Niccolò Machiavelli · Complete work
Chapter III
Chapter III of 27. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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De’ principati misti.
Ma nel Principato nuovo consistono le difficultà. E prima se non è tutto nuovo, ma come membro, che si può chiamare tutto insieme quasi misto, le variazioni sue nascono in prima da una natural difficultà, quale è in tutti i Principati nuovi; perchè gli uomini mutano volentieri Signore, credendo migliorare; e questa credenza gli fa pigliar l’arme contro a chi regge; di che s’ingannano, perchè veggono poi per esperienza aver peggiorato. Il che dipende da un’altra necessità naturale ed ordinaria, quale fa che sempre bisogni offendere quelli, di chi si diventa nuovo Principe; e con gente d’arme, e con infinite altre ingiurie che si tira dietro il nuovo acquisto. Dimodochè ti trovi avere inimici tutti quelli che tu hai offesi in occupare quel Principato; e non ti puoi mantenere amici quelli, che vi ti hanno messo, per non gli potere satisfare in quel modo che si erano presupposto, e per non potere tu usare contra di loro medicine forti, essendo loro obbligato; perchè sempre, ancorchè uno sia fortissimo in su gli eserciti, ha bisogno del favore de’ provinciali ad entrare in una provincia. Per queste ragioni Luigi XII Re di Francia occupò subito Milano, e subito lo perdè, e bastarono a toglierlo la prima volta le forze proprie di Lodovico; perchè quelli popoli, che gli avevano aperte le porte, trovandosi ingannati della opinione loro, e di quel futuro bene che si aveano presupposto, non potevano sopportare fastidi del nuovo Principe. È ben vero che acquistandosi poi la seconda volta i paesi ribellati, si perdono con più difficultà; perchè il Signore, presa occasione dalla rebellione, è meno rispettivo ad assicurarsi, con punire i delinquenti, chiarire i sospetti, provvedersi nelle parti più deboli. In modo che se a far perdere Milano a Francia bastò la prima volta un Duca Lodovico, che romoreggiasse in su’ confini, a farlo dipoi perdere la seconda, gli bisognò avere contro il mondo tutto, e che gli eserciti suoi fossero spenti, e cacciati d’Italia; il che nacque dalle cagioni sopraddette. Nondimeno e la prima e la seconda volta gli fu tolto. Le cagioni universali della prima si sono discorse; resta ora a vedere quelle della seconda, e dire che remedii egli aveva, e quali può avere uno che fusse ne’ termini suoi, per potersi meglio mantenere nello acquistato, che non fece il Re di Francia. Dico pertanto, che questi Stati, i quali acquistandosi si aggiungono a uno Stato antico di quello che gli acquista, o sono della medesima provincia e della medesima lingua, o non sono. Quando siano, è facilità grande a tenergli, massimamente quando non siano usi a vivere liberi; e, a possedergli sicuramente, basta avere spenta la linea del Principe, che li dominava; perchè nelle altre cose, mantenendosi loro le condizioni vecchie, e non vi essendo disformità di costumi, gli uomini si vivono quietamente, come si è visto, che ha fatto la Borgogna, la Bertagna, la Guascogna, e la Normandia, che tanto tempo sono state con Francia; e benchè vi sia qualche disformità di lingua, nondimeno i costumi sono simili, e possonsi tra loro facilmente comportare: e a chi le acquista, volendole tenere, bisogna avere due rispetti; l’uno che il sangue del loro Principe antico si spenga; l’altro di non alterare nè loro leggi nè loro dazi; talmentechè in brevissimo tempo diventa con il loro Principato antico tutto un corpo. Ma quando si acquistano Stati in una provincia disforme di lingua, di costumi, e di ordini, qui sono le difficultà, e qui bisogna avere gran fortuna, e grande industria a tenergli; ed uno de’ maggiori rimedii e più vivi sarebbe, che la persona di chi gli acquista vi andasse ad abitare.
