Introduction
Original German
*Erster Theil*. *Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewuſstseyns*.
73 Es ist eine natürliche Vorstellung, daſs, eh in der Philosophie an die Sache selbst, nemlich an das wirkliche Erkennen dessen, was in Wahrheit ist, gegangen wird, es nothwendig ſey, vorher über das Erkennen sich zu verständigen, das als das Werkzeug, wodurch man des Absoluten sich bemächtige, oder als das Mittel, durch welches hindurch man es erblicke, betrachtet wird. Die Besorgniſs scheint gerecht, theils daſs es verschiedene Arten der Erkenntniſs geben, und darunter eine geschickter als eine andere zur Erreichung dieses Endzwecks seyn möchte, hiemit durch falsche Wahl unter ihnen, — theils auch daſs, indem das Erkennen ein Vermögen von bestimmter Art und Umfange iſt, ohne die genauere Bestimmung seiner Natur und Gräntze, Wolken des Irrthums statt des Himmels der Wahrheit erfaſst werden. Dieſe Besorgniſs muſs sich wohl sogar in die Ueberzeugung verwandeln, daſs das ganze Beginnen, dasjenige, was An-sich ist, durch das Erkennen dem Bewuſstseyn zu erwerben, in seinem Begriffe widersinnig sey, und zwischen das Erkennen und das Absolute eine sie schlechthin scheidende Gräntze falle. Denn ist das Erkennen das Werkzeug, sich des absoluten Wesens zu bemächtigen, so fällt sogleich auf, daſs die Anwendung eines Werkzeugs auf eine Sache, sie vielmehr nicht läſst, 1807 4 wie sie für sich ist, sondern eine Formirung und Veränderung mit ihr vornimmt. Oder ist das Erkennen nicht Werkzeug unserer Thätigkeit, sondern gewissermaſsen ein passives Medium, durch welches hindurch das Licht der Wahrheit an uns gelangt, so erhalten wir auch so sie nicht, wie sie an sich, sondern wie sie durch und in diesem Medium ist. Wir gebrauchen in beyden Fällen ein Mittel, welches unmittelbar das Gegentheil seines Zwecks hervorbringt; oder das Widersinnige ist vielmehr, daſs wir uns überhaupt eines Mittels bedienen. Es scheint zwar, daſs diesem Uebelstande durch die Kenntniſs der Wirkungsweise des Werkzeugs abzuhelfen steht, denn sie macht es möglich, den Theil, welcher in der Vorstellung, die wir durch es vom Absoluten erhalten, dem Werkzeuge angehört, im Resultate abzuziehen, und so das Wahre rein zu erhalten. Allein, diese Verbesserung würde uns in der That nur dahin zurückbringen, wo wir vorher waren. Wenn wir von einem formirten Dinge das wieder wegnehmen, was das Werkzeug daran gethan hat, so ist uns das Ding, — hier das Absolute — gerade wieder so viel als vor dieser somit überflüssiger Bemühung. Sollte das Absolute durch das Werkzeug uns nur überhaupt näher gebracht werden, ohne etwas an ihm zu verändern, wie etwa durch die Leimruthe der Vogel, so würde es wohl, wenn es nicht an und für sich schon bey uns wäre und seyn wollte, dieser List spotten; denn eine List wäre in 1807 5 diesem Falle das Erkennen, da es durch sein vielfaches Bemühen ganz etwas anderes zu treiben sich die Miene gibt, als nur die unmittelbare und somit mühelose Beziehung hervor zu bringen. Oder wenn die Prüffung des Erkennens, das wir als ein Medium uns vorstellen, uns das Gesetz seiner Strahlenbrechung kennen lehrt, so nützt es eben so nichts, sie im Resultate abzuziehen; denn nicht das Brechen des Strahls, sondern der Strahl selbst, wodurch die Wahrheit uns berührt, ist das Erkennen, und dieses abgezogen, wäre uns nur die reine Richtung, oder der leere Ort bezeichnet worden.
74 Inzwischen wenn die Besorgniſs in Irrthum zu gerathen, ein Miſstrauen in die Wissenschaft ſetzt, welche ohne dergleichen Bedenklichkeiten ans Werk selbst geht und wirklich erkennt, so ist nicht abzusehen, warum nicht umgekehrt ein Miſstrauen in diſs Miſstrauen gesetzt, und beſorgt werden soll, daſs diese Furcht zu irren schon der Irrthum selbst ist. In der That setzt sie etwas und zwar manches als Wahrheit voraus, und stützt darauf ihre Bedenklichkeiten und Consequenzen, was selbst vorher zu prüffen ist, ob es Wahrheit sey. Sie setzt nemlich Vorstellungen von dem Erkennen als einem Werkzeuge und Medium, auch einen Unterschied unserer selbst von diesem Erkennen voraus; vorzüglich aber diſs, daſs das Absolute auf einer Seite stehe, und das Erkennen auf der andern Seite für sich und getrennt von dem Absoluten doch etwas reelles, oder hiemit, daſs das 1807 6 Erkennen, welches, indem es auſser dem Absoluten, wohl auch auſser der Wahrheit ist, doch wahrhaft sey; eine Annahme, wodurch das, was sich Furcht vor dem Irrthume nennt, sich eher als Furcht vor der Wahrheit zu erkennen gibt.
75 Diese Consequenz ergibt sich daraus, daſs das Absolute allein wahr, oder das Wahre allein absolut ist. Sie kann abgelehnt werden, durch den Unterschied, daſs ein Erkennen, welches zwar nicht, wie die Wissenschaft will, das Absolute erkennt, doch auch wahr; und das Erkennen überhaupt, wenn es dasselbe zu fassen zwar unfahig sey, doch anderer Wahrheit fähig seyn könne. Aber wir sehen nachgerade, daſs solches hin- und herreden, auf einen trüben Unterschied zwischen einem absoluten Wahren, und einem sonstigen Wahren hinaus läufft, und das Absolute, das Erkennen, und so fort, Worte sind, welche eine Bedeutung voraus setzen, um die zu erlangen es erst zu thun ist.
76 Statt mit dergleichen unnützen Vorstellungen und Redensarten, von dem Erkennen, als einem Werkzeuge, des Absoluten habhafft zu werden, oder als einem Medium, durch das hindurch wir die Wahrheit erblicken und so fort, — Verhältnisse, worauf wohl alle diese Vorstellungen von einem Erkennen, das vom Absoluten, und einem Absoluten, das von dem Erkennen getrennt ist, hinauslauffen, — statt mit den Ausreden, welche das Unvermögen der Wissenschaft aus der 1807 7 Voraussetzung solcher Verhältnisse schöpft, um von der Mühe der Wissenschaft zugleich sich zu befreyen, und zugleich sich das Ansehen eines ernsthaften und eifrigen Bemühens zu geben, — so wie statt mit Antworten auf alles dieses sich herumzuplacken, könnten sie als zufällige und willkührliche Vorstellungen geradezu verworfen, und der damit verbundne Gebrauch von Worten als dem Absoluten, dem Erkennen, auch dem Objectiven und Subjectiven, und unzähligen andern, deren Bedeutung als allgemem bekannt vorausgesetzt wird, sogar als Betrug angesehen werden. Denn das Vorgeben, theils daſs ihre Bedeutung allgemein bekannt ist, theils auch, daſs man selbst ihren Begriff hat, scheint eher nur die Hauptsache ersparen zu sollen, nemlich diesen Begriff zu geben. Mit mehr Recht dagegen könnte die Mühe gespart werden, von solchen Vorstellungen und Redensarten, wodurch die Wissenschaft selbst abgewehrt werden soll, überhaupt Notitz zu nehmen, denn sie machen nur eine leere Erscheinung des Wissens aus, welche vor der auftretenden Wissenschaft unmittelbar verschwindet. Aber die Wissenschaft darin, dass sie auftritt, ist sie selbst eine Erscheinung; ihr Auftreten ist noch nicht sie in ihrer Wahrheit ausgeführt und ausgebreitet. Es ist hiebey gleichgültig, sich vorzustellen, daſs sie die Erscheinung ist, weil sie neben anderem auftritt, oder jenes andere unwahre Wissen ihr Erscheinen zu nennen. Die Wissenschaft muſs 1807 8 sich aber von diesem Scheine befreyen; und sie kann diſs nur dadurch, daſs sie sich gegen ihn wendet. Denn sie kann ein Wissen, welches nicht wahrhafft ist, weder als eine gemeine Ansicht der Dinge nur verwerfen, und versichern, daſs sie eine ganz andere Erkenntniſs, und jenes Wissen für sie gar nichts ist; noch sich auf die Ahndung eines bessern in ihm selbst beruffen. Durch jene Versicherung erklärte sie ihr Seyn für ihre Krafft; aber das unwahre Wissen berufft sich eben so darauf, daſs es ist, und versichert, daſs ihm die Wissenschaft nichts ist; ein trockenes Versichern gilt aber gerade so viel als ein anderes. Noch weniger kann sie sich auf die bessere Ahndung beruffen, welche in dem nicht wahrhafften Erkennen vorhanden, und in ihm selbst die Hinweisung auf sie sey; denn einestheils berieffe sie sich ebenso wieder auf ein Seyn; anderntheils aber auf sich, als auf die Weise, wie sie im nicht wahrhafften Erkennen ist, das heiſst, auf eine schlechte Weise ihres Seyns, und auf ihre Erscheinung vielmehr, als darauf, wie sie an und für sich ist. Aus diesem Grunde soll hier die Darstellung des erscheinenden Wissens vorgenommen werden.
