of kinship, in the self of the family, and the universal power of government is the will, the self of the people. Here, however, what is present means only objective actuality, whose consciousness lies beyond it; each individual moment as essence receives this essence, and with it actuality, from another, and insofar as it is actual, its essence is other than its actuality. Nothing has a spirit grounded and dwelling within itself, 1807 432 but is outside itself in an alien spirit; the equilibrium of the whole is not a unity remaining with itself and a repose returned into itself, but rests on the alienation of the opposed. The whole, like each individual moment, is therefore a reality alienated from itself. It divides into a realm in which self-consciousness is actually both itself and its object, and another, the realm of pure consciousness, which, beyond the first, has no actual presence but exists in faith. Now just as the ethical world, out of the division of divine and human law and their shapes, and its consciousness, out of the division into knowing and unconsciousness, return into their fate, into the self as the negative power of this opposition, so too these two realms of self-alienated spirit will return into the self. But whereas the former was the first, immediately valid self, the individual person, this second self, returning into itself from its externalization, will be the universal self, consciousness grasping the concept; and these spiritual worlds, all of whose moments claim for themselves a fixed actuality and unspiritual subsistence, will dissolve in pure insight. As the self grasping itself, pure insight completes cultivation. It grasps nothing but the self, and everything as the self; that is, it comprehends everything, erases all objectivity, and 1807 433 transforms all being-in-itself into being-for-itself. Turned against faith as the alien realm of essence lying beyond, it is the Enlightenment. Enlightenment completes alienation even in this realm, into which alienated spirit takes refuge, as into consciousness of self-equal repose. It disrupts the household that spirit maintains here by bringing in the furnishings of this world, which spirit cannot deny as its property because its consciousness belongs to this world as well.—In this negative occupation, pure insight at the same time realizes itself and produces its own object, unknowable absolute essence, and the useful. Since in this way actuality has lost all substantiality, and nothing in it is any longer in itself, the realm of faith as well as that of the real world is overthrown; and this revolution produces absolute freedom, with which previously alienated spirit has returned completely into itself, leaves this land of cultivation, and passes into another land, the land of moral consciousness.

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I. The World of Self-Alienated Spirit.

487 The world of this spirit divides into a doubled world: the first is the world of actuality, or of its alienation itself; the other is the world it builds for itself, rising above the first, in the ether of pure consciousness. This second world, opposed to that alienation, is for that very reason not free of it, but is instead only the other form of alienation, which consists precisely in having consciousness in two worlds and encompasses both. What is considered here is therefore not the self-consciousness of absolute essence as it is in and for itself, not religion, but faith, insofar as it is the flight from the actual world and thus is not in and for itself. This flight from the realm of the present is therefore immediately itself twofold. Pure consciousness is the element into which spirit rises; but it is not only the element of faith, but equally that of the concept. Both therefore enter together, and faith is considered only in opposition to the concept.

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a. Cultivation and Its Realm of Actuality.

488 The spirit of this world is spiritual essence permeated by a self-consciousness that knows itself to be immediately present as this being-for-itself, and knows essence as an actuality confronting it. But the existence of this world, like the actuality of self-consciousness, rests on the movement by which self-consciousness externalizes its personality, thereby produces its world, and relates to this as to an alien world of which it must now take possession. Yet renouncing its being-for-itself is itself the production of actuality, and through this renunciation it therefore immediately takes possession of actuality.—Or, self-consciousness is something, has reality, only insofar as it alienates itself; through this it posits itself as universal, and this universality of its is its validity and actuality. This equality with all is therefore not the equality of right, not that immediate recognition and validity of self-consciousness simply because it is; rather, its validity comes through the alienating mediation of having made itself conform to the universal. The spiritless universality of right takes into itself every natural mode of character and 1807 436 existence and legitimates it. But the universality that holds good here is one that has come to be, and for that reason it is actual.

489 What therefore gives the individual validity and actuality here is cultivation. The individual's true original nature and substance is the spirit of the alienation of natural being. This externalization is therefore as much the individual's purpose as its existence; it is at the same time the means, or transition, both of substance in thought into actuality and, conversely, of determinate individuality into essentiality. This individuality cultivates itself into what it is in itself, and only through this is it in itself and has actual existence. As much cultivation as it has, so much actuality and power. Although the self here knows itself to be actual as this self, its actuality nevertheless consists solely in sublating the natural self; originally determinate nature therefore reduces to the inessential difference of magnitude, to a greater or lesser energy of will. The will's purpose and content, however, belong solely to universal substance itself and can only be universal. The particularity of a nature that becomes purpose and content is something powerless and unactual; it is a sort that labors vainly and ridiculously to put itself into effect; it is the contradiction of giving the particular an actuality that is immediately the universal. If individuality is therefore wrongly placed in the 1807 437 *particularity of nature and character, then there are no individualities and characters in the real world; rather, individuals have an equal existence for one another. That supposed individuality is only intended existence, which has no permanence in this world, where only what externalizes itself, and thus only the universal, attains actuality.—The intended therefore counts for what it is: a sort. Art, “sort,” is not quite the same as espèce, “the most dreadful of all nicknames, for it designates mediocrity and expresses the highest degree of contempt.” But Art and being good of one's sort are German expressions that add to this meaning the honest appearance of not meaning anything so bad, or indeed do not yet contain consciousness of what a sort is, and what cultivation and actuality are.

490 What appears in relation to the single individual as its cultivation is the essential moment of substance itself: the immediate passage of its universality in thought into actuality, or its simple soul, through which the in-itself is something recognized and existent. The movement of self-cultivating individuality is therefore immediately its becoming, as universal objective essence—that is, the becoming of the actual world. Although this world has come to be through individuality, it is for self-consciousness something 1807 438 immediately alienated and has for it the form of an immovable actuality. Yet certain at the same time that this world is its substance, self-consciousness sets out to take possession of it. It attains this power over it through cultivation, which from this side appears as its conforming itself to actuality, to the extent that the energy of its original character and talent permits. What appears here as the force of the individual, under which substance would come and thereby be sublated, is the same as the actualization of substance. For the individual's power consists in conforming itself to substance—that is, externalizing its self and thus positing itself as objectively existing substance. Its cultivation and its own actuality are therefore the actualization of substance itself.

491 The self is actual to itself only as sublated. For it, therefore, the self does not constitute the unity of consciousness of itself and of the object; rather, the object is for it the negative of itself.—Through the self as soul, substance is thus developed in its moments in such a way that each opposed element animates the other, each through its alienation gives the other subsistence and equally receives subsistence from it. At the same time each moment has its determinacy as an invincible validity and a fixed actuality against the other. Thought fixes this difference in the most universal 1807 439 way through the absolute opposition of good and bad, which flee one another and can in no way become the same. But this fixed being has as its soul the immediate transition into its opposite; existence is instead the inversion of every determinacy into its opposite, and only this alienation is the essence and preservation of the whole. We must now consider this movement that actualizes and animates the moments; alienation will alienate itself, and through it the whole will take itself back into its concept.

492 First, simple substance itself must be considered in the immediate organization of its existing moments, which are not yet animated.—Just as nature unfolds into universal elements, among which air is the enduring, purely universal, transparent essence; water the essence that is continually sacrificed; fire their animating unity, which continually dissolves their opposition as much as it divides their simplicity into it; and earth, finally, the firm knot of this articulation and the subject of these essences and their process, their departure and return—so inward essence, or the simple spirit of self-conscious actuality, unfolds as a world into just such universal, but spiritual, masses: into the first mass, spiritual essence universal in itself and equal to itself; into the other, essence existing for itself, 1807 440 become unequal within itself, sacrificing and surrendering itself; and into the third, which as self-consciousness is subject and immediately has within itself the force of fire. In the first essence it is conscious of itself as being-in-itself; but in the second it has the becoming of being-for-itself through the sacrifice of the universal. Spirit itself, however, is the being-in-and-for-itself of the whole, which divides into substance as enduring and substance as self-sacrificing, and equally takes them back into its unity, both as the erupting flame that consumes them and as their enduring shape.—We see that these essences correspond to the community and family of the ethical world, but without possessing their spirit of being at home; conversely, whereas fate is alien to that spirit, here self-consciousness is and knows itself as the actual power of these essences.

493 These members must be considered both as they are initially represented within pure consciousness as thoughts, or as existing in themselves, and as they are represented in actual consciousness as objective essences.—In that form of simplicity, the first, as the self-equal, immediate, and unchangeable essence of all consciousness, is the good: the independent spiritual power of the in-itself, beside which the movement of consciousness existing for itself plays only an incidental role. The other, by contrast, 1807 441 is passive spiritual essence, or the universal insofar as it surrenders itself and lets individuals take from it consciousness of their individuality; it is the null essence, the bad.—This absolute dissolution of essence is itself enduring. Just as the first essence is the ground, starting point, and result of individuals, and they are purely universal within it, so, conversely, the second is on the one hand self-sacrificing being-for-another, and on the other, for that very reason, their constant return into themselves as the individual and their enduring becoming-for-themselves.

494 But these simple thoughts of good and bad are equally immediately alienated from themselves; they are actual and present in actual consciousness as objective moments. Thus the first essence is state power, the other wealth.—State power is both simple substance and the universal work: the absolute matter itself, in which individuals find their essence expressed and their individuality is absolutely only consciousness of their universality. It is equally the work and simple result from which the fact that it comes from their action disappears; it remains the absolute ground and subsistence of all their action.—Through this determination of its unchanging self-equality, this simple ethereal substance of their life is being, and thus only being-for-another. It is therefore immediately in itself the opposite 1807 442 of itself: wealth. Although wealth is the passive or null essence, it too is universal spiritual essence, equally the constantly becoming result of the labor and action of all, just as it dissolves again into the enjoyment of all. In enjoyment, individuality indeed becomes for itself, or individual, but this enjoyment itself is the result of universal action, just as it reciprocally produces universal labor and the enjoyment of all. The actual has absolutely the spiritual significance of being immediately universal. In this moment each individual indeed supposes that they act selfishly, for this is the moment in which they give themselves consciousness of being for themselves, and they therefore do not take it as something spiritual. Yet even viewed only externally, it is evident that in their enjoyment each gives everyone something to enjoy, and in their labor works for everyone as much as for themselves, while everyone works for them. Their being-for-themselves is therefore intrinsically universal, and selfishness is something merely intended, which cannot manage to actualize what it intends, namely, doing something that would not benefit everyone.

495 In these two spiritual powers, then, self-consciousness recognizes its substance, content, and purpose; it intuits its double essence in them: in one its being-in-itself, in the other its being-for-itself.—But as spirit it is at the same time the negative unity of their subsistence and of the separation of individuality and the universal, or of 1807 443 actuality and the self. Dominion and wealth are therefore present for the individual as objects—that is, as things from which it knows itself free, and between which it supposes it can choose, even choosing neither. As this free and pure consciousness, it confronts essence as something that is only for it. It then has essence as essence within itself.—In this pure consciousness, the moments of substance are for it not state power and wealth, but the thoughts of good and bad.—But self-consciousness is further the relation of its pure consciousness to its actual consciousness, of thought to objective essence; it is essentially judgment.—The immediate determinations of the two sides of actual essence have indeed already shown which is good and which bad: state power the former, wealth the latter. But this first judgment cannot be regarded as a spiritual judgment, for in it one side has been determined only as existing in itself, or positive, the other only as existing for itself and negative. But as spiritual essences, each is the interpenetration of both moments, and they are therefore not exhausted in those determinations. And the self-consciousness relating to them is in and for itself; it must therefore relate to each in the doubled manner through which their nature as determinations alienated from themselves will emerge.

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496 Now for self-consciousness, the object in which it finds itself is good and in itself, while the object in which it finds the opposite of itself is bad. The good is the equality of objective reality with it; the bad, its inequality. At the same time, what is good and bad for it is good and bad in itself, for self-consciousness is precisely that in which these two moments, being in itself and being for it, are the same. It is the actual spirit of objective essences, and judgment is the demonstration of its power over them, which makes them what they are in themselves. Their criterion and truth are not how they immediately are in themselves, as the equal or unequal, that is, abstract being-in-itself or being-for-itself, but what they are in spirit's relation to them: their equality or inequality with spirit. Its relation to them—which, initially posited as objects, become the in-itself through spirit—becomes at the same time their reflection into themselves, through which they attain actual spiritual being and what their spirit is emerges. But just as their first immediate determination differs from spirit's relation to them, so the third, their own spirit, will differ from the second.—To begin with, their second in-itself, which emerges through spirit's relation to them, must already turn out differently from the immediate one; for this mediation of spirit instead moves immediate determinacy and makes it something else.

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497 Accordingly, consciousness existing in and for itself does indeed find in state power its simple essence and subsistence in general, but not its individuality as such; its in-itself, but not its being-for-itself. Rather, it finds action as individual action denied and subjugated to obedience. The individual therefore reflects into itself before this power; to it, state power is the oppressive essence and the bad, for instead of being equal it is absolutely unequal to individuality.—Wealth, conversely, is the good: it aims at universal enjoyment, gives itself away, and provides everyone with consciousness of their self. In itself it is universal beneficence; if it withholds some benefit and does not accommodate every need, this is a contingency that does not detract from its universal, necessary essence of imparting itself to all individuals and being a thousand-handed giver.

498 These two judgments give the thoughts of good and bad a content opposite to the one they had for us.—But self-consciousness has as yet related to its objects only incompletely, namely, only by the standard of being-for-itself. Yet consciousness is equally essence existing in itself, and must likewise make this side its standard; only through this is spiritual judgment completed. From this side state 1807 446 power expresses its essence for it. State power is partly law at rest, partly government and command, which orders the individual movements of universal action; the one is simple substance itself, the other its action animating and preserving itself and everyone. The individual therefore finds its ground and essence expressed, organized, and activated in state power.—Conversely, through the enjoyment of wealth it does not experience its universal essence, but receives only the transient consciousness and enjoyment of itself as an individuality existing for itself and of its inequality with its essence.—The concepts of good and bad therefore receive here the opposite content to the preceding one.

499 Each of these two ways of judging finds an equality and an inequality: the first judging consciousness finds state power unequal to itself and the enjoyment of wealth equal; the second, conversely, finds the former equal and the latter unequal. There is a twofold finding equal and a twofold finding unequal, an opposed relation to the two real essentialities.—We must judge this different judging itself, applying the standard already established. Accordingly, the relation of consciousness that finds equality is the good, and that which finds inequality is the bad; and these two ways of relating must now themselves be retained as different shapes of consciousness 1807 447. By relating in different ways, consciousness itself comes under the determination of the difference between good and bad—not according to whether it has being-for-itself or pure being-in-itself as its principle, for both are equally essential moments. The doubled judging considered above represented the principles separately and therefore contains only abstract ways of judging. Actual consciousness contains both principles, and the difference falls solely within its essence, namely, in its relation to the real.

500 This relation takes opposed forms: one relates to state power and wealth as to something equal, the other as to something unequal.—The consciousness of the relation that finds equality is noble-minded. In public power it sees what is equal to itself, since in it it has its simple essence and the activity of that essence, and stands in service both of actual obedience and of inward respect toward it. Likewise in wealth it sees what provides consciousness of its other essential side, being-for-itself. It therefore also regards wealth as essence in relation to itself, acknowledges the one from whom it receives enjoyment as a benefactor, and holds itself bound to gratitude.

501 The consciousness of the other relation, conversely, is base, holding fast to inequality with 1807 448 both essentialities. In sovereign power it therefore sees a fetter and oppression of being-for-itself, and consequently hates the ruler, obeys only with concealed malice, and is always poised for revolt. In wealth, through which it attains enjoyment of its being-for-itself, it likewise sees only inequality, namely with enduring essence; since through wealth it attains only consciousness of individuality and transient enjoyment, it loves but despises wealth, and with the disappearance of enjoyment, which is intrinsically vanishing, regards its relation to the rich person as having disappeared as well.

502 These relations initially express only judgment, the determination of what the two essences are as objects for consciousness, not yet what they are in and for themselves. On the one hand, the reflection represented in judgment is as yet only for us a positing of either determination, and therefore an equal sublation of both; it is not yet their reflection for consciousness itself. On the other hand, they as yet are essences only immediately, having neither become this nor possessing self-consciousness within themselves; the consciousness for which they are is not yet their animation. They are predicates that are not yet themselves subject. Because of this separation, the whole of spiritual judging also still falls apart into two consciousnesses, each subject to a one-sided determination.—Now just as, initially, the indifference 1807 449 of the two sides of alienation—one, the in-itself of pure consciousness, namely the determinate thoughts of good and bad; the other, their existence as state power and wealth—rose to the relation of the two, to judgment, so this external relation must rise to inner unity, or to the relation of thought to actuality, and the spirit of the two shapes of judgment must emerge. This occurs when judgment becomes syllogism, the mediating movement in which the necessity and middle of the two sides of judgment emerge.

503 In judgment, therefore, noble consciousness finds itself confronting state power as something that is not yet a self, but only universal substance, of which, however, it is conscious as its essence, its purpose and absolute content. Relating positively to state power in this way, it relates negatively to its own purposes, its particular content and existence, and lets them disappear. It is the heroism of service: virtue, which sacrifices individual being to the universal and thereby brings the universal into existence; the person who of their own accord renounces possession and enjoyment, and acts and is actual for the existing power.

504 Through this movement the universal is joined with existence in general, just as existing consciousness cultivates itself through this externalization into essentiality. What it alienates from itself in 1807 450 service is its consciousness immersed in existence; but alienated being is the in-itself. Through this cultivation it therefore gains respect for itself and among others.—State power, however, which was at first only the universal in thought, the in-itself, becomes through this same movement the existing universal, actual power. It is actual power only in the actual obedience it attains through self-consciousness's judgment that it is essence, and through self-consciousness's free self-sacrifice. This action, joining essence with the self, produces a doubled actuality: itself as what has true actuality, and state power as the true that holds good.

505 Yet through this alienation state power is not yet a self-consciousness knowing itself as state power; only its law, or its in-itself, holds good. It does not yet have a particular will, for serving self-consciousness has not yet externalized its pure self and thereby animated state power, but has done so only with its being: it has sacrificed only its existence to state power, not its being-in-itself.—This self-consciousness counts as conforming to essence; it is recognized for the sake of its being-in-itself. Others find their essence activated in it, but not their being-for-themselves; their thought, or pure consciousness, fulfilled, but not their individuality. It therefore holds good in their thoughts and 1807 451 enjoys honor. It is the proud vassal active for state power insofar as this is not a will of its own, but an essential will; and it counts for itself only in this honor, only in the essential representation of universal opinion, not in the grateful representation of individuality, for it has not helped individuality attain its being-for-itself. Its language, if it related to state power's own will, which has not yet come to be, would be the counsel it offers for the universal good.

506 State power therefore still has no will in the face of counsel and makes no decision between the different opinions concerning the universal good. It is not yet government, and thus not yet truly actual state power.—Being-for-itself, the will not yet sacrificed as will, is the inward, secluded spirit of the estates, which, in contrast to its talk of the universal good, reserves its particular good for itself and is inclined to make this chatter about the universal good a substitute for action. The sacrifice of existence that occurs in service is indeed complete when it has gone as far as death; but the very danger of death that is endured and survived leaves a determinate existence, and with it a particular being-for-itself, remaining, which makes counsel for the universal good ambiguous and suspect and in fact reserves its own opinion and particular will against 1807 452 state power. It therefore still relates unequally to state power and falls under the determination of base consciousness: always poised for rebellion.

507 This contradiction, which it must sublate, contains, in this form of standing in the inequality of being-for-itself toward the universality of state power, at the same time the form that the externalization of existence, when it completes itself, namely in death, is itself an existing externalization, not one returning into consciousness: consciousness does not survive it and exist in and for itself, but only passes into the unreconciled opposite. The true sacrifice of being-for-itself is therefore only that in which it surrenders itself as completely as in death, yet preserves itself just as much in this externalization. It thereby becomes actual as what it is in itself, as the identical unity of itself and itself as the opposite. Because the secluded inward spirit, the self as such, emerges and alienates itself, state power is at the same time raised to a self of its own. Without this alienation, the acts of honor, of noble consciousness, and the counsels of its insight would remain ambiguous, still retaining that secluded reserve of particular intention and self-will.

508 But this alienation occurs only in language, which appears here in its distinctive 1807 453 significance.—As law and command in the world of ethical life, and initially as counsel in the world of actuality, language has essence as its content and is its form; here, however, it receives the form that it is as its content itself, and counts as language. It is the power of speaking as such that accomplishes what must be accomplished. For language is the existence of the pure self as self; in it the individuality existing for itself of self-consciousness comes as such into existence, so that it is for others. I as this pure I otherwise does not exist; in every other expression it is immersed in an actuality and in a shape from which it can withdraw. It is reflected into itself out of its action, as out of its physiognomic expression, and leaves such incomplete existence, which always contains as much too much as too little, lying soulless. But language contains the I in its purity; language alone speaks I, the I itself. This existence of the I, as existence, is an objectivity that contains its true nature. I is this I—but equally universal. Its appearing is equally immediately the externalization and disappearance of this I, and thereby its remaining in its universality. The I that expresses itself is heard; it is a contagion in which it has immediately passed into unity with those for whom it exists, and is universal self-consciousness.—In being heard, its 1807 454 existence itself has immediately died away; this otherness of its is taken back into itself. And precisely this is its existence as a self-conscious now: not to exist as soon as it exists, and to exist through this disappearance. This disappearance is therefore itself immediately its remaining; it is its own knowing of itself and its knowing of itself as something that has passed into another self, has been heard, and is universal.

509 Spirit here receives this actuality because the extremes whose unity it is equally immediately have the determination of being actualities of their own for themselves. Their unity is dissolved into rigid sides, each of which is for the other an actual object excluded from it. Unity therefore emerges as a middle excluded and distinguished from the separate actuality of the sides; it therefore itself has an actual objectivity distinct from its sides and is for them—that is, it exists. Spiritual substance enters existence as such only when it has acquired as its sides self-consciousnesses that know this pure self as an immediately valid actuality, and therein equally immediately know that it is this only through alienating mediation. Through the former, the moments are purified into the self-knowing category and thus to the point of being moments of spirit; through the latter, spirit enters 1807 455 existence as spirituality.—It is thus the middle that presupposes those extremes and is produced through their existence—but equally the spiritual whole breaking forth between them, dividing itself into them and first producing each, through this contact, as a whole in its principle.—That the two extremes are already in themselves sublated and dissolved brings forth their unity, and this unity is the movement that joins both together, exchanges their determinations, and joins these determinations together—indeed, in each extreme. This mediation thus posits the concept of each of the two extremes in its actuality, or makes what each is in itself into its spirit.

510 Through this, the two extremes, state power and noble consciousness, are dissolved: the former into the abstract universal that is obeyed and the will existing for itself, which, however, does not yet itself belong to that universal;—the latter into the obedience of sublated existence, or into the being-in-itself of self-respect and honor, and into pure being-for-itself not yet sublated, the will still held in reserve. The two moments into which both sides are purified, and which are therefore moments of language, are the abstract universal called the universal good, and the pure self that in service renounced its consciousness immersed in manifold existence. In the concept the two are the same, for the pure 1807 456 self is precisely the abstract universal, and their unity is therefore posited as their middle. But the self is as yet actual only at the extreme of consciousness, while the in-itself is as yet actual only at the extreme of state power. Consciousness lacks the passage of state power into it not merely as honor, but actually; state power lacks being obeyed not merely as the so-called universal good, but as will, or being the deciding self. The unity of the concept, in which state power still stands and into which consciousness has purified itself, becomes actual in this mediating movement, whose simple existence, as middle, is language.—Yet language does not yet have on its sides two selves present as selves, for state power is only now being animated into a self. This language is therefore not yet spirit as it perfectly knows and expresses itself.

511 Because noble consciousness is the extreme of the self, it appears as that from which the language proceeds through which the sides of the relationship take shape as animated wholes.—The heroism of silent service becomes the heroism of flattery. This speaking reflection of service constitutes the spiritual middle that dissolves itself; it reflects not only its own extreme into itself, but also the extreme of universal power back into that extreme itself, and makes 1807 457 this power, which initially is only in itself, into being-for-itself and the individuality of self-consciousness. Through this the spirit of this power becomes that of being an absolute monarch—absolute: the language of flattery raises power into its purified universality. As the product of language, of existence purified into spirit, this moment is a purified self-equality.—Monarch: language equally raises individuality to its pinnacle. What noble consciousness externalizes on this side of simple spiritual unity is the pure in-itself of its thinking, its I itself. More precisely, language raises individuality, otherwise only something intended, into its existing purity by giving the monarch the proper name. For it is only in the name that the difference of the individual from all others is not merely intended, but is made actual by all; in the name, the individual counts as purely individual no longer only in their own consciousness, but in the consciousness of all. Through the name the monarch is thus absolutely separated from everyone, singled out and solitary; in it he is the atom that can impart nothing of its essence and has no equal.—This name is thus the reflection into itself, or the actuality, that universal power has within itself; through it, it is the monarch. Conversely, he, this individual, knows himself, this individual, 1807 458 as universal power through the nobles' placing themselves around the throne not merely as ready to serve state power, but as ornaments, and through their continually telling its occupant what he is.

512 In this way the language of their praise is the spirit that joins the two extremes within state power itself. It reflects abstract power into itself and gives it the moment of the other extreme, willing and deciding being-for-itself, and thereby self-conscious existence; or, through this, this individual actual self-consciousness comes to know itself with certainty as power. It is the point of the self into which the many points have flowed through the externalization of inner certainty.—But since this own spirit of state power consists in having its actuality and sustenance in the sacrifice of the action and thinking of noble consciousness, it is independence alienated from itself. Noble consciousness, the extreme of being-for-itself, receives back the extreme of actual universality in exchange for the universality of thought it externalized; the power of the state has passed over to it. Only in noble consciousness is state power truly activated; in its being-for-itself state power ceases to be the inert essence it appeared as at the extreme of abstract being-in-itself.—Considered in itself, state power reflected into itself, or its having become spirit, means nothing other 1807 459 than its having become a moment of self-consciousness, that is, its existing only as sublated. It is now therefore essence whose spirit is to be sacrificed and surrendered, or it exists as wealth.—It does indeed at the same time continue to subsist as an actuality opposed to the wealth into which, according to its concept, it is always becoming; but its concept is precisely this movement: through the service and veneration by which it comes to be, passing into its opposite, into the externalization of power. For itself, therefore, the distinctive self that is its will becomes, through noble consciousness's casting itself away, a self-externalizing universality, a complete individuality and contingency surrendered to every more powerful will. What remains to it of universally recognized and incommunicable independence is the empty name.

513 If, then, noble consciousness determined itself as relating to universal power in an equal manner, its truth is instead to retain its own being-for-itself in its service, but in the actual renunciation of its personality to be the actual sublation and tearing apart of universal substance. Its spirit is the relationship of complete inequality: on the one hand retaining its will in its honor; on the other, in giving up that will, partly alienating itself from its inwardness 1807 460 and becoming supremely unequal to itself, partly subjecting universal substance to itself in this process and making substance completely unequal to itself.—It is clear that its determinacy in judgment as opposed to what was called base consciousness has thereby vanished, and with it base consciousness as well. The latter has achieved its purpose: bringing universal power under being-for-itself.

514 Thus enriched by universal power, self-consciousness exists as universal beneficence, or this is wealth, which is itself again an object for consciousness. For wealth is for consciousness the universal that has indeed been subjected, but through this first sublation has not yet returned absolutely into the self.—The self does not yet have itself as self as its object, but sublated universal essence. Since this object has only just come to be, the immediate relation of consciousness to it is posited; consciousness has therefore not yet displayed its inequality with it. It is noble consciousness, which receives its being-for-itself from the universal that has become inessential, and therefore acknowledges wealth and is grateful toward the benefactor.

515 Wealth already contains within itself the moment of being-for-itself. It is not the universal of state power, devoid of a self, or the untroubled inorganic nature of spirit, but that nature 1807 461 as it holds fast to itself through will against whoever wishes to seize it for enjoyment. But since wealth has only the form of essence, this is a one-sided being-for-itself that is not in itself, but instead the sublated in-itself: the essenceless return of the individual into itself in its enjoyment. Wealth itself therefore requires animation; and the movement of its reflection consists in its becoming being-in-and-for-itself from being merely for itself, in its becoming essence from being sublated essence. In this way it receives its own spirit within itself.—Since the form of this movement has been set out above, it is sufficient here to determine its content.

516 Here, then, noble consciousness relates to the object not as essence in general; rather, being-for-itself itself is what is alien to it. It finds its self as such already alienated, as an objective, fixed actuality that it must receive from another fixed being-for-itself. Its object is being-for-itself, thus its own; but because this is an object, it is at the same time immediately an alien actuality, which is a being-for-itself of its own, a will of its own. That is, it sees its self in the power of an alien will, on which it depends whether that will wishes to surrender this self to it.

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517 Self-consciousness can abstract from every particular side and therefore retains, in an obligation concerning such a side, its recognition and validity in itself as an essence existing for itself. Here, however, it sees itself, on the side of its pure, ownmost actuality, or its I, outside itself and belonging to another; it sees its personality as such dependent on the contingent personality of another, on the chance of a moment, an arbitrary whim, or some otherwise utterly indifferent circumstance.—In the condition of right, what is in the power of objective essence appears as a contingent content from which one can abstract; power does not concern the self as such, which is instead recognized. But here it sees its certainty of itself as such to be utterly inessential, pure personality to be absolute impersonality. The spirit of its gratitude is therefore the feeling of both this deepest degradation and the deepest rebellion. As the pure I intuits itself outside itself and torn apart, in this dismemberment everything possessing continuity and universality, everything called law, good, and right, has likewise fallen apart and perished. Everything equal is dissolved, for the purest inequality is present: the absolute inessentiality of the absolutely essential, the being-outside-itself of being-for-itself. The pure I itself is absolutely dissolved.

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518 Thus, although this consciousness receives back from wealth the objectivity of being-for-itself and sublates it, it is not merely incomplete according to its concept, like the preceding reflection, but unsatisfied for itself. In the reflection in which the self receives itself as an object, immediate contradiction is posited within the pure I itself. Yet as self it also immediately stands above this contradiction; it is the absolute elasticity that again sublates this sublation of the self, rejects this degradation in which its being-for-itself comes to it as something alien, and, rebelling against this reception of itself, is for itself in the very act of receiving.

519 Since the relationship of this consciousness is thus bound up with this absolute dismemberment, its distinction as noble against base consciousness falls away in its spirit, and the two are the same.—The spirit of beneficent wealth can further be distinguished from the spirit of the consciousness receiving the benefit, and must be considered separately.—It was essenceless being-for-itself, surrendered essence. But through imparting itself it becomes the in-itself; in fulfilling its determination to sacrifice itself, it sublates the individuality of enjoying only for itself, and as sublated individuality it is universality, or essence.—What it imparts, what it gives to others, is being-for-itself. Yet it 1807 464 does not surrender itself as nature without a self, as the condition of life giving itself away without reserve, but as self-conscious essence holding itself for itself. It is not the inorganic power of the element, which the receiving consciousness knows as intrinsically transient, but power over the self, knowing itself to be independent and arbitrary, and knowing at the same time that what it dispenses is another's self.—Wealth therefore shares degradation with its client, but arrogance takes the place of rebellion. For on one side, like the client, it knows being-for-itself as a contingent thing; but it is itself this contingency in whose power personality stands. In this arrogance, which supposes that by a meal it has maintained another's very I and thereby acquired the submission of that person's innermost essence, it overlooks the other's inward rebellion. It overlooks the complete casting off of every fetter, this pure dismemberment for which, since the self-equality of being-for-itself has become utterly unequal to it, everything equal, everything subsistent, has been torn apart—and which therefore tears apart the benefactor's opinion and view most of all. Wealth stands directly before this innermost abyss, this bottomless depth in which all support and substance have disappeared; and in this depth it sees nothing but a common thing, a plaything of its 1807 465 mood, a contingency of its arbitrary will. Its spirit is the utterly essenceless opinion of being the surface forsaken by spirit.

520 Just as self-consciousness had its language toward state power, or spirit emerged between these extremes as an actual middle, so it also has language toward wealth; still more, its rebellion has its language. The language that gives wealth consciousness of its essentiality and thereby takes possession of it is likewise the language of flattery, but ignoble flattery;—for what it pronounces as essence, it knows as surrendered essence, essence not existing in itself. Yet the language of flattery, as already remarked, is spirit that is still one-sided. For its moments are indeed the self purified through the cultivation of service into pure existence, and the being-in-itself of power. But the pure concept in which the simple self and the in-itself, that pure I and this pure essence or thought, are the same—this unity of the two sides between which the interaction occurs—is not within the consciousness of this language. For it, the object is still the in-itself opposed to the self; or the object is not for it also its own self as such.—But the language of dismemberment is the complete language and the true existing spirit of this whole world of cultivation. This self-consciousness, to which 1807 466 belongs the rebellion that rejects its degradation, is immediately absolute self-equality in absolute dismemberment, the pure mediation of pure self-consciousness with itself. It is the equality of the identical judgment in which one and the same personality is both subject and predicate. But this identical judgment is at the same time infinite, for this personality is absolutely divided, and subject and predicate are utterly indifferent beings that have nothing to do with one another, without necessary unity—even to the point that each is the power of a personality of its own. Being-for-itself has its being-for-itself as its object, as an utterly other and at the same time just as immediately as itself: itself as another, not that this other has a different content, but the content is the same self in the form of absolute opposition and completely its own, indifferent existence.—Here, then, the spirit of this real world of cultivation is present, conscious of itself in its truth and of its concept.

521 It is this absolute and universal inversion and alienation of actuality and thought: pure cultivation. What is experienced in this world is that neither the actual essences of power and wealth, nor their determinate concepts, good and bad, nor consciousness of good and bad, noble and base consciousness, have truth. Rather, all these 1807 467 moments invert themselves into one another, and each is the opposite of itself.—Universal power, which is substance, on attaining a spirituality of its own through the principle of individuality, receives its own self within it only as the name, and, in being actual power, is instead the powerless essence that sacrifices itself.—But this surrendered essence without a self, or the self become a thing, is instead essence's return into itself: it is being-for-itself existing for itself, the existence of spirit.—The thoughts of these essences, of good and bad, likewise invert themselves in this movement: what is determined as good is bad; what as bad, good. The consciousness of each of these moments, judged as noble and base consciousness, is in its truth just as much the reverse of what these determinations are supposed to be: noble consciousness is just as base and degraded as degradation turns into the nobility of the most highly cultivated freedom of self-consciousness.—Likewise, considered formally, everything is outwardly the reverse of what it is for itself; and again, what it is for itself it is not in truth, but is something other than it wishes to be. Being-for-itself is instead the loss of itself, and its alienation instead self-preservation.—What is present, then, is that all moments exercise a universal justice 1807 468 against one another, each alienating itself within itself just as much as it forms itself into its opposite and thus inverts that opposite.—But true spirit is precisely this unity of the absolutely separated; indeed, it comes into existence itself as their middle precisely through the free actuality of these extremes without a self. Its existence is universal speaking and rending judging, in which all those moments meant to count as essences and actual members of the whole dissolve, and which is equally this self-dissolving play with itself. This judging and speaking is therefore the true and invincible, while it overpowers everything: that which alone truly matters in this real world. In it every part of this world reaches the point where its spirit is expressed, or where it is spoken of with spirit and said to be what it is.—Honest consciousness takes each moment as an enduring essentiality and is the uncultivated thoughtlessness of not knowing that it equally does the reverse. Dismembered consciousness, however, is consciousness of inversion, and indeed of absolute inversion. The concept rules within it, bringing together thoughts that lie far apart for honesty, and its language is therefore spirited and witty.

522 The content of spirit's discourse of and about itself is therefore the inversion of all concepts and 1807 469 realities, the universal deception of itself and others; and the shamelessness of speaking this deception is for that very reason the greatest truth. This discourse is the madness of the musician “who heaped together and mingled thirty arias, Italian, French, tragic, comic, of every kind of character; now with a deep bass he descended into hell, then contracted his throat and with a falsetto tore through the heights of the air, by turns raging, soothed, commanding, and mocking.”—To tranquil consciousness, which honestly places the melody of the good and true in the equality of tones, that is, in a single note, this discourse appears as “a rambling of wisdom and madness, a mixture of as much skill as baseness, of ideas as correct as they are false, of such complete perversion of feeling, such perfect infamy, as utter openness and truth. It will not be able to refrain from entering into all these tones and running up and down the whole scale of feelings, from the deepest contempt and rejection to the highest admiration and emotion; a ridiculous trait will be fused into the latter, depriving them of their nature.” The former will have, in their very openness, a reconciling trait, and in their shattering depth the all-powerful trait that gives spirit to itself.

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523 If, against the discourse of this confusion clear to itself, we consider the discourse of that simple consciousness of the true and good, it can only be monosyllabic before the open and self-conscious eloquence of the spirit of cultivation; for it can tell this spirit nothing that spirit does not itself know and say. If it goes beyond its monosyllables, it therefore says the same thing spirit expresses, but commits the additional folly of supposing it says something new and different. Even its syllables, infamous, base, are already this folly, for spirit says them of itself. In its discourse this spirit inverts everything monotonous, because this self-equal element is only an abstraction and in its actuality is inversion within itself. If, in opposition, upright consciousness defends the good and noble, that is, what maintains equality with itself in its expression, in the only way possible here—namely, that it does not lose its value by being connected or mixed with the bad, for this is its condition and necessity, and herein lies nature's wisdom—then this consciousness, while supposing it contradicts, has only summed up the content of spirit's discourse in a trivial manner. Thoughtlessly making the opposite of the noble and good into the condition and necessity of the noble and good, it supposes it says something other than that what is called noble and 1807 471 good is in its essence the inversion of itself, just as the bad is conversely the excellent.

524 If simple consciousness replaces this spiritless thought with the actuality of excellence, presenting it in the example of an invented case or even a true anecdote, and thus showing that it is no empty name but exists, then the universal actuality of the inverted action of the entire real world stands opposed to it. In this world that example therefore constitutes only something entirely isolated, an espèce; and to present the existence of the good and noble as an isolated anecdote, whether invented or true, is the bitterest thing that can be said of it.—If, finally, simple consciousness demands the dissolution of this whole world of inversion, it cannot demand of the individual a withdrawal from it, for Diogenes in his barrel is conditioned by this world, and the demand addressed to the individual is precisely what counts as bad: caring for oneself as an individual. But addressed to universal individuality, the demand for this withdrawal cannot mean that reason should again relinquish the spiritually cultivated consciousness it has attained, sink the unfolded wealth of its moments back into the simplicity of the natural heart, and relapse into the wilderness and proximity to animal consciousness that 1807 472 is called nature, also innocence. Rather, the demand for this dissolution can be addressed only to the spirit of cultivation itself: that out of its confusion it should return to itself as spirit and attain a still higher consciousness.

525 In fact, however, spirit has already accomplished this in itself. The dismemberment of consciousness, conscious of itself and expressing itself, is mocking laughter at existence, at the confusion of the whole, and at itself; it is at the same time the dying away of this entire confusion, still hearing itself.—This vanity of all actuality and every determinate concept, hearing itself, is the doubled reflection of the real world into itself: once into this self of consciousness as this self, and again into its pure universality, or into thought. On the former side, spirit that has come to itself has directed its gaze into the world of actuality and still has this world as its purpose and immediate content; on the other side, however, its gaze is partly directed only into itself and negatively toward the world, partly turned away from it toward heaven, and the world's beyond is its object.

526 On that side of the return into the self, the vanity of all things is its own vanity, or it is vain. It is the self existing for itself that knows not merely how to judge and chatter about everything, but how to express with wit the fixed essences of actuality 1807 473 and the fixed determinations posited by judgment in their contradiction, and this contradiction is their truth.—Considered formally, it knows everything as alienated from itself: being-for-itself separated from being-in-itself; what is intended and the purpose from the truth; and being-for-another, the pretended, separated in turn from both—from the actual opinion and the true matter and intention.—It thus knows how to express correctly each moment against the other, and generally the inversion of them all; it knows better what each is than that thing is, however it may be determined. Since it knows the substantial from the side of the discord and conflict it unites within itself, but not from the side of this unity, it understands very well how to judge the substantial, but has lost the capacity to grasp it.—This vanity also needs the vanity of all things to give itself consciousness of the self through them; it therefore produces this vanity itself and is the soul sustaining it. Power and wealth are the highest purposes of its exertion; it knows that through renunciation and sacrifice it cultivates itself into the universal, attains possession of it, and in this possession has universal validity. These are the actual, acknowledged powers. But this validity of its is itself vain, and precisely in taking possession of them it knows them not to be essential selves, but rather knows itself as their power and them as vain. That it is thus, in 1807 474 possessing them, itself outside them, it presents in witty language, which is therefore its highest interest and the truth of the whole. In this language this self, as the pure self belonging neither to actual nor to thought determinations, becomes for itself spiritual, truly universally valid. It is the self-rending nature of all relationships and the conscious rending of them; but only as rebellious self-consciousness does it know its own dismemberment, and in this knowledge it has immediately risen above it. In that vanity all content becomes negative and can no longer be grasped positively; the positive object is only the pure I itself, and dismembered consciousness is in itself this pure self-equality of self-consciousness returned into itself.

b. Faith and Pure Insight.

527 The spirit of self-alienation has its existence in the world of cultivation; but since this whole has become alienated from itself, beyond it stands the unactual world of pure consciousness, or of thought. Its content is what is purely thought, and thought its absolute element. But since thought is initially the element of this world, consciousness only has these thoughts, but 1807 475 does not yet think them, or know that they are thoughts; rather, they are for it in the form of representation. For it steps out of actuality into pure consciousness, but is itself generally still in the sphere and determinacy of actuality. Dismembered consciousness is initially the self-equality of pure consciousness only in itself, for us, not for itself. It is therefore only the immediate elevation, not yet completed within itself, and still contains its opposed principle, by which it is conditioned, without having mastered it through the mediating movement. Hence the essence of its thought counts for it not as essence merely in the form of the abstract in-itself, but in the form of something ordinarily actual, an actuality that has merely been raised into another element without losing in it the determinacy of an actuality not grasped in thought.—It must essentially be distinguished from the in-itself that is the essence of Stoic consciousness. For the latter only the form of thought as such held good, with some content alien to it and taken from actuality; but for the consciousness under consideration it is not the form of thought that holds good. It must equally be distinguished from the in-itself of virtuous consciousness, for which essence indeed stands in relation to actuality and is the essence of actuality itself, but is as yet only unactual essence;—for the consciousness under consideration, it counts, although beyond 1807 476 actuality, as actual essence. Likewise, what is right and good in itself for lawgiving reason, and the universal of law-testing consciousness, do not have the determination of actuality.—If, therefore, within the world of cultivation itself pure thought fell on one side of alienation, namely as the standard of abstract good and bad in judging, then, having passed through the movement of the whole, it has been enriched by the moment of actuality and thereby of content. Yet this actuality of essence is at the same time only an actuality of pure, not of actual, consciousness. Though raised into the element of thought, it does not yet count for this consciousness as a thought; rather, it lies for consciousness beyond its own actuality, for it is the flight from this actuality.

528 As religion—for it is evident that religion is what is being discussed—appears here as the faith of the world of cultivation, it does not yet appear as it is in and for itself.—It has already appeared to us in other determinations, namely as unhappy consciousness, as a shape of the substanceless movement of consciousness itself.—It also appeared in ethical substance as faith in the underworld; but consciousness of the departed spirit is not properly faith, not essence posited in the element of pure consciousness beyond actual consciousness; rather, this spirit itself has 1807 477 immediate presence, and its element is the family.—Here, however, religion has partly emerged from substance and is pure consciousness of it; partly, this pure consciousness is alienated from its actual consciousness, essence from its existence. Thus, though it is no longer the substanceless movement of consciousness, it still has the determinacy of opposition to actuality as this actuality in general, and to the actuality of self-consciousness in particular; it is therefore essentially only a faith.

529 This pure consciousness of absolute essence is alienated. We must see more closely how that of which it is the other determines itself, and consider it only in connection with this. Initially, this pure consciousness seems to have only the world of actuality opposed to it; but since it is the flight from this world and thereby the determinacy of opposition, it contains this opposition within itself. Pure consciousness is therefore essentially alienated from itself within itself, and faith constitutes only one side of it. The other side has already arisen for us as well. For pure consciousness is reflection out of the world of cultivation in such a way that this world's substance, like the spheres into which it articulates itself, showed itself as what it is in itself: as spiritual essentialities, as absolutely restless movements or determinations that immediately sublate themselves in their opposite. Their essence, simple 1807 478 consciousness, is therefore the simplicity of absolute difference, which is immediately no difference. It is thus pure being-for-itself, not as this individual, but the self universal within itself as restless movement, which attacks and penetrates the tranquil essence of the matter. In it, therefore, there is present the certainty that immediately knows itself as truth, pure thought as the absolute concept in the power of its negativity, which annihilates every objective essence supposed to confront consciousness and makes it a being of consciousness.—This pure consciousness is at the same time equally simple, precisely because its difference is no difference. But as this form of simple reflection into itself, it is the element of faith, in which spirit has the determination of positive universality, of being-in-itself, against that being-for-itself of self-consciousness.—Driven back into itself from the essenceless world that merely dissolves itself, spirit is, in truth and in undivided unity, both the absolute movement and negativity of its appearing, and the essence satisfied within itself and its positive repose. But subject generally to the determinacy of alienation, these two moments fall apart as a doubled consciousness. The former is pure insight, as the spiritual process gathering itself into self-consciousness, which confronts and directs itself against consciousness of the positive, the form of objectivity 1807 479 or representation; its own object, however, is only the pure I.—Simple consciousness of the positive, or of tranquil self-equality, conversely has inward essence as essence for its object. Pure insight therefore initially has no content within itself, because it is negative being-for-itself; to faith, conversely, belongs content without insight. Whereas insight does not step out of self-consciousness, faith indeed likewise has its content in the element of pure self-consciousness, but in thought, not in concepts, in pure consciousness, not in pure self-consciousness. It is thus indeed pure consciousness of essence, that is, of the simple inward, and is therefore thought—the chief moment in the nature of faith, which is usually overlooked. The immediacy with which essence exists in faith consists in its object being essence, that is, pure thought. But insofar as thought enters consciousness, or pure consciousness enters self-consciousness, this immediacy acquires the significance of an objective being lying beyond consciousness of the self. Through this significance, which the immediacy and simplicity of pure thought acquire in consciousness, the essence of faith falls from thought into representation and becomes a supersensible world that is essentially an other of self-consciousness 1807 480.—In pure insight, conversely, the passage of pure thought into consciousness has the opposite determination: objectivity has the significance of a merely negative content that sublates itself and returns into the self. That is, only the self is properly its own object, or the object has truth only insofar as it has the form of the self.

530 Just as faith and pure insight belong together to the element of pure consciousness, so together they are the return from the actual world of cultivation. They therefore present themselves from three sides. First, each is in and for itself, outside every relation; second, each relates to the actual world opposed to pure consciousness; and third, each relates to the other within pure consciousness.

531 The side of being-in-and-for-itself in believing consciousness is its absolute object, whose content and determination have emerged. For according to the concept of faith, this object is nothing other than the real world raised into the universality of pure consciousness. The articulation of the latter world therefore also constitutes the organization of the former, except that in the former the parts do not alienate themselves in their animation, but are essences existing in and for themselves, spirits returned into themselves and remaining with themselves.—The movement 1807 481 of their transition is therefore only for us an alienation of the determinacy in which they exist in their difference, and only for us a necessary series; for faith, however, their difference is a tranquil diversity, and their movement an occurrence.

532 To name them briefly according to the external determination of their form: just as in the world of cultivation state power, or the good, was first, so here too the first is absolute essence, spirit existing in and for itself insofar as it is simple eternal substance. But in realizing its concept of being spirit, substance passes into being-for-another; its self-equality becomes actual, self-sacrificing absolute essence; it becomes self, but a transient self. The third is therefore the return of this alienated self and abased substance into their first simplicity; only in this way is substance represented as spirit.—

533 These differentiated essences, taken back into themselves through thought from the change of the actual world, are changeless eternal spirits whose being is to think the unity they constitute. Though thus removed from self-consciousness, these essences nevertheless intervene in it; were essence fixed in the form of the first simple substance, it would remain alien to self-consciousness. But the externalization of this substance, and then its spirit, contain the moment of actuality and thereby participate in 1807 482 believing self-consciousness, or believing consciousness belongs to the real world.

534 According to this second relationship, believing consciousness partly has its own actuality in the real world of cultivation and constitutes the spirit and existence of that world already considered; partly, however, it confronts this its actuality as something vain, and is the movement of sublating it. This movement does not consist in its having a witty consciousness of the world's inversion; for it is simple consciousness, which counts wit among vain things because wit still has the real world as its purpose. Rather, actuality confronts the tranquil realm of its thought as a spiritless existence that must therefore be overcome externally. Through sublating sensuous knowing and action, this obedience of service and praise produces consciousness of unity with essence existing in and for itself, but not as an intuited actual unity. Rather, this service is only a continual production that does not completely attain its goal in the present. The congregation does indeed attain it, for it is universal self-consciousness; but for individual self-consciousness the realm of pure thought necessarily remains a beyond of its actuality. Or, when this realm has entered actuality through the externalization of eternal essence, it is an uncomprehended 1807 483 sensuous actuality; but one sensuous actuality remains indifferent to the other, and the beyond has merely acquired the additional determination of remoteness in space and time.—The concept, however, spirit's actuality present to itself, remains in believing consciousness the inward element that is and effects everything, but does not itself emerge.

535 In pure insight, however, the concept is the sole actuality; and this third side of faith, being an object for pure insight, is the essential relation in which faith appears here.—Pure insight itself must likewise be considered partly in and for itself, partly in relation to the actual world insofar as it still exists positively, namely as vain consciousness, and finally in that relationship to faith.

536 We have seen what pure insight is in and for itself. Just as faith is the tranquil, pure consciousness of spirit as essence, so insight is spirit's self-consciousness; it therefore knows essence not as essence, but as absolute self. It thus aims to sublate every independence other than self-consciousness, whether of the actual or of what exists in itself, and to make it the concept. It is not merely the certainty of self-conscious reason that it is all truth; it knows that it is this.

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537 But as its concept appears, it is not yet realized. Its consciousness accordingly still appears as a contingent, individual consciousness, and what is essence for it appears as a purpose it must actualize. It initially has only the intention of making pure insight universal, that is, making everything actual into the concept, and into a concept in all self-consciousnesses. The intention is pure, for its content is pure insight; and this insight is likewise pure, for its content is only the absolute concept, which has no opposition in an object and is not limited within itself. The unlimited concept immediately contains both sides: that everything objective should have only the significance of being-for-itself, of self-consciousness, and that self-consciousness should have the significance of a universal, that pure insight should become the property of all self-consciousnesses. This second side of the intention is the result of cultivation insofar as in cultivation not only the differences of objective spirit, the parts and determinations of judgment of its world, but also the differences appearing as originally determinate natures have perished. Genius, talent, particular capacities generally belong to the world of actuality insofar as it still has the side of being a spiritual animal kingdom, which in mutual violence and confusion fights and deceives over the essences of the real world.—Differences 1807 485 indeed have no place in it as honest specimens; individuality neither contents itself with the unactual matter itself, nor has a particular content and purposes of its own. Rather, it counts only as something universally valid, namely as cultivated, and difference reduces to greater or lesser energy—a difference of magnitude, that is, an inessential one. But this last diversity has perished, because in the complete dismemberment of consciousness difference turned into an absolutely qualitative one. What is other to the I in this is only the I itself. In this infinite judgment every one-sidedness and peculiarity of original being-for-itself is erased; the self knows itself as pure self to be its object, and this absolute equality of the two sides is the element of pure insight.—Pure insight is therefore the simple essence undifferentiated within itself, and equally the universal work and universal possession. In this simple spiritual substance, self-consciousness gives and preserves for itself in every object consciousness of this individuality of its own, or of action, just as, conversely, its individuality is therein equal to itself and universal.—This pure insight is therefore the spirit that calls to every consciousness: be for yourselves what you all are in yourselves—rational.

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II. The Enlightenment.

538 The distinctive object against which pure insight directs the force of the concept is faith, as the form of pure consciousness confronting it in the same element. But it also has a relation to the actual world, for, like faith, it is the return from this world into pure consciousness. We must first see the nature of its activity against the world's impure intentions and perverted insights.

539 We have already mentioned the tranquil consciousness that confronts this whirlpool dissolving and reproducing itself within itself; it constitutes the side of pure insight and intention. But as we saw, this tranquil consciousness contains no particular insight into the world of cultivation. Rather, that world itself has the most painful feeling and truest insight concerning itself—the feeling of being the dissolution of everything establishing itself, broken on the wheel through all the moments of its existence and shattered in every bone. It is equally the language of this feeling and the judging, 1807 487 witty discourse concerning every side of its condition. Pure insight can therefore have no activity and content of its own here, and can thus relate only as the formal, faithful apprehension of this world's own witty insight and its language. Since this language is dispersed, its judgment a momentary rambling that immediately forgets itself again and is a whole only for a third consciousness, this third consciousness can distinguish itself as pure insight only by gathering those scattered traits into a universal picture and then making them an insight shared by all.