Questo farebbe più sicura e più durabile quella possessione, come ha fatto il Turco di Grecia, il quale con tutti gli altri ordini osservati da lui per tenere quello Stato, se non vi fusse ito ad abitare, non era possibile, che lo tenesse. Perchè standovi, si veggono nascere i disordini, e presto vi si può rimediare; non vi stando, s’intendono quando sono grandi, e non vi è più rimedio. Non è oltre a questo la provincia spogliata da’ tuoi ufiziali; satisfannosi i sudditi del ricorso propinquo al Principe, donde hanno più cagione di amarlo, volendo essere buoni, e volendo essere altrimente, di temerlo. Chi degli esterni volesse assaltare quello Stato, vi ha più rispetto; tantochè abitandovi lo può con grandissima difficultà perdere. L’altro migliore rimedio è mandare colonie in uno o in due luoghi, che siano quasi le chiavi di quello Stato; perchè è necessario o far questo, o tenervi assai gente d’arme e fanterie. Nelle colonie non ispende molto il Principe, e senza sua spesa, o poca, ve le manda e tiene, e solamente offende coloro, a chi toglie i campi e le case per darle a’ nuovi abitatori, che sono una minima parte di quello Stato; e quelli che egli offende, rimanendo dispersi e poveri, non gli possono mai nuocere, e tutti gli altri rimangono da una parte non offesi, e per questo si quietano facilmente; dall’altra paurosi di non errare, perchè non intervenisse loro come a quelli che sono stati spogliati. Conchiudo, che queste colonie non costano, sono più fedeli, offendono meno, e gli offesi, essendo poveri e dispersi, non possono nuocere, come ho detto. Perchè si ha a notare, che gli uomini si debbono o vezzeggiare o spegnere, perchè si vendicano delle leggieri offese; delle gravi non possono: sicchè l’offesa che si fa all’uomo, deve essere in modo, che ella non tema la vendetta. Ma tenendovi, in cambio di colonie, gente d’arme, si spende più assai, avendo a consumare nella guardia tutte l’entrate di quello Stato: in modo che l’acquistato gli torna in perdita, ed offende molto più; perchè nuoce a tutto quello Stato, tramutando con gli alloggiamenti il suo esercito; del quale disagio ognuno ne sente, e ciascuno li diventa nimico, e sono inimici, che gli possono nuocere, rimanendo battuti in casa loro. Da ogni parte dunque questa guardia è inutile, come quella delle colonie è utile. Debbe ancora chi è in una provincia disforme, come è detto, farsi capo e difensore de’ vicini minori potenti, ed ingegnarsi d’indebolire i più potenti di quella, e guardare che, per accidente alcuno, non vi entri uno forestiere non meno potente di lui: e sempre interverrà che vi sarà messo da coloro che saranno in quella malcontenti o per troppa ambizione o per paura; come si vide già che gli Etoli misero li Romani in Grecia; ed in ogni altra provincia che loro entrarono, vi furono messi dai provinciali. E l’ordine della cosa è, che subito che un forestiere potente entra in una provincia, tutti quelli che sono in essa meno potenti, gli aderiscono, mossi da una invidia che hanno contro a chi è stato potente sopra di loro; tantochè rispetto a questi minori potenti, egli non ha a durare fatica alcuna a guadagnarli, perché subito tutti insieme volentieri fanno massa con lo Stato, che egli vi ha acquistato. Ha solamente a pensare, che non piglino troppe forze, e troppa autorità; e facilmente può con le forze sue, e con il favor loro abbassare quelli che sono potenti, per rimanere in tutto arbitro di quella provincia. E chi non governerà bene questa parte, perderà presto quello che arà acquistato; e mentre che lo terrà, vi arà dentro infinite difficultà e fastidi.
I Romani nelle provincie che pigliarono, osservarono bene queste parti, e mandarono le colonie, intrattenerono i men potenti senza crescere loro potenza, abbassarono li potenti, e non vi lasciarono prendere riputazione a’ potenti forestieri. E voglio mi basti solo la provincia di Grecia per esempio. Furono intrattenuti da loro gli Achei, e gli Etoli, fu abbassato il Regno de’ Macedoni, funne cacciato Antioco; nè mai gli meriti degli Achei o delli Etoli fecero che permettessero loro accrescere alcuno Stato, nè le persuasioni di Filippo gli indussero mai ad essergli amici senza sbassarlo, nè la potenza di Antioco potè fare gli consentissero che tenesse in quella provincia alcuno Stato. Perchè i Romani fecero in questi casi quello che tutti i Principi savi debbono fare, li quali non solamente hanno ad aver riguardo alli scandoli presenti, ma alli futuri, ed a quelli con ogni industria riparare; perchè prevedendosi discosto, facilmente vi si può rimediare, ma aspettando, che ti s’appressino, la medicina non è più a tempo, perchè la malattia è diventata incurabile; ed interviene di questa come dicono i medici dell’etica, che nel principio è facile a curare, e difficile a cognoscere, ma nel corso del tempo, non l’avendo nel principio cognosciuta nè medicata, diventa facile a cognoscere e difficile a curare. Così interviene nelle cose dello Stato, perchè cognoscendo discosto, il che non è dato se non ad un prudente, i mali che nascono in quello, si guariscono presto; ma quando, per non gli aver cognosciuti, si lasciano crescere in modo che ognuno li cognosce, non vi è più rimedio. Però i Romani vedendo discosto gl’inconvenienti, li rimediarono sempre, e non li lasciarono mai seguire per fuggire una guerra, perchè sapevano, che la guerra non si leva, ma si differisce con vantaggio d’altri; però volsero fare con Filippo ed Antioco guerra in Grecia, per non l’avere a fare con loro in Italia; e potevano per allora fuggire e l’una e l’altra; il che non volsero, nè piacque mai loro quello che tutto dì è in bocca de’ savi de’ nostri tempi, Godere li beneficii del tempo; ma bene quello della virtù e prudenza loro; perchè il tempo si caccia innanzi ogni cosa, e può condurre seco bene come male, male come bene.
