{"schema_version":1,"access":"public","rights":"Public-domain or compatibly licensed source editions; provenance is retained per record.","work":{"slug":"prince","title":"The Prince","author":"Niccolò Machiavelli","tradition":"european","language":"it","genre":"political treatise","period":"1513 (printed 1532)","source_url":"https://it.wikisource.org/wiki/Il_Principe","original":{"text":"### Dedication\n\nSogliono il più delle volte coloro che desiderano acquistare grazia appresso un Principe, farsegli innanzi con quelle cose, che tra le loro abbino più care, o delle quali vegghino lui più dilettarsi; donde si vede molte volte esser loro presentati cavalli, arme, drappi d’oro, pietre preziose e simili ornamenti, degni della grandezza di quelli. Desiderando io adunque offerirmi alla Vostra Magnificenza con qualche testimone della servitù mia verso di quella, non ho trovato, tra la mia suppellettile, cosa, quale io abbia più cara, o tanto stimi, quanto la cognizione delle azioni degli uomini grandi, imparata da me con una lunga sperienza delle cose moderne, ed una continova lezione delle antiche, la quale avendo io con gran diligenza lungamente escogitata ed esaminata, ed ora in uno piccolo volume ridotta, mando alla Magnificenza Vostra. E benchè io giudichi questa opera indegna della presenza di quella; nondimeno confido assai, che per sua umanità gli debba essere accetta, considerato che da me non li possa essere fatto maggior dono, che darle facultà a poter in brevissimo tempo intendere tutto quello, che io in tanti anni, e con tanti miei disagi e pericoli ho cognosciuto ed inteso: la quale opera io non ho ornata nè ripiena di clausule ampie, o di parole ampollose o magnifiche, o di qualunque altro lenocinio o ornamento estrinseco, con li quali molti sogliono le lor cose discrivere ed ornare; perchè io ho voluto o che veruna cosa la onori, o che solamente la verità della materia, e la gravità del soggetto la faccia grata. Nè voglio sia riputata presunzione, se uno uomo di basso ed infimo stato ardisce discorrere e regolare i governi de’ Principi; perchè così come coloro che disegnano i paesi, si pongono bassi nel piano a considerare la natura de’ monti e de’ luoghi alti, e per considerare quella de’ bassi si pongono alti sopra i monti; similmente, a cognoscer bene la natura de’ popoli bisogna esser Principe, ed a cognoscer bene quella de’ Principi conviene essere popolare. Pigli adunque Vostra Magnificenza questo piccolo dono con quello animo che io lo mando; il quale se da quella fia diligentemente considerato e letto, vi cognoscerà dentro uno estremo mio desiderio, che ella pervenga a quella grandezza che la fortuna, e le altre sue qualità le promettono. E se Vostra Magnificenza dallo apice della sua altezza qualche volta volgerà gli occhi in questi luoghi bassi, cognoscerà, quanto indegnamente io sopporti una grande e continova malignità di fortuna.\n\n### Chapter I\n\nQuante siano le specie de’ Principati, e con quali modi si acquistino.\n\nTutti gli Stati, tutti i dominii che hanno avuto, e hanno imperio sopra gli uomini, sono stati e sono o Repubbliche o Principati. I principati sono o ereditari, de’ quali il sangue del loro Signore ne sia stato lungo tempo Principe, o e’ sono nuovi. I nuovi o sono nuovi tutti, come fu Milano a Francesco Sforza, o sono come membri aggiunti allo stato ereditario del Principe che gli acquista, come è il Regno di Napoli al Re di Spagna. Sono questi dominii, così acquistati, o consueti a vivere sotto un Principe, o usi ad esser liberi; ed acquistansi o con le armi di altri o con le proprie, o per fortuna o per virtù.\n\n### Chapter II\n\nDe’ Principati ereditari.\n\nIo lascerò indietro il ragionare delle Repubbliche, perchè altra volta ne ragionai a lungo. Volterommi solo al Principato, e anderò, nel ritessere queste orditure di sopra, disputando come questi Principati si possono governare e mantenere. Dico adunque, che nelli Stati ereditari, ed assuefatti al sangue del loro Principe, sono assai minori difficultà a mantenergli, che ne’ nuovi; perchè basta solo non trapassare l’ordine de’ suoi antenati, e dipoi temporeggiare con gli accidenti, in modo che se tal Principe è di ordinaria industria, sempre si manterrà nel suo Stato, se non è una straordinaria ed eccessiva forza che ne lo priva; e privato che ne sia, quantunque di sinistro abbia lo occupatore, lo racquista. Noi abbiamo in Italia, per esempio, il Duca di Ferrara, il quale non ha retto agli assalti de’ Viniziani nell’84, nè a quelli di Papa Iulio nel 10 per altre cagioni che per essere antiquato in quel Dominio. Perchè il Principe naturale ha minori cagioni e minori necessità di offendere; donde conviene che sia più amato; e se strasordinarii vizi non lo fanno odiare, è ragionevole che naturalmente sia ben voluto da’ suoi; e nell’antichità e continuazione del dominio sono spente le memorie e le cagioni delle innovazioni; perchè sempre una mutazione lascia lo addentellato per la edificazione dell’altra.\n\n### Chapter III\n\nDe’ principati misti.\n\nMa nel Principato nuovo consistono le difficultà. E prima se non è tutto nuovo, ma come membro, che si può chiamare tutto insieme quasi misto, le variazioni sue nascono in prima da una natural difficultà, quale è in tutti i Principati nuovi; perchè gli uomini mutano volentieri Signore, credendo migliorare; e questa credenza gli fa pigliar l’arme contro a chi regge; di che s’ingannano, perchè veggono poi per esperienza aver peggiorato. Il che dipende da un’altra necessità naturale ed ordinaria, quale fa che sempre bisogni offendere quelli, di chi si diventa nuovo Principe; e con gente d’arme, e con infinite altre ingiurie che si tira dietro il nuovo acquisto. Dimodochè ti trovi avere inimici tutti quelli che tu hai offesi in occupare quel Principato; e non ti puoi mantenere amici quelli, che vi ti hanno messo, per non gli potere satisfare in quel modo che si erano presupposto, e per non potere tu usare contra di loro medicine forti, essendo loro obbligato; perchè sempre, ancorchè uno sia fortissimo in su gli eserciti, ha bisogno del favore de’ provinciali ad entrare in una provincia. Per queste ragioni Luigi XII Re di Francia occupò subito Milano, e subito lo perdè, e bastarono a toglierlo la prima volta le forze proprie di Lodovico; perchè quelli popoli, che gli avevano aperte le porte, trovandosi ingannati della opinione loro, e di quel futuro bene che si aveano presupposto, non potevano sopportare fastidi del nuovo Principe. È ben vero che acquistandosi poi la seconda volta i paesi ribellati, si perdono con più difficultà; perchè il Signore, presa occasione dalla rebellione, è meno rispettivo ad assicurarsi, con punire i delinquenti, chiarire i sospetti, provvedersi nelle parti più deboli. In modo che se a far perdere Milano a Francia bastò la prima volta un Duca Lodovico, che romoreggiasse in su’ confini, a farlo dipoi perdere la seconda, gli bisognò avere contro il mondo tutto, e che gli eserciti suoi fossero spenti, e cacciati d’Italia; il che nacque dalle cagioni sopraddette. Nondimeno e la prima e la seconda volta gli fu tolto. Le cagioni universali della prima si sono discorse; resta ora a vedere quelle della seconda, e dire che remedii egli aveva, e quali può avere uno che fusse ne’ termini suoi, per potersi meglio mantenere nello acquistato, che non fece il Re di Francia. Dico pertanto, che questi Stati, i quali acquistandosi si aggiungono a uno Stato antico di quello che gli acquista, o sono della medesima provincia e della medesima lingua, o non sono. Quando siano, è facilità grande a tenergli, massimamente quando non siano usi a vivere liberi; e, a possedergli sicuramente, basta avere spenta la linea del Principe, che li dominava; perchè nelle altre cose, mantenendosi loro le condizioni vecchie, e non vi essendo disformità di costumi, gli uomini si vivono quietamente, come si è visto, che ha fatto la Borgogna, la Bertagna, la Guascogna, e la Normandia, che tanto tempo sono state con Francia; e benchè vi sia qualche disformità di lingua, nondimeno i costumi sono simili, e possonsi tra loro facilmente comportare: e a chi le acquista, volendole tenere, bisogna avere due rispetti; l’uno che il sangue del loro Principe antico si spenga; l’altro di non alterare nè loro leggi nè loro dazi; talmentechè in brevissimo tempo diventa con il loro Principato antico tutto un corpo. Ma quando si acquistano Stati in una provincia disforme di lingua, di costumi, e di ordini, qui sono le difficultà, e qui bisogna avere gran fortuna, e grande industria a tenergli; ed uno de’ maggiori rimedii e più vivi sarebbe, che la persona di chi gli acquista vi andasse ad abitare.\n\nQuesto farebbe più sicura e più durabile quella possessione, come ha fatto il Turco di Grecia, il quale con tutti gli altri ordini osservati da lui per tenere quello Stato, se non vi fusse ito ad abitare, non era possibile, che lo tenesse. Perchè standovi, si veggono nascere i disordini, e presto vi si può rimediare; non vi stando, s’intendono quando sono grandi, e non vi è più rimedio. Non è oltre a questo la provincia spogliata da’ tuoi ufiziali; satisfannosi i sudditi del ricorso propinquo al Principe, donde hanno più cagione di amarlo, volendo essere buoni, e volendo essere altrimente, di temerlo. Chi degli esterni volesse assaltare quello Stato, vi ha più rispetto; tantochè abitandovi lo può con grandissima difficultà perdere. L’altro migliore rimedio è mandare colonie in uno o in due luoghi, che siano quasi le chiavi di quello Stato; perchè è necessario o far questo, o tenervi assai gente d’arme e fanterie. Nelle colonie non ispende molto il Principe, e senza sua spesa, o poca, ve le manda e tiene, e solamente offende coloro, a chi toglie i campi e le case per darle a’ nuovi abitatori, che sono una minima parte di quello Stato; e quelli che egli offende, rimanendo dispersi e poveri, non gli possono mai nuocere, e tutti gli altri rimangono da una parte non offesi, e per questo si quietano facilmente; dall’altra paurosi di non errare, perchè non intervenisse loro come a quelli che sono stati spogliati. Conchiudo, che queste colonie non costano, sono più fedeli, offendono meno, e gli offesi, essendo poveri e dispersi, non possono nuocere, come ho detto. Perchè si ha a notare, che gli uomini si debbono o vezzeggiare o spegnere, perchè si vendicano delle leggieri offese; delle gravi non possono: sicchè l’offesa che si fa all’uomo, deve essere in modo, che ella non tema la vendetta. Ma tenendovi, in cambio di colonie, gente d’arme, si spende più assai, avendo a consumare nella guardia tutte l’entrate di quello Stato: in modo che l’acquistato gli torna in perdita, ed offende molto più; perchè nuoce a tutto quello Stato, tramutando con gli alloggiamenti il suo esercito; del quale disagio ognuno ne sente, e ciascuno li diventa nimico, e sono inimici, che gli possono nuocere, rimanendo battuti in casa loro. Da ogni parte dunque questa guardia è inutile, come quella delle colonie è utile. Debbe ancora chi è in una provincia disforme, come è detto, farsi capo e difensore de’ vicini minori potenti, ed ingegnarsi d’indebolire i più potenti di quella, e guardare che, per accidente alcuno, non vi entri uno forestiere non meno potente di lui: e sempre interverrà che vi sarà messo da coloro che saranno in quella malcontenti o per troppa ambizione o per paura; come si vide già che gli Etoli misero li Romani in Grecia; ed in ogni altra provincia che loro entrarono, vi furono messi dai provinciali. E l’ordine della cosa è, che subito che un forestiere potente entra in una provincia, tutti quelli che sono in essa meno potenti, gli aderiscono, mossi da una invidia che hanno contro a chi è stato potente sopra di loro; tantochè rispetto a questi minori potenti, egli non ha a durare fatica alcuna a guadagnarli, perché subito tutti insieme volentieri fanno massa con lo Stato, che egli vi ha acquistato. Ha solamente a pensare, che non piglino troppe forze, e troppa autorità; e facilmente può con le forze sue, e con il favor loro abbassare quelli che sono potenti, per rimanere in tutto arbitro di quella provincia. E chi non governerà bene questa parte, perderà presto quello che arà acquistato; e mentre che lo terrà, vi arà dentro infinite difficultà e fastidi.\n\nI Romani nelle provincie che pigliarono, osservarono bene queste parti, e mandarono le colonie, intrattenerono i men potenti senza crescere loro potenza, abbassarono li potenti, e non vi lasciarono prendere riputazione a’ potenti forestieri. E voglio mi basti solo la provincia di Grecia per esempio. Furono intrattenuti da loro gli Achei, e gli Etoli, fu abbassato il Regno de’ Macedoni, funne cacciato Antioco; nè mai gli meriti degli Achei o delli Etoli fecero che permettessero loro accrescere alcuno Stato, nè le persuasioni di Filippo gli indussero mai ad essergli amici senza sbassarlo, nè la potenza di Antioco potè fare gli consentissero che tenesse in quella provincia alcuno Stato. Perchè i Romani fecero in questi casi quello che tutti i Principi savi debbono fare, li quali non solamente hanno ad aver riguardo alli scandoli presenti, ma alli futuri, ed a quelli con ogni industria riparare; perchè prevedendosi discosto, facilmente vi si può rimediare, ma aspettando, che ti s’appressino, la medicina non è più a tempo, perchè la malattia è diventata incurabile; ed interviene di questa come dicono i medici dell’etica, che nel principio è facile a curare, e difficile a cognoscere, ma nel corso del tempo, non l’avendo nel principio cognosciuta nè medicata, diventa facile a cognoscere e difficile a curare. Così interviene nelle cose dello Stato, perchè cognoscendo discosto, il che non è dato se non ad un prudente, i mali che nascono in quello, si guariscono presto; ma quando, per non gli aver cognosciuti, si lasciano crescere in modo che ognuno li cognosce, non vi è più rimedio. Però i Romani vedendo discosto gl’inconvenienti, li rimediarono sempre, e non li lasciarono mai seguire per fuggire una guerra, perchè sapevano, che la guerra non si leva, ma si differisce con vantaggio d’altri; però volsero fare con Filippo ed Antioco guerra in Grecia, per non l’avere a fare con loro in Italia; e potevano per allora fuggire e l’una e l’altra; il che non volsero, nè piacque mai loro quello che tutto dì è in bocca de’ savi de’ nostri tempi, Godere li beneficii del tempo; ma bene quello della virtù e prudenza loro; perchè il tempo si caccia innanzi ogni cosa, e può condurre seco bene come male, male come bene.\n\nMa torniamo a Francia, ed esaminiamo se delle cose dette ne ha fatto alcuna; e parlerò di Luigi e non di Carlo, come di colui, del quale, per aver tenuto più lunga possessione in Italia, si sono meglio visti li suoi andamenti; e vedrete, come egli ha fatto il contrario di quelle cose, che si debbono fare per tenere uno Stato disforme. Il Re Luigi fu messo in Italia dall’ambizione de’ Viniziani, che volsero guadagnarsi mezzo lo Stato di Lombardia per quella venuta. Io non voglio biasimare quella venuta o  partito preso dal Re; perchè, volendo cominciare a mettere un piede in Italia, e non avendo in questa provincia amici, anzi essendoli, per li portamenti del Re Carlo, serrate tutte le porte, fu forzato prendere quelle amicizie che poteva; e sarebbeli riuscito il pensiero bene preso, quando negli altri maneggi non avesse fatto errore alcuno. Acquistata adunque il Re la Lombardia, si riguadagnò subito quella riputazione che gli aveva tolta Carlo; Genova cedette, i Fiorentini gli diventarono amici, Marchese di Mantova, Duca di Ferrara, Bentivogli, Madonna di Furlì, Signore di Faenza, di Pesaro, di Rimino, di Camerino, di Piombino, Lucchesi, Pisani, Sanesi, ognuno se li fece incontro per essere suo amico. Ed allora poterono considerare li Viniziani la temerità del partito preso da loro, i quali, per acquistare due terre in Lombardia, fecero Signore il Re di duoi terzi d’Italia. Consideri ora uno con quanta poca difficultà poteva il Re tenere in Italia la sua riputazione, se egli avessi osservate le regole sopraddette, e tenuti sicuri, e difesi tutti quelli amici suoi, li quali, per essere gran numero, e deboli, e paurosi chi della Chiesa, chi de’ Viniziani, erano sempre necessitati a star seco, e per il mezzo loro poteva facilmente assicurarsi di chi ci restava grande. Ma egli non prima fu in Milano, che fece il contrario, dando aiuto a Papa Alessandro, perché egli occupasse la Romagna. Nè si accorse con questa deliberazione che faceva sè debole, togliendosi li amici, e quelli che se li erano gittati in grembo, e la Chiesa grande, aggiugnendo allo spirituale, che gli dà tanta autorità, tanto temporale. E fatto un primo errore, fu costretto a seguitare; intantochè, per porre fine all’ambizione di Alessandro, e perché non divenisse Signore di Toscana, gli fu forza venire in Italia. E non gli bastò aver fatto grande la Chiesa, e toltisi gli amici, che per volere il regno di Napoli, lo divise con il Re di Spagna; e dove egli era prima arbitro d’Italia, vi messe un compagno, acciochè gli ambiziosi di quella provincia e malcontenti di lui avessero dove ricorrere; e dove poteva lasciare in quel Regno un Re suo pensionario, egli ne lo trasse per mettervi uno che potesse cacciarne lui. È cosa veramente molto naturale e ordinaria desiderare di acquistare, e sempre, quando gli uomini lo fanno che possino, ne saranno laudati e non biasimati; ma quando non possono e vogliono farlo in ogni modo, qui è il biasimo e l’errore. Se Francia adunque con le sue forze poteva assaltare Napoli, doveva farlo; se non poteva, non doveva dividerlo. E se la divisione che fece con i Viniziani di Lombardia, meritò scusa per avere con quella messo il piè in Italia, questa meritò biasimo per non essere scusato da quella necessità.\n\nAveva adunque Luigi fatto questi cinque errori: spenti i minori potenti; accresciuto in Italia potenza a un potente; messo in quella un forestiere potentissimo; non venuto ad abitarvi; non vi messo colonie. Li quali errori, vivendo lui, potevano ancora non lo offendere, se non avesse fatto il sesto, di torre lo Stato a’ Viniziani; perchè quando non avesse fatto grande la Chiesa, nè messo in Italia, Spagna, era ben ragionevole e necessario abbassarli; ma, avendo preso quelli primi partiti, non doveva mai consentire alla rovina loro; perchè essendo quelli potenti, arebbono sempre tenuti gli altri discosto dalla impresa di Lombardia, sì perchè i Viniziani non vi arebbero consentito, senza diventarne Signori loro; sì perchè gli altri non arebbero voluto torla a Francia per darla a loro; e andarli ad urtare ambidui non arebbero avuto animo. E se alcun dicesse, il Re Luigi cedè ad Alessandro la Romagna, ed a Spagna il Regno per fuggire una guerra; rispondo con le ragioni dette di sopra, che non si debba mai lasciar seguire uno disordine per fuggire una guerra; perchè ella non si fugge, ma si differisce a tuo disavvantaggio. E se alcuni altri allegassero la fede, che il Re aveva data al Papa, di far per lui quella impresa per la risoluzione del suo matrimonio, e per il Cappello di Roano, rispondo con quello che per me di sotto si dirà circa la fede dei Principi, e come ella si debba osservare.\n\nHa perduto dunque il Re Luigi la Lombardia per non avere osservato alcuno di quelli termini osservati da altri, che hanno preso provincie, e volutele tenere. Nè è miracolo alcuno questo, ma molto ragionevole ed ordinario. E di questa materia parlai a Nantes con Roano, quando il Valentino (che così volgarmente era chiamato Cesare Borgia figliuolo di Papa Alessandro) occupava la Romagna; perchè dicendomi il Cardinale Roano, che gl’Italiani non s’intendevano della guerra, io risposi, che i Francesi non s’intendevano dello Stato, perchè, intendendosene, non lascerebbono venire la Chiesa in tanta grandezza. E per esperienza si è visto, che la grandezza in Italia di quella, e di Spagna, è stata causata da Francia, e la rovina sua è proceduta da loro. Di che si cava una regola generale, quale non mai, o raro falla, che chi è cagione che uno diventi potente, rovina; perchè quella potenza è causata da colui o con industria, o con forza, e l’una e l’altra di queste due è sospetta a chi è divenuto potente.\n\n### Chapter IV\n\nPerchè il Regno di Dario da Alessandro occupato non si ribellò dalli successori di Alessandro dopo la sua morte.\n\nConsiderate le difficultà, le quali si hanno in tenere uno Stato acquistato di nuovo, potrebbe alcuno maravigliarsi, donde nacque che Alessandro Magno diventò Signore dell’Asia in pochi anni, e, non l’avendo appena occupata, morì, donde pareva ragionevole che tutto quello Stato si ribellasse; nondimeno li successori suoi se lo mantennero, e non ebbono a tenerselo altra difficultà, che quella che intra loro medesimi per propria ambizione nacque. Rispondo come i Principati, de’ quali si ha memoria, si trovano governati in due modi diversi, o per un Principe, e tutti gli altri servi, i quali come ministri per grazia e concessione sua aiutano governare quel Regno; o per un Principe e per Baroni, i quali non per grazia del Signore, ma per antichità di sangue tengono quel grado. Questi tali Baroni hanno Stati e sudditi propri, li quali gli riconoscono per Signori, e hanno in loro naturale affezione. Quelli Stati che si governano per un Principe e per servi, hanno il loro Principe con più autorità; perchè in tutta la sua provincia non è alcuno che riconosca per superiore se non lui; e se ubbidiscono altri, lo fanno come a ministro e ufficiale, e non gli portano particolare amore. Gli esempi di queste due diversità di governi sono, ne’ nostri tempi, il Turco e il Re di Francia. Tutta la monarchia del Turco è governata da un Signore; gli altri sono suoi servi; e distinguendo il suo Regno in Sangiacchi, vi manda diversi amministratori, e gli muta e varia come pare a lui. Ma il Re di Francia è posto in mezzo di una moltitudine antica di Signori, ricognosciuti da’ loro sudditi, ed amati da quelli; hanno le loro preminenzie, nè le può il Re torre loro senza suo pericolo. Chi considera adunque l’uno e l’altro di questi Stati, troverà difficultà nell’acquistare lo Stato del Turco; ma vinto che sia, è facilità grande a tenerlo.\n\nLe cagioni della difficultà in potere occupare il Regno del Turco sono per non potere l’occupatore essere chiamato da’ Principi di quel Regno, nè sperare con la ribellione di quelli che egli ha d’intorno, potere facilitare la sua impresa; il che nasce dalle ragioni sopraddette. Perchè essendogli tutti schiavi ed obbligati, si possono con più difficultà corrompere; e quando bene si corrompessino, se ne può sperare poco utile, non potendo quelli trarsi dietro i popoli, per le ragioni assegnate. Onde chi assalta il Turco è necessario pensare di averlo a trovare unito, e li conviene sperare più nelle forze proprie, che ne’ disordini di altri; ma vinto che fusse, e rotto alla campagna, in modo che non possa rifare eserciti, non si ha a dubitare d’altro, che del sangue del Principe, il quale spento, non resta alcuno di chi si abbia a temere, non avendo li altri credito con gli popoli; e come il vincitore avanti la vittoria non poteva sperare in loro, così non debbe dopo quella temere di loro.\n\nIl contrario interviene ne’ Regni governati come è quello di Francia, perchè con facilità puoi entrarvi, guadagnandoti alcuno Barone del Regno; perchè sempre si trova de’ malcontenti, e di quelli che desiderano innovare. Costoro, per le ragioni dette, ti possono aprire la via a quello Stato, e facilitarti la vittoria; la quale dipoi a volerti mantenere, si tira dietro infinite difficultà e con quelli che ti hanno aiutato, e con quelli che tu hai oppressi. Nè ti basta spegnere il sangue del Principe; perchè vi rimangono quelli Signori, che si fanno capi delle nuove alterazioni, e non li potendo nè contentare, nè spegnere, perdi quello stato qualunque volta venga la occasione. Ora se voi considererete di qual natura di governi era quello di Dario, lo troverete simile al Regno del Turco; e però ad Alessandro fu necessario prima urtarlo tutto, e torgli la campagna; dopo la quale vittoria essendo Dario morto, rimase ad Alessandro quello stato sicuro, per le ragioni sopra discorse. E li suoi successori, se fussino stati uniti, se lo potevano godere oziosi; nè in quello Regno nacquero altri tumulti, che quelli che loro proprii suscitarono. Ma gli Stati ordinati, come quello di Francia, è impossibile possedergli con tanta quiete. Di qui nacquero le spesse ribellioni di Spagna, di Francia, e di Grecia da’ Romani, per li spessi Principati che erano in quelli Stati, de’ quali mentre che durò la memoria, sempre furono i Romani incerti di quella possessione; ma spenta la memoria di quelli, con la potenza e diuturnità dell’imperio, ne diventarono sicuri possessori. E poterono dipoi anche quelli, combattendo tra loro, ciascuno tirarsi dietro parte di quelle provincie, secondo l’autorità vi aveva preso dentro; e quelle, per essere il sangue del loro antico Signore spento, non ricognoscevano altri, che i Romani. Considerando adunque queste cose, non si maraviglierà alcuno della facilità che ebbe Alessandro a tenere lo Stato d’Asia, e delle difficultà che hanno avuto gli altri a conservare l’acquistato, come Pirro, e molti altri; il che non è accaduto dalla poca o molta virtù del vincitore, ma dalla disformità del suggetto.\n\n### Chapter V\n\nIn che modo siano da governare le città o Principati, quali, prima che occupati fussino, vivevano con le loro leggi.\n\nQuando quelli Stati che si acquistano, come è detto, sono consueti a vivere con le loro leggi e in libertà, a volergli tenere ci sono tre modi. Il primo è rovinargli. L’altro andarvi ad abitare personalmente. Il terzo lasciargli vivere con le sue leggi, tirandone una pensione, e creandovi dentro uno Stato di pochi, che te lo conservino amico. Perchè essendo quello Stato creato da quel Principe, sa che non può stare senza l’amicizia e potenza sua, e ha da fare il tutto per mantenerlo; e più facilmente si tiene una città usa a vivere libera con il mezzo de’ suoi cittadini, che in alcuno altro modo, volendola preservare.\n\nSonoci, per esempio, gli Spartani, ed i Romani. Gli Spartani tennero Atene e Tebe, creandovi uno Stato di pochi: nientedimeno le perderono. I Romani per tenere Capua, Cartagine, e Numanzia, le disfecero, e non le perderono. Vollero tenere la Grecia quasi come la tennero gli Spartani, facendola libera, e lasciandole le sue leggi, e non successe loro; in modo che furono costretti disfare molte città di quella provincia per tenerla, perchè in verità non ci è modo sicuro a possederle, altro che la rovina. E chi diviene padrone di una città consueta a vivere libera, e non la disfaccia, aspetti di essere disfatto da quella; perchè sempre ha per refugio nella ribellione il nome della libertà, e gli ordini antichi suoi, li quali nè per lunghezza di tempo, nè per beneficii mai si scordano; e per cosa che si faccia o si provvegga, se non si disuniscono o dissipano gli abitatori, non si dimentica quel nome, nè quelli ordini, ma subito in ogni accidente vi si ricorre, come fe’ Pisa dopo tanti anni che ella era stata posta in servitù da’ Fiorentini. Ma quando le città o le provincie sono use a vivere sotto un Principe, e quel sangue sia spento, essendo da una parte use ad ubbidire, dall’altra non avendo il Principe vecchio, farne uno intra loro non si accordano, vivere libere non sanno; dimodochè sono più tarde a pigliare le armi, e con più facilità se li può un Principe guadagnare, e assicurarsi di loro. Ma nelle Republiche è maggior odio, più desiderio di vendetta, nè le lascia nè può lasciare riposare la memoria dell’antica libertà; talchè la più sicura via è spegnerle, o abitarvi.\n\n### Chapter VI\n\nDe’ Principati nuovi, che con le proprie armi e virtù si acquistano.\n\nNon si maravigli alcuno se nel parlare che io farò de’ Principati al tutto nuovi, e di Principe e di Stato, io addurrò grandissimi esempi; perchè, camminando gli uomini quasi sempre per le vie battute da altri, e procedendo nelle azioni loro con le imitazioni, nè si potendo le vie d’altri al tutto tenere, nè alla virtù di quelli che tu imiti, aggiugnere, debbe un uomo prudente entrare sempre per vie battute da uomini grandi, e quelli che sono stati eccellentissimi, imitare, acciochè se la sua virtù non v’arriva, almeno ne renda qualche odore; e fare come gli arcieri prudenti, ai quali parendo il luogo, dove disegnano ferire, troppo lontano, e cognoscendo fino a quanto arriva la virtù del loro arco, pongono la mira assai più alta, che il luogo destinato, non per aggiugnere con la loro forza o freccia a tanta altezza, ma per potere con lo aiuto di sì alta mira pervenire al disegno loro. Dico adunque, che ne’ Principati in tutto nuovi, dove sia un nuovo Principe, si trova più o meno difficultà a mantenergli, secondo che più o meno virtuoso è colui che gli acquista. E perchè questo evento di diventare di privato Principe presuppone o virtù o fortuna, pare che l’una o l’altra di queste due cose mitighino in parte molte difficultà. Nondimeno colui che è stato manco in su la fortuna, si è mantenuto più. Genera ancora facilità l’essere il Principe costretto, per avere altri Stati, venirvi personalmente ad abitare. Ma per venire a quelli, che per propria virtù e non per fortuna sono diventati Principi, dico, che li più eccellenti sono Moisè, Ciro, Romulo, Teseo, e simili. E benchè di Moisè non si debba ragionare, essendo stato un mero esecutore delle cose che gli erano ordinate da Dio; pure merita di essere ammirato solamente per quella grazia che lo faceva degno di parlare con Dio.\n\nMa considerando Ciro e gli altri, che hanno acquistato o fondato regni, si troveranno tutti mirabili; e se si considereranno le azioni e ordini loro  particulari, non parranno differenti da quelli di Moisè, benchè egli ebbe sì gran precettore. Ed esaminando le azioni, e vita loro, non si vedrà che quelli avessino altro dalla fortuna, che l’occasione, la quale dette loro materia di potervi introdurre quella forma che a lor parse; e senza quella occasione la virtù dell’animo loro si saria spenta, e senza quella virtù l’occasione sarebbe venuta invano. Era adunque necessario a Moisè trovare il popolo d’Isdrael in Egitto schiavo, e oppresso dagli Egizi, acciocchè quelli, per uscire di servitù, si disponessino a seguirlo. Conveniva che Romulo non capesse in Alba, e fusse stato esposto al nascer suo, a volere che diventasse Re di Roma, e fondatore di quella patria. Bisognava che Ciro trovasse i Persi malcontenti dell’imperio de’ Medi, ed i Medi molli ed effeminati per lunga pace. Non poteva Teseo dimostrare la sua virtù, se non trovava gli Ateniesi dispersi. Queste occasioni pertanto feciono questi uomini felici, e l’eccellente virtù loro fece quella occasione esser cognosciuta: donde la loro patria ne fu nobilitata, e diventò felicissima. Quelli i quali per vie virtuose simili a costoro diventano Principi, acquistano il Principato con difficultà, ma con facilità lo tengono; e le difficultà che hanno nell’acquistare il Principato, nascono in parte da’ nuovi ordini e modi, che sono forzati introdurre per fondare lo Stato loro e la loro sicurtà. E debbesi considerare come non è cosa più difficile a trattare, nè più dubbia a riuscire, nè più pericolosa a maneggiare, che farsi capo ad introdurre nuovi ordini. Perchè l’introduttore ha per nimici tutti coloro che degli ordini vecchi fanno bene; e tepidi difensori tutti quelli che degli ordini nuovi farebbono bene; la qual tepidezza nasce, parte per paura degli avversari, che hanno le leggi in beneficio loro, parte dalla incredulità degli uomini, i quali non credono in verità le cose nuove, se non ne veggono nata esperienza ferma. Donde nasce che qualunque volta quelli che sono nimici, hanno occasione di assaltare, lo fanno parzialmente, e quelli altri difendono tepidamente, in modo che insieme con loro si periclita. È necessario pertanto, volendo discorrere bene questa parte, esaminare se questi innovatori stanno per lor medesimi, o se dipendano da altri; cioè, se per condurre l’opera loro bisogna che preghino, ovvero possono forzare. Nel primo caso capitano sempre male, e non conducono cosa alcuna; ma quando dipendono da loro proprii, e possono forzare, allora è che rade volte periclitano. Di qui nacque che tutti li Profeti armati vinsono, e li disarmati rovinarono; perchè, oltre le cose dette, la natura de’ popoli è varia, ed è facile a persuadere loro una cosa, ma è difficile fermargli in quella persuasione. E però conviene essere ordinato in modo, che, quando non credono più, si possa far lor credere per forza.