540 Through this simple means it will bring the confusion of this world to dissolution. For it has emerged that neither the spheres, nor the determinate concepts and individualities, are the essence of this actuality, but that it has its substance and support solely in spirit existing as judging and discussing, and that the interest in having a content for this reasoning and chatter alone preserves the whole and the spheres of its articulation. In this language of insight its self-consciousness is still for itself this individual existing for itself; but the vanity of the content is at the same time the vanity of the self that knows it as vain. Now when the tranquilly apprehending consciousness brings into a collection the most incisive formulations from this whole witty chatter of vanity, those that cut to the heart of the matter, then, along with the 1807 488 remaining vanity of existence, the soul still preserving the whole—the vanity of witty judgment—perishes. The collection shows most people a better wit, or everyone at least a more varied wit, than their own, and superior knowledge and judging generally as something universal and now universally known. The only remaining interest is thereby erased, and individual insight dissolves into universal insight. Yet above vain knowing, knowledge of essence still stands firm, and pure insight first appears in its proper activity insofar as it acts against faith.

a. The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition.

541 The various modes of consciousness's negative relation—skepticism, on the one hand, and theoretical and practical idealism, on the other—are subordinate shapes compared with this shape of pure insight and its dissemination, the Enlightenment. For pure insight is born from substance, knows the pure self of consciousness as absolute, and takes its stand together with pure consciousness of the absolute essence of all actuality.—Since faith and 1807 489 insight are the same pure consciousness but opposed in form—essence being for faith thought, not concept, and therefore something utterly opposed to self-consciousness, while for pure insight essence is the self—each is for the other its absolute negative.—As the two confront one another, all content belongs to faith, since in its tranquil element of thought every moment gains subsistence; pure insight, however, is initially without content and is instead its pure disappearance. Yet through its negative movement against what is negative to it, insight will realize itself and give itself a content.

542 It knows faith as opposed to itself, to reason and truth. Just as faith is for it generally a fabric of superstition, prejudices, and errors, so, further, consciousness of this content organizes itself for insight into a realm of error. In this realm false insight exists, on the one hand, as the universal mass of consciousness, immediate, unsuspecting, and without reflection into itself; but it also contains the moment of reflection into itself, or self-consciousness, separated from that unsuspectingness, as an insight remaining for itself in the background and an evil intention by which the mass is deluded. This mass is the victim of deception by a priesthood that pursues both its jealous vanity of remaining alone in possession of insight 1807 490 and its other self-interest. At the same time this priesthood conspires with despotism, which, as the synthetic, conceptless unity of the real and this ideal realm—a strangely inconsistent essence—stands above the bad insight of the multitude and the bad intention of the priests, and also unites both within itself. Through the means of the deceiving priesthood, and despising both, it draws from the people's stupidity and confusion the advantage of tranquil domination and the fulfillment of its desires and arbitrary will, while at the same time itself being this same dullness of insight, this same superstition and error.

543 Enlightenment does not engage these three sides of the enemy without distinction. Since its essence is pure insight, the universal in and for itself, its true relation to the other extreme is the one in which it addresses what is common and equal in both. The side of individuality isolating itself from universal, unsuspecting consciousness is what is opposed to insight, which cannot touch it immediately. The will of the deceiving priesthood and oppressive despot is therefore not the immediate object of its action, but rather the insight that has no will and does not individuate itself into being-for-itself: the concept of rational self-consciousness, which has its existence in the mass but is not yet present in it as concept. But 1807 491 by rescuing this honest insight and its unsuspecting essence from prejudices and errors, pure insight wrests from evil intention the reality and power of its deception. That intention's realm has its ground and material in the conceptless consciousness of the universal mass, just as being-for-itself has its substance in simple consciousness generally.

544 The relation of pure insight to unsuspecting consciousness of absolute essence now has a doubled side: on the one hand, pure insight is in itself the same as this consciousness; on the other, this consciousness, in the simple element of its thought, lets absolute essence and its parts have their way and give themselves subsistence, and lets them count only as its in-itself, and thus objectively, while denying its being-for-itself in this in-itself.—Insofar as, on the first side, this faith is in itself pure self-consciousness for pure insight, and needs only to become this for itself, insight has in this concept of faith the element in which it realizes itself in place of false insight.

545 From this side, since both are essentially the same and the relation of pure insight occurs through and in the same element, its communication is immediate, and its giving and receiving an undisturbed flowing into one another. Whatever other stakes may have been driven into consciousness, it is in itself this simplicity 1807 492 in which everything is dissolved, forgotten, and without reserve, and which is therefore utterly receptive to the concept. The communication of pure insight is therefore comparable to a tranquil expansion, or a spreading like that of a fragrance in the unresisting atmosphere. It is a penetrating contagion that does not beforehand announce itself as opposed to the indifferent element into which it insinuates itself, and therefore cannot be warded off. Only when the contagion has spread does it exist for consciousness, which surrendered itself to it without concern. For what consciousness received into itself was indeed the simple essence equal to itself and to consciousness, but also the simplicity of negativity reflected into itself, which afterward unfolds according to its nature as something opposed, thereby reminding consciousness of its previous mode. It is the concept, the simple knowing that knows itself and also its opposite, but knows this opposite within it as sublated. Thus, as soon as pure insight exists for consciousness, it has already spread; the struggle against it betrays the infection that has occurred. The struggle is too late, and every remedy only worsens the sickness, for it has seized the marrow of spiritual life, namely consciousness in its concept, or its pure essence itself. Hence there is no force within consciousness superior to it. Because it is in essence itself, its still 1807 493 isolated expressions can be driven back and its superficial symptoms subdued. This is highly advantageous to it; for it now neither wastes its force uselessly nor shows itself unworthy of its essence, as happens when it erupts in symptoms and isolated outbreaks against the content of faith and the connected structure of its external actuality. Instead, now an invisible and unnoticed spirit, it creeps through and through the vital parts and has soon taken thorough possession of all the entrails and limbs of the unconscious idol; and “on one fine morning it gives its companion a nudge with its elbow, and bang! crash! the idol lies on the ground.”—On one fine morning, whose noon is not bloody, if the contagion has penetrated all the organs of spiritual life. Only memory then still preserves, as a history that has passed away one knows not how, the dead mode of spirit's previous shape; and in this way the new serpent of wisdom raised up for worship has merely shed a withered skin without pain.

546 But this silent weaving onward of spirit in the simple interior of its substance, concealing its action from itself, is only one side of the realization of pure insight. Its dissemination does not consist merely in like joining with like, and its actualization is not merely an expansion without opposition. Rather, the action of 1807 494 negative essence is just as essentially a developed movement differentiating itself within itself, which, as conscious action, must set forth its moments in determinate, manifest existence and must be present as a loud uproar and violent struggle with the opposed as such.

547 We must therefore see how pure insight and intention relate negatively to the other, opposed to them, that they find already present.—Since its concept is all essentiality and nothing is outside it, pure insight and intention in their negative relation can only be the negative of themselves. As insight, it therefore becomes the negative of pure insight: it becomes untruth and unreason; and as intention, the negative of pure intention: lying and impurity of purpose.

548 It entangles itself in this contradiction by entering into conflict and supposing itself to be combating something other.—It merely supposes this, for its essence as absolute negativity is to contain otherness within itself. The absolute concept is the category; it consists in knowing and the object of knowing being the same. Thus what pure insight pronounces as its other, as error or lie, can be nothing other than itself; it can condemn only what it is. What is not rational has no truth, or what is not comprehended is not; thus when reason speaks of an other 1807 495 than itself, it in fact speaks only of itself and does not step outside itself.—This struggle with the opposed therefore also contains the significance of being its actualization. For this actualization consists precisely in the movement of developing the moments and taking them back into itself. Part of this movement is the differentiation in which comprehending insight confronts itself as object; as long as it lingers in this moment, it is alienated from itself. As pure insight it is without all content; the movement of its realization consists in its own becoming content for itself, for no other content can become its content, since it is the self-consciousness of the category. But since it initially knows this content, in the opposition, only as content and not yet as itself, it fails to recognize itself in it. Its completion therefore means recognizing as its own the content that was initially objective to it. Its result will therefore be neither the restoration of the errors it combats nor merely its first concept, but an insight recognizing the absolute negation of itself as its own actuality, as itself—or its concept recognizing itself.—This nature of Enlightenment's struggle with errors, of combating itself in them and condemning in them what it affirms, is for us, or is what it and its struggle are in themselves. But the first side 1807 496 of this struggle, its contamination through admitting the negative relation into its self-equal purity, is how it is an object for faith. Faith therefore experiences it as lying, unreason, and evil intention, just as faith is for insight error and prejudice.—With regard to its content, pure insight is initially empty insight, to which its content appears as an other. It therefore finds this content in faith, in the shape of something not yet its own, as an existence entirely independent of it.

549 Enlightenment thus initially and generally apprehends its object by taking it as pure insight and, failing to recognize itself in it, declaring it error. In insight as such, consciousness grasps an object so that it becomes for it the essence of consciousness, or an object that it penetrates, in which it preserves itself, remains with itself and present to itself, and which it produces by thus being its movement. Enlightenment correctly expresses faith as precisely this when it says that what is absolute essence for faith is a being of its own consciousness, its own thought, something produced by consciousness. It thereby declares faith to be error and invention concerning the very thing that Enlightenment itself is.—Wishing to teach faith this new wisdom, it thereby tells faith nothing new; for faith's object is for faith precisely 1807 497 this: the pure essence of its own consciousness, so that consciousness does not posit itself as lost and negated in it, but instead trusts it—that is, finds itself in it as this consciousness, or as self-consciousness. The certainty of himself of the one I trust is for me certainty of myself; I recognize my being-for-myself in him, recognize that he acknowledges it and that it is his purpose and essence. But trust is faith because its consciousness relates immediately to its object and thus also intuits that it is one with it, within it.—Further, since that in which I recognize myself is an object for me, I am therein at the same time generally an other self-consciousness for myself—that is, one alienated therein from its particular individuality, namely its natural character and contingency, yet partly remaining self-consciousness therein, partly being precisely therein essential consciousness, like pure insight.—The concept of insight entails not merely that consciousness recognizes itself in the object it has insight into, and has itself immediately therein without leaving what is thought and only then returning from it into itself; it is also conscious of itself as the mediating movement, or of itself as action or production. Through this, the unity of itself as self and of the object is present for it in thought.—Faith too is precisely this consciousness: obedience 1807 498 and action are a necessary moment through which certainty of being in absolute essence comes about. This action of faith does not indeed appear as producing absolute essence itself. But faith's absolute essence is essentially not the abstract essence lying beyond believing consciousness; rather, it is the spirit of the congregation, the unity of abstract essence and self-consciousness. The action of the congregation is an essential moment in its being this spirit of the congregation; it is this only through consciousness's production—or rather, not without being produced by consciousness. For as essential as production is, it is just as essentially not the sole ground of essence, but only a moment. Essence is also in and for itself.

550 From the other side, the concept of pure insight is an other to itself as its object, for precisely this negative determination constitutes the object. From the other side it therefore also expresses the essence of faith as something alien to self-consciousness, something that is not its essence but has been foisted upon it like a changeling. Here, however, Enlightenment is utterly foolish; faith experiences it as speech that does not know what it says and does not understand the matter when it talks of priestly fraud and the deception of the people. 1807 499 It speaks as though the hocus-pocus of conjuring priests foisted something absolutely alien and other upon consciousness as its essence; and at the same time it says that this is an essence of consciousness, that consciousness believes in it, trusts it, and seeks to win its favor—that is, that it intuits therein its pure essence just as much as its individual and universal individuality, and through its action produces this unity of itself with its essence. What it pronounces as something alien to consciousness it immediately pronounces as consciousness's ownmost.—How, then, can it speak of fraud and deception? By itself immediately saying of faith the opposite of what it asserts about it, it instead shows itself to faith as the conscious lie. How could deception and fraud occur where consciousness immediately has in its truth the certainty of itself, where it possesses itself in its object, finding itself therein as much as producing itself? The difference is no longer present even in the words.—If the general question has been posed, whether it is permissible to deceive a people, the answer would in fact have to be that the question is worthless, because it is impossible to deceive a people in this matter.—Brass instead of gold, counterfeit bills of exchange instead of genuine ones, may indeed be sold to individuals; a lost battle palmed off on 1807 500 many as a victory; and other lies about sensuous things and particular events made credible for a time. But in knowledge of essence, in which consciousness has immediate certainty of itself, the thought of deception falls away entirely.

551 Let us see further how faith experiences Enlightenment in the different moments of its consciousness, to which the view exhibited above initially applied only generally. These moments are pure thought, or, as object, absolute essence in and for itself; then faith's relation to it as a knowing, the ground of its faith; and finally its relation to it in its action, or its service. Just as pure insight has failed to recognize and has denied itself in faith generally, so it will conduct itself perversely in these moments as well.

552 Pure insight relates negatively to the absolute essence of believing consciousness. This essence is pure thought, and pure thought posited within itself as object, or as essence. In believing consciousness this in-itself of thought acquires at the same time, for consciousness existing for itself, the form—but also only the empty form—of objectivity; it has the determination of something represented. But to pure insight, since it is pure consciousness on the side of the self existing for itself, the other appears as a negative of 1807 501 self-consciousness. This could still be taken either as the pure in-itself of thought or as the being of sense-certainty. But since it is at the same time for the self, and this self as a self having an object is actual consciousness, insight's distinctive object as such is an existing ordinary thing of sense-certainty. This object of its own appears to it in faith's representation. It condemns this representation and, in it, its own object. But it already wrongs faith by apprehending faith's object in such a way that it is its own. It accordingly says of faith that its absolute essence is a piece of stone, a block of wood that has eyes and does not see, or some bread dough grown in the field, transformed by human beings and sent back there—or in whatever other ways faith anthropomorphizes essence, making it an object and representing it to itself.

553 Enlightenment, which claims to be pure, here makes what for spirit is eternal life and holy spirit into an actual transient thing and soils it with the intrinsically null view of sense-certainty—a view entirely absent from worshiping faith, so that Enlightenment simply lies to faith in imputing it. What faith reveres is for it by no means stone, or wood, or bread dough, or any other temporal, sensuous thing. If it occurs to Enlightenment to say that faith's object 1807 502 is also this, or even that it is this in itself and in truth, then, on the one hand, faith knows that Also just as well, but it lies outside its worship; on the other, for faith nothing like a stone and so forth exists in itself at all, but only the essence of pure thought is in itself for it.

554 The second moment is the relation of faith as knowing consciousness to this essence. As thinking, pure consciousness, faith has this essence immediately; but pure consciousness is equally the mediated relation of certainty to truth—a relation constituting the ground of faith. For Enlightenment this ground likewise becomes a contingent knowledge of contingent events. But the ground of knowing is the knowing universal, and in its truth absolute spirit, which in abstract pure consciousness, or thought as such, is only absolute essence, but as self-consciousness is knowledge of itself. Pure insight likewise posits this knowing universal, simple spirit knowing itself, as the negative of self-consciousness. It is indeed itself pure mediated thought, that is, thought mediating itself with itself; it is pure knowing. But since it is pure insight, pure knowing, that does not yet know itself—that is, for which it is not yet the case that it is this pure mediating movement—this movement, like everything it itself is, appears to it as another. Thus, engaged in its actualization, it develops this essential 1807 503 moment of its own, but this appears to it as belonging to faith and, in its determinacy of being external to insight, as contingent knowledge of just such ordinarily actual histories. It therefore invents the charge against religious faith that its certainty rests on a few individual historical testimonies which, considered as historical testimonies, would admittedly not afford the degree of certainty about their content that newspaper reports give us about some event;—that its certainty further rests on the chance of the preservation of these testimonies, preservation through paper on the one hand, and on the other through the skill and honesty of transferring them from one paper to another, and finally on correctly apprehending the meaning of dead words and letters. In fact, however, it does not occur to faith to tie its certainty to such testimonies and contingencies. In its certainty it is an ingenuous relation to its absolute object, a pure knowledge of it that mixes no letters, paper, or copyists into its consciousness of absolute essence, and does not mediate itself with essence through such things. Rather, this consciousness is the self-mediating ground of its knowing; it is spirit itself that is its own testimony, both within the inwardness of individual consciousness and through the universal presence of the faith of all in it. If faith also wishes to supply itself from history with that kind of 1807 504 grounding, or at least confirmation, of its content of which Enlightenment speaks, and seriously thinks and acts as though this mattered, it has already let Enlightenment seduce it; and its efforts to ground or secure itself in this way are only testimonies it gives of its infection.

555 There remains the third side: the relation of consciousness to absolute essence as an action. This action is the sublation of the individual's particularity, or of the natural mode of its being-for-itself, from which arises for it the certainty of being pure self-consciousness, of being, according to its action—that is, as individual consciousness existing for itself—one with essence.—Since in action purposiveness and purpose are distinguished, and pure insight likewise relates negatively to this action and, as in the other moments, denies itself, it must show itself, in regard to purposiveness, as a lack of understanding. For insight joined with intention, the agreement of purpose and means, appears to it as another, indeed as the opposite. In regard to purpose, however, it must make the bad, enjoyment and possession, its purpose, and thus prove itself the most impure intention, since pure intention likewise, as another, is impure intention.

556 Accordingly, with regard to purposiveness, we see Enlightenment finding it foolish when the believing individual gives itself the higher consciousness of not 1807 505 being fettered to natural enjoyment and pleasure by actually denying itself natural enjoyment and pleasure, and demonstrating through the deed that it does not lie about its contempt for them, but that this contempt is true.—It likewise finds it foolish that the individual absolves itself of its determination to be absolutely individual, excluding all others and possessing property, by relinquishing its property itself. Through this the individual shows in truth that it is not serious about its isolation, but is raised above the natural necessity of individuating itself and, in this absolute individuation of being-for-itself, denying others as the same as itself.—Pure insight finds both acts unpurposive as well as wrong: unpurposive to deny oneself pleasure and give away a possession in order to prove oneself free of pleasure and possession. It will therefore, conversely, declare a person a fool who, in order to eat, adopts the means of actually eating.—It also finds it wrong to deny oneself a meal, and to give away butter and eggs not for money, or money not for butter and eggs, but outright, without receiving anything in return. It declares a meal or the possession of such things to be an end in itself, and thereby in fact declares itself a very impure intention, for which such enjoyment and possession are utterly essential concerns. As pure intention it also again asserts the necessity of rising 1807 506 above natural existence and above greed for its means; it merely finds it foolish and wrong that this elevation should be demonstrated through the deed. Or, this pure intention is in truth fraud, which professes and demands an inward elevation, but declares it superfluous, foolish, and even wrong to take this seriously, to actually put it into effect and prove its truth.—It therefore denies itself both as pure insight, since it denies immediately purposive action, and as pure intention, since it denies the intention of proving oneself freed from the purposes of individuality.

557 This is how Enlightenment offers itself to faith's experience. It appears in this bad guise because, precisely through its relation to another, it gives itself a negative reality, or presents itself as the opposite of itself; but pure insight and intention must give themselves this relation, for it is their actualization.—This initially appeared as negative reality. Perhaps its positive reality is better constituted; let us see how matters stand with it.—When all prejudice and superstition have been banished, the question arises: what next? What is the truth Enlightenment has spread in their place?—It has already expressed this positive content in its eradication of error, for that alienation of itself is equally its positive reality.—In what for faith is absolute 1807 507 spirit, it apprehends whatever determination it discovers as wood, stone, and so forth, as individual actual things. Since it generally comprehends every determinacy, that is, all spirit's content and fulfillment, in this way as a finitude, as human essence and representation, absolute essence becomes for it a vacuum to which no determinations, no predicates, can be ascribed. Such a coupling would in itself be culpable, and it is precisely the coupling in which the monsters of superstition have been begotten. Reason, pure insight, is indeed not itself empty, since the negative of itself exists for it and is its content; rather, it is rich, but only in individuality and limitation. To let nothing of this kind belong to absolute essence, or be ascribed to it, is its insightful good breeding, which knows how to put itself and its wealth of finitude in their proper place and treat the absolute worthily.

558 Confronting this empty essence as the second moment of Enlightenment's positive truth stands individuality in general, of consciousness and all being, excluded from absolute essence, as absolute being-in-and-for-itself. Consciousness, which in its very first actuality is sense-certainty and meaning, returns here from the whole course of its experience to this point, and is again knowledge of what is purely negative to itself, or of sensuous things, that is, beings standing indifferently opposed to its being-for-itself. Here, however, it is not 1807 508 immediate natural consciousness; rather, it has become this for itself. Initially surrendered to every entanglement into which its unfolding plunged it, now brought back by pure insight to its first shape, it has experienced that shape as the result. Grounded on insight into the nullity of all other shapes of consciousness, and thus of everything beyond sense-certainty, this sense-certainty is no longer meaning, but is instead absolute truth. This nullity of everything going beyond sense-certainty is admittedly only a negative proof of this truth; but it is capable of no other, for the positive truth of sense-certainty within itself is precisely the unmediated being-for-itself of the concept itself as object, and indeed in the form of otherness: that every consciousness is absolutely certain that it is, and that other actual things exist outside it, and that in its natural being it, like these things, is in and for itself, or absolute.

559 Finally, the third moment of Enlightenment's truth is the relation of individual essences to absolute essence, the relation of the first two moments. As pure insight into the equal or unlimited, insight also goes beyond the unequal, namely finite actuality, or beyond itself as mere otherness. As the beyond of this it has the void, to which it therefore relates sensuous 1807 509 actuality. The two sides do not enter the determination of this relation as content, since one is the void, and content is therefore present only through the other, sensuous actuality. But the form of the relation, in whose determination the side of the in-itself participates, can be made as one pleases; for form is the intrinsically negative, and therefore what is opposed to itself: being as well as nothing; in-itself as well as its opposite. Or, what is the same, the relation of actuality to the in-itself as the beyond is as much a negating as a positing of actuality. Finite actuality can therefore actually be taken just as one happens to need it. The sensuous is thus now related positively to the absolute as to the in-itself, and sensuous actuality is itself in itself; the absolute makes, shelters, and nurtures it. Again, it is also related to the absolute as to the opposite, as to its nonbeing; according to this relation it is not in itself, but only for another. Whereas in the previous shape of consciousness the concepts of the opposition determined themselves as good and bad, for pure insight they instead become the purer abstractions of being in itself and being for another.

560 But both ways of considering the finite, in its positive and its negative relation to the in-itself, are in fact equally necessary, and everything is therefore as much in itself as it is for another; or everything is 1807 510 *useful.—Everything surrenders itself to others, now allows others to use it and is for them, and now, so to speak, rears up on its hind legs again, acts unyieldingly toward another, is for itself, and uses the other in turn.—For the human being, as the thing conscious of this relation, its essence and position follow from this. As immediately existing, as natural consciousness, the human being is in itself, good, as individual absolute, and other things are for it. Indeed, since for it as the animal conscious of itself the moments have the significance of universality, everything is for its pleasure and delight, and, just as it came from God's hand, it walks about the world as a garden planted for it.—It must also have plucked from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; in this it possesses a benefit distinguishing it from everything else, for its intrinsically good nature happens also to be so constituted that an excess of delight harms it. Or rather, its individuality also has its beyond within it, can go beyond itself and destroy itself. Against this, reason is a useful means for properly limiting this going beyond, or rather for preserving itself in going beyond the determinate; for this is the force of consciousness. The enjoyment of the conscious essence, universal in itself, must itself be not determinate but universal in variety and duration. Measure therefore has the determination of 1807 511 preventing pleasure from being cut short in its variety and duration; that is, the determination of measure is immoderation.—Just as everything is useful to the human being, so it too is useful, and its determination is just as much to make itself a publicly useful and universally serviceable member of the troop. As much as it cares for itself, so much must it also give itself for others, and as much as it gives itself, so much does it care for itself: one hand washes the other. But wherever it finds itself, it is in the right place; it benefits others and is used.

561 Different things are useful to one another in different ways; but all things have this useful reciprocity through their essence, namely, through being related to the absolute in the doubled way: positively, thereby being in and for themselves; negatively, thereby being for others. The relation to absolute essence, or religion, is therefore the most useful of all useful things; for it is pure utility itself, this subsistence of all things, or their being-in-and-for-themselves, and the falling of all things, or their being-for-another.

562 To faith, of course, this positive result of Enlightenment is as much an abomination as its negative conduct toward faith. This insight into absolute essence, seeing in it nothing but absolute essence itself, the être suprême, or the void; this intention that everything in its immediate existence is in itself, or 1807 512 good; and finally that the concept of utility exhaustively expresses the relation of individual conscious being to absolute essence, religion—all this is utterly abhorrent to faith. This wisdom of Enlightenment's own necessarily appears to it at the same time as banality itself and the confession of banality; for it consists in knowing nothing of absolute essence, or, what is the same, knowing this utterly flat truth of it, that it is simply absolute essence, while knowing only finitude, and indeed knowing it as the true, and this knowledge of it as the true, as the highest.

563 Against Enlightenment, faith has divine right, the right of absolute self-equality, or pure thought, and experiences nothing but wrong from it; for Enlightenment distorts faith in all its moments and makes them something other than what they are in faith. Enlightenment, however, has only human right against faith and for its truth; for the wrong it commits is the right of inequality and consists in inverting and altering, a right belonging to the nature of self-consciousness as opposed to simple essence or thought. But since its right is the right of self-consciousness, it will not merely also retain its right, leaving two equal rights of spirit confronting one another, neither able to satisfy the other. Rather, it will assert absolute right, because self-consciousness is the negativity 1807 513 of the concept, which is not only for itself but also reaches over its opposite; and faith itself, because it is consciousness, will not be able to deny Enlightenment its right.

564 For Enlightenment confronts believing consciousness not with principles of its own, but with principles this consciousness itself contains. It merely brings together for faith its own thoughts, which fall apart unconsciously for faith; at one of its modes it merely reminds faith of the others it also has, but of which it always forgets one in the presence of another. Enlightenment proves itself pure insight against faith precisely by seeing the whole in a determinate moment, thus bringing forward the opposite related to that moment and, inverting one in the other, driving forth the negative essence of both thoughts, the concept. It therefore appears to faith as distortion and lie, because it exhibits the otherness of faith's moments; it thereby seems to faith immediately to make them something other than what they are in their individuality. But this other is equally essential, and is in truth present in believing consciousness itself; it is simply that this consciousness does not think of it, but has it somewhere else. It is therefore neither alien to faith nor something faith can deny.

565 But Enlightenment itself, which reminds faith of the opposite of its isolated moments, 1807 514 is equally unenlightened about itself. It relates purely negatively to faith insofar as it excludes its content from its own purity and takes it as the negative of itself. It therefore neither recognizes itself in this negative, in faith's content, nor, for this reason, brings together the two thoughts—the one it brings forward and the one against which it brings it forward. Since it does not recognize that what it condemns in faith is immediately its own thought, it is itself within the opposition of the two moments, acknowledging only one of them, namely whichever is opposed to faith, while separating the other from it, just as faith does. It therefore does not produce the unity of the two as their unity, that is, the concept; rather, the concept arises for it on its own, or it merely finds it already present. For in itself this is precisely the realization of pure insight: that insight, whose essence is the concept, first becomes for itself an absolute other and denies itself—for the opposition of the concept is absolute—and from this otherness comes to itself, or to its concept.—But Enlightenment merely is this movement; it is the still unconscious activity of the pure concept, which indeed comes to itself as object, but takes this object for an other, and also does not know the nature of the concept: that what is undifferentiated is what absolutely divides itself.—Against faith, then, insight 1807 515 is the power of the concept insofar as it is the movement and relating of the moments lying apart in faith's consciousness, a relating in which their contradiction comes to light. Here lies the absolute right of the force it exercises over faith; but the actuality to which it brings this force lies precisely in believing consciousness itself being the concept, and thus itself acknowledging the opposite that insight brings before it. Insight therefore retains its right against faith because it asserts in faith what is necessary to faith itself and what faith contains within itself.

566 First, Enlightenment asserts the moment of the concept as an action of consciousness. It asserts against faith that faith's absolute essence is the essence of its consciousness as a self, or that it is produced by consciousness. For believing consciousness, its absolute essence, just as it is its in-itself, is also not like an alien thing standing within it, no one knows how or from where. Rather, its trust consists precisely in finding itself within it as this personal consciousness, and its obedience and service in producing essence as its absolute essence through its action. Enlightenment properly only reminds faith of this when faith pronounces purely the in-itself of absolute essence beyond the action of consciousness.—But while it does bring the 1807 516 opposed moment of faith's action against faith's one-sidedness, against the being of which faith alone thinks here, it equally fails to bring its own thoughts together. It isolates the pure moment of action and pronounces faith's in-itself to be only something produced by consciousness. But isolated action opposed to the in-itself is contingent action and, as representing, a production of fictions—representations that are not in themselves; and this is how it regards faith's content.—Conversely, however, pure insight equally says the opposite. In asserting the moment of otherness contained in the concept, it pronounces faith's essence to be something that has nothing to do with consciousness, lies beyond it, and is alien and unknown to it. For faith, just as on one side it trusts essence and has within it the certainty of itself, so on the other side essence is inscrutable in its ways and unattainable in its being.

567 Further, Enlightenment asserts against believing consciousness a right that this consciousness itself concedes when it considers the object of faith's worship as stone and wood, or otherwise as a finite anthropomorphic determinacy. For since faith is this divided consciousness, having a beyond of actuality and a pure this world apart from that beyond, there is in it in fact also this view of the sensuous thing 1807 517 according to which it holds good in and for itself. But faith does not bring together these two thoughts of what exists in and for itself, which for it is at one time pure essence, at another an ordinary sensuous thing.—Even its pure consciousness is affected by the latter view; for, lacking the concept, the differences of its supersensible realm are a series of independent shapes, and their movement an occurrence; that is, they exist only in representation and have within them the mode of sensuous being.—Enlightenment, for its part, likewise isolates actuality as an essence abandoned by spirit, and determinacy as an immovable finitude that would not be a moment in the spiritual movement of essence itself—not nothing, nor something existing in and for itself, but something vanishing.

568 It is clear that the same holds for the ground of knowing. Believing consciousness itself acknowledges a contingent knowing, for it has a relation to contingencies, and absolute essence itself exists for it in the form of a represented ordinary actuality. Believing consciousness is thus also a certainty that does not contain truth within itself, and it confesses itself to be such an inessential consciousness, on this side of spirit that assures and confirms itself.—But it forgets this moment in its spiritual, immediate knowledge of absolute 1807 518 essence.—Enlightenment, however, in reminding it of this, thinks again only of contingent knowing and forgets the other kind; it thinks only of mediation occurring through an alien third, not of mediation in which the immediate is itself the third through which it mediates itself with the other, namely with itself.

569 Finally, in its view of faith's action, Enlightenment finds the casting away of enjoyment and possessions wrong and unpurposive.—As regards the wrong, it obtains believing consciousness's agreement, since this consciousness itself acknowledges the actuality of possessing, holding fast to, and enjoying property. It conducts itself all the more in isolation, and all the more obstinately, in asserting property, and abandons itself all the more crudely to its enjoyment, because its religious action—relinquishing possession and enjoyment—lies beyond this actuality and purchases for it freedom on that side. Through this opposition, this service of sacrificing natural pursuits and enjoyment in fact has no truth; retention takes place alongside sacrifice. Sacrifice is only a sign that accomplishes actual sacrifice only in a small part and therefore in fact merely represents it.

570 With regard to purposiveness, Enlightenment finds it inept to cast away a possession in order to know and prove oneself freed from possessions, and to deny oneself an enjoyment in order to know and prove oneself freed from 1807 519 *enjoyment. Believing consciousness itself grasps absolute action as universal action; not only is the action of its absolute essence as its object universal for it, but individual consciousness too ought to prove itself entirely and universally freed from its sensuous essence. Yet casting away an individual possession or renouncing an individual enjoyment is not this universal action. And since in the action the purpose, which is universal, and the execution, which is individual, should essentially confront consciousness in their inadequacy to one another, this action proves to be an activity in which consciousness has no part, and thus the activity is properly too naive to be an action. It is too naive to fast in order to prove oneself freed from the pleasure of a meal—too naive to remove other pleasure from one's body, like Origen, in order to prove it abolished. The action itself proves an external and individual activity, but desire is inwardly rooted and universal; its pleasure disappears neither with the instrument nor through individual abstention.

571 Enlightenment, however, for its part isolates here the inward, unactual against actuality, just as against faith's inwardness in its intuition and devotion it held fast to the externality of 1807 520 thinghood. It places the essential in intention, in thought, and thereby spares itself the actual accomplishment of liberation from natural purposes. On the contrary, this inwardness is itself the formal element that finds its fulfillment in natural impulses, which are justified precisely by being inward, by belonging to universal being, to nature.

572 Enlightenment thus has irresistible force over faith because the moments it asserts are found within faith's own consciousness. Considered more closely, the effect of this force seems to be that its conduct toward faith tears apart the beautiful unity of trust and immediate certainty, contaminates faith's spiritual consciousness with low thoughts of sensuous actuality, and destroys its heart, tranquil and secure in submission, through the vanity of understanding and of its own will and accomplishment. But in fact Enlightenment instead initiates the sublation of the thoughtless, or rather conceptless separation present in faith. Believing consciousness uses double measures and weights; it has two kinds of eyes, ears, tongue, and language; it has doubled all its representations without comparing this ambiguity. Or, faith lives in two kinds of perception: one, the perception of sleeping consciousness living purely in 1807 521 conceptless thoughts; the other, that of waking consciousness living purely in sensuous actuality; and in each it maintains a household of its own.—Enlightenment illuminates that heavenly world with the representations of the sensuous world, and has shown the former this finitude, which faith cannot deny because it is self-consciousness and hence the unity to which both modes of representation belong and in which they do not fall apart. For they belong to the same inseparable simple self into which faith has passed.

573 Faith has thereby lost the content that filled its element and collapses into a dull weaving of spirit within itself. It is driven from its realm, or this realm is plundered, since waking consciousness seized all its differentiation and extension and claimed and returned all its parts to the earth as the earth's property. But faith is not thereby satisfied, for through this illumination only individual essence has everywhere arisen, so that nothing speaks to spirit but essenceless actuality and finitude abandoned by it.—Since faith is without content and cannot remain in this emptiness, or since, going beyond the finite, which is the only content, it finds only the void, it is a pure longing. Its truth is an empty beyond for which no fitting content can any longer be found, 1807 522 since everything has been put to another use.—Faith has thereby in fact become the same as Enlightenment, namely consciousness of the relation of the finite existing in itself to the absolute without predicates, unknown and unknowable; only Enlightenment is satisfied Enlightenment, while faith is unsatisfied Enlightenment. Yet it will become apparent whether Enlightenment can remain in its satisfaction; that longing of troubled spirit, mourning the loss of its spiritual world, lies in ambush. Enlightenment itself bears this stain of unsatisfied longing: as pure object, in its empty absolute essence; as action and movement, in its going beyond its individual essence toward the unfulfilled beyond; as fulfilled object, in the absence of a self in the useful. It will sublate this stain; a closer consideration of the positive result that is its truth will show that the stain is already sublated within it in itself.

b. The Truth of Enlightenment.

574 The dull weaving of spirit that no longer differentiates anything within itself has thus passed inwardly beyond consciousness, which, by contrast, has become clear to itself.—The first moment of this clarity is determined in its necessity and condition by 1807 523 pure insight—or insight that is in itself concept—actualizing itself. It does so by positing otherness, or determinacy, within itself. In this way it is negative pure insight, that is, negation of the concept; this negation is equally pure, and thus the pure thing, absolute essence with no further determination, has come to be. More precisely, as absolute concept insight is a differentiating of differences that are no longer differences, of abstractions or pure concepts that no longer sustain themselves but have support and distinction only through the whole of the movement. This differentiating of the undifferentiated consists precisely in the absolute concept making itself its object and positing itself as essence over against that movement. Essence thereby lacks the side on which the abstractions or differences are held apart, and therefore becomes pure thought as pure thing.—This, then, is precisely that dull, unconscious weaving of spirit within itself to which faith sank when it lost its differentiated content;—it is also that movement of pure self-consciousness to which it is supposed to be the utterly alien beyond. For because this pure self-consciousness is movement in pure concepts, in differences that are no differences, it in fact collapses into unconscious weaving, that is, into pure feeling or pure thinghood.—But the concept alienated from 1807 524 itself—for it still stands here at this stage of alienation—does not recognize this same essence of both sides, the movement of self-consciousness and its absolute essence; it does not recognize their same essence, which is in fact their substance and subsistence. Since it does not recognize this unity, essence counts for it only in the form of the objective beyond, while differentiating consciousness, which thus has the in-itself outside itself, counts as a finite consciousness.

575 Over that absolute essence Enlightenment itself enters into the conflict with itself that it previously had with faith, and divides into two parties. A party proves itself victorious only by splitting into two parties; for in this it shows that it possesses within itself the principle it combated, and has thus sublated the one-sidedness in which it previously appeared. The interest divided between it and the other party now falls wholly within it and forgets the other, because it finds within this party itself the opposition that occupies it. At the same time, however, this opposition has been raised into the higher, victorious element in which it presents itself purified. Thus the discord arising within a party, which seems a misfortune, proves instead its good fortune.

576 Pure essence itself contains no difference; difference therefore comes to it through two such pure essences emerging for consciousness, or 1807 525 a twofold consciousness of essence.—Pure absolute essence exists only in pure thought, or rather is pure thought itself, thus absolutely beyond finite consciousness, beyond self-consciousness, and only negative essence. But in this way it is precisely being, the negative of self-consciousness. As self-consciousness's negative, it is also related to self-consciousness: it is external being, which, related to self-consciousness, within which differences and determinations fall, acquires within itself the differences of being tasted, seen, and so forth; and the relation is sense-certainty and perception.

577 If the starting point is this sensuous being, into which that negative beyond necessarily passes, but abstraction is made from these determinate modes of consciousness's relation, then pure matter remains as the dull weaving and movement within itself. Here it is essential to consider that pure matter is only what remains when we abstract from seeing, feeling, tasting, and so forth; that is, it is not what is seen, tasted, felt, and so forth. It is not matter that is seen, felt, and tasted, but color, a stone, a salt, and so forth. Matter is instead pure abstraction; and thereby the pure essence of thought, or pure thought itself, is present as the absolute undifferentiated within itself, indeterminate, and without predicates.

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578 One Enlightenment calls absolute essence that absolute without predicates, existing in thought beyond actual consciousness, which was the starting point;—the other calls it matter. If they were distinguished as nature and spirit or God, then the unconscious weaving within itself would lack the wealth of unfolded life needed to be nature, while spirit or God would lack consciousness differentiating itself within itself. As we have seen, both are utterly the same concept; the difference lies not in the matter itself, but purely in the different starting points of the two formations, and in each stopping at a particular point in the movement of thought. If they went beyond this, they would meet and recognize as the same what one professes to find an abomination, the other a folly. For one has absolute essence in its pure thought, or immediately for pure consciousness, outside finite consciousness, as its negative beyond. If it reflected that, on the one hand, that simple immediacy of thought is nothing other than pure being, and, on the other, what is negative for consciousness is also related to it, that in the negative judgment the is (copula) equally holds the two separated terms together, then the relation of this beyond to consciousness would emerge in the determination of an external being, 1807 527 and thereby as the same as what is called pure matter; the missing moment of presence would have been gained.—The other Enlightenment starts from sensuous being, then abstracts from the sensuous relation of tasting, seeing, and so forth, and makes this being the pure in-itself, absolute matter, what is neither felt nor tasted. This being has in this way become the simple, predicateless essence of pure consciousness; it is the pure concept as existing in itself, or pure thought within itself. This insight does not make in its consciousness the opposite step from being that is pure being to what is thought, which is the same as pure being, or from the purely positive to the purely negative. Yet the positive is pure only through negation, while the purely negative, as pure, is equal to itself within itself and precisely thereby positive.—Or, neither has arrived at the concept of Cartesian metaphysics that being-in-itself and thought are the same; neither at the thought that being, pure being, is not something concretely actual but pure abstraction; and conversely that pure thought, self-equality, or essence is partly the negative of self-consciousness and hence being, and partly, as immediate simplicity, equally nothing other than being: thought is thinghood, or thinghood is thought.

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579 Essence here initially contains division only in belonging to two kinds of consideration. On the one hand, essence must contain difference within itself; on the other, precisely in this the two ways of considering it come together into one, for the abstract moments of pure being and the negative through which they differ are then united in the object of these ways of considering it.—The universal common to both is the abstraction of pure trembling within itself, or of purely thinking itself. This simple movement rotating on its axis must cast itself apart, because it is itself movement only by differentiating its moments. This differentiation of the moments leaves behind the unmoved as the empty shell of pure being, which is no longer actual thought or life within itself; for differentiation, as difference, is all content. But in positing itself outside that unity, it is thereby the alternation of the moments—being-in-itself, being-for-another, and being-for-itself—that does not return into itself: actuality as it is the object for the actual consciousness of pure insight—utility.

580 However bad utility may look to faith, or to sentimentality, or even to the abstraction calling itself speculation that fixes the in-itself for itself, utility is where pure insight completes its realization and is itself its 1807 529 *object, which it now no longer denies, and which no longer has for it the value of the void or the pure beyond. For pure insight, as we saw, is the existing concept itself, or self-equal pure personality, differentiating itself within itself so that each differentiated element is itself pure concept, that is, immediately undifferentiated. It is simple pure self-consciousness, which is as much for itself as in itself in an immediate unity. Its being-in-itself is therefore not enduring being, but immediately ceases to be something in its difference. But such being, which immediately has no support, is not in itself, but essentially for another, which is the power absorbing it. Yet this second moment, opposed to the first, being-in-itself, vanishes just as immediately as the first; or as being only for another, it is instead vanishing itself, and being-returned-into-itself, being-for-itself, is posited. But as self-equality this simple being-for-itself is instead a being, or thereby for another.—The useful expresses this nature of pure insight in the unfolding of its moments, or insight as object. It is something subsisting in itself, or a thing; this being-in-itself is at the same time only a pure moment, and it is thus absolutely for another. Yet it is only for another just as much as it is in itself; these opposed moments have returned into the inseparable unity of 1807 530 being-for-itself. But although the useful expresses the concept of pure insight, it is not insight as such, but insight as representation, or as its object. It is only the restless alternation of those moments, one of which is indeed being-returned-into-itself, though only as being-for-itself—that is, as an abstract moment stepping to one side over against the others. The useful is not itself the negative essence containing these moments in their opposition at the same time undivided in one and the same respect, or as a thinking, as they exist as pure insight. The moment of being-for-itself is indeed present in the useful, but not in such a way that it reaches over the other moments, the in-itself and being-for-another, and thus would be the self. In the useful, therefore, pure insight has its own concept in its pure moments as its object. It is consciousness of this metaphysics, but not yet its comprehension; it has not yet reached the unity of being and the concept itself. Because the useful still has for it the form of an object, it has a world which, though no longer existing in and for itself, it still distinguishes from itself. But since the oppositions have emerged at the pinnacle of the concept, the next stage will be their collapse into one another, and Enlightenment's experience of the fruits of its deeds.

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581 Considering the object attained in relation to this entire sphere, the actual world of cultivation had gathered itself into the vanity of self-consciousness—into being-for-itself, which still has the world's confusion as its content and is still the individual concept, not yet the concept universal for itself. But returned into itself it is pure insight: pure consciousness as the pure self, or negativity, just as faith is this same consciousness as pure thought, or positivity. In that self faith has the moment that completes it;—but since faith perishes through this completion, it is now in pure insight that we see the two moments: as absolute essence, which is purely thought, or negative, and as matter, which is positive being.—This completeness still lacks that actuality of self-consciousness belonging to vain consciousness—the world from which thought rose into itself. This missing element is attained in utility insofar as pure insight gained positive objectivity in it; it is thereby actual consciousness satisfied within itself. This objectivity now constitutes its world; it has become the truth of the whole preceding world, both ideal and real. The first world of spirit is the extended realm of its dispersed existence and of its individualized certainty of itself, just as nature disperses its life into 1807 532 infinitely manifold shapes without their genus being present. The second contains the genus and is the realm of being-in-itself, or of truth opposed to that certainty. The third, however, the useful, is truth that is equally certainty of itself. The realm of the truth of faith lacks the principle of actuality, or certainty of itself as this individual. But actuality, or certainty of itself as this individual, lacks the in-itself. In the object of pure insight the two worlds are united. The useful is the object insofar as self-consciousness sees through it and has in it individual certainty of itself, its enjoyment (its being-for-itself); in this way it has insight into the object, and this insight contains the object's true essence: being something seen through, or for another. Insight is therefore itself true knowledge, and in this relation self-consciousness equally immediately has universal certainty of itself, its pure consciousness. In this relation, therefore, truth, presence, and actuality are united. Both worlds are reconciled, and heaven is transplanted down to earth.

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III. Absolute Freedom and Terror.

582 In utility consciousness has found its concept. But the concept is partly still object, and partly, for that very reason, still purpose, of which consciousness is not yet immediately in possession. Utility is still a predicate of the object, not subject itself, or consciousness's immediate and sole actuality. This is the same as what appeared earlier: being-for-itself had not yet proved itself the substance of the remaining moments, through which the useful would immediately be nothing other than the self of consciousness, and consciousness would thereby possess it.—But this taking back of the useful's form of objectivity has already occurred in itself, and from this inner revolution there emerges the actual revolution of actuality, the new shape of consciousness: absolute freedom.

583 For in fact no more than an empty semblance of objectivity remains to separate 1807 534 self-consciousness from possession. On the one hand, all subsistence and validity of the determinate members of the organization of the actual world and the world of faith have generally returned into this simple determination as into their ground and spirit. On the other hand, however, this determination no longer has anything of its own for itself, but is instead pure metaphysics, pure concept or knowing of self-consciousness. For regarding the being-in-and-for-itself of the useful as object, consciousness recognizes that its being-in-itself is essentially being-for-another; being-in-itself, as what is without a self, is in truth the passive, or what is for another self. But the object exists for consciousness in this abstract form of pure being-in-itself, for consciousness is pure insight, whose differences have the pure form of concepts.—But the being-for-itself into which being-for-another returns, the self, is not a self peculiar to what is called the object and different from the I. For consciousness as pure insight is not an individual self confronting an object likewise as a self of its own; rather, it is the pure concept, the self's looking into the self, the absolute seeing of itself doubled. Its certainty of itself is the universal subject, and its knowing concept the essence of all actuality. Thus, if the useful was only the alternation of moments not returning into its own unity, and was therefore still an object for knowing, it ceases to be this; for knowing 1807 535 is itself the movement of those abstract moments. It is the universal self, the self both of itself and of the object, and, as universal, the unity of this movement returning into itself.

584 Spirit is thereby present as absolute freedom. It is self-consciousness grasping that its certainty of itself is the essence of all the spiritual spheres of the real and supersensible worlds; or conversely, that essence and actuality are consciousness's knowledge of itself.—It is conscious of its pure personality and therein of all spiritual reality, and all reality is only spiritual. The world is for it absolutely its will, and this is universal will. Indeed, it is not the empty thought of will posited in tacit or represented consent, but really universal will, the will of all individuals as such. For will is in itself consciousness of personality, or of each person, and it ought to exist as this true actual will, as the self-conscious essence of all and every personality, so that each always does everything undividedly, and what appears as the action of the whole is the immediate and conscious action of each.

585 This undivided substance of absolute freedom ascends the throne of the world without any power being able to resist it. For since in truth consciousness alone is the element in which spiritual essences or 1807 536 powers have their substance, their entire system, which organized and maintained itself through division into spheres, has collapsed once individual consciousness has grasped the object as having no other essence than self-consciousness itself, or as being absolutely the concept. What made the concept an existing object was its differentiation into separate subsisting spheres; but since the object becomes the concept, nothing subsistent remains in it: negativity has penetrated all its moments. The concept enters existence in this way: every individual consciousness rises from the sphere assigned to it and no longer finds its essence and work in this particularized sphere, but grasps its self as the concept of will and all spheres as the essence of this will, and can therefore actualize itself only in a labor that is entire labor. In this absolute freedom all estates—the spiritual essences into which the whole articulates itself—are therefore erased. Individual consciousness, which belonged to such a member and willed and accomplished within it, has sublated its limit; its purpose is the universal purpose, its language universal law, its work the universal work.

586 Here the object and difference have lost the significance of utility, which was the predicate of all real being. Consciousness does not begin its movement with the object as something alien from which it 1807 537 would only then return into itself; rather, its object is consciousness itself. The opposition thus consists solely in the difference between individual and universal consciousness; but individual consciousness is immediately for itself that which had only the semblance of opposition: it is universal consciousness and will. The beyond of this its actuality floats over the corpse of the vanished independence of real being or the being of faith only as the exhalation of an insipid gas, the empty être suprême.

587 After the sublation of the differentiated spiritual spheres and the limited life of individuals, as well as of its two worlds, there is therefore only the movement of universal self-consciousness within itself, as an interaction of itself in the forms of universality and personal consciousness. Universal will goes into itself and is individual will, confronted by universal law and work. But this individual consciousness is just as immediately conscious of itself as universal will; it is conscious that its object is law given by itself and work accomplished by itself. Passing into activity and creating objectivity, it therefore makes nothing individual, but only laws and actions of state.

588 This movement is thus the interaction of consciousness with itself, in which it releases nothing in the shape of a free object confronting 1807 538 it. It follows that it can arrive at no positive work, neither universal works of language nor of actuality, neither laws and universal institutions of conscious freedom nor deeds and works of willing freedom.—The work into which freedom giving itself consciousness could make itself would consist in making itself, as universal substance, an object and enduring being. This otherness would be the difference within it through which it divided into subsisting spiritual spheres and into the members of different powers: partly these spheres would be the thought-things of separate legislative, judicial, and executive powers; partly, however, the real essences that emerged in the real world of cultivation and, if the content of universal action were more closely considered, the particular spheres of labor further distinguished as more specific estates.—Universal freedom that had thus separated itself into its members, and precisely thereby made itself existing substance, would thereby be free of single individuality and would distribute the multitude of individuals among its different members. But the action and being of personality would thereby find itself limited to a branch of the whole, to one kind of action and being; placed in the element of being, personality would acquire the significance of a determinate personality and cease in truth to be universal self-consciousness. This self-consciousness does not 1807 539 let itself be cheated of actuality either by the representation of obedience under self-given laws assigning it a part, or by its representation in lawgiving and universal action—not of the actuality of giving the law itself and accomplishing not an individual work but the universal work itself. For where the self is merely represented and presented in thought, it is not actual; where it is represented by another, it is not.

589 Just as individual self-consciousness does not find itself in this universal work of absolute freedom as existing substance, so neither does it find itself in the proper deeds and individual actions of its will. For the universal to achieve a deed, it must gather itself into the one of individuality and place an individual self-consciousness at its head; for universal will is actual will only in a self that is one. But thereby all other individuals are excluded from the whole of this deed and have only a limited share in it, so that the deed would not be the deed of actual universal self-consciousness.—Universal freedom can therefore produce no positive work or deed; only negative action remains to it. It is only the Fury of vanishing.

590 But the highest actuality, most opposed to universal freedom—or rather the only object that still comes to be for it—is the 1807 540 freedom and individuality of actual self-consciousness itself. For that universality, which does not let itself attain the reality of organic articulation and aims to preserve itself in undivided continuity, at the same time differentiates itself within itself, because it is movement, or consciousness generally. Indeed, because of its own abstraction, it separates into equally abstract extremes: simple, inflexible, cold universality, and the discrete, absolutely hard rigidity and obstinate pointlikeness of actual self-consciousness. Once it has finished eradicating real organization and now subsists for itself, this is its sole object—an object that no longer has any other content, possession, existence, or external extension, but is only this knowledge of itself as an absolutely pure and free individual self. The only place where it can be seized is its abstract existence in general.—Since these two are indivisibly and absolutely for themselves and therefore can send no part into the middle through which they might connect, their relation is entirely unmediated pure negation: specifically, the negation of the individual as existing within the universal. The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore death, and indeed a death having no inner scope or fulfillment, for what is negated is the unfulfilled point of the absolutely free self. It is thus the 1807 541 coldest, flattest death, with no more significance than cutting through a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water.