Ma torniamo a Francia, ed esaminiamo se delle cose dette ne ha fatto alcuna; e parlerò di Luigi e non di Carlo, come di colui, del quale, per aver tenuto più lunga possessione in Italia, si sono meglio visti li suoi andamenti; e vedrete, come egli ha fatto il contrario di quelle cose, che si debbono fare per tenere uno Stato disforme. Il Re Luigi fu messo in Italia dall’ambizione de’ Viniziani, che volsero guadagnarsi mezzo lo Stato di Lombardia per quella venuta. Io non voglio biasimare quella venuta o partito preso dal Re; perchè, volendo cominciare a mettere un piede in Italia, e non avendo in questa provincia amici, anzi essendoli, per li portamenti del Re Carlo, serrate tutte le porte, fu forzato prendere quelle amicizie che poteva; e sarebbeli riuscito il pensiero bene preso, quando negli altri maneggi non avesse fatto errore alcuno. Acquistata adunque il Re la Lombardia, si riguadagnò subito quella riputazione che gli aveva tolta Carlo; Genova cedette, i Fiorentini gli diventarono amici, Marchese di Mantova, Duca di Ferrara, Bentivogli, Madonna di Furlì, Signore di Faenza, di Pesaro, di Rimino, di Camerino, di Piombino, Lucchesi, Pisani, Sanesi, ognuno se li fece incontro per essere suo amico. Ed allora poterono considerare li Viniziani la temerità del partito preso da loro, i quali, per acquistare due terre in Lombardia, fecero Signore il Re di duoi terzi d’Italia. Consideri ora uno con quanta poca difficultà poteva il Re tenere in Italia la sua riputazione, se egli avessi osservate le regole sopraddette, e tenuti sicuri, e difesi tutti quelli amici suoi, li quali, per essere gran numero, e deboli, e paurosi chi della Chiesa, chi de’ Viniziani, erano sempre necessitati a star seco, e per il mezzo loro poteva facilmente assicurarsi di chi ci restava grande. Ma egli non prima fu in Milano, che fece il contrario, dando aiuto a Papa Alessandro, perché egli occupasse la Romagna. Nè si accorse con questa deliberazione che faceva sè debole, togliendosi li amici, e quelli che se li erano gittati in grembo, e la Chiesa grande, aggiugnendo allo spirituale, che gli dà tanta autorità, tanto temporale. E fatto un primo errore, fu costretto a seguitare; intantochè, per porre fine all’ambizione di Alessandro, e perché non divenisse Signore di Toscana, gli fu forza venire in Italia. E non gli bastò aver fatto grande la Chiesa, e toltisi gli amici, che per volere il regno di Napoli, lo divise con il Re di Spagna; e dove egli era prima arbitro d’Italia, vi messe un compagno, acciochè gli ambiziosi di quella provincia e malcontenti di lui avessero dove ricorrere; e dove poteva lasciare in quel Regno un Re suo pensionario, egli ne lo trasse per mettervi uno che potesse cacciarne lui. È cosa veramente molto naturale e ordinaria desiderare di acquistare, e sempre, quando gli uomini lo fanno che possino, ne saranno laudati e non biasimati; ma quando non possono e vogliono farlo in ogni modo, qui è il biasimo e l’errore. Se Francia adunque con le sue forze poteva assaltare Napoli, doveva farlo; se non poteva, non doveva dividerlo. E se la divisione che fece con i Viniziani di Lombardia, meritò scusa per avere con quella messo il piè in Italia, questa meritò biasimo per non essere scusato da quella necessità.