\n\nMoisè, Ciro, Teseo, e Romulo non arebbono potuto fare osservare lungamente le loro costituzioni, se fussero stati disarmati, come ne’ nostri tempi intervenne a Frate Girolamo Savonarola, il quale rovinò ne’ suoi ordini nuovi, come la moltitudine cominciò a non credergli, e lui non aveva il modo da tenere fermi quelli, che avevano creduto, nè a far credere i discredenti. Però questi tali hanno nel condursi gran difficultà, e tutti i loro pericoli sono tra via, e conviene che con la virtù gli superino; ma superati che gli hanno, e che cominciano ad essere in venerazione, avendo spenti quelli che di sua qualità gli avevano invidia, rimangono potenti, sicuri, onorati, felici. A sì alti esempi io voglio aggiugnere uno esempio minore; ma bene arà qualche proporzione con quelli, e voglio mi basti per tutti li altri simili: e questo è Ierone Siracusano. Costui di privato diventò Principe di Siracusa; nè ancor egli cognobbe altro dalla fortuna che l’occasione: perchè essendo i Siracusani oppressi l’elessono per loro capitano, donde meritò d’essere fatto loro Principe; e fu di tanta virtù ancora in privata fortuna, che chi ne scrive dice, che niente gli mancava a regnare eccetto il Regno. Costui spense la milizia vecchia, ordinò la nuova, lasciò le amicizie antiche, prese delle nuove; e come ebbe amicizie e soldati che fussero suoi, potette in su tale fondamento edificare ogni edificio; tantochè egli durò assai fatica in acquistare, e poca in mantenere.\n\n### Chapter VII\n\nDe’ Principati nuovi, che con forze d’altri e per fortuna si acquistano.\n\nColoro i quali solamente per fortuna diventano di privati Principi, con poca fatica diventano, ma con assai si mantengono: e non hanno difficultà alcuna tra via, perchè vi volano; ma tutte le difficultà nascono dappoi che vi sono posti. E questi tali sono quelli, a chi è concesso alcuno Stato o per danari, o per grazia di chi lo concede, come intervenne a molti in Grecia nelle città di Ionia, e dell’Ellesponto, dove furono fatti Principi da Dario, acciò le tenessero per sua sicurtà e gloria, come erano ancora fatti quelli Imperadori, che di privati per corruzione de’ soldati pervenivano allo Imperio. Questi stanno semplicemente in su la volontà e fortuna di chi gli ha fatti grandi, che sono due cose volubilissime e instabili, e non sanno e non possono tenere quel grado; non sanno, perchè se non è uomo di grande ingegno e virtù, non è ragionevole, che, essendo sempre vissuto in privata fortuna, sappia comandare; non possono, perchè non hanno forze che gli possino essere amiche e fedeli. Dipoi gli Stati che vengono subito, come tutte le altre cose della natura che nascono e crescono presto, non possono avere le radici e corrispondenzie loro in modo che il primo tempo avverso non le spenga; se già quelli, come è detto, che sì in un subito sono diventati Principi, non sono di tanta virtù, che quello che la fortuna ha messo loro in grembo, sappino subito prepararsi a conservare, e quelli fondamenti, che gli altri hanno fatti avanti che diventino Principi, gli faccino poi.\n\nIo voglio all’uno e all’altro di questi modi, circa il diventare Principe per virtù o per fortuna, addurre duoi esempi stati ne’ dì della memoria nostra: e questi sono Francesco Sforza, e Cesare Borgia. Francesco per li debiti mezzi, e con una sua gran virtù, di privato diventò Duca di Milano, e quello che con mille affanni aveva acquistato, con poca fatica mantenne. Dall’altra parte Cesare Borgia, chiamato dal vulgo Duca Valentino, acquistò lo Stato con la fortuna del Padre, e con quella lo perdette, non ostante che per lui si usasse ogni opera, e facessinsi tutte quelle cose che per un prudente e virtuoso uomo si dovevano fare, per mettere le radici sue in quelli Stati, che l’armi e fortuna di altri gli aveva concessi. Perchè, come di sopra si disse, chi non fa i fondamenti prima, gli potrebbe con una gran virtù fare dipoi, ancorchè si faccino con disagio dell’architettore, e pericolo dello edificio. Se adunque si considererà tutti i progressi del Duca, si vedrà quanto lui avesse fatto gran fondamenti alla futura potenzia, li quali non giudico superfluo discorrere, perchè io non saprei quali precetti mi dare migliori ad un Principe nuovo, che lo esempio delle azioni sue; e se gli ordini suoi non gli giovarono, non fu sua colpa, perchè nacque da una strasordinaria ed estrema malignità di fortuna. Aveva Alessandro VI nel voler fare grande il Duca suo figliuolo assai difficultà presenti e future. Prima non vedeva via di poterlo fare Signore di alcuno Stato, che non fusse Stato di Chiesa; e sapeva che il Duca di Milano e i Viniziani non glielo consentirebbono, perchè Faenza e Rimino erano di già sotto la protezione de’ Viniziani. Vedeva, oltre a questo, le armi d’Italia, e quelle in spezie, di chi si fusse possuto servire, essere nelle mani di coloro che dovevano temere la grandezza del Papa; e però non se ne poteva fidare, essendo tutte negli Orsini, e Colonnesi, e loro seguaci. Era adunque necessario che si turbassero quelli ordini, e disordinare gli Stati d’Italia, per potersi insignorire sicuramente di parte di quelli; il che gli fu facile; perchè trovò i Viniziani, che mossi da altre cagioni si erano volti a fare ripassare i Francesi in Italia; il che non solamente non contradisse, ma fece più facile con la risoluzione del matrimonio antico del Re Luigi. Passò adunque il Re in Italia con lo aiuto de’ Viniziani e consenso di Alessandro; nè prima fu in Milano, che il Papa ebbe da lui gente per l’impresa di Romagna, la quale gli fu consentita per la riputazione del Re.\n\n Acquistata adunque il Duca la Romagna, e battuti i Colonnesi, volendo mantenere quella, e procedere più avanti, l’impedivano due cose: l’una l’armi sue, che non gli parevano fedeli; l’altra la volontà di Francia; cioè temeva che l’armi Orsine, delle quali si era servito, non gli mancassero sotto, e non solamente gl’impedissero l’acquistare, ma gli togliessero l’acquistato; e che il Re ancora non gli facesse il simile. Degli Orsini ne ebbe uno riscontro quando dopo l’espugnazione di Faenza assaltò Bologna, che gli vide andare freddi in quello assalto. E circa il Re, cognobbe l’animo suo, quando, preso il Ducato di Urbino, assaltò la Toscana; dalla quale impresa il Re lo fece desistere; ondechè il Duca deliberò non dipendere più dalla fortuna ed armi d’altri. E la prima cosa indebolì le parti Orsine e Colonnesi in Roma, perchè tutti gli aderenti loro, che fussino gentiluomini, si guadagnò, facendogli suoi gentiluomini, e, dando loro gran provvisioni, gli onorò secondo le qualità loro, di condotte e di governi; in modo che in pochi mesi negli animi loro l’affezione delle parti si spense, e tutta si volse nel Duca.\n\nDopo questo aspettò l’occasione di spegnere gli Orsini, avendo dispersi quelli di casa Colonna, la quale gli venne bene, ed egli usò meglio; perchè avvedutisi gli Orsini tardi che la grandezza del Duca e della Chiesa era la lor rovina, fecero una dieta a Magione nel Perugino. Da quella nacque la ribellione di Urbino, e li tumulti di Romagna, ed infiniti pericoli del Duca, li quali superò tutti con l’aiuto de’ Francesi; e ritornatoli la riputazione, nè si fidando di Francia, nè di altre forze esterne, per non le avere a cimentare si volse agl’inganni, e seppe tanto dissimulare l’animo suo, che gli Orsini, mediante il Signor Paulo, si riconciliarono seco, con il quale il duca non mancò di ogni ragione di ufizio per assicurarlo, dandoli veste, danari, e cavalli; tantochè la semplicità loro gli condusse a Sinigaglia nelle sue mani. Spenti adunque questi capi, e ridotti li partigiani loro amici suoi, aveva il Duca gittati assai buoni fondamenti alla potenza sua, avendo tutta la Romagna con il Ducato di Urbino, e guadagnatosi tutti quei popoli, per avere incominciato a gustare il ben essere loro. E perchè questa parte è degna di notizia, e da essere imitata da altri, non la voglio lasciare indietro.\n\nPreso che ebbe il Duca la Romagna, trovandola essere stata comandata da Signori impotenti, quali piuttosto avevano spogliato i loro sudditi, che correttoli, e dato loro materia di disunione, che di unione; tantochè quella provincia era tutta piena di latrocini, di brighe, e di ogni altra sorte d’insolenza, giudicò necessario, a volerla ridurre pacifica ed obbediente al braccio regio, darli un buon governo. Però vi prepose messer Ramiro d’Orco, uomo crudele ed espedito, al quale dette pienissima potestà. Costui in breve tempo la ridusse pacifica e unita con grandissima riputazione. Dipoi giudicò il Duca non essere a proposito sì eccessiva autorità, perchè dubitava non diventasse odiosa; e preposevi un giudizio civile nel mezzo della provincia, con un presidente eccellentissimo, dove ogni città avea l’avvocato suo. E perchè cognosceva le rigorosità passate avergli generato qualche odio, per purgare gli animi di quelli popoli, e guadagnarseli in tutto, volse mostrare che se crudeltà alcuna era seguita, non era nata da lui, ma dall’acerba natura del ministro. E, preso sopra questo occasione, lo fece mettere una mattina in duo pezzi a Cesena in su la piazza con un pezzo di legno e un coltello sanguinoso a canto. La ferocità del quale spettacolo fece quelli popoli in un tempo rimanere soddisfatti e stupidi. Ma torniamo donde noi partimmo.\n\nDico, che trovandosi il Duca assai potente, ed in parte assicurato da’ presenti pericoli, per essersi armato a suo modo, ed avere in buona parte spente quelle armi che vicine lo potevano offendere, li restava, volendo procedere con l’acquisto, il respetto di Francia; perchè cognosceva che dal Re, il quale tardi si era avveduto dell’errore suo, non gli sarebbe sopportato. E cominciò per questo a cercare amicizie nuove, e vacillare con Francia, nella venuta che fecero i Francesi verso il Regno di Napoli contro li Spagnuoli che assediavano Gaeta. E l’animo suo era di assicurarsi di loro; il che già saria presto riuscito, se Alessandro viveva. E questi furono i governi suoi circa le cose presenti. Ma quanto alle future egli aveva da dubitare; prima che un nuovo successore alla Chiesa non gli fusse amico, e cercasse torgli quello che Alessandro gli aveva dato; e pensò farlo in quattro modi. Primo, con ispegnere tutti i sangui di quelli Signori che egli aveva spogliato, per torre al Papa quelle occasioni. Secondo, con guadagnarsi tutti i gentiluomini di Roma per potere con quelli, come è detto, tenere il Papa in freno. Terzo, con ridurre il Collegio più suo che poteva. Quarto, con acquistare tanto imperio, avanti che il Papa morisse, che potesse per sè medesimo resistere a un primo impeto.\n\nDi queste quattro cose alla morte di Alessandro ne aveva condotte tre; la quarta aveva quasi per condotta. Perchè de’ Signori spogliati ne ammazzò quanti ne potè aggiugnere, e pochissimi si salvarono; i gentiluomini Romani si aveva guadagnato; e nel Collegio aveva grandissima parte. E quanto al nuovo acquisto, aveva disegnato diventare Signore di Toscana; e possedeva già Perugia e Piombino, e di Pisa aveva preso la protezione. E come non avesse dovuto avere rispetto a Francia (che non glie n’aveva ad aver più, per essere già i Francesi spogliati del Regno di Napoli dagli Spagnuoli, in forma che ciascun di loro era necessitato di comperare l’amicizia sua), saltava in Pisa. Dopo questo, Lucca e Siena cedeva subito, parte per invidia de’ Fiorentini, e parte per paura; i Fiorentini non avevano rimedio; il che se li fusse riuscito, che gli riusciva l’anno medesimo che Alessandro morì, si acquistava tante forze e tanta riputazione, che per sè stesso si sarebbe retto, senza dipendere dalla fortuna o forza d’altri, ma solo dalla potenza e virtù sua. Ma Alessandro morì dopo cinque anni, che egli aveva incominciato a trarre fuora la spada. Lasciollo con lo Stato di Roma solamente assolidato, con tutti gli altri in aria, intra duoi potentissimi eserciti inimici, ammalato a morte. Ed era nel Duca tanta ferocia e tanta virtù, e si ben cognosceva come gli uomini s’abbino a guadagnare o perdere, e tanto erano validi i fondamenti che in sì poco tempo si aveva fatti, che se non avesse avuto quelli eserciti addosso, o fusse stato sano, arebbe retto ad ogni difficultà. E che li fondamenti suoi fussino buoni, si vide, che la Romagna l’aspettò più di un mese; in Roma, ancora che mezzo morto, stette sicuro; e benchè i Baglioni, Vitelli, e Orsini venissero in Roma, non ebbero seguito contro di lui. Potè fare, se non chi egli volle, almeno che non fusse Papa chi egli non voleva. Ma se nella morte di Alessandro fusse stato sano, ogni cosa gli era facile. Ed egli mi disse ne’ dì che fu creato Iulio II, che avea pensato a tutto quello che potesse nascere morendo il Padre, e a tutto aveva trovato rimedio, eccetto che non pensò mai in su la sua morte di stare ancora lui per morire. Raccolte adunque tutte queste azioni del Duca, non saprei riprenderlo, anzi mi pare, come io ho fatto, di proporlo ad imitare a tutti coloro, che per fortuna e con l’armi d’altri sono saliti all’imperio. Perchè egli avendo l’animo grande, e la sua intenzione alta, non si poteva governare altrimente; e solo si oppose alli suoi disegni la brevità della vita di Alessandro, e la sua infirmità.\n\nChi adunque giudica necessario nel suo Principato nuovo assicurarsi degl’inimici, guadagnarsi amici, vincere o per forza o per fraude, farsi amare e temere da’ populi, seguire e riverire da’ soldati, spegnere quelli che ti possono o debbono offendere, e innovare con nuovi modi gli ordini antichi, essere severo e grato, magnanimo e liberale, spegnere la milizia infedele, creare della nuova, mantenersi le amicizie de’ Re e delli Principi, in modo che ti abbino a beneficare con grazia, o ad offendere con rispetto, non può trovare più freschi esempi, che le azioni di costui. Solamente si può accusarlo nella creazione di Iulio II, nella quale egli ebbe mala elezione; perchè, come è detto, non potendo fare un Papa a suo modo, poteva tenere, che uno non fusse Papa; e non dovea acconsentire mai al Papato di quelli Cardinali, che lui avesse offesi, o che diventati Pontefici avessino ad avere paura di lui. Perchè gli uomini offendono o per paura, o per odio. Quelli che egli aveva offesi, erano, tra gli altri, S. Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, S. Giorgio, Ascanio. Tutti gli altri assunti al Pontificato avevano da temerlo, eccetto Roano e gli Spagnuoli. Questi per coniunzione e obbligo, quello per potenza, avendo congiunto seco il Regno di Francia. Pertanto il Duca innanzi ad ogni cosa doveva creare Papa uno Spagnuolo; e, non potendo, dovea consentire che fusse Roano, e non S. Pietro ad Vincula. E chi crede che ne’ personaggi grandi beneficii nuovi faccino dimenticare l’ingiurie vecchie, s’inganna. Errò adunque il Duca in questa elezione, e fu cagione dell’ultima rovina sua.\n\n### Chapter VIII\n\nDi quelli che per scelleratezze sono pervenuti al Principato.\n\nMa perchè di privato si diventa ancora in duoi modi Principe, il che non si può al tutto, o alla fortuna, o alla virtù attribuire, non mi pare da lasciargli indietro, ancora che dell’uno si possa più diffusamente ragionare dove si trattasse delle Republiche. Questi sono, quando o per qualche via scellerata e nefaria si ascende al Principato, o quando uno privato cittadino con il favore degli altri suoi cittadini diventa Principe della sua patria. E, parlando del primo modo, si mostrerà con duoi esempi, l’uno antico, l’altro moderno, senza entrare altrimenti ne’ meriti di questa parte, perchè giudico che bastino a chi fusse necessitato imitargli. Agatocle Siciliano, non solo di privata, ma d’infima ed abietta fortuna, divenne Re di Siracusa. Costui nato di un orciolaio, tenne sempre per i gradi della sua fortuna vita scellerata. Nondimanco accompagnò le sue scelleratezze con tanta virtù di animo e di corpo, che voltosi alla milizia, per li gradi di quella pervenne ad essere Pretore di Siracusa. Nel quale grado essendo costituito, ed avendo deliberato volere diventar Principe, e tenere con violenza e senza obbligo d’altri quello che d’accordo gli era stato concesso, ed avuto di questo suo disegno intelligenza con Amilcare Cartaginese, il quale con gli eserciti militava in Sicilia, congregò una mattina il Popolo ed il Senato di Siracusa, come se egli avesse avuto a deliberare cose pertinenti alla Repubblica; e, ad uno cenno ordinato, fece da’ suoi soldati uccidere tutti li Senatori, e li più ricchi del popolo; li quali morti, occupò e tenne il Principato di quella città senza alcuna controversia civile. E benchè da’ Cartaginesi fusse due volte rotto, e ultimamente assediato, non solamente potè difendere la sua città, ma lasciata parte della sua gente alla difesa di quella, con l’altre assaltò l’Affrica, e in breve tempo liberò Siracusa dall’assedio, e condusse i Cartaginesi in estrema necessità: i quali furono necessitati ad accordarsi con quello, ad essere contenti della possessione dell’Affrica, e ad Agatocle lasciare la Sicilia.\n\nChi considerasse adunque le azioni e virtù di costui, non vedria cose o poche, le quali possa attribuire alla fortuna, conciossiachè, come di sopra è detto, non per favore di alcuno, ma per li gradi della milizia, quali con mille disagi e pericoli si aveva guadagnato, pervenisse al Principato, e quello dipoi con tanti animosi partiti e pericolosi mantenesse. Non si può chiamare ancora virtù  ammazzare li suoi cittadini, tradire gli amici, essere senza fede, senza pietà, senza religione; li quali modi possono far acquistare imperio, ma non gloria. Perchè se si considerasse la virtù di Agatocle nell’entrare e nell’uscire de’ pericoli, e la grandezza dell’animo suo nel sopportare e superare le cose avverse, non si vede perchè egli abbia ad essere tenuto inferiore a qualsisia eccellentissimo capitano. Nondimeno la sua efferata crudeltà e inumanità, con infinite scelleratezze, non consentono che sia tra li eccellentissimi uomini celebrato. Non si può adunque attribuire alla fortuna o alla virtù quello che senza l’una e l’altra fu da lui conseguito. Ne’ tempi nostri, regnante Alessandro VI, Oliverotto da Fermo, essendo più anni addietro rimaso piccolo, fu da un suo zio materno, chiamato Giovanni Fogliani, allevato, e ne’ primi tempi della sua gioventù dato a militare sotto Paulo Vitelli, acciocchè ripieno di quella disciplina, pervenisse a qualche grado eccellente di milizia. Morto dipoi Paulo, militò sotto Vitellozzo suo fratello, ed in brevissimo tempo, per essere ingegnoso, e della persona e dell’animo gagliardo, diventò de’ primi uomini della sua milizia. Ma parendogli cosa servile lo stare con altri, pensò, con l’aiuto di alcuni cittadini di Fermo, a’ quali era più cara la servitù, che la libertà della loro patria, e con il favore Vitellesco, di occupare Fermo; e scrisse a Giovanni Fogliani, come essendo stato più anni fuor di casa, voleva venire a veder lui e la sua città, e in qualche parte ricognoscere il suo patrimonio. E perchè non si era affaticato per altro, che per acquistare onore, acciocchè i suoi cittadini vedessero come non aveva speso il tempo invano, voleva venire onorevolmente, ed accompagnato da  cento cavalli di suoi amici e servitori, e pregavalo che fusse contento ordinare che da’ Firmani fusse ricevuto onoratamente; il che non solamente tornava onore a lui, ma a sè proprio, essendo suo allievo.\n\nNon mancò pertanto Giovanni di alcuno officio debito verso il nipote, e fattolo ricevere onoratamente da’ Firmani, alloggiò nelle case sue, dove passato alcun giorno, ed atteso a ordinare quello che alla sua futura scelleratezza era necessario, fece un convito solennissimo, dove invitò Giovanni Fogliani, e tutti li primi uomini di Fermo. Ed avuto che ebbero fine le vivande, e tutti gli altri intrattenimenti che in simili conviti si fanno, Oliverotto ad arte mosse certi ragionamenti gravi, parlando della grandezza di Papa Alessandro e di Cesare suo figliuolo, e dell’imprese loro; alli quali ragionamenti rispondendo Giovanni e gli altri, egli ad un tratto si rizzò, dicendo quelle essere cose da parlarne in più segreto luogo, e ritirossi in una camera, dove Giovanni e tutti gli altri cittadini gli andarono dietro: Nè prima furono posti a sedere, che da luoghi secreti di quella uscirono soldati che ammazzarono Giovanni e tutti gli altri. Dopo il quale omicidio montò Oliverotto a cavallo, e corse la terra, ed assediò nel palazzo il supremo magistrato; tantochè per paura furono costretti ubbidirlo, e fermare un governo, del quale si fece Principe. E morti tutti quelli che, per essere malcontenti, lo potevano offendere, si corroborò con nuovi ordini civili e militari; in modo che in spazio di un anno che tenne il Principato, non solamente egli era sicuro nella città di Fermo, ma era diventato formidabile a tutti li suoi vicini; e sarebbe stata la sua espugnazione difficile, come quella di Agatocle, se non si  fusse lasciato ingannare da Cesare Borgia, quando a Sinigaglia, come di sopra si disse, prese gli Orsini e Vitelli, dove, preso ancora lui, un anno dopo il commesso parricidio, fu insieme con Vitellozzo, il quale aveva avuto maestro delle virtù e scelleratezze sue, strangolato.\n\nPotrebbe alcuno dubitare donde nascesse che Agatocle ed alcuno simile, dopo infiniti tradimenti e crudeltà, potette vivere lungamente sicuro nella sua patria, e difendersi dagl’inimici esterni, e da suoi cittadini non gli fu mai conspirato contra; conciossiachè molti altri, mediante la crudeltà, non abbino mai possuto ancora ne’ tempi pacifici mantenere lo Stato, non che ne’ tempi dubbiosi di guerre. Credo che questo avvenga dalle crudeltà male usate o bene usate. Bene usate si possono chiamare quelle, se del male è lecito dire bene, che si fanno una sol volta per necessità dell’assicurarsi, e dipoi non vi s’insiste dentro, ma si convertiscono in più utilità de’ sudditi che si può. Le male usate sono quelle, quali ancora che da principio siano poche, crescono piuttosto col tempo che le si spenghino. Coloro che osserveranno quel primo modo, possono con Dio e con gli uomini allo Stato loro avere qualche rimedio, come ebbe Agatocle. Quegli altri è impossibile si mantenghino. Onde è da notare, che nel pigliare uno Stato, debbe l’occupatore di esso discorrere e fare tutte le crudeltà in un tratto, e per non avere a ritornarvi ogni dì, e per potere, non l’innovando, assicurare gli uomini, e guadagnarseli con beneficargli. Chi fa altrimente per timidità o per mal consiglio, è sempre necessitato tenere il coltello in mano, nè mai si può fondare sopra i suoi sudditi, non si potendo quelli, per le continue e  fresche ingiurie, assicurare di lui. Perchè le ingiurie si debbono fare tutte insieme, acciocchè assaporandosi meno, offendino meno; li beneficii si debbono fare a poco a poco, acciocchè si assaporino meglio. E deve sopra tutto un Principe vivere con li suoi sudditi in modo che nessuno accidente, o di male, o di bene, lo abbia a far variare; perchè, venendo per li tempi avversi la necessità, tu non sei a tempo al male; ed il bene che tu fai, non ti giova, perchè è giudicato forzato, e non grado alcuno ne riporti.\n\n### Chapter IX\n\nDel Principato civile.\n\nMa venendo all’altra parte quando un Principe cittadino, non per scelleratezza o altra intollerabile violenza, ma con il favore degli altri suoi cittadini diventa Principe della sua patria, il qual si può chiamare Principato civile, nè al pervenirvi è necessario o tutta virtù, o tutta fortuna, ma piuttosto un’astuzia fortunata; dico, che si ascende a questo Principato o col favore del popolo, o col favore de’ grandi. Perchè in ogni città si trovano questi duoi umori diversi, e nascono da questo, che il popolo desidera non esser comandato nè oppresso da’ grandi, e i grandi desiderano comandare e opprimere il popolo; e da questi duoi appetiti diversi surge nelle città uno de’ tre effetti, o Principato, o Libertà, o Licenza. Il Principato è causato o dal popolo, o da’ grandi, secondochè l’una, o l’altra di queste parte ne ha l’occasione; perchè vedendo i grandi non poter resistere al popolo, cominciano a voltare la  riputazione ad uno di loro, e lo fanno Principe, per poter sotto l’ombra sua sfogare l’appetito loro. Il popolo ancora volta la riputazione ad un solo, vedendo non poter resistere alli grandi, e lo fa Principe, per essere con l’autorità sua difeso. Colui che viene al Principato con l’aiuto de’ grandi, si mantiene con più difficultà, che quello che diventa con l’aiuto del popolo; perchè si trova Principe con di molti intorno che a loro pare essere eguali a lui; e per questo non gli può nè comandare, nè maneggiare a suo modo. Ma colui che arriva al Principato con il favor popolare, vi si trova solo, e ha intorno o nessuno o pochissimi che non sieno parati ad ubbidire. Oltre a questo, non si può con onestà satisfare a’ grandi, e senza ingiuria d’altri, ma sibbene al popolo; perchè quello del popolo è più onesto fine che quel de’ grandi, volendo questi opprimere, e quello non essere oppresso. Aggiungesi ancora, che del popolo nimico il Principe non si può mai assicurare per essere troppi; de’ grandi si può assicurare per essere pochi.\n\nIl peggio che possa aspettare un Principe dal popolo nimico, è l’essere abbandonato da lui; ma da’ grandi nimici non solo debbe temere di essere abbandonato, ma che ancor loro gli venghino contro; perchè essendo in quelli più vedere e più astuzia, avanzano sempre tempo per salvarsi, e cercano gradi con quello che sperano che vinca. È necessitato ancora il Principe vivere sempre con quel medesimo popolo, ma può ben fare senza quelli medesimi grandi, potendo farne e disfarne ogni dì, e torre e dare, quando gli piace, riputazione loro. E per chiarire meglio questa parte, dico, come i grandi si debbono considerare in duoi modi principalmente, cioè o si governano in modo col procedere loro, che si obbligano in tutto alla tua fortuna, o no; quelli che si obbligano, e non sieno rapaci, si debbono onorare ed amare; quelli che non si obbligano, si hanno a considerare in duoi modi: o fanno questo per pusillanimità e difetto naturale d’animo, ed allora ti debbi servir di loro, e di quelli massime che sono di buon consiglio; perchè nelle prosperità te ne onori, e nelle avversità non hai da temere. Ma quando non si obbligano ad arte, e per cagione ambiziosa, è segno come e’ pensano più a sè, che a te. E da quelli si deve il Principe guardare, e tenergli come se fussero scoperti nimici, perchè sempre nelle avversità l’aiuteranno rovinare. Debbe pertanto uno che diventa Principe per favore del popolo, mantenerselo amico; il che gli fia facile, non domandando lui se non di non essere oppresso. Ma uno che contro il popolo diventi Principe con il favor de’ grandi, deve innanzi ogni altra cosa cercare di guadagnarsi il popolo; il che gli fia facile, quando pigli la protezione sua. E perchè gli uomini, quando hanno bene da chi credevano aver male, si obbligano più al beneficatore loro, diventa il popolo suddito più suo benevolo, che se si fusse condotto al Principato per li suoi favori; e puosselo il Principe guadagnare in molti modi, li quali perchè variano secondo il suggetto, non se ne può dare certa regola; però si lasceranno indietro.\n\nConchiuderò solo che ad un Principe è necessario avere il popolo amico, altrimenti non ha nelle avversità rimedio. Nabide Principe degli Spartani sostenne l’ossidione di tutta Grecia e di uno esercito Romano vittoriosissimo, e difese contro a quelli la patria sua e il suo Stato, e gli bastò solo,  sopravvenendo il pericolo, assicurarsi di pochi. Che se egli avessi avuto il popolo nemico, questo non gli bastava. E non sia alcuno che ripugni a questa mia opinione con quel proverbio trito, che chi fonda in sul populo fonda in sul fango; perchè quello è vero, quando un cittadino privato vi fa su fondamento, e dassi ad intendere che il popolo lo liberi quando esso fusse oppresso dagl’inimici, o da’ magistrati; in questo caso si potrebbe trovare spesso ingannato, come intervenne in Roma a’ Gracchi, ed a Firenze a Messer Giorgio Scali. Ma essendo un Principe quello che sopra vi si fonda, che possa comandare, e sia un uomo di cuore, nè si sbigottisca nelle avversità, e non manchi delle altre preparazioni, e tenga con l’animo e ordini suoi animato l’universale, non si troverà ingannato da lui, e gli parrà aver fatti i suoi fondamenti buoni. Sogliono questi Principati periclitare quando sono per salire dall’ordine civile allo assoluto: perchè questi Principi o comandano per loro medesimi, o per mezzo de’ magistrati. Nell’ultimo caso è più debole e più pericoloso lo Stato loro, perchè egli stanno al tutto con la volontà di quelli cittadini che sono preposti a’ magistrati, li quali, massimamente ne’ tempi avversi, gli possono torre con facilità grande lo Stato o con fargli contro, o col non l’ubbidire; e il Principe non è a tempo ne’ pericoli a pigliare l’autorità assoluta, perchè li cittadini, e sudditi, che sogliono avere li comandamenti da’ magistrati, non sono in quelli frangenti per ubbidire a’ suoi, e arà sempre ne’ tempi dubbi penuria di chi si possa fidare. Perchè simil Principe non può fondarsi sopra quello che vede ne’ tempi quieti, quando i cittadini hanno bisogno dello Stato; perchè allora ognuno corre, ognuno promette, e ciascuno vuole morire per lui quando la morte è discosto; ma ne’ tempi avversi, quando lo Stato ha bisogno de’ cittadini, allora se ne trova pochi. E tanto più è questa esperienza pericolosa, quanto la non si può fare se non una volta. Però uno Principe savio deve pensare un modo, per il quale li suoi cittadini sempre, ed in ogni modo e qualità di tempo, abbino bisogno dello Stato di lui, e sempre poi gli saranno fedeli.\n\n### Chapter X\n\nIn che modo le forze di tutti i Principati si debbino misurare.\n\nConviene avere, nell’esaminare le qualità di questi Principati, un’altra considerazione; cioè se un Principe ha tanto Stato, che possa, bisognando, per sè medesimo reggersi, ovvero se ha sempre necessità della defensione d’altri. E, per chiarire meglio questa parte, dico, come io giudico potersi coloro reggere per sè medesimi, che possono o per abbondanzia d’uomini, o di danari, mettere insieme un esercito giusto, e fare una giornata con qualunque li viene ad assaltare; e così giudico coloro aver sempre necessità d’altri, che non possono comparire contro gli inimici in campagna, ma sono necessitati rifuggirsi dentro alle mura, e guardare quelle. Nel primo caso si è discorso; e per l’avvenire diremo quello che ne occorre. Nel secondo caso non si può dire altro, salvo che confortare tali Principi a munire e fortificare la terra propria, e del paese non tenere alcun conto. E qualunque arà bene fortificata la sua terra, e circa gli altri governi con i sudditi si sia maneggiato, come di sopra è detto, e di sotto si dirà, sarà sempre assaltato con gran rispetto; perchè gli uomini sono sempre nimici delle imprese, dove si vegga difficultà; nè si può vedere facilità assaltando uno che abbia la sua terra gagliarda, e non sia odiato dal popolo.\n\nLe città d’Alemagna sono liberissime, hanno poco contado, ed ubbidiscono all’Imperadore quando le vogliono, e non temono nè questo, nè altro potente che l’abbino intorno, perchè le sono in modo fortificate, che ciascuno pensa la espugnazione di esse dovere essere tediosa e difficile, perchè tutte hanno fossi e mura convenienti, hanno artiglieria a sufficienza, e tengono sempre nelle canove pubbliche da mangiare e da bere, e da ardere per un anno. Ed oltre a questo, per potere tenere la plebe pasciuta, e senza perdita del pubblico, hanno sempre in comune per un anno da poter dar loro da lavorare in quelli esercizi che siano il nervo e la vita di quella città, e dell’industria de’ quali la plebe si pasca; tengono ancora gli esercizi militari in riputazione, e sopra questo hanno molti ordini a mantenerli. Un Principe adunque che abbia una città forte, e non si facci odiare, non può essere assaltato; e se pur fusse chi lo assaltasse, se ne partirebbe con vergogna; perchè le cose del mondo sono sì varie, che egli è quasi impossibile che uno possa con gli eserciti stare un anno ozioso, e campeggiarlo. E chi replicasse, se il popolo arà le sue possessioni fuora, e veggale ardere, non arà pazienza; e il lungo assedio e la carità propria gli farà dimenticare il Principe; rispondo che un Principe potente ed animoso supererà sempre quelle difficultà, dando ora speranza a’ sudditi che il male non sia lungo, ora timore della crudeltà del nimico, ora assicurandosi con destrezza di quelli che gli paressono troppo arditi.\n\nOltre a questo il nimico debbe ragionevolmente ardere e rovinare il paese loro in su la giunta sua, e ne’ tempi quando gli animi degli uomini sono ancora caldi, e volenterosi alla difesa; e però tanto meno il Principe debbe dubitare, perchè dopo qualche giorno che gli animi sono raffredditi, sono di già fatti i danni, sono ricevuti i mali, e non vi è più rimedio; ed allora tanto più si vengono ad unire col loro Principe, parendo che esso abbia con loro obligo, essendo state loro arse le case, e rovinate le possessioni per la difesa sua. E la natura degli uomini è, così obligarsi per li beneficii che essi fanno, come per quelli che essi ricevono. Onde se si considera bene tutto, non fia difficile a un Principe prudente tenere prima e poi fermi gli animi de’ suoi cittadini nella ossidione, quando non gli manchi da vivere, nè da difendersi.\n\n### Chapter XI\n\nDe’ Principati Ecclesiastici.