77 Weil nun diese Darstellung nur das erscheinende Wissen zum Gegenstande hat, so scheint sie selbst nicht die freye, in ihrer eigenthümlichen Gestalt sich bewegende Wissenschafft zu seyn, sondern sie kann von diesem Standpunkte aus, als der Weg des natürlichen Bewuſstseyns, das zum wahren 1807 9 Wissen dringt, genommen werden; oder als der Weg der Seele, welche die Reihe ihrer Gestaltungen, als durch ihre Natur ihr vorgesteckter Stationen durchwandert, daſs sie sich zum Geiste läutere, indem sie durch die vollständige Erfahrung ihrer selbst zur Kenntniſs desjenigen gelangt, was sie an sich selbst ist.
78 Das natürliche Bewuſstseyn wird sich erweisen, nur Begriff des Wissens, oder nicht reales Wissen zu seyn. Indem es aber unmittelbar sich vielmehr für das reale Wissen hält, so hat dieser Weg für es negative Bedeutung, und ihm gilt das vielmehr für Verlust seiner selbst was die Realisirung des Begriffs ist; denn es verliert auf diesem Wege seine Wahrheit. Er kann deſswegen als der Weg des Zweifels angesehen werden, oder eigentlicher als Weg der Verzweiflung; auf ihm geschieht nemlich nicht das, was unter zweifeln verstanden zu werden pflegt, ein Rütteln an dieser oder jener vermeynten Wahrheit, auf welches ein gehöriges wiederverschwinden des Zweifels und eine Rückkehr zu jener Wahrheit erfolgt, so daſs am Ende die Sache genommen wird wie vorher. Sondern er ist die bewuſste Einsicht in die Unwahrheit des erscheinenden Wissens, dem dasjenige das reellste ist, was in Wahrheit vielmehr nur der nichtrealisirte Begriff ist. Dieser sich vollbringende Stepticismus ist darum auch nicht dasjenige, womit wohl der ernsthafte Eifer um Wahrheit und Wissenschafft sich für diese fertig gemacht 1807 10 und ausgerüstet zu haben wähnt; nemlich mit dem Vorsatze, in der Wissenschaft auf die Autorität sich den Gedanken anderer nicht zu ergeben, sondern alles selbst zu prüffen und nur der eigenen Ueberzeugung zu folgen, oder besser noch, alles selbst zu produciren, und nur die eigne That für das Wahre zu halten. Die Reihe seiner Gestaltungen, welche das Bewuſstseyn auf diesem Wege durchläufft, ist vielmehr die ausführliche Geschichte der Bildung des Bewuſstseyns selbst zur Wissenschafft. Jener Vorsatz stellt die Bildung in der einfachen Weise des Vorsatzes als unmittelbar abgethan und geschehen vor; dieser Weg aber ist gegen dieſe Unwahrheit die wirkliche Ausführung. Der eigenen Ueberzeugung folgen, ist allerdings mehr als sich der Autorität ergeben; aber durch die Verkehrung des Dafürhaltens aus Autorität, in Dafürhalten aus eigener Ueberzeugung, ist nicht nothwendig der Innhalt desselben geändert und an die Stelle des Irrthums Wahrheit getreten. Auf die Autorität anderer oder aus eigener Ueberzeugung im Systeme des Meynens und des Vorurtheils zu stecken, unterscheidet sich von einander allein durch die Eitelkeit, welche der letztern Weise beywohnt. Der sich auf den ganzen Umfang des erscheinenden Bewuſstseyns richtende Skepticismus macht dagegen den Geist erst geschickt zu prüffen, was Wahrheit ist, indem er eine Verzweiflung an den sogenannten natürlichen Vorstellungen, Gedanken und Meynungen zustande bringt, 1807 11 welche es gleichgültig ist, eigene oder fremde zu nennen, und mit welchen das Bewuſstseyn, das geradezu ans Prüffen geht, noch erfüllt und behaftet, dadurch aber in der That dessen unfähig ist, was es unternehmen will.
79 Die Vollständigkeit der Formen des nicht realen Bewuſstseyns, wird sich durch die Nothwendigkeit des Fortganges und Zusammenhanges selbst ergeben. Um diſs begreiflich zu machen, kann im Allgemeinen zum voraus bemerkt werden, daſs die Darstellung des nicht wahrhaften Bewuſstseyns in seiner Unwahrheit, nicht eine bloſs negative Bewegung ist. Eine solche einseitige Ansicht hat das natürliche Bewuſstseyn überhaupt von ihr; und ein Wissen, welches diese Einseitigkeit zu seinem Wesen macht, ist eine der Gestalten des unvollendeten Bewuſstseyns, welche in den Verlauff des Weges selbst fällt, und darin sich darbieten wird. Sie ist nemlich der Skepticismus, der in dem Resultate nur immer das reine Nichts sicht, und davon abstrahirt, daſs diſs Nichts, bestimmt das Nichts dessen ist, woraus es resultirt. Das Nichts ist aber nur, genommen als das Nichts dessen, woraus es herkömmt, in der That das wahrhafte Resultat; es ist hiemit selbst ein bestimmtes und hat einen Innhalt. Der Skepticismus, der mit der Abstraction des Nichts oder der Leerheit endigt, kann von dieser nicht weiter fortgehen, sondern muſs es erwarten, ob, und was ihm etwa neues sich darbietet, um es in denselben leeren Abgrund zu 1807 12 werfen. Indem dagegen das Resultat, wie es in Wahrheit ist, aufgefaſst wird, als bestimmte Negation, so ist damit unmittelbar eine neue Form entsprungen, und in der Negation der Uebergang gemacht, wodurch sich der Fortgang durch die vollständige Reihe der Gestalten von selbst ergibt.
80 Das Ziel aber ist dem Wissen ebenso nothwendig, als die Reihe des Fortganges, gesteckt; es ist da, wo es nicht mehr über sich selbst hinaus zu gehen nöthig hat, wo es sich selbst findet, und der Begriff dem Gegenstande, der Gegenstand dem Begriffe entspricht. Der Fortgang zu diesem Ziele ist daher auch unaufhaltsam, und auf keiner frühern Station Befriedigung zu finden. Was auf ein natürliches Leben beschränkt ist, vermag durch sich selbst nicht über sein unmittelbares Daseyn hinauszugehen; aber es wird durch ein anderes darüber hinausgetrieben, und diſs hinausgerissen werden ist sein Tod. Das Bewuſstseyn aber ist für sich selbst sein Begriff, dadurch unmittelbar das hinausgehen über das Beschränkte, und, da ihm diſs Beschränkte angehört, über sich selbst; mit dem Einzelnen ist ihm zugleich das Jenseits gesetzt, wäre es auch nur, wie im räumlichen Anschauen, neben dem Beschränkten. Das Bewuſstseyn leidet also diese Gewalt, sich die beschränkte Befriedigung zu verderben, von ihm selbst. Bey dem Gefühle dieser Gewalt mag die Angst vor der Wahrheit wohl zurücktreten, und sich dasjenige, dessen Verlust droht, zu erhalten 1807 13 streben. Sie kann aber keine Ruhe finden; es sey daſs sie in gedankenloser Trägheit stehen bleiben will; der Gedanke verkümmert die Gedankenlosigkeit, und seine Unruhe stört die Trägheit; oder daſs sie als Empfindsamkeit sich befestigt, welche alles in seiner Art gut zu finden versichert; diese Versicherung leidet eben so Gewalt von der Vernunft, welche gerade darum etwas nicht gut findet, in so fern es eine Art ist. Oder die Furcht der Wahrheit mag sich vor sich und andern hinter dem Scheine verbergen, als ob gerade der heiſse Eifer für die Wahrheit selbst es ihr so schwer, ja unmöglich mache, eine andere Wahrheit zu finden, als die einzige der Eitelkeit, immer noch gescheuter zu seyn, als jede Gedanken, welche man aus sich selbst oder von andern hat; diese Eitelkeit, welche sich jede Wahrheit zu vereiteln, daraus in sich zurückzukehren versteht, und an diesem eignen Verstande sich weidet, der alle Gedanken immer aufzulösen und statt alles Innhalts nur das trockne Ich zu finden weiſs, ist eine Befriedigung, welche sich selbst überlassen werden muſs, denn sie flieht das Allgemeine, und sucht nur das Fürsichseyn.