Aveva adunque Luigi fatto questi cinque errori: spenti i minori potenti; accresciuto in Italia potenza a un potente; messo in quella un forestiere potentissimo; non venuto ad abitarvi; non vi messo colonie. Li quali errori, vivendo lui, potevano ancora non lo offendere, se non avesse fatto il sesto, di torre lo Stato a’ Viniziani; perchè quando non avesse fatto grande la Chiesa, nè messo in Italia, Spagna, era ben ragionevole e necessario abbassarli; ma, avendo preso quelli primi partiti, non doveva mai consentire alla rovina loro; perchè essendo quelli potenti, arebbono sempre tenuti gli altri discosto dalla impresa di Lombardia, sì perchè i Viniziani non vi arebbero consentito, senza diventarne Signori loro; sì perchè gli altri non arebbero voluto torla a Francia per darla a loro; e andarli ad urtare ambidui non arebbero avuto animo. E se alcun dicesse, il Re Luigi cedè ad Alessandro la Romagna, ed a Spagna il Regno per fuggire una guerra; rispondo con le ragioni dette di sopra, che non si debba mai lasciar seguire uno disordine per fuggire una guerra; perchè ella non si fugge, ma si differisce a tuo disavvantaggio. E se alcuni altri allegassero la fede, che il Re aveva data al Papa, di far per lui quella impresa per la risoluzione del suo matrimonio, e per il Cappello di Roano, rispondo con quello che per me di sotto si dirà circa la fede dei Principi, e come ella si debba osservare.
Ha perduto dunque il Re Luigi la Lombardia per non avere osservato alcuno di quelli termini osservati da altri, che hanno preso provincie, e volutele tenere. Nè è miracolo alcuno questo, ma molto ragionevole ed ordinario. E di questa materia parlai a Nantes con Roano, quando il Valentino (che così volgarmente era chiamato Cesare Borgia figliuolo di Papa Alessandro) occupava la Romagna; perchè dicendomi il Cardinale Roano, che gl’Italiani non s’intendevano della guerra, io risposi, che i Francesi non s’intendevano dello Stato, perchè, intendendosene, non lascerebbono venire la Chiesa in tanta grandezza. E per esperienza si è visto, che la grandezza in Italia di quella, e di Spagna, è stata causata da Francia, e la rovina sua è proceduta da loro. Di che si cava una regola generale, quale non mai, o raro falla, che chi è cagione che uno diventi potente, rovina; perchè quella potenza è causata da colui o con industria, o con forza, e l’una e l’altra di queste due è sospetta a chi è divenuto potente.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication for fidelity, Machiavelli’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
Of Mixed Principalities
But the difficulties lie in the new principality. To begin with, if it is not entirely new, but is added as a member to another, making what might be called a mixed principality, its changes arise first from a natural difficulty common to all new principalities: men willingly change rulers in the belief that they will better themselves, and this belief leads them to take up arms against the ruler they have. They are mistaken, as they later discover by experience that they have made their condition worse. This follows from another natural and ordinary necessity: a new Prince must always injure those whose Prince he becomes, both through his armed men and through the countless other injuries that a new conquest brings in its train. Thus you find yourself with enemies in all those you have injured while taking the principality; and you cannot keep as friends those who brought you into it, because you cannot satisfy them in the way they expected, and because, being indebted to them, you cannot use harsh remedies against them. For even the strongest man, however strong his armies, needs the support of the people of a province to enter it. For these reasons Louis XII, King of France, took Milan at once and lost it at once; the first time, Ludovico's own forces were enough to take it from him. The people who had opened the gates to Louis found themselves deceived in their hopes and in the good to come that they had imagined, and could not bear the vexations imposed by a new Prince. It is true that when rebellious territories are conquered a second time, they are lost with greater difficulty; for the ruler, taking occasion from the rebellion, is less restrained in securing his position by punishing the offenders, exposing those he suspects, and strengthening the weaker points. So although the first time a Duke Ludovico stirring unrest on the borders was enough to make France lose Milan, to make it lose Milan a second time required the whole world against it, its armies destroyed and driven out of Italy; and this arose from the causes already given. Nevertheless, Milan was taken from France both times. The general causes of the first loss have been discussed; it remains to consider those of the second, and to say what remedies Louis had, and what remedies someone in his position might have, to hold his conquest better than the King of France did. I say, then, that states acquired and added to a ruler's long-established state are either in the same region and speak the same language, or they are not. When they are, it is very easy to hold them, especially if they are not accustomed to living free. To possess them securely, it is enough to extinguish the line of the Prince who ruled them: if their old conditions are otherwise preserved, and there is no difference in customs, men live peaceably together. So it has been with Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been joined to France for so long. Though there is some difference in language, their customs are similar, and they can readily live together. Whoever conquers such lands and wishes to keep them must take care of two things: first, to extinguish the bloodline of their former Prince; second, to change neither their laws nor their taxes. In this way, within a very short time, they and his former principality become a single body. But when states are acquired in a region unlike one's own in language, customs, and institutions, here lie the difficulties; here great fortune and great skill are needed to hold them. One of the strongest and most effective remedies would be for the conqueror to go and live there himself.