\n\nRestaci solamente al presente a ragionare de’ Principati Ecclesiastici, circa i quali tutte le difficultà sono avanti che si possegghino; perchè si acquistano o per virtù o per fortuna, e senza l’una e l’altra si mantengono; perchè sono sostentati dagli ordini anticati nella Religione, quali sono tutti potenti, e di qualità, che tengono i loro Principi in istato in qualunque modo si procedino e vivino. Costoro soli hanno Stati e non gli difendono, hanno sudditi e non gli governano; e gli Stati, per essere indifesi, non sono loro tolti; e li sudditi, per non essere governati, non se ne curano, nè pensano nè possono alienarsi da loro. Solo adunque questi Principati sono sicuri e felici. Ma essendo quelli retti da cagioni superiori, alle quali la mente umana non aggiugne, lascerò il parlarne, perchè essendo esaltati e mantenuti da Dio, sarebbe ufficio d’uomo presuntuoso e temerario il discorrerne. Nondimanco se alcuno mi ricerca donde viene che la Chiesa nel temporale sia venuta a tanta grandezza, conciossiachè da Alessandro indietro i potentati Italiani, e non solamente quelli che si chiamano potentati, ma ogni Barone e Signore, benchè minimo, quanto al temporale, la stimava poco; e ora un Re di Francia ne trema, e l’ha potuto cavare d’Italia, e rovinare i Viniziani; ancorachè ciò noto sia, non mi pare superfluo ridurlo in qualche parte alla memoria.\n\nAvanti che Carlo Re di Francia passasse in Italia, era questa provincia sotto l’imperio del Papa, Viniziani, Re di Napoli, Duca di Milano, e Fiorentini. Questi Potentati avevano ad avere due cure principali: l’una, che un forestiero non entrasse in Italia con l’armi; l’altra, che nessuno di loro occupasse più stato. Quelli, a chi s’aveva più cura, erano il Papa e Viniziani. Ed a tenere addietro i Viniziani, bisognava l’unione di tutti gli altri, come fu nella difesa di Ferrara; e a tenere basso il Papa si servivano de’ Baroni di Roma, li quali essendo divisi in due fazioni, Orsini e Colonnesi, sempre v’era cagione di scandoli tra loro, e stando con l’armi in mano in su gli occhi del Pontefice, tenevano il Pontificato debole ed infermo. E benchè surgesse qualche volta un Papa animoso, come fu Sisto; pure la fortuna o il sapere non lo potè mai disobbligare da queste incomodità. E la brevità della vita loro ne era cagione, perchè in dieci anni che ragguagliato viveva un Papa, a fatica che potesse abbassare l’una delle fazioni; e, se per modo di parlare, l’uno aveva quasi spenti i Colonnesi, surgeva un altro nimico agli Orsini, che gli faceva risurgere, e non era a tempo a spegnerli. Questo faceva che le forze temporali del Papa erano poco stimate in Italia. Surse dipoi Alessandro VI, il quale di tutti li Pontefici che sono stati mai, mostrò quanto un Papa e con il danaio, e con le forze si poteva prevalere; e fece con l’istrumento del Duca Valentino, e con la occasione della passata de’ Francesi tutte quelle cose, che io ho discorso di sopra nelle azioni del Duca. E benchè l’intento suo non fusse di far grande la Chiesa, ma il Duca; nondimeno ciò che fece, tornò a grandezza della Chiesa, la quale dopo la sua morte, spento il Duca, fu erede delle fatiche sue.\n\nVenne dipoi Papa Iulio, e trovò la Chiesa grande, avendo tutta la Romagna, ed essendo spenti tutti li Baroni di Roma, e per le battiture d’Alessandro annullate quelle fazioni; e trovò ancora la via aperta al modo dell’accumulare danari, non mai più usitato da Alessandro indietro. Le quali cose Iulio non solamente seguitò, ma accrebbe, e pensò guadagnarsi Bologna, e spegnere i Viniziani, e cacciare i Francesi d’Italia; e tutte queste imprese gli riuscirono, e con tanta più sua laude, quanto fece ogni cosa per accrescere la Chiesa, e non alcun privato. Mantenne ancora le parti Orsine e Colonnesi in quelli termini che le trovò; e benchè tra loro fusse qualche capo da fare alterazione, nientedimeno due cose gli ha tenuti fermi: l’una, la  grandezza della Chiesa che gli sbigottisce; l’altra, il non avere loro Cardinali, quali sono origine di tumulti tra loro; nè mai staranno quiete queste parti qualunque volta abbino Cardinali, perchè questi nutriscono in Roma e fuori le parti, e quelli Baroni sono forzati a difenderle; e così dall’ambizione de’ Prelati nascono le discordie e tumulti tra’ Baroni. Ha trovato adunque la Santità di Papa Leone questo Pontificato potentissimo, del quale si spera che se quelli lo fecero grande con l’armi, esso con la bontà ed infinite altre sue virtù lo farà grandissimo e venerando.\n\n### Chapter XII\n\nQuante siano le spezie della milizia, e de’ soldati mercenari.\n\nAvendo discorso particolarmente tutte le qualità di quelli Principati, de’ quali nel principio proposi di ragionare, e considerato in qualche parte le cagioni del bene e del male essere loro, e mostro i modi con li quali molti hanno cerco d’acquistargli e tenergli; mi resta ora a discorrere generalmente le offese e difese, che in ciascuno dei prenominati possono accadere. Noi abbiamo detto di sopra come ad un Principe è necessario avere li suoi fondamenti buoni; altrimente di necessità conviene che rovini. I principali fondamenti che abbino tutti gli Stati, così nuovi come vecchi o misti, sono le buone leggi e le buone armi; e perchè non possono essere buone leggi dove non sono buone armi, e, dove sono buone armi conviene che siano buone leggi; io lascerò indietro il ragionare delle leggi, e parlerò dell’armi. Dico adunque, che l’armi, con le quali un Principe difende il suo Stato, o le sono proprie, o le sono mercenarie, o ausiliarie, o miste. Le mercenarie ed ausiliari sono inutili e pericolose; e se uno tiene lo Stato suo fondato in su l’armi mercenarie, non starà mai fermo nè sicuro, perchè le sono disunite, ambiziose, e senza disciplina, infedeli, gagliarde tra gli amici, tra li nimici vili, non hanno timore di Dio, non fede con gli uomini, e tanto si differisce la rovina, quanto si differisce l’assalto; e nella pace siei spogliato da loro, nella guerra da’ nimici.\n\nLa cagione di questo è, che non hanno altro amore, nè altra cagione che le tenga in campo, che un poco di stipendio, il quale non è sufficiente a fare che e’ voglino morire per te. Vogliono bene essere tuoi soldati mentre che tu non fai guerra; ma come la guerra viene, o fuggirsi o andarsene. La qual cosa dovrei durar poca fatica a persuadere, perchè la rovina d’Italia non è ora causata da altra cosa, che per essere in spazio di molti anni riposatasi in sull’armi mercenarie, le quali feciono già per qualcuno qualche progresso, e parevano gagliarde tra loro; ma come venne il forestiero, elle mostrarono quello che l’erano. Onde è che a Carlo Re di Francia fu lecito pigliare Italia col gesto; e chi diceva che ne erano cagione i peccati nostri, diceva il vero; ma non erano già quelli che credeva, ma questi ch’io ho narrato. E perchè gli erano peccati di Principi, ne hanno patita la pena ancora loro. Io voglio dimostrare meglio la infelicità di queste armi.\n\nI capitani mercenari o sono uomini eccellenti, o no; se sono, non te ne puoi fidare, perchè sempre aspirano alla grandezza propria o con l’opprimere te, che li siei padrone, o con l’opprimere altri fuora della tua intenzione; ma se non è il capitano virtuoso, ti rovina per l’ordinario. E se si risponde, che qualunque arà l’arme in mano, farà questo medesimo, o mercenario o no; replicherei, come l’armi hanno ad essere adoperate o da un Principe, o da una Repubblica; il Principe deve andare in persona, e fare lui l’ufficio del capitano; la Repubblica ha da mandare i suoi cittadini; e quando ne manda uno che non riesca valente, debbe cambiarlo; e quando sia, tenerlo con le leggi che non passi il segno. E per esperienza si vede i Principi soli, e le Repubbliche armate fare progressi grandissimi, e l’armi mercenarie non fare mai se non danno; e con più difficultà viene all’ubbidienza di un suo cittadino una Repubblica armata di armi proprie, che un’armata d’armi forestiere. Sterono Roma e Sparta molti secoli armate e libere. I Svizzeri sono armatissimi e liberissimi. Dell’armi mercenarie antiche, per esempio, ci sono li Cartaginesi, li quali furono per essere oppressi da loro soldati mercenari, finita la prima guerra co’ Romani, ancorachè i Cartaginesi avessero per capitani propri cittadini. Filippo Macedone fu fatto da’ Tebani, dopo la morte di Epaminonda, capitano della loro gente, e tolse loro, dopo la vittoria, la libertà. I Milanesi, morto il Duca Filippo, soldarono Francesco Sforza contro a’ Veniziani; il quale, superati li nimici a Caravaggio, si congiunse con loro per opprimere i Milanesi suoi padroni. Sforza suo padre, essendo soldato della Regina Giovanna di Napoli, la lasciò in un tratto disarmata, onde ella, per non perdere il Regno, fu costretta gettarsi in grembo al Re d’Aragona. E se i Viniziani e Fiorentini hanno accresciuto per l’addietro lo imperio loro con queste armi, e li loro capitani non se ne sono però fatti Principi, ma gli hanno difesi; rispondo, che gli Fiorentini in questo caso sono stati favoriti dalla sorte; perchè de’ capitani virtuosi, i quali potevano temere, alcuni non hanno vinto, alcuni hanno avuto opposizioni, altri hanno volto l’ambizione loro altrove. Quello che non vinse fu Giovanni Acuto, del quale, non vincendo, non si potea cognoscere la fede; ma ognuno confesserà, che, vincendo, stavano i Fiorentini a sua discrezione. Sforza ebbe sempre i Bracceschi contrari, che guardrono l’uno l’altro. Francesco volse l’ambizione sua in Lombardia. Braccio contro la Chiesa e il Regno di Napoli. Ma vegniamo a quello che è seguito poco tempo fa.\n\nFeciono i Fiorentini Paolo Vitelli loro capitano, uomo prudentissimo, e che di privata fortuna aveva presa riputazione grandissima. Se costui espugnava Pisa, veruno fia che nieghi come e’ conveniva a’ Fiorentini stare seco; perchè, se fusse diventato soldato de’ loro nemici, non avevano rimedio, e tenendolo, aveano ad ubbidirlo. I Viniziani, se si considera i progressi loro, si vedrà quelli sicuramente e gloriosamente avere operato, mentrechè feciono guerra loro propri, che fu avanti che si volgessino con l’imprese in terra, dove con li gentiluomini e con la plebe armata operarono virtuosamente; ma come cominciarono a combattere in terra, lasciarono questa virtù, e seguitarono i costumi d’Italia. E nel principio dell’augumento loro in terra, per non avere molto stato, e per essere in gran riputazione, non avevano da temere molto de’ loro capitani; ma come essi ampliarono, che fu sotto il Carmignuola, ebbono un saggio di questo errore; perchè,  vedutolo virtuosissimo, battuto che ebbero sotto il suo governo il Duca di Milano, e cognoscendo dall’altra parte, come egli era freddo nella guerra, giudicarono non potere più vincere con lui, perchè non volevano, nè poteano licenziarlo, per non perdere ciò che avevano acquistato, ondechè furono necessitati, per assicurarsi, di ammazzarlo.\n\nHanno dipoi avuto per loro capitani Bartolommeo da Bergamo, Ruberto da S. Severino, il Conte di Pitigliano, e simili, con li quali avevano da temere della perdita, non del guadagno loro; come intervenne dipoi a Vailà, dove in una giornata perderono quello che in ottocento anni con tante fatiche avevano acquistato; perchè da queste armi nascono solo i lenti, tardi e deboli acquisti, e le subite e miracolose perdite. E perchè io sono venuto con questi esempi in Italia, la quale è stata governata già molti anni dall’armi mercenarie, le voglio discorrere più da alto; acciocchè veduta l’origine e progressi di esse, si possano meglio correggere. Avete da intendere come, tostochè in questi ultimi tempi, l’Imperio cominciò ad essere ributtato d’Italia, e che il Papa nel temporale vi prese più riputazione, si divise l’Italia in più Stati; perchè molte delle città grosse presono l’armi contro i loro nobili, li quali prima, favoriti dall’Imperadore, le tenevano oppresse, e la Chiesa le favoriva per darsi riputazione nel temporale; di molte altre i loro cittadini ne diventarono Principi. Ondechè, essendo venuta l’Italia quasi in mano della Chiesa, e di qualche Repubblica; ed essendo quelli Preti e quelli altri cittadini usi a non cognoscere l’armi, incominciarono a soldare forestieri. Il primo che dette riputazione a questa milizia, fu Alberigo da Como Romagnuolo. Dalla disciplina di costui discese, tra gli altri, Braccio e Sforza, che ne’ loro tempi furono arbitri d’Italia.\n\nDopo questi vennero tutti gli altri, che fino a’ nostri tempi hanno governato l’armi d’Italia; ed il fine delle lor virtù è stato, che quella è stata corsa da Carlo, predata da Luigi, forzata da Ferrando, e vituperata da’ Svizzeri. L’ordine che loro hanno tenuto, è stato, prima per dare riputazione a loro propri, aver tolto riputazione alle fanterie. Feciono questo, perchè essendo senza Stato, e in su la industria, i pochi fanti non davano loro riputazione, e li assai non potevano nutrire; e però si ridussero a’ cavalli, dove con numero sopportabile erano nutriti e onorati; ed erano le cose ridotte in termine, che in un esercito di ventimila soldati non si trovavano duemila fanti. Avevano, oltre a questo, usato ogni industria per levar via a sè, e a’ soldati la fatica e la paura, non s’ammazzando nelle zuffe, ma pigliandosi prigioni e senza taglia. Non traevano di notte alle terre, quelli delle terre non traevano di notte alle tende, non facevano intorno al campo nè steccato nè fossa, non campeggiavano il verno. E tutte queste cose erano permesse ne’ loro ordini militari, e trovate da loro per fuggire, come è detto, e la fatica ed i pericoli; tantochè essi hanno condotta Italia schiava e vituperata.\n\n### Chapter XIII\n\nDe’ soldati ausiliari, misti, e propri.\n\nL’armi ausiliarie, che sono le altre armi inutili, sono quando si chiama un potente, che con l’armi sue ti venga ad aiutare e difendere, come fece ne’ prossimi tempi Papa Iulio, il quale avendo visto  nell’impresa di Ferrara la trista prova delle sue armi mercenarie, si volse alle ausiliari, e convenne con Ferrando Re di Spagna, che con le sue genti ed eserciti dovesse aiutarlo. Queste armi possono essere utili e buone per loro medesime, ma sono per chi le chiama sempre dannose; perchè perdendo rimani disfatto, vincendo resti loro prigione. E ancora che di questi esempi ne sieno piene l’antiche istorie; nondimanco io non mi voglio partire da questo esempio di Papa Iulio II, quale è ancora fresco, il partito del quale non potè essere manco considerato, per volere Ferrara, mettendosi tutto nelle mani d’uno forestiere. Ma la sua buona fortuna fece nascere una terza causa, acciò non cogliesse il frutto della sua mala elezione; perchè, essendo gli ausiliari suoi rotti a Ravenna, e surgendo gli Svizzeri che cacciarono i vincitori fuora d’ogni opinione e sua, e d’altri, venne a non rimanere prigione degli inimici, essendo fugati, nè degli ausiliari suoi, avendo vinto con altre armi, che con le loro.\n\nI Fiorentini essendo al tutto disarmati condussero diecimila Francesi a Pisa per espugnarla; per il qual partito portarono più pericolo che in qualunque tempo de’ travagli loro. Lo Imperadore di Costantinopoli, per opporsi alli suoi vicini, mise in Grecia diecimila Turchi, li quali, finita la guerra, non se ne volsero partire; il che fu principio della servitù della Grecia con gl’infedeli. Colui adunque che vuole non poter vincere, si vaglia di queste armi, perchè sono molto più pericolose, che le mercenarie; perchè in queste è la rovina fatta, sono tutte unite, tutte volte all’obbedienza di altri; ma nelle mercenarie, ad offenderti, vinto che elle hanno, bisogna più tempo, e maggiore occasione, non essendo  tutte un corpo, ed essendo trovate e pagate da te, nelle quali un terzo che tu facci capo, non può pigliare subito tanta autorità che ti offenda. Insomma nelle mercenarie è più pericolosa la ignavia, nelle ausiliarie la virtù. Un Principe pertanto savio sempre ha fuggito queste arme, e voltosi alle proprie, e ha voluto piuttosto perdere con le sue, che vincere con l’altrui, giudicando non vera vittoria quella che con l’armi d’altri si acquistasse. Io non dubiterò mai di allegare Cesare Borgia, e le sue azioni.\n\nQuesto Duca entrò in Romagna con le armi ausiliarie, conducendovi tutte genti Francesi, e con quelle prese Imola e Furlì; ma, non li parendo poi tali arme sicure, si volse alle mercenarie, giudicando in quelle manco pericolo, e soldò gli Orsini e Vitelli; le quali poi nel maneggiare trovando dubbie, infedeli, e pericolose, le spense e volsesi alle proprie. E puossi facilmente vedere che differenza sia tra l’una e l’altra di queste armi, considerato che differenza fu dalla riputazione del Duca quando aveva gli Orsini e Vitelli, e quando rimase con gli soldati suoi, e sopra di sè stesso, e si troverà sempre accresciuta; nè mai fu stimato assai, se non quando ciascuno vide che egli era intero possessore delle sue armi. Io non mi volevo partire dagli esempi Italiani e freschi: pure non voglio lasciare indietro Ierone Siracusano, essendo uno de’ sopra nominati da me. Costui, come di già dissi, fatto dalli Siracusani capo degli eserciti, cognobbe subito quella milizia mercenaria non essere utile, per essere conduttori fatti come li nostri Italiani, e parendoli non gli potere tenere nè lasciare, gli fece tutti tagliare a pezzi; dipoi fece guerra con l’armi sue, e non con l’altrui. Voglio ancora ridurre a memoria una figura del Testamento Vecchio fatta a questo proposito.\n\nOfferendosi David a Saul di andare a combattere con Golia provocatore Filisteo, Saul, per dargli animo, l’armò dell’armi sue, le quali come David ebbe indosso, ricusò, dicendo, con quelle non si potere ben valere di sè stesso; e però voleva trovare il nimico con la sua fromba, e con il suo coltello. In somma l’armi d’altri o le ti cascono di dosso, o elle ti pesano, e le ti stringono. Carlo VII padre del Re Luigi XI avendo con la sua fortuna e virtù libera la Francia dagl’Inglesi, cognobbe questa necessità di armarsi d’armi proprie, e ordinò nel suo regno l’ordinanza delle genti di arme e delle fanterie. Dipoi il Re Luigi suo figliuolo spense quella de’ fanti, e cominciò a soldare Svizzeri; il quale errore seguitato dagli altri, è, come si vede ora in fatto, cagione de’ pericoli di quel Regno. Perchè, avendo dato riputazione a’ Svizzeri, ha invilito tutte l’armi sue, perchè le fanterie ha spento in tutto, e le sue genti d’arme ha obbligate all’arme d’altri, perchè essendo assuefatti a militare con Svizzeri, non pare loro di poter vincere senza essi.\n\nDi qui nasce, che gli Francesi contro a’ Svizzeri non bastano, e senza i Svizzeri contro ad altri non provano. Sono adunque stati gli eserciti di Francia misti, parte mercenari, e parte propri; le quali armi e tutte insieme sono molto migliori, che le semplici mercenarie, o le semplici ausiliarie, e molto inferiori alle proprie. E basti l’esempio detto, perchè il Regno di Francia sarebbe insuperabile, se l’ordine di Carlo era accresciuto, o preservato. Ma la poca prudenza degli uomini comincia una cosa, che per sapere allora di buono non manifesta il veleno che v’è sotto, come io dissi di sopra delle febbri etiche. Pertanto se colui che è in un Principato, non cognosce i mali se non quando che nascono, non è veramente savio; e questo è dato a pochi. E se si considerasse la prima rovina dell’Imperio Romano, si troverà essere stato solo il cominciare a soldare i Goti; perchè da quel principio cominciarono ad enervare le forze dell’Imperio Romano; e tutta quella virtù, che si levava da lui, si dava a loro. Conchiudo adunque, che, senza avere arme proprie, nessuno Principato è sicuro; anzi tutto obligato alla fortuna, non avendo virtù che nell’avversità lo difenda. E fu sempre opinione e sentenzia degli uomini savi, che niente sia così infermo ed instabile, come è la fama della potenza non fondata nelle forze proprie. E l’arme proprie sono quelle che sono composte di sudditi o di cittadini, o di creati tuoi; tutte l’altre sono o mercenarie, o ausiliari. E il modo ad ordinare l’arme proprie sarà facile a trovare, se si discorreranno gli ordini sopra nominati da me; e se si vedrà come Filippo, padre di Alessandro Magno, e come molte Repubbliche e Principi si sono armati ed ordinati; a’ quali ordini io mi rimetto al tutto.\n\n### Chapter XIV\n\nQuello che al Principe si appartenga circa la milizia.\n\nDeve adunque un Principe non avere altro oggetto, nè altro pensiero, nè prendere cosa alcuna per sua arte, fuori della guerra, ed ordini e disciplina di essa; perchè quella è sola arte che si aspetta a chi comanda; ed è di tanta virtù, che non  solo mantiene quelli che sono nati Principi, ma molte volte fa gli uomini di privata fortuna salire a quel grado. E per contrario si vede, che quando i Principi hanno pensato più alle delicatezze, che all’arme, hanno perso lo Stato loro. E la prima cagione che ti fa perdere quello, è il disprezzare questa arte; e la cagione che te lo fa acquistare, è l’essere professo di questa arte. Francesco Sforza, per essere armato, diventò di privato Duca di Milano; e li figliuoli, per fuggire le fatiche e i disagi dell’arme, di Duchi diventarono privati. Perchè tra le altre cagioni di male, che ti arreca l’essere disarmato, ti fa disprezzare; la quale è una di quelle infamie, dalle quali il Principe si debbe guardare, come di sotto si dirà. Perchè da uno armato a un disarmato non è proporzione alcuna; e la ragione non vuole che chi è armato ubbidisca volentieri a chi è disarmato, e che il disarmato stia sicuro tra i servitori armati. Perchè essendo nell’uno sdegno, e nell’altro sospetto, non è possibile operino bene insieme. E però un Principe che della milizia non s’intende, oltre all’altre infelicità, come è detto, non può essere stimato da’ suoi soldati, nè fidarsi di loro.\n\nNon debbe pertanto mai levare il pensiero da questo esercizio della guerra, e nella pace vi si deve più esercitare, che nella guerra; il che può fare in due modi, l’uno con l’opere, l’altro con la mente. E quanto all’opere, deve, oltre al tener bene ordinati ed esercitati li suoi, star sempre in sulle caccie, e mediante quelle assuefare il corpo a’ disagi, e parte imparare la natura de’ siti, e cognoscere come sorgono i monti, come imboccano le valli, come giacciono i piani, ed intendere la natura de’ fiumi e  delle paludi; ed in questo porre grandissima cura. La qual cognizione è utile in duoi modi. Prima si impara a cognoscere il suo paese, e può meglio intendere le difese di esso. Dipoi, mediante la cognizione e pratica di quelli siti, con facilità comprende un altro sito, che di nuovo gli sia necessario speculare; perchè li poggi, le valli, e piani, e fiumi, e paludi che sono, verbigrazia, in Toscana, hanno con quelle dell’altre provincie certa similitudine; tale che dalla cognizione del sito di una provincia, si può facilmente venire alla cognizione dell’altre. E quel Principe che manca di questa perizia, manca della prima parte che vuole avere un capitano; perchè questa insegna trovar il nemico, pigliare gli alloggiamenti, condurre gli eserciti, ordinare le giornate, campeggiare le terre con tuo vantaggio.\n\n— Filopemene Principe degli Achei, tralle altre laudi, che dagli scrittori gli son date, è che ne’ tempi della pace non pensava mai se non a’ modi della guerra, e quando era in campagna con gli amici spesso si fermava e ragionava con quelli: se gli nimici fussero in su quel colle, e noi ci trovassimo qui col nostro esercito, chi di noi arebbe vantaggio? Come sicuramente si potrebbe ire a trovargli, servando gli ordini? Se noi volessimo ritirarci, come aremmo a fare? Se loro si ritirassero, come aremmo a seguirgli? E proponeva loro, andando, tutti i casi che in uno esercito possono occorrere, intendeva l’opinion loro, diceva la sua, corroboravala con le ragioni; talchè per queste continue cogitazioni non poteva mai, guidando gli eserciti, nascere accidente alcuno, che egli non vi avesse il rimedio. Ma, quanto all’esercizio della mente, deve il Principe leggere le istorie, ed in quelle considerare le azioni degli uomini eccellenti, vedere come si sono governati nelle guerre, esaminare le cagioni delle vittorie e perdite loro, per potere queste fuggire, quelle imitare; e sopra tutto fare come ha fatto per l’addietro qualche uomo eccellente, che ha preso ad imitare, se alcuno è stato innanzi a lui lodato e glorioso, e di quello che ha tenuto sempre i gesti ed azioni appresso di sè, come si dice che Alessandro Magno imitava Achille, Cesare Alessandro, Scipione Ciro. E qualunque legge la vita di Ciro scritta da Senofonte, riconosce dipoi nella vita di Scipione quanto quella imitazione gli fu di gloria, e quanto nella castità, affabilità, umanità, e liberalità Scipione si conformasse con quelle cose che di Ciro sono da Senofonte scritte. Questi simili modi deve osservare un Principe savio, nè mai ne’ tempi pacifici stare ozioso, ma con industria farne capitale, per potersene valere nelle avversità, acciocchè quando si muta la fortuna, lo trovi parato a resistere alli suoi colpi.\n\n### Chapter XV\n\nDelle cose, mediante le quali gli uomini, e massimamente i Principi, sono lodati o vituperati.\n\nResta ora a vedere quali debbano essere i modi e governi di un Principe con li sudditi e con gli amici. E perchè io so che molti di questo hanno scritto, dubito, scrivendone ancor io, non esser tenuto presontuoso, partendomi, massime nel disputare questa materia, dagli ordini degli altri. Ma essendo l’intento mio scrivere cosa utile a chi l’intende, mi è parso più conveniente andare dietro alla verità effettuale della cosa, che all’immaginazione di essa: e molti si sono immaginate Repubbliche e Principati, che non si sono mai visti nè cognosciuti essere in vero; perchè egli è tanto discosto da come si vive, a come si doveria vivere, che colui che lascia quello che si fa per quello che si doveria fare, impara piuttosto la rovina, che la preservazione sua; perchè un uomo che voglia fare in tutte le parti professione di buono, conviene che rovini fra tanti che non sono buoni. Onde è necessario ad un Principe, volendosi mantenere, imparare a potere essere non buono, ed usarlo e non usarlo secondo la necessità.\n\nLasciando adunque indietro le cose circa un Principe immaginate, e discorrendo quelle che son vere, dico, che tutti gli uomini, quando se ne parla, e massime i Principi, per esser posti più alto, sono notati di alcuna di queste qualità che arrecano loro o biasimo, o laude; e questo è che alcuno è tenuto liberale, alcuno misero, usando un termine Toscano, (perchè avaro in nostra lingua è ancor colui che per rapina desidera d’avere, e misero chiamiamo quello che troppo si astiene dall’usare il suo) alcuno è tenuto donatore, alcuno rapace; alcuno crudele, alcuno pietoso; l’uno fedífrago, l’altro fedele; l’uno effeminato e pusillanime, l’altro feroce ed animoso; l’uno umano, l’altro superbo; l’uno lascivo, l’altro casto; l’uno intero, l’altro astuto; l’uno duro, l’altro facile; l’uno grave, l’altro leggiere; l’uno religioso, l’altro incredulo, e simili. Io so che ciascuno confesserà, che sarebbe laudabilissima cosa un Principe trovarsi di tutte le sopraddette qualità, quelle che sono tenute buone; ma perchè non si possono avere, nè interamente osservare per le condizioni umane che non lo consentono, gli è necessario essere tanto prudente, che sappia fuggire l’infamia di quelli vizi che li torrebbono lo Stato, e da quelli che non gliene tolgano, guardarsi, se egli è possibile; ma non potendosi, si può con minor rispetto lasciare andare. Ed ancora non si curi d’incorrere nell’infamia di quelli vizi, senza i quali possa difficilmente salvare lo Stato; perchè, se si considera bene tutto, si troverà qualche cosa che parrà virtù, e seguendola sarebbe la rovina sua; e qualcun’altra che parrà vizio, e seguendola ne risulta la sicurtà, ed il ben essere suo.\n\n### Chapter XVI\n\nDella liberalità e miseria.\n\nCominciando adunque dalle prime soprascritte qualità, dico come sarebbe bene esser tenuto liberale. Nondimanco la liberalità usata in modo che tu non sia temuto, ti offende; perchè se la si usa virtuosamente e come la si deve usare, la non fia conosciuta, e non ti cadrà l’infamia del suo contrario. E però a volersi mantenere tra gli uomini il nome del liberale, è necessario non lasciare indietro alcuna qualità di sontuosità; talmentechè sempre un Principe così fatto consumerà in simili opere tutte le sue facultà, e sarà necessitato alla fine, se egli si vorrà mantenere nome del liberale, gravare i popoli straordinariamente, ed esser fiscale, e fare tutte quelle cose che si possono fare per avere danari. Il che comincerà a farlo odioso con li sudditi, e poco stimare da ciascuno, diventando povero; in modo che, avendo con questa sua liberalità offeso molti, e  premiato pochi, sente ogni primo disagio, e periclita in qualunque primo pericolo; il che cognoscendo lui, e volendosene ritrarre, incorre subito nell’infamia del misero.\n\nUn Principe adunque, non potendo usare questa virtù del liberale senza suo danno, in modo che la sia cognosciuta, deve, se egli è prudente, non si curare del nome del misero; perchè con il tempo sarà tenuto sempre più liberale. Veggendo che con la sua parsimonia le sue entrate gli bastano, può difendersi da chi gli fa guerra, può fare imprese senza gravare i popoli; talmentechè viene a usare la liberalità a tutti quelli, a chi non toglie, che sono infiniti, e miseria a tutti coloro, a chi non dà, che sono pochi. Ne’ nostri tempi noi non abbiamo veduto fare gran cose, se non a quelli che sono stati tenuti miseri, gli altri essere spenti. Papa Iulio II come si fu servito del nome di liberale per aggiugnere al Papato, non pensò più a mantenerselo per potere far guerra al Re di Francia; e ha fatto tante guerre senza porre un dazio strasordinario, perchè alle superflue spese ha somministrato la lunga sua parsimonia. Il Re di Spagna presente, se fusse tenuto liberale, non arebbe fatto, nè vinto tante imprese. Pertanto un Principe deve stimare poco, per non avere a rubare i sudditi, per poter difendersi, per non diventare povero ed abietto, per non essere forzato diventar rapace, d’incorrere nel nome di misero, perchè questo è uno di quelli vizi, che lo fanno regnare. E se alcun dicesse: Cesare con la liberalità pervenne all’Imperio; e molti altri, per essere stati ed esser tenuti liberali, sono venuti a gradi grandissimi; rispondo: o tu siei Principe fatto, o tu siei in via di acquistarlo. Nel primo caso questa liberalità è dannosa; nel secondo è ben necessario esser tenuto liberale, e Cesare era un di quelli che voleva pervenire al Principato di Roma; ma, se poichè vi fu venuto, fusse sopravvissuto, e non si fusse temperato da quelle spese, arebbe distrutto quell’Imperio. E se alcuno replicasse: molti sono stati Principi, e con gli eserciti hanno fatto gran cose, che sono stati tenuti liberalissimi; ti rispondo: o il Principe spende del suo e de’ suoi sudditi, o di quello d’altri. Nel primo caso deve esser parco, nel secondo non deve lasciare indietro parte alcuna di liberalità. E quel Principe che va con gli eserciti, che si pasce di prede, di sacchi, e di taglie, e maneggia quel d’altri, gli è necessaria questa liberalità; altrimenti non sarebbe seguíto da’ soldati. E di quello che non è tuo o de’ tuoi sudditi, si può essere più largo donatore, come fu Ciro, Cesare, e Alessandro; perchè lo spendere quel d’altri non toglie riputazione, ma te ne aggiugne; solamente lo spendere il tuo è quello che ti nuoce. E non ci è cosa che consumi sè stessa quanto la liberalità, la quale mentre che tu usi, perdi la facultà di usarla, e diventi o povero o vile, o, per fuggire la povertà, rapace e odioso. E tra tutte le cose, da che un Principe si debbe guardare, è l’essere disprezzato e odioso; e la liberalità all’una e l’altra di queste cose ti conduce. Pertanto è più sapienza tenersi il nome di misero, che partorisce una infamia senza odio, che, per volere il nome di liberale, incorrere per necessità nel nome di rapace, che partorisce una infamia con odio.\n\n### Chapter XVII\n\nDella crudeltà e clemenzia; e se egli è meglio essere amato, che temuto.\n\nDiscendendo appresso alle altre qualità preallegate, dico, che ciascuno Principe deve disiderare di essere tenuto pietoso, e non crudele. Nondimanco deve avvertire di non usar male questa pietà. Era tenuto Cesare Borgia crudele; nondimanco quella sua crudeltà aveva racconcia la Romagna, unitala, e ridottala in pace e in fede. Il che se si considera bene, si vedrà quello essere stato molto più pietoso, che il Popolo Fiorentino, il quale, per fuggire il nome di crudele, lasciò distruggere Pistoia. Deve pertanto un Principe non si curare dell’infamia di crudele, per tenere i sudditi suoi uniti, e in fede: perchè con pochissimi esempi sarai più pietoso, che quelli, li quali per troppa pietà lasciano seguire i disordini, onde naschino occisioni o rapine; perchè queste sogliono offendere una università intera; e quelle esecuzioni che vengono dal Principe, offendono un particolare. E tra tutti i Principi, al Principe nuovo è impossibile fuggire il nome di crudele, per essere gli Stati nuovi pieni di pericoli. Onde Virgilio, per la bocca di Didone, escusa l’inumanità del suo Regno, per essere quello nuovo, dicendo:\n\nRes dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt\n\nMoliri, et late fines custode tueri.