81 Wie dieses vorläuffig und im allgemeinen über die Weise und Nothwendigkeit des Fortgangs gesagt worden ist, so kann noch über die Methode der Ausführung etwas zu erinnern dienlich seyn. Diese Darstellung als ein Verhalten der Wissenschaft zu dem erscheinenden Wissen, und als Untersuchung 1807 14 und Prüffung der Realität des Erkennens vorgestellt, scheint nicht ohne irgend eine Voraussetzung, die als Maſsstab zu Grunde gelegt wird, statt finden zu können. Denn die Prüffung besteht in dem Anlegen eines angenommenen Maſsstabes, und in der sich ergebenden Gleichheit oder Ungleichheit dessen, was geprüfft wird, mit ihm, die Entscheidung, ob es richtig oder unrichtig ist; und der Maſsstab überhaupt, und ebenso die Wissenschaft, wenn sie der Maſsstab wäre, ist dabey als das Wesen oder als das an sich angenommen. Aber hier, wo die Wissenschaft erst auftritt, hat weder sie selbst, noch was es sey, sich als das Wesen oder als das an sich gerechtfertigt; und ohne ein solches scheint keine Prüffung statt finden zu können.
82 Dieser Widerspruch und seine Wegräumung wird sich bestimmter ergeben, wenn zuerst an die abstracten Bestimmungen des Wissens und der Wahrheit erinnert wird, wie sie an dem Bewuſstseyn vorkommen. Dieses unterscheidet nemlich etwas von sich, worauf es sich zugleich bezieht; oder wie diſs ausgedrückt wird, es ist etwas für dasselbe; und die bestimmte Seite dieses Beziehens, oder des Seyns von Etwas für ein Bewuſstseyn ist das Wissen. Von diesem Seyn für ein anderes, unterscheiden wir aber, das an sich seyn; das auf das Wissen bezogene wird eben so von ihm unterschieden, und gesetzt als seyend auch ausser dieser Beziehung; die Seite dieses an sich heiſst Wahrheit. Was eigentlich an diesen 1807 15 Bestimmungen sey, geht uns weiter hier nichts an, denn indem das erscheinende Wissen unser Gegenstand ist, so werden auch zunächst seine Bestimmungen aufgenommen, wie sie sich unmittelbar darbieten; und so wie sie gefaſst worden sind, ist es wohl, daſs sie sich darbieten.
83 Untersuchen wir nun die Wahrheit des Wissens, so scheint es, wir untersuchen, was es an sich ist. Allein in dieser Untersuchung ist es unser Gegenstand, es ist für uns; und das an sich desselben, welches sich ergäbe, wäre so vielmehr sein Seyn für uns; was wir als sein Wesen behaupten würden, vielmehr nicht seine Wahrheit, sondern nur unser Wissen von ihm. Das Wesen oder der Maſsstab fiele in uns, und dasjenige, was mit ihm verglichen, und über welches durch diese Vergleichung entschieden werden sollte, hätte ihn nicht nothwendig anzuerkennen.
84 Aber die Natur des Gegenstandes, den wir untersuchen, überhebt dieser Trennung oder dieses Scheins von Trennung und Voraussetzung. Das Bewuſstseyn gibt seinen Maſsstab an ihm selbst, und die Untersuchung wird dadurch eine Vergleichung seiner mit sich selbst seyn; denn die Unterscheidung, welche so eben gemacht worden ist, fällt in es. Es ist in ihm eines für ein anderes, oder es hat überhaupt die Bestimmtheit des Moments des Wissens an ihm; zugleich ist ihm diſs andere nicht nur für es, sondern auch auſser dieser Beziehung oder an sich; 1807 16 das Moment der Wahrheit. An dem also, was das Bewuſstseyn innerhalb seiner für das an sich oder das Wahre erklärt, haben wir den Maſsstab, den es selbst aufstellt, sein Wissen daran zu messen. Nennen wir das Wissen den Begriff, das Wesen oder das Wahre aber, das Seyende oder den Gegenstand, so besteht die Prüffung darin, zuzusehen, ob der Begriff dem Gegenstande entspricht. Nennen wir aber das Wesen oder das an sich des Gegenstandes den Begriff, und verstehen dagegen unter dem Gegenstande, ihn als Gegenstand, nemlich wie er für ein anderes ist, so besteht die Prüffung darin, daſs wir zusehen, ob der Gegenstand seinem Begriff entspricht. Man sieht wohl, daſs beydes dasselbe ist; das wesentliche aber ist, diſs für die ganze Untersuchung festzuhalten, daſs diese beyden Momente, Begriff und Gegenstand, für ein anderes, und an sich selbst seyn, in das Wissen, das wir untersuchen, selbst fallen, und hiemit wir nicht nöthig haben, Maſsstäbe mitzubringen, und unsere Einfälle und Gedanken bey der Untersuchung zu appliciren; dadurch, daſs wir diese weglassen, erreichen wir es, die Sache, wie sie an und für sich selbst ist, zu betrachten.
85 Aber nicht nur nach dieser Seite, daſs Begriff und Gegenstand, der Maſsstab und das zu Prüffende, in dem Bewuſstseyn selbst vorhanden sind, wird eine Zuthat von uns überflüssig, sondern wir werden auch der Mühe der Vergleichung beyder, und der eigentlichen Prüffung überhoben, so daſs indem das 1807 17 Bewuſstseyn sich selbst prüfft, uns auch von dieser Seite nur das reine Zusehen bleibt. Denn das Bewuſstseyn ist einerseits Bewuſstseyn des Gegenstandes, anderseits Bewuſstseyn seiner selbst; Bewuſstseyn dessen, was ihm das Wahre ist, und Bewuſstseyn seines Wissens davon. Indem beyde für dasselbe sind, ist es selbst ihre Vergleichung; es wird für dasselbe, ob sein Wissen von dem Gegenstande diesem entspricht oder nicht. Der Gegenstand scheint zwar für dasselbe nur so zu seyn, wie es ihn weiſs; es scheint gleichsam nicht dahinter kommen zu können, wie er, nicht für dasselbe, sondern wie er an sich ist, und also auch sein Wissen nicht an ihm prüffen zu können. Allein gerade darin, daſs es überhaupt von einem Gegenstande weiſs, ist schon der Unterschied vorhanden, daſs ihm etwas das an sich, ein anderes Moment aber das Wissen, oder das Seyn des Gegenstandes für das Bewuſstseyn ist. Auf dieser Unterscheidung, welche vorhanden ist, beruht die Prüffung. Entspricht sich in dieser Vergleichung beydes nicht, so scheint das Bewuſstseyn sein Wissen ändern zu müssen, um es dem Gegenstande gemäſs zu machen, aber in der Veränderung des Wissens ändert sich ihm in der That auch der Gegenstand selbst; denn das vorhandene Wissen war wesentlich ein Wissen von dem Gegenstande; mit dem Wissen wird auch er ein anderer, denn er gehörte wesentlich diesem Wissen an. Es wird hiemit dem Bewuſstseyn, daſs dasjenige, was 1807 18 ihm vorher das an sich war, nicht an sich ist, oder daſs es nur für es an sich war. Indem es also an seinem Gegenstande sein Wissen diesem nicht entsprechend findet, hält auch der Gegenstand selbst nicht aus; oder der Maſsstab der Prüffung ändert sich, wenn dasjenige, dessen Maſsstab er seyn sollte, in der Prüffung nicht besteht; und die Prüffung ist nicht nur eine Prüffung des Wissens, sondern auch ihres Maſsstabes.