This would make possession more secure and more lasting, as the Turk has done in Greece: despite all the other measures he took to hold that state, he could not possibly have held it if he had not gone to live there. When you are present, you see disorders as they arise and can quickly remedy them; when you are absent, you hear of them only when they have grown great and there is no remedy left. Moreover, the province is not plundered by your officials; subjects are satisfied to have their Prince close at hand to hear their appeals, and have more reason to love him if they wish to be good, and to fear him if they wish to behave otherwise. A foreigner wishing to attack that state will think twice about it; so a Prince who lives there can lose it only with very great difficulty. The other best remedy is to send colonies to one or two places that serve as the keys to the state; for you must either do this or maintain a large force of cavalry and infantry there. Colonies cost the Prince little: at no expense to himself, or very little, he sends and maintains them. He injures only those whose fields and houses he takes to give to the new settlers, and these are a very small part of the state. Those he injures, left scattered and poor, can never harm him; everyone else, being unharmed, readily remains quiet, yet is afraid to do wrong lest the same thing happen to them as to those who were dispossessed. I conclude that colonies cost little, are more loyal, cause less injury, and that the injured, being poor and scattered, cannot do harm, as I have said. For it must be noted that men should either be treated kindly or destroyed: they avenge slight injuries but cannot avenge grave ones. Thus the injury done to a man must be such that there is no fear of his revenge. If, instead of colonies, you keep armed men there, the expense is far greater, since all the revenues of that state must be spent on its defense. Thus the conquest becomes a loss, and it causes far greater injury, since the whole state suffers as the army moves from one set of quarters to another. Everyone feels this burden and becomes an enemy; and these are enemies who can harm you, for they remain, though beaten, in their own homes. In every respect, then, such a garrison is as useless as colonies are useful. Further, one who is in a region unlike his own, as I have said, must make himself the leader and protector of its less powerful neighbors; he must contrive to weaken its more powerful ones and take care that no foreigner as powerful as himself enters it through any turn of events. Such a foreigner will always be brought in by those who are discontented there, whether out of excessive ambition or fear. So the Aetolians once brought the Romans into Greece; and wherever else the Romans entered, they were brought in by the people of the region. What happens is this: as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a region, all its weaker powers attach themselves to him, driven by their envy of the one who has been powerful over them. He need take no trouble at all to win over these lesser powers, for they all willingly and immediately join forces with the state he has acquired there. He need only see that they gain neither too much strength nor too much authority. Then, with his own forces and their support, he can easily bring down those who are powerful and remain the sole arbiter of the whole region. Whoever fails to manage this matter well will soon lose what he has won; and for as long as he holds it, he will face endless difficulties and vexations.
The Romans observed these rules well in the provinces they conquered. They sent colonies; cultivated the lesser powers without increasing their power; brought down the greater ones; and allowed no powerful foreigners to gain standing there. Let the province of Greece alone suffice as an example. The Romans cultivated the Achaeans and the Aetolians, humbled the kingdom of the Macedonians, and drove out Antiochus. Yet the services of the Achaeans or Aetolians never led them to allow either people to enlarge its dominion; Philip's persuasions never induced them to befriend him without first humbling him; nor could the power of Antiochus make them consent to his holding any dominion in that region. For in these cases the Romans did what all wise Princes ought to do: they considered not only present troubles but those to come, and took every care to forestall them. When troubles are foreseen from afar they can easily be remedied, but if you wait until they draw near, the medicine comes too late, for the disease has become incurable. It is as physicians say of consumption: at the beginning it is easy to cure and difficult to recognize, but as time passes, if it was neither recognized nor treated at the beginning, it becomes easy to recognize and difficult to cure. So it is with affairs of state. When the evils arising in a state are recognized from afar—a gift granted only to a prudent man—they are soon cured; but when, because they have gone unrecognized, they are allowed to grow until everyone recognizes them, there is no remedy left. The Romans, therefore, seeing troubles from afar, always remedied them; they never allowed them to run their course in order to avoid a war, knowing that war is not eliminated but merely postponed to another's advantage. They chose, therefore, to fight Philip and Antiochus in Greece rather than have to fight them in Italy. At the time they could have avoided both wars; they chose not to. Nor did they ever favor the saying forever on the lips of the wise men of our day, “Enjoy the benefits of time.” Instead, they relied on the benefits of their own ability and prudence: for time sweeps everything before it and can bring good along with evil, and evil along with good.