\n\nNondimeno deve esser grave a credere ed al muoversi, nè si deve far paura da sè stesso, e  procedere in modo temperato con prudenza ed umanità, che la troppa confidenza non lo faccia incauto, e la troppa diffidanza non lo renda intollerabile. Nasce da questo una disputa: s’egli è meglio essere amato che temuto, o temuto che amato. Rispondesi, che si vorrebbe essere l’uno e l’altro; ma perchè egli è difficile, che e’ stiano insieme, è molto più sicuro l’esser temuto che amato, quando s’abbi a mancare dell’un de’ duoi. Perchè degli uomini si può dire questo generalmente, che sieno ingrati, volubili, simulatori, fuggitori de’ pericoli, cupidi di guadagno; e mentre fai loro bene sono tutti tuoi, ti offeriscono il sangue, la roba, la vita, ed i figliuoli, come di sopra dissi, quando il bisogno è discosto; ma, quando ti si appressa, si rivoltano. E quel Principe che si è tutto fondato in sulle parole loro, trovandosi nudo di altri preparamenti, rovina; perchè l’amicizie che si acquistano con il prezzo, e non con grandezza e nobiltà d’animo, si meritano, ma non le si hanno, e a’ tempi non si possono spendere. E gli uomini hanno men rispetto di offendere uno che si facci amare, che uno che si facci temere; perchè l’amore è tenuto da un vincolo di obbligo, il quale, per essere gli uomini tristi, da ogni occasione di propria utilità è rotto; ma il timore è tenuto da una paura di pena, che non abbandona mai. Deve nondimeno il Principe farsi temere in modo, che, se non acquista l’amore, e’ fugga l’odio, perchè può molto bene stare insieme esser temuto, e non odiato; il che farà, semprechè s’astenga dalla roba de’ suoi cittadini, e de’ suoi sudditi, e dalle donne loro. E quando pure gli bisognasse procedere contro al sangue di qualcuno, farlo quando vi sia giustificazione conveniente e causa manifesta; ma sopratutto astenersi dalla roba  d’altri; perchè gli uomini dimenticano piuttosto la morte del padre, che la perdita del patrimonio.\n\nDipoi le cagioni del torre la roba non mancano mai; e sempre colui che comincia a vivere con rapina, trova cagioni d'occupare quel d’altri, e per avverso contro al sangue sono più rare e mancano più tosto. Ma quando il Principe è con gli eserciti, e ha in governo moltitudine di soldati, allora è al tutto necessario non si curare del nome di crudele: perchè senza questo nome non si tiene un esercito unito, nè disposto ad alcuna fazione. Tra le mirabili azioni di Annibale si connumera questa, che avendo un esercito grossissimo, misto d'infinite generazioni d'uomini, condotto a militare in terre d'altri, non vi surgesse mai una dissensione nè fra loro, nè contro il Principe, così nella trista, come nella sua buona fortuna. Il che non potè nascere da altro, che da quella sua inumana crudeltà, la quale insieme con infinite sue virtù lo fece sempre nel cospetto de’ suoi soldati venerando e terribile; e, senza quella, l'altre sue virtù a far quello effetto non gli bastavano. E gli scrittori poco considerati dall’una parte ammirano queste sue azioni, e dall’altra dannano la principale cagione di esse. E che sia vero che l’altre sue virtù non gli sarieno bastate, si può considerare in Scipione, rarissimo non solamente ne’ tempi suoi, ma in tutta la memoria delle cose che si sanno, dal quale gli eserciti suoi in Ispagna si ribellarono; il che non nacque da altro, che dalla sua troppa pietà, la quale aveva dato a’ suoi soldati più licenza, che alla disciplina militare non si conveniva. La qual cosa gli fu da Fabio Massimo nel Senato rimproverata, chiamandolo corruttore della Romana milizia. I Locrensi essendo stati da un legato di  Scipione distrutti, non furono da lui vindicati, nè l'insolenza di quel legato corretta, nascendo tutto da quella sua natura facile. Talmentechè volendolo alcuno in Senato scusare, disse come egli erano molti uomini, che sapevano meglio non errare, che correggere gli errori d'altri. La qual natura arebbe con il tempo violato la fama e la gloria di Scipione, se egli avesse con essa perseverato nell'imperio; ma vivendo sotto il governo del Senato, questa sua qualità dannosa non solamente si nascose, ma gli fu a gloria. Conchiudo adunque, tornando all'esser temuto ed amato, che amando gli uomini a posta loro, e temendo a posta del Principe, deve un Principe savio fondarsi in su quello che è suo, non in su quello che è d’altri; e deve solamente ingegnarsi di fuggir l'odio, come è detto.\n\n### Chapter XVIII\n\nIn che modo i Principi debbino osservare la fede.\n\nQuanto sia laudabile in un Principe mantenere la fede, e vivere con integrità, e non con astuzia, ciascuno lo intende. Nondimeno si vede per esperienzia, ne’ nostri tempi, quelli Principi aver fatto gran cose, che della fede hanno tenuto poco conto, e che hanno saputo con astuzia aggirare i cervelli degli uomini, ed alla fine hanno superato quelli che si sono fondati in su la lealtà. Dovete adunque sapere come sono due generazioni di combattere: l’una con le leggi, l’altra con le forze. Quel primo è degli uomini; quel secondo è delle bestie; ma perchè il primo spesse volte non basta, bisogna ricorrere al secondo. Pertanto ad un Principe è necessario  saper ben usare la bestia e l’uomo. Questa parte è stata insegnata a’ Principi copertamente dagli antichi scrittori, i quali scrivono come Achille e molti altri di quelli Principi antichi furono dati a nutrire a Chirone Centauro, che sotto la sua disciplina gli custodisse; il che non vuol dire altro l’avere per precettore un mezzo bestia e mezzo uomo, se non che bisogna a un Principe sapere usare l’una e l’altra natura, e l’una senza l’altra non è durabile. Essendo adunque un Principe necessitato sapere bene usare la bestia, debbe di quella pigliare la volpe e il lione; perchè il lione non si defende da’ lacci, la volpe non si defende da’ lupi. Bisogna adunque essere volpe a cognoscere i lacci, e lione a sbigottire i lupi. Coloro che stanno semplicemente in sul lione, non se ne intendono. Non può pertanto un Signore prudente, nè debbe osservare la fede, quando tale osservanzia gli torni contro, e che sono spente le cagioni che la feciono promettere. E se gli uomini fussero tutti buoni, questo precetto non saria buono; ma perchè sono tristi, e non l’osserverebbono a te, tu ancora non l’hai da osservare a loro. Nè mai a un Principe mancheranno cagioni legittime di colorare l’inosservanza.\n\nDi questo se ne potriano dare infiniti esempi moderni, e mostrare quante paci, quante promesse siano state fatte irrite e vane per la infedeltà de’ Principi; e a quello che ha saputo meglio usare la volpe, è meglio successo. Ma è necessario questa natura saperla bene colorire, ed essere gran simulatore e dissimulatore; e sono tanto semplici gli uomini, e tanto ubbidiscono alle necessità presenti, che colui che inganna, troverà sempre chi si lascerà ingannare. Io non voglio degli esempi freschi tacerne uno. Alessandro VI non fece mai altro che ingannare uomini, nè mai pensò ad altro, e trovò soggetto di poterlo fare; e non fu mai uomo che avesse maggiore efficacia in asseverare, e che con maggiori giuramenti affermasse una cosa, e che l’osservasse meno; nondimanco gli succederono sempre gl’inganni, perchè cognosceva bene questa parte del mondo. Ad un Principe adunque non è necessario avere in fatto tutte le soprascritte qualità, ma è ben necessario parere d’averle. Anzi ardirò di dire questo, che avendole, ed osservandole sempre, sono dannose; e parendo d’averle, sono utili; come parere pietoso, fedele, umano, religioso, intero, ed essere; ma stare in modo edificato con l’animo, che bisognando, tu possa e sappi mutare il contrario. E hassi ad intendere questo, che un Principe, e massime un Principe nuovo, non può osservare tutte quelle cose, per le quali gli uomini sono tenuti buoni, essendo spesso necessitato, per mantenere lo Stato, operare contro alla umanità, contro alla carità, contro alla religione. E però bisogna che egli abbia un animo disposto a volgersi secondo che i venti e le variazioni della fortuna gli comandano; e, come di sopra dissi, non partirsi dal bene, potendo, ma sapere entrare nel male, necessitato.\n\nDeve adunque avere un Principe gran cura, che non gli esca mai di bocca una cosa che non sia piena delle soprascritte cinque qualità, e paia, a vederlo e udirlo, tutto pietà, tutto integrità, tutto umanità, tutto religione. E non è cosa più necessaria a parere d’avere, che quest’ultima qualità; perchè gli uomini in universale giudicano più agli occhi che alle mani, perchè tocca a vedere a ciascuno, a sentire a’ pochi. Ognuno vede quel che tu pari; pochi  sentono quel che tu sei, e quelli pochi non ardiscono opporsi alla opinione de’ molti, che abbiano la maesta dello stato che gli difende; e nelle azioni di tutti gli uomini, e massime de’ Principi, dove non è giudizio a chi reclamare, si guarda al fine. Facci adunque un Principe conto di vivere e mantenere lo Stato; i mezzi saranno sempre giudicati onorevoli, e da ciascuno lodati; perchè il vulgo ne va sempre preso con quello che pare, e con l’evento della cosa; e nel mondo non è se non vulgo; e gli pochi hanno luogo, quando gli assai non hanno dove appoggiarsi. Alcuno Principe di questi tempi, il quale non è bene nominare, non predica mai altro, che pace e fede; e l’una e l’altra, quando e’ l’avesse osservata, gli arebbe più volte tolto lo Stato, e la riputazione.\n\n### Chapter XIX\n\nChe si debbe fuggire l’essere disprezzato e odiato.\n\nMa perchè circa le qualità, di che di sopra si fa menzione, io ho parlato delle più importanti, l’altre voglio discorrere brevemente sotto queste generalità, che il Principe pensi, come di sopra in parte è detto, di fuggire quelle cose che lo faccino odioso o vile; e qualunque volta fuggirà questo, arà adempiuto le parti sue, e non troverà nell’altre infamie pericolo alcuno. Odioso lo fa soprattutto, come io dissi, lo esser rapace, ed usurpatore della roba, e delle donne de’ sudditi; di che si deve astenere. Qualunque volta alle università degli uomini non si toglie nè roba nè onore, vivono contenti, e solo s’ha a combattere con l’ambizione di pochi, la quale in molti modi e con facilità si raffrena. Abietto lo fa l’esser tenuto vario, leggiero, effeminato, pusillanimo, irresoluto; di che un Principe si deve guardare come da uno scoglio, ed ingegnarsi che nelle azioni sue si riconosca grandezza, animosità, gravità, fortezza; e, circa i maneggi privati de’ sudditi, volere che la sua sentenzia sia irrevocabile, e si mantenga in tale opinione, che alcuno non pensi nè ad ingannarlo, nè ad aggirarlo. Quel Principe che dà di sè questa opinione, è riputato assai; e contro a chi è riputato assai con difficultà si congiura, e con difficultà è assaltato, purchè si intenda che sia eccellente e reverito da’ suoi. Perchè un Principe deve avere due paure: una dentro per conto de’ sudditi; l’altra di fuori per conto de’ potenti esterni. Da questa si difende con le buone arme e buoni amici; e sempre, se arà buone arme, arà buoni amici; e sempre staranno ferme le cose di dentro, quando stieno ferme quelle di fuori, se già le non fossero perturbate da una congiura; e quando pure quelle di fuori movessero, se egli è ordinato, e vissuto come io ho detto, quando non si abbandoni, sosterrà ogni impeto, come dissi che fece Nabide Spartano. Ma circa i sudditi, quando le cose di fuori non muovino, s’ha a temere, che non congiurino segretamente; del che il Principe si assicura assai, fuggendo l’essere odiato e disprezzato, e tenendosi il popolo satisfatto di lui; il che è necessario conseguire, come di sopra si disse a lungo. Ed uno de’ più potenti rimedi che abbi un Principe contro le congiure, è non essere odiato o disprezzato dall’universale; perchè sempre chi congiura crede con la morte del Principe satisfare al popolo; ma quando ei creda offenderlo, non piglia animo a prendere  simil partito; perchè le difficultà che sono dalla parte de’ congiuranti, sono infinite. Per esperienzia si vede molte essere state le congiure, e poche aver avuto buon fine; perchè chi congiura non può esser solo, nè può prendere compagnia, se non di quelli, che crede essere malcontenti; e subito che a uno malcontento tu hai scoperto l’animo tuo, gli dai materia a contentarsi, perchè, manifestandolo, lui ne può sperare ogni comodità; talmentechè veggendo il guadagno fermo da questa parte, e dall’altra veggendolo dubbio e pieno di pericolo, convien bene o che sia raro amico, o che sia al tutto ostinato nimico del Principe ad osservarti la fede. E, per ridurre la cosa in brevi termini, dico, che dalla parte del congiurante non è, se non paura, gelosia, sospetto di pena che lo sbigottisce; ma dalla parte del Principe è la maestà del Principato, le leggi, le difese degli amici e dello Stato che lo difendono; talmentechè aggiunto a tutte queste cose la benivolenza populare, è impossibile che alcun sia sì temerario, che congiuri. Perchè per l’ordinario dove uno congiurante ha a temere innanzi alla esecuzione del male, in questo caso debbe temere ancora dappoi, avendo per nimico il popolo, seguíto l’eccesso, nè potendo per questo sperare rifugio alcuno. Di questa materia se ne potria dare infiniti esempi; ma voglio solo esser contento d’uno, seguíto alla memoria de’ padri nostri.\n\nMesser Annibale Bentivogli, avolo del presente Messer Annibale, che era Principe in Bologna, essendo da’ Canneschi, che gli congiurarono contro, ammazzato, nè rimanendo di lui altri che Messer Giovanni, quale era in fasce, subito dopo tale omicidio si levò il popolo, ed ammazzò tutti i  Canneschi. Il che nacque dalla benivolenza popolare che la casa de’ Bentivogli aveva in quei tempi in Bologna; la qual fu tanta, che non vi restando alcuno che potesse, morto Annibale, reggere lo Stato, ed avendo indizio come in Firenze era un nato de’ Bentivogli, che si teneva fino allora figliuolo di un fabbro, vennero i Bolognesi per quello in Firenze, e li dettono il governo di quella città, la quale fu governata da lui fino a tanto che Messer Giovanni pervenisse in età conveniente al governo. Conchiudo adunque, che un Principe deve tenere delle congiure poco conto, quando il popolo gli sia benivolo; ma quando gli sia inimico, ed abbilo in odio, deve temere di ogni cosa e di ognuno. E gli stati bene ordinati, e li Principi savi hanno con ogni diligenza pensato di non far cadere in disperazione i grandi e di satisfare al popolo, e tenerlo contento, perchè questa è una delle più importanti materie che abbia un Principe. Tra i Regni bene ordinati e governati a’ nostri tempi è quello di Francia, ed in esso si trovano infinite costituzioni buone, donde ne dipende la libertà e sicurtà del Re, delle quali la prima è il Parlamento, e la sua autorità; perchè quello che ordinò quel Regno, cognoscendo l’ambizione de’ potenti e la insolenza loro, e giudicando esser necessario loro un freno in bocca che gli correggesse; e dall’altra parte cognoscendo l’odio dell’universale contro i grandi, fondato in su la paura, e volendo assicurarli, non volse che questa fusse particolar cura del Re, per torli quel carico che e’ potesse avere con i grandi, favorendo i popolari, e con i popolari, favorendo i grandi; e però constituì un giudice terzo, che fusse quello, che senza carico del Re, battesse i grandi, e favorisse i minori. Nè potè essere questo ordine migliore, nè più prudente, nè maggior cagione di sicurtà del Re, e del Regno. Di che si può trarre un altro notabile, che li Principi debbono le cose di carico fare sumministrare ad altri, e quelle di grazie a lor medesimi. Di nuovo conchiudo, che un Principe debbe stimare i grandi, ma non si far odiare dal popolo.\n\nParrebbe forse a molti, che, considerata la vita e morte di molti Imperatori Romani, fussono esempi contrarii a questa mia opinione, trovando alcuno esser vissuto sempre egregiamente, e mostro grande virtù d’animo, nondimeno aver perso l’imperio, ovvero essere stato morto da’ suoi che gli hanno congiurato contro. Volendo adunque rispondere a queste obiezioni, discorrerò le qualità di alcuni Imperatori, mostrando la cagione della lor rovina, non disforme da quello che da me si è addutto; e parte metterò in considerazione quelle cose che sono notabili a chi legge le azioni di quelli tempi. E voglio mi basti pigliare tutti quelli Imperatori, che succederono nell’Imperio da Marco Filosofo a Massimino, li quali furono Marco, Commodo suo figliuolo, Pertinace, Iuliano, Severo, Antonino, Caracalla suo figliuolo, Macrino, Eliogabalo, Alessandro, e Massimino. Ed è prima da notare, che dove negli altri Principi si ha solo a contendere con l’ambizione de’ grandi e insolenza de’ popoli, gl’Imperatori Romani avevano una terza difficultà, d’avere a sopportare la crudeltà ed avarizia de’ soldati; la qual cosa era sì difficile, che la fu cagione della rovina di molti, sendo difficile satisfare a’ soldati ed a’ popoli; perchè i populi amano la quiete, e per questo amano i Principi modesti, e li soldati amano il Principe d’animo militare, e che sia insolente, e crudele, e rapace. Le quali cose volevano che egli esercitasse ne’ popoli, per potere avere duplicato stipendio, e sfogare la loro avarizia e crudeltà; donde ne nacque che quelli Imperatori che per natura o per arte non avevano riputazione tale, che con quella tenessero l’uno e l’altro in freno, sempre rovinavano; e li più di loro, massime quelli che come uomini nuovi venivano al Principato, conosciuta la difficultà di questi duoi diversi umori, si volgevano a satisfare a’ soldati, stimando poco l’ingiuriare il popolo. Il qual partito era necessario; perchè non potendo i Principi mancare di non essere odiati da qualcuno, si debbono prima sforzare di non essere odiati dall’università; e quando non possono conseguir questo, si debbono ingegnare con ogni industria fuggire l’odio di quelle università che sono più potenti. E però quelli Imperatori, che per novità avevano bisogno di favori straordinari, aderivano ai soldati più volentieri, che alli popoli; il che tornava loro nondimeno utile o no, secondo che quel Principe si sapeva mantenere riputato con loro.\n\nDa queste cagioni sopradette nacque che Marco, Pertinace, e Alessandro essendo tutti di modesta vita, amatori della giustizia, inimici della crudeltà, umani, e benigni, ebbero tutti, da Marco infuora, tristo fine; Marco solo visse e morì onoratissimo, perchè lui succedè all’Imperio per eredità, e non aveva a ricognoscer quello nè dai soldati, nè dai popoli; dipoi essendo accompagnato da molte virtù che lo facevano venerando, tenne sempre, mentre visse, l’uno ordine e l’altro dentro a’ suoi termini, e non fu mai nè odiato, nè disprezzato. Ma Pertinace fu creato Imperadore contro alla voglia de’ soldati, li quali, essendo usi a vivere  licenziosamente sotto Commodo, non poterono sopportare quella vita onesta, alla quale Pertinace gli voleva ridurre; onde avendosi creato odio, ed a questo odio aggiunto dispregio per l’esser vecchio, rovinò ne’ primi principii della sua amministrazione. Onde si deve notare che l’odio si acquista così mediante le buone opere, come le triste; e però, come io dissi di sopra, volendo un Principe mantenere lo Stato, è spesso forzato a non esser buono; perchè quando quella università, o popolo, o soldati, o grandi che sieno, della quale tu giudichi, per mantenerti, aver bisogno, è corrotta, ti convien seguire l’umor suo, e sodisfarle; e allora le buone opere ti sono inimiche. Ma vegniamo ad Alessandro, il quale fu di tanta bontà, che tra l’altre lodi che gli sono attribuite, è, che in quattordici anni, che tenne l’imperio, non fu mai morto da lui nessuno ingiudicato; nondimanco, essendo tenuto effeminato, e uomo che si lasciasse governare dalla madre, e per questo venuto in dispregio; conspirò contro di lui l’esercito, ed ammazzollo.\n\nDiscorrendo ora per opposito le qualità di Commodo, di Severo, di Antonino, di Caracalla, e di Massimino, gli troverete crudelissimi e rapacissimi, li quali, per satisfare a’ soldati, non perdonarono a nissuna qualità d’ingiuria che ne’ popoli si potesse commettere; e tutti, eccetto Severo, ebbero tristo fine; perchè in Severo fu tanta virtù, che, mantenendosi i soldati amici, ancorchè i popoli fossero da lui gravati, potè sempre regnare felicemente; perchè quelle sue virtù lo facevano nel cospetto de’ soldati e de’ popoli sì mirabile, che questi rimanevano in un certo modo attoniti e stupidi, e quelli altri riverenti e satisfatti. E perchè le azioni di costui furono grandi in un Principe nuovo, io voglio mostrare brevemente quanto egli seppe bene usare la persona della volpe e del lione, le quali nature dico, come di sopra, esser necessario imitare ad un Principe.\n\nConosciuta Severo la ignavia di Iuliano Imperadore, persuase al suo esercito, del quale era in Schiavonia capitano, che egli era bene andare a Roma a vendicare la morte di Pertinace, il quale era stato morto dalla guardia imperiale, e sotto questo colore, senza mostrare di aspirare all’Imperio, mosse l’esercito contro a Roma, e fu prima in Italia che si sapesse la sua partita. Arrivato a Roma, fu dal Senato per timore eletto Imperadore, e morto Iuliano. Restavano a Severo dopo questo principio due difficultà a volersi insignorire di tutto lo Stato: l’una in Asia, dove Nigro capo degli eserciti Asiatici si era fatto chiamare Imperatore; l’altra in ponente di Albino, il quale ancora lui aspirava all’Imperio. E perchè giudicava pericoloso scoprirsi nimico a tutti duoi, deliberò di assaltar Nigro, e ingannare Albino; al quale scrisse, come essendo dal Senato eletto Imperadore, voleva partecipare quella dignità con lui, e mandogli il titolo di Cesare, e per deliberazione del Senato se lo aggiunse collega; le quali cose furono da Albino accettate per vere. Ma poichè Severo ebbe vinto e morto Nigro, e pacate le cose orientali, ritornatosi a Roma si querelò in Senato di Albino, che, come poco conoscente de’ beneficii ricevuti da lui, aveva a tradimento cerco d’ammazzarlo, e per questo era necessitato andare a punire la sua ingratitudine. Dipoi andò a trovarlo in Francia, e gli tolse lo Stato e la vita. Chi esaminerà adunque tritamente le azioni di costui, lo troverà un ferocissimo lione e un’astutissima volpe, e vedrà quello temuto e riverito da ciascuno, e dagli eserciti non odiato; e non si maraviglierà se lui, uomo nuovo, arà possuto tenere tanto Imperio, perchè la sua grandissima riputazione lo difese sempre da quell’odio che i popoli per le sue rapine avevano potuto concipere. Ma Antonino suo figliuolo fu ancor lui uomo eccellentissimo, ed aveva in sè parti eccellentissime, che lo facevano ammirabile nel cospetto de’ popoli, e grato a’ soldati, perchè era uomo militare, sopportantissimo di ogni fatica, disprezzatore di ogni cibo delicato, e di ogni altra mollizie; la qual cosa lo faceva amare da tutti gli eserciti. Nondimeno la sua ferocia e crudeltà fu tanta e sì inaudita, per avere dopo molte occisioni particulari morto gran parte del Popolo di Roma, e tutto quello d’Alessandria, che diventò odiosissimo a tutto il mondo, e cominciò ad esser temuto da quelli ancora che egli aveva intorno, in modo che fu ammazzato da un centurione in mezzo del suo esercito. Dove è da notare che queste simili morti, le quali seguitano per deliberazione di un animo deliberato e ostinato, non si possono da’ Principi evitare, perchè ciascuno che non si curi di morire, lo può fare; ma deve bene il Principe temerne meno, perchè le sono rarissime. Deve solo guardarsi di non fare ingiuria grave ad alcuno di coloro, de’ quali si serve, e che egli ha d’intorno al servizio del suo Principato, come aveva fatto Antonino, il quale aveva morto contumeliosamente un fratello di quel centurione, e lui ogni giorno minacciava, e nientedimeno lo teneva a guardia del suo corpo: il che era partito temerario, e da rovinarvi, come gl’intervenne. Ma vegniamo a Commodo, al quale era facilità grande tenere l’Imperio, per averlo ereditario, essendo figliuolo di Marco; e solo gli bastava seguire le vestigia del padre, ed a’ populi e a’ soldati arebbe satisfatto; ma essendo di animo crudele e bestiale, per potere usare la sua rapacità ne’ populi, si volse ad intrattenere gli eserciti, e fargli licenziosi; dall’altra parte non tenendo la sua dignità, descendendo spesso nelli teatri a combattere con i gladiatori, e facendo altre cose vilissime, e poco degne della Maiestà Imperiale, diventò vile nel cospetto de’ soldati; ed essendo odiato da una parte, e dall’altra disprezzato, fu conspirato contro di lui e morto.\n\nRestaci a narrare le qualità di Massimino. Costui fu uomo bellicosissimo; ed essendo gli eserciti infastiditi dalla mollizie di Alessandro, del quale ho di sopra discorso, morto lui, lo elessero all'Imperio, il quale non molto tempo possedette, perchè due cose lo fecero odioso e disprezzato: l’una esser lui vilissimo per aver guardate le pecore in Tracia (la qual cosa era per tutto notissima, e gli faceva una gran dedignazione nel cospetto di ciascuno); l’altra, perchè avendo, nell'ingresso del suo Principato, differito l'andare a Roma, ed entrare nella possessione della sedia Imperiale, aveva dato opinione di crudelissimo, avendo per li suoi prefetti in Roma, e in qualunque luogo dell'Imperio esercitato molte crudeltà; a talchè commosso tutto il mondo dallo sdegno per la viltà del suo sangue, e dall'altra parte dallo odio per la paura della sua ferocia, prima l'Affrica, dipoi il Senato con tutto il Popolo di Roma, e tutta l'Italia gli cospirò contro; al che si aggiunse il suo proprio esercito, il quale campeggiando Aquileia, e trovando difficultà nell'espugnazione, infastidito della crudeltà sua, e, per vedergli tanti nimici, temendolo meno, lo ammazzò.\n Io non voglio ragionare nè di Eliogabalo, nè di Macrino, nè di Iuliano, i quali, per essere al tutto vili, si spensero subito; ma verrò alla conclusione di questo discorso; e dico, che li Principi de’ nostri tempi hanno meno questa difficultà di satisfare straordinariamente a’ soldati ne’ governi loro, perchè nonostante che si abbi ad avere a quelli qualche considerazione, pure si risolve presto, per non avere alcuno di questi Principi eserciti insieme, che sieno inveterati con li governi ed amministrazioni delle provincie, come erano gli eserciti dell'Imperio Romano; e però se allora era necessario sodisfare a’ soldati, più che a’ popoli, era perchè i soldati potevano più, che i popoli; ora è più necessario a tutti i Principi, eccetto che al Turco ed al Soldano, satisfare a’ popoli, che a’ soldati, perchè i popoli possono più, che quelli. Di che io ne eccettuo il Turco, tenendo sempre quello intorno dodicimila fanti e quindicimila cavalli, da’ quali dipende la sicurtà e la fortezza del suo Regno; ed è necessario che posposto ogni altro rispetto de' popoli, se gli mantenga amici. Simile è il Regno del Soldano, quale essendo tutto in mano de’ soldati, conviene che ancora lui, senza respetto de’ popoli, se gli mantenga amici. Ed avete a notare, che questo Stato del Soldano è disforme da tutti gli altri Principati; perchè egli è simile al Pontificato Cristiano, il quale non si può chiamare nè Principato ereditario, nè Principato nuovo; perchè non i figliuoli del Principe morto rimangono eredi e signori, ma colui che è eletto a quel grado da coloro che ne hanno autorità. Ed essendo questo ordine anticato, non si può chiamare Principato nuovo; perchè in quello non sono alcune di quelle difficultà che sono ne’ nuovi; perchè sebbene il Principe è nuovo, gli ordini di quello Stato sono vecchi, e ordinati a riceverlo come se fusse loro signore ereditario.\n\nMa, tornando alla materia nostra, dico, che qualunque considererà al sopraddetto discorso, vedrà o l’odio, o il dispregio essere stato causa della rovina di quelli Imperadori prenominati, e cognoscerà ancora donde nacque, che parte di loro procedendo in uno modo, e parte al contrario, in qualunque di quelli uno ebbe felice, e gli altri infelice fine; perchè a Pertinace ed Alessandro, per essere Principi nuovi, fu inutile e dannoso il volere imitare Marco, che era nel Principato ereditario; e similmente a Caracalla, Commodo e Massimino essere stata cosa perniziosa imitar Severo, per non avere avuto tanta virtù che bastasse a seguitare le vestigia sue. Pertanto un Principe nuovo in un Principato non può imitare le azioni di Marco, nè ancora è necessario imitare quelle di Severo; ma deve pigliare di Severo quelle parti che per fondare il suo Stato sono necessarie, e da Marco quelle che sono convenienti e gloriose a conservare uno Stato, che sia di già stabilito e fermo.\n\n### Chapter XX\n\nSe le fortezze, e molte altre cose che spesse volte i Principi fanno, sono utili o dannose.\n\nAlcuni Principi, per tenere sicuramente lo Stato, hanno disarmato i loro sudditi; alcuni altri hanno tenuto divise in parti le terre suggette; alcuni altri hanno nutrito nimicizie contro a sè medesimi; alcuni altri si sono volti a guadagnarsi quelli che gli erano sospetti nel principio del suo Stato; alcuni hanno edificato fortezze; alcuni le hanno rovinate e distrutte. E benchè di tutte queste cose non si possa dare determinata sentenzia, se non si viene su’ particulari di questi Stati, dove si avesse da pigliare alcuna simile deliberazione; nondimeno io parlerò in quel modo largo che la materia per sè medesima sopporta. Non fu mai adunque che un Principe nuovo disarmasse i suoi sudditi; anzi, quando gli ha trovati disarmati, gli ha sempre armati; perchè armandosi, quelle arme diventano tue; diventano fedeli quelli che ti sono sospetti; e quelli che erano fedeli, si mantengono; e gli sudditi tuoi si fanno tuoi partigiani. E perchè tutti i sudditi non si possono armare, quando si benefichino quelli che tu armi, con gli altri si può fare più sicurtà; e quella diversità del procedere che conoscono in loro, gli fa tuoi obbligati; quelli altri ti scusano, giudicando esser necessario quelli aver più merito che hanno più pericolo e più obbligo. Ma quando tu gli disarmi, tu incominci ad offendergli, e mostrare che tu abbi in loro diffidenza o per viltà, o per poca fede; e l’una e l’altra di queste opinioni concipe odio contro di te. E perchè tu non puoi stare disarmato, conviene che ti volti alla milizia mercenaria, della quale di sopra abbiam detto quale sia; e quando essa fusse buona, non può esser tanta, che ti difenda da’ nimici potenti, e da’ sudditi sospetti. Però, come io ho detto, un Principe nuovo in un nuovo Principato sempre vi ha ordinato l’arme. Di questi esempi son piene le istorie. Ma quando un Principe acquista uno Stato nuovo, che come membro si aggiunga al suo vecchio, allora è necessario disarmare quello Stato, eccetto quelli che nello acquistarlo si sono per te scoperti; e questi ancora con il tempo ed occasioni è necessario fargli molli ed effeminati, e ordinarsi in modo, che tutte l’arme del tuo Stato sieno in quelli soldati tuoi propri, che nello Stato tuo antico vivono appresso di te.\n\nSolevano li antichi nostri, e quelli che erano stimati savi, dire, come era necessario tenere Pistoia con le parti, e Pisa con le fortezze; e per questo nutrivano in qualche terra lor suddita le differenze per possederla più facilmente. Questo, in quelli tempi che Italia era in un certo modo bilanciata, doveva essere ben fatto; ma non mi pare si possa dare oggi per precetto; perchè io non credo che le divisioni fatte faccino mai bene alcuno; anzi è necessario, quando il nimico si accosta, che le città divise si perdino subito; perchè sempre la parte più debole si accosterà alle forze esterne, e l’altra non potrà reggere. I Viniziani mossi, come io credo, dalle ragioni sopraddette, nutrivano le sette Guelfe e Ghibelline nelle città loro suddite; e benchè non gli lasciassino mai venire al sangue, pure nutrivano fra loro questi dispareri acciocchè, occupati quelli cittadini in quelle loro differenze, non si muovessero contro di loro. Il che, come si vide, non tornò poi loro a proposito; perchè, essendo rotti a Vailà, subito una parte di quelle prese ardire, e tolsono loro tutto lo Stato. Arguiscano pertanto simili modi debolezza del Principe; perchè in un Principato gagliardo mai si permetteranno tali divisioni; perchè le fanno solo profitto a tempo di pace, potendosi, mediante quelle, più facilmente maneggiare i sudditi; ma, venendo la guerra, mostra simile ordine la fallacia sua.