86 Diese dialektische Bewegung, welche das Bewuſstseyn an ihm selbst, sowohl an seinem Wissen, als an seinem Gegenstande ausübt, in sofern ihm der neue wahre Gegenstand daraus entspringt, ist eigentlich dasjenige, was Erfahrung genannt wird. Es ist in dieser Beziehung an dem so eben erwähnten Verlauffe ein Moment noch näher herauszuheben, wodurch sich über die wissenschafftliche Seite der folgenden Darstellung ein neues Licht verbreiten wird. Das Bewuſstseyn weiſs Etwas, dieser Gegenstand ist das Wesen oder das an sich; er ist aber auch für das Bewuſstseyn das an sich; damit tritt die Zweydeutigkeit dieses Wahren ein. Wir sehen, daſs das Bewuſstseyn itzt zwey Gegenstände hat, den einen das erste an sich, den zweyten, das für es seyn dieses an sich. Der letztere scheint zunächst nur die Reflexion des Bewuſstseyns in sich selbst zu seyn, ein Vorstellen, nicht eines Gegenstandes, sondern nur seines Wissens von jenem ersten. Allein wie vorhin gezeigt worden, ändert sich ihm dabey der erste 1807 19 Gegenstand; er hört auf das an sich zu seyn, und wird ihm zu einem solchen, der nur für es das an sich ist; somit aber ist dann diſs: das für es seyn dieses an sich, das wahre, das heiſst aber, diſs ist das Wesen, oder sein Gegenstand. Dieser neue Gegenstand enthält die Nichtigkeit des ersten, er ist die über ihn gemachte Erfahrung.
87 An dieser Darstellung des Verlauffs der Erfahrung ist ein Moment, wodurch sie mit demjenigen nicht übereinzustimmen scheint, was unter der Erfahrung verstanden zu werden pflegt. Der Uebergang nemlich, vom ersten Gegenstande und dem Wissen desselben, zu dem andern Gegenstande, an dem man sagt, daſs die Erfahrung gemacht worden sey, wurde so angegeben, daſs das Wissen vom ersten Gegenstande, oder das für das Bewuſstseyn des ersten an sich, der zweyte Gegenstand selbst werden soll. Dagegen es sonst scheint, daſs wir die Erfahrung von der Unwahrheit unseres ersten Begriffs, an einem andern Gegenstande machen, den wir zufälliger Weise und äuſserlich etwa finden, so daſs überhaupt nur das reine Auffassen dessen, was an und für sich ist, in uns falle. In jener Ansicht aber zeigt sich der neue Gegenstand als geworden, durch eine Umkehrung des Bewuſstseyns selbst. Diese Betrachtung der Sache ist unsere Zuthat, wodurch sich die Reihe der Erfahrungen des Bewuſstseyns zum wissenschaftlichen Gange erhebt, und welche nicht für das Bewuſstseyn ist, das wir betrachten. Es ist aber 1807 20 diſs in der That auch derselbe Umstand, von welchem oben schon in Ausehung des Verhältnisses dieser Darstellung zum Skepticismus die Rede war, daſs nemlich das jedesmahlige Resultat, welches sich an einem nicht wahrhafften Wissen ergibt, nicht in ein leeres Nichts zusammenlauffen dürfe, sondern nothwendig als Nichts desjenigen, dessen Resultat es ist, aufgefaſst werden müsse; ein Resultat, welches das enthält, was das vorhergehende Wissen Wahres an ihm hat. Diſs bietet sich hier so dar, daſs, indem das, was zuerst als der Gegenstand erschien, dem Bewuſstseyn zu einem Wissen von ihm herabsinkt, und das an sich, zu einem: für das Bewuſstseyn seyn des an sich wird, diſs der neue Gegenstand ist, womit auch eine neue Gestalt des Bewuſstseyns auftritt, welcher etwas anderes das Wesen ist, als der vorhergehenden. Dieser Umstand ist es, welcher die ganze Folge der Gestalten des Bewuſstseyns in ihrer Nothwendigkeit leitet. Nur diese Nothwenkeit selbst, oder die Entstehung des neuen Gegenstandes, der dem Bewuſstseyn, ohne zu wissen, wie ihm geschieht, sich darbietet, ist es, was für uns gleichsam hinter seinem Rücken vorgeht. Es kommt dadurch in seine Bewegung ein Moment des an sich, oder für uns seyns, welches nicht für das Bewuſstseyn, das in der Erfahrung selbst begriffen ist, sich darstellt; der Inhalt aber dessen, was uns entsteht, ist für es, und wir begreiffen nur das formelle desselben, oder sein reines Entstehen; für es 1807 21 ist diſs entstandene nur als Gegenstand, für uns zugleich als Bewegung und Werden.
88 Durch diese Nothwendigkeit ist dieser Weg zur Wissenschaft selbst schon Wissenschaft, und nach ihrem Inhalte hiemit Wissenschafft der Erfahrung des Bewuſstseyns.
89 Die Erfahrung, welche das Bewuſstseyn über sich macht, kann ihrem Begriffe nach nichts weniger in sich begreiffen, als das ganze System desselben, oder das ganze Reich der Wahrheit des Geistes, so daſs die Momente derselben in dieser eigenthümlichen Bestimmtheit sich darstellen, nicht abstracte, reine Momente zu seyn, sondern so, wie sie für das Bewuſstseyn sind, oder wie dieses selbst, in seiner Beziehung auf sie auftritt, wodurch die Momente des Ganzen, Gestalten des Bewuſstseyns sind. Indem es zu seiner wahren Existenz sich forttreibt, wird es einen Punkt erreichen, auf welchem es seinen Schein ablegt, mit fremdartigem, das nur für es und als ein anderes ist, behafftet zu seyn, oder wo die Erscheinung dem Wesen gleich wird, seine Darstellung hiemit mit eben diesem Punkte der eigentlichen Wissenschafft des Geistes zusammenfällt, und endlich, indem es selbst diſs sein Wesen erfaſst, wird es die Natur des absoluten Wissens selbst bezeichnen.
Musean translation
Mouseia's complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the 1807 first edition, all 808 standard paragraphs in eight chapters plus Preface and Introduction, for fidelity, Hegel's argument, clarity and structure. German witness: Deutsches Textarchiv, CC BY-SA 4.0; page markers keep the 1807 pagination.
*First Part*. *Science of the Experience of Consciousness*.
73 It is natural to suppose that, before philosophy approaches the matter itself—namely, the actual cognition of what is in truth—it is necessary first to reach an understanding about cognition, regarded as the instrument by which one takes possession of the absolute, or as the medium through which one beholds it. The concern seems justified: partly that there may be different kinds of cognition, one more suitable than another for attaining this final purpose, and that a wrong choice among them may therefore lead us astray; partly, too, that since cognition is a capacity of a determinate kind and scope, without a more precise determination of its nature and limits we may grasp clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth. This concern must indeed turn into the conviction that the entire undertaking of acquiring for consciousness, through cognition, what is in itself is absurd in its very concept, and that a boundary falls between cognition and the absolute, separating them utterly. For if cognition is the instrument for taking possession of absolute essence, it is immediately apparent that applying an instrument to a thing does not leave it 1807 4 as it is for itself, but instead shapes and alters it. Or if cognition is not the instrument of our activity but a kind of passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then here too we receive truth not as it is in itself, but as it is through and in this medium. In both cases we employ a means that immediately produces the opposite of its purpose; or rather, the absurdity is that we employ a means at all. It seems, admittedly, that this difficulty can be remedied by knowing how the instrument operates, since this makes it possible to subtract from the result the part belonging to the instrument in the representation of the absolute we receive through it, and so obtain the true in its purity. But this correction would in fact merely bring us back to where we were before. If we remove from a shaped thing what the instrument has done to it, the thing—here the absolute—is for us just what it was before this consequently superfluous effort. If the instrument were merely to bring the absolute closer to us, without altering anything in it, as a bird is caught by a limed twig, the absolute would surely mock this cunning if it were not already, in and for itself, with us and willing to be with us; for cognition would in 1807 5 this case be a cunning device, since through its manifold efforts it gives the appearance of doing something quite different from merely producing an immediate and hence effortless relation. Or if the examination of cognition, conceived as a medium, teaches us its law of refraction, it is equally useless to subtract this from the result; for cognition is not the refraction of the ray, but the ray itself through which truth touches us, and if this were subtracted, only the pure direction, or the empty place, would have been indicated to us.