591 In the flatness of this syllable consists the wisdom of the government, the understanding of universal will concerning its accomplishment of itself. Government is itself nothing other than the point establishing itself, or the individuality of universal will. As a willing and accomplishing that proceeds from one point, it at the same time wills and accomplishes a determinate order and action. It thereby excludes the remaining individuals from its deed, on the one hand, and on the other constitutes itself as a determinate will, and thus as opposed to universal will. It can therefore absolutely not present itself otherwise than as a faction. Only the victorious faction is called government, and precisely in its being a faction lies the immediate necessity of its downfall; conversely, its being government makes it a faction and guilty. Whereas universal will holds to the government's actual action as the crime it commits against universal will, the government, by contrast, has nothing determinate and external through which the guilt of the will opposed to it would present itself. For it, as actual universal will, is confronted only by unactual pure will, intention. Coming under suspicion therefore takes the place of, or has the significance and effect 1807 542 of, being guilty. The external reaction against this actuality lying in the simple interior of intention consists in the bare eradication of this existing self, from which nothing else can be taken away but its being itself.

592 In this distinctive work of its own, absolute freedom becomes its own object, and self-consciousness experiences what freedom is. In itself, freedom is precisely this abstract self-consciousness that eradicates within itself every difference and every subsistence of difference. As this, it is its own object; the terror of death is the intuition of this its negative essence. But absolutely free self-consciousness finds this reality of its own quite different from its concept of itself: that universal will is only the positive essence of personality, and personality knows itself in universal will only positively, or as preserved. Rather, for self-consciousness—which as pure insight absolutely separates its positive and negative essence, the absolute without predicates as pure thought and as pure matter—the absolute transition from one into the other is here present in its actuality.—Universal will, as absolutely positive actual self-consciousness, turns into negative essence because it is this self-conscious actuality raised to pure thought or abstract matter, and proves itself equally to be the sublation of thinking itself, or of self-consciousness.

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593 Thus absolute freedom, as the pure self-equality of universal will, contains negation, and thereby difference in general, and develops this again as actual difference. For in self-equal universal will, pure negativity has the element of subsistence, or the substance in which its moments realize themselves; it has the matter it can employ in its determinacy. And insofar as this substance has shown itself as the negative for individual consciousness, the organization of spiritual spheres to which the multitude of individual consciousnesses is assigned therefore forms itself again. These consciousnesses, which have felt the fear of their absolute master, death, again submit to negation and differences, order themselves under the spheres, and return to a divided and limited work, but thereby to their substantial actuality.

594 From this tumult spirit would have been hurled back to its starting point, the ethical and real world of cultivation, which would only have been refreshed and rejuvenated by the fear of the master returning into people's hearts. Spirit would have to traverse this cycle of necessity anew and repeat it continually if the result were only the complete interpenetration of self-consciousness and substance—an interpenetration in which self-consciousness, having experienced the force of its universal essence as negative against 1807 544 itself, wished to know and find itself not as this particular, but only as universal, and could therefore also endure the objective actuality of universal spirit excluding it as a particular.—But in absolute freedom it was not consciousness immersed in manifold existence, or fixing determinate purposes and thoughts for itself, and an external valid world, whether of actuality or of thought, that stood in interaction with each other. Rather, it was the world absolutely in the form of consciousness, as universal will, and likewise self-consciousness contracted from all extended existence or manifold purpose and judgment into the simple self, that stood in interaction. The cultivation it attains in interaction with that essence is therefore the most sublime and final: to see its pure simple actuality vanish immediately and pass into empty nothingness. In the world of cultivation itself, self-consciousness does not reach the point of intuiting its negation or alienation in this form of pure abstraction; rather, its negation is fulfilled: either the honor or wealth it gains in place of the self it alienated, or the language of spirit and insight attained by dismembered consciousness, or the heaven of faith, or the useful of Enlightenment. All these determinations are lost in the loss the self experiences in absolute 1807 545 freedom; its negation is meaningless death, the pure terror of the negative that contains nothing positive, nothing fulfilling.—Yet at the same time this negation in its actuality is not something alien: it is neither the universal necessity lying beyond, in which the ethical world perishes, nor the individual contingency of one's own possession or of the possessor's mood, on which dismembered consciousness sees itself dependent. Rather, it is universal will, which in this final abstraction has nothing positive and therefore can give nothing back for sacrifice—but for that very reason is unmediatedly one with self-consciousness, or is the purely positive because it is the purely negative. And meaningless death, the unfulfilled negativity of the self, turns within the inner concept into absolute positivity. For consciousness, its immediate unity with universal will, its demand to know itself as this determinate point within universal will, turns into the utterly opposite experience. What vanishes for it therein is abstract being, or the immediacy of the substanceless point; and this vanished immediacy is universal will itself, as which consciousness now knows itself, insofar as it is sublated immediacy, insofar as it is pure knowing or pure will. Through this it knows universal will as itself, and itself as essence, but not 1807 546 as immediately existing essence: neither universal will as revolutionary government or as the anarchy striving to constitute anarchy, nor itself as the center of this faction or its opposite. Rather, universal will is its pure knowing and willing, and it is universal will as this pure knowing and willing. It does not lose itself therein, for pure knowing and willing is more truly itself than the atomic point of consciousness. It is thus the interaction of pure knowing with itself: pure knowing as essence is universal will, but this essence is absolutely only pure knowing. Self-consciousness is therefore pure knowledge of essence as pure knowing. Further, as individual self, it is only the form of the subject, or actual action, which it knows as form; likewise, objective actuality, being, is for it form absolutely without a self, for such actuality would be what is not known, whereas this knowing knows knowing as essence.

595 Absolute freedom has thus reconciled with itself the opposition of universal and individual will. Self-alienated spirit, driven to the pinnacle of its opposition, in which pure willing and what purely wills are still distinguished, reduces this opposition to transparent form and finds itself within it.—Just as the realm of the actual world passes into the realm of faith and insight, so absolute freedom passes from its 1807 547 self-destroying actuality into another land of self-conscious spirit, where in this unactuality it counts as the true, in the thought of which spirit refreshes itself insofar as it is and remains thought, and knows this being enclosed within self-consciousness as perfect and complete essence. The new shape of moral spirit has arisen.

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C. Spirit Certain of Itself: Morality.

596 The ethical world showed the spirit merely departed within it, the individual self, as its fate and truth. But this person of right has its substance and fulfillment outside itself. The movement of the world of cultivation and faith sublates this abstraction of the person, and through completed alienation, through the highest abstraction, substance becomes for spirit's self first universal will and finally its property. Here, therefore, knowing seems at last to have become perfectly equal to its truth; for its truth is this knowing itself, and all opposition between the two sides has vanished—not for us, or in itself, but for self-consciousness itself. For it has mastered the opposition of consciousness itself. Consciousness rests on the opposition of certainty of itself and the object; but now the object is for it itself certainty of itself, knowing—just as certainty of itself 1807 549 as such no longer has purposes of its own, and thus no longer exists in determinacy, but is pure knowing.

597 Self-consciousness's knowing is therefore for it substance itself. Substance is for it equally immediate and absolutely mediated in an undivided unity. Immediate: like ethical consciousness, it itself knows and performs duty and belongs to duty as its nature; but it is not character, like ethical consciousness, which because of its immediacy is a determinate spirit, belongs to only one of the ethical essentialities, and has the side of not knowing.—It is absolute mediation, like self-cultivating and believing consciousness; for it is essentially the movement of the self that sublates the abstraction of immediate existence and becomes universal for itself—but neither through pure alienation and dismemberment of its self and actuality, nor through flight. Rather, it is immediately present to itself in its substance, for substance is its knowing, its intuited pure certainty of itself; and precisely this immediacy, which is its own actuality, is all actuality. For the immediate is being itself, and as pure immediacy purified through absolute negativity, it is pure being, being in general, or all being.

598 Absolute essence is therefore not exhausted in the determination of being the simple essence of thought 1807 550; rather, it is all actuality, and this actuality exists only as knowing. What consciousness did not know would have no sense and could be no power for it; all objectivity and world have withdrawn into its knowing will. It is absolutely free in knowing its freedom, and precisely this knowledge of its freedom is its substance and purpose and sole content.

a. The Moral Worldview.

599 Self-consciousness knows duty as absolute essence; it is bound only by duty, and this substance is its own pure consciousness. Duty cannot acquire for it the form of something alien. Yet, enclosed within itself in this way, moral self-consciousness is not yet posited and considered as consciousness. The object is immediate knowing, and so purely permeated by the self it is not an object. But essentially mediation and negativity, self-consciousness contains in its concept the relation to an otherness and is consciousness. On the one hand, because duty constitutes its sole essential purpose and object, this otherness is for it an entirely meaningless actuality. Yet because this consciousness is so completely enclosed within itself, it relates to this otherness with complete freedom and 1807 551 indifference; on the other hand, existence is therefore an existence completely released by self-consciousness, likewise relating only to itself. The freer self-consciousness becomes, the freer too the negative object of its consciousness. This object is thereby a world completed within itself into its own individuality, an independent whole of laws of its own, as well as an independent course and free actualization of those laws—a nature in general whose laws and action belong to itself as an essence as unconcerned with moral self-consciousness as moral self-consciousness is with it.

600 From this determination a moral worldview develops, consisting in the relation of moral being-in-and-for-itself and natural being-in-and-for-itself. This relation is grounded both in the complete mutual indifference and separate independence of nature and moral purposes and activity, and, on the other side, in consciousness of duty's being the one and only essentiality and of nature's complete lack of independence and essentiality. The moral worldview contains the development of the moments contained in this relation of such wholly conflicting presuppositions.

601 First, then, moral consciousness in general is presupposed. For this consciousness, which is actual and active and fulfills duty in its actuality and deed, duty counts as essence. But for this 1807 552 moral consciousness there is also the presupposed freedom of nature; or it experiences that nature is unconcerned with giving it consciousness of the unity of its actuality with nature's, and thus perhaps lets it become happy, and perhaps not. Immoral consciousness, by contrast, perhaps happens to find its actualization where moral consciousness sees only an occasion for action, but through its action sees neither the happiness of execution nor the enjoyment of accomplishment fall to its share. Moral consciousness therefore instead finds reason to complain of this condition of inadequacy between itself and existence, and of the injustice that limits it to having its object only as pure duty, but denies it the sight of that object, and of itself, actualized.

602 Moral consciousness cannot renounce happiness and omit this moment from its absolute purpose. The purpose expressed as pure duty essentially contains this individual self-consciousness; individual conviction and the knowledge of it constituted an absolute moment of morality. This moment in the purpose that has become objective, in fulfilled duty, is individual consciousness intuiting itself as actualized, or enjoyment, which is thus contained not immediately in the concept of morality considered as disposition 1807 553, but in the concept of its actualization. Yet through this it is also contained in morality as disposition, for disposition aims not to remain disposition opposed to action, but to act, or actualize itself. The purpose, expressed as the whole with consciousness of its moments, is therefore this: fulfilled duty should be as much a purely moral action as realized individuality, and nature, as the side of individuality opposed to the abstract purpose, should be one with this purpose.—As necessary as the experience of disharmony between both sides is, because nature is free, equally duty alone is essential and nature, opposed to duty, without a self. That whole purpose, constituted by harmony, contains actuality itself within it. It is at the same time the thought of actuality. The harmony of morality and nature—or, since nature is considered only insofar as consciousness experiences nature's unity with it, the harmony of morality and happiness—is thought as necessarily existing, or is postulated. For demanding expresses that something not yet actual is thought as existing: a necessity not of the concept as concept, but of being. Yet necessity is at the same time essentially relation through the concept. The demanded being therefore does not belong to the representation of contingent consciousness, but lies in the concept of morality itself, whose 1807 554 true content is the unity of pure and individual consciousness. To the latter belongs this: that this unity should exist for it as an actuality, which in the content of the purpose is happiness, but in its form is existence generally.—This demanded existence, or unity of the two, is therefore not a wish, nor, considered as a purpose, one whose attainment would still be uncertain; rather, it is a demand of reason, or reason's immediate certainty and presupposition.

603 That first experience and this postulate are not the only ones; rather, a whole circle of postulates opens up. For nature is not merely this entirely free external mode in which, as in a pure object, consciousness would have to realize its purpose. Consciousness is essentially within itself something for which this other free actuality exists; that is, it is itself contingent and natural. This nature, which is its own for it, is sensibility, which in the shape of willing, as drives and inclinations, has for itself a determinate essentiality of its own, or individual purposes, and is thus opposed to pure will and its pure purpose. Against this opposition, however, for pure consciousness the essential is instead the relation of sensibility to it, sensibility's absolute unity with it. The two, pure thought and consciousness's sensibility, are in themselves one consciousness, and pure thought is precisely that for 1807 555 which and in which this pure unity exists; but for it as consciousness there is the opposition between itself and the drives. In this conflict between reason and sensibility, the essential for reason is that the conflict should dissolve and the unity of the two emerge as the result: not their original unity, that both exist in one individual, but a unity arising from the known opposition between them. Only such unity is actual morality, for it contains the opposition through which the self is consciousness, or first becomes actual and in fact self, and at the same time universal; or it expresses that mediation which, as we see, is essential to morality.—Since, of the two moments of the opposition, sensibility is simply otherness, or the negative, whereas pure thought of duty is the essence of which nothing can be relinquished, the unity produced seems achievable only through sublating sensibility. But since sensibility is itself a moment of this becoming, the moment of actuality, we must initially content ourselves with expressing the unity as sensibility's conformity to morality.—This unity too is a postulated being; it does not exist, for what exists is consciousness, or the opposition of sensibility and pure consciousness. Yet it is also not an in-itself like 1807 556 the first postulate, in which free nature constitutes one side and its harmony with moral consciousness therefore falls outside this consciousness. Rather, nature here is the nature within consciousness itself, and what is at issue is morality as such, a harmony that belongs to the acting self itself. Consciousness must therefore itself bring this harmony about and continually advance in morality. But morality's completion must be deferred to infinity, for if it actually occurred, moral consciousness would sublate itself. For morality is moral consciousness only as negative essence, for whose pure duty sensibility has only a negative significance, is only nonconforming. In harmony, however, morality as consciousness, or its actuality, disappears, just as in moral consciousness, or actuality, its harmony disappears. Completion is therefore not actually to be attained, but only to be thought as an absolute task, that is, one that remains absolutely a task. Yet at the same time its content must be thought as something that absolutely must be, and does not remain a task—whether one represents consciousness as wholly sublated in this goal, or not. How this is properly to be understood can no longer be 1807 557 clearly distinguished in the dark distance of infinity, into which the attainment of the goal must for that very reason be pushed. Properly speaking, it will have to be said that the determinate representation ought neither to interest us nor be sought, because this leads to contradictions: of a task that should remain a task yet be fulfilled; of a morality that should no longer be consciousness, no longer actual. But the consideration that completed morality would contain a contradiction would injure the holiness of moral essentiality and make absolute duty appear something unactual.

604 The first postulate was the harmony of morality and objective nature, the final purpose of the world; the other, the harmony of morality and sensuous will, the final purpose of self-consciousness as such. The first, then, was harmony in the form of the in-itself, the other in the form of being-for-itself. But what connects these two thought extremes of final purpose as their middle is the movement of actual action itself. They are harmonies whose moments, in their abstract differentiation, have not yet become objects; this happens in actuality, where the sides appear in consciousness proper, each as the other of the other. The postulates thereby arising now contain harmonies existing in and for themselves, where previously they contained only the separate harmonies existing in themselves and for themselves.

605 As the simple knowing and willing of pure duty, moral consciousness in action 1807 558 is related to the object opposed to its simplicity—to the actuality of the manifold case—and thereby has a manifold moral relation. Here there arise, in content, the many laws generally, and, in form, the contradictory powers of knowing consciousness and the unconscious.—As regards, first, the many duties, only pure duty in them counts for moral consciousness generally; the many duties as many are determinate, and therefore as such are nothing holy for moral consciousness. Yet at the same time, being necessary through the concept of action, which encompasses a manifold actuality and therefore a manifold moral relation, they must be regarded as existing in and for themselves. Further, since they can exist only in a moral consciousness, they exist at the same time in a consciousness other than the one for which only pure duty as pure exists in and for itself and is holy.

606 It is therefore postulated that there should be an other consciousness that sanctifies them, or knows and wills them as duties. The first keeps pure duty indifferent to all determinate content, and duty is only this indifference to content. The other, however, contains the equally essential relation to action and the necessity of determinate content. Since duties count for it as determinate duties, content as 1807 559 such is thereby just as essential for it as the form through which content is duty. This consciousness is thus one in which the universal and particular are absolutely one, and its concept is therefore the same as the concept of the harmony of morality and happiness. For this opposition likewise expresses the separation of self-equal moral consciousness from actuality, which, as manifold being, conflicts with the simple essence of duty. But whereas the first postulate expresses only the existing harmony of morality and nature, because nature therein is this negative of self-consciousness, the moment of being, this in-itself is now, by contrast, essentially posited as consciousness. For what exists now has the form of the content of duty, or is determinacy in determinate duty. The in-itself is therefore the unity of elements that, as simple essentialities, are essentialities of thought and hence exist only in a consciousness. This consciousness is now therefore a lord and ruler of the world who produces the harmony of morality and happiness and at the same time sanctifies duties as many. The latter means that determinate duty cannot be immediately holy for consciousness of pure duty; yet because determinate duty is likewise necessary for actual action, which is determinate, its necessity falls outside that consciousness into another, which is thus the mediator of determinate and pure duty and the ground of determinate duty's also holding good.

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607 In actual action, however, consciousness conducts itself as this self, as a completely individual self; it is directed toward actuality as such and has actuality as its purpose, for it wishes to accomplish. Duty in general therefore falls outside it into another essence, which is consciousness and the holy lawgiver of pure duty. For the acting consciousness, precisely because it acts, the other of pure duty holds good immediately; pure duty is therefore the content of another consciousness, and is holy for the acting consciousness only mediately, namely in this other consciousness.

608 Since it is thereby posited that the validity of duty as holy in and for itself falls outside actual consciousness, this consciousness thus stands generally on one side as imperfect moral consciousness. In its knowing, it therefore knows itself as a consciousness whose knowledge and conviction are incomplete and contingent; equally, in its willing, as one whose purposes are affected by sensibility. Because of its unworthiness, it can therefore regard happiness not as necessary but as something contingent, and expect it only from grace.

609 Yet although its actuality is imperfect, duty nevertheless counts as essence for its pure will and knowing; in the concept, insofar as this is opposed to reality, or in thought, consciousness is therefore perfect. But absolute essence is precisely this thought essence postulated beyond actuality 1807 561; it is therefore the thought in which morally imperfect knowing and willing count as perfect, and which thus, taking them at their full value, also grants happiness according to worthiness, namely according to the merit ascribed to consciousness.

610 In this the worldview is completed; for in the concept of moral self-consciousness the two sides, pure duty and actuality, are posited in one unity, and thereby neither is posited as existing in and for itself, but as a moment, or as sublated. In the final part of the moral worldview this comes to be for consciousness. For consciousness places pure duty in another essence than itself; that is, it posits duty partly as something represented, partly as something that is not what holds good in and for itself, while the nonmoral instead counts as perfect. Likewise, it posits itself as a consciousness whose actuality, inadequate to duty, is sublated, and as sublated, or in the representation of absolute essence, no longer contradicts morality.

611 For moral consciousness itself, however, its moral worldview does not mean that in it consciousness develops its own concept and makes this its object. It is conscious neither of this opposition of form nor of the opposition in content, 1807 562 whose parts it does not relate and compare with one another, but rolls onward in its development without being the concept holding the moments together. For it knows only pure essence, or the object insofar as it is duty, insofar as it is the abstract object of its pure consciousness, as pure knowing or as itself. It therefore relates only in thought, not in comprehension. Hence the object of its actual consciousness is not yet transparent to it; it is not the absolute concept, which alone grasps otherness as such, or its absolute opposite, as itself. Its own actuality, like all objective actuality, indeed counts for it as the inessential; but its freedom is the freedom of pure thought, over against which nature has therefore at the same time arisen as something equally free. Because both are equally present in consciousness—the freedom of being and being's enclosure within consciousness—its object comes to be as something existing that is at the same time only thought. In the final part of its view, the content is essentially posited so that its being is represented being, and this connection of being and thought is expressed as what it in fact is: representation.

612 If we consider the moral worldview in such a way that this objective mode is nothing other than the concept of moral self-consciousness itself, which it makes objective to itself, 1807 563 then through this consciousness of the form of its origin another shape of its presentation emerges.—The first starting point is actual moral self-consciousness, or that such a consciousness exists. For the concept posits it with the determination that all actuality in general has essence for it only insofar as actuality conforms to duty, and the concept posits this essence as knowing, that is, in immediate unity with the actual self. This unity is thus itself actual: it is an actual moral consciousness.—Now, as consciousness, it represents its content to itself as an object, namely as the final purpose of the world, as the harmony of morality and all actuality. But since it represents this unity as object and is not yet the concept having power over the object as such, this unity is for it a negative of self-consciousness, or falls outside it as a beyond of its actuality, yet at the same time as something also thought as existing, but only thought.

613 What remains for it, then, as a self-consciousness that is other than the object, is the disharmony between consciousness of duty and actuality—indeed, its own actuality. The proposition now reads: there is no actual self-consciousness that is morally perfect; and since the moral exists at all only insofar as it is perfect—for duty is the pure, unmixed in-itself, and morality consists solely in conformity to 1807 564 this purity—the second proposition means, in general, that there is nothing morally actual.

614 But since, third, it is one self, it is in itself the unity of duty and actuality. This unity therefore becomes its object as perfected morality—but as a beyond of its actuality, which nevertheless is to be actual.

615 In this goal, the synthetic unity of the first two propositions, self-conscious actuality as well as duty is posited only as a sublated moment. Neither exists separately; yet since their essential determination is to be free of the other, in their unity each is no longer free of the other, and thus each is sublated. Accordingly, in terms of content, they become objects as things of which each counts as the other; in terms of form, this exchange between them is at the same time only represented.—Or what is not actually moral, because it is equally pure thought and elevated above its actuality, is nevertheless moral in representation and is accepted as fully valid. The first proposition, that there is a moral self-consciousness, is thereby restored, but joined to the second, that there is none: namely, there is one, but only in representation; or there is indeed none, but another nevertheless allows it to count as one.

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b. Dissemblance.

616 In the moral worldview we see, on the one hand, consciousness itself consciously producing its object. We see it neither finding this object as something alien nor having it arise for it unconsciously; instead, it proceeds everywhere on a ground from which it posits the objective essence. It therefore knows this essence as itself, for it knows itself as the active agent that produces it. Here, then, it seems to arrive at rest and satisfaction, for it can find these only where it no longer needs to go beyond its object, because the object no longer goes beyond it. On the other hand, however, consciousness itself instead posits the object outside itself, as something beyond it. Yet this being-in-and-for-itself is equally posited as something that is not free of self-consciousness but exists for its sake and through it.

617 The moral worldview is therefore in fact nothing but the development of this underlying contradiction in its various aspects. To use a Kantian expression here, where it is most appropriate, it is a whole nest of thoughtless contradictions. In this development consciousness behaves by fixing one moment and 1807 566 passing immediately from it to the other, sublating the first; but once it has set up this second moment, it also displaces it again, making its opposite the essence instead. At the same time it is conscious of its contradiction and dissemblance, for it passes from one moment immediately, in relation to that very moment, into its opposite. Because a moment has no reality for it, it posits precisely that moment as real; or, what is the same, in order to maintain one moment as being in itself, it maintains the opposite as being in itself. It thereby admits that in fact it is serious about neither. We must examine this more closely in the moments of this dizzying movement.

618 Let us initially leave aside the presupposition that an actual moral consciousness exists, since it is not immediately made in relation to anything preceding it, and turn to the harmony of morality and nature, the first postulate. This harmony is to exist in itself, not for actual consciousness, not in the present; rather, the present is only the contradiction between the two. In the present, morality is assumed to be there, while actuality is placed in a position of disharmony with it. But actual moral consciousness is an acting consciousness; precisely in this consists the actuality of its morality. In action itself, however, that position is immediately displaced; for action is nothing 1807 567 other than the actualization of the inner moral purpose, nothing other than the production of an actuality determined by the purpose, or of the harmony of moral purpose and actuality itself. At the same time, the accomplishment of the action exists for consciousness: it is the presence of this unity of actuality and purpose. And because in the accomplished action consciousness intuits itself as actualized as this individual, or intuits existence as having returned into itself, and enjoyment consists in this, the actuality of the moral purpose also contains that form of actuality called enjoyment and happiness.—In fact, then, action immediately fulfills what had been declared not to take place, what was supposed to be only a postulate, only a beyond. Through its deed, consciousness thus declares that it is not serious about postulating, because the meaning of action is rather to make present what was not supposed to be in the present. And since harmony is postulated for the sake of action—namely, what is to become actual through action must be so in itself, otherwise its actuality would not be possible—the connection between action and the postulate is such that, for the sake of action, that is, for the sake of the actual harmony of purpose and actuality, this harmony is posited as not actual, as beyond.

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619 Insofar as one acts, then, one is not at all serious about the inadequacy of actuality to the purpose; instead, one seems serious about action itself. But in fact actual action is only the action of an individual consciousness, and so is itself only something individual, its work contingent. The purpose of reason, however, as the universal, all-embracing purpose, is nothing less than the whole world: a final purpose extending far beyond the content of this individual action, and therefore to be placed altogether beyond all actual action. Because the universal good is to be accomplished, nothing good is done. In fact, however, the nullity of actual action and the reality of the whole purpose alone, which have now been set up, are in every respect displaced once again. Moral action is not something contingent and limited, for its essence is pure duty. This constitutes the one whole purpose; and thus action, as its actualization, is the accomplishment of the whole absolute purpose, however limited its content may otherwise be. Or if actuality is again taken as nature, which has its own laws and is opposed to pure duty, so that duty cannot realize its law within it, then, since duty as such is the essence, what matters is in fact not the accomplishment of pure duty, which is the whole 1807 569 purpose. For accomplishment would have as its purpose not pure duty but its opposite, actuality. Yet the claim that actuality is not at issue is again dissemblance; for according to the concept of moral action, pure duty is essentially active consciousness. Action is therefore indeed to take place, absolute duty is to be expressed in all of nature, and the moral law is to become the law of nature.

620 If, then, we accept this highest good as the essence, consciousness is not serious about morality at all. For in this highest good nature has no law other than morality's. Moral action itself thus falls away, for action exists only on the presupposition of something negative that is to be sublated through action. But if nature conforms to the moral law, this law would be violated by action, by the sublation of what is.—That assumption therefore acknowledges as the essential condition one in which moral action is superfluous and does not take place at all. The postulate of the harmony of morality and actuality—a harmony posited through the concept of moral action, which is to bring the two into agreement—thus also expresses itself from this side as follows: because moral action is the absolute purpose, the absolute purpose is that moral action should not exist at all.

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621 If we gather together these moments through which consciousness rolled onward in its moral representation, it becomes clear that it sublates each in its opposite. It begins from the claim that for it morality and actuality are not in harmony; but it is not serious about this, since in action this harmony is present for it. Nor is it serious about this action, however, since action is something individual, whereas it has so lofty a purpose, the highest good. Yet this again merely disguises the matter, for in that good all action and all morality would fall away. Or, what it is not really serious about is moral action; rather, what is absolutely most desirable is that the highest good should be accomplished and moral action become superfluous.

622 From this result consciousness must roll further onward in its contradictory movement, and must necessarily disguise once again the sublation of moral action. Morality is the in-itself; for morality to take place, the world's final purpose cannot have been accomplished. Rather, moral consciousness must be for itself and find a nature opposed to it. But in its own self it must be perfect. This leads to the second postulate, the harmony between consciousness and the nature immediately present in it: sensibility. Moral self-consciousness sets up its purpose as pure, as independent of inclinations and drives, so that it 1807 571 has eradicated the purposes of sensibility within itself.—Yet it again disguises this proposed sublation of the sensuous essence. It acts, brings its purpose into actuality, and self-conscious sensibility, which is supposed to be sublated, is precisely this middle term between pure consciousness and actuality: it is the instrument or organ of the former's actualization, and is what is called drive or inclination. There is therefore no seriousness in sublating inclinations and drives, for these are precisely self-consciousness actualizing itself. But they are not to be suppressed, either, only made conformable to reason. They do conform to it, too, for moral action is nothing other than consciousness actualizing itself, and thus giving itself the shape of a drive; that is, it is immediately the present harmony of drive and morality. In fact, however, drive is not merely this empty shape, capable of containing a spring other than itself and being impelled by it. For sensibility is a nature that has its own laws and motive springs within itself. Morality therefore cannot seriously mean to be the driving force of drives, the angle of inclination of inclinations. For since these have their own fixed determinacy and distinctive content, the consciousness to which they conformed would, rather, conform to them—a conformity that moral self-consciousness refuses to accept. The 1807 572 harmony of the two thus exists only in itself and is postulated.—In moral action, the present harmony of morality and sensibility had just been set up, but now this is displaced: harmony lies beyond consciousness in a misty distance, where nothing can any longer be precisely distinguished or comprehended; for the attempt we just made to comprehend this unity did not succeed.—But in this in-itself consciousness gives itself up altogether. This in-itself is its moral perfection, in which the struggle between morality and sensibility has ceased, and the latter conforms to the former in a way that cannot be grasped.—This perfection is therefore again merely a disguise of the matter, for in it morality itself would in fact give itself up. Morality is only consciousness of the absolute purpose as pure, and therefore in opposition to all other purposes; it is equally the activity of this pure purpose insofar as it is conscious of rising above sensibility, of sensibility's interference, and of its opposition to and struggle with sensibility.—Consciousness itself directly declares that it is not serious about moral perfection by displacing it into infinity, that is, by asserting that it is never perfected.

623 What alone has validity for it, then, is rather this intermediate condition of imperfection—a condition that is at least supposed to be a progression toward perfection. Yet it cannot be this either, for 1807 573 progress in morality would instead be an advance toward its destruction. The goal would be the nothingness mentioned above, or the sublation of morality and consciousness itself; but to come closer and closer to nothingness means to diminish. Moreover, progression in general, like diminution, would assume differences of magnitude in morality; yet there can be no question of these within it. In morality, as the consciousness for which the ethical purpose is pure duty, no difference at all is conceivable, least of all the superficial difference of magnitude. There is only one virtue, only one pure duty, only one morality.

624 Since, then, it is not moral perfection that is taken seriously, but rather the intermediate condition—that is, as just discussed, nonmorality—we return from another side to the content of the first postulate. For it is impossible to see how happiness can be demanded for this moral consciousness on account of its worthiness. It is conscious of its imperfection and therefore cannot in fact demand happiness as a merit, as something of which it is worthy, but only through a freely bestowed grace. That is, it can demand happiness as such, in and for itself, and expect it not on that absolute ground but according to chance and caprice.—In precisely this, nonmorality declares what it is: that what matters is not morality but 1807 574 happiness in and for itself, without reference to morality.

625 This second side of the moral worldview also sublates the other assertion of the first side, in which the disharmony of morality and happiness is presupposed.—The claim is that experience shows how, in this present world, things often go badly for the moral person, while the immoral person often prospers. Yet the intermediate condition of imperfect morality, which has emerged as essential, plainly shows that this perception and supposed experience merely disguise the matter. For since morality is imperfect—that is, since morality in fact does not exist—what substance can there be in the experience that it fares badly?—Since it has also emerged that happiness in and for itself is what matters, it becomes clear that the judgment that the immoral person prospers did not mean that an injustice takes place here. The designation of an individual as immoral falls away in itself, since morality is imperfect altogether, and therefore has only an arbitrary ground. The meaning and content of the judgment of experience is thus solely this: that some people ought not to receive happiness in and for itself. That is, it is envy taking morality for its cloak. The ground for supposing that others ought to receive so-called good fortune, however, is 1807 575 good friendship, which wishes this grace—that is, this chance—for them and itself, and gladly sees it bestowed.

626 Morality in moral consciousness is therefore imperfect: this is what is now set up. Yet its essence is solely to be perfect and pure; imperfect morality is therefore impure, or it is immorality. Morality itself thus resides in a being other than actual consciousness: a holy moral legislator.—The imperfect morality in consciousness, which is the ground of this postulating, means in the first instance that morality, insofar as it is posited as actual in consciousness, stands in relation to an other, to an existence, and therefore itself acquires otherness or difference. Through this, a manifold multitude of moral commandments arises. Yet moral self-consciousness at the same time regards these many duties as inessential, for what matters is only the one pure duty, and for it they have no truth insofar as they are determinate. They can therefore have their truth only in an other, and are holy through a holy legislator—which they are not for moral self-consciousness.—Yet this itself is again merely a disguise of the matter. For moral self-consciousness is the absolute to itself, and duty is simply and solely what it knows as duty. But it knows only pure duty as duty. What is not holy to it is not holy in itself; and what is not holy in itself cannot be 1807 576 sanctified by the holy being. Nor, in general, is moral consciousness serious about allowing something to be sanctified by a consciousness other than itself; for only what is holy to it through itself and within it is holy to it at all.—It is therefore just as little serious in asserting that this other being is holy, for in that being something was supposed to attain essential status which has no essential status for moral consciousness—that is, in itself.

627 If the holy being was postulated so that duty might have validity in it not as pure duty but as a plurality of determinate duties, this too must therefore be displaced again: the other being is to be holy only insofar as pure duty alone has validity in it. Pure duty does in fact have validity only in another being, not in moral consciousness. Although pure morality alone seems to count within moral consciousness, this must nevertheless be presented differently, for it is at the same time natural consciousness. In it, morality is affected and conditioned by sensibility, and thus is not in and for itself, but a contingency of free will; while in consciousness as pure will, it is a contingency of knowledge. Morality in and for itself therefore resides in another being.

628 This being is therefore pure, perfected morality here because in it morality does not stand in 1807 577 relation to nature and sensibility. Yet the reality of pure duty is its actualization in nature and sensibility. Moral consciousness locates its imperfection in morality's having a positive relation to nature and sensibility within it, since it regards it as an essential moment of morality that its relation to them should be exclusively negative. Pure moral being, by contrast, because it is elevated above the struggle with nature and sensibility, does not stand in a negative relation to them. In fact, then, only the positive relation to them remains for it—that is, precisely what was just counted as imperfect, as immoral. But pure morality entirely separated from actuality, so that it would equally have no positive relation to actuality, would be an unconscious, nonactual abstraction in which the concept of morality—being the thought of pure duty, and a willing and doing—would be utterly sublated. This purely moral being is therefore once again a disguise of the matter, and must be abandoned.

629 In this purely moral being, however, the moments of the contradiction in which this synthetic representation moves about draw so close together—as do the opposed alsos which it allows to follow one another, always replacing one opposite with the other without bringing these thoughts together—that 1807 578 consciousness must here abandon its moral worldview and flee back into itself.

630 It recognizes its morality as imperfect because it is affected by a sensibility and nature opposed to morality. These partly cloud morality itself as such, and partly give rise to a multitude of duties that leave consciousness perplexed in the concrete case of actual action. For each case is the concretion of many moral relations, just as an object of perception in general is a thing of many properties; and since determinate duty is the purpose, it has a content, and its content is part of the purpose, so morality is not pure.—Morality therefore has its reality in another being. But this reality means nothing other than that morality here exists in and for itself: for itself, that is, as the morality of a consciousness; in itself, that is, possessing existence and actuality.—In that first, imperfect consciousness, morality is not carried out; there it is the in-itself in the sense of a thing of thought. For it is associated with nature and sensibility, with the actuality of being and consciousness, which constitutes its content; and nature and sensibility are morally null.—In the second, morality exists as perfected, and not as an unexecuted thing of thought. But this perfection consists precisely in morality's having actuality in a consciousness, as well as free 1807 579 actuality, existence in general: in its being not empty but fulfilled and full of content.—That is, the perfection of morality is located in the presence within it and as part of it of what was just defined as morally null. At one moment morality is to have validity solely as the nonactual thing of thought of pure abstraction, yet equally it is to have no validity in this form. Its truth is to consist in being opposed to actuality and entirely free and empty of it, and then again in being actuality.

631 The syncretism of these contradictions, spread out in the moral worldview, collapses into itself when the distinction on which it rests—between what must necessarily be thought and posited and yet is at the same time inessential—becomes a distinction that no longer exists even in the words. What is ultimately posited as different, both as the null and as the real, is one and the same: existence and actuality. And what is supposed to exist absolutely only as the beyond of actual being and consciousness, yet equally only within it and to be null as a beyond, is pure duty and the knowledge of it as the essence. The consciousness that makes this distinction, which is no distinction, declaring actuality both null and real, and pure morality both the true 1807 580 essence and the essenceless, pronounces together the thoughts it previously separated. It itself declares that it is not serious about this determination and separation of the moments of the self and the in-itself. Rather, what it declares to be the absolute being outside consciousness it keeps enclosed within the self of self-consciousness; and what it declares to be the absolutely thought, or the absolute in-itself, it takes for that very reason to possess no truth.—Consciousness comes to see that separating these moments is a dissemblance, and that it would be hypocrisy to retain it nevertheless. But as morally pure self-consciousness it recoils in abhorrence into itself from this inequality between its representation and its essence, from this untruth that declares true what it regards as untrue. It is pure conscience, which scorns such a moral representation of the world; within itself it is the simple spirit certain of itself, acting conscientiously and immediately, without the mediation of those representations, and having its truth in this immediacy.—But if this world of dissemblance is nothing other than the development of moral self-consciousness in its moments, and thus its reality, then by returning into itself it will not become anything different in its essence. Its return into itself is instead merely the consciousness it has attained that 1807 581 its truth is a pretense. It would still have to pass this off as its truth, for it would have to express and present itself as an objective representation, but it would know that this was only dissemblance. It would therefore in fact be hypocrisy, and that scorn for dissemblance would already be hypocrisy's first utterance.

c. Conscience, the beautiful soul, evil and its forgiveness.

632 The antinomy of the moral worldview—that there is a moral consciousness and that there is none, or that duty's validity lies beyond consciousness and, conversely, takes place only within it—had been gathered into the representation in which the nonmoral consciousness counts as moral, its contingent knowing and willing is accepted as fully valid, and happiness is granted it through grace. Moral self-consciousness did not take this self-contradictory representation upon itself, but transferred it to a being other than itself. Yet this placing outside itself of what it must think as necessary is just as much a contradiction in form as the former is in content 1807 582. But because, in itself, precisely what appears contradictory, and in whose separation and repeated dissolution the moral worldview moves about, is the same—namely, pure duty as pure knowledge is nothing other than the self of consciousness, and the self of consciousness is being and actuality; and likewise what is supposed to be beyond actual consciousness is nothing other than pure thought, thus in fact the self—self-consciousness, for us or in itself, returns into itself and knows as itself that essence in which the actual is at the same time pure knowledge and pure duty. It is to itself what is fully valid in its contingency, knowing its immediate singularity as pure knowing and acting, as true actuality and harmony.

633 This self of conscience, spirit immediately certain of itself as absolute truth and being, is the third self to have emerged for us from the third world of spirit, and must be briefly compared with the preceding selves. The totality or actuality that presents itself as the truth of the ethical world is the self of the person; its existence is being-recognized. Just as the person is the self empty of substance, so this existence of the person is likewise abstract actuality. The person counts, and does so immediately; the self is the point immediately at rest in the element of its being. It is not severed from its universality, so the two are not 1807 583 in movement or relation to one another. The universal is undifferentiated within it, and is neither the content of the self, nor is the self filled through itself.—The second self is the world of cultivation that has arrived at its truth, or the spirit of estrangement restored to itself: absolute freedom. In this self that first immediate unity of singularity and universality separates. The universal, which likewise remains purely spiritual essence, being-recognized, or universal will and knowledge, is the object and content of the self and its universal actuality. But it does not have the form of existence free of the self; hence in this self it reaches no fulfillment and no positive content, no world. Moral self-consciousness does indeed let its universality go free, so that it becomes a nature of its own, and equally holds it fast within itself as sublated. But it is only the dissembling play of alternation between these two determinations. Only as conscience does it have, in its self-certainty, the content for previously empty duty, as also for empty right and the empty universal will; and because this self-certainty is equally immediate, it has existence itself.

634 Having reached this truth of itself, moral self-consciousness thus abandons—or rather sublates within itself—the separation from which dissemblance arose: the separation of the in-itself and the self, of pure duty as pure purpose 1807 584 and actuality as a nature and sensibility opposed to pure purpose. Thus returned into itself, it is concrete moral spirit, which does not give itself, in the consciousness of pure duty, an empty standard opposed to actual consciousness. Rather, pure duty as well as the nature opposed to it are sublated moments. It is moral essence actualizing itself in immediate unity, and its action is immediately a concrete moral shape.

635 A case for action is at hand; it is an objective actuality for knowing consciousness. As conscience, consciousness knows it in an immediately concrete way, and at the same time it is only as consciousness knows it. Knowledge is contingent insofar as it is other than its object; but spirit certain of itself is no longer such contingent knowledge, no longer a creation of thoughts within itself from which actuality differs. Rather, since the separation of the in-itself and the self is sublated, the case is immediately in the sensuous certainty of knowledge as it is in itself, and it is in itself only as it is in this knowledge.—Action as actualization is thereby the pure form of will: the mere conversion of actuality as a case that is into an actuality that is done, of the mere mode of objective knowledge into the mode of knowledge 1807 585 of actuality as something produced by consciousness. Just as sensuous certainty is immediately taken up into, or rather converted into, the in-itself of spirit, so this conversion too is simple and unmediated: a transition through the pure concept without alteration of the content, which is determined by the interest of the consciousness that knows it.—Furthermore, conscience does not separate the circumstances of the case into different duties. It does not behave as a positive universal medium in which the many duties, each for itself, would acquire an immovable substantiality, so that either no action could take place at all—because every concrete case contains opposition in general, and as a moral case contains the opposition of duties, so that in determining an action one side, one duty, would always be violated—or, if action took place, one of the opposed duties would actually be violated. Conscience is rather the negative one, or absolute self, which eradicates these different moral substances. It is simple action in accordance with duty, which does not fulfill this or that duty, but knows and does what is concretely right. It is therefore the first instance of moral action as action, into which the preceding inactive consciousness of morality has passed.—The concrete shape of the deed may be analyzed by a distinguishing consciousness into different properties—that is, here 1807 586, into different moral relations—and these may either each be declared absolutely valid, as they must be if they are to be duties, or be compared and examined. In the simple moral action of conscience, duties are so buried that all these individual essences are immediately encroached upon, and the testing and shaking of duty has no place at all in the unshakable certainty of conscience.

636 Just as little does conscience contain that wavering uncertainty of consciousness which now places so-called pure morality outside itself in another, holy being and regards itself as unholy, but then again places moral purity within itself and the linkage of the sensuous with the moral within the other being.

637 It renounces all these positions and displacements of the moral worldview by renouncing the consciousness that conceives duty and actuality as contradictory. According to the latter, I act morally insofar as I am conscious of accomplishing pure duty alone, not anything else—which in fact means insofar as I do not act. But insofar as I actually act, I am conscious of an other, of an actuality already present and one I intend to produce; I have a determinate purpose and fulfill a determinate duty. There 1807 587 is something other in this than pure duty, which alone was supposed to be intended.—Conscience, by contrast, is the consciousness that when moral consciousness declares pure duty to be the essence of its action, this pure purpose disguises the matter. For the matter itself is that pure duty consists in the empty abstraction of pure thought and has its reality and content only in a determinate actuality—an actuality that is the actuality of consciousness itself, not as a thing of thought but as an individual. For itself, conscience has its truth in the immediate certainty of itself. This immediate, concrete certainty of itself is the essence; considered in terms of the opposition belonging to consciousness, its own immediate singularity is the content of moral doing, while its form is this very self as pure movement: namely, as knowledge or its own conviction.

638 To consider this more closely in its unity and in the meaning of its moments: moral consciousness grasped itself only as the in-itself or essence; as conscience, however, it grasps its being-for-itself, or its self.—The contradiction of the moral worldview dissolves: that is, the difference underlying it proves to be no difference, and it converges into pure negativity. But this is precisely the self: a simple self 1807 588 that is both pure knowledge and knowledge of itself as this individual consciousness. This self therefore constitutes the content of the previously empty essence, for it is the actual, which no longer means a nature alien to essence and independent in its own laws. As the negative, it is the difference of pure essence—a content, and indeed one valid in and for itself.

639 Furthermore, as pure knowledge equal to itself, this self is the absolutely universal, so that precisely this knowledge as its own knowledge, as conviction, is duty. Duty is no longer the universal confronting the self; rather, it is known to have no validity in this separation. The law now exists for the sake of the self, not the self for the sake of the law. Yet law and duty therefore have not only the meaning of being-for-itself, but also that of being-in-itself, for this knowledge, by virtue of its equality with itself, is precisely the in-itself. In consciousness, this in-itself also separates itself from that immediate unity with being-for-itself; confronting it in this way, it is being, being-for-another.—Duty, precisely as duty abandoned by the self, is now known to be only a moment. From its significance as absolute essence, it has sunk to being that is not self, not for itself, and thus is being-for-another. But this being-for-another remains an essential moment for that very reason: because the self as consciousness constitutes the opposition between being-for-itself and 1807 589 being-for-another, and duty is now immediately actual consciousness in itself, no longer merely abstract pure consciousness.

640 This being-for-another is therefore the substance that is in itself, distinct from the self. Conscience has not abandoned pure duty or the abstract in-itself; rather, duty is the essential moment of relating to others as universality. It is the common element of self-consciousnesses, and this is the substance in which the deed has subsistence and actuality: the moment of being recognized by others. Moral self-consciousness does not possess this moment of being-recognized, of pure consciousness that exists, and consequently is not an acting, actualizing consciousness at all. Its in-itself is for it either the abstract, nonactual essence, or being as an actuality that is not spiritual. The existent actuality of conscience, however, is one that is self: that is, self-conscious existence, the spiritual element of being recognized. Doing is therefore only the transposition of its individual content into the objective element, in which that content is universal and recognized; and precisely its being recognized makes the action actual. The action is recognized and thereby actual because existent actuality is immediately linked with conviction or knowledge, or because knowledge of its purpose is immediately the element of existence, universal recognition. For 1807 590 the essence of the action, duty, consists in conscience's conviction about it; this conviction is precisely the in-itself itself. It is self-consciousness universal in itself, or being-recognized, and thus actuality. What is done with the conviction of duty is therefore immediately something possessing subsistence and existence. There can therefore no longer be any question here of good intentions failing to come about, or of the good faring badly. Rather, what is known as duty is accomplished and attains actuality, because what accords with duty is precisely what is universal to all self-consciousnesses, what is recognized and therefore exists. But taken separately and alone, without the content of the self, this duty is being-for-another, the transparent element that has only the significance of an essence devoid of content in general.

641 If we look back to the sphere with which spiritual reality first entered, its concept was that the expression of individuality is being-in-and-for-itself. But the shape that immediately expressed this concept was honest consciousness, which busied itself with the abstract matter itself. There this matter itself was predicate; only in conscience, however, is it subject, which has posited all the moments of consciousness within itself, and for which all these moments—substantiality in general, external existence, and the essence of thought—are contained in this certainty of itself. The matter itself has substantiality in general in ethical life, external existence in 1807 591 cultivation, and the self-knowing essence of thought in morality; and in conscience it is the subject that knows these moments within itself. Whereas honest consciousness always grasps only the empty matter itself, conscience, by contrast, attains it in the fulfillment it gives to it through itself. It is this power because it knows the moments of consciousness as moments and, as their negative essence, masters them.

642 Considered in relation to the individual determinations of the opposition that appears in action, and in terms of its consciousness of their nature, conscience first relates as knowing to the actuality of the case in which action is required. Insofar as this knowledge contains the moment of universality, knowledge belonging to conscientious action must embrace the actuality before it without restriction, and thus know precisely and take into consideration the circumstances of the case. But because this knowledge knows universality as a moment, it is therefore a knowledge of these circumstances conscious of not embracing them, or of not being conscientious in this regard. The truly universal and pure relation of knowledge would be a relation to something not opposed to it, to itself; but action, through the opposition essential to it, relates to a negative of consciousness, to an actuality that is in itself. As against the simplicity of 1807 592 pure consciousness, this actuality is the absolutely other, or manifoldness in itself: an absolute multiplicity of circumstances dividing and extending infinitely backward into their conditions, sideways in their coexistence, and forward in their consequences.—Conscientious consciousness is aware of this nature of the matter and of its relation to it. It knows that it does not know the case in which it acts according to this required universality, and that its claim to a conscientious consideration of all the circumstances is null. Yet this knowledge and consideration of all the circumstances is not entirely absent; it is present only as a moment, as something that is only for others. And its incomplete knowledge, because it is its knowledge, counts for it as sufficient and complete knowledge.

643 The same holds for the universality of essence, or the determination of content through pure consciousness.—Conscience proceeding to action relates to the many aspects of the case. The case divides, as does pure consciousness's relation to it, through which the manifoldness of the case becomes a manifoldness of duties.—Conscience knows that it must choose and decide among them; for none is absolute in its determinacy or content, but only pure duty. Yet in its reality this abstraction has acquired the significance of the self-conscious I. Spirit 1807 593 certain of itself rests within itself as conscience, and its real universality, or its duty, lies in its pure conviction of duty. This pure conviction is as such as empty as pure duty: pure in the sense that nothing within it, no determinate content, is duty. Yet action is to take place; the individual must determine. And spirit certain of itself, in which the in-itself has acquired the significance of the self-conscious I, knows that it possesses this determination and content in the immediate certainty of itself. As determination and content, this is natural consciousness, that is, drives and inclinations.—Conscience recognizes no content as absolute for it, for it is the absolute negativity of everything determinate. It determines from itself; but the sphere of the self within which determinacy as such falls is so-called sensibility. When a content is to be had from the immediate certainty of itself, nothing but sensibility lies ready to hand.—Everything that in earlier shapes presented itself as good or bad, as law and right, is an other than the immediate certainty of itself. It is a universal, which is now a being-for-another; or, viewed differently, an object that, mediating consciousness with itself, comes between it and its own truth, and separates it from itself rather than being its immediacy.—For conscience, however, certainty of itself is pure, immediate 1807 594 truth; and this truth is therefore its immediate certainty of itself represented as content: that is, in general, the individual's caprice and the contingency of its unconscious natural being.

644 At the same time this content counts as moral essence, or duty. For pure duty, as already emerged in the examination of laws, is utterly indifferent to every content and accommodates every content. Here it also has the essential form of being-for-itself, and this form of individual conviction is nothing other than consciousness of the emptiness of pure duty, of its being only a moment, and of its substantiality being a predicate whose subject is the individual. The individual's caprice gives duty its content, can attach any content to this form and fasten its conscientiousness upon it.—An individual increases his property in a certain way. It is a duty that everyone provide for his own preservation and that of his family, and no less for the possibility of becoming useful to his fellow human beings and doing good to those in need. The individual is conscious that this is duty, for this content is immediately contained in his certainty of himself; he further sees that he fulfills this duty in this case. Others perhaps regard this particular manner of proceeding as fraud; they hold to other aspects of the concrete case, while he 1807 595 holds fast to this aspect by being conscious of the increase of property as pure duty.—Thus what others call violence and injustice fulfills the duty of asserting one's independence against others; what they call cowardice fulfills the duty of preserving one's life and the possibility of being useful to one's fellow human beings. What they call courage, however, violates both duties. But cowardice must not be so inept as not to know that preserving life and the possibility of being useful to others are duties, not to be convinced that its action accords with duty, and not to know that conformity to duty consists in knowing; otherwise it would commit the ineptitude of being immoral. Since morality lies in the consciousness of having fulfilled duty, this consciousness will be lacking no more in the action called cowardice than in that called courage. The abstraction called duty is capable of this content as of any other; the individual therefore knows what he does as duty, and since he knows this, and conviction of duty is conformity to duty itself, he is recognized by others. The action thereby has validity and actual existence.

645 Against this freedom, which places any content it pleases into the universal passive medium of pure duty and knowledge just as readily as any other, it is no help to assert that another 1807 596 content ought to be placed there. For whatever the content, each bears the stain of determinacy, from which pure knowledge is free, and which it can disdain just as it can accept any content. Every content, in being determinate, stands on the same footing as every other, even if it seems to have precisely the character of having sublated the particular within it. It may seem that, since in an actual case duty divides into opposition in general, and thereby into the opposition of singularity and universality, the duty whose content is the universal itself immediately possesses the nature of pure duty, and form and content thus become wholly conformable to one another; so that, for example, action for the universal good ought to be preferred to action for the individual's good. Yet this universal duty is in general what exists as substance being in and for itself, as right and law, and has validity independently of the individual's knowledge and conviction as well as his immediate interest. It is therefore precisely that against whose form morality in general is directed. As for its content, this too is determinate, insofar as the universal good is opposed to the individual's good; hence its law is one from which conscience knows itself to be utterly free, granting itself absolute authority to add to it and subtract from it, to omit it as well as to fulfill it.—Furthermore, that 1807 597 distinction between duty toward the individual and duty toward the universal is, by the nature of opposition in general, nothing fixed. Rather, what the individual does for himself also benefits the universal. The more he has provided for himself, the greater not only is his possibility of benefiting others; his actuality itself consists solely in being and living in connection with others. His individual enjoyment essentially means giving up what is his to others and helping them acquire their enjoyment. Thus in fulfilling duty toward the individual, and so toward oneself, duty toward the universal is also fulfilled.—The consideration and comparison of duties that would enter here would amount to calculating the advantage that the universal would derive from an action. But on the one hand morality would thereby fall prey to the necessary contingency of insight; on the other, it is precisely the essence of conscience to cut off this calculation and deliberation, and decide from itself without such grounds.