\n\nSanza dubbio li Principi diventano grandi  quando superano le difficultà e le opposizioni che son fatte loro; e però la fortuna, massime quando vuole far grande un Principe nuovo, il quale ha maggiore necessità di acquistare riputazione, che uno ereditario, gli fa nascere de’ nimici, e gli fa fare delle imprese contro, acciocchè quello abbia cagione di superarle, e su per quella scala, che gli hanno portata i nimici suoi, salir più alto. E però molti giudicano che un Principe savio, quando ne abbia l'occasione, deve nutrirsi con astuzia qualche inimicizia, acciocchè, oppressa quella, ne seguiti maggiore sua grandezza. Hanno i Principi, e specialmente quelli che son nuovi, trovato più fede e più utilità in quelli uomini, che nel principio del loro Stato son tenuti sospetti, che in quelli che nel principio erano confidenti. Pandolfo Petrucci Principe di Siena reggeva lo Stato suo più con quelli che furono sospetti, che con gli altri. Ma di questa cosa non si può parlare largamente, perchè ella varia secondo il subietto; solo dirò questo, che quelli uomini che nel principio di un Principato erano stati nimici, che sono di qualità che a mantenersi abbino bisogno di appoggio, sempre il Principe con facilità grandissima se li potrà guadagnare; e loro maggiormente son forzati a servirlo con fede, quanto cognoscono essere loro più necessario cancellare con l'opere quella opinione sinistra che si aveva di loro; e così il Principe ne trae sempre più utilità, che di coloro, i quali, servendolo con troppa sicurtà, trascurano le cose sue. E poichè la materia lo ricerca, non voglio lasciare indietro il ricordare a un Principe che ha preso uno Stato di nuovo, mediante i favori intrinsechi di quello, che consideri bene qual cagione abbi mosso quelli che l'hanno favorito, a favorirlo; e se ella non è affezione naturale verso di quello, ma fusse solo perchè quelli non si contentavano di quello Stato, con fatica e difficultà grande se gli potrà mantenere amici; perchè e’ fia impossibile che lui possa contentargli. E discorrendo bene con quelli esempi che dalle cose antiche e moderne si traggono la cagione di questo, vedrà esser molto più facile il guadagnarsi amici quelli uomini che dello Stato innanzi si contentavono, e però erano suoi nimici, che quelli, i quali, per non se ne contentare, gli diventarono amici, e favorironlo ad occuparlo.\n\nÈ stata consuetudine de’ Principi, per poter tenere più sicuramente lo Stato loro, edificare fortezze che sieno briglia e freno di quelli che disegnassino far loro contro, ed avere un rifugio sicuro da un primo impeto. Io lodo questo modo, perchè gli è usitato anticamente. Nondimeno Messer Niccolò Vitelli ne’ tempi nostri si è visto disfare due fortezze in Città di Castello, per tener quello Stato. Guid’Ubaldo Duca di Urbino, ritornato nel suo Stato, donde da Cesare Borgia era stato cacciato, rovinò da fondamenti tutte le fortezze di quella provincia; e giudicò senza quelle più difficilmente riperdere quello Stato. I Bentivogli, ritornati in Bologna, usarono simil termine. Sono adunque le fortezze utili o no, secondo li tempi; e se ti fanno bene in una parte, ti offendono in una altra. E puossi discorrere questa parte così. Quel Principe che ha più paura de’ popoli, che de’ forestieri, deve fare le fortezze; ma quello che ha più paura de’ forestieri, che de’ popoli, deve lasciarle indietro. Alla Casa Sforzesca ha fatto e farà più guerra il castello di Milano che vi edificò Francesco Sforza, che alcun altro  disordine di quello Stato. Però la migliore fortezza che sia, è non essere odiato da' popoli; perchè ancora che tu abbi le fortezze, ed il popolo ti abbi in odio, le non ti salvano; perchè non mancano mai a’ popoli, preso che egli hanno l’armi, forestieri che gli soccorrino. Ne’ tempi nostri non si vede che quelle abbin fatto profitto ad alcun Principe, se non alla Contessa di Furlì quando fu morto il Conte Girolamo suo consorte; perchè, mediante quella, potè fuggire l’impeto popolare, ed aspettare il soccorso di Milano, e ricuperare lo Stato; e li tempi stavano allora in modo, che il forestiero non poteva soccorrere il popolo. Ma dipoi valsono ancor poco a lei, quando Cesare Borgia l’assaltò, e che il popolo nimico suo si congiunse col forestiero. Pertanto ed allora, e prima, saria stato più sicuro a lei non essere odiata dal popolo, che avere le fortezze. Considerate adunque queste cose, io loderò chi farà fortezze, e chi non le farà; e biasimerò qualunque, fidandosi delle fortezze, stimerà poco l'essere odiato da’ popoli.\n\n### Chapter XXI\n\nCome si debba governare un Principe per acquistarsi riputazione.\n\nNissuna cosa fa tanto stimare un Principe, quanto fanno le grandi imprese, e il dare di sè esempi rari. Noi abbiamo nei nostri tempi Ferrando Re d'Aragona, presente Re di Spagna. Costui si può chiamare quasi Principe nuovo, perchè d'un Re debole è diventato per fama e per gloria il primo Re dei Cristiani; e se considererete le azioni sue, le troverete tutte grandissime, e qualcuna straordinaria. Egli nel principio del suo regno assaltò la Granata, e quella impresa fu il fondamento dello Stato suo. In prima ei la fece ozioso, e senza sospetto di essere impedito; tenne occupati in quella gli animi de’ Baroni di Castiglia, li quali pensando a quella guerra non pensavano ad innovare; e lui acquistava in questo mezzo riputazione ed imperio sopra di loro, che non se ne accorgevano. Potè nutrire, con danari della Chiesa e de’ popoli, gli eserciti, e fare un fondamento con quella guerra lunga alla milizia, la quale dipoi lo ha onorato. Oltra questo, per potere intraprender maggiori imprese, servendosi sempre della Religione, si volse a una pietosa crudeltà, cacciando e spogliando il suo Regno de’ Marrani; nè può essere questo esempio più mirabile, nè più raro. Assaltò sotto questo medesimo mantello l’Affrica, fece l’impresa d’Italia, ha ultimamente assaltato la Francia, e così sempre ordito cose grande, le quali sempre hanno tenuto sospesi ed ammirati gli animi de’ sudditi, ed occupati nell’evento di esse. E sono nate queste sue azioni in modo l’una dall’altra, che non hanno dato mai spazio agli uomini di quietare ed operargli contro.\n\nGiova ancora assai a un Principe dare di sè esempi rari circa il governo di dentro, simili a quelli che si narrano di Messer Bernabò di Milano, quando si ha l’occasione di qualcuno che operi qualche cosa straordinaria o in bene o in male nella vita civile, e trovare un modo circa il premiarlo o punirlo, di che s’abbi a parlare assai. E soprattutto un Principe si debbe ingegnare dare di sè in ogni sua azione fama di grande ed eccellente. È ancora stimato un Principe quando egli è vero amico, o vero nimico, cioè quando senza alcun rispetto si scuopre in favore di alcuno contro un altro; il qual partito fia sempre più utile, che star neutrale; perchè se duoi potenti tuoi vicini vengono alle mani, o essi sono di qualità che vincendo un di quelli tu abbi da temere del vincitore, o no. In qualunque di questi duoi casi ti sarà sempre più utile lo scuoprirti, e far buona guerra; perchè nel primo caso se tu non ti scuopri sarai sempre preda di chi vince con piacere e satisfazione di colui che è stato vinto, e non arai ragione nè cosa alcuna che ti difenda, nè chi ti riceva. Perchè chi vince non vuole amici sospetti, e che nelle avversità non l'aiutino; chi perde non ti riceve, per non aver tu voluto con l'armi in mano correre la fortuna sua.\n\nEra passato Antioco in Grecia, messovi dagli Etoli per cacciarne i Romani. Mandò Antioco oratori agli Achei, che erano amici de’ Romani, a confortarli a star di mezzo; e dall'altra parte i Romani gli persuadevano a pigliare l'armi per loro. Venne questa cosa a deliberarsi nel concilio degli Achei, dove il legato d'Antioco gli persuadeva a stare neutrali; a che il legato Romano rispose: Quanto alla parte, che si dice essere ottimo ed utilissimo allo Stato vostro il non v'intromettere nella guerra nostra, niente vi è più contrario; imperocchè, non vi ci intromettendo, senza grazia e senza riputazione alcuna resterete premio del vincitore. E sempre interverrà, che quello che non è ti amico, ti richiederà della neutralità, e quello che ti è amico, ti ricercherà che ti scuopra con l'armi. E li Principi mal risoluti, per fuggire i presenti pericoli, seguono il più delle volte quella via neutrale, ed il più delle volte rovinano. Ma quando il Principe si scuopre gagliardamente in favore di una parte, se colui, con chi tu aderisci, vince, ancorachè sia potente e che tu rimanga a sua discrezione, egli ha teco obbligo, e vi è contratto l’amore, e gli uomini non sono mai sì disonesti, che con tanto esemplo d'ingratitudine ti opprimessero. Dipoi le vittorie non sono mai sì prospere, che il vincitore non abbia ad avere qualche rispetto; e massime alla giustizia. Ma se quello, con il quale tu aderisci, perde, tu siei ricevuto da lui; e, mentre che può, ti aiuta, e diventi compagno di una fortuna che può risurgere. Nel secondo caso quando quelli che combattono insieme sono di qualità, che tu non abbia da temere di quello che vince, tantopiù è gran prudenza lo aderire; perchè tu vai alla rovina d’uno con l'aiuto di chi lo dovrrebbe salvare, se fusse savio, e vincendo rimane alla tua discrezione, ed è impossibile con l'aiuto tuo non vinca. E qui è da notare, che un Principe deve avvertire non far mai compagnia con uno più potente di sè per offendere altri, se non quando la necessità lo strigne, come di sopra si dice; perchè, vincendo lui, tu rimani a sua discrezione, e li Principi debbono fuggire quanto possono lo stare a discrezione d'altri. I Viniziani si accompagnarono con Francia contro al Duca di Milano, e potevano fuggire di non fare quella compagnia; di che ne risultò la rovina loro. Ma quando non si può fuggirla, come intervenne a’ Fiorentini quando il Papa e Spagna andarono con gli eserciti ad assaltare la Lombardia, allora vi deve il Principe aderire per le sopradette ragioni. Nè creda mai alcuno Stato poter pigliare partiti sicuri; anzi pensi d'avere a prenderli tutti dubbi; perchè si trova questo nell’ordine delle cose, che mai si cerca fuggire uno inconveniente, che non s'incorra in un altro: ma la prudenza consiste in saper cognoscere la qualità degli inconvenienti, e prendere il manco tristo per buono.\n\nDeve ancora un Principe mostrarsi amatore delle virtù, e onorare gli eccellenti in ciascuna arte. Appresso deve animare i suoi cittadini di poter quietamente esercitare gli esercizi loro e nella mercanzia, e nell'agricultura, ed in ogni altro esercizio degli uomini, acciocchè quello non si astenga di ornare le sue possessioni per timore che non gli sieno tolte, e quell’altro di aprire un traffico per paura delle taglie; ma deve preparare premi a chi vuol fare queste cose, ed a qualunque pensa in qualunque modo di ampliare la sua città o il suo Stato. Deve oltre a questo ne’ tempi convenienti dell’anno tenere occupati li popoli con le feste e spettacoli; e perchè ogni città è divisa o in arti o in tribù, deve tenere conto di quelle università, ragunarsi con loro qualche volta, dare di sè esempio di umanità e di magnificenza; tenendo nondimeno sempre ferma la maestà della dignità sua; perchè questo non si vuole mai che manchi in cosa alcuna.\n\n### Chapter XXII\n\nDelli segretari de’ Principi.\n\nNon è di poca importanza a un Principe la elezione de’ ministri, li quali sono buoni o no, secondo la prudenza del Principe. E la prima coniettura che si fa di un signore, e del cervel suo, è vedere gli uomini che lui ha d’intorno; e quando  sono sufficienti e fedeli, sempre si può riputarlo savio, perchè ha saputo cognoscergli sufficienti e  mantenerseli fedeli. Ma quando siano altrimenti, sempre si può fare non buono giudizio di lui; perchè il primo errore che e’ fa, lo fa in questa elezione. Non era alcuno che cognoscesse Messer Antonio da Venafro per ministro di Pandolfo Petrucci Principe di Siena, che non giudicasse Pandolfo essere prudentissimo uomo, avendo quello per suo ministro. E perchè sono di tre generazioni cervelli; l’uno intende per sè, l’altro intende quanto da altri gli è mostro, il terzo non intende nè sè stesso nè per dimostrazione d’altri. Quel primo è eccellentissimo, il secondo eccellente, il terzo inutile.\n\nConveniva pertanto di necessità, che se Pandolfo non era nel primo grado, fusse nel secondo; perchè ogni volta che uno ha giudicio di cognoscere il bene ed il male che un fa e dice, ancorachè da sè non abbia invenzione, cognosce le opere triste e le buone del ministro, e quelle esalta e le altre corregge; ed il ministro non può sperare d’ingannarlo, e mantiensi buono. Ma come un Principe possa cognoscere il ministro, ci è questo modo che non falla mai. Quando tu vedi il ministro pensare più a sè, che a te, e che in tutte le azioni vi ricerca l’utile suo, questo tale così fatto mai non fia buon ministro, nè mai te ne potrai fidare; perchè quello che ha lo Stato di uno in mano, non deve mai pensare a sè, ma al Principe; e non gli ricordare mai cosa, che non appartenga a lui. E dall’altra parte il Principe per mantenerlo buono deve pensare al ministro, onorandolo, facendolo ricco, obbligandoselo, partecipandogli gli onori e carichi, acciocchè li assai onori, le assai ricchezze concessegli siano causa che egli non desideri altri onori, e ricchezze; e gli assai carichi gli faccino temere le mutazioni, cognoscendo non poter reggersi senza lui. Quando adunque i Principi e li ministri sono così fatti, possono confidare l’uno dell’altro; quando altrimenti, il fine sarà sempre dannoso o per l’uno, o per l’altro.\n\n### Chapter XXIII\n\nCome si debbino fuggire gli adulatori.\n\nNon voglio lasciare indietro un capo importante, ed un errore, dal quale i Principi con difficultà si difendono, se non sono prudentissimi, o se non hanno buona elezione. E questo è quello degli adulatori, delli quali le corti sono piene, perchè gli uomini si compiacciono tanto nelle cose lor proprie, e in modo vi s’ingannano, che con difficultà si difendono da questa peste; ed a volersene difendere si porta pericolo di non diventare disprezzato. Perchè non ci è altro modo a guardarsi dalle adulazioni, se non che gli uomini intendino che non ti offendono a dirti il vero; ma quando ciascuno può dirti il vero, ti manca la riverenza. Pertanto un Principe prudente deve tenere un terzo modo, eleggendo nel suo Stato uomini savi, e solo a quelli deve dare libero arbitrio a parlargli la verità, e di quelle cose sole che lui domanda, e non di altro; ma deve domandargli di ogni cosa, e udire le opinioni loro, dipoi deliberare da sè a suo modo; e con questi consigli, e con ciascun di loro portarsi in modo, che ognuno conosca che quanto più liberamente si parlerà, tanto più gli sarà accettato; fuori di quelli, non volere udire alcuno, andar dietro alla cosa deliberata, ed essere ostinato nelle deliberazioni sue. Chi fa altrimenti o precipita per gli adulatori, o si muta  spesso per la variazione de’ pareri; di che nasce la poca estimazione sua. Io voglio a questo proposito addurre un esempio moderno. Pre’ Luca, uomo di Massimiliano presente Imperatore, parlando di sua Maestà, disse, come non si consigliava con persona, e non faceva mai d’alcuna cosa a suo modo; il che nasceva dal tenere contrario termine al sopradetto; perchè l’Imperatore è uomo segreto, non comunica li suoi segreti con persona, non ne piglia parere. Ma come nel mettergli ad effetto s’incominciano a conoscere e scuoprire, gl’incominciano ad esser contradetti da coloro che egli ha d’intorno, e quello come facile se ne stoglie. Di qui nasce che quelle cose che fa l’un giorno, distrugge l’altro; e che non s’intenda mai quello che vogli, o disegni fare, e che sopra le sue deliberazioni non si può fondare.\n\nUn Principe pertanto deve consigliarsi sempre, ma quando lui vuole, non quando altri vuole; anzi deve torre animo a ciascuno di consigliarlo d’alcuna cosa, se non gliene domanda; ma lui deve ben essere largo domandatore, e dipoi, circa le cose domandate, paziente auditore del vero; anzi intendendo che alcuno per qualche rispetto non gliene dica, turbarsene. E perchè molti stimano che alcun Principe, il quale dà di sè opinione di prudente, sia così tenuto non per sua natura, ma per li buoni consigli che lui ha d’intorno, senza dubbio s’ingannano; perchè questa non falla mai, ed è regola generale, che un Principe, il quale non sia savio per sè stesso, non può essere consigliato bene, se già a sorte non si rimettesse in un solo che al tutto lo governasse, che fusse uomo prudentissimo. In questo caso potria bene essere ben governato, ma durerebbe poco, perchè quello governatore in breve tempo gli torrebbe lo Stato; ma consigliandosi con più d’uno, un Principe che non sia savio, non arà mai uniti consigli, nè saprà per sè stesso unirgli. Dei consiglieri ciascuno penserà alla proprietà sua; ed egli non gli saprà correggere, nè cognoscere. E non si possono trovare altrimenti, perchè gli uomini sempre ti riusciranno tristi, se da una necessità non sono fatti buoni. Però si conchiude che li buoni consigli, da qualunque venghino, conviene naschino dalla prudenza del Principe, e non la prudenza del Principe da’ buoni consigli.\n\n### Chapter XXIV\n\nPerchè i Principi d’Italia abbino perduto i loro Stati.\n\nLe cose sopradette osservate prudentemente fanno parere un Principe nuovo antico; e lo rendono subito più sicuro e più fermo nello Stato, che se vi fosse anticato dentro. Perchè un Principe nuovo è molto più osservato nelle sue azioni, che uno ereditario; e quando le son cognosciute virtuose, si guadagnano molto più gli uomini, e molto più gli obbligano, che il sangue antico; perchè gli uomini sono molto più presi dalle cose presenti, che dalle passate, e quando nelle presenti ei trovano il bene, vi si godono, e non cercano altro; anzi pigliano ogni difesa di lui, quando il Principe non manchi nelle altre cose a sè medesimo. E così arà duplicata gloria di aver dato principio a un Principato nuovo, ed ornatolo, e corroboratolo di buone leggi, di buone armi, di buoni amici, e di buoni esempi; come quello arà duplicata vergogna, che è nato Principe, e per sua poca prudenza l’ha perduto. E se si considera quelli Signori che in Italia hanno perduto lo Stato ne’ nostri tempi, come il Re di Napoli, Duca di Milano, e altri, si troverà in loro prima un comune difetto quanto all’armi, per le cagioni che di sopra a lungo si sono discorse; dipoi si vedrà alcun di loro o che arà avuto nimici i popoli, o se arà avuto amico il popolo, non si sarà saputo assicurare de’ grandi; perchè senza questi difetti non si perdono gli Stati, che abbino tanto nervi, che possino tenere un esercito alla campagna.\n\nFilippo Macedone, non il padre di Alessandro Magno, ma quello che fu da Tito Quinzio vinto, aveva non molto Stato rispetto alla grandezza de’ Romani, e di Grecia, che l’assaltò; nientedimeno, per essere uomo militare, e che sapeva intrattenere i popoli, ed assicurarsi de’ grandi, sostenne più anni la guerra contro di quelli; e se alla fine perdè il dominio di qualche città, gli rimase nondimanco il Regno. Pertanto questi nostri Principi, i quali molti anni erano stati nel loro Principato, per averlo dipoi perso, non accusino la fortuna, ma l’ignavia loro; perchè non avendo mai pensato ne’ tempi quieti che possino mutarsi; (il che è comune difetto degli uomini non far conto nella bonaccia della tempesta) quando poi vennero i tempi avversi, pensarono a fuggirsi, non a difendersi, e sperarono che i populi, infastiditi per la insolenza de’ vincitori, gli richiamassero. Il quale partito, quando mancano li altri, è buono; ma è ben male avere lasciato gli altri rimedi per quello; perchè non si vorrebbe mai cadere per credere poi di trovare chi ti ricolga. Il che, o non avviene, o se egli avviene, non è con tua sicurtà, per essere quella difesa vile, e non dipendere da te; e quelle  difese solamente sono buone, certe, e durabili, che dipendono da te proprio, e dalla virtù tua.\n\n### Chapter XXV\n\nQuanto possa nelle umane cose la fortuna, e in che modo se gli possa ostare.\n\nNon mi è incognito, come molti hanno avuto e hanno opinione, che le cose del mondo siano in modo governate dalla fortuna, e da Dio, che gli uomini con la prudenza loro non possino correggerle, anzi non vi abbino rimedio alcuno; e per questo potrebbono giudicare che non fusse da insudare molto nelle cose, ma lasciarsi governare dalla sorte. Questa opinione è suta più creduta ne’ nostri tempi per la variazione delle cose grandi che si sono viste, e veggonsi ogni dì fuori di ogni umana coniettura. A che pensando io qualche volta, sono in qualche parte inchinato nella opinione loro. Nondimanco, perchè il nostro libero arbitrio non sia spento, giudico potere esser vero, che la fortuna sia arbitra della metà delle azioni nostre, ma che ancora ella ne lasci governare l’altra metà, o poco meno, a noi. Ed assomiglio quella ad fiume rovinoso, che quando ei si adira, allaga i piani, rovina gli arbori e gli edifici, lieva da questa parte terreno, ponendolo a quell’altra; ciascuno gli fugge davanti, ognuno cede al suo furore, senza potervi ostare; e benchè sia così fatto, non resta però che gli uomini, quando sono tempi quieti, non vi possino fare provvedimenti e con ripari, e con argini, immodochè crescendo poi, o egli andrebbe per un canale, o l’impeto suo non sarebbe sì licenzioso, nè sì dannoso.\n\n Similmente interviene della fortuna, la quale dimostra la sua potenzia dove non è ordinata virtù a resistere, e quivi volta i suoi impeti, dove la sa che non sono fatti gli argini, nè i ripari a tenerla. E se voi considererete l’Italia, che è la sede di queste variazioni, e quella che ha dato loro il moto, vedrete essere una campagna senza argini, e senza alcun riparo. Che se la fusse riparata da conveniente virtù, come è la Magna, la Spagna, e la Francia, questa inondazione non avrebbe fatto le variazioni grandi che l’ha, o la non ci sarebbe venuta. E questo voglio basti aver detto quanto all’opporsi alla fortuna in universale. Ma restringendomi più al particulare, dico, come si vede oggi questo Principe felicitare, e domani rovinare, senza vederli aver mutato natura o qualità alcuna. Il che credo nasca prima dalle cagioni che si sono lungamente per lo addietro trascorse; cioè, che quel Principe che si appoggia tutto in sulla fortuna, rovina come quella varia. Credo ancora, che sia felice quello, il modo del cui procedere suo si riscontra con la qualità de’ tempi, e similmente sia infelice quello, dal cui procedere si discordano i tempi. Perchè si vede gli uomini nelle cose che gl’inducono al fine, quale ciascuno ha innanzi, cioè gloria e ricchezze, procedervi variamente, l’uno con rispetti, l’altro con impeto; l’uno per violenza, l’altro per arte; l’uno con pazienza, l’altro col suo contrario; e ciascuno con questi diversi modi vi può pervenire. E vedesi ancora duoi respettivi, l’uno pervenire al suo disegno, l’altro no; e similmente duoi equalmente felicitare con due diversi studi, essendo l’uno respettivo, l’altro impetuoso; il che non nasce da altro, se non da qualità di tempi che si conformino o no col procedere loro. Di qui nasce quello ho detto che duoi, diversamente operando, sortiscano il medesimo effetto; e duoi equalmente operando, l’uno si conduce al suo fine, l’altro no. Da questo ancora dipende la variazione del bene; perchè se a uno, che si governa con rispetto e pazienza, i tempi e le cose girano in modo che il governo suo sia buono, esso viene felicitando; ma se li tempi e le cose si mutano, egli rovina, perchè non muta modo di procedere. Nè si trova uomo sì prudente, che si sappi accordare a questo, sì perchè non si può deviare da quello, a che la natura l’inclina; sì ancora perchè avendo sempre uno prosperato camminando per una via, non si può persuadere, che sia bene partirsi da quella; e però l’uomo rispettivo, quando gli è tempo di venire all’impeto non lo sa fare; donde egli rovina; che se si mutasse natura con li tempi e con le cose, non si muterebbe fortuna. Papa Iulio II procedette in ogni sua cosa impetuosamente, e trovò tanto i tempi e le cose conformi a quel suo modo di procedere, che sempre sortì felice fine. Considerate la prima impresa che fece di Bologna, vivendo ancora Messer Giovanni Bentivogli. I Viniziani non se ne contentavano, il Re di Spagna similmente con Francia aveva ragionamento di tale impresa; e lui nondimanco con la sua ferocità ed impeto si mosse personalmente a quella espedizione, la qual mossa fece star sospesi e fermi e Spagna, e i Viniziani; quelli per paura, quell’altro per il desiderio di ricuperare tutto il Regno di Napoli; e dall’altra parte si tirò dietro il Re di Francia, perchè vedutolo quel Re mosso, e desiderando farselo amico per abbassare i Viniziani, giudicò non poterli negare le sue genti senza ingiuriarlo manifestamente.\n\n Condusse adunque Iulio con la sua mossa impetuosa quello che mai altro Pontefice con tutta l’umana prudenza non avria condutto; perchè se egli aspettava di partirsi da Roma con le conclusione ferme, e tutte le cose ordinate, come qualunque altro Pontefice arebbe fatto, mai non gli riusciva. Perchè il Re di Francia avria trovate mille scuse, e gli altri gli arebbero messo mille paure. Io voglio lasciare stare le altre sue azioni, che tutte sono state simili, e tutte gli sono successe bene, e la brevità della vita non gli ha lasciato sentire il contrario; perchè se fussero sopravvenuti tempi che fosse bisognato procedere con rispetti, ne seguiva la sua rovina; perchè mai non arebbe deviato da quelli modi, a’ quali la natura lo inchinava. Conchiudo adunque, che, variando la fortuna, e gli uomini stando nei loro modi ostinati, sono felici mentre concordano insieme, e come discordano sono infelici. Io giudico ben questo, che sia meglio essere impetuoso, che rispettivo, perchè la Fortuna è donna; ed è necessario, volendola tener sotto, batterla, ed urtarla; e si vede che la si lascia più vincere da questi che da quelli che freddamente procedono. E però sempre, come donna, è amica de’ giovani, perchè sono meno rispettivi, più feroci, e con più audacia la comandano.\n\n### Chapter XXVI\n\nEsortazione a liberare la Italia da’ barbari.\n\nConsiderato adunque tutte le cose di sopra discorse, e pensando meco medesimo se al presente in Italia correvano tempi da onorare un Principe nuovo, e se ci era materia che desse occasione a uno  prudente e virtuoso d’introdurvi nuova forma, che facesse onore a lui, e bene alla università degli uomini di quella, mi pare concorrino tante cose in beneficio d’un Principe nuovo, che non so qual mai tempo fusse più atto a questo. E se, come io dissi, era necessario, volendo vedere la virtù di Moisè, che il popolo d’Istrael fusse schiavo in Egitto, ed a conoscere la grandezza e l’animo di Ciro, che i Persi fussero oppressi da’ Medi, e ad illustrare l’eccellenza di Teseo, che gli Ateniesi fussero dispersi; così al presente, volendo conoscere la virtù di uno spirito Italiano, era necessario che l’Italia si conducesse ne’ termini presenti, e che la fusse più schiava che gli Ebrei, più serva che i Persi, più dispersa che gli Ateniesi, senza capo, senz’ordine, battuta, spogliata, lacera, corsa, ed avesse sopportato di ogni sorta rovine. E benchè infino a qui si sia mostro qualche spiraculo in qualcuno da poter giudicare che fusse ordinato da Dio per sua redenzione; nientedimanco si è visto come dipoi nel più alto corso delle azioni è stato dalla fortuna reprobato in modo, che, rimasa come senza vita, aspetta qual possa esser quello che sani le sue ferite, e ponga fine alle direpzioni, e a’ sacchi di Lombardia, alle espilazioni, e taglie del Reame, e di Toscana, e la guarisca di quelle sue piaghe già per lungo tempo infistolite.\n\nVedesi come la prega Dio che gli mandi qualcuno che la redima da queste crudeltà ed insolenzie barbare. Vedesi ancora tutta pronta e disposta a seguire una bandiera, purchè ci sia alcuno che la pigli. Nè si vede al presente in quale la possa più sperare che nella illustre Casa Vostra, la quale con la sua virtù e fortuna, favorita da Dio e dalla Chiesa, della quale è ora Principe, possa farsi capo di questa  redenzione. E questo non vi sarà molto difficile, se vi recherete innanzi le azioni e vite de’ soprannominati. E benchè quelli uomini siano rari e maravigliosi; nondimeno furono uomini, ed ebbe ciascuno di loro minore occasione, che la presente; perchè l’impresa loro non fu più giusta di questa, nè più facile; nè fu Dio più a loro amico, che a voi. Qui è giustizia grande, perchè quella guerra è giusta, che gli è necessaria; e quelle armi sono pietose, dove non si spera in altro, che in elle. Qui è disposizione grandissima; nè può essere, dove è grande disposizione, grande difficultà; purchè quella pigli delli ordini di coloro che io vi ho proposto per mira. Oltre a questo, qui si veggono straordinari senza esempio, condutti da Dio: il mare s’è aperto, una nube vi ha scorto il cammino, la pietra ha versato l’acqua; qui è piovuto la manna, ogni cosa è concorsa nella vostra grandezza; il rimanente dovete far voi. Dio non vuole far ogni cosa, per non ci torre il libero arbitrio, e parte di quella gloria che tocca a noi. E non è maraviglia, se alcuno de’ prenominati Italiani non ha possuto far quello che si può sperare facci la illustre Casa Vostra, e se in tante revoluzioni d’Italia, e in tanti maneggi di guerra, e’ pare sempre che in quella la virtù militare sia spenta; perchè questo nasce che gli ordini antichi di quella non erano buoni, e non ci è suto alcuno che abbia saputo trovare de’ nuovi. Nessuna cosa fa tanto onore ad uno uomo che di nuovo surga, quanto fanno le nuove leggi e nuovi ordini trovati da lui. Queste cose quando sono ben fondate, ed abbino in loro grandezza, lo fanno reverendo e mirabile, e in Italia non manca materia da introdurvi ogni forma. Qui è virtù grande nelle membra, quando ella non mancasse ne’ capi. Specchiatevi nelli  duelli, e nei congressi de’ pochi, quanto gl’Italiani siano superiori con le forze, con la destrezza, con l’ingegno. Ma come si viene agli eserciti, non compariscono; e tutto procede dalla debolezza de’ capi, perchè quelli che sanno, non sono ubbedienti, ed a ciascuno par sapere, non ci essendo infino a qui suto alcuno che si sia rilevato tanto e per virtù e per fortuna, che gli altri cedino. Di qui nasce che in tanto tempo, in tante guerre fatte ne’ passati venti anni, quando gli è stato un esercito tutto Italiano, sempre ha fatto mala prova; di che è testimone prima il Taro, dipoi Alessandria, Capua, Genova, Vailà, Bologna, Mestri.\n\nVolendo dunque la illustre Casa Vostra seguitare quelli eccellenti uomini, che redimerono le provincie loro, è necessario innanzi a tutte le altre cose, come vero fondamento d’ogni impresa, provvedersi d’armi proprie; perchè non si può avere nè più fidi, nè più veri, nè migliori soldati. E benchè ciascuno di essi sia buono, tutti insieme diventeranno migliori, quando si vedranno comandare dal loro Principe, e da quello onorare ed intrattenere. È necessario pertanto prepararsi a queste armi, per potersi con virtù Italiana difendere dagli esterni. E benchè la fanteria Svizzera, e Spagnuola sia stimata terribile; nondimanco in ambedue è difetto, per il quale uno ordine terzo potrebbe non solamente opporsi loro, ma confidare di superargli. Perchè gli Spagnuoli non possono sostenere i cavalli, e gli Svizzeri hanno ad aver paura de’ fanti, quando gli riscontrino nel combattere ostinati come loro. Donde si è veduto, e vedrassi per isperienza, gli Spagnuoli non poter sostenere una cavalleria Francese, e gli Svizzeri essere rovinati da una fanteria Spagnuola. E benchè di questo ultimo non se ne sia vista intera sperienza; nientedimeno se ne è veduto uno saggio nella giornata di Ravenna, quando le fanterie Spagnuole si affrontarono con le battaglie Tedesche, le quali servano il medesimo ordine che i Svizzeri, dove gli Spagnuoli con l’agilità del corpo, e aiuti de’ loro brocchieri erano entrati tra le picche loro sotto, e stavano sicuri ad offendergli, senza che li Tedeschi vi avessino rimedio; e se non fusse la cavalleria che gli urtò, gli arebbono consumati tutti. Puossi adunque, cognosciuto il difetto dell’una e dell’altra di queste fanterie, ordinarne una di nuovo, la quale resista a’ cavalli, e non abbia paura de’ fanti; il che lo farà non la generazione delle armi, ma la variazione degli ordini. E queste sono di quelle cose che di nuovo ordinate danno riputazione, e grandezza a un Principe nuovo. Non si deve adunque lasciar passare questa occasione, acciocchè la Italia vegga dopo tanto tempo apparire un suo redentore. Nè posso esprimere con quale amore ei fussi ricevuto in tutte quelle provincie che hanno patito per queste illuvioni esterne, con qual sete di vendetta, con che ostinata fede, con che pietà, con che lacrime. Quali porte se gli serrerebbono? Quali popoli li negherebbono la obbidienza? Quale invidia se gli opporrebbe? Quale Italiano gli negherebbe l’ossequio? Ad ognuno puzza questo barbaro dominio. Pigli adunque la illustre Casa Vostra questo assunto con quello animo, e con quelle speranze che si pigliano l’imprese giuste, acciocchè sotto la sua insegna questa patria ne sia nobilitata, e sotto i suoi auspicii si verifichi quel detto del Petrarca:\n\nVirtù contro al furore\nPrenderà l’armi, e fia il combatter corto;\nChè l’antico valore\nNegli Italici cuor non è ancor morto.","download_url":"https://mouseia.org/api/works/prince/original.txt"},"translations":[{"id":"trn_prince_mouseia","translator":"Mouseia","kind":"curated","note":"Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication for fidelity, Machiavelli’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.","text":"### Dedication\n\nThose who wish to win the favor of a Prince most often come before him bearing what they hold most dear among their possessions, or what they see gives him the greatest pleasure. Thus one often sees him presented with horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments worthy of his greatness. Wishing, then, to offer myself to Your Magnificence with some token of my devotion to you, I have found among my possessions nothing dearer to me, or more highly prized, than my knowledge of the deeds of great men, acquired through long experience of affairs in our own time and constant study of those of antiquity. Having considered and examined this knowledge with great diligence over many years, and now condensed it into a small volume, I send it to Your Magnificence. And though I judge this work unworthy of your presence, I trust nonetheless that your kindness will make it welcome, since I can give you no greater gift than the means to understand in a very short time all that I have come to know and understand over so many years and through so many hardships and dangers. I have neither adorned this work nor filled it with elaborate periods, with grand and inflated words, or with any other extrinsic embellishment or allure of the kind with which many customarily describe and dress up their works; for I have wished either that nothing should adorn it or that only the truth of its matter and the gravity of its subject should commend it. Nor do I wish it thought presumptuous that a man of low and humble station should dare to discuss and lay down rules for the government of Princes. For just as those who draw maps of countries stand low on the plain to observe the nature of mountains and high places, and climb high on the mountains to observe the nature of the lowlands, so to know well the nature of peoples one must be a Prince, and to know well the nature of Princes one must be a man of the people. Let Your Magnificence, then, receive this small gift in the spirit in which I send it. If you consider and read it carefully, you will discover in it my deepest desire: that you attain the greatness that fortune and your other qualities promise you. And if Your Magnificence, from the summit of your lofty station, should sometimes turn your eyes toward these low places, you will see how undeservedly I bear the great and unrelenting malice of fortune.