74 Meanwhile, if the concern about falling into error generates distrust of science, which sets to work without such misgivings and actually cognizes, it is not apparent why, conversely, one should not distrust this distrust and be concerned that this fear of error is already the error itself. In fact it presupposes something, indeed a good deal, as truth, and bases its misgivings and consequences on what must itself first be examined to see whether it is true. It presupposes, namely, representations of cognition as an instrument and medium, and also a difference between ourselves and this cognition; above all, however, it presupposes that the absolute stands on one side, and cognition on the other, for itself and separated from the absolute, yet something real—or, in other words, that 1807 6 cognition, which, being outside the absolute, is surely also outside truth, is nevertheless truthful. Through this assumption, what calls itself fear of error reveals itself rather as fear of truth.
75 This consequence follows from the fact that the absolute alone is true, or the true alone absolute. It may be rejected by drawing the distinction that a cognition which does not cognize the absolute, as science intends, may nevertheless be true, and that cognition in general, though incapable of grasping the absolute, may nevertheless be capable of another truth. But we gradually see that such talk back and forth comes down to an obscure distinction between an absolute true and some other true, and that the absolute, cognition, and so forth are words presupposing a meaning which is precisely what must first be attained.
76 Instead of troubling ourselves with such useless representations and expressions concerning cognition as an instrument for getting hold of the absolute, or as a medium through which we behold truth, and so forth—relations to which all these representations of a cognition separated from the absolute and an absolute separated from cognition presumably amount—instead of the excuses that incapacity for science draws from 1807 7 the presupposition of such relations, in order at once to escape the labor of science and give itself the appearance of serious and zealous effort, and instead of struggling with answers to all this, we could simply reject them as contingent and arbitrary representations, and even regard the associated use of words such as the absolute, cognition, objective and subjective, and innumerable others whose meaning is presupposed as universally familiar, as a deception. For the pretense, partly that their meaning is universally familiar and partly that one possesses their concept oneself, seems intended rather to spare us the main thing: giving this concept. With more right, however, we could spare ourselves the trouble of taking any notice of such representations and expressions, by which science itself is to be warded off; for they constitute only an empty appearance of knowing that immediately vanishes before science as it comes on the scene. Yet in coming on the scene, science is itself an appearance; its appearance is not yet science elaborated and unfolded in its truth. It is immaterial here whether one imagines that science is the appearance because it comes on the scene alongside something else, or calls that other untrue knowing its appearance. But science must 1807 8 free itself from this semblance, and can do so only by turning against it. For science can neither simply reject knowing that is not truthful as an ordinary view of things, assuring us that it is an altogether different cognition and that this knowing is nothing to it, nor appeal to the intimation of something better within that knowing itself. By the former assurance, science would declare its being to be its power; but untrue knowing likewise appeals to the fact that it is, and assures us that science is nothing to it. One bare assurance, however, is worth just as much as another. Still less can science appeal to the better intimation present in untruthful cognition and supposedly pointing to science within that cognition itself; for, on the one hand, it would again be appealing to a being, and on the other, to itself as it exists in untruthful cognition—that is, to an inferior mode of its being, and to its appearance rather than to what it is in and for itself. For this reason, the presentation of appearing knowing is to be undertaken here.
77 Since this presentation has only appearing knowing as its object, it seems not itself to be free science moving in its distinctive shape; rather, from this standpoint it can be taken as the path of natural consciousness pressing toward true 1807 9 knowing, or as the path of the soul journeying through the succession of its configurations as stations prescribed by its nature, so that it may purify itself into spirit by attaining, through complete experience of itself, knowledge of what it is in itself.
78 Natural consciousness will prove to be only the concept of knowing, or not real knowing. But since it immediately regards itself as real knowing, this path has a negative meaning for it, and what is the realization of the concept counts for it rather as the loss of itself; for on this path it loses its truth. It can therefore be regarded as the path of doubt, or, more properly, the path of despair. For what occurs on it is not what is usually understood by doubting: a shaking of this or that supposed truth, followed by an appropriate disappearance of doubt and a return to that truth, so that in the end the matter is taken as before. Rather, it is conscious insight into the untruth of appearing knowing, for which what is most real is in truth only the unrealized concept. This self-accomplishing skepticism is therefore also not what serious zeal for truth and science imagines it has prepared 1807 10 and equipped itself with: namely, the resolution not to submit in science to others' thoughts on authority, but to examine everything oneself and follow only one's own conviction—or, better still, to produce everything oneself and regard only one's own deed as the true. Rather, the succession of its configurations through which consciousness passes on this path is the detailed history of the cultivation of consciousness itself into science. That resolution represents cultivation, in the simple manner of a resolution, as immediately accomplished and done; this path, in contrast to that untruth, is the actual carrying-out. Following one's own conviction is certainly more than submitting to authority; but changing belief based on authority into belief based on one's own conviction does not necessarily change its content and put truth in the place of error. To be stuck in the system of opinion and prejudice on the authority of others or from one's own conviction differs only through the vanity accompanying the latter manner. By contrast, skepticism directed at the entire scope of appearing consciousness first makes spirit capable of examining what truth is, by bringing about despair concerning so-called natural representations, thoughts, and opinions, 1807 11 which it is indifferent to call one's own or others', and with which consciousness that sets straightaway to examining is still filled and encumbered, and thus is in fact incapable of what it wishes to undertake.
79 The completeness of the forms of nonreal consciousness will result from the necessity of the progression and connection themselves. To make this comprehensible, we may observe in general beforehand that the presentation of untruthful consciousness in its untruth is not a merely negative movement. Natural consciousness generally takes this one-sided view of it; and a knowing that makes this one-sidedness its essence is one of the shapes of incomplete consciousness falling within the course of the path itself, where it will present itself. It is namely the skepticism that always sees in the result only pure nothing, and abstracts from the fact that this nothing is determinately the nothing of that from which it results. But only when taken as the nothing of that from which it comes is nothing in fact the true result; it is thereby itself something determinate and has a content. Skepticism that ends with the abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot advance beyond this, but must wait to see whether something new presents itself, and what, so as to cast it into the same empty abyss 1807 12. When, by contrast, the result is grasped as it is in truth, as determinate negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen, and in the negation the transition has been made through which the progress along the complete succession of shapes comes about of itself.
80 The goal, however, is set for knowing just as necessarily as the succession of its progression; it is where knowing no longer needs to go beyond itself, where it finds itself, and the concept corresponds to the object and the object to the concept. Progress toward this goal is therefore also unstoppable, and satisfaction cannot be found at any earlier station. What is confined to a natural life cannot of itself go beyond its immediate existence; but it is driven beyond it by another, and this being torn beyond itself is its death. Consciousness, however, is for itself its concept, and thereby immediately a going-beyond the limited and, since this limited belongs to it, beyond itself. With the singular, the beyond is at the same time posited for it, even if only, as in spatial intuition, beside the limited. Thus consciousness suffers at its own hands this violence of spoiling its limited satisfaction. Feeling this violence, anxiety before truth may well recoil and strive to preserve 1807 13 what threatens to be lost. But it can find no rest: if it wishes to remain in thoughtless inertia, thought stunts thoughtlessness and its unrest disturbs inertia; or if it entrenches itself as sentimentality, assuring us that it finds everything good in its own kind, this assurance likewise suffers violence from reason, which finds something not good precisely insofar as it is a kind. Or fear of truth may hide from itself and others behind the appearance that precisely its ardent zeal for truth makes it so difficult, indeed impossible, to find any truth other than the single truth of vanity: always to be cleverer than any thoughts one has from oneself or others. This vanity, which knows how to nullify every truth, return from it into itself, and feast upon its own understanding—which always knows how to dissolve all thoughts and find, instead of all content, only the barren I—is a satisfaction that must be left to itself; for it flees the universal and seeks only being-for-itself.
