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Niccolò Machiavelli · Complete work

Chapter II

Chapter II of 27. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.

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Original Italian

De’ Principati ereditari.

Io lascerò indietro il ragionare delle Repubbliche, perchè altra volta ne ragionai a lungo. Volterommi solo al Principato, e anderò, nel ritessere queste orditure di sopra, disputando come questi Principati si possono governare e mantenere. Dico adunque, che nelli Stati ereditari, ed assuefatti al sangue del loro Principe, sono assai minori difficultà a mantenergli, che ne’ nuovi; perchè basta solo non trapassare l’ordine de’ suoi antenati, e dipoi temporeggiare con gli accidenti, in modo che se tal Principe è di ordinaria industria, sempre si manterrà nel suo Stato, se non è una straordinaria ed eccessiva forza che ne lo priva; e privato che ne sia, quantunque di sinistro abbia lo occupatore, lo racquista. Noi abbiamo in Italia, per esempio, il Duca di Ferrara, il quale non ha retto agli assalti de’ Viniziani nell’84, nè a quelli di Papa Iulio nel 10 per altre cagioni che per essere antiquato in quel Dominio. Perchè il Principe naturale ha minori cagioni e minori necessità di offendere; donde conviene che sia più amato; e se strasordinarii vizi non lo fanno odiare, è ragionevole che naturalmente sia ben voluto da’ suoi; e nell’antichità e continuazione del dominio sono spente le memorie e le cagioni delle innovazioni; perchè sempre una mutazione lascia lo addentellato per la edificazione dell’altra.

Musean translation

Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication for fidelity, Machiavelli’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.

On Hereditary Principalities

I shall leave aside the discussion of republics, for I have discussed them at length elsewhere. I shall turn only to the principality, and, taking up again the threads outlined above, consider how these principalities can be governed and maintained. I say, then, that hereditary states, accustomed to the family of their Prince, are far easier to maintain than new ones. It is enough not to depart from the ways of one's ancestors and then to adapt to events, so that a Prince of ordinary diligence will always keep his state unless some extraordinary and overwhelming force deprives him of it; and even if he is deprived of it, he will recover it at the first misfortune that befalls its occupier. We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who withstood the assaults of the Venetians in '84 and those of Pope Julius in '10 for no other reason than that his rule in that dominion was long established. For a hereditary Prince has fewer causes and less need to offend his subjects, and so he is bound to be better loved. Unless extraordinary vices make him hated, it is reasonable that his people should naturally wish him well. And with the age and continuity of his rule, the memories and causes of change die away; for one change always leaves a foothold on which another can be built.

Plain English translation

Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication.

On Hereditary Principalities

I will set aside republics, because I have discussed them at length elsewhere. I will deal only with principalities. I will pick up the threads laid out above and discuss how these principalities can be governed and held. In hereditary states, where people are used to the ruler's family, keeping power is much easier than it is in new states. The Prince only needs to avoid breaking with the ways of his ancestors, then adapt to events as they arise. If he has ordinary ability, he will always keep his state unless an extraordinary and overwhelming force takes it from him. Even if he loses it, he will regain it whenever the person who seized it suffers a setback. In Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84 and those of Pope Julius in '10 for no other reason than that his family had ruled there for so long. A hereditary Prince has fewer reasons and less need to offend his subjects, so he is likely to be loved more. Unless extraordinary faults make them hate him, it is natural for his people to wish him well. Under a long, unbroken rule, memories of change and the reasons for it die away. Every change leaves a foothold for the next one.

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