646 In this way, then, conscience acts and maintains itself in the unity of being-in-itself and being-for-itself, in the unity of pure thought and individuality, and is spirit certain of itself, possessing its truth within itself, in its self, in its knowledge, and in this as knowledge of duty. It maintains itself precisely through the fact that whatever is positive in the action—both its 1807 598 content and the form of duty and knowledge of it—belongs to the self, to certainty of itself; whereas whatever seeks to confront the self as an in-itself of its own counts as untrue, only as sublated, only as a moment. Hence what counts is not universal knowledge in general but its acquaintance with the circumstances. Into duty as universal being-in-itself it places the content it takes from its natural individuality, for this is the content present within itself. Through the universal medium in which it exists, this content becomes the duty it performs, and empty pure duty is thereby posited as sublated, or as a moment. This content is duty's sublated emptiness, or its fulfillment.—But conscience is equally free of any content whatsoever. It absolves itself from every determinate duty that is supposed to count as law; in the force of its certainty of itself it has the majesty of absolute self-sufficiency, to bind and to loose.—This self-determination is therefore immediately what absolutely accords with duty. Duty is knowledge itself; but this simple selfhood is the in-itself, for the in-itself is pure equality with itself, and this is present in this consciousness.—

647 This pure knowledge is immediately being-for-another; for as pure equality with itself it is immediacy, or being. But this being is at the same time the purely universal, the selfhood of all; or, action is recognized and therefore actual. 1807 599 This being is the element through which conscience immediately stands in a relation of equality with all self-consciousnesses; and the meaning of this relation is not selfless law, but the self of conscience.

648 Yet because this right that conscience does is at the same time being-for-another, an inequality seems to enter it. The duty it accomplishes is a determinate content; this is indeed the self of consciousness, and therein its knowledge of itself, its equality with itself. But accomplished, placed in the universal medium of being, this equality is no longer knowledge, no longer this distinguishing that equally sublates its differences immediately. Rather, in being, difference is posited as subsisting, and the action is determinate, unequal to the element of the self-consciousness of all, and thus not necessarily recognized. Both sides—the acting conscience and the universal consciousness recognizing this action as duty—are equally free of the determinacy of this deed. Because of this freedom, their relation in the common medium of connection is instead a relation of complete inequality; hence the consciousness for which the action exists finds itself in complete uncertainty about the acting spirit certain of itself. Spirit acts; it posits a determinacy as being. The others hold to this being as its 1807 600 truth and are certain of it therein: in it, spirit has declared what counts as duty for it. Yet it is free of any determinate duty. It has left the place where they suppose it actually to be; and this medium of being itself, and duty as being in itself, count for it only as a moment. What it thus sets before them, it displaces again—or rather, it has immediately displaced it. For its actuality is not this duty and determination set outside itself, but the actuality it possesses in absolute certainty of itself.

649 They therefore do not know whether this conscience is morally good or evil; or rather, not only can they not know, they must also take it to be evil. For just as it is free of the determinacy of duty and of duty as being in itself, so are they. They themselves know how to displace what it sets before them: it is something through which only the self of another is expressed, not their own. They not only know themselves to be free of it, but must dissolve it within their own consciousness, nullify it through judgment and explanation, in order to preserve their self.

650 Yet the action of conscience is not merely this determination of being abandoned by the pure self. What is to count and be recognized as duty is so solely through knowledge and conviction of it as duty, through the 1807 601 knowledge of oneself in the deed. If the deed ceases to have this self within it, it ceases to be what alone is its essence. Its existence, abandoned by this consciousness, would be an ordinary actuality, and the action would appear to us as a fulfillment of pleasure and desire. What is to exist here is essential only through being known as individuality expressing itself; and this being-known is what is recognized, and what is to have existence as such.

651 The self enters existence as self; spirit certain of itself exists as such for others. Its immediate action is not what has validity and actuality; not the determinate, not what is in itself, is recognized, but solely the self-knowing self as such. The element of subsistence is universal self-consciousness. What enters this element cannot be the effect of the action, which does not endure in it or gain permanence. Rather, self-consciousness alone is recognized and attains actuality.

652 Here we see language once again as the existence of spirit. It is self-consciousness existing for others, immediately present as such and, as this self-consciousness, universal. It is the self separating itself from itself, becoming objective to itself as pure I—I, and in this objectivity preserving itself as this self just as immediately as it flows together with the others and is their 1807 602 self-consciousness. It hears itself just as it is heard by the others, and this hearing is precisely existence that has become self.

653 The content language has acquired here is no longer the inverted, inverting, and torn self of the world of cultivation, but spirit returned into itself, certain of itself and, in its self, of its truth or recognition, and recognized as this knowledge. The language of ethical spirit is law and simple command, and lament, which is more a tear shed over necessity; moral consciousness, by contrast, is still mute, shut up within its own inwardness. For in it the self does not yet have existence; existence and the self stand as yet only in an external relation to one another. Language, however, emerges only as the middle term between independent and recognized self-consciousnesses, and the existent self is immediately universal, manifold being-recognized, simple in this manifoldness. The content of the language of conscience is the self knowing itself as essence. This alone it expresses, and this expression is the true actuality of doing and the validity of the action. Consciousness expresses its conviction; only in this conviction is the action duty, and it counts as duty only through the conviction's being expressed. For universal self-consciousness is free of the determinate action that merely exists; the action as existence 1807 603 counts for nothing to it, but rather the conviction that it is duty; and this conviction is actual in language.—To actualize the action here means not to transpose its content from the form of purpose or being-for-itself into the form of abstract actuality, but from the form of immediate certainty of itself, which knows its knowledge or being-for-itself as the essence, into the form of the assurance that consciousness is convinced of duty and, as conscience, knows duty from itself. This assurance thus assures us that consciousness is convinced that its conviction is the essence.

654 Whether the assurance of acting from conviction of duty is true, whether what is done is actually duty—these questions or doubts have no meaning against conscience.—The question whether the assurance is true would presuppose that the inner intention differs from the professed intention: that is, that the willing of the individual self can separate itself from duty, from the will of universal and pure consciousness. The latter would be placed in the speech, while the former would really be the true mainspring of the action. Yet precisely this difference between universal consciousness and the individual self has sublated itself, and conscience is its sublation. The immediate knowledge of the self certain of itself is law and duty; its intention is right because it is its intention. All that is required 1807 604 is that it know this and say that it is convinced its knowing and willing is right. The expression of this assurance in itself sublates the form of its particularity; in it, consciousness acknowledges the necessary universality of the self. By calling itself conscience, it calls itself pure self-knowledge and pure abstract willing; that is, it calls itself a universal knowing and willing that recognizes the others and is equal to them—for they are precisely this pure self-knowing and willing—and is therefore also recognized by them. In the willing of the self certain of itself, in this knowledge that the self is the essence, lies the essence of right.—Anyone, therefore, who says he acts in this way from conscience speaks truly, for his conscience is the knowing and willing self. But he must essentially say this, for this self must at the same time be a universal self. It is not universal in the content of the action, for because of its determinacy that content is in itself indifferent; rather, universality lies in the action's form. This form is what must be posited as actual: it is the self, which as such is actual in language, declares itself the true, and precisely therein recognizes all selves and is recognized by them.

655 Thus conscience, in the majesty of its elevation above determinate law and every content of duty, places whatever content it pleases into its knowing and willing. It is moral genius 1807 605, which knows the inner voice of its immediate knowledge as the divine voice; and since in this knowledge it equally immediately knows existence, it is the divine creative power that has living force in its concept. It is equally worship within itself, for its action is the intuition of this divinity of its own.

656 This solitary worship is at the same time essentially the worship of a community, and pure inner self-knowing and self-hearing advances to the moment of consciousness. Its intuition of itself is its objective existence, and this objective element is the expression of its knowing and willing as something universal. Through this expression the self becomes valid and the action becomes an effective deed. The actuality and subsistence of its doing is universal self-consciousness; but the expression of conscience posits certainty of itself as pure, and thereby as universal, self. The others accept the action on account of this speech, in which the self is expressed and recognized as the essence. The spirit and substance of their association is therefore their mutual assurance of their conscientiousness and good intentions, their delight in this reciprocal purity, and their refreshment in the glory of knowing and expressing, of cherishing and fostering such excellence.—Insofar as this conscience still distinguishes its abstract 1807 606 consciousness from its self-consciousness, its life is only hidden in God. God is indeed immediately present to its spirit and heart, to its self; but what is manifest—its actual consciousness and the mediating movement of that consciousness—is for it other than that hidden interior and the immediacy of the present essence. Yet in the perfection of conscience the distinction between its abstract consciousness and its self-consciousness is sublated. It knows that abstract consciousness is precisely this self, this being-for-itself certain of itself; that in the immediacy of the relation of the self to the in-itself—which, posited outside the self, is abstract essence and what is hidden from it—precisely the difference is sublated. For a mediating relation is one in which the related terms are not one and the same, but are an other for one another and are one only in a third; an immediate relation, however, in fact means nothing other than unity. Consciousness, raised above the thoughtlessness of still taking these distinctions that are none to be distinctions, knows the immediate presence of essence within it as the unity of essence and its self, and thus knows its self as the living in-itself, and this knowledge of its own as religion. As intuited or existent knowledge, religion is the community's speaking about its spirit.

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657 Here, then, we see self-consciousness returned into its innermost depths, where all externality as such vanishes for it—into the intuition of I = I, in which this I is all essence and existence. It founders in this concept of itself, for it has been driven to the utmost point of its extremes, and in such a way that the distinct moments through which it is real, or is still consciousness, are these pure extremes not merely for us. Rather, what it is for itself, what for it is in itself, and what for it is existence, have evaporated into abstractions that no longer have any support, any substance, for this consciousness itself; and everything that hitherto was essence for consciousness has returned into these abstractions.—Refined to this purity, consciousness is its poorest shape, and the poverty constituting its sole possession is itself a vanishing. This absolute certainty into which substance has dissolved is absolute untruth, collapsing into itself; it is absolute self-consciousness, in which consciousness founders.

658 Considered within itself, this foundering means that for consciousness the substance that is in itself is knowledge as its knowledge. As consciousness, it is divided into the opposition of itself and the object that is the essence for it; but this very object is perfectly transparent: it is its self, and its consciousness is only knowledge of itself. All life and all spiritual essence have returned into this 1807 608 self and lost their difference from the I itself. The moments of consciousness are therefore these extreme abstractions, none of which stands, but loses itself in the other and produces it. It is the interchange of unhappy consciousness with itself, but an interchange that for this consciousness itself takes place within it and is conscious of being the concept of reason, which unhappy consciousness is only in itself. As consciousness, then, its absolute certainty of itself immediately turns into a sounding-out, into the objectivity of its being-for-itself; but this created world is its speech, which it has equally immediately heard, and whose echo alone returns to it. This return therefore does not mean that it is in and for itself therein; for the essence is for it not an in-itself but itself. Just as little does it have existence, for the objective does not attain the status of a negative of the actual self, just as the self does not attain actuality. It lacks the power of externalization, the power to make itself a thing and endure being. It lives in dread of staining the glory of its inwardness through action and existence; and to preserve the purity of its heart it flees contact with actuality and persists in its obstinate inability to renounce its self, sharpened to the ultimate abstraction, and give itself substantiality, or turn its thought into being and entrust itself to absolute difference. The hollow 1807 609 object it produces for itself therefore now fills it with the consciousness of emptiness. Its doing is a yearning that merely loses itself in its becoming an essenceless object and, falling back to itself beyond this loss, finds itself only as lost.—In this transparent purity of its moments, an unhappy so-called beautiful soul, it burns itself out within itself and vanishes like a shapeless vapor dissolving into air.

659 But this silent confluence of the marrowless essences of evaporated life must also be taken in the other meaning of the actuality of conscience and in the appearance of its movement, and conscience must be considered as acting.—The objective moment in this consciousness was determined above as universal consciousness. Self-knowing knowledge, as this self, is distinct from other selves. The language in which all reciprocally recognize one another as acting conscientiously, this universal equality, breaks apart into the inequality of individual being-for-itself; each consciousness is equally reflected completely out of its universality into itself. Through this, the opposition of singularity to other individuals and to the universal necessarily enters, and this relation and its movement must be considered.—Or, this universality and duty has the directly opposite meaning of determinate singularity exempting 1807 610 itself from the universal, for which pure duty is only the universality that has come to the surface and turned outward. Duty lies only in the words and counts as a being-for-another. Conscience, initially directed only negatively against duty as this determinate, given duty, knows itself to be free of it; but in filling empty duty with a determinate content from itself, it has the positive consciousness that as this self it makes the content for itself. Its pure self, as empty knowledge, is without content and determination; the content it gives this self is taken from its self as this determinate self, from itself as natural individuality. In speaking of the conscientiousness of its action, it is indeed conscious of its pure self; but in the purpose of its action as actual content, it is conscious of itself as this particular individual and of the opposition between what it is for itself and what it is for others, the opposition of universality or duty and its reflectedness out of universality.

660 If the opposition into which conscience enters as acting thus expresses itself within it, it is at the same time outward inequality in the element of existence: the inequality of its particular singularity with another individual.—Its particularity consists in the fact that the two moments constituting its consciousness, the self and the in-itself, have unequal value within it, with the determination that certainty of its 1807 611 self is the essence as against the in-itself or the universal, which counts only as a moment. This inner determination is therefore confronted by the element of existence, or universal consciousness, for which universality, duty, is instead the essence, while singularity that is for itself against the universal counts only as a sublated moment. For this adherence to duty, the first consciousness counts as evil, because it is the inequality of its being-within-itself with the universal; and since at the same time it declares its doing to be equality with itself, duty and conscientiousness, it counts as hypocrisy.

661 The movement of this opposition is initially the formal establishment of equality between what evil is within itself and what it expresses. It must become apparent that it is evil, and its existence must thus become equal to its essence: hypocrisy must be unmasked.—This return of the inequality present in it into equality is not already accomplished by hypocrisy's demonstrating, as people commonly say, its respect for duty and virtue precisely by adopting their semblance and using it as a mask for its own consciousness no less than for another's, as though equality and agreement were implicitly contained in this recognition of the opposite.—Rather, hypocrisy is at the same time just as much withdrawn from this recognition in language 1807 612 and reflected into itself. And in using what is in itself only as a being-for-another, it instead contains its own contempt for it and the display of its essencelessness for all. For what allows itself to be used as an external instrument proves to be a thing possessing no weight of its own.

662 Nor does this equality come about either through evil consciousness's one-sided persistence in itself or through the judgment of universal consciousness.—If the former disavows itself before the consciousness of duty, maintaining that what the latter declares to be badness, absolute inequality with the universal, is an action according to inner law and conscience, then in this one-sided assurance of equality its inequality with the other remains, since the other neither believes nor recognizes that equality.—Or, since one-sided persistence in one extreme dissolves itself, evil would indeed thereby admit itself to be evil, but in doing so would immediately sublate itself, and would neither be hypocrisy nor unmask itself as such. In fact, it admits itself to be evil by maintaining that, opposed to the recognized universal, it acts according to its inner law and conscience. For if this law and conscience were not the law of its singularity and caprice, it would not be something inward and its own, but the universally recognized. Anyone, therefore, who says he acts against others according to his law and 1807 613 conscience in fact says that he mistreats them. But actual conscience is not this persistence in a knowledge and will that opposes itself to the universal. Rather, the universal is the element of its existence, and its language declares its doing to be recognized duty.

663 Just as little is universal consciousness's persistence in its judgment an unmasking and dissolution of hypocrisy.—By crying out against it, “Bad! Base!” and the like, it appeals in such a judgment to its law, just as evil consciousness appeals to its own. For the former law emerges in opposition to the latter, and thereby as a particular law. Universal consciousness thus has no advantage over the other, but rather legitimizes it; and this zeal does precisely the opposite of what it thinks it does—namely, it shows what it calls true duty, which is supposed to be universally recognized, to be something unrecognized, and thereby grants the other an equal right to being-for-itself.

664 Yet this judgment also has another side, from which it becomes the introduction to the dissolution of the existing opposition.—The consciousness of the universal does not behave toward the first consciousness as actual and acting, for it is rather the first that is actual. Instead, it opposes the first as that which is not caught in the opposition of singularity and universality that enters into 1807 614 action. It remains in the universality of thought, behaves as apprehending, and its first action is only judgment.—Through this judgment it now places itself, as just noted, alongside the first consciousness; and through this equality the first comes to intuit itself in this other consciousness. For the consciousness of duty behaves receptively, passively; but it thereby contradicts itself as the absolute will of duty, as that which determines wholly from itself. It has an easy time preserving itself in purity, for it does not act. It is the hypocrisy that wants its judging to be taken for an actual deed and proves its rectitude not through action but through the expression of excellent sentiments. It is therefore constituted exactly like the consciousness it reproaches for placing duty only in its speech. In both, the side of actuality is equally distinct from speech: in the one through the self-interested purpose of the action, in the other through the absence of action altogether, whose necessity lies in the very speaking of duty, for duty has no meaning at all without the deed.

665 But judging must also be considered as a positive action of thought, and has a positive content. From this side, the contradiction present in apprehending consciousness, and its equality with the first consciousness, becomes still 1807 615 more complete.—Acting consciousness declares this determinate doing of its to be duty, and judging consciousness cannot deny it this; for duty itself is the contentless form capable of every content. Or, the concrete action, differentiated within itself in its many aspects, has the universal side that is taken as duty just as much as the particular side constituting the individual's share and interest. Judging consciousness now does not stop at that side of duty and at the agent's knowledge that this is his duty, the relation and station of his actuality. Rather, it holds to the other side, shifts the action into inwardness, and explains it from an intention distinct from the action itself and a self-interested motive. Every action admits of this other consideration of particularity just as it admits of consideration in terms of its conformity to duty; for as action it is the actuality of the individual.—This judging thus removes the action from its existence and reflects it into inwardness, or into the form of its own particularity.—If it is accompanied by fame, judgment knows this inwardness as the craving for fame; if it conforms to the individual's station in general without going beyond it, and is so constituted that individuality does not have its station attached to it as an external determination but fills this universality through 1807 616 itself, thereby showing itself capable of a higher station, judgment knows its inwardness as ambition, and so on. Since in action generally the agent attains the intuition of himself in objectivity, or a feeling of himself in his existence, and thus enjoyment, judgment knows the inwardness as a drive toward one's own happiness, even if this consists only in inner moral vanity, enjoyment of the consciousness of one's own excellence, and the foretaste of the hope of future happiness.—No action can escape such judging, for duty for duty's sake, this pure purpose, is the nonactual. It has its actuality in the doing of individuality, and the action thereby possesses the side of particularity.—There is no hero for his valet—not, however, because the former is not a hero, but because the latter is the valet, with whom the hero deals not as a hero but as someone eating, drinking, dressing, and in general in the singularity of need and representation. Similarly, for judging there is no action in which it could not oppose the side of individuality's singularity to the action's universal side and play the moral valet to the agent.

666 This judging consciousness is therefore itself base, because it divides the action and produces and holds fast its 1807 617 inequality with itself. It is further hypocrisy, because it passes off such judging not as another manner of being evil but as the correct consciousness of the action; in this nonactuality and vanity of knowing well and knowing better, it raises itself above the deeds it disparages and wants its deedless talk to be taken for an excellent actuality.—Thus making itself equal to the agent it judges, it is recognized by him as the same as himself. He finds himself not merely apprehended by it as something alien and unequal to it, but finds that the other, by its own constitution, is equal to him. Intuiting this equality and expressing it, he confesses himself to the other and likewise expects that, just as the other has in fact placed itself on an equal footing with him, it will also reciprocate his speech, express its equality in it, and bring about the existence of mutual recognition. His confession is not an abasement, humiliation, or self-degradation in relation to the other; for this expression is not the one-sided expression that would posit his inequality with the other. Rather, he expresses himself solely because he intuits the equality of the other with himself. In his confession he expresses their equality from his side, and does so because language is the existence of spirit as immediate self. He therefore expects the other to contribute its part to this existence.

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667 Yet the confession of evil, “I am so,” receives no reciprocal, equal confession. That was not what the other's judgment meant—on the contrary! It rejects this community and is the hard heart that is for itself and repudiates continuity with the other.—Here the scene reverses. The one who confessed sees himself repulsed and the other in the wrong: the other refuses to let its inwardness emerge into the existence of speech, and opposes the beauty of its soul to evil, while opposing to confession the stiff neck of a character remaining equal to itself and the silence of keeping itself within itself and not abasing itself before another. Here spirit certain of itself is brought to its highest revolt. For it intuits itself as this simple knowledge of the self in the other, and indeed in such a way that even the external shape of this other is not something essenceless, as wealth is, not a thing. Rather, it is thought, knowledge itself, that is held up against it; it is this absolutely fluid continuity of pure knowledge that refuses to establish its communication with it—with the one who, already in his confession, renounced isolated being-for-itself and posited himself as sublated particularity and thereby as continuity with the other, as universal. The other, however, reserves within itself its uncommunicative being-for-itself; in the confessing consciousness it retains 1807 619 precisely the same thing, although the latter has already cast it off. It thereby shows itself to be a consciousness abandoned by spirit and denying spirit, for it does not recognize that, in the absolute certainty of itself, spirit is master of every deed and actuality and can cast them off and make them undone. At the same time, it does not recognize the contradiction it commits in refusing to accept the casting-off accomplished in speech as a true casting-off, while it itself has the certainty of its spirit not in an actual action but in its inwardness and the existence of that inwardness in the speech of its judgment. It is therefore itself what obstructs the other's return from the deed into the spiritual existence of speech and into the equality of spirit, and through this hardness produces the inequality that still remains.

668 Now insofar as spirit certain of itself, as a beautiful soul, does not possess the power to externalize its self-knowledge that holds fast to itself, it cannot attain equality with the repulsed consciousness, and therefore cannot attain the intuited unity of itself in the other, cannot attain existence. Equality therefore comes about only negatively, as a spiritless being. The beautiful soul devoid of actuality, caught in the contradiction of its pure self and that self's necessity of externalizing itself into being and turning into actuality, in the immediacy of this opposition held fast—an immediacy that alone is the middle term and 1807 620 reconciliation of the opposition raised to its pure abstraction, and that is pure being or empty nothingness—is thus, as consciousness of this contradiction in its unreconciled immediacy, shattered into madness and melts away in yearning consumption. It thereby in fact gives up its hard adherence to its being-for-itself, but produces only the spiritless unity of being.

669 The true reconciliation, namely the self-conscious and existent one, is already contained in its necessity in what precedes. The breaking of the hard heart and its elevation to universality is the same movement that was expressed in the consciousness that confessed itself. The wounds of spirit heal without leaving scars; the deed is not imperishable, but is taken back by spirit into itself, and the side of singularity present in it—whether as intention or as its existent negativity and limitation—is what immediately vanishes. The actualizing self, the form of its action, is only a moment of the whole; and so too is the knowledge that determines through judgment and fixes the difference between the individual and universal sides of action. That evil consciousness posits this externalization of itself, or posits itself as a moment, drawn into confessing existence by the intuition of itself in the other. But just as its one-sided, unrecognized existence of particular 1807 621 being-for-itself must break, so must this other's one-sided, unrecognized judgment break; and just as the former displays the power of spirit over its actuality, so the latter displays its power over its determinate concept.

670 The latter renounces divisive thought and the hardness of the being-for-itself that holds fast to it, because in fact it intuits itself in the first consciousness. By casting away its actuality and making itself a sublated this, the first in fact presents itself as universal; it returns out of its external actuality into itself as essence. Universal consciousness therefore recognizes itself in it.—The forgiveness it grants the first consciousness is a renunciation of itself, of its nonactual essence, to which it equates that other consciousness which was actual action. It recognizes as good what was called evil on account of the determination that action received in thought; or rather, it lets go of this distinction of determinate thought and of its determining judgment existing for itself, just as the other lets go of its determination of action existing for itself.—The word of reconciliation is existent spirit, which intuits pure knowledge of itself as universal essence in its opposite, in the pure knowledge of itself as singularity absolutely within itself—a reciprocal recognition that is absolute spirit.

671 Spirit enters existence only at the summit where its pure knowledge of itself is opposition to and interchange with itself. Knowing that its 1807 622 pure knowledge is abstract essence, it is this knowing duty in absolute opposition to the knowledge that knows itself, as absolute singularity of the self, to be the essence. The former is the pure continuity of the universal, which knows the singularity that knows itself as essence to be null in itself, to be evil. The latter, however, is absolute discreteness, which knows itself in its pure oneness to be absolute, and that universal to be the nonactual, existing only for others. Both sides are refined to this purity, in which they no longer contain any selfless existence, any negative of consciousness. Rather, that duty is the self-identical character of its self-knowing, and this evil equally has its purpose in its being-within-itself and its actuality in its speech. The content of this speech is the substance of its subsistence; it is the assurance of spirit's certainty within itself.—Both spirits certain of themselves have no other purpose than their pure self and no other reality and existence than precisely this pure self. Yet they are still different, and the difference is absolute because it is posited in this element of the pure concept. Nor is it so only for us, but for the concepts themselves standing in this opposition. For although these concepts are determinate against one another, they are at the same time universal in themselves, so that they fill the self's entire compass, and this self has no content other than this 1807 623 determinacy of its, which neither extends beyond it nor is more limited than it. For the one, the absolutely universal, is just as much pure self-knowledge as the other, the absolute discreteness of singularity, and both are only this pure self-knowledge. Both determinations are therefore knowing pure concepts whose determinacy is itself immediately knowledge, or whose relation and opposition is the I. Through this they are for one another these absolute opposites. It is the completely inward that has thus confronted itself and entered existence; they constitute pure knowledge, which through this opposition is posited as consciousness. But it is not yet self-consciousness. It has this actualization in the movement of this opposition. For this opposition is rather itself the indiscrete continuity and equality of I = I; and each for itself, precisely through the contradiction of its pure universality—which at the same time still resists its equality with the other and separates itself from it—sublates itself within itself. Through this externalization, this knowledge divided in its existence returns into the unity of the self. It is the actual I, the universal knowledge of itself in its absolute opposite, in the knowledge being within itself which, because of the purity of its isolated being-within-itself, is itself completely universal. The reconciling Yes, in which both I's relinquish their opposed 1807 624 *existence, is the existence of the I extended into duality, which therein remains equal to itself and, in its complete externalization and opposite, possesses certainty of itself. It is God appearing in the midst of those who know themselves as pure knowledge.

Plain English translation

Mouseia's complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German, paragraph by paragraph, in shorter sentences and everyday words.

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VI. Spirit.

438 Reason is spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its world and of the world as itself.—The movement immediately preceding this showed how spirit comes to be. In that movement the object of consciousness, the pure category, rose to the concept of reason. In observing reason, this pure unity of the I and being, of being-for-itself and being-in-itself, is determined as the in-itself, or as being, and rational consciousness finds itself. But the truth of observation is instead the sublation of this immediate instinct to find, this unconscious existence of reason. The intuited category, the thing found, enters consciousness as the I's being-for-itself. The I now knows itself in objective essence as the self. But defining the category as being-for-itself opposed to being-in-itself is equally one-sided, a moment that sublates itself. For consciousness, the category therefore comes to be defined as it is in its universal truth: 1807 377 as essence existing in and for itself. This still abstract definition, which constitutes the matter itself, is at first only spiritual essence. Consciousness of it is a formal knowledge of it that busies itself with its various contents. In fact, as an individual consciousness, it is still distinct from substance. It either gives arbitrary laws or thinks that its knowledge as such contains the laws as they are in and for themselves, and regards itself as the power that judges them.—Considered from the side of substance, this is spiritual essence existing in and for itself but not yet conscious of itself.—But essence existing in and for itself that is also actual as consciousness and presents itself to itself is spirit.

439 Its spiritual essence has already been called ethical substance. Spirit, however, is ethical actuality. It is the self of actual consciousness. Spirit—or rather, the self—confronts this consciousness as an objective, actual world. Yet for the self this world has lost all meaning of being foreign, just as the self has lost all meaning of being a separate being-for-itself, dependent on or independent of the world. As substance, and as universal, self-equal, enduring essence, spirit is the unmoved and undissolved ground and starting point of everyone's activity. As the in-itself of all self-consciousness, grasped in thought, it is their purpose and goal.—This substance is equally the universal work that 1807 378 produces itself through the activity of each and all as their unity and equality. For it is being-for-itself, the self, activity. As substance, spirit is unwavering, just equality with itself. But as being-for-itself, substance is the dissolved, self-sacrificing, generous essence within which each person accomplishes their own work, tears universal being apart, and takes their share of it. This dissolution and individualization of essence is precisely the moment of everyone's activity and self. It is the movement and soul of substance, and universal essence brought about by action. Substance is being that is dissolved within the self. Precisely for that reason it is not dead essence, but actual and alive.

440 Spirit is therefore the absolute, real essence that sustains itself. All previous shapes of consciousness are abstractions of it. They consist in spirit analyzing itself, distinguishing its moments, and dwelling on particular ones. This isolation of such moments presupposes spirit itself and has its subsistence in spirit. It exists only within spirit, which is existence. Isolated in this way, the moments seem to exist as such. But their onward movement and return to their ground and essence showed that they are only moments, or vanishing quantities. This essence is precisely the movement and dissolution of these moments. Here, where spirit—or their reflection into themselves—is posited, our reflection can briefly 1807 379 recall them from this perspective. They were consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason. Spirit is thus consciousness in general, including sense-certainty, perception, and understanding, insofar as, in analyzing itself, it holds fast to the moment of being an objective, existing actuality for itself, and disregards the fact that this actuality is its own being-for-itself. If, conversely, it holds fast to the other moment of the analysis, that its object is its being-for-itself, it is self-consciousness. But as immediate consciousness of being-in-and-for-itself, as the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, it is consciousness that has reason. As the word has indicates, it has an object determined as rational in itself, or as having the standing of the category, but in such a way that the object does not yet have that standing for consciousness of it. This is the consciousness we have just finished considering. Finally, when spirit intuits this reason that it has as something that is reason—as reason that is actual within it and is its world—then it is in its truth. It is spirit; it is actual ethical essence.

441 As immediate truth, spirit is the ethical life of a people: the individual that is a world. It must advance to consciousness of what it immediately is, sublate beautiful ethical life, and 1807 380 reach knowledge of itself through a series of shapes. These differ from the previous shapes, however, in being real spirits, actualities in the proper sense. Instead of being shapes merely of consciousness, they are shapes of a world.

442 The living ethical world is spirit in its truth. When spirit first reaches abstract knowledge of its essence, ethical life collapses into the formal universality of legal right. Now divided within itself, spirit traces out one of its worlds in its objective element as a harsh actuality: the realm of cultivation. Opposed to it, in the element of thought, stands the world of faith, the realm of essence. But spirit withdraws into itself from this loss of itself. Grasped by this spirit, by the concept, both worlds are thrown into confusion and revolutionized by insight and its spread, the Enlightenment. The realm divided and spread out into a here and a beyond returns into self-consciousness. In morality, self-consciousness now grasps itself as essentiality and essence as an actual self. It no longer places its world and the world's ground outside itself. Instead, it lets everything fade away within itself and, as conscience, is spirit certain of itself.

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443 The ethical world, the world torn apart into a here and a beyond, and the moral worldview are therefore the spirits whose movement and return into spirit's simple self existing for itself will unfold. As their goal and result, the actual self-consciousness of absolute spirit will emerge.

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A. True spirit: ethical life.

444 In its simple truth, spirit is consciousness, and it separates its moments from one another. Action divides it into substance and consciousness of substance. It also divides both substance and consciousness themselves. As universal essence and purpose, substance confronts itself as individualized actuality. The infinite middle is self-consciousness. In itself, self-consciousness is the unity of itself and substance, and it now becomes this for itself. It unites universal essence with its individualized actuality, raises this actuality to that essence, and acts ethically. It also brings that essence down to this actuality and carries out the purpose, the substance that was only thought. It produces the unity of its self and substance as its work, and thus as actuality.

445 In this separation of consciousness, simple substance has, on the one hand, come into opposition to self-consciousness. On the other, it thereby presents within itself the very nature of consciousness, 1807 383 of differentiating itself within itself, as a world articulated into its constituent bodies. It therefore splits into a differentiated ethical essence, into a human and a divine law. Likewise, the self-consciousness confronting it assigns itself, according to its essence, to one of these powers. As knowing, it divides into ignorance of what it does and knowledge of it—a knowledge that is therefore deceived. In its deed it thus experiences both the contradiction between those powers into which substance split, and their mutual destruction. It also experiences the contradiction between its knowledge of the ethical character of its action and what is ethical in and for itself. It finds its own downfall. In fact, however, through this movement ethical substance has become actual self-consciousness, or this self has become something existing in and for itself. But in this very process ethical life has perished.

a. The ethical world: human and divine law, man and woman.

446 As consciousness, the simple substance of spirit divides itself. Or, just as consciousness of abstract, sensuous being passes over into perception, 1807 384 so does immediate certainty of real, ethical being. For sense-perception, simple being becomes a thing with many properties. Likewise, for ethical perception, the situation in which one acts is an actuality with many ethical relations. But for the former, the useless multiplicity of properties contracts into the essential opposition of individuality and universality. Still more, for the latter, which is purified, substantial consciousness, the multiplicity of ethical moments becomes the twofold division into a law of individuality and a law of universality. Yet each of these constituent bodies of substance remains the whole spirit. In sense-perception, things have no substance other than the two determinations of individuality and universality. Here, however, these express only the superficial opposition of the two sides to one another.

447 In the essence we are considering here, individuality means self-consciousness in general, not an individual, contingent consciousness. In this determination, ethical substance is therefore actual substance, absolute spirit realized in the multiplicity of existing consciousness. It is the community. For us, when we entered the practical shape of reason in general, the community was absolute essence. Here it has emerged in its truth for itself, as conscious ethical essence and as the essence for the consciousness 1807 385 we have as our object. It is spirit that exists for itself by seeing itself reflected in individuals, and exists in itself, or as substance, by maintaining them within itself. As actual substance, it is a people; as actual consciousness, it is a citizen of that people. This consciousness has its essence in simple spirit and its certainty of itself in the actuality of this spirit, the whole people. There it immediately has its truth: not in something unactual, but in a spirit that exists and has validity.

448 This spirit can be called human law because it exists essentially in the form of actuality conscious of itself. In the form of universality, it is the known law and the existing custom. In the form of individuality, it is actual certainty of itself in the individual in general. As government, it is certainty of itself as simple individuality. Its truth is validity openly displayed in the light of day: an existence that, for immediate certainty, takes the form of an existence released into independence.

449 But another power, divine law, confronts this ethical power and openness. For as the movement of conscious activity, ethical state power has its opposite in the simple and immediate essence of ethical life. As actual universality, it is a force directed against individual being-for-itself. And as 1807 386 actuality in general, it still has in inner essence something other than itself.

450 We have already noted that each opposed way in which ethical substance exists contains the whole substance and all moments of its content. So if the community is substance as actual activity conscious of itself, the other side has the form of immediate, or simply existing, substance. On the one hand, this is the inner concept, or universal possibility, of ethical life in general. On the other, it equally contains the moment of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness expressing ethical life within this element of immediacy or being—an immediate consciousness of itself in another, both as essence and as this self, a natural ethical community—is the family. As the unconscious, still inner concept, the family stands opposed to its self-conscious actuality. As the element of the people's actuality, it stands opposed to the people itself. As immediate ethical being, it stands opposed to ethical life that forms and maintains itself through work for the universal. The Penates, or household gods, stand opposed to universal spirit.

451 Although the family's ethical being is defined as immediate, the family is not an ethical essence within itself insofar as it is the natural relation among its members, or their immediate relation as actual individuals. For 1807 387 the ethical is universal in itself. This natural relation is essentially just as much a spirit, and is ethical only as spiritual essence. We must see what its distinctive ethical character consists in.—First, because the ethical is universal in itself, the ethical relation between family members is not a relation of feeling or love. It now seems that the ethical must be placed in the relation of the individual family member to the whole family as substance, so that the individual's activity and actuality have only the family as their purpose and content. But the conscious purpose of the whole's activity, insofar as it is directed toward the whole itself, is itself the individual. Acquiring and maintaining power and wealth is partly directed only toward need and belongs to desire. In its higher role, however, it serves only as a means. This higher determination does not fall within the family itself, but is directed toward what is truly universal, the community. It is instead negative toward the family. It consists in taking the individual out of the family, subduing the individual's natural character and individuality, and leading the individual toward virtue, toward life in and for the universal. The positive purpose distinctive to the family is the individual as such. Now, for this relation to be ethical, the individual—whether the person acting or the person to whom the action relates—cannot appear according to 1807 388 some contingent circumstance, as happens in some particular assistance or service. The content of ethical action must be substantial, or whole and universal. It can therefore relate only to the whole individual, or to the individual as universal. Nor can this merely mean imagining that a service advances the person's entire happiness, while as an immediate, actual action it only does something particular for them. Nor can it mean that, as education, the action actually takes the person as a whole as its object and produces that person as its work through a series of efforts. In that case, besides the purpose being negative toward the family, the actual action has only a limited content. Finally, it cannot mean emergency assistance that truly saves the whole individual. For such assistance is itself a wholly contingent deed, occasioned by an ordinary actuality that may or may not exist. The action in question embraces the whole existence of the blood relative. Its object and content is not the citizen, who does not belong to the family, nor the person who is to become a citizen and cease to count as this individual. Rather, it takes this individual belonging to the family as a universal essence, lifted out of sensuous—that is, individual—actuality. Such action no longer concerns the living, but the dead. The dead person has gathered the long series of their scattered existence 1807 389 into its one completed shape and risen from the unrest of contingent life into the rest of simple universality.—Because the individual is actual and substantial only as a citizen, the individual, insofar as they are not a citizen and belong to the family, is only an unactual, strengthless shade.

452 This universality that the individual reaches as such is pure being, death. It is an immediate, natural having-come-to-be, not the activity of a consciousness. The family member's duty is therefore to add this latter side, so that the relative's final being, this universal being, will not belong to nature alone and remain something irrational. Instead, it is to be something done, in which the right of consciousness is upheld. Or rather, the action's meaning is that the rest and universality of self-conscious essence do not in truth belong to nature. The appearance of an action of this kind, which nature has arrogated to itself, must therefore be removed and the truth restored.—What nature did to the individual is the side from which their becoming universal presents itself as the movement of something that exists. This movement does fall within the ethical community and has the community as its purpose. Death is the completion and highest work that the individual as such undertakes for it. But insofar as the individual is essentially individual, it is contingent whether their death 1807 390 was directly connected with their work for the universal and resulted from it. And even if it was, death is natural negativity and the movement of the individual as something that exists, in which consciousness does not return into itself and become self-consciousness. Or, since the movement of what exists consists in its being sublated and reaching being-for-itself, death is the side of division in which the being-for-itself attained is something other than the existing being that entered the movement.—Because ethical life is spirit in its immediate truth, the sides into which its consciousness separates also fall within this form of immediacy. Individuality passes over into this abstract negativity. Without comfort or reconciliation in itself, it must necessarily receive them through an actual, external action.—Blood relationship therefore completes the abstract natural movement by adding the movement of consciousness. It interrupts nature's work and rescues the blood relative from destruction. Or rather, since destruction—the relative's becoming pure being—is necessary, the family itself takes on the deed of destruction.—In this way, dead, universal being too becomes a being returned into itself, a being-for-itself. Powerless, pure, single individuality is raised to universal individuality. The dead person has released their being from their 1807 391 activity, or negative one, and is empty individuality, only a passive being for another. The dead person is abandoned to all low, irrational individuality and to the forces of abstract materials. These are now stronger: the former because of the life it possesses, the latter because of their negative nature. The family wards off this dishonoring activity of unconscious desire and abstract entities, puts its own activity in its place, and joins the relative in marriage to the earth's bosom, to elemental, imperishable individuality. It thereby makes the relative a member of a community that instead overcomes and holds bound the forces of individual materials and the low forms of life that were being released against the relative and sought to destroy them.

453 This final duty therefore constitutes the complete divine law, or the positive ethical action toward the individual. Every other relation to the individual that goes beyond love and is ethical belongs to human law. It has the negative meaning of raising the individual above confinement within the natural community to which they belong as an actual individual. Now human right has as its content and power actual, self-conscious ethical substance, the whole people, while divine right and law have the individual who is beyond actuality. Yet this individual is not without power. 1807 392 Their power is the abstract, purely universal: the elemental individual. This elemental individual tears back into pure abstraction, as into its essence, the individuality that breaks away from the element and constitutes the self-conscious actuality of the people, just as it is also that individuality's ground.—How this power manifests itself in the people will unfold further.

454 Within each law there are also distinctions and stages. For both essences contain the moment of consciousness, so distinction unfolds within them. This makes up their movement and their distinctive life. Examining these distinctions shows how the two universal essences of the ethical world act and are self-conscious, and how they connect and pass over into one another.

455 The community, the higher law whose validity lies openly in sunlight, has its actual life in government, in which it is an individual. Government is actual spirit reflected into itself, the simple self of the whole ethical substance. This simple power does allow the essence to spread out into its articulated parts and give each part subsistence and its own being-for-itself. In this, spirit has its reality, or existence, and the family is the element of this reality. But spirit is also the power of the whole that gathers these parts 1807 393 back into the negative one, makes them feel their lack of independence, and keeps them conscious that they have their life only in the whole. On the one hand, then, the community may organize itself into systems of personal independence and property, of rights of persons and rights in things. It may likewise articulate and make independent the ways of working for initially individual purposes—acquisition and enjoyment—into associations of their own. The spirit of universal association is the simplicity and negative essence of these systems that isolate themselves. To prevent their taking root and hardening in this isolation, thereby breaking up the whole and letting spirit evaporate, government must shake them internally from time to time through wars. It must thereby violate and disrupt their established order and right of independence. Individuals absorbed in these systems tear themselves away from the whole and strive for inviolable being-for-itself and personal security. Through the work imposed on them, government must make them feel their master, death. By dissolving the form of settled subsistence in this way, spirit prevents ethical existence from sinking into natural existence. It preserves and raises the self of its consciousness into freedom and its power.—Negative essence reveals itself as the community's proper might and the power 1807 394 of its self-preservation. The community therefore has the truth and confirmation of its might in the essence of divine law and the underworld.

456 Divine law, which rules in the family, likewise contains distinctions. Their relation makes up the living movement of its actuality. There are three relations: husband and wife, parents and children, and siblings as brother and sister. First, the relation of husband and wife is the immediate recognition of one consciousness in the other, and recognition of their mutual being-recognized. Because this is natural recognition, not ethical recognition, it is only the representation and image of spirit, not actual spirit itself.—But a representation or image has its actuality in something other than itself. This relation therefore has its actuality not within itself but in the child, an other whose coming-to-be it is, and in whom it itself disappears. This onward succession of generations has its subsistence in the people.—The devotion of husband and wife to one another is therefore mixed with natural relationship and feeling. Their relation does not have its return into itself within itself. The same holds for the second relation, the mutual devotion of parents and children. The devotion of parents 1807 395 to their children is affected by this very emotion: having consciousness of one's actuality in another and seeing being-for-itself come to be in that other, without receiving it back. Instead, it remains a foreign actuality of its own.—Conversely, the devotion of children toward parents is mixed with the emotion of having one's own coming-to-be, or in-itself, in another who is disappearing, and of attaining being-for-itself and one's own self-consciousness only by separating from the origin—a separation in which that origin dries up.

457 These two relations remain within transition and the inequality of the sides allotted to them.—The unmixed relation, however, occurs between brother and sister. They are the same blood, but blood that has reached rest and equilibrium in them. They therefore do not desire one another. Nor has either given being-for-itself to the other or received it from the other. Instead, they are free individualities in relation to one another. As sister, the feminine therefore has the highest intimation of ethical essence. It does not reach consciousness and actuality of that essence, because the law of the family is essence existing in itself, inner essence. It does not lie in the daylight of consciousness, but remains inner feeling and the divine removed from actuality. The feminine is bound 1807 396 to these Penates, or household gods. In them it intuits both its universal substance and its individuality, but without this relation of individuality also being the natural relation of pleasure.—As daughter, a woman must see her parents disappear, with natural emotion and ethical calm. For only at the cost of this relation does she attain the being-for-itself of which she is capable. In her parents, then, she does not intuit her being-for-itself positively.—But in the relations of mother and wife, individuality is partly something natural belonging to pleasure, and partly something negative that sees only its own disappearance in them. Partly, for that very reason, it is something contingent that can be replaced by another individuality. In the household of ethical life, it is not this husband or this child, but a husband, children in general—not feeling, but the universal—that grounds these relations of woman. Her ethical character differs from man's precisely in this: in her orientation toward individuality and in her pleasure she remains immediately universal and foreign to the individuality of desire. In man, by contrast, these two sides separate. As a citizen he possesses the self-conscious power of universality, and thereby purchases the right of desire, while at the same time retaining freedom from it. Since individuality is mixed into this relation of woman, 1807 397 its ethical character is not pure. But insofar as it is pure, individuality is indifferent, and the woman lacks the moment of recognizing herself as this self in the other.—For the sister, however, the brother is tranquil, equal essence in general. Her recognition in him is pure and unmixed with natural relationship. The indifference of individuality and its ethical contingency are therefore absent from this relation. Here the moment of the recognizing and recognized individual self may assert its right, because it is connected with the equilibrium of blood and a relation without desire. The loss of her brother is therefore irreplaceable for the sister, and her duty toward him is the highest.

458 This relation is also the boundary at which the self-contained family dissolves and goes outside itself. The brother is the side through which the family's spirit becomes individuality that turns toward something else and passes over into consciousness of universality. The brother leaves this immediate, elemental, and therefore properly negative ethical life of the family in order to acquire and produce actual ethical life conscious of itself.

459 He passes from divine law, in whose sphere he lived, to human law. The sister, however, becomes—or the wife remains—the head of the household and guardian of divine 1807 398 law. In this way the two sexes overcome their natural essence and appear in their ethical meaning, as differences that divide between themselves the two distinctions ethical substance gives itself. These two universal essences of the ethical world have their determinate individuality in naturally differentiated self-consciousness because ethical spirit is the immediate unity of substance and self-consciousness. This immediacy, on the side of reality and distinction, therefore also appears as the existence of a natural distinction.—This is the side that appeared as originally determinate nature in the shape of individuality real to itself, within the concept of spiritual essence. This moment loses the indeterminateness it still had there, and the contingent diversity of talents and abilities. It is now the determinate opposition of the two sexes, whose natural character also acquires the meaning of their ethical determination.

460 Yet the distinction between the sexes and their ethical content remains within the unity of substance, and its movement is precisely substance's enduring coming-to-be. The spirit of the family sends the man out into the community, where he finds his self-conscious essence. Through him, the family has its universal substance and subsistence in the community. Conversely, the community 1807 399 has in the family the formal element of its actuality, and in divine law its power and confirmation. Neither exists in and for itself alone. In its living movement, human law starts from divine law, the law valid on earth from the law below, the conscious from the unconscious, mediation from immediacy. It equally returns to where it began. The power below, in turn, has its actuality on earth. Through consciousness it becomes existence and activity.

461 The universal ethical essences are therefore substance as universal consciousness and substance as individual consciousness. Their universal actuality is the people and the family; their natural self and active individuality is man and woman. In this content of the ethical world, we see the purposes achieved that the previous, unsubstantial shapes of consciousness set themselves. What reason grasped only as an object has become self-consciousness, and what self-consciousness had only within itself is present as true actuality.—What observation knew as something found already there, in which the self had no part, is here an already existing custom, but an actuality that is also the deed and work of the one who finds it.—The individual seeking the pleasure of enjoying their individuality finds it in the family. The necessity in which pleasure passes away is the individual's own 1807 400 self-consciousness as a citizen of their people.—Or it is this: knowing the law of the heart as the law of all hearts, and consciousness of the self as the acknowledged universal order.—It is virtue enjoying the fruits of its sacrifice. It accomplishes what it aims at: bringing essence out into actual presence. Its enjoyment is this universal life.—Finally, consciousness of the matter itself finds satisfaction in real substance, which positively contains and preserves the abstract moments of that empty category. In the ethical powers, substance has a true content that has replaced the unsubstantial commands that sound reason wanted to give and know. It thereby also has a standard full of content, determined within itself, for testing not laws, but what is done.

462 The whole is a tranquil equilibrium of all its parts. Each part is a spirit at home, seeking its satisfaction not beyond itself but possessing it within itself, because it is itself in this equilibrium with the whole.—This equilibrium can be alive only if inequality arises within it and is brought back to equality by justice. But justice is neither a foreign essence existing beyond it nor the actuality, unworthy of justice, of mutual malice, betrayal, 1807 401 ingratitude, and so forth, which would execute judgment through thoughtless chance, as an uncomprehended connection and an unconscious doing and leaving undone. Rather, as the justice of human right, it brings being-for-itself that has left the equilibrium—the independence of classes and individuals—back into the universal. It is the government of the people: the self-present individuality of universal essence and everyone's own self-conscious will.—But the justice that brings the universal, when it becomes overpowering against the individual, back into equilibrium is equally the simple spirit of the person who has suffered wrong. It is not split into the sufferer and an essence beyond. The sufferer is the power below, and it is their Fury that pursues revenge. For their individuality, their blood, lives on in the household; their substance has an enduring actuality. The only wrong that can be done to an individual in the ethical realm is that something simply happens to them. The power that does consciousness this wrong, making it a mere thing, is nature. It is the universality not of the community, but the abstract universality of being. In undoing the wrong suffered, individuality turns not against the community, which has not wronged it, but against this abstract universality. As we have seen, consciousness belonging to the individual's blood undoes this 1807 402 wrong by making what has happened into a work, so that being, the final thing, is also something willed, and thus a source of gladness.

463 In its subsistence, the ethical realm is thus an unstained world, unpolluted by any division. Its movement is likewise the tranquil becoming of one of its powers into the other, so that each itself maintains and produces the other. We do see it divide into two essences and their actuality. But their opposition is instead the confirmation of each by the other. Where they immediately touch as actual powers, their middle and element is their immediate interpenetration. One extreme, universal self-conscious spirit, is joined to its other extreme, its power and element, unconscious spirit, through the individuality of man. Conversely, divine law has its individualization, or the unconscious spirit of the individual has its existence, in woman. Through her as its middle, it rises from its unactuality into actuality, from what does not know and is not known into the conscious realm. The union of man and woman constitutes the active middle of the whole and the element that, divided into these extremes of divine and human law, is equally their immediate union. It makes those first two syllogisms into the same syllogism 1807 403 and unites the opposed movements into one: actuality descending into unactuality—human law, organized into independent members, descending to the danger and test of death—and the law below ascending to the actuality of daylight and conscious existence. The former movement belongs to man, the latter to woman.

b. Ethical action: human and divine knowledge, guilt and fate.

464 Given the character of opposition in this realm, self-consciousness has not yet appeared in its right as single individuality. On one side, individuality counts here only as universal will; on the other, as the family's blood. This individual counts only as the unactual shade.—No deed has yet been done. But the deed is the actual self.—It disturbs the tranquil organization and movement of the ethical world. In that world, the two essences appear in an orderly harmony, each confirming and completing the other. Through the deed, this becomes a transition between opposites, in which each proves instead to be the nullity of itself 1807 404 and the other, rather than their confirmation. It becomes the negative movement, or eternal necessity, of terrible fate. Fate devours divine and human law, along with the two self-consciousnesses in which these powers exist, into the abyss of its simplicity. For us, it passes over into the absolute being-for-itself of purely individual self-consciousness.

465 The ground from which this movement begins and on which it proceeds is the ethical realm. But the activity of this movement is self-consciousness. As ethical consciousness, it is a simple, pure orientation toward ethical essentiality, or duty. It contains no arbitrary choice, no struggle or indecision, since the giving and testing of laws have been abandoned. Instead, ethical essentiality is for it immediate, unwavering, and free from contradiction. It therefore offers neither the sorry spectacle of finding itself in a conflict between passion and duty, nor the comic spectacle of a conflict between duty and duty. In content, the latter conflict is the same as that between passion and duty. For passion can equally be represented as duty: once consciousness withdraws into itself from duty's immediate, substantial essentiality, duty becomes the formal universal into which every content fits equally well, as shown above. The conflict 1807 405 of duties is comic because it expresses a contradiction: an opposed absolute. It thus expresses the absolute and, immediately, the nullity of this so-called absolute, or duty.—Ethical consciousness, however, knows what it has to do and is decided in belonging either to divine or to human law. The immediacy of its decision is a being-in-itself and therefore also has the meaning of a natural being, as we have seen. Nature, not the contingency of circumstances or choice, assigns one sex to one law, the other to the other. Or conversely, the two ethical powers themselves give themselves their individual existence and actualization in the two sexes.