81 Just as these preliminary, general remarks have been made about the manner and necessity of the progression, it may also be useful to recall something about the method of carrying it out. Conceived as a relation of science to appearing knowing, and as an investigation 1807 14 and examination of the reality of cognition, this presentation seems unable to take place without some presupposition laid down as a standard. For examination consists in applying an assumed standard, and the decision whether what is examined is correct or incorrect lies in its resulting equality or inequality with that standard; the standard in general, and likewise science if science were the standard, is thereby assumed as essence, or as what is in itself. But here, where science is only coming on the scene, neither science itself nor anything else has justified itself as essence or as what is in itself; and without something of this kind no examination seems possible.
82 This contradiction and its removal will emerge more determinately if we first recall the abstract determinations of knowing and truth as they occur in consciousness. Consciousness, namely, distinguishes something from itself to which it at the same time relates itself; or, as this is expressed, something is for it. The determinate aspect of this relating, or of something's being for a consciousness, is knowing. But from this being for another we distinguish being-in-itself; what is related to knowing is likewise distinguished from it, and posited as being also outside this relation. The aspect of this in-itself is called truth. What these 1807 15 determinations really are does not concern us further here; for since appearing knowing is our object, its determinations too are initially taken up as they immediately present themselves, and they do indeed present themselves as they have been grasped.
83 Now if we investigate the truth of knowing, it seems that we investigate what it is in itself. Yet in this investigation it is our object, it is for us; and its in-itself that emerged would thus be rather its being for us. What we asserted as its essence would be not its truth, but only our knowledge of it. The essence or standard would fall within us, and what was compared with it and judged through this comparison would not necessarily have to acknowledge it.
84 But the nature of the object we investigate frees us from this separation, or this semblance of separation and presupposition. Consciousness supplies its standard within itself, and the investigation will thereby be a comparison of consciousness with itself; for the distinction just made falls within it. Within consciousness, one thing is for another, or consciousness has within it the determinateness of the moment of knowing in general; at the same time, this other is for consciousness not merely for it, but also outside this relation, or in itself: 1807 16 the moment of truth. Thus in what consciousness declares within itself to be the in-itself or the true, we have the standard that consciousness itself establishes for measuring its knowing. If we call knowing the concept, but essence or the true that which is, or the object, then the examination consists in seeing whether the concept corresponds to the object. But if we call the essence, or the in-itself of the object, the concept, and understand by the object, by contrast, the object as object, namely as it is for another, then the examination consists in seeing whether the object corresponds to its concept. It is clear that both are the same; what is essential, however, is to hold fast throughout the investigation to the fact that these two moments, concept and object, being for another and being in itself, fall within the very knowing we investigate. We therefore need not bring standards with us or apply our fancies and thoughts in the investigation; by leaving these aside we succeed in considering the matter as it is in and for itself.
85 But not only is an addition from us superfluous in this respect, that concept and object, the standard and what is to be examined, are present in consciousness itself; we are also spared the labor of comparing the two and of the actual examination, so that, as 1807 17 consciousness examines itself, all that remains for us from this side too is pure observation. For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself: consciousness of what is the true for it, and consciousness of its knowledge of this. Since both are for it, consciousness itself is their comparison; whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object or not comes to be for it. The object admittedly seems to be for consciousness only as consciousness knows it; consciousness seems unable, as it were, to get behind the object to discover how it is not for consciousness, but in itself, and hence unable to examine its knowing against the object. Yet precisely in knowing an object at all, the difference is already present: for consciousness, something is the in-itself, while another moment is knowing, or the object's being for consciousness. The examination rests on this distinction, which is present. If the two do not correspond in this comparison, consciousness seems obliged to alter its knowing to make it conform to the object; but in the alteration of knowing the object itself in fact alters for consciousness as well. For the existing knowing was essentially knowing of the object; with knowing, the object too becomes another, since it essentially belonged to this knowing. Thus consciousness comes to see that what 1807 18 was formerly the in-itself for it is not in itself, or was in itself only for consciousness. Accordingly, when consciousness finds in its object that its knowing does not correspond to it, the object itself also fails to stand firm; or the standard of examination changes when that of which it was to be the standard does not withstand the examination. The examination is thus not only an examination of knowing, but also of its standard.
86 This dialectical movement that consciousness exercises upon itself, upon both its knowing and its object, insofar as the new true object arises for consciousness from it, is properly what is called experience. In this connection, one moment in the course just mentioned must be brought out more closely, which will cast new light on the scientific aspect of the following presentation. Consciousness knows something; this object is essence, or the in-itself; but it is also the in-itself for consciousness, and with this the ambiguity of this true enters. We see that consciousness now has two objects: one, the first in-itself; the second, the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself. The latter initially seems to be merely the reflection of consciousness into itself, a representing not of an object, but only of its knowledge of that first object. Yet, as shown earlier, the first 1807 19 object changes for consciousness in this process; it ceases to be the in-itself and becomes for consciousness something that is the in-itself only for consciousness. But then this, the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself, is the true; that is, this is essence, or its object. This new object contains the nullity of the first; it is the experience undergone concerning it.
87 In this presentation of the course of experience there is a moment through which it seems not to agree with what is ordinarily understood by experience. The transition, namely, from the first object and the knowledge of it to the other object, in relation to which experience is said to have been undergone, was specified in such a way that knowledge of the first object, or the first in-itself's being for consciousness, is itself to become the second object. Ordinarily, by contrast, it seems that we experience the untruth of our first concept in relation to another object that we happen to find contingently and externally, so that in general only the pure apprehension of what is in and for itself falls within us. In the former view, however, the new object shows itself as having come to be through a reversal of consciousness itself. This consideration of the matter is our addition, through which the succession of consciousness's experiences is raised to a scientific course; it is not present for the consciousness we observe. But this 1807 20 is in fact also the same circumstance already discussed above regarding the relation of this presentation to skepticism: namely, that the result arising each time in an untruthful knowing must not collapse into an empty nothing, but must necessarily be grasped as the nothing of that of which it is the result—a result containing what is true in the preceding knowing. This presents itself here in the following way: as what first appeared as the object sinks for consciousness to a knowledge of it, and the in-itself becomes the being-for-consciousness of the in-itself, this is the new object, with which a new shape of consciousness also appears, for which something other than what was essence for the preceding shape is now essence. This circumstance guides the entire succession of the shapes of consciousness in their necessity. Only this necessity itself, or the arising of the new object that presents itself to consciousness without consciousness knowing what is happening to it, is what takes place for us, as it were, behind its back. A moment of being-in-itself, or being-for-us, thereby enters its movement, a moment that does not present itself for the consciousness engaged in the experience itself. But the content of what arises for us is for consciousness, and we comprehend only its formal aspect, or its pure arising; for consciousness, 1807 21 what has thus arisen is only as object, for us it is at the same time as movement and becoming.
88 Through this necessity, this path to science is itself already science, and is thereby, in its content, science of the experience of consciousness.
89 The experience consciousness undergoes concerning itself can, according to its concept, encompass nothing less than its entire system, or the whole realm of spirit's truth. The moments of this truth thus present themselves in this distinctive determinateness: not as abstract, pure moments, but as they are for consciousness, or as consciousness itself appears in its relation to them; through this, the moments of the whole are shapes of consciousness. As consciousness drives itself onward toward its true existence, it will reach a point at which it casts off its semblance of being encumbered with something alien that is only for it and as an other, or where appearance becomes equal to essence. Its presentation thereby coincides with precisely this point of the science of spirit proper; and finally, when consciousness itself grasps this essence of its own, it will designate the nature of absolute knowing itself.
Plain English translation
Mouseia's complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German, paragraph by paragraph, in shorter sentences and everyday words.
*Part One*. *Science of the Experience of Consciousness*.