But let us return to France and examine whether it did any of the things I have described. I shall speak of Louis and not Charles, for Louis held possessions in Italy longer, and his conduct is therefore easier to see. You will see that he did the opposite of what must be done to hold a state unlike one's own. King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who wished to gain half of Lombardy through his arrival. I do not mean to blame the King for coming or for making that choice: since he wished to gain a foothold in Italy, and had no friends in the region—indeed, since the conduct of King Charles had closed every door to him—he was forced to accept whatever alliances he could find. His plan would have succeeded had he made no errors in the measures that followed. Once he had conquered Lombardy, the King immediately regained the standing Charles had lost. Genoa yielded; the Florentines became his friends; the Marquis of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivogli, the Lady of Forlì, the lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, and Piombino, the people of Lucca, Pisa, and Siena—all came forward to be his friends. The Venetians could then see how rash their choice had been: to gain two towns in Lombardy, they had made the King lord of two-thirds of Italy. Consider how little difficulty the King would have had in maintaining his standing in Italy if he had followed the rules set out above and kept all these friends safe and protected. They were numerous, weak, and afraid, some of the Church, others of the Venetians, and so were always bound to stand by him; through them he could easily have secured himself against the remaining great powers. But no sooner had he entered Milan than he did the opposite, helping Pope Alexander seize the Romagna. He did not realize that by this decision he weakened himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had placed themselves in his hands, while making the Church great, adding so much temporal power to the spiritual power that already gave it such authority. Having made his first error, he was compelled to pursue it, until, to put an end to Alexander's ambition and prevent him from becoming lord of Tuscany, he was forced to come into Italy himself. And as though it were not enough to have made the Church great and lost his friends, his desire for the kingdom of Naples led him to divide it with the King of Spain. Where he had once been the arbiter of Italy, he introduced a partner, giving the ambitious men of that region and those discontented with him someone to turn to. Where he could have left in that kingdom a king dependent on him, he drove that king out to install one who could drive him out in turn. The desire to acquire is truly a natural and ordinary thing, and whenever men do so when they are able, they will be praised, not blamed; but when they cannot and still wish to do so at any cost, that is an error and deserves blame. If France, then, could attack Naples with its own forces, it should have done so; if it could not, it should not have divided the kingdom. And if its division of Lombardy with the Venetians deserved pardon because it gave France a foothold in Italy, this division deserved blame, since no such necessity excused it.
Louis, then, had made these five errors: he had destroyed the lesser powers, increased the power of an already powerful state in Italy, brought a very powerful foreigner into it, failed to live there himself, and failed to establish colonies. These errors might still not have hurt him in his lifetime if he had not committed a sixth: stripping the Venetians of their state. If he had not made the Church great or brought Spain into Italy, it would indeed have been reasonable and necessary to bring them down; but once he had taken those first steps, he should never have consented to their ruin. For while the Venetians were powerful, they would always have kept others away from any attempt on Lombardy: they would not have consented to such an attempt unless they themselves became its masters, and the others would not have wanted to take Lombardy from France only to give it to the Venetians; nor would they have dared to challenge both at once. If someone were to say that King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid a war, I answer with the reasons given above: a disorder should never be allowed to run its course in order to avoid a war, for war is not avoided but postponed to your disadvantage. And if others cite the promise the King had made to the Pope to undertake that campaign for him in exchange for the annulment of his marriage and a cardinal's hat for the Archbishop of Rouen, I answer with what I shall say below about the promises of Princes and how they ought to be kept.
King Louis lost Lombardy, then, because he observed none of the rules followed by others who have taken provinces and wished to hold them. This is nothing surprising, but entirely reasonable and ordinary. I spoke of this at Nantes with the Cardinal of Rouen when Duke Valentino (as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was commonly called) was seizing the Romagna. The cardinal told me that the Italians did not understand war; I replied that the French did not understand statecraft, for if they did, they would not let the Church grow so powerful. Experience has shown that the power of the Church and of Spain in Italy was brought about by France, and that France's ruin came from them. From this we may draw a general rule that never, or rarely, fails: whoever makes another powerful brings about his own ruin. For that power was created by him either through skill or through force, and both of these arouse the suspicion of the one who has become powerful.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication.