\n\n### Chapter I\n\nHow Many Kinds of Principalities There Are, and by What Means They Are Acquired\n\nAll states, all dominions that have held and still hold power over people, have been and are either republics or principalities. Principalities are either hereditary, when the ruler's family has long held power, or new. The new are either wholly new, as Milan was to Francesco Sforza, or like members added to the hereditary state of the Prince who acquires them, as the Kingdom of Naples is to the King of Spain. Dominions acquired in this way are either accustomed to living under a Prince or used to being free; and they are acquired either with the arms of others or with one's own, either through fortune or through ability.\n\n### Chapter II\n\nOn Hereditary Principalities\n\nI shall leave aside the discussion of republics, for I have discussed them at length elsewhere. I shall turn only to the principality, and, taking up again the threads outlined above, consider how these principalities can be governed and maintained. I say, then, that hereditary states, accustomed to the family of their Prince, are far easier to maintain than new ones. It is enough not to depart from the ways of one's ancestors and then to adapt to events, so that a Prince of ordinary diligence will always keep his state unless some extraordinary and overwhelming force deprives him of it; and even if he is deprived of it, he will recover it at the first misfortune that befalls its occupier. We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who withstood the assaults of the Venetians in '84 and those of Pope Julius in '10 for no other reason than that his rule in that dominion was long established. For a hereditary Prince has fewer causes and less need to offend his subjects, and so he is bound to be better loved. Unless extraordinary vices make him hated, it is reasonable that his people should naturally wish him well. And with the age and continuity of his rule, the memories and causes of change die away; for one change always leaves a foothold on which another can be built.\n\n### Chapter III\n\nOf Mixed Principalities\n\nBut the difficulties lie in the new principality. To begin with, if it is not entirely new, but is added as a member to another, making what might be called a mixed principality, its changes arise first from a natural difficulty common to all new principalities: men willingly change rulers in the belief that they will better themselves, and this belief leads them to take up arms against the ruler they have. They are mistaken, as they later discover by experience that they have made their condition worse. This follows from another natural and ordinary necessity: a new Prince must always injure those whose Prince he becomes, both through his armed men and through the countless other injuries that a new conquest brings in its train. Thus you find yourself with enemies in all those you have injured while taking the principality; and you cannot keep as friends those who brought you into it, because you cannot satisfy them in the way they expected, and because, being indebted to them, you cannot use harsh remedies against them. For even the strongest man, however strong his armies, needs the support of the people of a province to enter it. For these reasons Louis XII, King of France, took Milan at once and lost it at once; the first time, Ludovico's own forces were enough to take it from him. The people who had opened the gates to Louis found themselves deceived in their hopes and in the good to come that they had imagined, and could not bear the vexations imposed by a new Prince. It is true that when rebellious territories are conquered a second time, they are lost with greater difficulty; for the ruler, taking occasion from the rebellion, is less restrained in securing his position by punishing the offenders, exposing those he suspects, and strengthening the weaker points. So although the first time a Duke Ludovico stirring unrest on the borders was enough to make France lose Milan, to make it lose Milan a second time required the whole world against it, its armies destroyed and driven out of Italy; and this arose from the causes already given. Nevertheless, Milan was taken from France both times. The general causes of the first loss have been discussed; it remains to consider those of the second, and to say what remedies Louis had, and what remedies someone in his position might have, to hold his conquest better than the King of France did. I say, then, that states acquired and added to a ruler's long-established state are either in the same region and speak the same language, or they are not. When they are, it is very easy to hold them, especially if they are not accustomed to living free. To possess them securely, it is enough to extinguish the line of the Prince who ruled them: if their old conditions are otherwise preserved, and there is no difference in customs, men live peaceably together. So it has been with Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been joined to France for so long. Though there is some difference in language, their customs are similar, and they can readily live together. Whoever conquers such lands and wishes to keep them must take care of two things: first, to extinguish the bloodline of their former Prince; second, to change neither their laws nor their taxes. In this way, within a very short time, they and his former principality become a single body. But when states are acquired in a region unlike one's own in language, customs, and institutions, here lie the difficulties; here great fortune and great skill are needed to hold them. One of the strongest and most effective remedies would be for the conqueror to go and live there himself.\n\nThis would make possession more secure and more lasting, as the Turk has done in Greece: despite all the other measures he took to hold that state, he could not possibly have held it if he had not gone to live there. When you are present, you see disorders as they arise and can quickly remedy them; when you are absent, you hear of them only when they have grown great and there is no remedy left. Moreover, the province is not plundered by your officials; subjects are satisfied to have their Prince close at hand to hear their appeals, and have more reason to love him if they wish to be good, and to fear him if they wish to behave otherwise. A foreigner wishing to attack that state will think twice about it; so a Prince who lives there can lose it only with very great difficulty. The other best remedy is to send colonies to one or two places that serve as the keys to the state; for you must either do this or maintain a large force of cavalry and infantry there. Colonies cost the Prince little: at no expense to himself, or very little, he sends and maintains them. He injures only those whose fields and houses he takes to give to the new settlers, and these are a very small part of the state. Those he injures, left scattered and poor, can never harm him; everyone else, being unharmed, readily remains quiet, yet is afraid to do wrong lest the same thing happen to them as to those who were dispossessed. I conclude that colonies cost little, are more loyal, cause less injury, and that the injured, being poor and scattered, cannot do harm, as I have said. For it must be noted that men should either be treated kindly or destroyed: they avenge slight injuries but cannot avenge grave ones. Thus the injury done to a man must be such that there is no fear of his revenge. If, instead of colonies, you keep armed men there, the expense is far greater, since all the revenues of that state must be spent on its defense. Thus the conquest becomes a loss, and it causes far greater injury, since the whole state suffers as the army moves from one set of quarters to another. Everyone feels this burden and becomes an enemy; and these are enemies who can harm you, for they remain, though beaten, in their own homes. In every respect, then, such a garrison is as useless as colonies are useful. Further, one who is in a region unlike his own, as I have said, must make himself the leader and protector of its less powerful neighbors; he must contrive to weaken its more powerful ones and take care that no foreigner as powerful as himself enters it through any turn of events. Such a foreigner will always be brought in by those who are discontented there, whether out of excessive ambition or fear. So the Aetolians once brought the Romans into Greece; and wherever else the Romans entered, they were brought in by the people of the region. What happens is this: as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a region, all its weaker powers attach themselves to him, driven by their envy of the one who has been powerful over them. He need take no trouble at all to win over these lesser powers, for they all willingly and immediately join forces with the state he has acquired there. He need only see that they gain neither too much strength nor too much authority. Then, with his own forces and their support, he can easily bring down those who are powerful and remain the sole arbiter of the whole region. Whoever fails to manage this matter well will soon lose what he has won; and for as long as he holds it, he will face endless difficulties and vexations.\n\nThe Romans observed these rules well in the provinces they conquered. They sent colonies; cultivated the lesser powers without increasing their power; brought down the greater ones; and allowed no powerful foreigners to gain standing there. Let the province of Greece alone suffice as an example. The Romans cultivated the Achaeans and the Aetolians, humbled the kingdom of the Macedonians, and drove out Antiochus. Yet the services of the Achaeans or Aetolians never led them to allow either people to enlarge its dominion; Philip's persuasions never induced them to befriend him without first humbling him; nor could the power of Antiochus make them consent to his holding any dominion in that region. For in these cases the Romans did what all wise Princes ought to do: they considered not only present troubles but those to come, and took every care to forestall them. When troubles are foreseen from afar they can easily be remedied, but if you wait until they draw near, the medicine comes too late, for the disease has become incurable. It is as physicians say of consumption: at the beginning it is easy to cure and difficult to recognize, but as time passes, if it was neither recognized nor treated at the beginning, it becomes easy to recognize and difficult to cure. So it is with affairs of state. When the evils arising in a state are recognized from afar—a gift granted only to a prudent man—they are soon cured; but when, because they have gone unrecognized, they are allowed to grow until everyone recognizes them, there is no remedy left. The Romans, therefore, seeing troubles from afar, always remedied them; they never allowed them to run their course in order to avoid a war, knowing that war is not eliminated but merely postponed to another's advantage. They chose, therefore, to fight Philip and Antiochus in Greece rather than have to fight them in Italy. At the time they could have avoided both wars; they chose not to. Nor did they ever favor the saying forever on the lips of the wise men of our day, “Enjoy the benefits of time.” Instead, they relied on the benefits of their own ability and prudence: for time sweeps everything before it and can bring good along with evil, and evil along with good.\n\nBut let us return to France and examine whether it did any of the things I have described. I shall speak of Louis and not Charles, for Louis held possessions in Italy longer, and his conduct is therefore easier to see. You will see that he did the opposite of what must be done to hold a state unlike one's own. King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who wished to gain half of Lombardy through his arrival. I do not mean to blame the King for coming or for making that choice: since he wished to gain a foothold in Italy, and had no friends in the region—indeed, since the conduct of King Charles had closed every door to him—he was forced to accept whatever alliances he could find. His plan would have succeeded had he made no errors in the measures that followed. Once he had conquered Lombardy, the King immediately regained the standing Charles had lost. Genoa yielded; the Florentines became his friends; the Marquis of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivogli, the Lady of Forlì, the lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, and Piombino, the people of Lucca, Pisa, and Siena—all came forward to be his friends. The Venetians could then see how rash their choice had been: to gain two towns in Lombardy, they had made the King lord of two-thirds of Italy. Consider how little difficulty the King would have had in maintaining his standing in Italy if he had followed the rules set out above and kept all these friends safe and protected. They were numerous, weak, and afraid, some of the Church, others of the Venetians, and so were always bound to stand by him; through them he could easily have secured himself against the remaining great powers. But no sooner had he entered Milan than he did the opposite, helping Pope Alexander seize the Romagna. He did not realize that by this decision he weakened himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had placed themselves in his hands, while making the Church great, adding so much temporal power to the spiritual power that already gave it such authority. Having made his first error, he was compelled to pursue it, until, to put an end to Alexander's ambition and prevent him from becoming lord of Tuscany, he was forced to come into Italy himself. And as though it were not enough to have made the Church great and lost his friends, his desire for the kingdom of Naples led him to divide it with the King of Spain. Where he had once been the arbiter of Italy, he introduced a partner, giving the ambitious men of that region and those discontented with him someone to turn to. Where he could have left in that kingdom a king dependent on him, he drove that king out to install one who could drive him out in turn. The desire to acquire is truly a natural and ordinary thing, and whenever men do so when they are able, they will be praised, not blamed; but when they cannot and still wish to do so at any cost, that is an error and deserves blame. If France, then, could attack Naples with its own forces, it should have done so; if it could not, it should not have divided the kingdom. And if its division of Lombardy with the Venetians deserved pardon because it gave France a foothold in Italy, this division deserved blame, since no such necessity excused it.\n\nLouis, then, had made these five errors: he had destroyed the lesser powers, increased the power of an already powerful state in Italy, brought a very powerful foreigner into it, failed to live there himself, and failed to establish colonies. These errors might still not have hurt him in his lifetime if he had not committed a sixth: stripping the Venetians of their state. If he had not made the Church great or brought Spain into Italy, it would indeed have been reasonable and necessary to bring them down; but once he had taken those first steps, he should never have consented to their ruin. For while the Venetians were powerful, they would always have kept others away from any attempt on Lombardy: they would not have consented to such an attempt unless they themselves became its masters, and the others would not have wanted to take Lombardy from France only to give it to the Venetians; nor would they have dared to challenge both at once. If someone were to say that King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid a war, I answer with the reasons given above: a disorder should never be allowed to run its course in order to avoid a war, for war is not avoided but postponed to your disadvantage. And if others cite the promise the King had made to the Pope to undertake that campaign for him in exchange for the annulment of his marriage and a cardinal's hat for the Archbishop of Rouen, I answer with what I shall say below about the promises of Princes and how they ought to be kept.\n\nKing Louis lost Lombardy, then, because he observed none of the rules followed by others who have taken provinces and wished to hold them. This is nothing surprising, but entirely reasonable and ordinary. I spoke of this at Nantes with the Cardinal of Rouen when Duke Valentino (as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was commonly called) was seizing the Romagna. The cardinal told me that the Italians did not understand war; I replied that the French did not understand statecraft, for if they did, they would not let the Church grow so powerful. Experience has shown that the power of the Church and of Spain in Italy was brought about by France, and that France's ruin came from them. From this we may draw a general rule that never, or rarely, fails: whoever makes another powerful brings about his own ruin. For that power was created by him either through skill or through force, and both of these arouse the suspicion of the one who has become powerful.\n\n### Chapter IV\n\nWhy the Kingdom of Darius, Conquered by Alexander, Did Not Rebel Against Alexander’s Successors After His Death\n\nConsidering the difficulties involved in holding a newly acquired state, someone might wonder how Alexander the Great became lord of Asia in a few years and died scarcely having conquered it, when it would seem reasonable that the whole state should rebel. Yet his successors held it, and encountered no difficulty in keeping it except what arose among themselves from their own ambition. I answer that the principalities known to us are governed in two different ways: either by a Prince, with all others his servants, who help govern the kingdom as ministers by his grace and permission; or by a Prince and barons, who hold their rank not by their lord’s grace but by the antiquity of their blood. These barons have states and subjects of their own, who recognize them as lords and bear them a natural affection. States governed by a Prince and servants give their Prince greater authority, for throughout his dominion there is no one whom people recognize as their superior except him; if they obey another, they do so as a minister and officer, and bear him no particular love. Examples of these two kinds of government in our own time are the Turk and the King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord; the others are his servants. Dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he sends different administrators there and changes and replaces them as he sees fit. But the King of France stands amid an ancient multitude of lords, recognized and loved by their subjects. They have their privileges, which the king cannot take from them without danger to himself. Whoever considers both these states, then, will find it difficult to conquer the state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, very easy to hold.\n\nThe difficulty in conquering the Turk’s kingdom lies in the conqueror’s inability to be invited in by the princes of that kingdom, or to hope that a rebellion among those surrounding its ruler will ease his undertaking. This follows from the reasons already given. Since all of them are servants bound to him, they are harder to corrupt; and even if they were corrupted, little benefit could be expected, since for the reasons stated they cannot draw the people after them. Thus anyone who attacks the Turk must expect to find him united and must rely more on his own forces than on disorders among others. But once he is defeated and routed in the field so that he cannot raise fresh armies, there is nothing left to fear except the Prince’s bloodline. Once that is extinguished, no one remains to be feared, since the others have no standing with the people. Just as the victor could not hope for their help before victory, so he need not fear them afterward.\n\nThe reverse occurs in kingdoms governed like France. You can enter such a kingdom easily by winning over one of its barons, for there are always discontented men and men who desire change. For the reasons given, these can open the way into the state and make your victory easier; but afterward, if you wish to retain it, that victory brings endless difficulties, both with those who helped you and with those you oppressed. Nor is it enough to extinguish the Prince’s bloodline, for those lords remain who make themselves leaders of fresh upheavals; and since you can neither satisfy nor eliminate them, you lose the state whenever an opportunity arises. Now, if you consider the nature of Darius’s government, you will find it like that of the Turk. Alexander therefore had first to meet its full force and drive it from the field. After that victory, with Darius dead, the state remained secure in Alexander’s hands for the reasons discussed above. And if his successors had remained united, they could have enjoyed it at their ease; no disturbances arose in that kingdom except those they stirred up themselves. But states organized like France cannot possibly be held so quietly. Hence the frequent rebellions against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, because of the many principalities in those lands. So long as the memory of those principalities endured, the Romans were never secure in their possession; but when their memory was extinguished, Roman power and the long duration of Roman rule made possession secure. Later, even as the Romans fought among themselves, each could draw part of those provinces to his side according to the authority he had gained there; and the provinces, because the bloodline of their former lords was extinct, recognized no one but Romans. Considering these things, no one will wonder at the ease with which Alexander held the state of Asia or at the difficulties others, such as Pyrrhus and many more, have faced in keeping what they had won. The cause was not the greater or lesser ability of the victor, but the differing nature of what was conquered.\n\n### Chapter V\n\nHow Cities or Principalities That Lived Under Their Own Laws Before Being Conquered Should Be Governed\n\nWhen states acquired in the manner described are accustomed to living under their own laws and in freedom, there are three ways to hold them. The first is to destroy them. The second is to go and live there yourself. The third is to let them live under their own laws, exacting tribute and establishing within them a government of a few men who will keep them friendly to you. For since that government is created by the Prince, it knows it cannot stand without his friendship and power, and must do everything to maintain them. And if one wishes to preserve a city accustomed to living free, it is easier to hold it through its own citizens than by any other means.\n\nConsider the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes by establishing governments of a few men there; nevertheless, they lost them. The Romans, to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, destroyed them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece much as the Spartans had, making it free and leaving it its own laws; this did not succeed, so they were forced to destroy many cities in that province in order to hold it. For in truth there is no secure way to possess such cities except to destroy them. Whoever becomes master of a city accustomed to living free and does not destroy it should expect to be destroyed by it. For in rebellion it always has the name of liberty and its ancient institutions to turn to, and neither the passage of time nor benefits conferred will ever make it forget them. Whatever one does or provides for, unless the inhabitants are divided or dispersed, that name and those institutions are not forgotten: at the first turn of events they are called upon again, as happened with Pisa after so many years of subjection to the Florentines. But when cities or provinces are accustomed to living under a Prince and his bloodline has been extinguished, they are, on the one hand, used to obedience; on the other, without their old Prince, they cannot agree to make one of themselves a new Prince, and they do not know how to live free. Thus they are slower to take up arms, and a Prince can more easily win them over and make himself secure against them. In republics, however, hatred runs deeper and the desire for revenge is greater; the memory of their former freedom neither lets them rest nor can let them rest. Thus the surest course is to destroy them or live there.\n\n### Chapter VI\n\nOf New Principalities Acquired by One’s Own Arms and Ability\n\nNo one should be surprised if, in speaking of wholly new principalities, new both in Prince and in state, I bring forward the greatest examples. For men almost always walk in paths beaten by others and proceed in their actions by imitation; yet they cannot follow those paths exactly or attain the ability of the people they imitate. A prudent man, therefore, should always take the paths of great men and imitate those who have excelled above all others, so that if his ability falls short of theirs, at least some trace of it may remain. He should do as skilled archers do: when the place they intend to strike seems too distant, and they know how far the power of their bow can reach, they aim much higher than the intended mark—not because they expect their arrow to rise so high, but so that by aiming high they may hit their target. I say, then, that in wholly new principalities under a new Prince, there is more or less difficulty in maintaining them according to the greater or lesser ability of the man who acquires them. And since the event of a private citizen becoming a Prince presupposes either ability or fortune, it seems that one or the other of these partly eases many difficulties. Nevertheless, the man who has relied less on fortune has held on longer. It also makes matters easier when a Prince, because he has other states, is compelled to come and live there in person. But to come to those who have become Princes by their own ability and not by fortune, I say that the most outstanding are Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and others like them. And although one should not reason about Moses, since he merely carried out what God commanded him, he deserves admiration for the grace alone that made him worthy to speak with God.\n\nBut if we consider Cyrus and the others who acquired or founded kingdoms, we shall find them all admirable; and if we consider their particular deeds and institutions, they will not seem different from those of Moses, though he had so great a teacher. Examining their deeds and lives, we see that fortune gave them nothing but the opportunity that furnished the material upon which they could impose the form they thought best. Without that opportunity their strength of spirit would have been wasted, and without their ability the opportunity would have come in vain. It was necessary, then, for Moses to find the people of Israel enslaved in Egypt and oppressed by the Egyptians, so that they would be ready to follow him out of servitude. For Romulus to become king of Rome and founder of his country, he had to have no place in Alba and to be exposed at birth. Cyrus needed to find the Persians discontented with the rule of the Medes, and the Medes softened and enfeebled by a long peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability if he had not found the Athenians scattered. These opportunities, then, made those men fortunate, and their outstanding ability made them recognize the opportunities; from this their countries were ennobled and became exceedingly prosperous. Men who become Princes through ability, as they did, acquire a principality with difficulty but hold it with ease; and the difficulties they face in acquiring it arise in part from the new institutions and ways they are forced to introduce in order to establish their state and their own security. We must consider that there is nothing more difficult to undertake, more doubtful of success, or more dangerous to manage than taking the lead in introducing new institutions. For the innovator has as enemies all those who prosper under the old institutions, and as lukewarm defenders all those who would prosper under the new. Their lukewarmness arises partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws on their side, and partly from the skepticism of men, who do not truly believe in new things until they have seen firm proof of them. Thus, whenever the enemies have a chance to attack, they do so with partisan zeal, while the others offer only lukewarm defense, so that the innovator is put in danger along with them. To examine this matter properly, then, we must ask whether these innovators stand on their own or depend on others: that is, whether they must plead in order to carry out their work, or can compel. In the first case they always come to grief and accomplish nothing; but when they depend on themselves and can compel, they seldom come to harm. This is why all armed prophets have prevailed and the unarmed have failed. For beyond what has been said, the nature of peoples is changeable: it is easy to persuade them of something, but hard to keep them persuaded. Therefore one must be prepared, when they no longer believe, to make them believe by force.