73 It is natural to think that before philosophy tackles the subject itself—actually knowing what truly is—we must first come to an understanding about knowing. Knowing is regarded as the tool by which we take possession of the absolute, or the medium through which we see it. There seem to be good grounds for concern. There may be different kinds of knowledge, one better suited than another to reaching this final purpose, so we might choose wrongly. Also, knowing is a capacity of a specific kind and scope. Unless its nature and limits are defined more precisely, we might grasp clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth. This concern may even turn into the conviction that the whole undertaking of acquiring what is in itself for consciousness through knowing is contradictory in its very concept, and that a boundary falls between knowing and the absolute, separating them completely. For if knowing is the tool for taking possession of absolute essence, it is immediately clear that applying a tool to a thing does not leave it 1807 4 as it is for itself, but shapes and changes it. Or suppose knowing is not a tool of our activity but, in a sense, a passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us. Then too we receive truth not as it is in itself, but as it is through and in this medium. In both cases we use a means that immediately produces the opposite of its purpose. Or rather, the absurdity lies in our using a means at all. It may seem possible to remedy this difficulty by knowing how the tool works. This would let us subtract from the result the part contributed by the tool to our representation of the absolute, and so obtain truth pure. But this correction would in fact only bring us back to where we were before. If we remove from a shaped thing what the tool has done to it, the thing—here the absolute—is once again just as much for us as it was before this thus unnecessary effort. If the tool were only to bring the absolute closer to us without changing it, like a bird caught with a limed twig, then unless the absolute were already with us in and for itself, and wanted to be with us, it would surely mock this trick. For knowing would in 1807 5 that case be a trick: its many efforts give it the appearance of doing something quite different from merely producing the immediate and therefore effortless relation. Or suppose examining knowing, conceived as a medium, teaches us its law of refraction. Subtracting that refraction from the result is equally useless. For knowing is not the bending of the ray, but the ray itself through which truth touches us. Subtract that, and we would be shown only the pure direction, or the empty place.
74 Meanwhile, fear of falling into error breeds distrust of science, which goes to work and actually knows without such scruples. But why should we not instead distrust this distrust and worry that this fear of error is already the error itself? In fact, it presupposes something—indeed, quite a lot—as true, and bases its scruples and conclusions on what must itself first be tested for truth. It presupposes ideas of knowing as a tool and medium, and a difference between ourselves and this knowing. Above all, it presupposes that the absolute stands on one side, and knowing on the other, for itself and separate from the absolute, yet still something real. In other words, it presupposes that 1807 6 knowing, which in being outside the absolute is surely also outside truth, is nevertheless genuine. Through this assumption, what calls itself fear of error reveals itself instead as fear of truth.
75 This consequence follows because the absolute alone is true, or truth alone absolute. It can be rejected by making a distinction: knowing that does not know the absolute, as science intends to do, may nevertheless be true; knowing in general, though unable to grasp the absolute, may still be capable of other truth. But we gradually see that this talk back and forth amounts to a cloudy distinction between an absolute truth and some other truth. “The absolute,” “knowing,” and so on are words that presuppose a meaning we must first work to obtain.
76 Instead of troubling ourselves with these useless ideas and phrases about knowing as a tool for getting hold of the absolute, or as a medium through which we see truth, and so on—relations to which all these ideas of knowing separated from the absolute, and an absolute separated from knowing, probably amount—we could simply reject them as accidental and arbitrary ideas. We could do the same with the excuses that inability to do science draws from the 1807 7 presupposition of these relations, both to escape the labor of science and to gain the appearance of serious and eager effort; and we could spare ourselves the trouble of answering all this. We might even regard the associated use of words such as “the absolute,” “knowing,” “the objective,” “the subjective,” and countless others whose meaning is assumed to be generally familiar, as deception. For claiming both that their meaning is generally familiar and that one possesses their concept seems intended only to spare the main task: giving this concept. With more right, however, we could spare ourselves the trouble of taking any notice at all of ideas and phrases meant to ward off science itself. They form only an empty appearance of knowing that immediately vanishes before science as it comes on the scene. But in coming on the scene, science is itself an appearance. Its appearance is not yet science worked out and spread out in its truth. It makes no difference here whether we imagine that science is the appearance because it appears alongside something else, or call that other, untrue knowing science's appearing. Science must 1807 8 free itself from this seeming, and it can do so only by turning against it. It cannot merely reject knowing that is not genuine as an ordinary view of things and assure us that it is an entirely different kind of knowledge and that the other knowing counts for nothing with it. Nor can it appeal to an intimation of something better within that other knowing itself. With the first assurance, science would declare its being to be its power. But untrue knowing likewise appeals to the fact that it is and assures us that science counts for nothing with it. One dry assurance is worth exactly as much as another. Still less can science appeal to the better intimation present in nongenuine knowing as a pointer to science within it. First, science would again be appealing to a being. Second, it would appeal to itself as it is in nongenuine knowing—that is, to an inferior mode of its being, to its appearance rather than to what it is in and for itself. For this reason, a presentation of knowing as it appears is to be undertaken here.
77 Since this presentation has only appearing knowing as its object, it seems not to be free science moving in its own distinctive shape. From this standpoint it can instead be taken as the road of natural consciousness pressing toward true 1807 9 knowing; or as the road of the soul, traveling through the series of its shapes as stations set out for it by its nature. Through the complete experience of itself, the soul reaches knowledge of what it is in itself and so purifies itself into spirit.
78 Natural consciousness will show itself to be only the concept of knowing, or knowing that is not real. But since it immediately takes itself instead to be real knowing, this road has a negative meaning for it. What is the realization of the concept counts for it instead as the loss of itself, since on this road it loses its truth. The road can therefore be regarded as the road of doubt, or more properly as the road of despair. For what happens on it is not what is usually understood by doubting: shaking this or that supposed truth, then duly letting the doubt disappear and returning to that truth, so that in the end things are taken just as before. Instead, it is conscious insight into the untruth of appearing knowing. What that knowing regards as most real is in truth only the unrealized concept. This skepticism accomplishing itself is therefore not what serious zeal for truth and science imagines has prepared 1807 10 and equipped it for them: the resolution not to submit in science to others' thoughts on authority, but to test everything oneself and follow only one's own conviction—or, better still, to produce everything oneself and regard only one's own deed as true. Rather, the series of forms consciousness passes through on this road is the detailed history of consciousness's own cultivation into science. That resolution pictures cultivation, in the simple form of a resolution, as immediately settled and accomplished. Against this untruth, this road is the actual carrying-out. Following one's own conviction is certainly more than submitting to authority. But changing from holding an opinion on authority to holding it from one's own conviction does not necessarily change its content or replace error with truth. Being caught in a system of opinion and prejudice on others' authority or from one's own conviction differs only through the vanity that accompanies the latter way. By contrast, skepticism directed at the entire scope of appearing consciousness first makes spirit capable of testing what is true. It brings about despair concerning so-called natural representations, thoughts, and opinions. 1807 11 Whether we call these one's own or someone else's makes no difference. Consciousness that sets straight to testing is still filled and burdened with them, and is therefore in fact incapable of what it wants to undertake.
79 The completeness of the forms of nonreal consciousness will emerge from the necessity of their advance and connection itself. To make this understandable, we can note in general beforehand that presenting nongenuine consciousness in its untruth is not a merely negative movement. Natural consciousness generally has this one-sided view of it. Knowing that makes this one-sidedness its essence is one of the forms of incomplete consciousness that falls within the course of the road itself and will appear there. It is the skepticism that always sees only pure nothing in the result and abstracts from the fact that this nothing is specifically the nothing of what it results from. But only when taken as the nothing of what it comes from is nothing in fact the genuine result. It is thereby itself determinate and has a content. Skepticism that ends with the abstraction of nothing, or emptiness, cannot go further from there. It must wait to see whether, and what, new thing may present itself, in order to throw it into the same empty abyss. 1807 12 By contrast, when the result is grasped as it truly is, as determinate negation, a new form has immediately arisen with it. In the negation, the transition is made through which the advance through the complete series of forms happens of itself.