466 Ethical life essentially consists in this immediate decidedness, so that for consciousness only one law is the essence. At the same time, the ethical powers are actual in consciousness's self. They therefore acquire the meaning of excluding and being opposed to one another. In self-consciousness they exist for themselves, whereas in the ethical realm they exist only in themselves. Because ethical consciousness is decided for one of them, it is essentially character. For it, the two do not have equal essentiality. Their opposition therefore appears as an unfortunate conflict of duty only with an actuality that has no right. Ethical 1807 406 consciousness, as self-consciousness, stands within this opposition. As such, it also aims to subject this opposed actuality by force to the law to which it belongs, or to deceive it. Since each sees right only on its own side and wrong on the other, the consciousness belonging to divine law sees contingent human violence on the other side. The consciousness assigned to human law sees there the stubbornness and disobedience of inner being-for-itself. For the government's commands are the universal meaning, public and in the light of day. The will of the other law, however, is the meaning below, enclosed within the inward realm. In its existence it appears as the will of individuality and, in contradicting the first law, is an outrage.

467 This produces in consciousness the opposition of the known and unknown, just as in substance it produces that of the conscious and unconscious. The absolute right of ethical self-consciousness comes into conflict with the divine right of essence. For self-consciousness as consciousness, objective actuality as such has essence. But in its substance, self-consciousness is the unity of itself and this opposite. Ethical self-consciousness is consciousness of substance. The object opposed to self-consciousness has therefore completely lost the meaning 1807 407 of having essence for itself. The spheres in which the object is only a thing have long disappeared. So have those in which consciousness establishes something from within itself and makes an individual moment into the essence. Against such one-sidedness, actuality has a power of its own. Allied with truth against consciousness, it first shows consciousness what truth is. But ethical consciousness has drunk from the cup of absolute substance, forgetting all the one-sidedness of being-for-itself, its purposes, and its distinctive concepts. In this water of the Styx, it has therefore also drowned all the objective world's own essentiality and independent significance. Its absolute right is thus that, when it acts according to ethical law, it should find in this actualization nothing other than the accomplishment of that law itself, and that the deed should show nothing other than what the ethical activity is.—As both absolute essence and absolute power, the ethical cannot suffer any distortion of its content. If it were only absolute essence without power, individuality could distort it. But as ethical consciousness, individuality has renounced distortion by giving up one-sided being-for-itself. Conversely, mere power would be distorted by essence if power still were such a being-for-itself. Because of this unity, 1807 408 individuality is the pure form of substance, which is the content. Activity is the passage from thought into actuality, merely as the movement of an opposition without essence, whose moments have no particular content or essentiality differing from one another. Ethical consciousness's absolute right is therefore that the deed, the shape of its actuality, should be nothing other than what it knows.

468 But ethical essence has split itself into two laws, while consciousness, as an undivided relation to law, is assigned to only one. This simple consciousness insists on its absolute right that essence should have appeared to it, as ethical consciousness, as it is in itself. Equally, essence insists on the right of its reality, or on being twofold. Yet this right of essence does not confront self-consciousness as something located elsewhere. It is self-consciousness's own essence. It has its existence and power only within self-consciousness, and its opposition is the deed of self-consciousness. For precisely by existing for itself as a self and proceeding to the deed, self-consciousness rises out of simple immediacy and itself posits division. Through the deed, it gives up the determination of ethical life as the simple certainty of immediate truth. It posits the separation of itself into itself as active and the opposed actuality that is negative for it 1807 409. Through the deed, it therefore becomes guilty. For the deed is its activity, and activity is its ownmost essence. Guilt also acquires the meaning of crime: as simple ethical consciousness, it has turned toward one law, renounced the other, and violates this other through its deed.—Guilt is not the indifferent, ambiguous situation in which the deed, as it actually lies in the light of day, might or might not be the activity of its self. That would suggest that something external and contingent could attach itself to activity without belonging to it, so that from this side the activity would be innocent. Rather, activity is itself this division: positing itself for itself and, opposed to it, a foreign, external actuality. That such an actuality exists belongs to activity itself and occurs through it. Only non-action is therefore innocent, like the being of a stone—not even that of a child.—In its content, however, ethical action contains the moment of crime because it does not sublate the natural distribution of the two laws between the two sexes. Instead, as an undivided orientation toward law, it remains within natural immediacy. As activity, it makes this one-sidedness into guilt: grasping only one side of essence and relating negatively to the other, that is, violating it. We will later state more precisely where guilt and crime, activity and action fall within universal ethical life 1807 410. This much is immediately clear: it is not this individual who acts and is guilty. For as this self the individual is only the unactual shade, or exists only as a universal self. Individuality is purely the formal moment of activity in general. The content is laws and customs, and, specifically for the individual, those of their class. The individual is substance as genus, which through its determination becomes a species, but the species remains at the same time the universality of the genus. Within a people, self-consciousness descends from the universal only as far as particularity, not to single individuality that posits in its activity an exclusive self, an actuality negative to itself. Instead, its action is grounded in secure trust in the whole, unmixed with anything foreign, with fear or hostility.

469 Ethical self-consciousness now experiences in its deed the developed nature of actual action, whether it has committed itself to divine or to human law. The law manifest to it is essentially connected with the opposite law. Essence is the unity of both, but the deed has carried out only one against the other. Since the two are essentially connected, fulfilling one calls forth the other, and calls it forth as what the deed has made it: a violated 1807 411 essence, now hostile and demanding revenge. For action, only one side of the decision in general lies in the light of day. But in itself the decision is the negative, which sets against itself an other, something foreign to itself as knowing. Actuality therefore keeps the other side, foreign to knowledge, hidden within itself. It does not show itself to consciousness as it is in and for itself. It does not show the son his father in the man who wrongs him and whom he kills; nor his mother in the queen he takes as his wife. In this way a power that shuns the light stalks ethical self-consciousness. Only after the deed is done does it break out and catch consciousness in the deed. For the accomplished deed is the sublated opposition between the knowing self and the actuality confronting it. The agent cannot deny the crime and their guilt.—The deed consists in moving the unmoved and bringing forth what was enclosed only as a possibility. It thus connects the unconscious with the conscious, what does not exist with being. In this truth, then, the deed comes into the sunlight: as something in which a conscious element is joined to an unconscious one, one's own to something foreign. It appears as divided essence, whose other side consciousness experiences as its own too, but as a power it has violated and stirred into hostility.

1807 412

470 The right that lay in ambush may be present for the acting consciousness not in its distinctive shape, but only in itself, in the inward guilt of the decision and action. But ethical consciousness is more complete, its guilt purer, when it knows beforehand the law and power it confronts, takes them for violence and wrong, for an ethical contingency, and knowingly commits the crime, as Antigone does. The accomplished deed reverses its view. Accomplishment itself declares that what is ethical must be actual, since the actuality of the purpose is the purpose of action. Action expresses precisely the unity of actuality and substance. It declares that actuality is not contingent for essence, but allied with it and granted to nothing that is not truly right. For the sake of this actuality, and for the sake of its own activity, ethical consciousness must acknowledge its opposite as its own. It must acknowledge its guilt: “because we suffer, we acknowledge that we have erred”—

471 This acknowledgment expresses the sublation of the division between ethical purpose and actuality. It expresses the return to the ethical attitude that knows that nothing has validity except what is right. But the agent thereby gives up its character and the actuality of its self, and has perished 1807 413. Its being consists in belonging to its ethical law as its substance. But in acknowledging the opposite, this law has ceased to be its substance. Instead of its actuality, it has attained unactuality, the ethical attitude.—Substance does appear in individuality as its pathos, while individuality appears as what gives substance life and therefore stands above it. But substance is a pathos that is also individuality's character. Ethical individuality is immediately, and in itself, one with this universal of its own. It exists only within it and cannot survive the downfall that this ethical power suffers through the opposite power.

472 Yet it is certain that the individuality whose pathos is this opposite power suffers no more evil than it has inflicted. The movement of ethical powers against one another, and of the individualities that bring them into life and action, reaches its true end only when both sides experience the same downfall. For neither power has any advantage over the other that would make it a more essential moment of substance. The equal essentiality of the two and their indifferent coexistence constitute their being without a self. In the deed, however, they exist as selves, but as different selves. This contradicts the unity of the self and constitutes their lack of right 1807 414 and their necessary downfall. Character, too, belongs in its pathos or substance to only one power. At the same time, on the side of knowing, each character is divided into a conscious and an unconscious element. Each itself calls forth this opposition, and through the deed even its not-knowing is its work. It thus incurs the guilt that consumes it. The victory of one power and its character, and the defeat of the other side, would therefore be only a partial and unfinished work that advances irresistibly toward the equilibrium of both. Only in the equal subjection of both sides is absolute right accomplished. Ethical substance then appears as the negative power that devours both sides, or as almighty and just fate.

473 If the two powers are taken in their determinate content and its individualization, the picture of their embodied conflict presents itself in two ways. Formally, it is the conflict of ethical life and self-consciousness with unconscious nature and a contingency brought about through nature. This contingency has a right against self-consciousness because the latter is only true spirit, only in immediate unity with its substance. In content, the picture presents the division between divine and human law.—The young man leaves unconscious essence, the spirit of the family, and becomes the individuality of the community. But 1807 415 he still belongs to the nature from which he tore himself away. This shows itself in his appearing in the contingency of two brothers, who seize control of the community with equal right. The inequality of earlier and later birth, as a natural distinction, has no significance for them, who are entering ethical essence. But government, as the simple soul or self of the people's spirit, cannot tolerate a duality of individuality. Nature, as the chance of plurality, confronts the ethical necessity of this unity. The two therefore fall into conflict, and their equal right to state power destroys them both, who are equally in the wrong. From the human point of view, the one who is not in possession and attacks the community headed by the other has committed the crime. Right, by contrast, is on the side of the one who knew how to treat the other merely as an individual, detached from the community, and expelled him in this powerlessness. He has attacked only the individual as such, not the community, not the essence of human right. The community, attacked and defended by empty individuality, preserves itself, while the brothers bring about one another's downfall. For the individuality that ties the whole's danger to its own being-for-itself has excluded itself from the community and dissolves within itself. But the community 1807 416 will honor the one who was on its side. The other, who already proclaimed the community's devastation on its walls, will be punished by the government—the restored simplicity of the community's self—by being denied the final honor. Whoever came to assault the highest spirit of consciousness, the community, must be stripped of the honor of their whole completed essence, the honor of the departed spirit.

474 In this way the universal easily strikes off the pure tip of its pyramid and does win a victory over the rebellious principle of individuality, the family. Yet it has thereby only entered into battle with divine law; self-conscious spirit has only entered into battle with the unconscious. For the latter is the other essential power, and is therefore not destroyed by the former, but only offended. Against the powerful law in the light of day, however, it has only the bloodless shade to help it achieve actual effect. As the law of weakness and darkness, it therefore initially yields to the law of daylight and strength, since its power has validity below, not on earth. But the actual, by taking honor and power from the inward, has thereby consumed its own essence. Manifest spirit has the root of its power in the underworld. The people's certainty, secure of itself and assuring itself, has the truth of its oath binding everyone into one only in the 1807 417 unconscious, silent substance of all, in the waters of forgetfulness. This turns manifest spirit's accomplishment into its opposite. It experiences its highest right as the highest wrong, its victory as its own downfall. The dead person whose right has been violated therefore knows how to find instruments of revenge as actual and powerful as the power that injured them. These powers are other communities, whose altars dogs or birds have defiled with the corpse. Instead of being raised into unconscious universality through its proper return to the elemental individual, the corpse has remained above ground in the realm of actuality. As the power of divine law, it now acquires a self-conscious, actual universality. These communities rise in hostility and destroy the community that dishonored and shattered its own power, the family's devotion.

475 In this presentation, the movement of human and divine law expresses its necessity in individuals. In them the universal appears as a pathos, and the activity of the movement as individual activity, which gives its necessity the appearance of contingency. But individuality and activity constitute the principle of individuality in general, which in its pure universality was called inner 1807 418 divine law. As a moment of the manifest community, it has not only that underground effect—or an effect that is external in the form it takes—but also an equally manifest existence and movement, actual in the actual people. Taken in this form, what was presented as the simple movement of individualized pathos acquires a different appearance. The crime and the destruction of the community grounded in it acquire the proper form of their existence.—Human law, then, is the community in its universal existence, masculinity in its activity in general, and government in its actual activity. It is, moves, and preserves itself by consuming within itself the separation of the Penates, the household gods—that is, the independent division into families headed by femininity—and keeping them dissolved in the continuity of its fluidity. But the family is also its element in general, and individual consciousness its universal active ground. The community secures its subsistence only by disturbing family happiness and dissolving self-consciousness into the universal. It therefore produces its internal enemy in what it suppresses and what is also essential to it: femininity in general. Femininity—the eternal irony of the community—uses intrigue to change the government's universal purpose 1807 419 into a private purpose. It turns the government's universal activity into the work of this particular individual and perverts the state's universal property into the family's possession and ornament. It thereby makes the serious wisdom of mature age—which has died to individuality, to pleasure and enjoyment as well as actual activity, and thinks and cares only for the universal—an object of ridicule for immature youth's high spirits and of contempt for its enthusiasm. In general, it raises the power of youth to authority: the son, in whom the mother has given birth to her master; the brother, in whom the sister has man as her equal; the young man, through whom the daughter is freed from her dependence and attains the enjoyment and dignity of wifehood.—The community can preserve itself only by suppressing this spirit of individuality. Yet because it is an essential moment, the community also produces it, and through its suppressive attitude produces it as a hostile principle. This principle, however, separating itself from the universal purpose, is only evil and null in itself. It could accomplish nothing if the community itself did not acknowledge youth's power—masculinity that is not mature and still remains within individuality—as the power of the whole. For the community is a people, is itself individuality, and essentially exists for itself only insofar as other individualities 1807 420 exist for it, insofar as it excludes them and knows itself independent of them. The community's negative side, suppressing the separation of individuals within but acting on its own toward the outside, has its weapons in individuality. War is the spirit and form in which the essential moment of ethical substance—the absolute freedom of the ethical self from all existence—is present in its actuality and confirmation. On one side, war makes the individual systems of property and personal independence, as well as individual personality itself, feel the power of the negative. On the other, in war this same negative essence rises as what preserves the whole. The brave young man, in whom femininity takes pleasure, the suppressed principle of ruin, comes into the open and becomes authoritative. Now natural power, and what appears as the chance of good fortune, decide the existence of ethical essence and spiritual necessity. Since ethical essence's existence rests on strength and fortune, it is already decided that it has perished.—Just as previously only the Penates perished in the people's spirit, so now the living spirits of peoples perish through their individuality in a universal community. Its simple universality is spiritless and dead, and its life is the single individual as an individual. The ethical shape of spirit 1807 421 has disappeared, and another takes its place.

476 This downfall of ethical substance and its passage into another shape is therefore determined by ethical consciousness being essentially immediately directed toward law. This determination of immediacy means that nature in general enters ethical action. Its actuality reveals only the contradiction and seed of ruin that ethical spirit's beautiful harmony and tranquil equilibrium contain precisely in that tranquility and beauty. For immediacy has the contradictory meaning of being both nature's unconscious rest and spirit's self-conscious, restless rest.—Because of this natural character, this ethical people is in general an individuality determined by nature and therefore limited. It thus finds its sublation in another individuality. But this determination, when posited in existence, is limitation and equally the negative in general and the self of individuality. When it disappears, spirit's life and this substance conscious of itself in everyone are lost. Substance emerges in them as a formal universality. It no longer lives within them as living spirit. Instead, the simple solidity of their individuality has shattered into many points.

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c. The legal condition.

477 The universal unity into which the living, immediate unity of individuality and substance returns is the spiritless community. It has ceased to be the substance of individuals that is not conscious of itself. They now count within it, according to their individual being-for-itself, as selves and substances. The universal has splintered into the atoms of an absolute multiplicity of individuals. This dead spirit is an equality in which all count as each, as persons.—What was called hidden divine law in the ethical world has in fact emerged from its inwardness into actuality. In that world the individual had validity and actuality only as the universal blood of the family. As this individual, the individual was the departed spirit without a self. Now, however, the individual has emerged from this unactuality. Because ethical substance is only true spirit, spirit returns into certainty of itself. It is that substance as the positive universal, but its actuality is to be a negative, universal self.—We saw the powers and shapes of the ethical world sink into the simple necessity of empty fate. This power over them is substance reflecting itself into its simplicity. But absolute essence reflecting itself into itself—precisely that necessity of empty 1807 423 fate—is nothing other than the I of self-consciousness.

478 So this I now counts as essence existing in and for itself. Its being-recognized is its substantiality. But this is abstract universality, because its content is this unyielding self, not the self dissolved in substance.

479 Personality has therefore emerged here from the life of ethical substance. It is the independence of consciousness that has actual validity. The unactual thought of this independence, which comes about by renouncing actuality, appeared earlier as Stoic self-consciousness. Just as Stoic self-consciousness arose from mastery and servitude, the immediate existence of self-consciousness, so personality has arisen from immediate spirit, which is everyone's universal ruling will and equally the obedience with which they serve. What for Stoicism was the in-itself only in abstraction is now an actual world. Stoicism is nothing other than the consciousness that reduces the principle of the legal condition—spiritless independence—to its abstract form. By fleeing from actuality, it attained only the thought of independence. It exists absolutely for itself by not attaching its essence to any existence, but by giving up all existence and placing its essence solely in the unity of pure thought. In the same way, the right of a person is attached neither to a 1807 424 richer or more powerful existence of the individual as such, nor to a universal living spirit. Instead, it is attached to the pure one of the individual's abstract actuality, or to the individual as self-consciousness in general.

480 Just as Stoicism's abstract independence presented its actualization, so this actualization will also repeat the movement of that first independence. That first independence passes into the skeptical confusion of consciousness: a rambling of the negative that wanders without shape from one contingency of being and thought to another. It dissolves them in absolute independence, but equally produces them again. In fact, it is only the contradiction between the independence and dependence of consciousness.—Likewise, the personal independence of legal right is instead this same universal confusion and mutual dissolution. For what counts as absolute essence is self-consciousness as the person's pure, empty one. Against this empty universality, substance has the form of fullness and content. This content is now completely released and disordered, since the spirit that subdued it and held it together in its unity is no longer present.—In its reality, this empty one of the person is therefore a contingent existence and an inessential movement and activity that achieves no stability. Like skepticism, the formalism of legal right 1807 425 is thus, by its concept, without content of its own. It finds a manifold subsistence, possession, already there, and, like skepticism, stamps it with the same abstract universality, through which it is called property. In skepticism, however, actuality so determined is called appearance in general and has only a negative value; in legal right it has a positive one. The negative value consists in the actual having the meaning of the self as thinking, as the universal in itself. The positive value consists in its being mine in the meaning of the category, as an acknowledged and actual validity.—Both are the same abstract universal. The actual content, or determination, of what is mine—whether an external possession or the inner wealth or poverty of spirit and character—is not contained in this empty form and does not concern it. Content therefore belongs to a power of its own, different from the formal universal: chance and arbitrary will.—In its actual validity itself, consciousness of legal right therefore experiences instead the loss of its reality and its complete inessentiality. To describe an individual as a person expresses contempt.

481 The free power of content takes this form: the dispersion into the absolute multiplicity of personal atoms is, through the nature of this determination, also gathered into one point, foreign to them and equally 1807 426 spiritless. On one side, like the rigidity of their personality, this point is purely individual actuality. But opposed to their empty individuality, it also has for them the meaning of all content and therefore of real essence. Against their supposedly absolute, but intrinsically inessential actuality, it is universal power and absolute actuality. In this way, this lord of the world is, for himself, the absolute person who also encompasses all existence. For his consciousness, no higher spirit exists. He is a person, but the solitary person who has confronted everyone. These others constitute the valid universality of the person. For the individual as such is true only as the universal multiplicity of individuality. Separated from this, the solitary self is in fact the unactual, powerless self.—At the same time, it is consciousness of the content that has confronted that universal personality. But freed from its negative power, this content is the chaos of spiritual powers. Unleashed as elemental beings, they rage wildly and destructively against one another in unrestrained excess. Their powerless self-consciousness is the impotent enclosure and ground of their tumult. Knowing himself as the sum of all actual powers, this lord of the world is the monstrous self-consciousness that knows itself as the actual God. But since he is only the 1807 427 formal self, unable to control those powers, his movement and self-enjoyment are equally monstrous excess.

482 The lord of the world has actual consciousness of what he is—the universal power of actuality—in the destructive force he exercises against the self of his subjects confronting him. For his power is not the unity of spirit in which persons would recognize their own self-consciousness. Instead, as persons they exist for themselves, and from the absolute rigidity of their pointlike existence they exclude continuity with others. They therefore stand in a merely negative relation both to one another and to him, who is their relation or continuity. As this continuity, he is the essence and content of their formalism. But he is a content foreign to them, a hostile essence that instead sublates precisely what they regard as their essence: being-for-itself without content. As the continuity of their personality, he destroys that very personality. When the content foreign to it asserts itself within legal personality—and it does assert itself within persons, because it is their reality—legal personality therefore experiences, instead, its own lack of substance. The destructive digging around in this inessential ground, by contrast, gives itself consciousness of its universal dominion. But this self is mere devastation, and therefore exists only outside itself. It is instead the throwing away of its self-consciousness.

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483 This is the character of the side on which self-consciousness as absolute essence is actual. But consciousness driven back into itself from this actuality thinks its own lack of essence. Earlier, we saw the Stoic independence of pure thought pass through skepticism and find its truth in unhappy consciousness: the truth about its being-in-and-for-itself. At that time, this knowledge appeared only as the one-sided view of consciousness as such. Here, its actual truth has arrived. It consists in this: the universal validity of self-consciousness is reality alienated from it. This validity is the self's universal actuality, but it is just as immediately an inversion: the loss of its essence.—The actuality of the self, absent in the ethical world, has been gained through that world's return into the person. What was united there now appears developed, but alienated from itself.

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B. Spirit alienated from itself: cultivation.

484 Ethical substance kept opposition enclosed within its simple consciousness, and kept this consciousness in immediate unity with its essence. Essence therefore has the simple determination of being for consciousness, which is immediately directed toward it and whose custom it is. Consciousness does not count for itself as this exclusive self. Nor does substance mean an existence excluded from consciousness, with which consciousness would have to unite itself, and which it would also have to produce, only by alienating itself. But the spirit whose self is absolutely separate confronts its content as an equally hard actuality. Here the world is determined as something external, the negative of self-consciousness. Yet this world is spiritual essence. In itself, it is the interpenetration of being and individuality. Its existence is the work of self-consciousness, but also an immediately present actuality foreign to it, with a being of its own, in which self-consciousness does not recognize itself. It is the 1807 430 external essence and the free content of legal right. But this external actuality, which the lord of the world of legal right encompasses within himself, is not merely this elemental essence contingently present for the self. It is the self's labor, though not its positive labor, but rather its negative labor. It obtains its existence through self-consciousness's own externalization and loss of essence. Amid the devastation ruling the world of legal right, the external violence of the unbound elements seems to inflict this on self-consciousness. On their own, these elements are only pure devastation and their own dissolution. But this dissolution, their negative essence, is precisely the self. The self is their subject, their activity and coming-to-be. Yet this activity and coming-to-be, through which substance becomes actual, is the alienation of personality. For the self that has validity in and for itself immediately, that is, without alienation, has no substance and is the plaything of those raging elements. Its substance is therefore its externalization itself, and externalization is substance, or the spiritual powers that organize themselves into a world and thereby preserve themselves.

485 In this way substance is spirit, the self-conscious unity of self and essence. But each also has the meaning of alienation for the other. Spirit is consciousness of an objective actuality free for itself. Yet this consciousness is confronted by that unity of self and 1807 431 essence: actual consciousness is confronted by pure consciousness. On one side, actual self-consciousness passes through its externalization into the actual world, and this world returns into self-consciousness. On the other, this very actuality, both the person and objectivity, is sublated. They are purely universal. This alienation of theirs is pure consciousness, or essence. The present immediately has its opposite in its beyond, which is its thinking and its being-thought; just as the beyond has its opposite in the world on this side, which is its actuality alienated from it.

486 This spirit therefore develops not just one world, but a doubled world, divided and opposed.—The world of ethical spirit is its own present. Each of its powers therefore exists within this unity and, insofar as the two differ, in equilibrium with the whole. Nothing has the meaning of being the negative of self-consciousness. Even the departed spirit is present in the blood of kinship, in the self of the family. The government's universal power is the people's will, its self. Here, however, what is present means only objective actuality, which has its consciousness beyond itself. Each individual moment, as essence, receives this essence, and with it actuality, from another. Insofar as it is actual, its essence is something other than its actuality. Nothing has a spirit grounded and dwelling within itself, 1807 432 but exists outside itself in a foreign spirit. The equilibrium of the whole is not a unity remaining at home with itself and finding rest through its return into itself. Instead, it rests on the alienation of opposites. The whole, like each individual moment, is therefore a reality alienated from itself. It divides into a realm in which self-consciousness is actually both itself and its object, and another realm, that of pure consciousness. Beyond the first, this has no actual presence but exists in faith. The ethical world returned from the separation of divine and human law and their shapes—and its consciousness from the separation of knowledge and unconsciousness—into its fate, into the self as the negative power of this opposition. So too these two realms of self-alienated spirit will return into the self. But the former self was the first, immediately valid self, the individual person. This second self, returning into itself from its externalization, will be the universal self, consciousness that grasps the concept. These spiritual worlds, all of whose moments claim a fixed actuality and unspiritual subsistence of their own, will dissolve in pure insight. As the self grasping itself, pure insight completes cultivation. It grasps nothing but the self, and everything as the self. That is, it comprehends everything, erases all objectivity, and 1807 433 changes all being-in-itself into being-for-itself. Directed against faith as the foreign realm of essence beyond, it is the Enlightenment. In this realm too, where alienated spirit takes refuge in the consciousness of self-equal rest, Enlightenment completes alienation. It disrupts the household that spirit keeps here by bringing in the utensils of the world here below. Spirit cannot deny that these are its property, since its consciousness belongs to this world as well.—In this negative business, pure insight also realizes itself and produces its own object: unknowable absolute essence and the useful. Actuality has in this way lost all substantiality, and nothing in it is any longer in itself. Thus both the realm of faith and that of the real world are overthrown. This revolution produces absolute freedom. With it, previously alienated spirit has returned completely into itself, leaves this land of cultivation, and passes into another land, the land of moral consciousness.

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I. The world of self-alienated spirit.

487 This spirit's world divides into two. The first is the world of actuality, or of its alienation itself. The other is the world it builds for itself in the ether of pure consciousness by rising above the first. Precisely because this second world is opposed to that alienation, it is not free from it. Instead, it is only the other form of alienation. Alienation consists precisely in having consciousness in two worlds and encompasses both. What we consider here is therefore not self-consciousness of absolute essence as it is in and for itself, not religion, but faith insofar as it is flight from the actual world and thus does not exist in and for itself. This flight from the realm of the present is therefore itself immediately twofold. Pure consciousness is the element into which spirit rises. But it is the element not only of faith but equally of the concept. The two therefore enter together, and faith is considered only in opposition to the concept.

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a. Cultivation and its realm of actuality.

488 The spirit of this world is spiritual essence permeated by a self-consciousness that knows itself to be immediately present as this being-for-itself, and knows essence as an actuality confronting it. But the existence of this world, like the actuality of self-consciousness, rests on a movement: self-consciousness externalizes its personality, thereby produces its world, and relates to this world as something foreign that it must now take possession of. Yet renouncing its being-for-itself is itself the production of actuality, and through this renunciation it therefore immediately takes possession of actuality.—Or self-consciousness is something, has reality, only insofar as it alienates itself. Through this, it posits itself as universal, and this universality is its validity and actuality. This equality with everyone is therefore not the equality of legal right, not the immediate recognition and validity of self-consciousness simply because it is. Rather, its validity comes through the alienating mediation of having made itself conform to the universal. The spiritless universality of legal right accepts and authorizes every natural form of character and 1807 436 existence. The universality valid here, however, is one that has come to be, and for that reason it is actual.

489 What gives the individual validity and actuality here is therefore cultivation. The individual's true original nature and substance is the spirit of alienation of natural being. This externalization is therefore both the individual's purpose and existence. It is also the means, or transition, both of substance as thought into actuality and, conversely, of determinate individuality into essentiality. This individuality cultivates itself into what it is in itself. Only through this does it exist in itself and have actual existence. It has as much actuality and power as it has cultivation. Although the self here knows itself to be actual as this self, its actuality consists solely in sublating the natural self. The originally determinate nature is therefore reduced to an inessential difference of degree, to a greater or lesser energy of will. But the will's purpose and content belong solely to universal substance itself and can only be universal. A particular nature made into purpose and content is something powerless and unactual. It is a type struggling vainly and ridiculously to put itself into effect. It is the contradiction of giving the particular an actuality that is immediately the universal. If individuality is therefore wrongly placed in the 1807 437 particularity of nature and character, then the real world contains no individualities and characters. Instead, individuals have an equal existence for one another. That supposed individuality is only the existence meant, which has no permanence in this world, where only what externalizes itself, and thus only the universal, gains actuality.—What is meant therefore counts as what it is: a type. Art, “type,” is not quite the same as espèce, “the most dreadful of all nicknames, for it signifies mediocrity and expresses the highest degree of contempt.” But Art and being good of one's type are German expressions that add to this meaning an honest-looking air, as though it were not meant so badly. Or they actually do not yet include consciousness of what a type is, and what cultivation and actuality are.

490 What appears, in relation to the single individual, as the individual's cultivation is the essential moment of substance itself: the immediate passage of its universality as thought into actuality, or its simple soul, through which the in-itself is recognized and has existence. The movement of individuality cultivating itself is therefore immediately its coming-to-be as universal, objective essence: the coming-to-be of the actual world. Although this world has come to be through individuality, for self-consciousness it is something 1807 438 immediately alienated, with the form of an unmoved actuality. Yet self-consciousness is also certain that the world is its substance, and sets out to take possession of it. It gains this power over it through cultivation. From this side, cultivation appears as self-consciousness making itself conform to actuality, as far as the energy of its original character and talent allows. What appears here as the individual's force, under which substance would come and would thereby be sublated, is the same as substance's actualization. For the individual's power consists in conforming to substance: in externalizing its self, and thus positing itself as objectively existing substance. Its cultivation and its own actuality are therefore the actualization of substance itself.

491 The self is actual for itself only as sublated. For it, therefore, it does not constitute the unity of consciousness of itself and of the object. Instead, the object is its negative.—Through the self as soul, substance therefore develops in its moments so that each opposite animates the other. Through its alienation, each gives the other subsistence and equally receives subsistence from it. At the same time, each moment has its determination as a validity that cannot be overcome and a fixed actuality against the other. Thought fixes this distinction in the most universal 1807 439 way through the absolute opposition of good and bad. Fleeing one another, these can in no way become the same. But this fixed being has as its soul the immediate passage into its opposite. Existence is instead the reversal of each determination into its opposite, and only this alienation is the essence and preservation of the whole. We must now consider this movement that actualizes and animates the moments. Alienation will alienate itself, and through it the whole will take itself back into its concept.

492 First, we must consider simple substance itself in the immediate organization of its existing, still unanimated moments.—Nature unfolds into universal elements. Air is the enduring, purely universal, transparent essence. Water is the essence that is always sacrificed. Fire is their animating unity, which constantly dissolves their opposition and equally divides their simplicity into that opposition. Finally, earth is the solid knot of this articulation and the subject of these essences and their process, their departure and return. In the same way, inner essence, or the simple spirit of self-conscious actuality, unfolds as a world into similar universal but spiritual masses. The first is spiritual essence universal in itself and equal to itself. The other is the essence existing for itself, 1807 440 become unequal within itself, sacrificing and giving itself up. The third, as self-consciousness, is subject and immediately has within itself the power of fire. In the first essence it is conscious of itself as being-in-itself. In the second it has the coming-to-be of being-for-itself through the sacrifice of the universal. But spirit itself is the whole's being-in-and-for-itself. It divides into substance as enduring and substance as self-sacrificing, and equally takes them back into its unity, both as the erupting flame that consumes them and as their enduring shape.—We see that these essences correspond to the community and the family of the ethical world, but without possessing their homelike spirit. Yet whereas fate is foreign to that spirit, here self-consciousness is, and knows itself as, the actual power of these essences.

493 These members must be considered both as they are first represented within pure consciousness as thoughts, or as existing in themselves, and as they are represented in actual consciousness as objective essences.—In that simple form, the first, as the self-equal, immediate, unchanging essence of all consciousness, is the good: the independent spiritual power of the in-itself, beside which the movement of consciousness existing for itself is only incidental. The other, by contrast, 1807 441 is passive spiritual essence, or the universal insofar as it gives itself up and lets individuals draw from it consciousness of their individuality. It is the null essence, the bad.—This absolute dissolution of essence is itself enduring. The first essence is the foundation, starting point, and result of individuals, and they are purely universal within it. The second, by contrast, is on one side self-sacrificing being for another, and on the other, precisely for that reason, their constant return to themselves as individuals and their enduring becoming-for-themselves.

494 But these simple thoughts of good and bad are just as immediately alienated from themselves. They are actual, present in actual consciousness as objective moments. Thus the first essence is state power, the other wealth.—State power is both simple substance and the universal work: the absolute matter itself, in which individuals have their essence expressed and their individuality is nothing but consciousness of their universality. It is also the work and simple result from which the fact that it comes from their activity has disappeared. It remains the absolute foundation and subsistence of all their activity.—Through this determination of unchanging equality with itself, this simple, ethereal substance of their life is being, and therefore only being for another. In itself it is thus immediately its own opposite 1807 442, wealth. Although wealth is the passive or null essence, it too is universal spiritual essence. It is both the constantly emerging result of everyone's work and activity, and what dissolves again into everyone's enjoyment. In enjoyment, individuality does come to exist for itself, or as individual. But this enjoyment itself results from universal activity, just as it in turn produces universal labor and everyone's enjoyment. The actual simply has the spiritual meaning of being immediately universal. In this moment, every individual does think they are acting selfishly. For this is the moment in which individuals give themselves consciousness of existing for themselves, and they therefore do not take it to be spiritual. Yet even viewed externally, it is clear that in their enjoyment each gives everyone something to enjoy; in their labor each works for everyone as much as for themselves, and everyone works for them. Their being-for-itself is therefore universal in itself. Self-interest is something merely intended, unable to make actual what it intends: doing something that would not benefit everyone.

495 In these two spiritual powers, then, self-consciousness recognizes its substance, content, and purpose. It intuits its double essence in them: its being-in-itself in one, its being-for-itself in the other.—But as spirit it is also the negative unity of their subsistence and of the separation between individuality and the universal, or between 1807 443 actuality and the self. Rule and wealth are therefore present for the individual as objects: things from which the individual knows itself free, and between which it thinks it can choose, or even choose neither. As this free, pure consciousness, it confronts essence as something that exists only for it. It then has essence as essence within itself.—In this pure consciousness, the moments of substance are not state power and wealth, but the thoughts of good and bad.—Further, self-consciousness is the relation of its pure consciousness to its actual consciousness, of what is thought to objective essence. It is essentially judgment.—The immediate determinations of the two sides of actual essence have already shown which is good and which bad: state power is good, wealth bad. But this first judgment cannot count as a spiritual judgment. For it determines one side only as being-in-itself, or positive, and the other only as being-for-itself and negative. But as spiritual essences, each is the interpenetration of both moments, and those determinations therefore do not exhaust them. The self-consciousness relating to them exists in and for itself. It must therefore relate to each in a twofold way, which will reveal their nature as determinations alienated from themselves.

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496 For self-consciousness, the object in which it finds itself is good and exists in itself. The object in which it finds its own opposite is bad. The good is objective reality's equality with it; the bad is reality's inequality with it. At the same time, what is good and bad for it is good and bad in itself. For self-consciousness is precisely that in which these two moments—being in itself and being for it—are the same. It is the actual spirit of objective essences. Judgment demonstrates its power over them, a power that makes them what they are in themselves. Their criterion and truth is not how they are immediately equal or unequal within themselves—that is, abstract being-in-itself or being-for-itself—but what they are in spirit's relation to them: their equality or inequality with spirit. Spirit's relation to them, which are initially posited as objects and become the in-itself through spirit, also becomes their reflection into themselves. Through this they acquire actual spiritual being, and what their spirit is emerges. But just as their first, immediate determination differs from spirit's relation to them, so the third, their own spirit, will differ from the second.—Their second in-itself, which first emerges through spirit's relation to them, must already turn out differently from their immediate in-itself. For this mediation by spirit instead moves their immediate determination and makes it something else.

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497 Accordingly, consciousness existing in and for itself does find in state power its simple essence and subsistence in general, but not its individuality as such. It finds its in-itself, but not its being-for-itself. Instead, it finds activity as individual activity denied and subjected to obedience. Faced with this power, the individual therefore reflects into itself. For it, state power is the oppressive essence and the bad: instead of being equal to individuality, it is utterly unequal to it.—Wealth, by contrast, is the good. It aims at universal enjoyment, gives itself up, and provides everyone with consciousness of their self. In itself, it is universal beneficence. If it withholds some benefit or does not accommodate every need, this is a contingency that does not impair its universal, necessary essence: sharing itself with all individuals and being a giver with a thousand hands.

498 These two judgments give the thoughts of good and bad a content opposite to the one they had for us.—But so far self-consciousness has related to its objects only incompletely, using only the standard of being-for-itself. Consciousness is equally essence existing in itself and must also make this side its standard. Only then is spiritual judgment complete. From this side, state 1807 446 power expresses its essence for it. State power is partly law at rest, partly government and command that orders the individual movements of universal activity. The former is simple substance itself; the latter is its activity that animates and preserves itself and everyone. In state power, then, the individual finds its ground and essence expressed, organized, and put into action.—Through enjoying wealth, by contrast, it does not experience its universal essence. It gains only transitory consciousness and enjoyment of itself as an individuality existing for itself, and of its inequality with its essence.—Here, then, the concepts of good and bad receive the opposite content to their previous one.

499 Each of these two ways of judging finds an equality and an inequality. The first judging consciousness finds state power unequal to itself and the enjoyment of wealth equal to itself. The second, conversely, finds the former equal and the latter unequal to itself. There is a double finding-equal and a double finding-unequal: an opposed relation to the two real essentialities.—We must judge this different judging itself, applying the standard we established. According to it, consciousness's relation of finding-equal is the good, and its relation of finding-unequal is the bad. We must now hold these two ways of relating themselves as different shapes of consciousness 1807 447. Because consciousness relates in different ways, it itself falls under the distinction of being good or bad. This does not depend on its having either being-for-itself or pure being-in-itself as its principle, since both are equally essential moments. The twofold judging we considered presented the principles separately and therefore contains only abstract ways of judging. Actual consciousness contains both principles. The distinction falls solely within its essence: in its relation of itself to the real.

500 The ways of relating are opposed. One relates to state power and wealth as something equal to itself, the other as something unequal.—The consciousness that finds equality in its relation is noble. In public power it sees what is equal to itself: it has in public power its simple essence and that essence's activity. It stands in a service of actual obedience and inner respect toward it. Likewise, in wealth it sees what provides consciousness of its other essential side, being-for-itself. It therefore also regards wealth as essence in relation to itself, acknowledges the person from whom it enjoys benefits as a benefactor, and considers itself obliged to be grateful.

501 Consciousness of the other relation, by contrast, is base. It holds fast to its inequality with 1807 448 both essentialities. In ruling power, it therefore sees a fetter and oppression of being-for-itself. It hates the ruler, obeys only with hidden malice, and is always ready to revolt. In wealth, through which it comes to enjoy its being-for-itself, it likewise sees only inequality—inequality with enduring essence. For wealth brings it only to consciousness of individuality and transitory enjoyment. It loves wealth but despises it, and when enjoyment disappears—as it inherently does—it also regards its relation to the wealthy person as having disappeared.

502 So far, these relations express only judgment: the determination of what the two essences are as objects for consciousness, not yet what they are in and for themselves. The reflection represented in judgment is, on one side, as yet only for us a positing of both determinations and therefore an equal sublation of both. It is not yet their reflection for consciousness itself. On the other side, they are as yet only immediate essences. They have neither become essences nor contain self-consciousness. The consciousness for which they exist is not yet what animates them. They are predicates that are not yet themselves subject. Because of this separation, the whole of spiritual judging also still falls apart into two consciousnesses, each subject to a one-sided determination.—At first the two sides of alienation were indifferent 1807 449 to one another: on one side the in-itself of pure consciousness, namely the determinate thoughts of good and bad; on the other their existence as state power and wealth. This indifference rose to a relation between the two, to judgment. Likewise, this external relation must rise to inner unity, or to the relation of thought to actuality. The spirit of the two shapes of judgment must emerge. This happens when judgment becomes a syllogism, the mediating movement in which the necessity and middle of the two sides of judgment emerge.

503 In judgment, then, noble consciousness finds itself confronting state power. State power is not yet a self, but only universal substance. Yet noble consciousness is conscious of it as its essence, its purpose and absolute content. In relating positively to state power in this way, it relates negatively to its own purposes, its particular content and existence, and lets them disappear. It is the heroism of service: the virtue that sacrifices individual being to the universal and thereby brings the universal into existence; the person who voluntarily renounces possession and enjoyment, and acts and is actual for the existing power.

504 This movement joins the universal with existence in general, just as through this externalization existing consciousness cultivates itself into essentiality. What consciousness alienates in 1807 450 service is its consciousness immersed in existence. But alienated being is the in-itself. Through this cultivation, it therefore gains respect for itself and among others.—Through the same movement, state power, which was initially only the universal in thought, the in-itself, becomes the existing universal, actual power. It is actual power only in the actual obedience it gains through self-consciousness's judgment that state power is essence, and through self-consciousness's free sacrifice of itself. This activity, which joins essence with the self, produces a double actuality: itself as what has true actuality, and state power as the true that has validity.

505 But through this alienation, state power is not yet a self-consciousness knowing itself as state power. Only its law, or its in-itself, has validity. It does not yet have a particular will. For serving self-consciousness has not yet externalized its pure self and thereby animated state power with it, but only with its being. It has sacrificed only its existence to state power, not its being-in-itself.—This self-consciousness counts as conforming to essence. It is recognized for its being-in-itself. Others find their essence active in it, but not their being-for-itself. Their thought or pure consciousness is fulfilled, but not their individuality. It therefore has standing in their thoughts and 1807 451 enjoys honor. It is the proud vassal who acts for state power insofar as state power is not a will of its own, but an essential will. It values itself only in this honor, only in the essential representation of general opinion, not in the grateful representation of individuality, since it has not helped individuality attain its being-for-itself. Its language, if it were to relate to state power's own will, which has not yet come to be, would be the advice it gives for the universal good.

506 Faced with this advice, state power therefore still lacks a will and does not decide between the different opinions about the universal good. It is not yet government, and thus not yet truly actual state power.—Being-for-itself, the will that has not yet been sacrificed as will, is the inward, secluded spirit of the classes. While speaking of the universal good, it reserves its own particular good for itself, and is inclined to substitute this chatter about the universal good for action. The sacrifice of existence made in service is indeed complete when it has gone as far as death. But enduring the danger of death and surviving it leaves behind a determinate existence and thus a particular being-for-itself. Such a particular being-for-itself makes advice for the universal good ambiguous and suspect. In fact, it reserves its own opinion and particular will against 1807 452 state power. It therefore still relates to state power unequally, and falls under the determination of base consciousness: always ready to rebel.

507 It must sublate this contradiction. The contradiction has the form of being-for-itself standing in inequality with the universality of state power. At the same time it has the form that the externalization of existence, when it completes itself in death, is itself an existing externalization, not one returning into consciousness. Consciousness does not survive it and exist in and for itself, but merely passes into its unreconciled opposite. The true sacrifice of being-for-itself is therefore only one in which it gives itself up as completely as in death, but equally preserves itself in this externalization. Through this it becomes actual as what it is in itself: the identical unity of itself and itself as its opposite. When the secluded inward spirit, the self as such, comes forth and alienates itself, state power is also raised to a self of its own. Without this alienation, the actions of honor, of noble consciousness, and the counsels of its insight would remain ambiguous, still concealing private intention and self-will in that secluded reserve.

508 But this alienation happens only in language, which here appears in its distinctive 1807 453 meaning.—As law and command in the ethical world, and initially as advice in the world of actuality, language has essence as its content and is essence's form. Here, however, it takes the form that it itself is as its content, and has validity as language. It is the power of speaking as such that accomplishes what must be accomplished. For language is the existence of the pure self as self. In it, the individuality existing for itself of self-consciousness comes as such into existence, so that it exists for others. Otherwise, I as this pure I am not there. In every other expression, the I is immersed in an actuality and in a shape from which it can withdraw. It reflects out of its action, as out of its facial expression, into itself, leaving such incomplete existence—always containing as much too much as too little—lying there without a soul. Language, however, contains the I in its purity. Language alone expresses I, the I itself. This existence of the I is, as existence, an objectivity that bears its true nature. I is this I, but equally universal. Its appearance is just as immediately the externalization and disappearance of this I, and thereby its remaining in its universality. The I that expresses itself is heard. It is a contagion in which it has immediately passed into unity with those for whom it exists and is universal self-consciousness.—In being heard, its 1807 454 existence itself has immediately died away. This otherness has been taken back into itself. And this is precisely its existence: as a self-conscious now, not to be there just as it is there, and to be there through this disappearance. This disappearance is therefore itself immediately its remaining. It is its own knowledge of itself, and its knowledge of itself as having passed into another self, having been heard, and being universal.

509 Spirit acquires this actuality here because the extremes whose unity it is are also immediately determined as actualities of their own, existing for themselves. Their unity has split into rigid sides, each of which is for the other an actual object excluded from it. Unity therefore emerges as a middle excluded and distinguished from the separate actuality of the sides. It thus itself has an actual objectivity different from its sides and exists for them: that is, it has existence. Spiritual substance comes into existence as such only when it has gained, as its sides, self-consciousnesses that know this pure self as an immediately valid actuality, and equally know immediately that it is this only through alienating mediation. Through the former, the moments are purified into the category knowing itself, and thereby to the point of being moments of spirit. Through the latter, spirit enters 1807 455 existence as spirituality.—It is thus the middle that presupposes those extremes and is produced through their existence. But it is equally the spiritual whole erupting between them, dividing itself into them, and only through this contact producing each as a whole in its principle.—The two extremes' already being in themselves sublated and dissolved produces their unity. This unity is the movement that joins them together, exchanges their determinations, and joins these determinations together—and does so in each extreme. This mediation therefore posits the concept of each extreme in its actuality, or makes what each is in itself into its spirit.

510 Through this, the two extremes—state power and noble consciousness—have been divided. State power has divided into the abstract universal that is obeyed and the will existing for itself, which does not yet itself belong to that universal. Noble consciousness has divided into the obedience of sublated existence, or the being-in-itself of self-respect and honor, and pure being-for-itself not yet sublated: the will still kept in reserve. The two moments into which both sides have been purified, and which are therefore moments of language, are the abstract universal, called the universal good, and the pure self that in service renounced its consciousness immersed in manifold existence. In their concept the two are the same, since the pure 1807 456 self is precisely the abstract universal. Their unity is therefore posited as their middle. But the self is so far actual only at the extreme of consciousness, and the in-itself only at the extreme of state power. Consciousness lacks state power's having passed over to it not merely as honor, but actually. State power lacks being obeyed not merely as the so-called universal good, but as will, or being the deciding self. The unity of the concept, in which state power still remains and into which consciousness has purified itself, becomes actual in this mediating movement. Its simple existence as the middle is language.—Yet language does not yet have two selves, present as selves, for its sides. State power is only now being animated into a self. This language is therefore not yet spirit as it fully knows and expresses itself.

511 Because noble consciousness is the extreme of the self, it appears as the source of the language through which the sides of the relation take shape as animated wholes.—The heroism of silent service becomes the heroism of flattery. This speaking reflection of service constitutes the spiritual middle that divides itself. It reflects not only its own extreme back into itself, but also the extreme of universal power back into that power itself. It makes 1807 457 this power, which initially exists only in itself, into being-for-itself and the individuality of self-consciousness. The spirit of this power thereby becomes that of being an absolute monarch.—Absolute: the language of flattery raises power into its purified universality. As a product of language, of existence purified into spirit, this moment is a purified equality with itself.—Monarch: language equally raises individuality to its summit. On this side of simple spiritual unity, what noble consciousness externalizes is the pure in-itself of its thought, its I itself. More precisely, language raises individuality, otherwise only something meant, into its existing purity by giving the monarch a proper name. For only in the name is the individual's distinction from all others not merely meant, but made actual by everyone. In the name, the individual counts as purely individual not only in their own consciousness, but in everyone's consciousness. Through it, then, the monarch is absolutely separated and singled out from everyone, and alone. In it he is the atom that can communicate nothing of its essence and has no equal.—This name is therefore the reflection into itself, or actuality, that universal power has within itself. Through the name it is the monarch. Conversely, he, this individual, knows himself, this individual, 1807 458 to be universal power because the nobles gather around the throne not merely ready to serve state power, but as ornaments, and because they are always telling its occupant what he is.

512 The language of their praise is thus the spirit that joins the two extremes within state power itself. It reflects abstract power into itself, gives it the other extreme's moment—willing and deciding being-for-itself—and thereby gives it self-conscious existence. Or through this, this individual, actual self-consciousness comes to know itself with certainty as power. It is the point of the self into which the many points have flowed together through the externalization of inner certainty.—But state power's own spirit consists in having its actuality and nourishment in the sacrifice of noble consciousness's activity and thought. It is therefore independence alienated from itself. Noble consciousness, the extreme of being-for-itself, receives back the extreme of actual universality in exchange for the universality of thought that it externalized. State power has passed over to it. Only in noble consciousness is state power truly put into action. In its being-for-itself, state power ceases to be the inert essence it appeared as at the extreme of abstract being-in-itself.—Considered in itself, state power reflected into itself, or its having become spirit, means nothing other 1807 459 than its having become a moment of self-consciousness, that is, existing only as sublated. It is now essence whose spirit is to be sacrificed and given away, or it exists as wealth.—It does also continue to exist as an actuality opposed to the wealth it is always becoming according to its concept. But its concept is precisely this movement: through the service and reverence by which it comes to be, it passes into its opposite, into the externalization of power. Through noble consciousness's throwing itself away, then, the distinctive self that is state power's will becomes, for itself, a universality externalizing itself, a complete individuality and contingency abandoned to every more powerful will. What remains of its universally acknowledged and incommunicable independence is the empty name.

513 If noble consciousness defines itself as relating to universal power in an equal way, its truth is instead to keep its own being-for-itself in service, while in actually renouncing its personality it is the actual sublation and tearing apart of universal substance. Its spirit is a relation of complete inequality. On one side, in its honor it retains its will. On the other, in giving up that will it both alienates itself from its inner self 1807 460 and becomes supremely unequal to itself, and subjects universal substance to itself, making substance wholly unequal to itself.—It is clear that its determination in judgment, as opposed to what was called base consciousness, has therefore disappeared, and with it base consciousness too. The latter has achieved its purpose: bringing universal power under being-for-itself.

514 Enriched in this way by universal power, self-consciousness exists as universal beneficence, or this beneficence is wealth, which is itself once again an object for consciousness. For consciousness, wealth is indeed the subjected universal, but through this first sublation the universal has not yet returned absolutely into the self.—The self does not yet have itself as self as its object, but the sublated universal essence. Since this object has only just come to be, an immediate relation of consciousness to it is posited. Consciousness has therefore not yet displayed its inequality with it. It is noble consciousness, which receives its being-for-itself from the universal that has become inessential, and therefore acknowledges wealth and is grateful to the benefactor.

515 Wealth already contains the moment of being-for-itself. It is not the universal of state power, which has no self, or spirit's unresisting inorganic nature, but that nature 1807 461 holding fast to itself through will against whoever wants to seize it for enjoyment. But since wealth has only the form of essence, this is one-sided being-for-itself: not the in-itself, but rather the sublated in-itself, the individual's inessential return into itself in enjoyment. Wealth therefore needs animation itself. The movement of its reflection consists in its becoming being-in-and-for-itself instead of merely being-for-itself; in its becoming essence instead of being sublated essence. It thereby gains its own spirit within itself.—Since the form of this movement was explained earlier, we need only determine its content here.

516 Here, then, noble consciousness relates to the object not as essence in general. Instead, being-for-itself itself is foreign to it. It finds its self as such already alienated, as an objective, fixed actuality that it must receive from another fixed being-for-itself. Its object is being-for-itself, and thus its own. But because it is an object, it is also immediately a foreign actuality with its own being-for-itself and will. In other words, it sees its self in the power of a foreign will, on which it depends whether that will wishes to hand this self over to it.