\n\nMoses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus could not have made their institutions obeyed for long if they had been unarmed, as happened in our own time to Friar Girolamo Savonarola. He was ruined by his new institutions as soon as the multitude began to disbelieve him, for he had no means of keeping steadfast those who had believed, or of making believers of those who did not. Such men, therefore, meet with great difficulty on their way, and all their dangers lie along the road; they must overcome them by ability. But once they have overcome them and begun to be held in reverence, having eliminated those of their own standing who envied them, they remain powerful, secure, honored, and happy. To these lofty examples I wish to add a lesser one, though it bears some resemblance to them; let it stand for all others like it: Hiero of Syracuse. From a private citizen he became Prince of Syracuse, and he too owed nothing to fortune but opportunity. For when the Syracusans were oppressed, they elected him their commander, and in that post he earned the right to be made their Prince. Even as a private citizen he had such ability that a writer on his life says he lacked nothing needed to reign except a kingdom. He abolished the old militia and organized a new one; he abandoned his old friendships and made new ones. Once he had friends and soldiers who were his own, he could build any structure on such a foundation; thus he labored greatly to gain his position and little to keep it.\n\n### Chapter VII\n\nOf New Principalities Acquired Through the Forces of Others and by Fortune\n\nThose who rise from private life to become Princes solely through fortune rise with little effort, but maintain their position with much. They meet no difficulty on the way, for they fly there; all the difficulties arise once they have arrived. Such men are those to whom a state is granted either for money or through the favor of the one who grants it, as happened to many in the Greek cities of Ionia and the Hellespont, where Darius made them Princes so that they might hold those cities for his security and glory. So too were those emperors made who rose from private life to the empire by corrupting the soldiers. Such men depend entirely on the will and fortune of those who have made them great, two of the most changeable and unstable things; they neither know how nor are able to maintain their rank. They do not know how, because unless a man has great intelligence and ability, it is unreasonable to expect that someone who has always lived as a private person should know how to command. They are not able to, because they have no forces that can be friendly and loyal to them. Moreover, states that spring up suddenly, like all other things in nature that are born and grow quickly, cannot have roots and connections so firm that the first adversity will not destroy them—unless those who have so suddenly become Princes possess enough ability to prepare at once to preserve what fortune has placed in their laps, and afterward lay the foundations that others laid before they became Princes.\n\nTo illustrate each of these two ways of becoming a Prince, by ability or by fortune, I wish to offer two examples from our own time: Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper means and his own great ability, rose from private life to become Duke of Milan; what he had acquired through a thousand hardships he maintained with little effort. Cesare Borgia, on the other hand, popularly called Duke Valentino, acquired his state through his father's fortune and lost it along with that fortune, despite employing every effort himself and doing everything a prudent and capable man should do to put down roots in the states that the arms and fortune of others had granted him. For, as I said above, a man who does not lay foundations beforehand may still lay them afterward through great ability, although the work is difficult for the builder and dangerous for the building. If, then, we consider all the Duke's actions, we shall see how substantial the foundations were that he laid for his future power. I do not think it superfluous to examine them, because I know no better counsel to give a new Prince than the example of his deeds. If his measures did not help him, it was not his fault; the cause was an extraordinary and extreme malice of fortune. In seeking to make his son the Duke powerful, Pope Alexander VI faced many difficulties, both immediate and future. First, he could see no way to make him lord of a state that was not a state of the Church; and he knew that the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not allow him to take one, since Faenza and Rimini were already under Venetian protection. He saw, moreover, that the arms of Italy, and especially those he might have used, were in the hands of men who had reason to fear the Pope's greatness. He could not trust them, for they all belonged to the Orsini, the Colonna, and their followers. It was therefore necessary to disrupt these arrangements and throw the states of Italy into disorder, so that he could securely take possession of a part of them. This proved easy for him: he found that the Venetians, moved by other causes, had resolved to bring the French back into Italy. Far from opposing this, he made it easier by dissolving King Louis's former marriage. The King thus entered Italy with Venetian help and Alexander's consent; and no sooner had he reached Milan than the Pope received troops from him for the campaign in Romagna, which was allowed to proceed because of the King's standing.\n\nHaving acquired Romagna and defeated the Colonna, the Duke wished to hold that territory and advance farther, but two things stood in his way: his own forces, which he thought unreliable, and the will of France. He feared that the Orsini troops he had employed would fail him, not only obstructing further conquests but taking away what he had already won; he feared that the King might do the same. He received a warning about the Orsini when, after taking Faenza, he attacked Bologna and saw how little enthusiasm they showed for the assault. As for the King, he learned his intentions when, after taking the duchy of Urbino, he attacked Tuscany and the King forced him to abandon the campaign. The Duke therefore resolved to depend no longer on the fortune and arms of others. His first step was to weaken the Orsini and Colonna factions in Rome: he won over all their adherents who were gentlemen, making them his own courtiers, awarding them generous stipends, and honoring them according to their standing with military commands and governorships. Within a few months their attachment to their factions had died out and turned wholly toward the Duke.\n\nAfter this, having scattered the members of the Colonna family, he waited for an opportunity to destroy the Orsini. The opportunity came, and he used it even better than it presented itself. The Orsini realized too late that the growing power of the Duke and the Church meant their ruin, and held a meeting at Magione in the Perugia district. From it came the rebellion of Urbino, disturbances in Romagna, and countless dangers for the Duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the French. Once his standing was restored, however, he trusted neither France nor any other outside force. Rather than put them to the test, he turned to deception, concealing his intentions so well that the Orsini, through Signor Paolo, were reconciled with him. The Duke spared no courtesy to reassure Paolo, giving him clothes, money, and horses; thus the Orsini's credulity brought them into his hands at Senigallia. Having eliminated these leaders and made their followers his friends, the Duke had laid very sound foundations for his power: he held all Romagna and the duchy of Urbino, and had won over all those peoples, who had begun to taste the benefits of better government. Because this episode deserves notice and imitation by others, I do not wish to pass it over.\n\nWhen the Duke took Romagna, he found that it had been ruled by ineffectual lords, who had despoiled their subjects rather than corrected them and given them causes for division rather than unity. The province was full of robberies, quarrels, and every other kind of lawlessness. He judged it necessary, if he wished to bring it to peace and obedience to his sovereign authority, to give it good government. He therefore placed Messer Ramiro d'Orco over it, a cruel and decisive man, and gave him full powers. In a short time Ramiro made it peaceful and united, to his own great renown. The Duke then judged that such excessive authority was no longer advisable, fearing that it might become hated. He established a civil court in the center of the province, presided over by an excellent magistrate, where every city had its own advocate. And because he knew that the earlier severities had aroused some hatred against him, he wished to clear the minds of the people and win them over completely by showing that whatever cruelty had occurred arose not from him but from the minister's harsh nature. Seizing an occasion to do so, he had Ramiro placed one morning in two pieces in the square at Cesena, with a block of wood and a bloody knife beside him. The ferocity of this spectacle left the people at once satisfied and stunned. But let us return to where we left off.\n\nI say that the Duke, having become quite powerful and in some measure secured himself against immediate dangers by arming himself as he wished and largely extinguishing the nearby forces that could harm him, still had to reckon with France if he wanted to extend his conquests. He knew that the King, who had belatedly realized his mistake, would not tolerate it. He therefore began to seek new alliances and waver in his loyalty to France when the French marched toward the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards besieging Gaeta. His intention was to secure himself against the French, and he would soon have succeeded had Alexander lived. Such were his measures for present affairs. As for the future, he had to fear, first, that a new pope would be unfriendly to him and seek to take away what Alexander had given him. He planned to prevent this in four ways. First, he would extinguish the bloodlines of all the lords he had dispossessed, removing those grounds for action from the pope. Second, he would win over all the gentlemen of Rome so that, as I have said, he could use them to keep the pope in check. Third, he would bring the College of Cardinals as much as possible onto his side. Fourth, he would acquire enough dominion before the pope died to withstand the first assault by his own strength.\n\nOf these four aims he had achieved three when Alexander died; the fourth was nearly accomplished. He had killed as many of the dispossessed lords as he could reach, and very few escaped; he had won over the Roman gentlemen; and he had a very large following in the College. As for further conquest, he planned to become lord of Tuscany. He already held Perugia and Piombino and had taken Pisa under his protection. And once he no longer had to defer to France—as indeed he no longer did, since the Spaniards had already stripped the French of the kingdom of Naples, leaving both sides obliged to purchase his friendship—he would swoop upon Pisa. After that Lucca and Siena would yield at once, partly from envy of the Florentines and partly from fear; the Florentines would have no remedy. Had this succeeded, as it would have done in the very year Alexander died, he would have acquired such strength and such standing that he could have stood on his own, depending no longer on the fortune or forces of others, but solely on his own power and ability. Yet Alexander died only five years after the Duke had begun to draw his sword. He left the Duke with his hold on Rome alone secure, all his other possessions in the balance, between two immensely powerful enemy armies, and mortally ill. Such was the Duke's boldness and ability, so well did he understand how to win men or destroy them, and so strong were the foundations he had laid in so little time, that, had those armies not been upon him, or had he been healthy, he would have overcome every difficulty. That his foundations were sound was clear: Romagna waited for him for more than a month; in Rome, though half dead, he remained safe; and although the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini came to Rome, they gained no following against him. If he could not make the man he wanted pope, he could at least prevent the election of one he did not want. Had he been healthy when Alexander died, everything would have been easy for him. In the days when Julius II was elected, he told me that he had considered everything that might happen upon his father's death and found a remedy for it all, except that he had never imagined he himself would be near death at the same time. Considering all these actions of the Duke together, I cannot condemn him. Rather, as I have done, I think he should be held up for imitation by all who have risen to power through fortune and the arms of others. For a man of such great spirit and high ambition could not have acted otherwise; only the shortness of Alexander's life and his own illness thwarted his plans.\n\nWhoever, then, judges it necessary in his new principality to secure himself against enemies, win friends, conquer by force or deception, make himself loved and feared by the people, followed and respected by soldiers, destroy those who can or are bound to harm him, replace old institutions with new ones, be stern and gracious, magnanimous and generous, destroy disloyal troops and create new ones, and maintain friendships with kings and Princes so that they help him willingly or harm him only with caution, can find no fresher examples than the actions of this man. He can be faulted only for his choice in the election of Julius II, in which he chose badly. For, as I have said, although he could not make the pope of his choice, he could prevent someone else from becoming pope; and he should never have consented to the election of any cardinal whom he had injured, or who would have reason to fear him upon becoming pope. Men do harm either from fear or from hatred. Those he had injured included San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio. All the others, if raised to the papacy, would have had reason to fear him, except the cardinal of Rouen and the Spaniards: the Spaniards because of their ties and obligations to him, Rouen because of his power, with the kingdom of France allied to him. The Duke should therefore, above all, have made a Spaniard pope; if he could not, he should have agreed to Rouen, not San Pietro ad Vincula. Whoever believes that new favors make great men forget old injuries deceives himself. The Duke erred, then, in this election, and brought about his final ruin.\n\n### Chapter VIII\n\nOf Those Who Have Come to a Principality Through Crimes\n\nBut since a private man may also become Prince in two ways that cannot be attributed entirely either to fortune or to ability, I do not think they should be passed over, though one of them could be discussed more fully in a treatment of republics. These are when someone rises to a principality by some criminal and wicked means, or when a private citizen becomes Prince of his country with the favor of his fellow citizens. Speaking of the first way, I shall illustrate it with two examples, one ancient and one modern, without otherwise entering into the merits of this matter, since I judge these sufficient for anyone compelled to imitate them. Agathocles the Sicilian became King of Syracuse from a station not merely private but humble and lowly. Born the son of a potter, he led a criminal life at every stage of his ascent. Nevertheless, he joined his crimes to such strength of mind and body that, turning to military service, he rose through its ranks to become praetor of Syracuse. Once established in that office, he resolved to become Prince and to hold by force, owing nothing to anyone, what had been granted him by common consent. Having reached an understanding about this design with Hamilcar the Carthaginian, who was campaigning in Sicily with his armies, he assembled the people and senate of Syracuse one morning as though he had matters concerning the republic to discuss. At a prearranged signal, he had his soldiers kill all the senators and the richest men of the people. With them dead, he seized and held the principality of that city without any civil opposition. And although the Carthaginians defeated him twice and finally besieged him, he was able not only to defend his city but, leaving part of his forces to defend it, to attack Africa with the rest. In a short time he relieved the siege of Syracuse and drove the Carthaginians to such desperate straits that they were forced to make terms with him, content to keep Africa and leave Sicily to Agathocles.\n\nAnyone considering this man's actions and powers would see little, if anything, that could be attributed to fortune. For, as I have said, he came to the principality not through anyone's favor but through the ranks of military service, earned amid a thousand hardships and dangers; afterward he held it by decisions as bold as they were perilous. Yet killing one's fellow citizens, betraying one's friends, and living without faith, mercy, or religion cannot be called virtue. Such means can win dominion, but not glory. For if we consider Agathocles' skill in entering and escaping danger, and the greatness of his spirit in enduring and overcoming adversity, there is no reason to rank him below the most excellent of commanders. Nevertheless, his savage cruelty and inhumanity, together with his countless crimes, forbid us to celebrate him among the most excellent of men. What he gained without either fortune or virtue cannot, then, be credited to either. In our own times, during the reign of Pope Alexander VI, Oliverotto da Fermo was left fatherless at an early age and brought up by his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani. In his early youth he was sent to serve under Paolo Vitelli, so that, trained in military discipline, he might attain some distinguished rank in arms. After Paolo's death he served under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a very short time, being ingenious and vigorous in body and spirit, he became one of the foremost men in his army. But service under another seemed servile to him, and he planned to seize Fermo with the help of some of its citizens, who preferred their country's subjection to its liberty, and with the support of the Vitelli. He wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for many years, he wished to come and see him and his city, and to take some stock of his inheritance. Since he had labored for nothing but honor, he wished to come in honorable fashion, accompanied by a hundred horsemen, friends and servants of his, so that his fellow citizens might see that he had not spent his time in vain. He asked Giovanni to arrange for the people of Fermo to receive him with honor; this would bring honor not only to Oliverotto, but to Giovanni himself, whose ward he had been.\n\nGiovanni therefore neglected no duty toward his nephew: he arranged an honorable reception by the people of Fermo and lodged him in his own house. After some days there, spent preparing what was needed for his coming crime, Oliverotto gave a magnificent banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and all the leading men of Fermo. When the meal and all the other entertainments customary at such feasts had ended, Oliverotto deliberately raised grave subjects, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare and of their enterprises. As Giovanni and the others replied, he suddenly rose, saying that these were matters to be discussed in greater privacy, and withdrew into a room. Giovanni and all the other citizens followed him. No sooner had they sat down than soldiers emerged from hiding places in the room and killed Giovanni and all the others. After this murder Oliverotto mounted his horse, rode through the town, and besieged its highest magistrate in the palace. Fear forced them to obey him and establish a government of which he made himself Prince. Having killed all those whose discontent might have threatened him, he strengthened his position with new civil and military institutions. Thus, in the year he held the principality, he was not only secure in Fermo but had become formidable to all his neighbors. His overthrow would have been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed Cesare Borgia to deceive him when, as I said above, Cesare captured the Orsini and Vitelli at Senigallia. Oliverotto was captured there too, and a year after the murder of his uncle and the others he was strangled alongside Vitellozzo, the master from whom he had learned his abilities and his crimes.\n\nSomeone may wonder how Agathocles, and others like him, could live for so long in safety in their own country after countless betrayals and cruelties, defend themselves against enemies abroad, and never face a conspiracy among their own citizens, when many others have been unable, through cruelty, to hold their states even in peaceful times, much less in the uncertainties of war. I believe the difference lies in cruelty used badly or used well. Cruelties may be called well used—if it is permissible to speak well of evil—when they are carried out once, from the necessity of securing one's position, and are not then continued, but are turned to the greatest possible benefit of the subjects. Badly used cruelties are those which, however few at first, multiply with time instead of dying out. Those who follow the first course may find some means of preserving their state before God and men, as Agathocles did. Those who follow the other cannot possibly endure. Therefore it should be noted that, on taking a state, its conqueror must think through and carry out all the cruelties at once, so that he need not return to them every day, and so that, by not renewing them, he can reassure men and win them over by doing them good. Anyone who acts otherwise, from timidity or bad counsel, must always keep a knife in his hand. He can never rely on his subjects, for continual, fresh injuries prevent them from feeling safe with him. Injuries must be inflicted all at once, so that, being tasted less, they give less offense; benefits must be bestowed little by little, so that they may be tasted more fully. Above all, a Prince should live with his subjects in such a way that no event, good or bad, can make him change his course. For when adversity brings necessity, it is too late for you to do harm; and the good you do then avails you nothing, because it is judged to have been forced on you, and earns you no gratitude.\n\n### Chapter IX\n\nOf the Civil Principality\n\nTurning now to the other case, when a citizen becomes Prince of his country not through crime or other intolerable violence but with the favor of his fellow citizens—a position that may be called a civil principality, and one attained not by ability alone or fortune alone but rather by fortunate shrewdness—I say that one rises to this principality with the support either of the people or of the nobles. For these two different dispositions are found in every city: the people desire neither to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles desire to rule and oppress the people. From these two opposing appetites arises one of three outcomes in a city: principality, liberty, or license. A principality is brought about either by the people or by the nobles, according to which side finds its opportunity. For when the nobles see that they cannot resist the people, they begin to direct their esteem toward one of their own and make him Prince, so that beneath his protection they may indulge their appetite. The people likewise turn their esteem toward one man when they see that they cannot resist the nobles, and make him Prince so that his authority may protect them. He who comes to the principality with the help of the nobles maintains himself with greater difficulty than he who comes with the help of the people. He finds himself a Prince surrounded by many who consider themselves his equals; he cannot command or manage them as he wishes. But he who attains the principality with popular favor stands alone and has around him either no one, or very few, unwilling to obey. Furthermore, one cannot satisfy the nobles honorably and without injury to others, but one can satisfy the people: the people's aim is more honorable than that of the nobles, since the latter wish to oppress, while the former wish not to be oppressed. Moreover, a Prince can never make himself safe from a hostile people, because they are too many; he can make himself safe from the nobles, because they are few.\n\nThe worst a Prince can expect from a hostile people is that they will abandon him. From hostile nobles he must fear not only abandonment but active opposition: having greater foresight and cunning, they always act in time to save themselves and seek favor with whoever they expect to win. The Prince must also always live with the same people, but he can readily do without the same nobles: he can make and unmake them every day, taking away or granting their standing as he pleases. To make this point clearer, I say that nobles must be considered chiefly in two ways: either their conduct binds them wholly to your fortune, or it does not. Those who bind themselves to you, provided they are not rapacious, should be honored and loved. Those who do not must be considered in two ways. If they hold back from faintheartedness and a natural lack of courage, you should make use of them, especially those whose counsel is good: in prosperity they will bring you honor, and in adversity you need not fear them. But when they deliberately withhold their allegiance out of ambition, it is a sign that they think more of themselves than of you. A Prince should guard against these men and treat them as open enemies, since in adversity they will always help bring him down. Therefore a man who becomes Prince through the favor of the people must keep them friendly; this will be easy, since all they ask is not to be oppressed. But a man who becomes Prince through the favor of the nobles, against the people, must seek above all to win the people to his side. He will find this easy if he takes them under his protection. For when men receive good from someone from whom they expected evil, they become more beholden to their benefactor: the people become more favorably disposed to him than if he had risen to the principality with their own support. A Prince can win them over in many ways; these vary with the circumstances, so no certain rule can be given, and I shall pass them over.\n\nI conclude only that a Prince must have the people as his friends; otherwise he has no remedy in adversity. Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, withstood the siege of all Greece and a most victorious Roman army, defending his country and his state against them. When danger came, it was enough for him to secure himself against a few men. Had the people been his enemies, that would not have sufficed. And let no one object to my opinion with the worn proverb that whoever builds on the people builds on mud. That is true when a private citizen makes the people his foundation and imagines that they will rescue him when enemies or magistrates oppress him. He may often find himself deceived, as the Gracchi did in Rome and Messer Giorgio Scali in Florence. But if the man who relies on the people is a Prince able to command, a man of courage who does not lose heart in adversity, who has made the other necessary preparations and keeps the whole people resolute by his spirit and his institutions, they will not fail him, and he will find that his foundations were sound. Such principalities usually come into danger when they are about to rise from civil government to absolute rule, for these Princes govern either in person or through magistrates. In the latter case their position is weaker and more dangerous, because they depend entirely on the will of those citizens who hold the magistracies. These men can, especially in adverse times, very easily take away their state, either by opposing them or by refusing to obey them. Amid danger the Prince has no time to assume absolute authority, because citizens and subjects accustomed to receiving commands from the magistrates will not obey his commands at such a moment. In uncertain times he will always find few people he can trust. For such a Prince cannot rely on what he observes in quiet times, when citizens need the state. Then everyone runs to his aid, everyone makes promises, and everyone is ready to die for him when death is far away. But in adverse times, when the state needs its citizens, few can be found. This test is all the more dangerous because it can be made only once. A wise Prince must therefore devise a way for his citizens always, in every circumstance and season, to need his state; then they will always remain faithful to him.\n\n### Chapter X\n\nHow the Strength of Every Principality Should Be Measured\n\nIn examining the character of these principalities, we must consider one further point: whether a Prince possesses a state strong enough to stand on its own when necessary, or always needs the defense of others. To make this clearer, I judge those able to stand on their own who, through an abundance of men or money, can assemble an adequate army and give battle to anyone who attacks them. I judge those always in need of others who cannot meet their enemies in the field, but are forced to take refuge within their walls and defend them. The first case has been discussed, and I shall say more about it when the occasion arises. In the second, nothing can be said except to urge such Princes to provision and fortify their own city, and to take no account of the surrounding countryside. Anyone who has fortified his city well and governed his subjects in the ways I have described above and shall describe below will always be attacked with great caution. For men are always averse to undertakings that appear difficult, and there can be no appearance of ease in attacking someone whose city is strong and whose people do not hate him.\n\nThe cities of Germany are very free. They have little territory beyond their walls and obey the Emperor when they choose. They fear neither him nor any other neighboring power, because they are so well fortified that anyone contemplating their capture expects a long and difficult task. All have proper ditches and walls and enough artillery; in their public storehouses they always keep a year's supply of food, drink, and fuel. Furthermore, so that the common people may be fed without expense to the public treasury, they always keep in communal reserve the means to give them a year's work in the trades that are the sinew and life of each city, and by which the common people earn their living. They also hold military training in high esteem and have many institutions to sustain it. A Prince, then, who has a strong city and does not make himself hated cannot be attacked; and if anyone did attack him, that man would depart in disgrace. For the affairs of the world are so changeable that it is almost impossible for someone to keep an army idle in the field besieging him for a year. If anyone objects that the people, seeing their property outside the walls go up in flames, will lose patience, and that a long siege and concern for their own interests will make them forget the Prince, I answer that a powerful and courageous Prince will always overcome those difficulties. At one moment he will give his subjects hope that their suffering will not last long, at another he will make them fear the enemy's cruelty, and at another he will discreetly secure himself against those who seem too bold.\n\nBesides this, the enemy will naturally burn and ruin their countryside upon his arrival, when men's spirits are still ardent and eager for defense. The Prince therefore has less cause to fear: a few days later, when their ardor has cooled, the damage has already been done, the suffering endured, and there is no remedy. Then they become all the more united with their Prince, since it seems that he owes them a debt: their houses were burned and their property ruined in his defense. It is human nature to feel bound by the benefits one gives as much as by those one receives. Considering everything, then, a prudent Prince will find it no difficult matter to keep his citizens' spirits firm both at the beginning and throughout a siege, provided they have food and the means to defend themselves.