On Mixed Principalities
But a new principality brings difficulties. When it is not entirely new but is added to an old one, forming what we might call a mixed principality, its troubles begin with a natural difficulty common to all new principalities. People are glad to change rulers because they believe they will be better off. That belief makes them take up arms against their ruler. Then they learn from experience that they have made things worse. This follows from another ordinary and unavoidable fact: a new Prince always has to hurt the people whose land he takes over. His troops and the many other injuries that come with conquest see to that. So everyone you hurt in taking a principality becomes your enemy. Yet you cannot keep the friendship of the people who helped you take it. You cannot give them all they expected, and you cannot use harsh measures against them because you owe them a debt. Even a man with a very strong army needs the support of local people to enter a province. For these reasons Louis XII, king of France, took Milan quickly and lost it just as quickly. The first time, Ludovico's own forces were enough to take it back. The people who had opened the gates to Louis found that the benefits they had expected were an illusion. They could not put up with the troubles brought by their new Prince. It is true, though, that once a ruler takes a rebellious territory a second time, it is harder to lose. The rebellion gives him a reason to secure his position with fewer restraints: he can punish offenders, find out who is suspect, and strengthen weak points. The first time France lost Milan, all it took was Duke Ludovico making trouble on the border. The second time, the whole world had to turn against France. Its armies had to be destroyed and driven out of Italy. This happened for the reasons just given. Even so, Milan was taken from France both times. I have discussed the general reasons for the first loss. Now we must look at the second and ask what Louis could have done, and what someone in his position can do, to hold a conquest better than the king of France did. Here is my answer. A state added to a ruler's old state either belongs to the same region and speaks the same language or it does not. If it does, it is very easy to hold, especially if its people are not used to living free. To hold it securely, you need only end the line of the Prince who ruled it before. Keep the old conditions in other respects, and, where customs do not differ, people will live quietly. That is what we have seen with Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy, which have long been part of France. Their languages differ somewhat, but their customs are similar, so the people can easily live together. Anyone who takes such lands and wants to keep them must attend to two things. First, the former Prince's bloodline must be wiped out. Second, their laws and taxes must not be changed. In very little time the new lands will become one body with his old principality. But when states are taken in a region whose language, customs, and institutions differ, holding them is difficult. It takes great fortune and considerable skill. One of the best and most effective ways to hold them is for the conqueror to go and live there.
Living there would make possession more secure and lasting. The Turk did this in Greece. Despite all the other measures he took to hold that state, he could not have kept it if he had not gone to live there. When you live in a province, you see trouble starting and can deal with it quickly. When you do not, you hear of trouble only after it has grown so large that you can no longer fix it. Your officials also cannot strip the province bare. Your subjects are satisfied because they can appeal to their Prince nearby. If they want to behave well, they have more reason to love him; if they want to behave otherwise, they have more reason to fear him. An outsider who wants to attack the state will think twice. Living there therefore makes the state very hard to lose. The next best solution is to send settlers to one or two places that serve as keys to the state. You must either do this or keep a large force of cavalry and infantry there. Settlements cost the Prince little. He can send and maintain the settlers at little or no expense to himself. He hurts only the people whose fields and houses he takes to give to the newcomers, and they are a very small part of the state. Left poor and scattered, the injured people cannot harm him. Everyone else is unharmed and so settles down easily. They are also afraid to cause trouble, in case they suffer the same fate as those who lost their property. In short, these settlements cost little, are more loyal, and hurt fewer people. As I said, the people they do hurt are too poor and scattered to strike back. Note that you must either treat people well or destroy their ability to resist. People take revenge for small injuries; they cannot take revenge for grave ones. If you injure someone, then, you must do it in a way that leaves you no reason to fear his revenge. If instead of settlers you keep troops there, the cost is far greater. Guarding the state uses up all its revenue, so the conquest becomes a loss to you. It does far more harm as well. The whole state suffers as the army moves its quarters from place to place. Everyone feels this hardship, and everyone becomes your enemy. These enemies can hurt you because, although beaten, they are still in their own homes. A garrison is therefore useless in every respect, while settlements are useful. A ruler in a region with different customs must also become the leader and defender of its weaker neighbors. He must try to weaken its stronger powers and take care that no foreigner as powerful as himself enters it for any reason. Someone in the region who is unhappy, either out of ambition or fear, will always invite such an outsider in. This is how the Aetolians brought the Romans into Greece. Wherever else the Romans entered, local people invited them. This is how it works: as soon as a powerful outsider enters a region, all its weaker powers join him. They resent the power that has been above them. He has no trouble winning them over. They all willingly unite at once with the state he has taken there. He need only make sure they do not gain too much power or authority. With his own forces and their support, he can easily bring down the stronger powers and become master of the whole region. Whoever mishandles this will soon lose his conquest. While he still holds it, he will face endless difficulties and troubles.
The Romans followed these rules well in the provinces they took. They sent settlers and cultivated ties with the weaker powers without making them stronger. They brought the stronger powers down and did not let powerful foreigners gain a foothold. Greece alone will serve as an example. The Romans maintained ties with the Achaeans and Aetolians, humbled the kingdom of Macedon, and drove out Antiochus. But they never let the Achaeans or Aetolians expand their states, whatever those peoples had done for them. Philip's arguments never persuaded them to be his friends without first weakening him. And Antiochus's power never made them agree to let him hold any state in that region. In these cases the Romans did what all wise Princes should do. They watched not only for present troubles but for future ones and worked hard to prevent them. When you see trouble from far away, you can easily deal with it. If you wait until it comes close, it is too late for treatment because the disease has become incurable. It is like the disease doctors call a hectic fever. At first it is easy to cure but hard to recognize. As time passes without recognition or treatment, it becomes easy to recognize but hard to cure. The same is true in affairs of state. A prudent ruler alone can see troubles coming from far away, and then he can deal with them quickly. But if they go unnoticed until they have grown plain to everyone, there is no cure left. The Romans saw problems coming and always dealt with them. They never let them develop just to avoid a war. They knew that war cannot be avoided this way; it can only be postponed to someone else's advantage. So they chose to fight Philip and Antiochus in Greece rather than fight them later in Italy. They could have avoided both wars at the time, but they chose not to. They never liked the saying constantly on the lips of today's wise men, "Enjoy the benefits of time." They preferred to rely on their own ability and good judgment. Time drives everything forward and can bring good as well as bad, or bad as well as good.