80 But the goal is set for knowing just as necessarily as the series of its advance. It is where knowing no longer needs to go beyond itself, where it finds itself and the concept corresponds to the object, the object to the concept. Advance toward this goal is therefore unstoppable too, and satisfaction can be found at no earlier station. What is confined to a natural life cannot go beyond its immediate existence by itself. It is driven beyond it by another, and this being torn beyond itself is its death. But consciousness is for itself its concept. It is therefore immediately a going-beyond the limited and, because this limited belongs to it, a going-beyond itself. Together with the individual thing, a beyond is posited for consciousness, even if only beside the limited, as in spatial intuition. Thus consciousness suffers from itself this violence of spoiling its limited satisfaction. Feeling this violence, anxiety about truth may well retreat and strive to preserve 1807 13 what it is threatened with losing. But it can find no rest. If it wants to remain in thoughtless inertia, thought stunts its thoughtlessness and its restlessness disturbs the inertia. Or if it entrenches itself as sentimentality, assuring us that everything is good of its kind, this assurance likewise suffers violence from reason, which finds something not good precisely insofar as it is a kind. Or fear of truth may hide from itself and others behind the appearance that its burning zeal for truth itself makes it so hard, even impossible, to find any truth except the single truth of vanity: always being cleverer than any thoughts one has from oneself or others. This vanity knows how to nullify every truth, return from it into itself, and feast on its own understanding, which always knows how to dissolve all thoughts and find only the dry I instead of any content. It is a satisfaction that must be left to itself, for it flees the universal and seeks only being-for-itself.
81 These are preliminary, general remarks about the way the advance happens and its necessity. It may also be useful to say something about the method of carrying it out. If this presentation is conceived as a relation of science to appearing knowing, and as an investigation 1807 14 and test of the reality of knowing, it seems impossible without some presupposition laid down as a standard. For testing consists in applying an accepted standard. The resulting equality or inequality between what is tested and the standard decides whether it is correct or incorrect. The standard in general—and science too, if science were the standard—is thereby assumed as essence, or as what is in itself. But here, where science is only coming on the scene, neither science itself nor anything else has justified itself as essence or as what is in itself. Without something of this kind, no testing seems possible.
82 This contradiction and its removal will emerge more precisely if we first recall the abstract determinations of knowing and truth as they occur in consciousness. Consciousness distinguishes something from itself while at the same time relating to it. Or, as this is expressed, something is for consciousness. The determinate side of this relating, or of something's being for a consciousness, is knowing. But from this being for another we distinguish being-in-itself. What is related to knowing is also distinguished from knowing and posited as being outside this relation as well. This side of the in-itself is called truth. What these 1807 15 determinations really involve need not concern us further here. Since appearing knowing is our object, its determinations too are initially taken up as they immediately present themselves. And they do present themselves in the way we have grasped them.
83 Now, if we investigate the truth of knowing, it seems we investigate what it is in itself. But in this investigation knowing is our object: it is for us. So the in-itself that emerged would instead be its being for us. What we claimed as its essence would be not its truth but only our knowledge of it. The essence, or standard, would fall within us. What was to be compared with it, and judged through that comparison, would not necessarily have to recognize that standard.
84 But the nature of the object we investigate frees us from this separation, or this appearance of separation and presupposition. Consciousness supplies its standard within itself. The investigation will therefore be a comparison of consciousness with itself, since the distinction just made falls within consciousness. In it, one thing is for another: it has within it the determination of the moment of knowing in general. At the same time, this other is for consciousness not only for it, but also outside this relation, or in itself: 1807 16 the moment of truth. Thus, in what consciousness declares within itself to be the in-itself, or the true, we have the standard consciousness itself sets up to measure its knowing. If we call knowing the concept, and essence or truth what is, or the object, then testing consists in seeing whether the concept corresponds to the object. But if we call the object's essence, or its in-itself, the concept, and understand by the object the object as object, namely as it is for another, then testing consists in seeing whether the object corresponds to its concept. Clearly, both are the same. What matters is to hold firmly throughout the investigation that these two moments—concept and object, being for another and being in itself—fall within the knowing we are investigating. We therefore do not need to bring standards with us or apply our notions and thoughts in the investigation. By leaving these out, we manage to consider the subject as it is in and for itself.
85 An addition from us is unnecessary not only because concept and object, the standard and what is to be tested, are present in consciousness itself. We are also spared the trouble of comparing the two and performing the actual test. Since 1807 17 consciousness tests itself, all that remains for us on this side too is simply to watch. For consciousness is, on one side, consciousness of the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself: consciousness of what is true for it, and consciousness of its knowledge of that truth. Since both are for it, consciousness is itself their comparison. Whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object or not becomes something for it. Admittedly, the object seems to be for consciousness only as consciousness knows it. Consciousness seems unable to get behind this, as it were, to see how the object is not for it, but in itself, and thus unable to test its knowing against the object. But precisely in consciousness's knowing an object at all, the distinction is already present: something is for it the in-itself, while another moment is knowing, or the object's being for consciousness. Testing rests on this distinction, which is present. If the two do not correspond in this comparison, consciousness seems to have to change its knowing to make it fit the object. But as its knowing changes, the object itself in fact changes for consciousness too. For the existing knowing was essentially knowledge of the object. Along with knowing, the object also becomes another, because it essentially belonged to this knowing. Consciousness thus comes to see that what 1807 18 was previously the in-itself for it is not in itself, or was in itself only for consciousness. So when consciousness finds at its object that its knowing does not correspond to it, the object itself does not stand up either. Or, the standard of testing changes when what it was supposed to measure fails the test. The testing is therefore not only a testing of knowing, but also of its standard.
86 This dialectical movement that consciousness carries out on itself, both on its knowing and on its object, insofar as the new true object arises for it from that movement, is properly what is called experience. In the course just mentioned, one moment needs to be brought out more closely. This will shed new light on the scientific side of the following presentation. Consciousness knows something. This object is essence, or the in-itself. But it is also the in-itself for consciousness. This introduces an ambiguity into this truth. We see that consciousness now has two objects: the first in-itself, and, second, the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself. The latter at first seems to be only consciousness's reflection into itself, a representation not of an object but only of its knowledge of that first object. But as shown earlier, in this process the first 1807 19 object changes for consciousness. It ceases to be the in-itself and becomes an object that is the in-itself only for consciousness. But then this—the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself—is the true; that is, it is essence, or consciousness's object. This new object contains the first object's nullity. It is the experience made of that first object.
87 This account of the course of experience contains a moment that seems not to agree with what is usually understood by experience. The transition from the first object and knowledge of it to the other object, with which, people say, experience has been gained, was described as follows: knowledge of the first object, or the first in-itself's being for consciousness, is to become the second object itself. Usually, by contrast, it seems that we experience the untruth of our first concept with another object that we happen to find externally. Only the pure apprehension of what is in and for itself would then fall within us. In the view given here, however, the new object shows itself as having become through a reversal of consciousness itself. This way of considering the matter is our addition. Through it, the series of consciousness's experiences is raised to a scientific course. It is not present for the consciousness we are considering. But 1807 20 this is in fact the same circumstance mentioned above in discussing this presentation's relation to skepticism: each result yielded by nongenuine knowing must not collapse into an empty nothing. It must necessarily be grasped as the nothing of that of which it is the result: a result containing what was true in the preceding knowing. Here this appears as follows. What first appeared as the object sinks for consciousness to a knowledge of it, and the in-itself becomes the being-for-consciousness of the in-itself. This is the new object, with which a new form of consciousness also appears. For this new form, something different is essence from what was essence for the preceding form. This circumstance guides the entire succession of consciousness's forms in their necessity. Only this necessity itself, or the arising of the new object that presents itself to consciousness without its knowing how this happens, is what takes place for us, as it were, behind its back. A moment of being-in-itself, or being-for-us, thereby enters its movement. This moment does not present itself to the consciousness caught up in the experience. But the content of what arises for us is for consciousness. We comprehend only its formal aspect, or its pure arising. For consciousness, 1807 21 what has arisen is only an object; for us, it is at the same time movement and becoming.
88 Through this necessity, this road to science is itself already science, and in its content is therefore the science of the experience of consciousness.
89 By its concept, the experience consciousness undergoes concerning itself can include nothing less than its entire system, or the whole realm of spirit's truth. The moments of this truth present themselves with this distinctive determination: they are not abstract, pure moments, but are as they are for consciousness, or as consciousness itself appears in its relation to them. Through this, the moments of the whole are forms of consciousness. As consciousness drives itself forward to its true existence, it will reach a point where it casts off the appearance of being burdened with something alien that is only for it and is an other. Here appearance becomes equal to essence. Its presentation thus coincides at this very point with the genuine science of spirit. Finally, as consciousness itself grasps this essence of its own, it will indicate the nature of absolute knowing itself.
About this section
Introduction is part of The Phenomenology of Spirit by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 2 of 10 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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