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517 Self-consciousness can abstract from any particular aspect. In an obligation concerning such an aspect, it therefore retains its recognition and validity in itself as an essence existing for itself. Here, however, it sees itself outside itself and belonging to another on the side of its pure, ownmost actuality, or its I. It sees its personality as such dependent on another's contingent personality, on the chance of a moment, an arbitrary will, or some otherwise utterly indifferent circumstance.—In the legal condition, what lies in the power of objective essence appears as a contingent content from which one can abstract. The power does not affect the self as such; on the contrary, the self is recognized. But here it sees its certainty of itself as such to be utterly inessential, pure personality to be absolute impersonality. The spirit of its gratitude is therefore the feeling both of this deepest degradation and of the deepest rebellion. As the pure I intuits itself outside itself and torn apart, everything that has continuity and universality, everything called law, good, and right, is also torn apart and destroyed in this disruption. Everything equal is dissolved, since the purest inequality is present: the absolute inessentiality of the absolutely essential, being-for-itself's being outside itself. The pure I itself is absolutely disintegrated.

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518 This consciousness does receive back from wealth the objectivity of being-for-itself and sublate it. Yet it is not merely incomplete according to its concept, as the previous reflection was, but dissatisfied for itself. In this reflection, since the self receives itself as an object, immediate contradiction is posited within the pure I itself. But as self, it also immediately stands above this contradiction. It is the absolute elasticity that again sublates this sublation of the self. It rejects the degradation of having its being-for-itself come to it as something foreign. Rebelling against receiving itself in this way, it exists for itself in the very act of receiving.

519 The relation of this consciousness is therefore bound up with this absolute disruption. Within its spirit, the distinction by which it was defined as noble in contrast to base consciousness disappears, and the two are the same.—The spirit of beneficent wealth can also be distinguished from the spirit of the consciousness receiving the benefit, and must be considered separately.—It was inessential being-for-itself, essence given away. But through sharing itself it becomes the in-itself. By fulfilling its determination to sacrifice itself, it sublates the individuality of enjoying only for itself. As sublated individuality, it is universality, or essence.—What it shares, what it gives others, is being-for-itself. But it 1807 464 does not give itself up as nature with no self, as the unresisting condition of life freely offering itself. It gives itself as self-conscious essence that holds onto itself for itself. It is not the inorganic power of the element, known by the receiving consciousness as inherently perishable. Instead, it is power over the self, knowing itself to be independent and arbitrary, and also knowing that what it distributes is another's self.—Wealth therefore shares the client's degradation, but arrogance takes the place of rebellion. On one side, like the client, it knows being-for-itself as a contingent thing. But it is itself this contingency in whose power personality lies. In this arrogance, it thinks it has maintained another I-self through a meal and thereby gained the subjection of that self's innermost essence. It overlooks the other's inward rebellion. It overlooks the complete throwing off of every fetter, this pure disruption, for which everything equal and everything stable is torn apart, since the self-equality of being-for-itself has become utterly unequal to it. This disruption therefore tears apart the benefactor's opinion and view most of all. Wealth stands immediately before this innermost abyss, this bottomless depth in which all support and substance have disappeared. Yet in this depth it sees only an ordinary thing, a plaything of its 1807 465 mood, a chance event of its arbitrary will. Its spirit is to be utterly inessential opinion, the surface abandoned by spirit.

520 Self-consciousness had its language toward state power, or spirit emerged as an actual middle between these extremes. Likewise, it has language toward wealth, and still more its rebellion has its language. The language that gives wealth consciousness of its essentiality, and thereby takes possession of it, is also the language of flattery, but ignoble flattery. For what it expresses as essence it knows to be essence given away, not existing in itself. But as already noted, the language of flattery is still one-sided spirit. Its moments are indeed the self, purified into pure existence through the cultivation of service, and the being-in-itself of power. Yet the consciousness of this language does not contain the pure concept in which the simple self and the in-itself, that pure I and this pure essence or thought, are the same. It does not contain this unity of the two sides between which interaction occurs. For it, the object is still the in-itself opposed to the self. Or the object is not also its own self as such.—The language of disruption, however, is complete language and the true existing spirit of this whole world of cultivation. This self-consciousness, characterized 1807 466 by a rebellion that rejects its degradation, is immediately absolute equality with itself in absolute disruption: the pure mediation of pure self-consciousness with itself. It is the equality of the judgment of identity in which one and the same personality is both subject and predicate. But this judgment of identity is also infinite. For this personality is absolutely divided, and subject and predicate are utterly indifferent existing beings that have nothing to do with one another and no necessary unity. Indeed, each is the power of a personality of its own. Being-for-itself has its being-for-itself as its object, as something utterly other and also just as immediately as itself: itself as an other. This other does not have a different content. Rather, the content is the same self in the form of absolute opposition and an indifferent existence that is completely its own.—Here, then, the spirit of this real world of cultivation is present, conscious of itself in its truth and of its concept.

521 It is this absolute, universal reversal and alienation of actuality and thought: pure cultivation. What is experienced in this world is that neither the actual essences of power and wealth, nor their determinate concepts, good and bad, nor consciousness of good and bad, noble and base consciousness, possess truth. Instead, all these 1807 467 moments turn into one another, and each is its own opposite.—Universal power, which is substance, attains its own spirituality through the principle of individuality. Yet it receives its own self only as the name attached to it, and when it is actual power it is instead the powerless essence that sacrifices itself.—But this surrendered essence without a self, or the self become a thing, is instead essence's return into itself. It is being-for-itself existing for itself, the existence of spirit.—The thoughts of these essences, of good and bad, are likewise reversed in this movement. What is defined as good is bad; what is defined as bad is good. Consciousness of each moment, judged as noble and base consciousness, is in its truth equally the reverse of what these determinations are supposed to be. Noble consciousness is just as base and degraded as degradation turns into the nobility of self-consciousness's most cultivated freedom.—Formally considered, everything is likewise outwardly the reverse of what it is for itself. And what it is for itself is not what it truly is, but something different from what it wants to be. Being-for-itself is instead the loss of itself, and alienation of itself is instead self-preservation.—What is present, then, is this: all moments exercise a universal justice 1807 468 upon one another. Each is as much alienated within itself as it forms itself into its opposite and thereby reverses that opposite.—But true spirit is precisely this unity of the absolutely separated. It comes into existence itself as their middle precisely through the free actuality of these extremes without a self. Its existence is universal speaking and a judging that tears apart. In this judging all those moments that are supposed to count as essences and actual members of the whole dissolve, while judging is itself equally this self-dissolving play with itself. This judging and speaking is therefore what is true and unconquerable, while conquering everything: what this real world is truly and solely concerned with. Each part of this world reaches the point where its spirit is expressed, or where it is spoken of with wit and what it is gets said.—Honest consciousness takes each moment as an enduring essentiality. It is the uncultivated thoughtlessness of not knowing that it equally does the reverse. Disrupted consciousness, however, is consciousness of reversal, and indeed of absolute reversal. The concept rules within it, bringing together thoughts that lie far apart for honesty. Its language is therefore witty.

522 The content of spirit's speech of and about itself is therefore the reversal of all concepts and 1807 469 realities, the universal deception of itself and others. Precisely for that reason, the shamelessness of declaring this deception is the greatest truth. This speech is the madness of the musician “who piled up and mixed thirty arias, Italian, French, tragic, comic, of every sort of character. Now he descended to hell in a deep bass, then tightened his throat and tore through the heights of the air with a falsetto, by turns raging, soothed, commanding, and mocking.”—To tranquil consciousness, which honestly places the melody of the good and true in the equality of tones, that is, in a single note, this speech appears as “a rambling of wisdom and madness, a mixture of as much skill as baseness, of ideas as correct as they are false, of as complete a perversion of feeling and as perfect a disgrace as of total openness and truth. It will be unable to refuse to enter into all these tones and run up and down the whole scale of feelings, from the deepest contempt and rejection to the highest admiration and emotion. A ridiculous trait will be blended into the latter, robbing them of their nature.” The former feelings will have, in their very openness, a reconciling trait, and in their shattering depth the all-powerful trait that gives spirit to itself.

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523 Against the speech of this confusion clear to itself, consider the speech of that simple consciousness of the true and good. Faced with the open, self-conscious eloquence of the spirit of cultivation, it can only be monosyllabic. For it can tell this spirit nothing that spirit does not itself know and say. If it goes beyond its monosyllables, it therefore says the same thing spirit expresses, but also commits the folly of thinking it says something new and different. Even its syllables, disgraceful, base, already amount to this folly, since spirit says them about itself. In its speech, this spirit reverses everything monotonous, since such self-equality is only an abstraction and in its actuality is reversal within itself. Straightforward consciousness, by contrast, defends the good and noble—that is, what remains equal to itself in its expression—in the only way possible here: by saying that it does not lose its worth because it is connected or mixed with the bad, since this is its condition and necessity, and nature's wisdom lies in this. In thinking it contradicts spirit, this consciousness has merely summed up the content of spirit's speech in a trivial way. Thoughtlessly making the opposite of the noble and good into the condition and necessity of the noble and good, it thinks it says something other than that what is called noble and 1807 471 good is in its essence its own reverse, just as, conversely, the bad is the excellent.

524 Suppose simple consciousness replaces this spiritless thought with the actuality of excellence by presenting it in an example, a fictional case or a true anecdote, thereby showing that excellence is no empty name but exists. Against it stands the universal actuality of the whole real world's reversed activity. Within this, that example is therefore only something wholly isolated, an espèce. To present the existence of the good and noble as an isolated anecdote, whether fictional or true, is the bitterest thing that can be said about it.—Finally, suppose simple consciousness demands the dissolution of this entire world of reversal. It cannot demand that the individual withdraw from it, for Diogenes in his barrel is conditioned by it. The demand made of the individual is precisely what counts as bad: caring for oneself as an individual. Directed toward universal individuality, however, the demand for this withdrawal cannot mean that reason should again give up the spiritually cultivated consciousness it has attained, sink the wide-ranging wealth of its moments back into the simplicity of the natural heart, and fall back into the wilderness and proximity to animal consciousness, 1807 472 which is called nature and also innocence. Rather, the demand for this dissolution can be directed only to the spirit of cultivation itself: that it return to itself from its confusion as spirit and gain a still higher consciousness.

525 In fact, spirit has already accomplished this in itself. Consciousness's self-conscious, self-expressing disruption is mocking laughter at existence, at the confusion of the whole, and at itself. At the same time, it is the dying away of this whole confusion, still hearing itself.—This vanity of all actuality and every determinate concept, hearing itself, is the real world's double reflection into itself: first into this self of consciousness as this self, and second into its pure universality, or into thought. From the first side, spirit that has come to itself looks into the world of actuality and still has that world as its purpose and immediate content. From the other side, its gaze is partly turned only inward and negatively against the world, and partly away from the world toward heaven, with the world's beyond as its object.

526 On that side of the return into the self, the vanity of all things is spirit's own vanity, or spirit is vain. It is the self existing for itself that knows not only how to judge and chatter about everything, but how to express wittily the fixed essences of actuality 1807 473 and the fixed determinations posited by judgment in their contradiction. This contradiction is their truth.—Considered formally, it knows everything as alienated from itself: being-for-itself separated from being-in-itself; what is meant and intended separated from truth; and being for another separated from both—what is professed separated from the actual meaning, the true matter and intention.—It therefore knows how to express each moment correctly against the other, and the reversal of them all in general. Whatever something may be determined as, it knows better what it is than that thing itself is. It knows the substantial on the side of the discord and conflict that it unites within itself, but not on the side of this unity. It therefore knows very well how to judge the substantial, but has lost the ability to grasp it.—This vanity also needs the vanity of all things to give itself consciousness of the self through them. It therefore produces their vanity itself and is the soul sustaining it. Power and wealth are the highest purposes of its effort. It knows that through renunciation and sacrifice it cultivates itself into the universal, comes to possess the universal, and in this possession has universal validity. Power and wealth are the actual, acknowledged powers. But this validity of its own is itself vain. Precisely in taking possession of them, it knows them not to be essential selves, but instead knows itself as their power and them as vain. It presents its being outside them even 1807 474 while possessing them in witty language, which is therefore its highest interest and the truth of the whole. In this language, this self—as this pure self belonging neither to actual nor to thought determinations—becomes for itself spiritual, truly universally valid. It is the self-disrupting nature of all relations and their conscious disruption. But only as rebellious self-consciousness does it know its own disruption, and in knowing it, it has immediately risen above it. In that vanity all content becomes negative, no longer capable of being grasped positively. The positive object is only the pure I itself, and disrupted consciousness is in itself this pure self-equality of self-consciousness returned into itself.

b. Faith and pure insight.

527 The spirit of self-alienation has its existence in the world of cultivation. But once this whole has become alienated from itself, beyond it stands the unactual world of pure consciousness, or of thought. Its content is what is purely thought; thought is its absolute element. But since thought is initially the element of this world, consciousness merely has these thoughts, 1807 475 without yet thinking them or knowing that they are thoughts. Instead, for it they have the form of representation. For consciousness passes from actuality into pure consciousness, but is itself still generally within actuality's sphere and determination. Disrupted consciousness is as yet only in itself the self-equality of pure consciousness: for us, not for itself. It is therefore only an immediate elevation, not yet completed within itself. It still contains its opposite principle, by which it is conditioned, without having mastered it through a mediating movement. The essence of its thought therefore does not count for it as essence merely in the form of the abstract in-itself, but in the form of ordinary actuality: an actuality raised into another element without losing there the determination of an actuality not thought.—It must be essentially distinguished from the in-itself that is the essence of Stoic consciousness. For Stoic consciousness, only the form of thought as such had validity, with some content foreign to it, taken from actuality. For this consciousness, however, it is not the form of thought that has validity. It must likewise be distinguished from the in-itself of virtuous consciousness. For virtuous consciousness, essence does relate to actuality and is the essence of actuality itself, but is as yet only unactual essence. For the consciousness here, essence counts as actual essence, even though beyond 1807 476 actuality. Likewise, the right and good in themselves of lawgiving reason, and the universal of consciousness testing laws, do not have the determination of actuality.—If, therefore, within the world of cultivation itself, pure thought fell as one side of alienation, as the standard of abstract good and bad in judging, then, having passed through the movement of the whole, it has been enriched by the moment of actuality and thus of content. Yet this actuality of essence is also only an actuality of pure, not actual, consciousness. Though raised into the element of thought, it does not yet count as a thought for this consciousness. Rather, it lies beyond consciousness's own actuality, because the former is the flight from the latter.

528 Here religion—for clearly this is what is being discussed—appears as the faith of the world of cultivation, not yet as it is in and for itself.—It has already appeared to us in other determinations: as unhappy consciousness, as a shape of the unsubstantial movement of consciousness itself.—In ethical substance too, it appeared as faith in the underworld. But consciousness of the departed spirit is not properly faith. It is not essence posited in the element of pure consciousness beyond actual consciousness. Instead, the departed spirit itself has 1807 477 immediate presence; its element is the family.—Here, however, religion has, on one side, emerged from substance and is pure consciousness of it. On the other, this pure consciousness is alienated from its actual consciousness, essence from its existence. Religion is therefore no longer the unsubstantial movement of consciousness, but still has the determination of opposition to actuality as this in general, and to the actuality of self-consciousness in particular. It is therefore essentially only a faith.

529 This pure consciousness of absolute essence is alienated. We must examine more closely how that of which it is the other determines itself, and consider pure consciousness only in connection with it. At first, this pure consciousness seems to confront only the world of actuality. But since it is flight from that world, and thus the determination of opposition, it contains this determination within itself. Pure consciousness is therefore essentially alienated within itself, and faith constitutes only one of its sides. The other side has already arisen for us as well. Pure consciousness is reflection out of the world of cultivation in such a way that its substance, and the constituent bodies into which it articulates itself, have shown themselves as what they are in themselves: spiritual essentialities, absolutely restless movements or determinations that immediately sublate themselves in their opposites. Their essence, simple 1807 478 consciousness, is therefore the simplicity of absolute distinction, which is immediately no distinction. It is thus pure being-for-itself, not that of this individual, but the self universal within itself as a restless movement attacking and penetrating the tranquil essence of the matter. Within it there is therefore the certainty that immediately knows itself as truth: pure thought as the absolute concept in the power of its negativity. This negativity destroys every objective essence supposed to confront consciousness and makes it a being of consciousness.—This pure consciousness is also equally simple, precisely because its distinction is no distinction. As this form of simple reflection into itself, however, it is the element of faith. In faith, spirit has the determination of positive universality, of being-in-itself, against that being-for-itself of self-consciousness.—Driven back into itself from the inessential world that merely dissolves, spirit is in truth, in undivided unity, both the absolute movement and negativity of its appearance and its inwardly satisfied essence and positive rest. But since it lies generally under the determination of alienation, these two moments separate as a doubled consciousness. The former is pure insight: the spiritual process gathering itself together in self-consciousness. It confronts and opposes consciousness of the positive, the form of objectivity 1807 479 or representation. Its own object, however, is only the pure I.—Simple consciousness of the positive, or of tranquil equality with itself, by contrast, has inner essence as essence for its object. Pure insight therefore initially has no content within itself, since it is negative being-for-itself. Faith, by contrast, possesses content without insight. Pure insight does not move beyond self-consciousness. Faith too has its content in the element of pure self-consciousness, but in thought, not in concepts; in pure consciousness, not in pure self-consciousness. It is thus indeed pure consciousness of essence, that is, of the simple inward, and therefore is thought. This is the chief moment in faith's nature, usually overlooked. The immediacy with which essence is present in faith consists in its object being essence, that is, pure thought. But when thought enters consciousness, or pure consciousness enters self-consciousness, this immediacy acquires the meaning of an objective being beyond consciousness of the self. Through this meaning that the immediacy and simplicity of pure thought acquire in consciousness, the essence of faith falls from thought into representation and becomes a supersensible world, essentially an other of self-consciousness 1807 480.—In pure insight, by contrast, the passage of pure thought into consciousness has the opposite determination. Objectivity has the meaning of a merely negative content that sublates itself and returns into the self. That is, only the self is properly its object, or the object has truth only insofar as it has the form of the self.

530 Just as faith and pure insight both belong to the element of pure consciousness, they are also both the return from the actual world of cultivation. They therefore present themselves from three sides. First, each exists in and for itself, apart from every relation. Second, each relates to the actual world opposed to pure consciousness. Third, each relates to the other within pure consciousness.

531 In believing consciousness, the side of being-in-and-for-itself is its absolute object, whose content and determination have emerged. For according to the concept of faith, this object is nothing other than the real world raised into the universality of pure consciousness. The articulation of the real world therefore also constitutes the organization of this other world. The difference is that here the parts, in becoming spiritual, do not alienate themselves. Instead, they are essences existing in and for themselves, spirits returned into themselves and remaining at home with themselves.—The movement 1807 481 of their transition is therefore only for us an alienation of the determination in which they differ, and only for us a necessary series. For faith, however, their distinction is a tranquil diversity and their movement an event.

532 To name them briefly according to the external determination of their form: just as state power, or the good, was first in the world of cultivation, here too the first is absolute essence, spirit existing in and for itself insofar as it is simple, eternal substance. But in realizing its concept of being spirit, substance passes over into being for another. Its self-equality becomes actual, self-sacrificing absolute essence. It becomes a self, but a transitory self. The third is therefore the return of this alienated self and humbled substance into their original simplicity. Only in this way is substance represented as spirit.—

533 Taken back into themselves by thought from the changing actual world, these differentiated essences are unchanging, eternal spirits whose being is to think the unity they constitute. Although removed from self-consciousness in this way, these essences nevertheless intervene in it. If essence remained unmoved in the form of the first simple substance, it would remain foreign to self-consciousness. But the externalization of this substance, and then its spirit, contain the moment of actuality and thereby take part in 1807 482 believing self-consciousness. Or believing consciousness belongs to the real world.

534 In this second relation, believing consciousness partly has its own actuality in the real world of cultivation and constitutes that world's spirit and existence, which we have considered. But it also confronts this actuality of its own as something vain, and is the movement of sublating it. This movement does not consist in having a witty consciousness of the world's reversal. For believing consciousness is simple consciousness, which counts wit as vain because wit still has the real world as its purpose. Instead, actuality confronts the tranquil realm of its thought as a spiritless existence that must therefore be overcome externally. By sublating sensuous knowledge and activity, this obedience of service and praise produces consciousness of unity with essence existing in and for itself. Yet it does not produce unity as intuited, actual unity. This service is only a continual production that does not fully achieve its goal in the present. The congregation does attain this unity, since it is universal self-consciousness. But for individual self-consciousness, the realm of pure thought necessarily remains beyond its actuality. Or, insofar as this realm has entered actuality through the externalization of eternal essence, it is an uncomprehended 1807 483 sensuous actuality. But one sensuous actuality remains indifferent to another, and the beyond has merely acquired the additional determination of distance in space and time.—The concept, however, spirit's actuality present to itself, remains in believing consciousness the inward that is and effects everything, but does not itself emerge.

535 In pure insight, however, the concept is the only actual thing. This third side of faith—being an object for pure insight—is the proper relation in which faith appears here.—Pure insight itself must likewise be considered partly in and for itself, partly in relation to the actual world insofar as it still exists positively as vain consciousness, and finally in that relation to faith.

536 We have seen what pure insight is in and for itself. Just as faith is the tranquil, pure consciousness of spirit as essence, pure insight is spirit's self-consciousness. It therefore knows essence not as essence but as absolute self. It thus aims to sublate every independence other than self-consciousness, whether that of the actual or of what exists in itself, and to make it into the concept. It is not merely the certainty of self-conscious reason that it is all truth. It knows that it is this.

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537 But as its concept appears, it is not yet realized. Its consciousness therefore still appears as a contingent, individual consciousness, and what is essence for it appears as a purpose it must actualize. At first it has only the intention of making pure insight universal: of making everything actual into the concept, and into a concept in every self-consciousness. The intention is pure, since its content is pure insight. This insight is equally pure, since its content is only the absolute concept, which has no opposition in an object and is not limited within itself. The unlimited concept immediately contains both sides: everything objective is to have only the meaning of being-for-itself, of self-consciousness; and self-consciousness is to have the meaning of being universal, so that pure insight becomes the property of every self-consciousness. This second side of the intention is a result of cultivation insofar as cultivation has destroyed both the distinctions of objective spirit—the parts and judgment-determinations of its world—and the distinctions appearing as originally determinate natures. Genius, talent, and particular abilities in general belong to the world of actuality insofar as it still has the side of being a spiritual animal kingdom, fighting and deceiving over the essences of the real world in mutual violence and confusion.—Within it, these distinctions 1807 485 do not have a place as honest specimens. Individuality is not content with the unactual matter itself, nor does it have a particular content and purposes of its own. Instead, it counts only as something universally valid, namely as cultivated. Difference is reduced to lesser or greater energy: a difference of magnitude, that is, an inessential one. But this last diversity has perished when, in consciousness's complete disruption, difference turned into an absolutely qualitative difference. What is other to the I there is only the I itself. In this infinite judgment, all one-sidedness and peculiarity of original being-for-itself are erased. The self knows that it is its own object as pure self. This absolute equality of the two sides is the element of pure insight.—Pure insight is therefore simple essence without distinction within itself, and equally the universal work and universal possession. In this simple spiritual substance, self-consciousness both gives itself and preserves in every object consciousness of this individuality of its own, or of activity. Conversely, its individuality is equal to itself and universal within this substance.—Pure insight is therefore the spirit that calls to every consciousness: be for yourselves what you all are in yourselves—rational.

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II. The Enlightenment.

538 The specific object against which pure insight directs the power of the concept is faith, as the form of pure consciousness confronting it within the same element. But pure insight also relates to the actual world, since, like faith, it is the return from that world into pure consciousness. We must first see the character of its activity against that world's impure intentions and distorted insights.

539 We have already mentioned the tranquil consciousness that confronts this whirlpool dissolving and producing itself again. It constitutes the side of pure insight and intention. But as we saw, this tranquil consciousness contains no particular insight into the world of cultivation. Instead, that world itself has the most painful feeling and truest insight about itself: the feeling of being the dissolution of everything that establishes itself, broken on the wheel through every moment of its existence and shattered in every bone. It is equally the language of this feeling and the judging, 1807 487 witty speech about every side of its condition. Pure insight can therefore have no activity or content of its own here. It can relate only as the formal, faithful apprehension of the world's own witty insight and its language. This language is scattered; its judging is a moment's rambling, immediately forgotten again, and a whole only for a third consciousness. As pure insight, this third consciousness can therefore distinguish itself only by gathering those scattered traits into a universal picture, and then making them everyone's insight.

540 By this simple means, pure insight will bring this world's confusion to dissolution. For it has become clear that the essence of this actuality does not lie in its constituent bodies or determinate concepts and individualities. Instead, it has its substance and support only in spirit existing as judging and discussing. The interest in having a content for this reasoning and chatter alone preserves the whole and the bodies of its articulation. In this language of insight, its self-consciousness is still for itself this individual existing for itself. But the vanity of the content is also the vanity of the self that knows the content to be vain. Tranquilly apprehending consciousness now collects from all this witty chatter of vanity the most striking formulations, the ones that cut through to the matter. Thus, along with the 1807 488 rest of existence's vanity, the soul that still preserves the whole perishes: the vanity of witty judging. The collection shows most people a wit better than their own, or at least shows everyone a more varied wit. It shows knowing better and judging in general as something universal and now universally known. The only remaining interest thereby erases itself, and individual insight dissolves into universal insight. Yet above vain knowledge, knowledge of essence still stands firm. Pure insight first appears in its proper activity when it turns against faith.

a. The Enlightenment's struggle with superstition.

541 The different ways consciousness relates negatively—skepticism, theoretical idealism, and practical idealism—are subordinate shapes compared with pure insight and its spread, the Enlightenment. For pure insight is born from substance, knows the pure self of consciousness as absolute, and takes its stand together with pure consciousness of the absolute essence of all actuality.—Faith and 1807 489 insight are the same pure consciousness, but are opposed in form. For faith, essence is thought, not concept, and is therefore utterly opposed to self-consciousness. For pure insight, essence is the self. Each is therefore for the other the other's sheer negative.—As they confront one another, faith possesses all content, since in its tranquil element of thought every moment gains subsistence. Pure insight, by contrast, initially has no content and is instead content's pure disappearance. But through its negative movement against what is negative to it, it will realize itself and give itself a content.

542 It knows faith as opposed to itself, to reason and truth. In general, it sees faith as a web of superstition, prejudices, and errors. For it, consciousness of this content further organizes itself into a realm of error. Within this, false insight exists first as the universal mass of consciousness, immediate, trusting, and without reflection into itself. But false insight also contains the moment of reflection into itself, or self-consciousness, separated from that trusting innocence: an insight and evil intention remaining for itself in the background, by which the mass is deceived. This mass is the victim of fraud by a priesthood, which carries out its jealous vanity of keeping insight exclusively to itself, 1807 490 along with its other self-interest. At the same time, the priesthood conspires with despotism. As the synthetic unity, without concept, of the real realm and this ideal realm—a strangely inconsistent essence—despotism stands above both the crowd's bad insight and the priests' bad intention, while also combining both within itself. Through the deceitful priesthood, it takes advantage of the people's stupidity and confusion, despising both, to rule undisturbed and satisfy its desires and arbitrary will. Yet at the same time, it is itself the same dullness of insight, the same superstition and error.

543 The Enlightenment does not engage these three sides of the enemy indiscriminately. Its essence is pure insight, the universal in and for itself. Its true relation to the other extreme therefore seeks what is common and equal in both. The side of individuality that isolates itself from universal, trusting consciousness is opposed to enlightenment and cannot be touched by it immediately. The will of the deceitful priesthood and the oppressive despot is therefore not the immediate object of its activity. Rather, its object is insight without will, not individualized into being-for-itself: the concept of rational self-consciousness, which has its existence in the mass but is not yet present there as concept. But 1807 491 by tearing this honest insight and its trusting essence away from prejudices and errors, pure insight wrests from evil intention the reality and power of its deception. Its realm has its ground and material in the mass's universal consciousness without concept, just as being-for-itself has its substance in simple consciousness in general.

544 Pure insight's relation to the trusting consciousness of absolute essence now has two sides. On one side, it is in itself the same as this consciousness. On the other, within the simple element of its thought, this consciousness lets absolute essence and its parts freely give themselves subsistence. It lets them count only as its in-itself, and thus objectively, while denying its being-for-itself within this in-itself.—According to the first side, this faith is in itself, for pure insight, pure self-consciousness, and needs only to become this for itself. In this concept of faith, pure insight therefore has the element in which it realizes itself in place of false insight.

545 From this side—that both are essentially the same and pure insight's relation takes place through and within the same element—its communication is immediate, and its giving and receiving an undisturbed flowing together. Whatever other stakes may have been driven into consciousness, it is in itself this simplicity 1807 492 in which everything is dissolved, forgotten, and unguarded, and which is therefore absolutely receptive to the concept. Communicating pure insight can consequently be compared to a tranquil expansion, or to the spread of a fragrance through an unresisting atmosphere. It is a penetrating infection that does not first announce itself as something opposed to the indifferent element into which it slips, and therefore cannot be warded off. Only after the infection has spread does it exist for consciousness, which had surrendered to it without concern. For consciousness received into itself a simple essence equal both to itself and to consciousness, but also the simplicity of negativity reflected into itself. This negativity subsequently unfolds, according to its nature, as something opposed, thereby reminding consciousness of its former way of being. It is the concept: simple knowing that knows itself and also its opposite, but knows this opposite as sublated within itself. Thus, once pure insight exists for consciousness, it has already spread. The struggle against it betrays that the infection has occurred. The struggle is too late, and every remedy only worsens the disease. For it has seized the marrow of spiritual life: consciousness in its concept, or its pure essence itself. There is therefore no power within consciousness superior to it. Because it is in essence itself, its still 1807 493 isolated expressions can be driven back and its superficial symptoms subdued. This is highly advantageous to it. It now neither wastes its power uselessly nor shows itself unworthy of its essence, as it does when it breaks out in symptoms and isolated eruptions against faith's content and the connections of faith's external actuality. Instead, now an invisible and unnoticed spirit, it creeps right through the vital organs. Soon it has thoroughly taken possession of every organ and limb of the unconscious idol, and “on one fine morning it nudges its companion with an elbow, and bang! Crash! The idol lies on the ground.”—On one fine morning, whose noon is not bloody, if the infection has penetrated every organ of spiritual life. Memory alone then preserves the dead way of spirit's former shape as a history that has passed away, no one knows how. In this way, the new serpent of wisdom, raised up for worship, has merely shed a withered skin without pain.

546 But this silent weaving onward of spirit within the simple interior of its substance, hiding its activity from itself, is only one side of pure insight's realization. Its spread does not consist merely in like joining like, and its actualization is not merely an expansion without opposition. Rather, the activity of 1807 494 negative essence is just as essentially a developed movement differentiating itself within itself. As conscious activity, it must set out its moments in determinate, manifest existence, and must be present as loud noise and violent struggle against the opposed as such.

547 We must therefore see how pure insight and intention relate negatively to the other, opposed to them, that they find already present.—Since their concept is all essentiality and nothing exists outside them, pure insight and intention relating negatively can be only the negative of themselves. As insight, pure insight thus becomes the negative of pure insight: untruth and unreason. As intention, it becomes the negative of pure intention: lying and impurity of purpose.

548 It entangles itself in this contradiction by entering into conflict and thinking it is fighting something other.—It merely thinks this, for its essence as absolute negativity consists in containing otherness within itself. The absolute concept is the category: knowing and the object of knowing are the same. What pure insight expresses as its other, as error or a lie, can therefore be nothing other than itself. It can condemn only what it is. What is not rational has no truth, or what is not comprehended does not exist. When reason speaks of something other 1807 495 than itself, it therefore in fact speaks only of itself. It does not move outside itself.—This struggle with its opposite consequently also has the meaning of being its actualization. Its actualization consists precisely in the movement of developing its moments and taking them back into itself. One part of this movement is the differentiation in which comprehending insight confronts itself as object. As long as it remains in this moment, it is alienated from itself. As pure insight, it has no content at all. The movement of its realization consists in itself becoming its content. No other content can become its own, because it is the self-consciousness of the category. But at first, in opposing this content to itself, it knows it only as content, not yet as itself, and so fails to recognize itself in it. Its completion therefore means recognizing as its own the content that is initially objective for it. Its result will thus be neither the restoration of the errors it fights nor merely its original concept. It will be an insight recognizing the absolute negation of itself as its own actuality, as itself: its concept recognizing itself.—The nature of the Enlightenment's struggle with errors—to fight itself in them and condemn in them what it affirms—is for us, or is what enlightenment and its struggle are in themselves. The first side 1807 496 of this struggle, however, is its contamination by taking negative relating into its self-equal purity. This is how it is an object for faith, which therefore experiences it as lying, unreason, and bad intention, just as faith is error and prejudice for enlightenment.—Regarding its content, enlightenment is initially empty insight whose content appears to it as an other. It therefore finds this content in faith as something not yet its own, an existence completely independent of it.

549 At first, and in general, enlightenment therefore grasps its object by taking it as pure insight. Failing to recognize itself, it thus declares the object to be error. In insight as such, consciousness grasps an object so that it becomes for consciousness the essence of consciousness, or an object consciousness penetrates, within which it preserves itself, remains at home with itself and present to itself. Since consciousness is thus the object's movement, it produces the object. Enlightenment correctly describes faith as precisely this when it says that faith's absolute essence is a being of its own consciousness, its own thought, something produced by consciousness. It thereby declares faith to be error and fiction about the very thing enlightenment itself is.—Enlightenment wants to teach faith this new wisdom, but tells it nothing new. For faith's object is precisely 1807 497 this: the pure essence of its own consciousness. Consciousness does not posit itself as lost and negated within it, but instead trusts it. This means precisely that within it consciousness finds itself as this consciousness, or as self-consciousness. The certainty of self of someone I trust is for me the certainty of myself. I recognize my being-for-myself in that person: that they acknowledge it and that it is their purpose and essence. But trust is faith, because its consciousness relates immediately to its object and therefore also intuits that it is one with it, within it.—Further, when my object is that in which I recognize myself, I am also present to myself there as an other self-consciousness in general. That is, it is a self-consciousness that has been alienated there from its particular individuality, its natural character and contingency. Yet it partly remains self-consciousness there, and partly is, precisely there, essential consciousness, like pure insight.—The concept of insight includes more than consciousness recognizing itself in the object it understands and having itself immediately within that object, without leaving what is thought and only then returning into itself. Consciousness is also conscious of itself as the mediating movement, or of itself as activity, as production. Through this, the unity of itself as self and the object exists for it in thought.—Faith too is precisely this consciousness. Obedience 1807 498 and activity are a necessary moment through which certainty of being within absolute essence comes about. This activity of faith does not indeed appear to produce absolute essence itself. But faith's absolute essence is essentially not abstract essence located beyond believing consciousness. It is the spirit of the congregation, the unity of abstract essence and self-consciousness. In its being this spirit of the congregation, the congregation's activity is an essential moment. It is this spirit only through production by consciousness—or rather, not without being produced by consciousness. For production is essential, but it is just as essential that it is not the sole ground of essence. It is only a moment. Essence also exists in and for itself.

550 From the other side, the concept of pure insight is to itself an other as its object, since precisely this negative determination constitutes the object. From the other side, then, enlightenment also describes faith's essence as something foreign to self-consciousness, not its essence, but a changeling slipped into its place. But here enlightenment is completely foolish. Faith experiences it as speech that does not know what it is saying and does not understand the matter when it talks about priestly fraud and deception of the people. 1807 499 It speaks as though some hocus-pocus of conjuring priests had substituted something absolutely foreign and other as essence for consciousness. At the same time, it says that this is an essence of consciousness, that consciousness believes in it, trusts it, and seeks its favor. That is, consciousness intuits in it both its pure essence and its individual and universal individuality, and through its activity produces this unity of itself with its essence. Enlightenment immediately describes as consciousness's ownmost what it describes as foreign to consciousness.—How, then, can it speak of fraud and deception? By itself immediately saying the opposite of what it asserts about faith, it shows itself to faith instead as the conscious lie. How can deception and fraud occur where consciousness, in its truth, immediately has certainty of itself, where it possesses itself in its object by both finding and producing itself there? The distinction is no longer present even in the words.—If the general question has been posed, whether it is permissible to deceive a people, the answer must in fact be that the question is worthless, because it is impossible to deceive a people in this matter.—Brass may be sold for gold and forged bills of exchange for genuine ones in individual cases. A lost battle may be passed off to many people as a 1807 500 victory, and other lies about sensuous things and individual events may be made credible for a time. But in knowledge of essence, in which consciousness has immediate certainty of itself, the thought of deception falls away entirely.

551 Let us see further how faith experiences enlightenment in the distinct moments of its consciousness, to which the view just presented initially referred only in general. These moments are pure thought—or, as object, absolute essence in and for itself—then faith's relation to it as knowing, the ground of its faith, and finally its relation to it in its activity, or its service. Just as pure insight has failed to recognize and has denied itself in faith generally, so it will behave perversely in these moments as well.

552 Pure insight relates negatively to believing consciousness's absolute essence. This essence is pure thought, and pure thought posited within itself as object, or as essence. In believing consciousness, this in-itself of thought also receives for consciousness existing for itself the form—but only the empty form—of objectivity. It has the determination of something represented. But to pure insight, since it is pure consciousness on the side of the self existing for itself, the other appears as a negative of 1807 501 self-consciousness. This could still be taken either as the pure in-itself of thought or as the being of sense-certainty. But since it is also for the self, and this self having an object is actual consciousness, pure insight's distinctive object as such is an existing, ordinary thing of sense-certainty. This object of its own appears to it in faith's representation. It condemns the representation, and in it its own object. But it already wrongs faith by grasping faith's object in such a way that it is its own. Accordingly, it says of faith that its absolute essence is a piece of stone, a block of wood with eyes that do not see, or a little bread dough that grew in the field and, transformed by human beings, is sent back there; or in whatever other ways faith gives essence a human form, makes it an object, and represents it to itself.

553 Enlightenment, which claims to be pure, here makes what for spirit is eternal life and holy spirit into an actual, perishable thing. It soils it with the inherently null view of sense-certainty—a view not present at all to worshiping faith, so that enlightenment is simply lying when it attributes it to faith. What faith reveres is for it in no way stone or wood or bread dough or any other temporal, sensuous thing. If enlightenment takes it into its head to say that faith's object 1807 502 is also this, or even that it is this in itself and in truth, then, on one side, faith knows that Also just as well, but it lies outside its worship. On the other, for faith something like a stone and so on does not exist in itself at all. Only the essence of pure thought exists in itself for faith.

554 The second moment is faith's relation to this essence as knowing consciousness. As thinking, pure consciousness, faith has this essence immediately. But pure consciousness is equally a mediated relation of certainty to truth, a relation constituting the ground of faith. For enlightenment, this ground likewise becomes a contingent knowledge of contingent events. But the ground of knowledge is the knowing universal, and in its truth absolute spirit. In abstract pure consciousness, or thought as such, this is only absolute essence. As self-consciousness, however, it is knowledge of itself. Pure insight likewise posits this knowing universal, the simple spirit knowing itself, as the negative of self-consciousness. It is itself indeed pure mediated thought, thought mediating itself with itself; it is pure knowledge. But it is pure insight, pure knowledge that does not yet know itself, for which it is not yet the case that it is this pure mediating movement. This movement therefore appears to it, like everything it itself is, as an other. In the course of actualizing itself, then, it develops this essential 1807 503 moment of its own. But the moment appears to it as belonging to faith and, in its determination as external to pure insight, as a contingent knowledge of just such ordinary, actual histories. It therefore invents the claim that religious faith grounds its certainty on a few individual historical testimonies. Considered as historical testimonies, these would certainly not give the degree of certainty about their content that newspaper reports give us about some event. It further claims that faith's certainty rests on the chance preservation of these testimonies: preservation by paper on one side, and by the skill and honesty of transferring them from one paper to another on the other; and finally on correctly grasping the sense of dead words and letters. But in fact it does not occur to faith to attach its certainty to such testimonies and contingencies. In its certainty, faith is a natural, unforced relation to its absolute object, a pure knowledge of it that does not mix letters, paper, and copyists into its consciousness of absolute essence, or mediate itself with essence through such things. Instead, this consciousness is the self-mediating ground of its knowledge. It is spirit itself that bears witness to itself, both in the interior of individual consciousness and through the universal presence of everyone's faith in it. If faith also wants to give itself, from history, the kind of 1807 504 grounding or at least confirmation of its content that enlightenment speaks of, and seriously thinks and acts as though this mattered, then it has already let enlightenment lead it astray. Its efforts to ground or secure itself in this way are only testimonies it gives of its infection.

555 The third side still remains: consciousness's relation to absolute essence as activity. This activity sublates the individual's particularity, or the natural way of its being-for-itself. From this comes the certainty of being pure self-consciousness, of being one with essence in its activity—that is, as individual consciousness existing for itself.—Since in activity suitability to purpose and purpose are distinguished, and pure insight also relates negatively to this activity and denies itself here as in the other moments, it must present itself as lacking understanding in regard to suitability to purpose. For insight joined with intention, the agreement of means and purpose, appears to it as an other, indeed as its opposite. In regard to purpose, it must make the bad—enjoyment and possession—its purpose and thereby prove itself the most impure intention, since pure intention too, as an other, is impure intention.

556 Accordingly, regarding suitability to purpose, we see enlightenment finding it foolish when the believing individual gives itself the higher consciousness of not 1807 505 being tied to natural enjoyment and pleasure by actually denying itself natural enjoyment and pleasure, and proving through the deed that its contempt for them is not a lie but true.—It likewise finds it foolish that the individual frees itself from its determination as absolutely individual, excluding all others and possessing property, by relinquishing its property itself. Through this, the individual shows in truth that it is not serious about its isolation, but is above the natural necessity of individualizing itself and, in this absolute individualization of being-for-itself, denying others as the same as itself.—Pure insight finds both unsuitable to their purpose and wrong: unsuitable to prove oneself free of pleasure and possession by denying oneself pleasure and giving away a possession. It will therefore, conversely, declare someone a fool who, in order to eat, adopts the means of actually eating.—It also finds it wrong to deny oneself a meal, or to give away butter and eggs not in exchange for money, or money not in exchange for butter and eggs, but outright, without receiving anything of the sort in return. It declares a meal or possession of such things an end in itself. It thereby declares itself in fact a very impure intention, essentially concerned with such enjoyment and possession. As pure intention, it in turn also asserts the necessity of rising 1807 506 above natural existence and greed for its means. It merely finds it foolish and wrong to prove this elevation through the deed. Or this pure intention is in truth fraud: it professes and demands an inward elevation, but declares it superfluous, foolish, and even wrong to be serious about it, to actually carry it out and prove its truth.—It therefore denies itself both as pure insight, by denying activity that is immediately suited to its purpose, and as pure intention, by denying the intention of proving oneself free from the purposes of individuality.

557 This is how enlightenment gives itself to faith's experience. It appears in this bad light because, through its relation to another, it gives itself a negative reality, or presents itself as its own opposite. Yet pure insight and intention must give themselves this relation, because it is their actualization.—This actualization first appeared as negative reality. Perhaps enlightenment's positive reality is better constituted. Let us see how it behaves.—Once every prejudice and superstition has been banished, the question arises: what next? What truth has enlightenment spread in their place?—It has already expressed this positive content in its eradication of error, since that alienation of itself is equally its positive reality.—In what is absolute 1807 507 spirit for faith, enlightenment grasps whatever determination it discovers as wood, stone, and so on, as individual actual things. In general, it understands all determination—all spirit's content and fullness—in this way as something finite, as human essence and representation. Absolute essence therefore becomes for it a vacuum to which no determinations or predicates can be attributed. Such a mating would be blameworthy in itself, and it is precisely such a mating that has produced the monsters of superstition. Reason, pure insight, is itself certainly not empty, since its own negative exists for it and is its content. It is rich, but only in individuality and limitation. Its insightful good manners consist in letting nothing of this sort belong to absolute essence or attributing it to that essence. These manners know how to put themselves and their wealth of finitude in their proper place and treat the absolute worthily.

558 Opposed to this empty essence stands the second moment of enlightenment's positive truth: the individuality of consciousness and all being in general, excluded from absolute essence, as absolute being-in-and-for-itself. Consciousness, which in its very first actuality is sense-certainty and opinion, returns here to that point from the whole course of its experience. It is once again knowledge of its own pure negative, or of sensuous things: existing beings that stand indifferently opposite its being-for-itself. Here, however, it is not 1807 508 immediate, natural consciousness. It has become such for itself. Initially abandoned to all the entanglements into which its unfolding plunges it, and now led back to its first shape by pure insight, it has experienced this shape as the result. Grounded in insight into the nullity of all other shapes of consciousness, and thus of everything beyond sense-certainty, this sense-certainty is no longer opinion. Instead, it is absolute truth. The nullity of everything beyond sense-certainty is indeed only a negative proof of this truth. But it is capable of no other proof. For the positive truth of sense-certainty within itself is precisely the unmediated being-for-itself of the concept itself as object, and indeed in the form of otherness: every consciousness is absolutely certain that it is, that other actual things exist outside it, and that in its natural being it, like these things, exists in and for itself, or absolutely.

559 Finally, the third moment of enlightenment's truth is the relation of individual essences to absolute essence, the relation of the first two moments. As pure insight into the equal or unlimited, insight also goes beyond the unequal—finite actuality—or beyond itself as mere otherness. Beyond this, it has the empty, to which it therefore relates sensuous 1807 509 actuality. The two sides do not enter the determination of this relation as content, since one is the empty. Content is therefore present only through the other, sensuous actuality. But the form of the relation, in determining which the side of the in-itself plays a part, can be made as one pleases. For form is what is negative in itself, and therefore what is opposed to itself: being as well as nothing, the in-itself as well as its opposite. Or, what is the same, the relation of actuality to the in-itself as the beyond is as much a negating as a positing of actuality. Finite actuality can therefore properly be taken in whatever way is needed. The sensuous is now related positively to the absolute as the in-itself, and sensuous actuality itself exists in itself: the absolute makes, tends, and cares for it. Again, actuality is also related to the absolute as its opposite, as its non-being. In this relation it does not exist in itself, but only for another. In the previous shape of consciousness, the opposed concepts were defined as good and bad. For pure insight, by contrast, they become the purer abstractions of being in itself and being for another.

560 But in fact both ways of considering the finite—its positive and its negative relation to the in-itself—are equally necessary. Everything therefore exists as much in itself as it exists for another, or everything is 1807 510 useful.—Everything gives itself up to others, now lets others use it and exists for them, and now, so to speak, gets back up on its hind legs, keeps its distance from others, exists for itself, and uses the other in turn.—For the human being, as the thing conscious of this relation, its essence and position follow from this. As it immediately is, as natural consciousness, the human being exists in itself, is good, and as an individual is absolute. Other things exist for it. Indeed, since for the human being as a self-conscious animal the moments have the meaning of universality, everything is for its pleasure and delight. Just as it came from God's hand, it walks about the world as a garden planted for it.—It must also have picked from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. In this it possesses a benefit that distinguishes it from everything else. For its inherently good nature also happens to be such that excessive delight harms it. Or rather, its individuality also has its beyond within it: it can go beyond itself and destroy itself. Against this, reason is a useful means of properly limiting this going beyond—or rather of preserving itself in going beyond what is determinate, for this is the power of consciousness. The enjoyment of conscious essence, universal in itself, must itself be not determinate but universal in variety and duration. Moderation therefore has the determination of 1807 511 preventing pleasure from being interrupted in its variety and duration. That is, moderation's determination is immoderation.—Just as everything is useful to the human being, so the human being is useful too. Its determination is equally to make itself a member of the troop who is useful to the community and universally serviceable. As much as it cares for itself, it must also give itself up for others. As much as it gives itself up, it cares for itself. One hand washes the other. Wherever it finds itself, it is in the right place: it benefits others and is made use of.

561 Different things are useful to one another in different ways. But all things have this useful reciprocity through their essence: being related to the absolute in the twofold way, positively—thereby existing in and for themselves—and negatively—thereby existing for others. The relation to absolute essence, or religion, is therefore the most useful of all useful things. For it is pure usefulness itself: the subsistence of all things, or their being-in-and-for-themselves, and the falling away of all things, or their being for another.

562 For faith, of course, this positive result of enlightenment is as much an abomination as enlightenment's negative behavior toward it. This insight into absolute essence, seeing nothing in it but precisely the absolute essence, the supreme being, or the empty; this intention that everything in its immediate existence exists in itself, or 1807 512 is good; and finally, the exhaustive expression of the relation of individual conscious being to absolute essence—religion—by the concept of usefulness: all this is utterly abhorrent to faith. This wisdom peculiar to enlightenment necessarily appears to faith both as banality itself and as the admission of banality. For it consists in knowing nothing about absolute essence, or, what is the same, knowing only this perfectly flat truth about it: that it is merely absolute essence. On the other hand, it knows only finitude, and indeed knows finitude as the true, and knows this knowledge of finitude as the true to be the highest.

563 Against enlightenment, faith has divine right, the right of absolute equality with itself, or pure thought. It experiences nothing but wrong from enlightenment, which distorts every one of faith's moments and makes them something other than what they are within faith. Enlightenment, however, has only human right against faith and on behalf of its truth. For the wrong it commits is the right of inequality and consists in reversing and changing. This right belongs to the nature of self-consciousness as opposed to simple essence or thought. But because enlightenment's right is the right of self-consciousness, it will not merely also retain its right, leaving two equal rights of spirit confronting one another, neither able to satisfy the other. Instead, it will assert absolute right, because self-consciousness is the negativity 1807 513 of the concept, which not only exists for itself but also reaches over its opposite. Faith itself, because it is consciousness, will be unable to deny enlightenment its right.

564 For enlightenment does not confront believing consciousness with principles peculiar to itself, but with principles that believing consciousness itself contains. It merely brings together faith's own thoughts, which fall apart without faith being conscious of this. In connection with one of faith's ways, it merely reminds faith of the others it also has, but always forgets while attending to another. It proves itself pure insight against faith precisely by seeing the whole in a determinate moment. It thus introduces the opposite relating to that moment and, reversing one within the other, brings out the negative essence of both thoughts, the concept. It therefore appears to faith as distortion and lying because it shows the otherness of faith's moments. In doing so, it seems immediately to make them something other than what they are in their individuality. But this other is equally essential and is truly present in believing consciousness itself. Faith simply does not think of it, but has it elsewhere. It is therefore neither foreign to faith nor something faith can deny.

565 But enlightenment itself, which reminds faith of the opposite of its isolated moments, 1807 514 is just as little enlightened about itself. It relates purely negatively to faith insofar as it excludes its own content from its purity and takes it as its own negative. It therefore neither recognizes itself in this negative, in faith's content, nor, for this very reason, brings its two thoughts together: the thought it introduces and the thought against which it introduces it. Since it does not recognize that what it condemns in faith is immediately its own thought, it remains within the opposition of the two moments. It acknowledges only one—the one opposed to faith in each case—and separates the other from it, just as faith does. It therefore does not produce the unity of both as their unity, that is, the concept. But the concept arises for it on its own, or enlightenment merely finds it already there. For pure insight's realization is in itself precisely this: insight, whose essence is the concept, first becomes an absolute other to itself and denies itself—for the concept's opposition is absolute—and from this otherness comes to itself, or to its concept.—But enlightenment is only this movement. It is the still unconscious activity of the pure concept, which does come to itself as object, but takes this object for an other. Nor does it know the concept's nature: that what is undifferentiated is what absolutely separates itself.—Against faith, then, insight 1807 515 is the power of the concept insofar as it is the movement and relating of moments lying apart in faith's consciousness, a relating in which their contradiction comes to light. Here lies the absolute right of the force it exercises over faith. But the actuality to which it brings this force lies precisely in this: believing consciousness is itself the concept, and therefore itself acknowledges the opposite that insight introduces to it. Enlightenment therefore retains its right against faith because it brings to bear within faith what is necessary for faith itself and what faith contains within itself.

566 First, enlightenment asserts the concept's moment of being an activity of consciousness. It asserts this against faith: that faith's absolute essence is the essence of its consciousness as a self, or that it is produced by consciousness. For believing consciousness, its absolute essence, though its in-itself, is not at the same time a foreign thing standing within it, no one knows how or from where. Instead, its trust consists precisely in finding itself there as this personal consciousness, and its obedience and service in producing this essence as its absolute essence through its activity. Enlightenment properly only reminds faith of this when faith expresses purely the in-itself of absolute essence beyond consciousness's activity.—But although enlightenment brings the 1807 516 opposite moment of faith's activity against faith's one-sidedness, against the being that alone occupies faith's thought here, enlightenment likewise does not bring its own thoughts together. It isolates the pure moment of activity and says of faith's in-itself that it is only something produced by consciousness. But activity isolated and opposed to the in-itself is contingent activity and, as representing, a production of fictions—representations that do not exist in themselves. This is how enlightenment regards faith's content.—Conversely, pure insight equally says the opposite. By asserting the moment of otherness contained in the concept, it describes faith's essence as something that has nothing to do with consciousness, something beyond it, foreign and unknown to it. For faith, just as it trusts this essence on one side and has certainty of itself within it, so on the other this essence is unfathomable in its ways and unattainable in its being.