But let us return to France and see whether it did any of these things. I will talk about Louis rather than Charles, because Louis held territory in Italy longer, making his actions easier to see. You will see that he did the opposite of what a ruler must do to hold a state with different customs. King Louis came into Italy at the invitation of the Venetians, who hoped his arrival would win them half of Lombardy. I do not blame the king for coming or for making that choice. He wanted to establish a foothold in Italy, but he had no friends there. Indeed, King Charles's conduct had closed every door to him. Louis had to accept what alliances he could find. His plan would have worked well if he had made no mistakes in the rest of his dealings. Once the king took Lombardy, he immediately regained the standing Charles had lost. Genoa submitted, and the Florentines became his friends. The marquis of Mantua, the duke of Ferrara, the Bentivoglio family, the lady of Forlì, the lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, and Piombino, and the people of Lucca, Pisa, and Siena all came forward to be his friends. The Venetians could then see how rash their decision had been. To acquire two towns in Lombardy, they had made the king master of two-thirds of Italy. Think how easily he could have kept his standing there if he had followed the rules given above. He had many allies, all weak and all afraid of either the Church or the Venetians. They had to stay with him. If he had kept them safe and defended them, he could easily have used their support to protect himself against the other major powers. But as soon as he reached Milan, he did the opposite. He helped Pope Alexander take Romagna. He did not see that this decision weakened him by taking away his friends and those who had put themselves in his hands. It made the Church strong by adding extensive worldly power to the religious power that already gave it so much authority. Having made this first mistake, he had to keep going. To put a stop to Alexander's ambition and prevent him from becoming master of Tuscany, Louis had to come back to Italy. Nor was it enough that he had made the Church powerful and lost his friends. He wanted the kingdom of Naples, so he divided it with the king of Spain. He had been the arbiter of Italy, but now he brought in a partner. Ambitious Italians and people unhappy with Louis now had someone else to turn to. He could have left a king in Naples who depended on him and received a pension from him. Instead he removed that king and put in one who could drive Louis himself out. Wanting to gain more is natural and ordinary. When people have the power to do it, they will always be praised, not blamed. But if they lack the power and insist on doing it anyway, that is a mistake and deserves blame. If France had the strength to attack Naples alone, it should have done so. If it did not, it should not have divided the kingdom. Sharing Lombardy with the Venetians was excusable because it gave France a foothold in Italy. Sharing Naples was blameworthy because there was no such need for it.
Louis had therefore made five mistakes. He destroyed the weaker powers. He increased the power of one strong power in Italy. He brought in an extremely powerful foreigner. He did not come to live there. And he did not establish settlements there. Even so, these mistakes might not have hurt him during his lifetime if he had not made a sixth: taking the Venetians' state from them. If he had not made the Church powerful or brought Spain into Italy, it would have been reasonable and necessary to weaken the Venetians. But after making those first choices, he should never have allowed their ruin. As long as the Venetians remained strong, they would have kept others from trying to take Lombardy. They would not have allowed anyone else to take it unless they themselves became its masters. Others would not have wanted to take it from France only to give it to the Venetians. Nor would they have dared to confront France and Venice together. Someone might say that King Louis gave Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom of Naples to Spain to avoid a war. My answer is the one already given: you must never allow trouble to develop simply to avoid a war. You do not avoid it; you put it off to your disadvantage. Others might point to the promise the king made to the Pope to carry out the campaign for him in exchange for the annulment of Louis's marriage and a cardinal's hat for Rouen. I answer with what I will say later about the promises Princes make and how they should keep them.
King Louis lost Lombardy because he followed none of the methods used by rulers who have conquered provinces and wanted to keep them. There is nothing surprising about this. It is only natural. I talked about this at Nantes with the cardinal of Rouen when Duke Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was commonly called, was taking Romagna. The cardinal told me that Italians did not understand warfare. I replied that the French did not understand statecraft. If they did, they would not let the Church grow so powerful. Experience has shown that France caused the rise of the Church and Spain in Italy, and that these powers in turn caused France's ruin. From this comes a general rule that almost never fails: whoever makes someone else powerful brings about his own ruin. For the new power was built with that person's skill or force, and the one who has become powerful distrusts both.