567 Enlightenment further asserts against believing consciousness a right that faith itself concedes when enlightenment regards the object of faith's reverence as stone and wood, or as some other finite, anthropomorphic determination. For faith is this divided consciousness, having a beyond of actuality and a pure this side of that beyond. In fact, therefore, it also contains this view of the sensuous thing, 1807 517 according to which the thing has validity in and for itself. But it does not bring together these two thoughts of what exists in and for itself, which for it is now pure essence, now an ordinary sensuous thing.—Even its pure consciousness is affected by the latter view. For, lacking the concept, the distinctions of its supersensible realm are a series of independent shapes, and their movement is an event. That is, they exist only in representation and have the manner of sensuous being.—Enlightenment, for its part, likewise isolates actuality as an essence abandoned by spirit, and determination as an immovable finitude, rather than as a moment in essence's own spiritual movement: neither nothing nor something existing in and for itself, but something vanishing.

568 Clearly, the same applies to the ground of knowledge. Believing consciousness itself acknowledges contingent knowledge, since it relates to contingencies and absolute essence itself has for it the form of represented, ordinary actuality. Believing consciousness is thus also a certainty that does not contain truth within itself. It acknowledges itself as such an inessential consciousness, on this side of spirit that assures and confirms itself.—But it forgets this moment in its immediate spiritual knowledge of absolute 1807 518 essence.—Enlightenment, which reminds it of this, again thinks only of contingent knowledge and forgets the other. It thinks only of mediation through a foreign third, not of mediation in which the immediate is itself the third through which it mediates itself with the other, namely with itself.

569 Finally, in its view of faith's activity, enlightenment finds the throwing away of enjoyment and possessions wrong and unsuitable to its purpose.—Regarding wrongness, it gains believing consciousness's agreement because faith itself acknowledges this actuality: possessing, retaining, and enjoying property. In asserting property, faith behaves all the more stubbornly and in isolation, and abandons itself all the more crudely to enjoyment, because its religious activity, which gives up possession and enjoyment, falls beyond this actuality and purchases its freedom on that side. Through this opposition, this service of sacrificing natural pursuits and enjoyment in fact has no truth. Retention takes place alongside sacrifice. Sacrifice is only a sign, actually sacrificing only a small part and therefore in fact merely representing sacrifice.

570 Regarding suitability to purpose, enlightenment finds it clumsy to throw away a possession in order to know and prove oneself free of possession, or to deny oneself a pleasure in order to be free of 1807 519 pleasure. Believing consciousness itself grasps absolute activity as universal activity. Not only is the action of its absolute essence as its object universal for it, but individual consciousness too is to prove itself wholly and universally freed from its sensuous essence. Throwing away an individual possession or renouncing an individual pleasure is not this universal action. In action, the purpose, which is universal, and the execution, which is individual, must essentially stand before consciousness in their inadequacy to one another. The action therefore proves to be one in which consciousness has no share. It thus proves, properly speaking, too naive to be an action. It is too naive to fast in order to prove oneself free of pleasure in meals; too naive, like Origen, to remove other pleasure from one's body in order to prove it done away with. The action itself proves to be an external, individual activity. Desire, however, is rooted inwardly and is universal. Its pleasure disappears neither with the tool nor through individual deprivation.

571 But enlightenment, for its part, here isolates the inward, unactual against actuality, just as it held fast to the externality of 1807 520 thinghood against faith's inwardness in intuition and devotion. It places what is essential in intention, in thought, thereby sparing itself the actual accomplishment of liberation from natural purposes. On the contrary, this inwardness is itself the formal element whose fulfillment lies in natural drives. These are justified precisely by being inward, by belonging to universal being, to nature.

572 Enlightenment therefore has irresistible force over faith because the moments it brings to bear are found within faith's own consciousness. Consider the effect of this force more closely. Enlightenment's conduct toward faith seems to tear apart the beautiful unity of trust and immediate certainty, to contaminate faith's spiritual consciousness with low thoughts of sensuous actuality, and to destroy its heart, tranquil and secure in submission, through the vanity of understanding and of its own will and accomplishment. But in fact enlightenment instead initiates the sublation of the thoughtless, or rather conceptless, separation present in faith. Believing consciousness uses double measures and weights. It has two kinds of eyes, ears, tongue, and language. It has doubled all its representations without comparing this double meaning. Or faith lives in two kinds of perception: one belonging to sleeping consciousness living purely in 1807 521 thoughts without concepts, the other to waking consciousness living purely in sensuous actuality. It keeps a separate household in each.—Enlightenment illuminates that heavenly world with the representations of the sensuous world, and shows the heavenly world this finitude. Faith cannot deny it, because faith is self-consciousness and thus the unity to which both ways of representing belong and in which they do not fall apart. For they belong to the same inseparable, simple self into which faith has passed.

573 Faith has thereby lost the content that filled its element, and collapses into a dull weaving of spirit within itself. It is expelled from its realm, or this realm is plundered. This happens because waking consciousness has seized all its distinctions and extent, claimed all its parts as the earth's property, and returned them to earth. But faith is not satisfied by this, since this illumination has everywhere produced only individual essence. As a result, nothing speaks to spirit except inessential actuality and a finitude that spirit has abandoned.—Faith has no content and cannot remain in this emptiness. Or, going beyond the finite, which is its only content, it finds only the empty. It is therefore pure longing. Its truth is an empty beyond for which no suitable content can any longer be found, 1807 522 since everything has been put to other uses.—In fact, faith has thereby become the same as enlightenment: consciousness of the relation of the finite existing in itself to an absolute without predicates, unknown and unknowable. The only difference is that enlightenment is satisfied, while faith is unsatisfied enlightenment. Yet we will see whether enlightenment can remain satisfied. That longing of clouded spirit, mourning the loss of its spiritual world, lies in wait. Enlightenment itself contains this blemish of unsatisfied longing: as pure object, in its empty absolute essence; as activity and movement, in going beyond its individual essence toward an unfulfilled beyond; and as fulfilled object, in the lack of a self in the useful. It will sublate this blemish. A closer examination of the positive result that is its truth will show that the blemish is already sublated in itself within that result.

b. The truth of the Enlightenment.

574 Spirit's dull weaving, no longer distinguishing anything within itself, has thus inwardly passed beyond consciousness, which by contrast has become clear to itself.—The necessity and condition of this clarity's first moment are 1807 523 determined by pure insight—insight that is concept in itself—actualizing itself. It does so by positing otherness, or determinateness, within itself. In this way it is negative pure insight, that is, negation of the concept. This negation is equally pure. The pure thing has thereby come to be: absolute essence with no further determination. More precisely, as absolute concept, pure insight differentiates differences that no longer are differences: abstractions or pure concepts that no longer support themselves, but have support and distinction only through the whole movement. This differentiation of the undifferentiated consists precisely in the absolute concept making itself its own object, and positing itself as essence opposed to that movement. Essence thereby lacks the side on which abstractions or differences are kept apart, and thus becomes pure thought as pure thing.—This is therefore precisely that dull, unconscious weaving of spirit within itself into which faith sank when it lost its differentiated content. It is also that movement of pure self-consciousness for which it is supposed to be the absolutely foreign beyond. For since this pure self-consciousness is movement in pure concepts, in differences that are none, it in fact collapses into unconscious weaving, that is, pure feeling or pure thinghood.—But the concept alienated 1807 524 from itself—for it still stands here at this stage of alienation—does not recognize this same essence of both sides, of self-consciousness's movement and its absolute essence. It does not recognize their same essence, which is in fact their substance and subsistence. Since it does not recognize this unity, essence counts for it only in the form of an objective beyond. Differentiating consciousness, which thus has the in-itself outside itself, counts as finite consciousness.

575 Over that absolute essence, enlightenment itself enters the conflict with itself that it previously had with faith, and divides into two parties. A party proves itself victorious only by splitting into two parties. For in doing so, it shows that it possesses within itself the principle it fought, and has thereby sublated the one-sidedness with which it previously appeared. The interest previously divided between it and the other party now falls wholly within it and forgets the other, because it finds within this party itself the opposition that occupies it. Yet this opposition has also been raised into the higher, victorious element, where it presents itself purified. Thus the discord arising within a party, which seems a misfortune, proves instead to be its good fortune.

576 Pure essence itself contains no distinction. Distinction therefore comes to it through two such pure essences emerging for consciousness, or 1807 525 a twofold consciousness of this essence.—Pure absolute essence exists only in pure thought, or rather is pure thought itself. It is therefore utterly beyond finite consciousness, beyond self-consciousness, and is only negative essence. But in this way it is precisely being, the negative of self-consciousness. As self-consciousness's negative, it is also related to it. It is external being. Related to self-consciousness, within which distinctions and determinations fall, this being acquires the distinctions of being tasted, seen, and so forth. The relation is sense-certainty and perception.

577 Suppose we start from this sensuous being, into which that negative beyond necessarily passes, but abstract from these determinate ways in which consciousness relates. What remains is pure matter, as a dull weaving and movement within itself. Here it is essential to observe that pure matter is only what remains when we abstract from seeing, feeling, tasting, and so forth. That is, it is not what is seen, tasted, felt, and so forth. It is not matter that is seen, felt, or tasted, but color, a stone, a salt, and so on. Matter is instead pure abstraction. In it, therefore, the pure essence of thought, or pure thought itself, is present as the absolute without internal distinction, determination, or predicates.

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578 One enlightenment calls absolute essence that absolute without predicates existing in thought beyond actual consciousness, from which we started. The other calls it matter. If they were distinguished as nature and spirit or God, the unconscious weaving within itself would lack the wealth of unfolded life required to be nature, while spirit or God would lack consciousness differentiating itself within itself. As we have seen, both are utterly the same concept. The difference lies not in the matter itself, but purely in the different starting points of the two formations, and in each stopping at a point of its own in thought's movement. If they went beyond these points, they would meet and recognize as the same what one professes to find an abomination and the other finds foolishness. For one, absolute essence is in its pure thought, or immediately for pure consciousness, outside finite consciousness, as finite consciousness's negative beyond. If it reflected that, first, this simple immediacy of thought is nothing other than pure being, and second, what is negative for consciousness also relates to consciousness—that in a negative judgment the is (the copula) equally holds the two separated terms together—then the relation of this beyond to consciousness would emerge as that of something externally existing, 1807 527 and thus as the same as what is called pure matter. The missing moment of presence would have been gained.—The other enlightenment starts from sensuous being, then abstracts from the sensuous relations of tasting, seeing, and so forth, and makes it the pure in-itself, absolute matter, what is neither felt nor tasted. In this way, this being has become the simple without predicates, the essence of pure consciousness. It is the pure concept as existing in itself, or pure thought within itself. In its consciousness, this insight does not take the opposite step from what exists, which purely exists, to what is thought, which is the same as what purely exists; or from the purely positive to the purely negative. Yet the positive is pure only through negation, while the purely negative, as pure, is equal to itself within itself and thereby positive.—Or neither enlightenment has reached the concept of Cartesian metaphysics, that being-in-itself and thought are the same. Neither has reached the thought that being, pure being, is not something concrete and actual, but pure abstraction. Nor, conversely, has either reached the thought that pure thought, equality with itself, or essence, is partly the negative of self-consciousness and therefore being, and partly, as immediate simplicity, equally nothing other than being. Thought is thinghood, or thinghood is thought.

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579 Here essence initially contains division only by belonging to two kinds of consideration. On the one hand, essence must have distinction within itself. On the other, precisely through this the two ways of considering it come together into one. For the abstract moments of pure being and the negative, through which they differ, are then united in the object of these ways of considering.—The universal common to both is the abstraction of pure trembling within itself, or of pure thinking of itself. This simple movement turning on its axis must fling itself apart, since it is movement only by distinguishing its moments. This differentiation leaves the unmoved behind as the empty shell of pure being, no longer any actual thought or life within itself. For as distinction, differentiation is all content. But by placing itself outside that unity, it is thereby the alternation of the moments of being-in-itself, being for another, and being-for-itself, an alternation not returning into itself. It is actuality as the object of pure insight's actual consciousness: usefulness.

580 However bad usefulness may look to faith, to sentimentality, or to the abstraction calling itself speculation that fixes the in-itself for itself, it is in usefulness that pure insight completes its realization and is its own 1807 529 object. It no longer denies this object, nor does the object count for it as the empty or a pure beyond. For as we saw, pure insight is the existing concept itself, or pure personality equal to itself, differentiating itself within itself so that each thing it differentiates is itself pure concept, that is, immediately not differentiated. It is simple, pure self-consciousness existing equally for itself and in itself in immediate unity. Its being-in-itself is therefore not enduring being, but immediately ceases to be anything in its distinction. But a being that immediately has no support does not exist in itself. It exists essentially for another, the power that absorbs it. Yet this second moment, opposed to the first, to being-in-itself, disappears just as immediately as the first. Or, as being only for another, it is instead disappearance itself, and return into itself has occurred: being-for-itself is posited. But as equality with itself, this simple being-for-itself is instead a being, and therefore for another.—The useful expresses this nature of pure insight in the unfolding of its moments, or pure insight as object. It is something subsisting in itself, or a thing. This being-in-itself is at the same time only a pure moment. It is thus absolutely for another, but it is for another only to the same degree that it is in itself. These opposed moments have returned into the inseparable unity of 1807 530 being-for-itself. Yet although the useful expresses pure insight's concept, it is not pure insight as such, but pure insight as representation, or as its object. It is only the restless alternation of those moments. One of them is indeed the return into itself as such, but only as being-for-itself, that is, an abstract moment stepping to one side, opposed to the others. The useful itself is not the negative essence that contains these moments in their opposition also undivided in one and the same respect, or as a thinking, as they are in pure insight. The moment of being-for-itself is indeed present in the useful, but not so that it reaches over the other moments, the in-itself and being for another, and would thus be the self. In the useful, then, pure insight has as its object its own concept in its pure moments. It is consciousness of this metaphysics, but not yet comprehension of it. It has not yet reached the unity of being and the concept itself. Since the useful still has for pure insight the form of an object, pure insight still has a world distinguished from itself, although this world no longer exists in and for itself. But since the oppositions have emerged at the summit of the concept, the next stage will be their collapse together, and enlightenment's experience of the fruits of its deeds.

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581 Consider the object attained, in relation to this entire sphere. The actual world of cultivation had gathered itself into the vanity of self-consciousness: into being-for-itself, which still has that world's confusion as its content and is still the individual concept, not yet the concept universal for itself. But returned into itself, it is pure insight: pure consciousness as pure self, or negativity, just as faith is this same consciousness as pure thought, or positivity. In that self, faith has the moment that completes it. But faith perishes through this completion, and now in pure insight we see both moments: absolute essence, which is purely thought, or negative, and matter, which is positive, existing being.—This completeness still lacks the actuality of self-consciousness belonging to vain consciousness: the world from which thought rose into itself. This missing element is attained in usefulness insofar as pure insight has gained positive objectivity there. Through this, it is actual consciousness satisfied within itself. This objectivity now constitutes its world. It has become the truth of the whole preceding world, both ideal and real. Spirit's first world is the extensive realm of its scattered existence and individualized certainty of itself, just as nature scatters its life into 1807 532 infinitely varied shapes without their genus being present. The second contains the genus and is the realm of being-in-itself, or truth, opposed to that certainty. But the third, the useful, is truth that is equally certainty of itself. The realm of the truth of faith lacks the principle of actuality, or certainty of itself as this individual. Actuality, or certainty of itself as this individual, however, lacks the in-itself. In pure insight's object the two worlds are united. The useful is the object insofar as self-consciousness sees through it and has in it its individual certainty of itself, its enjoyment, its being-for-itself. In this way it gains insight into the object, and this insight contains the object's true essence: being something seen through, or for another. This insight is therefore itself true knowledge. In this relation, self-consciousness also immediately has universal certainty of itself, its pure consciousness. Truth, presence, and actuality are thus united in the relation. Both worlds are reconciled, and heaven has been transplanted down to earth.

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III. Absolute freedom and terror.

582 Consciousness has found its concept in usefulness. But this concept is partly still an object, and partly, for that very reason, still a purpose that consciousness does not yet immediately possess. Usefulness is still the predicate of the object, not itself subject, or consciousness's immediate and sole actuality. This is the same point that appeared earlier: being-for-itself has not yet proved itself the substance of the other moments. If it had, the useful would immediately be nothing other than consciousness's self, and consciousness would thereby possess it.—But this withdrawal of the useful's form of objectivity has already occurred in itself. From this inward revolution emerges the actual revolution of actuality, the new shape of consciousness: absolute freedom.

583 In fact, only an empty appearance of objectivity remains to separate 1807 534 self-consciousness from possession. On one side, all the subsistence and validity of the determinate members in the organization of the actual world and the world of faith have altogether returned into this simple determination as their ground and spirit. On the other, this determination no longer has anything of its own for itself. It is instead pure metaphysics, pure concept, or self-consciousness's knowledge. In the useful's being-in-and-for-itself as object, consciousness recognizes that its being-in-itself is essentially being for another. Being-in-itself as what has no self is in truth the passive, or what exists for another self. But the object exists for consciousness in this abstract form of pure being-in-itself, since consciousness is pure insight, whose differences have the pure form of concepts.—The being-for-itself into which being for another returns—the self—is not a self peculiar to what is called object and different from the I. For consciousness as pure insight is not an individual self confronted by the object as likewise a self of its own. Instead, it is the pure concept, the self looking into the self, the absolute seeing of itself doubled. Its certainty of itself is the universal subject, and its knowing concept is the essence of all actuality. So if the useful was only the alternation of moments not returning into its own unity, and therefore still an object for knowledge, it ceases to be this. For knowledge 1807 535 is itself the movement of those abstract moments. It is the universal self, the self both of itself and of the object, and as universal it is this movement's unity returning into itself.

584 Spirit is thereby present as absolute freedom. It is self-consciousness grasping that its certainty of itself is the essence of all spiritual bodies in both the real and supersensible worlds. Or conversely, essence and actuality are consciousness's knowledge of itself.—It is conscious of its pure personality, and within that of all spiritual reality; all reality is only spiritual. For it, the world is simply its will, and this is universal will. Indeed, it is not the empty thought of will placed in silent or represented consent. It is really universal will, the will of all individuals as such. For will is in itself consciousness of personality, or of each person. It is to exist as this true, actual will, as the self-conscious essence of each and every personality, so that each always does everything undivided, and what appears as the whole's activity is the immediate, conscious activity of each.

585 This undivided substance of absolute freedom rises to the world's throne without any power being able to resist it. For in truth, consciousness alone is the element in which spiritual essences or 1807 536 powers have their substance. Their whole system, organized and preserved through division into bodies, has therefore collapsed once individual consciousness grasps the object as having no essence other than self-consciousness itself, or as being absolutely the concept. What made the concept an existing object was its differentiation into separate, subsisting bodies. But when the object becomes concept, nothing subsisting remains within it. Negativity has penetrated all its moments. The concept enters existence in this way: every individual consciousness rises out of the sphere to which it was assigned, no longer finds its essence and work in this particularized body, but grasps its self as the concept of will and all bodies as essences of this will. It can therefore actualize itself only in a labor that is the whole labor. In this absolute freedom, then, all classes—the spiritual essences into which the whole articulates itself—are erased. The individual consciousness that belonged to such a member, and willed and accomplished within it, has sublated its limitation. Its purpose is the universal purpose, its language universal law, its work the universal work.

586 Here the object and distinction have lost the meaning of usefulness, which was the predicate of all real being. Consciousness does not begin its movement from the object as something foreign, from which it would 1807 537 only then return into itself. Instead, the object is for it consciousness itself. Opposition therefore consists solely in the distinction between individual and universal consciousness. But individual consciousness is immediately for itself what only had the appearance of opposition: it is universal consciousness and will. The beyond of this actuality hovers over the corpse of the vanished independence of real being or the being of faith only as the vapor of a stale gas, the empty supreme being.

587 After the sublation of the differentiated spiritual bodies and individuals' limited life, as well as spirit's two worlds, only universal self-consciousness's movement within itself remains. It is an interaction of this self-consciousness in the forms of universality and personal consciousness. Universal will withdraws into itself and is individual will, confronted by universal law and work. But this individual consciousness is just as immediately conscious of itself as universal will. It is conscious that its object is law it has itself given and work it has itself accomplished. In passing into activity and creating objectivity, it therefore produces nothing individual, but only laws and actions of state.

588 This movement is therefore consciousness's interaction with itself, in which it releases nothing in the shape of a free 1807 538 object confronting it. It follows that consciousness can accomplish no positive work: neither universal works of language nor of actuality, neither laws and universal institutions of conscious freedom nor deeds and works of willing freedom.—The work into which freedom giving itself consciousness could make itself would consist in its making itself, as universal substance, into an object and enduring being. This otherness would be the distinction within freedom by which it divided into subsisting spiritual bodies and the members of different powers. These bodies would partly be thought-things: a separate legislative, judicial, and executive power. Partly they would be the real essences that emerged in the real world of cultivation and, on closer consideration of universal activity's content, the particular bodies of labor further differentiated as more specialized classes.—Universal freedom that had thus separated into its members and thereby made itself an existing substance would be free from single individuality, and would distribute the multitude of individuals among its different members. But personality's activity and being would thereby find themselves limited to one branch of the whole, one kind of activity and being. Placed in the element of being, personality would acquire the meaning of being determinate. It would cease to be truly universal self-consciousness. Such self-consciousness will 1807 539 not let itself be cheated of actuality by the representation of obeying self-given laws assigning it a part, nor by being represented in lawgiving and universal activity. It will not be cheated of the actuality of giving the law itself and accomplishing not an individual work, but the universal work itself. For where the self is merely represented and pictured, it is not actual. Where another stands in for it, it is not.

589 Individual self-consciousness does not find itself in this universal work of absolute freedom as existing substance. Nor does it find itself in the proper deeds and individual actions of freedom's will. For the universal to accomplish a deed, it must gather itself into the one of individuality and place an individual self-consciousness at its head. For universal will is actual will only in a self that is one. But this excludes all other individuals from the whole of this deed. They have only a limited share in it, so the deed would not be the deed of actual universal self-consciousness.—Universal freedom can therefore produce no positive work or deed. Only negative activity remains to it. It is only the Fury of disappearance.

590 But the highest actuality, the one most opposed to universal freedom—or rather the only object that still arises for it—is the 1807 540 freedom and individuality of actual self-consciousness itself. For this universality, which does not let itself reach the reality of organic articulation and aims to preserve itself in undivided continuity, also differentiates itself within itself because it is movement, or consciousness in general. Indeed, because of its own abstraction, it separates into equally abstract extremes: simple, inflexible, cold universality, and the separate, absolutely hard rigidity and stubborn pointlikeness of actual self-consciousness. Once universal freedom has finished eradicating the real organization and now subsists for itself, this is its only object. The object no longer has any other content, possession, existence, or external extent. It is only this knowledge of itself as an absolutely pure and free individual self. The only place it can be seized is its abstract existence in general.—Since these two are indivisibly, absolutely for themselves, they can send no part into the middle through which they might connect. Their relation is therefore completely unmediated, pure negation: the negation of the individual as existing within the universal. Universal freedom's only work and deed is therefore death, a death without inner scope or fullness. For what is negated is the unfilled point of the absolutely free self. It is therefore the 1807 541 coldest, most commonplace death, with no more significance than cutting through a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water.

591 The banality of this syllable contains the wisdom of government, universal will's understanding of how to accomplish itself. Government is itself nothing other than the point establishing itself, or the individuality of universal will. As a willing and accomplishing that starts from one point, it also wills and accomplishes a determinate arrangement and action. On one side, it thereby excludes the other individuals from its deed. On the other, it thereby constitutes itself as a determinate will opposed to universal will. It simply cannot present itself as anything other than a faction. Only the victorious faction is called government. Precisely in its being a faction lies the immediate necessity of its downfall. Conversely, being government makes it a faction and guilty. Universal will takes government's actual action as the crime government commits against it. Government, however, has nothing determinate and external by which the guilt of the will opposed to it could present itself. For as actual universal will, it confronts only unactual pure will, intention. Becoming suspect therefore takes the place of being guilty, or has its meaning and effect 1807 542. The external reaction against this actuality, which lies in the simple inwardness of intention, consists in the bare eradication of this existing self. There is nothing else to take from it except its being itself.

592 In this distinctive work of its own, absolute freedom becomes its own object, and self-consciousness experiences what freedom is. In itself, freedom is precisely this abstract self-consciousness that eradicates within itself every distinction and all subsistence of distinction. As this, freedom is its own object. The terror of death is the intuition of its negative essence. But absolutely free self-consciousness finds this reality of its own completely different from its concept of itself: that universal will is only the positive essence of personality, and that personality knows itself in universal will only positively, or as preserved. Instead, this self-consciousness, which as pure insight completely separates its positive and negative essence—the absolute without predicates as pure thought and as pure matter—now has before it the absolute transition from one into the other in its actuality.—Universal will, as absolutely positive, actual self-consciousness, turns into negative essence because it is this self-conscious actuality raised to pure thought or abstract matter. It proves equally to be the sublation of thinking oneself, or of self-consciousness.

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593 As the pure equality with itself of universal will, absolute freedom therefore contains negation, and with it distinction in general, and develops distinction again as actual distinction. For in universal will equal to itself, pure negativity has the element of subsistence, or the substance, in which its moments realize themselves. It has the matter it can use for its determination. Insofar as this substance has shown itself as the negative for individual consciousness, the organization of spiritual bodies therefore develops again, and the multitude of individual consciousnesses is assigned to them. Having felt fear of their absolute master, death, these consciousnesses again accept negation and distinctions. They subordinate themselves to the bodies and return to a divided and limited work, but thereby to their substantial actuality.

594 From this tumult, spirit would have been thrown back to its starting point, the ethical and real world of cultivation. That world would merely have been refreshed and rejuvenated by fear of the master returning into people's hearts. Spirit would have to traverse this cycle of necessity anew and repeat it forever if the result were merely the complete interpenetration of self-consciousness and substance. In such an interpenetration, self-consciousness, having experienced the power of its universal essence as negative toward it, 1807 544 would want to know and find itself not as this particular self, but only as universal. It could therefore also tolerate universal spirit's objective actuality, which excludes it as particular.—But in absolute freedom, there was no interaction between consciousness immersed in manifold existence, or fixing determinate purposes and thoughts for itself, and an external world with validity, whether of actuality or thought. Instead, the interaction was between the world, present wholly in the form of consciousness as universal will, and self-consciousness, likewise contracted from all extended existence and manifold purposes and judgments into the simple self. The cultivation it gains through interaction with that essence is therefore the highest and last: seeing its pure, simple actuality immediately disappear and pass into empty nothingness. In the world of cultivation itself, self-consciousness does not reach the point of intuiting its negation or alienation in this form of pure abstraction. Instead, its negation is a filled one: either the honor or wealth it gains in place of the self it alienated; or the language of spirit and insight that disrupted consciousness gains; or the heaven of faith; or the useful of enlightenment. All these determinations are lost in the loss the self experiences in absolute 1807 545 freedom. Its negation is meaningless death, the pure terror of the negative containing nothing positive, nothing fulfilling.—At the same time, however, this negation in its actuality is not something foreign. It is neither the universal necessity beyond, in which the ethical world perishes, nor the individual contingency of one's own possessions or of an owner's mood, on which disrupted consciousness sees itself dependent. Instead, it is universal will, which in this final abstraction contains nothing positive and therefore can give nothing back in return for sacrifice. But precisely for that reason it is unmediatedly one with self-consciousness. Or it is the purely positive because it is the purely negative. In the inner concept, meaningless death, the self's unfilled negativity, turns into absolute positivity. For consciousness, its immediate unity with universal will—its demand to know itself as this determinate point within universal will—turns into the utterly opposite experience. What disappears for it in this experience is abstract being, or the immediacy of the substanceless point. This vanished immediacy is universal will itself, as which consciousness now knows itself insofar as it is sublated immediacy, and insofar as it is pure knowledge or pure will. Through this it knows universal will as itself and itself as essence, but not 1807 546 as immediately existing essence. It knows universal will neither as revolutionary government nor as the anarchy striving to establish anarchy, and itself neither as the center of this faction nor of the opposite faction. Instead, universal will is its pure knowing and willing, and it is universal will as this pure knowing and willing. It does not lose itself in this, since pure knowing and willing is more truly itself than the atomic point of consciousness. It is therefore the interaction of pure knowledge with itself. Pure knowledge as essence is universal will, but this essence is absolutely nothing but pure knowledge. Self-consciousness is thus pure knowledge of essence as pure knowledge. Further, as individual self, it is only the form of the subject or of actual activity, known by it as form. Likewise, for it objective actuality, being, is form utterly without a self, since it would be what is not known; but this knowledge knows knowledge as essence.

595 Absolute freedom has therefore reconciled the opposition of universal and individual will with itself. Self-alienated spirit, driven to the height of its opposition, where pure willing and what wills purely are still differentiated, reduces this opposition to transparent form and finds itself within it.—Just as the realm of the actual world passes into the realm of faith and insight, absolute freedom passes from its self-destroying 1807 547 actuality into another land of self-conscious spirit. There, in this unactuality, freedom counts as the true. Spirit refreshes itself in the thought of freedom insofar as it is and remains thought, and knows this being enclosed within self-consciousness as perfect and complete essence. The new shape of moral spirit has arisen.

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C. Spirit certain of itself: morality.

596 The ethical world showed the spirit that was only departed within it, the individual self, to be its fate and truth. But this legal person has its substance and fulfillment outside itself. The movement of the world of cultivation and faith sublates this abstraction of the person. Through completed alienation, through the highest abstraction, substance first becomes universal will for spirit's self, and finally becomes its property. Here, then, knowledge at last seems to have become completely equal to its truth. For its truth is this knowledge itself, and all opposition between the two sides has disappeared—not for us, or in itself, but for self-consciousness itself. For it has mastered the opposition of consciousness itself. Consciousness rests on the opposition between certainty of itself and the object. But now, for consciousness itself, the object is certainty of itself, knowledge, just as certainty of itself as 1807 549 such no longer has purposes of its own, and thus no longer exists in determinateness, but is pure knowledge.

597 Self-consciousness's knowledge is therefore for it substance itself. In an undivided unity, substance is for it both immediate and absolutely mediated. Immediate: like ethical consciousness, it itself knows and does duty and belongs to duty as its nature. But it is not character, as ethical consciousness is. Because of its immediacy, ethical consciousness is a determinate spirit, belongs to only one ethical essentiality, and has the side of not knowing.—It is absolute mediation, like consciousness cultivating itself and believing consciousness. For it is essentially the self's movement of sublating the abstraction of immediate existence and becoming universal for itself. Yet it does this neither through pure alienation and tearing apart of its self and actuality, nor through flight. Instead, it is immediately present to itself in its substance, since substance is its knowledge, the intuited pure certainty of itself. And precisely this immediacy, its own actuality, is all actuality. For the immediate is being itself, and as pure immediacy purified through absolute negativity, it is pure being in general, or all being.

598 Absolute essence is therefore not exhausted by the determination of being the simple essence of thought. 1807 550 Instead, it is all actuality, and this actuality exists only as knowledge. What consciousness did not know would have no meaning and could have no power for it. All objectivity and world have withdrawn into its knowing will. It is absolutely free in knowing its freedom, and precisely this knowledge of its freedom is its substance, purpose, and sole content.

a. The moral worldview.

599 Self-consciousness knows duty as absolute essence. It is bound only by duty, and this substance is its own pure consciousness. Duty cannot take the form of something foreign for it. But enclosed within itself in this way, moral self-consciousness is not yet posited and considered as consciousness. The object is immediate knowledge, and so purely permeated by the self, it is not an object. Yet self-consciousness is essentially mediation and negativity. Its concept contains a relation to otherness, and it is consciousness. On one side, since duty constitutes its only essential purpose and object, this otherness is for it a completely meaningless actuality. But since this consciousness is so completely enclosed within itself, it relates to this otherness completely freely and 1807 551 indifferently. On the other side, therefore, existence is completely released by self-consciousness and equally relates only to itself. The freer self-consciousness becomes, the freer also becomes its consciousness's negative object. This object is thereby a world completed within itself into an individuality of its own: an independent whole of distinctive laws, an independent course and free actualization of them. It is a nature in general. Its laws and activity belong to itself, as to an essence that is as unconcerned with moral self-consciousness as moral self-consciousness is with it.

600 From this determination, a moral worldview develops. It consists in the relation between moral being-in-and-for-itself and natural being-in-and-for-itself. This relation is grounded, on one side, in the complete mutual indifference and separate independence of nature and moral purposes and activity. On the other side, it is grounded in consciousness of duty's sole essentiality and nature's complete lack of independence and essence. The moral worldview contains the development of the moments contained in this relation of such utterly conflicting presuppositions.

601 First, then, moral consciousness in general is presupposed. Duty counts as essence for this consciousness, which is actual and active, and fulfills duty in its actuality and deed. But for this 1807 552 moral consciousness, nature's presupposed freedom is also present. Or it experiences that nature is unconcerned with giving it consciousness of the unity of its own actuality with nature's, and therefore perhaps lets it become happy, and perhaps not. Immoral consciousness, by contrast, may by chance find its actualization where moral consciousness sees only an occasion for action. But through that action moral consciousness does not see the good fortune of execution and the enjoyment of accomplishment fall to it. It therefore finds reason instead to complain of this condition in which it and existence do not fit one another, and of the injustice that limits it to having its object only as pure duty, while denying it the sight of this object, and of itself, actualized.

602 Moral consciousness cannot renounce happiness and leave this moment out of its absolute purpose. The purpose expressed as pure duty essentially contains this individual self-consciousness. Individual conviction and knowledge of it constituted an absolute moment of morality. In the purpose become objective, in fulfilled duty, this moment is individual consciousness intuiting itself as actualized, or enjoyment. Enjoyment is therefore not immediately contained in the concept of morality considered as attitude, 1807 553 but in the concept of its actualization. Yet through this it is also contained in morality as attitude. For attitude aims not to remain attitude opposed to action, but to act, or actualize itself. Expressed as the whole, with consciousness of its moments, the purpose is therefore this: fulfilled duty should be both purely moral action and realized individuality, and nature, as the side of individuality opposed to the abstract purpose, should be one with that purpose.—The experience of disharmony between the two sides is necessary because nature is free. Yet duty alone is equally what is essential, and nature has no self in relation to it. That whole purpose constituted by harmony contains actuality itself within it. It is also the thought of actuality. The harmony of morality and nature—or, since nature matters only insofar as consciousness experiences nature's unity with consciousness, the harmony of morality and happiness—is thought as necessarily existing, or is postulated. For demanding expresses that something not yet actual is thought as existing: a necessity not of the concept as concept, but of being. Yet necessity is also essentially relation through the concept. The being demanded therefore does not belong to the representing of contingent consciousness. It lies in the concept of morality itself, whose 1807 554 true content is the unity of pure and individual consciousness. It belongs to individual consciousness that this unity should exist for it as an actuality. In the purpose's content, this is happiness; in its form, existence in general.—This demanded existence, or unity of the two, is therefore not a wish. Considered as a purpose, it is not one whose attainment is still uncertain. It is a demand of reason, or reason's immediate certainty and presupposition.

603 That first experience and this postulate are not the only ones. A whole circle of postulates opens up. For nature is not merely this completely free, external mode in which consciousness would have to realize its purpose as in a pure object. Consciousness is within itself essentially something for which this other free actuality exists. That is, consciousness itself is contingent and natural. This nature, which is its own, is sensibility. In the shape of willing, as drives and inclinations, sensibility has for itself a determinate essentiality of its own, or individual purposes, and therefore opposes pure will and its pure purpose. But against this opposition, what is essential for pure consciousness is instead sensibility's relation to it, sensibility's absolute unity with it. Both pure thought and consciousness's sensibility are in themselves one consciousness, and pure thought is precisely that for 1807 555 which and within which this pure unity exists. But for pure thought as consciousness, there is opposition between itself and the drives. In this conflict of reason and sensibility, what is essential for reason is that the conflict dissolve and that the unity of the two emerge as result. This is not that original unity in which both are present in one individual, but a unity emerging from their known opposition. Only such unity is actual morality. For it contains the opposition through which the self is consciousness, or only then actual and in fact a self, and also universal. Or it expresses that mediation which, as we see, is essential to morality.—Of the two moments of the opposition, sensibility is simply otherness, or the negative, while the pure thought of duty is essence, none of which can be given up. It therefore seems that the unity produced can come about only through sublating sensibility. But sensibility is itself a moment of this coming-to-be, the moment of actuality. For the present, then, we must content ourselves with expressing this unity by saying that sensibility should conform to morality.—This unity too is a postulated being. It does not exist, since what does exist is consciousness, or the opposition of sensibility and pure consciousness. Yet it is also not an in-itself like 1807 556 the first postulate, in which free nature constitutes one side and its harmony with moral consciousness therefore falls outside moral consciousness. Here nature is the nature within consciousness itself. What is at issue is morality as such, a harmony belonging to the acting self itself. Consciousness must therefore bring this harmony about itself and make continual progress in morality. But morality's completion must be deferred to infinity. For if it actually occurred, moral consciousness would sublate itself. This is because morality is moral consciousness only as negative essence, for whose pure duty sensibility has only a negative meaning, only that of not conforming. In harmony, however, morality as consciousness, or its actuality, disappears, just as in moral consciousness, or actuality, its harmony disappears. Completion therefore cannot actually be attained, but only thought as an absolute task: one that remains a task unconditionally. Yet its content must also be thought as something that absolutely must be and does not remain a task. Whether one represents consciousness as completely sublated at this goal or not, it can no longer be 1807 557 clearly distinguished how this should really be understood in the dark distance of infinity, where attainment of the goal must be pushed precisely for this reason. Properly, it must be said that the determinate representation should not interest us or be sought, because it leads to contradictions: a task that is to remain a task and yet be fulfilled; a morality that is no longer to be consciousness, no longer actual. But if we consider that completed morality would contain a contradiction, the holiness of moral essentiality would suffer, and absolute duty would appear as something unactual.

604 The first postulate was the harmony of morality and objective nature, the final purpose of the world. The other was the harmony of morality and sensuous will, the final purpose of self-consciousness as such. The first was therefore harmony in the form of the in-itself, the other in the form of being-for-itself. What connects these two thought extremes of final purpose as their middle is the movement of actual action itself. They are harmonies whose moments, in their abstract distinctness, have not yet become objects. This happens in actuality, where the sides appear within consciousness proper, each as the other of the other. The postulates arising from this now contain harmonies existing in and for themselves, where previously there were only separate harmonies existing in themselves and for themselves.

605 As the simple knowing and willing of pure duty, moral consciousness in action 1807 558 relates to an object opposed to its simplicity: the actuality of the manifold case. It thereby has a manifold moral relation. Here, in content, the many laws in general arise; in form, the contradictory powers of knowing consciousness and the unconscious arise.—First, regarding the many duties, only pure duty within them has validity for moral consciousness in general. The many duties, as many, are determinate and therefore as such are nothing holy for moral consciousness. Yet they are also necessary through the concept of action, which includes a manifold actuality and therefore a manifold moral relation. They must therefore be regarded as existing in and for themselves. Further, since they can exist only in a moral consciousness, they are also in a consciousness other than the one for which only pure duty as pure exists in and for itself and is holy.

606 It is therefore postulated that another consciousness exists that sanctifies them, or knows and wills them as duties. The first consciousness keeps pure duty indifferent to every determinate content, and duty is only this indifference to content. The other consciousness, however, contains the equally essential relation to action and the necessity of determinate content. Since duties have validity for it as determinate duties, content as 1807 559 such is as essential for it as the form through which content is duty. This is therefore a consciousness in which the universal and the particular are absolutely one. Its concept is thus the same as the concept of the harmony of morality and happiness. For this opposition likewise expresses the separation of moral consciousness equal to itself from actuality, which as manifold being conflicts with duty's simple essence. But the first postulate expresses only the existing harmony of morality and nature, because nature there is this negative of self-consciousness, the moment of being. Now, by contrast, this in-itself is essentially posited as consciousness. For what exists now has the form of the content of duty, or is the determinateness in determinate duty. The in-itself is therefore the unity of things that, as simple essentialities, are essentialities of thought and thus exist only in a consciousness. This consciousness is therefore now a lord and ruler of the world, producing the harmony of morality and happiness and also sanctifying duties as many. The latter means that for consciousness of pure duty, determinate duty cannot immediately be holy. Yet since determinate duty is likewise necessary for actual action, which is determinate, its necessity falls outside that consciousness into another. This other consciousness therefore mediates between determinate and pure duty and is the ground of determinate duty's validity too.

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607 In actual action, however, consciousness behaves as this self, as a completely individual self. It is directed toward actuality as such and has actuality as its purpose, since it wants to accomplish. Duty in general therefore falls outside it into another essence that is consciousness and the holy lawgiver of pure duty. Precisely because it acts, acting consciousness immediately regards what is other than pure duty as valid. Pure duty is therefore the content of another consciousness and is holy for the acting consciousness only indirectly, namely in that other consciousness.

608 It has thus been posited that duty's validity as holy in and for itself falls outside actual consciousness. Actual consciousness therefore stands generally on one side as imperfect moral consciousness. In its knowing, it knows itself as a consciousness whose knowledge and conviction are incomplete and contingent. Likewise, in its willing, it knows itself as a consciousness whose purposes are affected by sensibility. Because of its unworthiness, it can therefore regard happiness not as necessary but as contingent, and expect it only through grace.

609 Although its actuality is imperfect, duty nevertheless counts as essence for its pure willing and knowing. In the concept, insofar as the concept is opposed to reality, or in thought, consciousness is therefore perfect. But absolute essence is precisely this thing thought and postulated beyond actuality 1807 561. It is therefore the thought in which morally imperfect knowing and willing count as perfect. Since absolute essence thus accepts this knowing and willing as having full worth, it also grants happiness according to worthiness, namely according to the merit attributed to moral consciousness.

610 In this, the worldview is complete. For in the concept of moral self-consciousness, both sides—pure duty and actuality—are posited in a single unity. Neither is therefore posited as existing in and for itself, but as a moment, or as sublated. This comes to be for consciousness in the final part of the moral worldview. Consciousness places pure duty in an essence other than itself. That is, it posits duty partly as something represented, and partly as something that is not what has validity in and for itself; instead, the nonmoral counts as perfect. Likewise, consciousness posits itself as a consciousness whose actuality, inadequate to duty, is sublated and, as sublated, or within the representation of absolute essence, no longer contradicts morality.

611 For moral consciousness itself, however, its moral worldview does not mean that it develops its own concept within that worldview and makes the concept its object. It is conscious neither of this opposition of form nor of the opposition in content, 1807 562 whose parts it does not relate and compare with one another. Instead, it rolls onward in its development without being the concept holding the moments together. For it knows only pure essence, or the object insofar as the object is duty, insofar as it is the abstract object of its pure consciousness, as pure knowledge or as itself. It therefore relates only by thinking, not by comprehending. The object of its actual consciousness is consequently not yet transparent to it. It is not the absolute concept, which alone grasps otherness as such, or its absolute opposite, as itself. Its own actuality, like all objective actuality, does indeed count for it as inessential. But its freedom is the freedom of pure thought, and nature has therefore also arisen opposite it as something equally free. Both are equally present in it: the freedom of being and being's enclosure within consciousness. Its object therefore comes to be as something existing that is at the same time only thought. In the last part of its view, the content is essentially posited so that its being is something represented. This combination of being and thought is expressed as what it in fact is: representation.

612 If we consider the moral worldview in this way—so that this objective mode is nothing other than the concept of moral self-consciousness itself, which self-consciousness makes objective for itself— 1807 563 then this consciousness of the form of its origin yields another shape of its presentation.—The first thing, the starting point, is actual moral self-consciousness, or that such a consciousness exists. For the concept posits self-consciousness with the determination that, for it, all actuality in general has essence only insofar as it conforms to duty. The concept posits this essence as knowledge, that is, in immediate unity with the actual self. This unity is therefore itself actual: it is an actual moral consciousness.—As consciousness, it now represents its content to itself as an object, namely as the final purpose of the world, as the harmony of morality and all actuality. But it represents this unity as an object and is not yet the concept that has power over the object as such. This unity is therefore for it a negative of self-consciousness, or falls outside it as a beyond of its actuality, yet at the same time as something that is also thought as existing, but is only thought.

613 What remains for it, as a self-consciousness that is different from the object, is therefore the lack of harmony between the consciousness of duty and actuality—its own actuality. The proposition now reads: there is no actual self-consciousness that is morally complete. And morality exists at all only when it is complete. Duty is the pure, unmixed in-itself, and morality consists only in conformity with 1807 564 this purity. So the second proposition means, in general, that nothing morally actual exists.

614 But third, since it is one self, it is in itself the unity of duty and actuality. This unity therefore becomes its object as complete morality—but as something beyond its actuality, which nevertheless is supposed to be actual.

615 In this goal, the synthetic unity of the first two propositions, both self-conscious actuality and duty are posited only as sublated moments. Neither exists on its own. Yet their essential character is to be free of the other. In their unity, therefore, neither is any longer free of the other; each is sublated. In terms of content, they thus become objects such that each counts for the other. In terms of form, this exchange between them is at the same time only represented. Or what is not actually moral is nevertheless moral in representation, because it is also pure thought and rises above its actuality; it is accepted as fully valid. This restores the first proposition, that there is a moral self-consciousness, but combines it with the second, that there is none. That is, there is one, but only in representation. Or there is none, but another consciousness nevertheless allows it to count as one.

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b. Dissemblance.

616 In the moral worldview we see, on the one hand, consciousness itself consciously producing its object. We see that it neither finds the object as something foreign nor has it develop for it unconsciously. Instead, it always proceeds from a ground on which it posits the objective essence. It therefore knows this essence as itself, since it knows itself as the active agent that produces it. Here, then, it seems to reach peace and satisfaction. It can find these only where it no longer needs to go beyond its object, because the object no longer goes beyond it. On the other hand, however, it itself places the object outside itself, as something beyond it. Yet this being in and for itself is equally posited as something that is not free of self-consciousness, but exists for its purposes and through it.

617 In fact, then, the moral worldview is nothing but the development of the different sides of this underlying contradiction. To use a Kantian expression where it fits best, it is a whole nest of thoughtless contradictions. In this development consciousness fixes one moment and 1807 566 immediately passes from it to the other, sublating the first. But once it has set up this second moment, it also shifts it again, making its opposite the essence instead. At the same time it is conscious of its contradiction and of this dissemblance. For it passes from one moment to its opposite immediately in relation to that very moment. Precisely because a moment has no reality for it, it posits that same moment as real. Or, what amounts to the same thing, to maintain that one moment exists in itself, it maintains that the opposite exists in itself. In doing so it admits that it is not really serious about any of them. We must examine this more closely in the moments of this dizzying movement.

618 Let us first leave aside the presupposition that an actual moral consciousness exists. This is not made in immediate relation to anything preceding it. Let us turn instead to the harmony of morality and nature, the first postulate. This harmony is supposed to exist in itself, not for actual consciousness, not in the present. Instead, the present is only the contradiction between the two. In the present, morality is assumed to be there, while actuality is placed in a position in which it does not harmonize with morality. But actual moral consciousness is an acting consciousness. This is precisely what makes its morality actual. In action itself, however, that position is immediately shifted. For action is nothing 1807 567 but realizing the inner moral purpose, nothing but producing an actuality determined by the purpose, or the harmony of the moral purpose and actuality itself. At the same time, the completed action exists for consciousness: it is the present existence of this unity of actuality and purpose. In the completed action consciousness sees itself realized as this individual, or sees existence returned into itself. Enjoyment consists in this. So the actuality of the moral purpose also contains the form of that actuality called enjoyment and happiness.—Action therefore immediately fulfills in fact what had been declared not to take place, what was supposed to be only a postulate, only something beyond. Through its deed consciousness thus says that it is not serious about postulating. The meaning of action is rather to make present what was supposed not to be present. Harmony is postulated for the sake of action: what is to become actual through action must be so in itself, or actuality would not be possible. The connection between action and the postulate therefore takes this form: for the sake of action, that is, for the sake of the actual harmony of purpose and actuality, this harmony is posited as not actual, as beyond.

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619 In acting, then, consciousness is not serious about the mismatch between purpose and actuality in general. On the other hand, it seems serious about action itself. But in fact an actual action is only the action of an individual consciousness. It is therefore itself only something individual, and its work is contingent. The purpose of reason, however, as the universal, all-embracing purpose, is nothing less than the whole world. This is a final purpose that goes far beyond the content of this individual action, and must therefore be placed beyond all actual action in general. Because the universal good is to be accomplished, nothing good is done. In fact, however, the nullity of actual action and the reality of the whole purpose alone, which have now been asserted, are again shifted in every respect. Moral action is not something contingent and limited, since its essence is pure duty. This constitutes the one whole purpose. So action, as its realization, accomplishes the whole absolute purpose, however limited its content may otherwise be. Or suppose actuality is again taken as nature, which has its own laws and stands opposed to pure duty, so that duty cannot realize its law in it. Then, since duty as such is the essence, the point is in fact not to accomplish pure duty, which is the whole 1807 569 purpose. For such accomplishment would have as its purpose not pure duty but its opposite, actuality. Yet the claim that actuality is not the point is itself again shifted. For according to the concept of moral action, pure duty is essentially active consciousness. Action should therefore certainly take place. Absolute duty should be expressed throughout nature, and the moral law should become natural law.

620 So if we accept this highest good as the essence, consciousness is not serious about morality at all. For in this highest good nature has no law different from morality's. This removes moral action itself, since action exists only on the presupposition of something negative that the action must sublate. But if nature conforms to the moral law, action, by sublating what exists, would violate that law.—This assumption therefore admits that the essential condition is one in which moral action is unnecessary and does not take place at all. The postulate of the harmony of morality and actuality is posited by the concept of moral action as bringing the two into agreement. From this side, too, it thus says: because moral action is the absolute purpose, the absolute purpose is that moral action should not exist at all.

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621 If we bring together these moments through which consciousness rolled onward in its moral representations, we see that it sublates each in its opposite. It starts from the claim that for it morality and actuality do not harmonize. But it is not serious about this, since in action this harmony is present for it. Nor is it serious about this action, since action is something individual, whereas its purpose is so high: the highest good. But this again only shifts the issue, since all action and all morality would disappear in it. Or it is not really serious about moral action. What is most desirable, what is absolute, is instead that the highest good should be accomplished and moral action become unnecessary.

622 From this result consciousness must roll onward in its contradictory movement, and must necessarily shift away again from the sublation of moral action. Morality is what exists in itself. For it to take place, the world's final purpose cannot have been accomplished. Moral consciousness must instead exist for itself and find a nature opposed to it. But in its own self it must be complete. This leads to the second postulate: its harmony with the nature immediately within it, with sensibility. Moral self-consciousness sets up its purpose as pure, independent of inclinations and drives, so that it 1807 571 has destroyed the purposes of sensibility within itself.—But it again shifts away from this asserted sublation of its sensible being. It acts, brings its purpose into actuality, and self-conscious sensibility, which is supposed to be sublated, is precisely the middle term between pure consciousness and actuality. It is pure consciousness's instrument or organ for realizing itself, and is what is called drive or inclination. So it is not serious about sublating inclinations and drives, since these are precisely self-consciousness realizing itself. Yet they are not to be suppressed, either, but only to conform to reason. And they do conform to it, since moral action is nothing but consciousness realizing itself and thus giving itself the form of a drive. That is, it is immediately the present harmony of drive and morality. But in fact drive is not merely this empty form, capable of having within it a motive other than itself and being driven by that motive. Sensibility is a nature with its own laws and springs of action within itself. Morality therefore cannot seriously mean to be the driving force of drives, the angle of inclination of inclinations. Since these have their own fixed character and distinctive content, the consciousness to which they conformed would instead conform to them. Moral self-consciousness rejects such conformity. The 1807 572 harmony of the two therefore exists only in itself and is postulated.—The present harmony of morality and sensibility was just asserted in moral action. But now this is shifted away. It lies beyond consciousness in a misty distance, where nothing can any longer be distinguished precisely or comprehended. For the attempt we just made to comprehend this unity did not succeed.—In this in-itself, however, consciousness gives itself up altogether. This in-itself is its moral completion, in which the struggle between morality and sensibility has ended, and the latter conforms to the former in an incomprehensible way.—This completion therefore again only shifts the issue. In fact, morality itself would give itself up in it. For morality is only the consciousness of the absolute purpose as pure, and thus as opposed to all other purposes. It is equally the activity of this pure purpose insofar as it is conscious of rising above sensibility, of sensibility's interference, and of its opposition and struggle against it.—Consciousness itself immediately states that it is not serious about moral completion by shifting it out into infinity, that is, by asserting it as never completed.

623 Only this intermediate condition of incompletion, then, is valid for it. Yet this condition is at least supposed to be a progression toward completion. But it cannot be even this, since 1807 573 progress in morality would instead be an approach toward its destruction. The goal would be the nothingness mentioned above, the sublation of morality and consciousness itself. But coming closer and closer to nothing means decreasing. Besides, progress in general, like decrease, would assume differences of magnitude in morality. But there can be no question of these in it. In morality, as the consciousness for which the ethical purpose is pure duty, no difference at all can be considered, least of all the superficial difference of magnitude. There is only one virtue, only one pure duty, only one morality.

624 Since consciousness is therefore not serious about moral completion but instead about the intermediate condition—that is, as just explained, about nonmorality—we return from another side to the content of the first postulate. We cannot see how happiness can be demanded for this moral consciousness on the grounds that it deserves it. It is conscious of its incompletion, and therefore cannot in fact demand happiness as something earned, something of which it is worthy. It can demand it only through a free act of grace: that is, it can demand happiness as such, in and for itself, and expect it not on that absolute ground but through chance and arbitrary choice.—In this, nonmorality says exactly what it is: that what matters is not morality but 1807 574 happiness in and for itself, without relation to morality.

625 This second side of the moral worldview also sublates the other assertion of its first side, which presupposes disharmony between morality and happiness.—It claims to experience that, in the present, moral people often fare badly while immoral people often fare well. But the intermediate condition of incomplete morality, which has proved essential, plainly shows that this perception and supposed experience only shifts the issue. For if morality is incomplete—that is, if morality in fact does not exist—what can there be to the experience that it fares badly?—At the same time it has emerged that happiness in and for itself is what matters. This shows that the judgment that the immoral person fares well did not mean that an injustice was occurring. Since morality is incomplete in general, the designation of an individual as immoral falls away in itself, and therefore has only an arbitrary basis. The judgment drawn from experience thus means only that some people ought not to receive happiness in and for itself. That is, it is envy, using morality as its cover. But the reason why others should receive so-called happiness is 1807 575 good friendship, which wishes this grace—that is, this chance—for them and itself, and gladly lets them have it.

626 Morality in moral consciousness is therefore incomplete. This is what is now asserted. But its essence is to be only what is complete and pure. Incomplete morality is therefore impure, or is immorality. Morality itself thus exists in a being other than actual consciousness: a holy moral lawgiver.—The incomplete morality within consciousness, which provides the basis for this postulate, initially means the following. When morality is posited as actual within consciousness, it stands in relation to an other, to an existence. It thus acquires otherness or difference within itself, and this produces a multiplicity of moral commands. But at the same time moral self-consciousness regards these many duties as inessential. What matters is only the one pure duty, and for it they have no truth insofar as they are determinate. They can therefore have their truth only in another being. Through a holy lawgiver they are holy, which they are not for moral self-consciousness.—But this again only shifts the issue. For moral self-consciousness is the absolute for itself, and duty is simply only what it knows as duty. But it knows only pure duty as duty. What is not holy for it is not holy in itself, and what is not holy in itself cannot be made holy 1807 576 by the holy being. Nor is moral consciousness serious at all about letting something be sanctified by another consciousness rather than itself. For it, only what is holy through itself and within it is holy at all.—So it is no more serious about this other being's holiness. For something was supposed to acquire essential standing in that being which has none for moral consciousness, that is, none in itself.

627 If the holy being was postulated so that duty would be valid in it not as pure duty but as a multiplicity of determinate duties, this too must therefore be shifted. The other being must be holy only insofar as pure duty alone is valid in it. In fact, pure duty is valid only in another being, not in moral consciousness. Although pure morality alone seems to count in moral consciousness, this must nevertheless be put differently, since it is also natural consciousness. Morality in it is affected and conditioned by sensibility. It therefore does not exist in and for itself, but is something contingent in free willing; and within consciousness as pure willing, it is something contingent in knowing. Morality therefore exists in and for itself in another being.

628 Here, then, this being is purely complete morality because morality in it does not stand in 1807 577 relation to nature and sensibility. But the reality of pure duty is its realization in nature and sensibility. Moral consciousness locates its imperfection in morality's having a positive relation to nature and sensibility within it. For it regards an exclusively negative relation to them as an essential moment of morality. The pure moral being, by contrast, is above the struggle with nature and sensibility, and therefore does not stand in a negative relation to them. In fact, then, only a positive relation to them remains for it—precisely what just counted as incomplete, as immoral. But pure morality entirely separated from actuality, so that it equally had no positive relation to it, would be an unconscious, nonactual abstraction. In it the concept of morality—being the thought of pure duty, and a willing and doing—would be completely sublated. This supposedly pure moral being therefore again shifts the issue and must be given up.

629 But in this purely moral being, the moments of the contradiction in which this synthetic representation moves around draw together. So do the opposed alsos, which it lets follow one another without bringing these thoughts together, always replacing one opposite with the other. They come 1807 578 so close that consciousness must abandon its moral worldview and flee back into itself.

630 It recognizes its morality as incomplete because it is affected by an opposed sensibility and nature. These partly cloud morality itself as such, and partly give rise to a mass of duties that leave it at a loss in the concrete case of actual action. For each case combines many moral relations, just as an object of perception in general is a thing with many properties. And when determinate duty is the purpose, it has a content; its content is part of the purpose, and morality is not pure.—Morality therefore has its reality in another being. But this reality means nothing other than that morality here exists in and for itself: for itself, that is, as the morality of a consciousness; in itself, that is, having existence and actuality.—In that first, incomplete consciousness, morality is not carried out. There it is the in-itself in the sense of a thing of thought. For it is associated with nature and sensibility, with the actuality of being and consciousness, which makes up its content; and nature and sensibility are morally null.—In the second being, morality is present as complete, not as an unfulfilled thing of thought. But this completion consists precisely in morality's having existence in a consciousness, having actuality as well as free 1807 579 actuality, existence in general; in its being not empty but fulfilled and full of content. That is, morality's completion is placed in the presence within it of what was just defined as morally null. At one moment it is supposed to be valid solely as the nonactual thing of thought belonging to pure abstraction, yet equally to have no validity in this form. Its truth is supposed to consist in being opposed to actuality, entirely free and empty of it, and then again in being actuality.

631 The syncretism of these contradictions, spread out in the moral worldview, collapses into itself. The distinction on which it rests—between something that must necessarily be thought and posited, yet is at the same time inessential—becomes a distinction no longer present even in the words. What is finally posited as different, both as null and as real, is one and the same: existence and actuality. And what is supposed to exist absolutely only beyond actual being and consciousness, yet equally only within them and to be null as a beyond, is pure duty and the knowledge of it as the essence. Consciousness makes this distinction that is no distinction. It declares actuality both null and real, and pure morality both the true 1807 580 essence and without essence. It thus states together the thoughts it previously separated. It itself says that it is not serious about this determination and about separating the moments of the self and the in-itself. Instead, what it declares to be the absolute being outside consciousness it keeps enclosed within the self of self-consciousness; and what it declares to be the absolutely thought, or the absolute in-itself, it therefore regards as having no truth.—Consciousness comes to see that separating these moments is dissemblance, and it would be hypocrisy to maintain them nonetheless. But as morally pure self-consciousness, it recoils in disgust back into itself from this mismatch between its representation and its essence, from this untruth that declares true what it regards as untrue. It is pure conscience, which scorns such a moral representation of the world. Within itself it is simple spirit, certain of itself, acting conscientiously and immediately without the mediation of those representations, and having its truth in this immediacy.—But if this world of dissemblance is nothing other than the development of moral self-consciousness in its moments, and thus its reality, then its return into itself will not change its essence. Its return into itself is instead only the attained awareness that 1807 581 its truth is a pretense. It would still have to pass this off as its truth, since it would have to express and present itself in objective representation. But it would know that this was only dissemblance. It would thus in fact be hypocrisy, and that scorn for dissemblance would already be hypocrisy's first expression.

c. Conscience, the beautiful soul, evil and its forgiveness.

632 The antinomy of the moral worldview was that a moral consciousness exists and that none exists—or that duty's validity lies beyond consciousness, and conversely takes place only within it. This had been brought together in the representation in which nonmoral consciousness counted as moral, its contingent knowing and willing were accepted as fully valid, and happiness was granted to it by grace. Moral self-consciousness did not take this self-contradictory representation upon itself, but transferred it to a being other than itself. But placing outside itself what it must necessarily think is just as much a contradiction in form as the former was in content. 1807 582 Yet what appears contradictory is in itself precisely the same thing, and the moral worldview moves around in separating it and dissolving the separation again. Pure duty as pure knowing is nothing other than the self of consciousness, and the self of consciousness is being and actuality. Equally, what is supposed to be beyond actual consciousness is nothing other than pure thought, and thus in fact the self. So for us, or in itself, self-consciousness returns into itself and knows as itself the being in which the actual is at the same time pure knowing and pure duty. It is for itself what is fully valid in its contingency. It knows its immediate individuality as pure knowing and acting, as true actuality and harmony.

633 This self of conscience, spirit immediately certain of itself as absolute truth and being, is the third self that has emerged for us from the third world of spirit. We should briefly compare it with the previous selves. The totality or actuality that presents itself as the truth of the ethical world is the self of the person. Its existence is being recognized. Just as the person is the self empty of substance, its existence is likewise abstract actuality. The person counts, and does so immediately. The self is the point immediately at rest in the element of its being. It is not separated from its universality, so the two 1807 583 are not in movement and relation to one another. The universal is undifferentiated within it, and is neither the self's content, nor is the self filled through itself.—The second self is the world of cultivation that has reached its truth, or the spirit of division restored to itself: absolute freedom. In this self, that first immediate unity of individuality and universality falls apart. The universal, which remains equally a purely spiritual essence, being recognized, or universal will and knowing, is the self's object and content, and its universal actuality. But it does not have the form of existence free from the self. In this self, therefore, it reaches no fulfillment and no positive content, no world. Moral self-consciousness does release its universality, so that it becomes a nature of its own, while equally holding it within itself as sublated. But it is only the dissembling play of alternation between these two determinations. Only as conscience does it have, in its self-certainty, the content for the previously empty duty, as well as for empty right and the empty universal will. And because this self-certainty is equally immediate, it has existence itself.

634 Having reached this truth of itself, moral self-consciousness therefore abandons—or rather sublates within itself—the separation from which dissemblance arose: the separation of the in-itself and the self, of pure duty as pure purpose 1807 584 and actuality as a nature and sensibility opposed to pure purpose. Returned into itself in this way, it is concrete moral spirit. It does not give itself, in the consciousness of pure duty, an empty standard opposed to actual consciousness. Instead, pure duty and the nature opposed to it are both sublated moments. It is a moral being realizing itself in immediate unity, and its action is immediately a concrete moral shape.

635 A case calling for action is present. It is an objective actuality for knowing consciousness. As conscience, consciousness knows it in an immediate, concrete way, and the case is at the same time only as consciousness knows it. Knowing is contingent insofar as it differs from the object. But spirit certain of itself is no longer such contingent knowing, no longer the creation within itself of thoughts different from actuality. The separation of the in-itself and the self has been sublated. So in the sensory certainty of knowing, the case is immediately as it is in itself, and it is in itself only as it is in this knowing.—Action as realization is thereby the pure form of willing. It simply reverses actuality as an existing case into an actuality done, and the mere mode of objective knowing into the mode of knowing 1807 585 actuality as something produced by consciousness. Just as sense-certainty is immediately taken up into spirit's in-itself—or rather reversed—this reversal too is simple and unmediated. It is a transition through the pure concept without changing the content, which is determined by the interest of the consciousness that knows it.—Further, conscience does not divide the circumstances of the case into different duties. It does not act as a positive universal medium in which the many duties, each for itself, acquired unshakable substantiality. That would mean either that no action at all could take place, since every concrete case contains opposition in general and, as a moral case, the opposition of duties, so that in determining action one side, one duty, would always be violated; or that, if action took place, one of the opposed duties would actually be violated. Conscience is instead the negative one, or absolute self, that destroys these different moral substances. It is simple action in accordance with duty, which does not fulfill this or that duty but knows and does what is concretely right. It is thus, for the first time, moral action as action, into which the previous inactive consciousness of morality has passed.—A consciousness that makes distinctions may analyze the deed's concrete shape into different properties—that is, here, 1807 586 into different moral relations. It may declare each of these absolutely valid, as it must if they are to be duties, or compare and examine them. In conscience's simple moral action the duties are so submerged that each of these individual essences is immediately curtailed. In conscience's unshakable certainty, the testing that shakes duty does not take place at all.

636 Nor does conscience contain that wavering uncertainty of a consciousness which now places so-called pure morality outside itself in another, holy being and regards itself as unholy, and then again places moral purity within itself and the connection of the sensible with the moral in the other being.

637 It renounces all these positions and shifts of the moral worldview by renouncing the consciousness that grasps duty and actuality as contradictory. According to that consciousness, I act morally when I am conscious of accomplishing only pure duty, not anything else. In fact, this means when I do not act. But when I actually act, I am conscious of an other, of an actuality already present and one I want to produce. I have a determinate purpose and fulfill a determinate duty. 1807 587 Something other is involved than pure duty, which alone was supposed to be intended.—Conscience, by contrast, is the awareness that when moral consciousness declares pure duty to be the essence of its action, this pure purpose disguises the issue. The issue itself is that pure duty consists in the empty abstraction of pure thought, and has its reality and content only in a determinate actuality. This actuality is that of consciousness itself, not as a thing of thought but as an individual. For itself, conscience has its truth in its immediate certainty of itself. This immediate, concrete self-certainty is the essence. Viewed in terms of the opposition belonging to consciousness, its own immediate individuality is the content of moral doing; and its form is precisely this self as pure movement, namely as knowing or as its own conviction.

638 Considered more closely in its unity and in the meaning of its moments, moral consciousness grasped itself only as the in-itself or essence. But as conscience it grasps its being-for-itself, or its self.—The contradiction of the moral worldview dissolves: the distinction underlying it proves to be no distinction, and it contracts into pure negativity. But this is precisely the self: a simple self 1807 588 that is equally pure knowing and knowing itself as this individual consciousness. This self therefore makes up the content of the previously empty essence. For it is the actual, which no longer means a nature foreign to the essence and independent in its own laws. As the negative, it is the difference within the pure essence: a content, and indeed one valid in and for itself.

639 Further, as pure knowing equal to itself, this self is the universal without qualification. So this very knowing, as its own knowing, as conviction, is duty. Duty is no longer the universal confronting the self. It is known to have no validity in this separation. The law now exists for the self's sake, not the self for the law's sake. But law and duty therefore mean not only being-for-itself but also being-in-itself. For because this knowing is equal to itself, it is precisely the in-itself. In consciousness this in-itself also separates from that immediate unity with being-for-itself. Confronting it in this way, it is being, being for another.—Duty itself, as duty deserted by the self, is now known to be only a moment. It has sunk from its meaning as absolute essence to a being that is not self, not for itself, and thus is being for another. But this being for another remains an essential moment for that very reason. For the self as consciousness constitutes the opposition of being-for-itself and 1807 589 being for another; and duty is now immediately actual consciousness within itself, no longer merely abstract pure consciousness.

640 This being for another is therefore the substance that exists in itself and is distinct from the self. Conscience has not given up pure duty, or the abstract in-itself. Rather, it is the essential moment of relating to others as universality. It is the common element of self-consciousnesses, and this is the substance in which the deed has subsistence and actuality: the moment of being recognized by others. Moral self-consciousness lacks this moment of being recognized, of pure consciousness that exists. For that reason it does not act or realize anything at all. Its in-itself is for it either the abstract, nonactual essence or being as an actuality that is not spiritual. But the existing actuality of conscience is one that is self: existence conscious of itself, the spiritual element of being recognized. Doing is therefore only the translation of its individual content into the objective element, in which that content is universal and recognized. Precisely its being recognized makes the action actual. The action is recognized and therefore actual because existing actuality is immediately linked with conviction or knowing; or because knowing its purpose is immediately the element of existence, universal recognition. For 1807 590 the action's essence, duty, consists in conscience's conviction about it. This conviction is precisely the in-itself itself. It is self-consciousness universal in itself, or being recognized, and thus actuality. What is done with the conviction of duty is therefore immediately something that subsists and exists. There is no longer any question here of good intentions failing to be accomplished, or of goodness faring badly. Instead, what is known as duty fulfills itself and comes into actuality. For what accords with duty is precisely what is universal to all self-consciousnesses, what is recognized and therefore exists. But separated and taken alone, without the self's content, this duty is being for another, something transparent that means only an essence without content in general.

641 If we look back at the sphere in which spiritual reality first appeared, its concept was that expressing individuality is what exists in and for itself. But the shape that immediately expressed this concept was honest consciousness, occupied with the abstract matter itself. There this matter itself was predicate. Only in conscience is it subject, which has posited all the moments of consciousness within itself, and for which all these moments—substantiality in general, external existence, and the essence of thought—are contained in this self-certainty. The matter itself has substantiality in general in ethical life, external existence in 1807 591 cultivation, and the self-knowing essence of thought in morality. In conscience it is the subject that knows these moments within itself. Whereas honest consciousness always grasps only the empty matter itself, conscience gains it in its fulfillment, which it gives it through itself. It has this power because it knows the moments of consciousness as moments, and, as their negative essence, controls them.

642 Consider conscience in relation to the particular determinations of the opposition that appears in action, and its awareness of their nature. It first relates as knowing to the actuality of the case in which action is required. Insofar as this knowing contains the moment of universality, knowing involved in conscientious action requires comprehending the actuality before it without restriction, and thus knowing and considering the circumstances of the case precisely. But because this knowing knows universality as a moment, its knowledge of these circumstances is aware that it does not comprehend them, or is not conscientious in this respect. The truly universal and pure relation of knowing would be a relation to something not opposed to it, to itself. But action, through the opposition essential to it, relates to a negative of consciousness, to an actuality existing in itself. As the absolute other to the simplicity of 1807 592 pure consciousness, or as multiplicity in itself, this actuality is an absolute plurality of circumstances. It divides and spreads endlessly backward into its conditions, sideways into its coexistence with other circumstances, and forward into its consequences.—Conscientious consciousness is aware of this nature of the matter and of its relation to it. It knows that it does not know the case in which it acts with the universality demanded, and that its claim to have conscientiously considered every circumstance is empty. Yet this knowledge and consideration of all circumstances is not entirely absent. It exists only as a moment, as something only for others. Its incomplete knowledge counts for it as sufficiently complete knowledge because it is its knowledge.

643 The same holds for the universality of the essence, or the determination of content by pure consciousness.—Conscience proceeding to action relates to the case's many sides. The case divides, and so does pure consciousness's relation to it. Through this, the multiplicity of the case becomes a multiplicity of duties.—Conscience knows that it must choose and decide among them. None is absolute in its determinacy or content; only pure duty is absolute. But in its reality this abstraction has acquired the meaning of the self-conscious I. 1807 593 As conscience, spirit certain of itself rests within itself, and its real universality, or its duty, lies in its pure conviction of duty. As such, this pure conviction is as empty as pure duty: pure in the sense that nothing within it, no determinate content, is duty. But action is required; the individual must determine something. Spirit certain of itself, in which the in-itself has acquired the meaning of the self-conscious I, knows that it has this determination and content in its immediate self-certainty. As determination and content, this is natural consciousness, that is, drives and inclinations.—Conscience recognizes no content as absolute for it, since it is the absolute negativity of everything determinate. It determines from itself. But the sphere of the self into which determinacy as such falls is so-called sensibility. To have a content from immediate self-certainty, nothing else is at hand.—Everything that appeared in earlier shapes as good or bad, as law and right, is an other than immediate self-certainty. It is a universal that is now a being for another. Or, viewed differently, it is an object that mediates consciousness with itself, stepping between it and its own truth, separating it from itself rather than being its immediacy.—For conscience, however, self-certainty is pure immediate 1807 594 truth. This truth is therefore its immediate self-certainty represented as content: that is, in general, the individual's arbitrary choice and the contingency of its unconscious natural being.

644 At the same time this content counts as moral essence or duty. For pure duty, as already emerged in examining laws, is entirely indifferent to every content and accommodates any content. Here it also has the essential form of being-for-itself. This form of individual conviction is nothing other than the awareness of pure duty's emptiness, and of its being only a moment. Its substantiality is a predicate whose subject is the individual. The individual's arbitrary choice gives duty its content, can attach any content to this form, and fasten its conscientiousness to it.—An individual increases their property in a certain way. Everyone has a duty to provide for their own preservation and that of their family, and no less for the possibility of being useful to their fellow human beings and doing good to those in need. The individual is conscious that this is duty, since this content is immediately contained in their self-certainty. They further see that they fulfill this duty in this case. Others may regard this particular way as fraud. They focus on other sides of the concrete case, but the individual 1807 595 holds to this side by being conscious of increasing property as pure duty.—Similarly, what others call violence and injustice fulfills the duty to maintain one's independence against others. What they call cowardice fulfills the duty to preserve one's life and the possibility of being useful to one's fellow human beings. But what they call courage instead violates both duties. Cowardice must not be so clumsy as not to know that preserving life and the possibility of being useful to others are duties, not to be convinced that its action accords with duty, and not to know that accordance with duty consists in this knowing. Otherwise it would commit the blunder of being immoral. Since morality lies in the consciousness of having fulfilled duty, this will be lacking no more in action called cowardice than in action called courage. Like every other content, this content too can belong to the abstraction called duty. Conscience thus knows what it does as duty. Since it knows this, and conviction of duty is accordance with duty itself, it is recognized by others. The action thereby counts and has actual existence.

645 Against this freedom, which places any chosen content in the universal passive medium of pure duty and knowing as readily as any other, it is no use asserting that a different 1807 596 content ought to be placed there. Whatever it is, every content has the stain of determinacy, from which pure knowing is free. It can scorn that determinacy just as it can accept any of it. In being determinate, every content stands on the same level as every other, even if it seems to have the character of sublating the particular within itself. In an actual case, duty divides into opposition in general, and thereby into that of individuality and universality. It may therefore seem that the duty whose content is the universal itself immediately has the nature of pure duty, so that form and content become entirely appropriate to one another. Thus, for example, action for the universal good would be preferable to action for the individual's good. But this universal duty is, in general, what is present as substance existing in and for itself, as right and law, and is valid independently of the individual's knowledge and conviction as well as their immediate interest. It is therefore precisely what morality in general is directed against in its form. As for its content, this too is determinate, insofar as the universal good is opposed to the individual's good. Its law is thus one from which conscience knows itself to be entirely free. Conscience grants itself absolute authority to add to it or take from it, to omit it or fulfill it.—Further, that 1807 597 distinction between duty toward the individual and toward the universal is not fixed, given the nature of opposition in general. Instead, what the individual does for themselves also benefits the universal. The more they have provided for themselves, the greater not only their possibility of helping others. Their actuality itself consists only in being and living in connection with others. Their individual enjoyment essentially means giving up what is theirs to others and helping them obtain their enjoyment. Fulfilling duty toward the individual, and thus toward oneself, therefore also fulfills duty toward the universal.—The consideration and comparison of duties that would enter here would amount to calculating the advantage the universal would gain from an action. But this would both surrender morality to the necessary contingency of insight and contradict conscience's very essence, which is to cut short this calculation and consideration and decide from itself without such grounds.

646 In this way, then, conscience acts and maintains itself in the unity of the in-itself and being-for-itself, in the unity of pure thought and individuality. It is spirit certain of itself, which has its truth within itself, in its self, in its knowing, and in knowing as knowledge of duty. It maintains itself precisely because whatever is positive in the action—both its 1807 598 content and the form of duty and knowledge of it—belongs to the self, to its self-certainty. But whatever claims to confront the self as an in-itself of its own counts as untrue, as only sublated, only a moment. What counts, therefore, is not universal knowledge in general, but its knowledge of the circumstances. Into duty, as universal being-in-itself, it places the content taken from its natural individuality, since this is the content present within it. Through the universal medium in which it is, this becomes the duty it carries out. Empty pure duty is thereby posited as sublated, or as a moment. This content is its sublated emptiness, or its fulfillment.—But conscience is equally free of every content in general. It absolves itself from every determinate duty claiming validity as law. In the power of its self-certainty, it has the majesty of absolute self-sufficiency, to bind and to release.—This self-determination therefore immediately accords with duty without qualification. Duty is knowing itself. But this simple selfhood is the in-itself, since the in-itself is pure equality with itself, and that equality is in this consciousness.—

647 This pure knowing is immediately being for another. For as pure equality with itself, it is immediacy, or being. But this being is at the same time the pure universal, the selfhood of all. Or action is recognized and therefore actual. 1807 599 This being is the element through which conscience immediately stands in a relation of equality with all self-consciousnesses. This relation means not selfless law, but the self of conscience.

648 Yet because this right thing that conscience does is also being for another, an inequality seems to enter it. The duty it accomplishes is a determinate content. This is indeed the self of consciousness, and thus its knowledge of itself, its equality with itself. But once accomplished and placed in the universal medium of being, this equality is no longer knowing, no longer that distinguishing which immediately sublates its distinctions. Instead, in being, the distinction is posited as subsisting. The action is a determinate action, unequal to the element of everyone's self-consciousness, and therefore not necessarily recognized. Both sides, acting conscience and the universal consciousness recognizing this action as duty, are equally free from the determinacy of this doing. Because of this freedom, their relation in the shared medium of connection is instead a relation of complete inequality. The consciousness for which the action exists is thus completely uncertain about the acting spirit certain of itself. This spirit acts; it posits a determinacy as existing. Others hold to this being as its 1807 600 truth, and are certain of it there. In it, spirit has expressed what counts for it as duty. But it is free from any determinate duty. It has left the place where they think it actually is, and this medium of being itself, and duty as existing in itself, count for it only as a moment. So what it places before them it also shifts away again, or rather has immediately shifted already. For its actuality is not this duty and determination placed outside it, but the actuality it has in its absolute self-certainty.

649 They therefore do not know whether this conscience is morally good or evil. Or rather, not only can they not know; they must also take it to be evil. For just as it is free from the determinacy of duty and from duty as existing in itself, so are they. They themselves know how to shift away what it places before them. This expresses only the self of another, not their own. They not only know themselves free of it; they must dissolve it in their own consciousness, destroy it through judgment and explanation, to preserve their self.

650 But conscience's action is not only this determination of being deserted by the pure self. What is to count and be recognized as duty does so only through knowledge and conviction of it as duty, through 1807 601 knowing oneself in the deed. If the deed ceases to have this self within it, it ceases to be what alone constitutes its essence. Deserted by this consciousness, its existence would be an ordinary actuality, and the action would appear to us as the fulfillment of its pleasure and desire. Here, what is to exist has essential standing only through being known as individuality expressing itself. This being known is what is recognized and what should have existence as such.

651 The self enters existence as self. Spirit certain of itself exists as such for others. Its immediate action is not what counts and is actual. Neither the determinate nor what exists in itself is recognized, but only the self-knowing self as such. The element of subsistence is universal self-consciousness. What enters this element cannot be the action's effect. This does not endure there or acquire permanence. Only self-consciousness is recognized and gains actuality.

652 Here we again see language as the existence of spirit. Language is self-consciousness existing for others, immediately present as such, and universal as this self-consciousness. It is the self separating itself from itself, becoming objective to itself as pure I—I. In this objectivity it preserves itself as this self just as immediately as it merges with others and is their 1807 602 self-consciousness. It hears itself just as it is heard by others, and hearing is precisely existence become self.

653 The content language has gained here is no longer the inverted, inverting, and torn self of the world of cultivation. It is spirit returned into itself, certain of itself and, within its self, of its truth or recognition, and recognized as this knowing. The language of ethical spirit is law and the simple command, and lament, which is more a tear shed over necessity. Moral consciousness, by contrast, is still silent, closed within its inwardness. In it the self does not yet have existence; existence and the self initially stand in an external relation to one another. But language emerges only as the middle term between independent and recognized self-consciousnesses. The existing self is immediately universal, multiple recognition that is simple in this multiplicity. The content of conscience's language is the self knowing itself as essence. This alone it expresses, and this expression is the true actuality of doing and the action's validity. Consciousness expresses its conviction. Only in this conviction is the action duty, and it counts as duty only because the conviction is expressed. For universal self-consciousness is free of the determinate action that only exists. The action as existence 1807 603 counts for nothing to it; what counts is the conviction that the action is duty, and this is actual in language.—Here, realizing the action does not mean translating its content from the form of purpose or being-for-itself into the form of abstract actuality. It means translating it from the form of immediate self-certainty, which knows its knowing or being-for-itself as the essence, into the form of the assurance that consciousness is convinced of duty, and as conscience knows duty from itself. This assurance thus assures us that consciousness is convinced that its conviction is the essence.

654 Whether the assurance of acting from conviction of duty is true, whether what is done is really duty—these questions or doubts have no meaning against conscience.—The question whether the assurance is true would presuppose that the inner intention differed from the alleged one. That is, the willing of the individual self could separate itself from duty, from the will of universal and pure consciousness. The latter would be put into speech, while the former would be the action's real driving force. But this distinction between universal consciousness and the individual self is precisely what has been sublated, and conscience is its sublation. The immediate knowing of the self certain of itself is law and duty. Its intention is right because it is its intention. All that is required 1807 604 is that it know this and say it: say that it is convinced that its knowing and willing are right. Expressing this assurance in itself sublates the form of its particularity. In it, consciousness recognizes the necessary universality of the self. By calling itself conscience, it calls itself pure self-knowing and pure abstract willing. That is, it calls itself a universal knowing and willing that recognizes others and is equal to them, since they are precisely this pure self-knowing and willing too, and that is therefore also recognized by them. The essence of right lies in the willing of the self certain of itself, in this knowledge that the self is the essence.—Anyone who says they act this way from conscience therefore speaks the truth, since their conscience is the knowing and willing self. But it is essential that they say this, since this self must also be a universal self. It is not universal in the action's content, since this is in itself indifferent because of its determinacy. Universality instead lies in the action's form. This form is what must be posited as actual. It is the self, actual as such in language, declaring itself to be the true, and thereby recognizing all selves and being recognized by them.

655 Thus conscience, in the majesty of its elevation above determinate law and every content of duty, places whatever content it chooses into its knowing and willing. It is moral genius, 1807 605 knowing the inner voice of its immediate knowledge as a divine voice. And since in this knowledge it equally immediately knows existence, it is the divine creative power that has living force in its concept. It is equally worship within itself, since its action is the intuition of this divinity of its own.

656 This solitary worship is at the same time essentially the worship of a community, and pure inward self-knowing and self-hearing move onward to the moment of consciousness. Its intuition of itself is its objective existence, and this objective element is the expression of its knowing and willing as something universal. Through this expression the self becomes valid and the action becomes an accomplishing deed. The actuality and subsistence of its doing are universal self-consciousness. But conscience's expression posits its self-certainty as pure, and therefore universal, self. Others accept the action because of this speech, in which the self is expressed and recognized as the essence. The spirit and substance of their association are therefore their mutual assurance of conscientiousness and good intentions, their delight in this mutual purity, and their refreshment in the splendor of knowing, expressing, cherishing, and tending such excellence.—Insofar as this conscience still distinguishes its abstract 1807 606 consciousness from its self-consciousness, its life is only hidden in God. God is indeed immediately present to its spirit and heart, to its self. But what is manifest—its actual consciousness and that consciousness's mediating movement—is for it something other than that hidden inwardness and the immediacy of the present essence. In conscience's completion, however, the distinction between its abstract consciousness and its self-consciousness is sublated. It knows that abstract consciousness is precisely this self, this being-for-itself certain of itself. It knows that in the immediacy of the self's relation to the in-itself—which, posited outside the self, is the abstract essence and what is hidden from it—difference is sublated. For a mediating relation is one in which the related terms are not one and the same but an other for one another, and are one only in a third. An immediate relation, however, means in fact nothing other than unity. Consciousness has risen above the thoughtlessness of still treating these distinctions, which are no distinctions, as distinctions. It knows the immediacy of the essence's presence within it as the unity of the essence and its self, and thus knows its self as the living in-itself. It knows this knowing of its own as religion, which, as intuited or existing knowing, is the community's speech about its spirit.

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657 Here, then, we see self-consciousness returned into its innermost self, for which all externality as such disappears—into the intuition of I = I, in which this I is all essence and existence. It sinks into this concept of itself. For it has been driven to the furthest point of its extremes, in such a way that the distinct moments through which it is real, or still exists as consciousness, are these pure extremes not only for us. What it is for itself, what for it is in itself, and what for it is existence, have evaporated into abstractions that no longer have any hold or substance for this consciousness itself. Everything that was previously essence for consciousness has retreated into these abstractions.—Refined to this purity, consciousness is its poorest shape. The poverty constituting its only possession is itself a vanishing. This absolute certainty, into which substance has dissolved, is absolute untruth, collapsing into itself. It is absolute self-consciousness, in which consciousness sinks away.

658 Consider this sinking within itself. For consciousness, the substance existing in itself is knowing as its own knowing. As consciousness, it is divided into the opposition between itself and the object that is the essence for it. But this very object is completely transparent: it is its self, and its consciousness is only knowledge of itself. All life and all spiritual essence have returned into this 1807 608 self and lost their difference from the I itself. The moments of consciousness are therefore these extreme abstractions. None stands; each loses itself in the other and produces it. This is unhappy consciousness's interchange with itself, but an interchange that takes place for consciousness itself within it, and is conscious of being the concept of reason, which unhappy consciousness is only in itself. Its absolute self-certainty therefore immediately turns, for it as consciousness, into an utterance, into the objectivity of its being-for-itself. But this created world is its speech, which it has just as immediately heard, and whose echo alone returns to it. This return therefore does not mean that consciousness exists in and for itself in it. For the essence is not an in-itself for it, but is itself. Nor does it have existence, since the objective never becomes a negative of the actual self, just as this self never reaches actuality. It lacks the strength to externalize itself, the strength to make itself a thing and endure being. It lives in fear of staining the splendor of its inwardness through action and existence. To preserve its heart's purity, it flees contact with actuality. It persists in its obstinate inability to relinquish its self, sharpened to the ultimate abstraction, and to give itself substantiality, or transform its thinking into being and entrust itself to absolute difference. The hollow 1807 609 object it produces for itself therefore now fills it with the consciousness of emptiness. Its doing is longing, which only loses itself as it becomes an object without essence. Going beyond this loss and falling back into itself, it finds itself only as lost.—In this transparent purity of its moments, an unhappy so-called beautiful soul, it burns itself out within itself and vanishes like a shapeless mist dissolving into air.

659 But this silent merging of the marrowless essences of evaporated life must also be taken in the other meaning of conscience's actuality, and in the appearance of its movement. Conscience must be considered as acting.—The objective moment in this consciousness was determined above as universal consciousness. Self-knowing knowledge, as this self, is distinct from other selves. The language in which all mutually recognize one another as acting conscientiously—this universal equality—breaks apart into the inequality of individual being-for-itself. Each consciousness is equally reflected entirely into itself out of its universality. This necessarily brings about the opposition of individuality to other individuals and to the universal. This relation and its movement must be considered.—Or this universality and duty have the wholly opposite meaning of determinate individuality that exempts itself from the universal. 1807 610 For it, pure duty is only universality brought to the surface and turned outward. Duty lies only in words and counts as a being for another. At first conscience, directed only negatively against duty as this determinate, given duty, knows itself free from it. But by filling empty duty from itself with a determinate content, it has the positive awareness that as this self it makes the content for itself. Its pure self, as empty knowing, has no content or determination. The content it gives this self is taken from its self as this determinate self, from itself as natural individuality. In speaking of the conscientiousness of its action, it is indeed aware of its pure self. But in its action's purpose as actual content, it is conscious of itself as this particular individual, and of the opposition between what it is for itself and what it is for others—the opposition between universality or duty and its reflection out of universality.

660 When the opposition into which conscience enters as acting is expressed within it in this way, it is also inequality outwardly, in the element of existence: the inequality of its particular individuality with other individuals.—Its particularity consists in the two moments constituting its consciousness, the self and the in-itself, having unequal worth within it. Specifically, self-certainty 1807 611 is the essence as against the in-itself, or the universal, which counts only as a moment. Opposed to this inward determination stands the element of existence, or universal consciousness. For this consciousness, universality, duty, is instead the essence, while individuality that exists for itself against the universal counts only as a sublated moment. To this holding fast to duty, the first consciousness counts as evil, because it is the inequality of its being-within-itself with the universal. And because it also declares its doing to be equality with itself, duty and conscientiousness, it counts as hypocrisy.

661 The movement of this opposition is initially the formal establishment of equality between what evil is inwardly and what it expresses. Its evil must come to light, so that its existence equals its essence: hypocrisy must be unmasked.—The inequality within hypocrisy has not already returned to equality merely because, as people commonly say, hypocrisy proves its respect for duty and virtue by assuming their appearance and using it as a mask for its own consciousness no less than for others'. This recognition of the opposite is supposed to contain equality and agreement in itself.—But hypocrisy is equally withdrawn from this recognition in language 1807 612 and reflected into itself. In using what exists in itself only as a being for another, it instead contains its own contempt for it, and a display to everyone of its lack of essence. For what lets itself be used as an external tool shows itself to be a thing without any weight of its own.

662 Nor does this equality come about either through evil consciousness's one-sided insistence on itself or through the judgment of universal consciousness.—Suppose the former denies what it is before the consciousness of duty, and maintains that what the latter calls badness, absolute inequality with the universal, is action according to inner law and conscience. Its inequality with the other remains in this one-sided assurance of equality, since the other does not believe or recognize it.—Or, since one-sided insistence on one extreme dissolves itself, evil would thereby admit itself to be evil, but would immediately sublate itself in doing so, and would neither be hypocrisy nor unmask itself as such. It does in fact admit itself to be evil by asserting that, opposed to the recognized universal, it acts according to its inner law and conscience. For if this law and conscience were not the law of its individuality and arbitrary choice, they would not be something inward and its own, but what is universally recognized. Anyone who therefore says they act against others according to their own law and 1807 613 conscience says in fact that they mistreat them. But actual conscience is not this insistence on knowing and willing opposed to the universal. Rather, the universal is the element of its existence, and its language expresses its doing as recognized duty.

663 Universal consciousness's insistence on its judgment no more unmasks and dissolves hypocrisy.—When it cries out against hypocrisy, calling it bad, base, and so forth, it appeals in this judgment to its law, just as evil consciousness appeals to its own. For the former appears in opposition to the latter, and therefore as a particular law. It thus has no advantage over the other, but instead legitimizes it. This zeal does precisely the opposite of what it means to do: it shows what it calls true duty, which ought to be universally recognized, as unrecognized, and thereby grants the other the same right of being-for-itself.

664 But this judgment also has another side, through which it introduces the dissolution of the existing opposition.—The consciousness of the universal does not relate to the first consciousness as actual and acting, since the first is instead the actual one. It stands opposed to it as the consciousness not caught in the opposition of individuality and universality that enters 1807 614 action. It remains in the universality of thought, relates as an apprehending consciousness, and its first action is only judgment.—Through this judgment, as just noted, it places itself alongside the first consciousness, and through this equality the first comes to intuit itself in this other consciousness. For the consciousness of duty relates by apprehending, passively. But this puts it in contradiction with itself as the absolute will of duty, as what determines entirely from itself. It is easy for it to preserve its purity, since it does not act. It is hypocrisy that wants judging to count as an actual deed and proves its integrity not through action but through expressing excellent sentiments. It is therefore exactly like the consciousness it accuses of putting duty only into its speech. In both, actuality is equally distinct from speech: in one through the action's self-interested purpose, in the other through the absence of action altogether. The necessity of action lies in speaking of duty itself, since without deeds duty has no meaning at all.

665 But judging must also be considered as a positive action of thought, and it has a positive content. From this side, the contradiction within apprehending consciousness and its equality with the first become even 1807 615 more complete.—Acting consciousness expresses this determinate doing of its own as duty, and judging consciousness cannot deny this. For duty itself is the contentless form capable of any content. Or the concrete action, differentiated within itself in its many sides, contains the universal side taken as duty just as much as the particular side constituting the individual's share and interest. Now judging consciousness does not stop at that side of duty, and at the agent's knowledge that this is their duty, the relation and situation of their actuality. Instead it holds to the other side, shifts the action inward, and explains it from an intention different from the action itself and from a self-interested motive. Just as every action can be considered in terms of its conformity to duty, so can it be considered in this other way, in terms of particularity. For as action it is the individual's actuality.—This judging thus removes the action from its existence and reflects it inward, or into the form of its own particularity.—If fame accompanies it, judging knows this inwardness as a craving for fame. If the action suits the individual's station in general without going beyond it, and is such that individuality does not have that station attached to it as an external determination, but fills this universality through 1807 616 itself and thereby shows itself capable of a higher station, judgment knows its inwardness as ambition, and so forth. In action in general, the agent comes to intuit themselves in objectivity, or to feel themselves in their existence, and thus to enjoy it. Judgment therefore knows the inwardness as a drive toward personal happiness, even if this consists only in inward moral vanity, the enjoyment of being conscious of one's excellence, and the anticipated taste of hoped-for future happiness.—No action can escape such judgment. For duty for duty's sake, this pure purpose, is nonactual. It has its actuality in individuality's doing, and the action thereby has the side of particularity.—No one is a hero to their valet. But this is not because the hero is not a hero; it is because the valet is—the valet, who deals with the hero not as a hero but as someone eating, drinking, dressing, in general in the individuality of need and representation. Similarly, there is no action in which judging cannot set the side of individuality against the action's universal side, and play morality's valet toward the agent.

666 This judging consciousness is thus itself base, because it divides the action, produces its 1807 617 inequality with itself, and holds fast to it. Further, it is hypocrisy, because it passes off such judging not as another way of being evil but as the right consciousness of the action. In its nonactuality and vanity of knowing well and knowing better, it places itself above the deeds it disparages, and wants its deedless talk to count as an excellent actuality.—In thus making itself equal to the agent it judges, it is recognized by that agent as the same as itself. The agent finds that it is not merely apprehended by judging consciousness as something foreign and unequal to it; rather, judging consciousness is equal to it in its own constitution. Intuiting this equality and expressing it, the agent confesses to the other. It expects that, just as the other has in fact placed itself on an equal footing, it will also return its speech, express its equality in that speech, and bring recognizing existence into being. Its confession is not degradation, humiliation, or self-abasement in relation to the other. For this expression is not one-sided, positing its inequality with the other. It expresses itself only because it intuits the other's equality with itself. From its side, in its confession, it expresses their equality. It expresses this because language is the existence of spirit as immediate self. It therefore expects the other to contribute its own part to this existence.

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667 But the confession of evil, “I am so,” receives no answering confession of the same kind. That was not what the other's judging meant—quite the opposite! It rejects this community and is the hard heart that exists for itself and refuses continuity with the other.—The scene thereby reverses. The consciousness that confessed sees itself rejected and sees the other as being in the wrong. The other refuses to let its inwardness emerge into the existence of speech. Against evil it sets the beauty of its soul, and against confession the stiff neck of its unchanging character and the silence that keeps itself within itself and will not throw itself away before another. Here spirit certain of itself is posited in its highest outrage. For it intuits itself in the other as this simple knowing of the self. Even the other's external shape is not something without essence, like wealth, not a thing. Instead, what confronts it is thought, knowing itself. It is this absolutely fluid continuity of pure knowing that refuses to establish communication with it—with the consciousness that, in its confession, has already renounced isolated being-for-itself, and posited itself as sublated particularity and thus as continuity with the other, as universal. But the other reserves within itself its uncommunicating being-for-itself. In the confessing consciousness it retains 1807 619 that same character, which the confessing consciousness has already cast off. It thereby shows itself to be a consciousness abandoned by spirit and denying spirit. For it does not recognize that spirit, in its absolute self-certainty, is master over every deed and actuality, and can cast them off and undo them. Nor does it recognize the contradiction it commits in not accepting the casting-off that has occurred in speech as a true casting-off, while it itself has the certainty of its spirit not in an actual action but in its inwardness and that inwardness's existence in the speech of its judgment. It is therefore itself what obstructs the other's return from the deed into the spiritual existence of speech and into spirit's equality. Through this hardness it produces the inequality that still remains.

668 Now insofar as spirit certain of itself, as a beautiful soul, lacks the strength to externalize its self-knowledge that holds itself within itself, it cannot reach equality with the rejected consciousness, and thus cannot reach the intuited unity of itself in the other, cannot reach existence. Equality therefore comes about only negatively, as a spiritless being. The beautiful soul without actuality is caught in the contradiction between its pure self and that self's necessity to externalize itself into being and turn into actuality. In the immediacy of this fixed opposition—an immediacy that alone is the middle term and 1807 620 reconciliation of the opposition heightened to pure abstraction, and that is pure being or empty nothing—it is consciousness of this contradiction in its unreconciled immediacy. It is therefore shattered into madness and wastes away in yearning consumption. It does thereby in fact give up its hard insistence on its being-for-itself, but produces only the spiritless unity of being.

669 The necessity of the true reconciliation—the self-conscious reconciliation that exists—is already contained in what came before. The breaking of the hard heart and its elevation to universality are the same movement expressed in the consciousness that confessed. Spirit's wounds heal without leaving scars. The deed is not imperishable; spirit takes it back into itself. The side of individuality present in it, whether as intention or as its existing negativity and limitation, is what immediately vanishes. The realizing self, the form of its action, is only a moment of the whole. So too is the knowing that determines through judgment and fixes the distinction between the individual and universal sides of action. That evil consciousness posits this externalization of itself, or posits itself as a moment, drawn into confessing existence by intuiting itself in the other. But just as its one-sided, unrecognized existence of particular 1807 621 being-for-itself must break, so the other's one-sided, unrecognized judgment must break. Just as the first displays spirit's power over its actuality, the second displays its power over its determinate concept.

670 The latter renounces divisive thought and the hardness of the being-for-itself that holds to it because it in fact intuits itself in the former. By casting off its actuality and making itself a sublated this, the first consciousness in fact presents itself as universal. It returns from its external actuality into itself as essence. Universal consciousness therefore recognizes itself in it.—The forgiveness it grants the first is a relinquishment of itself, of its nonactual essence, to which it makes the other, which was actual action, equal. It recognizes as good what was called evil through the determination action received in thought. Or rather, it lets go of this distinction made by determinate thought and of its determining judgment existing for itself, just as the other lets go of its determination of action existing for itself.—The word of reconciliation is existing spirit, which intuits the pure knowing of itself as universal essence in its opposite: in the pure knowing of itself as individuality absolutely within itself. It is a mutual recognition that is absolute spirit.

671 Spirit enters existence only at the extreme point where its pure self-knowledge is opposition to itself and interchange with itself. Knowing that its 1807 622 pure knowing is the abstract essence, it is this knowing duty in absolute opposition to the knowing that knows itself, as absolute individuality of the self, to be the essence. The former is the pure continuity of the universal, which knows the individuality knowing itself as essence to be null in itself, to be evil. The latter is absolute discreteness, which knows itself in its pure oneness as absolute, and that universal as nonactual, existing only for others. Both sides have been refined to this purity, in which they no longer contain any selfless existence, any negative of consciousness. Instead, that duty is the unchanging character of its self-knowing, and this evil equally has its purpose in its being-within-itself and its actuality in its speech. The content of this speech is the substance of its subsistence. It is the assurance of spirit's certainty within itself.—Both spirits certain of themselves have no purpose other than their pure self, and no reality or existence other than precisely this pure self. But they are still different, and their difference is absolute because it is posited in this element of the pure concept. It is absolute not only for us but for the concepts themselves that stand in this opposition. For these concepts are indeed determinate in relation to one another, but also universal in themselves. They therefore fill the self's entire scope, and this self has no other content than this 1807 623 determinacy of its own, which neither goes beyond it nor is narrower than it. For the one, the absolutely universal, is pure self-knowing just as much as the other, the absolute discreteness of individuality; and both are only this pure self-knowing. Both determinations are therefore the knowing pure concepts whose determinacy is itself immediately knowing, or whose relation and opposition is the I. Through this they are for one another these utterly opposed terms. It is the entirely inward that has thus stepped opposite itself and into existence. They constitute pure knowing, posited through this opposition as consciousness. But it is not yet self-consciousness. It gains this realization in the movement of this opposition. For this opposition is itself instead the unseparated continuity and equality of I = I. And each, for itself, sublates itself within itself through the contradiction of its pure universality, which at the same time still resists its equality with the other and separates itself from it. Through this externalization, knowing divided in its existence returns into the unity of the self. It is the actual I, universal knowing of itself in its absolute opposite, in knowing within itself, which is itself wholly universal because of the purity of its isolated inwardness. The reconciling yes, in which both I's relinquish their opposed 1807 624 *existence, is the existence of the I extended into a duality, remaining equal to itself within it and having self-certainty in its complete externalization and opposite. It is God appearing among those who know themselves as pure knowing.

About this section

VI. Spirit is part of The Phenomenology of Spirit by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 8 of 10 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.

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Original German

VI. *Der Geist*.

A. *Der wahre Geist*, die Sittlichkeit.

a. *Die sittliche Welt*, das menschliche und göttliche Gesetz, der Mann und das Weib.

b. Die sittliche Handlung, das menschliche und göttliche Wissen, die Schuld und das Schicksal.

c. *Rechtszustand*.

B. *Der sich entfremdete Geist; die Bildung*.

I. Die Welt des sich entfremdeten Geistes.

a. *Die Bildung* und ihr Reich der Wirklichkeit.

b. Der Glauben und die reine Einsicht.

II. *Die Aufklärung*.

a. *Der Kampf* der Aufklärung mit dem Aberglauben.

b. Die Wahrheit der Aufklärung.

III. *Die abſolute Freyheit und der Schrecken*.

C. *Der seiner selbst gewiſse Geist. Die Moralität*.

a. Die moralische Weltanschauung.

b. *Die Verstellung*.

c. *Das Gewiſſen, die ſchöne Seele, das Böſe und ſeine Verzeyhung*.

Musean translation

VI. *Spirit*.

A. *True Spirit*: Ethical Life.

a. *The Ethical World*: Human and Divine Law, Man and Woman.

b. Ethical Action: Human and Divine Knowledge, Guilt and Fate.

c. *The Condition of Right*.

B. *Spirit Alienated from Itself: Cultivation*.

I. The World of Self-Alienated Spirit.

a. *Cultivation* and Its Realm of Actuality.

b. Faith and Pure Insight.

II. *The Enlightenment*.

a. *The Struggle* of Enlightenment with Superstition.

b. The Truth of Enlightenment.

III. *Absolute Freedom and Terror*.

C. *Spirit Certain of Itself: Morality*.

a. The Moral Worldview.

b. *Dissemblance*.

c. *Conscience, the beautiful soul, evil and its forgiveness*.

Plain English translation

VI. *Spirit*.

A. *True spirit*: ethical life.

a. *The ethical world*: human and divine law, man and woman.

b. Ethical action: human and divine knowledge, guilt and fate.

c. *The legal condition*.

B. *Spirit alienated from itself: cultivation*.

I. The world of self-alienated spirit.

a. *Cultivation* and its realm of actuality.

b. Faith and pure insight.

II. *The Enlightenment*.

a. The Enlightenment's *struggle* with superstition.

b. The truth of the Enlightenment.

III. *Absolute freedom and terror*.

C. *Spirit certain of itself: morality*.

a. The moral worldview.

b. *Dissemblance*.

c. *Conscience, the beautiful soul, evil and its forgiveness*.

About this section

VI. Der Geist.

A. Der wahre Geist, die Sittlichkeit.

a. Die sittliche Welt, das menschliche und göttliche Gesetz, der Mann und das Weib.

c. Rechtszustand.

B. Der sich entfremdete Geist; die Bildung.

a. Die Bildung und ihr Reich der Wirklichkeit.

II. Die Aufklärung.

a. Der Kampf der Aufklärung mit dem Aberglauben.

III. Die abſolute Freyheit und der Schrecken.

C. Der seiner selbst gewiſse Geist. Die Moralität.

b. Die Verstellung.

c. Das Gewiſſen, die ſchöne Seele, das Böſe und ſeine Verzeyhung.

VI. Spirit.

A. True Spirit: Ethical Life.

a. The Ethical World: Human and Divine Law, Man and Woman.

c. The Condition of Right.

B. Spirit Alienated from Itself: Cultivation.

a. Cultivation and Its Realm of Actuality.

II. The Enlightenment.

a. The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition.

III. Absolute Freedom and Terror.

C. Spirit Certain of Itself: Morality.

b. Dissemblance.

c. Conscience, the beautiful soul, evil and its forgiveness.

VI. Spirit.

A. True spirit: ethical life.

a. The ethical world: human and divine law, man and woman.

c. The legal condition.

B. Spirit alienated from itself: cultivation.

a. Cultivation and its realm of actuality.

II. The Enlightenment.

a. The Enlightenment's struggle with superstition.

III. Absolute freedom and terror.

C. Spirit certain of itself: morality.

b. Dissemblance.

c. Conscience, the beautiful soul, evil and its forgiveness.