\n\n### Chapter XI\n\nOf Ecclesiastical Principalities\n\nIt remains now only to discuss ecclesiastical principalities. All the difficulties concerning them arise before they are possessed: they are acquired either by ability or by fortune, and maintained without either. For they are sustained by institutions long established in religion, so powerful and so constituted that they keep their Princes in power however they act or live. These alone have states and do not defend them, have subjects and do not govern them; yet their states, though undefended, are not taken from them, and their subjects, though ungoverned, do not care about it, nor think of separating from them, nor can they do so. These principalities alone, then, are secure and fortunate. But since they are ruled by higher causes, beyond the reach of the human mind, I shall leave them aside: as God exalts and preserves them, it would be the work of a presumptuous and reckless man to discuss them. Nevertheless, if anyone asks me how the Church has attained such greatness in temporal affairs, when before Pope Alexander the powers of Italy—not only those called powers, but every baron and lord, however small—thought little of her temporal strength, whereas now a king of France trembles before her, and she has been able to drive him out of Italy and ruin the Venetians, I do not think it superfluous, familiar though this is, to recall some of it.\n\nBefore Charles, king of France, crossed into Italy, that land was under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the king of Naples, the duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These powers had two principal concerns: first, to prevent any foreigner from entering Italy in arms; second, to prevent any one of them from gaining more territory. Those who caused the greatest concern were the Pope and the Venetians. To hold back the Venetians required a union of all the others, as in the defense of Ferrara; to keep the Pope weak they made use of the barons of Rome. These barons were divided into two factions, the Orsini and the Colonna, and always had grounds for conflict. With weapons in hand before the Pope's very eyes, they kept the papacy weak and infirm. And although an energetic Pope sometimes arose, such as Sixtus, neither fortune nor his own skill could ever free him of these troubles. The shortness of their lives was the cause: in the ten years that a Pope lived on average, he could scarcely bring down one faction. If one had all but extinguished the Colonna, another arose hostile to the Orsini and revived the Colonna; then there was not time to extinguish them. This is why the Pope's temporal forces were held in little esteem in Italy. Then arose Pope Alexander VI, who showed, more than any Pope there had ever been, what a Pope could accomplish with money and armed force. Using Duke Valentino as his instrument, and the French invasion as his opportunity, he did everything I have described above in my account of the Duke's actions. Although his purpose was to make the Duke great, not the Church, all that he did contributed to the greatness of the Church, which inherited the fruits of his labors after his death, when the Duke had been brought down.\n\nThen came Pope Julius. He found the Church powerful, with all Romagna in its possession, the barons of Rome crushed, and their factions destroyed by Alexander's blows. He also found the way open to accumulate money on a scale never practiced before Alexander. Julius not only continued these measures but extended them. He resolved to win Bologna, destroy the Venetians, and drive the French from Italy. All these enterprises succeeded, and earned him all the greater praise because he did everything to increase the power of the Church, not of any private individual. He also kept the Orsini and Colonna factions within the limits in which he found them. Although there were leaders among them capable of stirring up trouble, two things held them in check: the greatness of the Church, which daunted them, and their lack of cardinals, who are a source of turmoil within their factions. These factions will never be at peace whenever they have cardinals, for cardinals foster their parties in Rome and elsewhere, and the barons are compelled to defend them. Thus the ambition of prelates gives rise to discord and disorder among the barons. His Holiness Pope Leo has therefore inherited a most powerful papacy; and it is hoped that, while those Popes made it great by force of arms, he will make it greater still and worthy of reverence by his goodness and his countless other virtues.\n\n### Chapter XII\n\nHow Many Kinds of Armed Forces There Are, and of Mercenary Soldiers\n\nHaving discussed in detail all the kinds of principalities I proposed to consider at the outset, examined to some extent the causes of their prosperity and adversity, and shown the ways in which many have sought to acquire and hold them, I must now discuss more generally the means of attack and defense that can arise in any of the states mentioned above. I have said already that a Prince must have sound foundations; otherwise he must inevitably fall. The principal foundations of every state, whether new, old, or mixed, are good laws and good arms. Since there can be no good laws where there are no good arms, and where there are good arms there must be good laws, I shall leave the laws aside and speak of arms. I say, then, that the forces with which a Prince defends his state are either his own, mercenary, auxiliary, or mixed. Mercenary and auxiliary forces are useless and dangerous. If a man bases the security of his state on mercenary forces, he will never stand firm or be secure: they are divided, ambitious, undisciplined, and unfaithful, bold among friends and cowardly before enemies; they have no fear of God and keep no faith with men. Disaster is postponed only as long as the attack is postponed; in peace you are plundered by them, and in war by your enemies.\n\nThe reason is that they have no affection, and no other reason to keep them in the field, beyond a little pay, which is not enough to make them willing to die for you. They are quite willing to be your soldiers while you are not at war; but when war comes, they flee or depart. It should take little effort to persuade anyone of this, since the ruin of Italy today has no other cause than her reliance for so many years on mercenary arms. At one time these forces made some progress for some rulers, and among themselves they appeared formidable; but when the foreigner came, they showed what they were. Thus Charles, king of France, was allowed to seize Italy with a stroke of chalk. Whoever said our sins were the cause spoke the truth, but they were not the sins he imagined: they were the ones I have described. And because they were the sins of Princes, the Princes too have paid the penalty. I wish to show more clearly the wretchedness of these forces.\n\nMercenary captains are either men of great ability or they are not. If they are, you cannot trust them, for they always aspire to greatness of their own, whether by oppressing you, their employer, or by oppressing others contrary to your wishes. If a captain has no ability, he generally ruins you. If someone replies that anyone with arms in his hands will do the same, mercenary or not, I would answer that arms must be wielded either by a Prince or by a republic. The Prince must go in person and perform the duties of a captain himself; the republic must send its own citizens. When it sends one who proves incapable, it should replace him; when he proves capable, it should restrain him by law from overstepping his bounds. Experience shows that Princes commanding in person and republics with their own armed forces achieve great things, whereas mercenary forces never bring anything but harm. A republic armed with its own forces is much less likely to fall under the power of one of its citizens than a republic armed with foreign forces. Rome and Sparta remained armed and free for many centuries. The Swiss are exceedingly well armed and exceedingly free. Among ancient examples of mercenary forces are the Carthaginians: after their first war with the Romans, they nearly fell to their own mercenary soldiers, even though Carthaginian citizens commanded them. After the death of Epaminondas, the Thebans made Philip of Macedon captain of their forces, and after his victory he took away their freedom. When Duke Filippo died, the Milanese hired Francesco Sforza against the Venetians; after defeating the enemy at Caravaggio, he joined forces with them to oppress his Milanese employers. His father Sforza, in the service of Queen Giovanna of Naples, suddenly left her defenseless, so that, to keep her kingdom, she was forced to throw herself into the arms of the king of Aragon. If the Venetians and Florentines have expanded their dominions in the past with such forces, and their captains have defended them instead of making themselves Princes, I reply that in this matter the Florentines were favored by fortune. Among the capable captains they might have feared, some failed to win victories, some met with rivals, and others turned their ambition elsewhere. Giovanni Acuto was one who failed to win; as he won no victories, his loyalty could not be tested. But everyone will admit that, had he won, the Florentines would have been at his mercy. Sforza always faced the captains of Braccio's faction, each keeping watch on the other. Francesco directed his ambition toward Lombardy; Braccio directed his against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But let us turn to what happened more recently.\n\nThe Florentines made Paolo Vitelli their captain, a man of exceptional judgment who had risen from private station to the highest renown. Had he taken Pisa, no one would deny that the Florentines would have had to submit to him: if he had entered the service of their enemies, they would have had no remedy, while if they kept him, they would have had to obey him. As for the Venetians, consider their successes and you will see that they acted securely and gloriously while they made war with their own people, before they turned to campaigns on land. With their nobles and an armed populace they fought with ability; but when they began to fight on land, they abandoned this virtue and adopted the customs of Italy. At the start of their expansion on land, they had little territory and a great reputation, and had little to fear from their captains. But as they expanded under Carmagnola, they had a taste of this mistake. They saw that he was a most capable man after they had defeated the duke of Milan under his command; but when they realized, on the other hand, that he had grown sluggish in the war, they judged that they could win no more with him. Yet they did not wish to dismiss him, nor could they do so without losing what they had gained; and so, to protect themselves, they were compelled to kill him.\n\nAfter him they had as captains Bartolommeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of Pitigliano, and men like them, with whom they had to fear losses, not gains. This happened later at Vailà, where in a single day they lost what they had acquired through eight hundred years of toil. From these forces come only slow, belated, feeble gains, and sudden, astonishing losses. Since these examples have brought me to Italy, which for many years has been ruled by mercenary forces, I wish to discuss them from farther back, so that, once their origin and development are understood, they may more readily be corrected. You must understand that, when in more recent times the Empire began to be driven back from Italy and the Pope gained greater standing there in temporal affairs, Italy split into many states. Many great cities took up arms against their nobles, who had previously held them down with the emperor's support; the Church aided the cities to increase its own temporal standing. In many other cities, citizens became Princes. As Italy fell largely into the hands of the Church and of certain republics, and as priests and other citizens had no knowledge of arms, they began to hire foreigners. The first to bring this kind of soldiery into repute was Alberigo da Como, a man of Romagna. Among those trained in his methods were Braccio and Sforza, who in their day held Italy's fate in their hands.\n\nAfter these men came all the others who have commanded Italy's armies down to our own times. The final result of their prowess has been that Italy was overrun by Charles, plundered by Louis, assaulted by Ferdinand, and disgraced by the Swiss. Their method was first to deprive infantry of its standing in order to raise their own. They did this because they had no states of their own and lived by their trade: a small number of foot soldiers brought them no prestige, and they could not maintain a large number. So they turned to cavalry, where a manageable number of men could be supported and honored. Matters reached the point where in an army of twenty thousand soldiers there were not two thousand foot soldiers. Moreover, they used every device to spare themselves and their soldiers hardship and danger: in battle they did not kill one another, but took prisoners without demanding ransom. They did not fire upon towns at night, nor did those in the towns fire upon their camps at night. They built neither palisades nor ditches around their camps, and they did not take the field in winter. All this was permitted by their military rules, which they devised, as I have said, to escape hardship and danger. Thus they have brought Italy into servitude and disgrace.\n\n### Chapter XIII\n\nOf Auxiliary, Mixed, and Native Troops\n\nAuxiliary forces, the other kind of useless arms, are those supplied when you call on a powerful ruler to come with his own troops to aid and defend you. Pope Julius did this recently: having seen how badly his mercenaries performed in the campaign against Ferrara, he turned to auxiliaries and arranged for Ferdinand, King of Spain, to help him with his men and armies. Such forces may be useful and good in themselves, but they are always harmful to the one who calls them in: if they lose, you are ruined; if they win, you are their prisoner. And although ancient histories abound in examples, I will stay with this still-fresh case of Pope Julius II. No decision could have shown less judgment than his desire to gain Ferrara by placing himself entirely in a foreigner's hands. But his good fortune brought about a third outcome, so that he did not reap the fruit of his bad choice. His auxiliaries were defeated at Ravenna; then the Swiss appeared and drove the victors off, to the astonishment of the pope and everyone else. Thus he was left a prisoner neither of his enemies, who had fled, nor of his auxiliaries, since the victory was won by forces other than theirs.\n\nThe Florentines, being wholly unarmed, brought ten thousand Frenchmen against Pisa to take it; by this decision they ran a greater risk than at any other time in their troubles. The Emperor of Constantinople, to oppose his neighbors, brought ten thousand Turks into Greece. When the war ended, they refused to leave: this was the beginning of Greece's subjection to the infidels. Let anyone who wants to ensure that he cannot win make use of such forces. They are far more dangerous than mercenaries, for with auxiliaries ruin is already complete: they are all united, all accustomed to obey another. Mercenaries, by contrast, need more time and a greater opportunity to injure you after they have won. They do not form a single body; you have recruited and paid them, and an outsider whom you put in command cannot immediately gain enough authority to turn them against you. In short, with mercenaries the greater danger is cowardice; with auxiliaries it is courage. A wise Prince, therefore, has always avoided these forces and turned to his own. He has preferred to lose with his own troops rather than win with another's, judging that a victory gained with another's arms is no true victory. I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions.\n\nThe duke entered Romagna with auxiliary forces, bringing in French troops alone, and with them took Imola and Forlì. But when he came to think these forces unsafe, he turned to mercenaries, judging them less dangerous, and hired the Orsini and Vitelli. Later, finding these men uncertain, disloyal, and dangerous to handle, he destroyed them and turned to troops of his own. One can readily see the difference between these kinds of forces by comparing the duke's standing when he had the Orsini and Vitelli with his standing when he relied on his own soldiers and on himself. It grew continually, and he was never held in such esteem as when everyone saw that he had full command of his own troops. I had not meant to leave recent Italian examples, but I cannot omit Hiero of Syracuse, whom I named earlier. As I have said, when the Syracusans made him commander of their armies, he immediately recognized the uselessness of their mercenaries, whose captains were much like our Italian ones. Since he thought he could neither keep them nor dismiss them, he had them all cut to pieces. Thereafter he made war with his own arms, not with another's. I also want to recall an image from the Old Testament that bears on this point.\n\nWhen David offered to fight Goliath, the Philistine champion, Saul armed him with his own armor to give him courage. But once David had put it on, he refused it, saying that he could not use his own strength properly in it; he wished instead to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In short, another's armor either falls from your shoulders or weighs you down and constricts you. Charles VII, father of King Louis XI, having freed France from the English by his fortune and ability, recognized the need to arm himself with troops of his own and established companies of cavalry and infantry in his kingdom. His son King Louis later disbanded the infantry and began hiring Swiss soldiers. That error, followed by his successors, is the cause, as events now show, of the dangers facing the kingdom. By raising the Swiss to such esteem he has diminished all his own forces: he abolished the infantry altogether and made his cavalry dependent on foreign troops, for they are so used to fighting alongside the Swiss that they think they cannot win without them.\n\nThus the French cannot stand against the Swiss, and without the Swiss they do not venture against others. The armies of France have therefore been mixed, partly mercenary and partly native. Taken together these troops are far better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, but far inferior to native troops. The example is enough: the kingdom of France would be invincible if Charles's system had been strengthened, or even preserved. But men's lack of foresight leads them to begin an undertaking whose immediate benefits conceal the poison beneath, as I said earlier of wasting fevers. Therefore a man who rules a principality but recognizes its dangers only when they arise is not truly wise; and few have such foresight. If we consider the first cause of the Roman Empire's ruin, we shall find it was simply the decision to hire the Goths. From that beginning the empire's strength began to waste away; all the power it lost passed to them. I conclude, then, that no principality is secure without troops of its own. On the contrary, it is wholly at the mercy of fortune, having no strength to defend it in adversity. Wise men have always held that nothing is so frail and unstable as a reputation for power unsupported by one's own forces. Native forces consist of your subjects, your citizens, or men dependent on you; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. The means of organizing native forces will be easy to discover by examining the arrangements I have discussed above, and by seeing how Philip, father of Alexander the Great, and many republics and Princes armed and organized themselves. To those arrangements I refer the reader entirely.\n\n### Chapter XIV\n\nWhat a Prince Must Do Concerning Military Affairs\n\nA Prince, then, must have no other object, no other thought, and no other profession than war, its organization, and its discipline. For this is the only art that belongs to one who commands, and it has such power that it not only preserves those born Princes but often raises men of private station to that rank. Conversely, when Princes have given more thought to luxury than to arms, we see that they have lost their states. The first cause of losing a state is neglect of this art; mastery of it is what enables you to gain one. Francesco Sforza rose from private citizen to Duke of Milan because he was armed; his sons, shunning the hardships and discomforts of military life, fell from dukes to private citizens. Among the other harms that come from being unarmed is contempt, one of the disgraces against which a Prince must guard, as I shall explain below. There can be no comparison between an armed man and an unarmed one. Nor is it reasonable to expect an armed man to obey an unarmed man willingly, or an unarmed ruler to feel safe among armed servants. With resentment on one side and suspicion on the other, they cannot work well together. A Prince ignorant of military affairs, therefore, suffers not only the other misfortunes already mentioned: his soldiers cannot esteem him, nor can he trust them.\n\nHe must never turn his thoughts away from the practice of war, and in peace he should practice it more than in wartime. He can do this in two ways: through action and through study. In action, besides keeping his men well organized and trained, he should always go hunting. In this way he accustoms his body to hardships and learns the nature of the terrain: how mountains rise, valleys open, plains lie, and rivers and marshes run. To these matters he must give the greatest care. This knowledge is useful in two ways. First, he learns to know his own country and can better understand how to defend it. Then, through familiarity with its terrain, he readily grasps the features of a new place that he needs to examine. The hills, valleys, plains, rivers, and marshes of Tuscany, for example, bear a certain resemblance to those of other provinces; knowledge of the terrain in one province thus makes it easy to understand another's. A Prince who lacks this skill lacks the first qualification of a commander. It teaches him how to find the enemy, choose campsites, move armies, order battles, and lay siege to towns to his advantage.\n\nAmong the praises writers give Philopoemen, leader of the Achaeans, is that even in peacetime he thought of nothing but the ways of war. When out in the country with his friends, he would often stop and ask them: “If the enemy were on that hill and our army stood here, which of us would have the advantage? How could we safely advance to meet them while keeping our formation? If we wanted to withdraw, how should we do it? And if they withdrew, how should we pursue them?” As they walked he would put to them every situation that might arise for an army, hear their opinions, give his own, and support it with reasons. By thinking continually in this way, he ensured that when he commanded armies no event could arise for which he had not already found a remedy. As for the exercise of the mind, a Prince should read histories and study in them the actions of outstanding men. He should see how they conducted themselves in war and examine the causes of their victories and defeats, so that he may avoid the latter and imitate the former. Above all, he should do as some great man of the past has done, taking as his model a predecessor praised and honored, and keeping that man's deeds and actions always before him. Thus Alexander the Great is said to have imitated Achilles, Caesar to have imitated Alexander, and Scipio to have imitated Cyrus. Anyone who reads Xenophon's account of Cyrus's life will recognize how much glory Scipio gained from that imitation, and how closely Scipio's chastity, courtesy, humanity, and generosity conformed to Xenophon's portrait of Cyrus. A wise Prince should follow these methods. He must never be idle in peacetime, but diligently turn it to account, so that he can use what he has learned in adversity and stand ready, when fortune changes, to withstand its blows.\n\n### Chapter XV\n\nOn the Qualities for Which Men, and Especially Princes, Are Praised or Blamed\n\nIt remains now to consider how a Prince should conduct himself toward his subjects and his friends. I know that many have written on this subject, and I fear that writing on it myself may seem presumptuous, especially since I depart from the methods of others in discussing it. But as my purpose is to write something useful to whoever understands it, I have thought it better to follow the effective truth of the matter than an imagined version of it. Many have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist in reality. For how people live is so far removed from how they ought to live that anyone who abandons what is done for what ought to be done learns how to bring about his ruin rather than his preservation. A man who makes a profession of goodness in every circumstance is bound to come to ruin among so many who are not good. Hence a Prince who wishes to maintain his position must learn how not to be good, and to use that knowledge, or not use it, as necessity demands.\n\nSetting aside, then, the things imagined about a Prince and considering those that are real, I say that all men, when they are spoken of, and Princes especially, because they stand higher, are credited with certain qualities that bring them either blame or praise. One is thought generous, another miserly—to use a Tuscan word, since in our language the word for “avaricious” also describes one who seeks to gain through plunder, while we call “miserly” a man who is too reluctant to use what is his. One is called openhanded, another grasping; one cruel, another merciful; one a breaker of faith, another faithful; one effeminate and fainthearted, another fierce and bold; one humane, another proud; one licentious, another chaste; one straightforward, another cunning; one stern, another yielding; one serious, another frivolous; one devout, another unbelieving, and so on. I know everyone will agree that it would be most praiseworthy for a Prince to possess all those qualities named above that are held to be good. But human conditions do not allow him to possess or practice them all without fail. He must therefore be prudent enough to avoid the disgrace of vices that would cost him his state, and guard against those that would not cost him his state if he can; but if he cannot, he may yield to them with fewer scruples. Nor should he shrink from the disgrace of those vices without which he could scarcely preserve his state. For if we consider everything carefully, we shall find something that appears a virtue but would bring him to ruin if followed, and something else that appears a vice but brings him security and well-being if followed.\n\n### Chapter XVI\n\nOn Generosity and Parsimony\n\nBeginning, then, with the first of the qualities mentioned above, I say that it would be good to be considered generous. Yet generosity exercised in a way that wins you no reputation harms you; for if you practice it virtuously and as it ought to be practiced, it will go unrecognized, and you will not escape the disgrace attached to its opposite. So, to maintain a reputation for generosity among men, you must leave no form of lavish display untried. A Prince who does this will always exhaust all his resources on such things. In the end, if he wishes to keep his name for generosity, he will be forced to burden his people with extraordinary levies, impose harsh taxes, and do everything he can to raise money. This will begin to make him hateful to his subjects; as he grows poor, everyone will esteem him less. Having offended many by his generosity and rewarded few, he feels every slight hardship and is imperiled by the first danger he meets. If he recognizes this and tries to draw back, he immediately incurs the disgrace of being called miserly.\n\nA Prince, then, cannot practice the virtue of generosity openly without harming himself; if he is prudent, he should not mind being called miserly. In time he will be considered more and more generous when people see that his economy makes his revenues sufficient, that he can defend himself against those who wage war on him, and that he can undertake campaigns without burdening his people. In this way he is generous to all those from whom he takes nothing, who are countless, and miserly to those to whom he gives nothing, who are few. In our own times we have seen great things done only by men who were called miserly; the others have been ruined. Pope Julius II made use of a reputation for generosity to gain the papacy, but afterward gave no thought to preserving it, so that he could wage war against the King of France. He has waged so many wars without imposing an extraordinary tax because his long practice of economy has supplied the funds for his extraordinary expenses. The present King of Spain, had he been considered generous, would neither have undertaken nor won so many campaigns. A Prince, therefore, should think little of being called miserly if this keeps him from robbing his subjects, enables him to defend himself, prevents him from becoming poor and contemptible, and spares him the need to become rapacious. Parsimony is one of those vices that enable him to reign. If someone were to say, “Caesar attained the empire through generosity, and many others have risen to the highest rank because they were generous and were thought so,” I would answer: either you are already a Prince, or you are on your way to becoming one. In the first case such generosity is harmful; in the second it is indeed necessary to be considered generous. Caesar was one of those who sought to become ruler of Rome; but if, after attaining that rank, he had lived on and had not curbed his spending, he would have destroyed the empire. If someone were to reply, “Many Princes have been thought exceedingly generous and yet accomplished great things with their armies,” I would answer: a Prince spends either his own resources and those of his subjects, or someone else's. In the first case he must be sparing; in the second he must neglect no opportunity for generosity. For a Prince who campaigns with his armies and lives on booty, plunder, and ransoms, disposing of what belongs to others, this generosity is necessary; otherwise his soldiers would not follow him. And with what belongs neither to you nor to your subjects, you may give more freely, as Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander did. Spending the property of others does not diminish your reputation; it increases it. Only spending your own resources harms you. Nothing consumes itself so thoroughly as generosity: as you practice it, you lose the means to go on practicing it, and become either poor or despised—or, to avoid poverty, rapacious and hated. Of all things a Prince must guard against, the foremost are contempt and hatred, and generosity leads to both. It is wiser, therefore, to accept the name of miser, which brings disgrace without hatred, than to seek the name of generous and so be driven to earn the name of rapacious, which brings disgrace with hatred.\n\n### Chapter XVII\n\nOn Cruelty and Mercy, and Whether It Is Better to Be Loved Than Feared\n\nTurning next to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every Prince should wish to be thought merciful rather than cruel. Yet he must take care not to misuse this mercy. Cesare Borgia was thought cruel; nevertheless, his cruelty restored order to Romagna, united it, and brought it to peace and loyalty. Consider this carefully, and he will be seen to have been far more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to escape the name of cruelty, allowed Pistoia to be destroyed. A Prince, then, must not fear the disgrace of being called cruel when it will keep his subjects united and loyal. For by making very few examples of offenders, you will be more merciful than those who, out of too much mercy, let disorders run their course until murders and robberies follow: these usually injure a whole community, whereas the executions ordered by the Prince injure one person. Of all Princes, a new Prince can least avoid the name of cruelty, since new states are full of dangers. Thus Virgil, speaking through Dido, excuses the harshness of her rule on the grounds that it is new, saying:\n\nHard circumstances and a new kingdom compel me\nTo take such measures, and to guard my borders far and wide.\n\nNevertheless, he must be slow to believe reports and slow to act; he must not frighten himself, but proceed with prudence and humanity in such measure that too much trust does not make him careless, nor too much suspicion make him unbearable. From this arises a question: is it better to be loved than feared, or feared than loved? The answer is that one would wish to be both. But since the two are difficult to unite, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one of them must be lacking. For of men in general it may be said that they are ungrateful, changeable, deceitful, eager to avoid danger, and greedy for gain. So long as you do them good, they are entirely yours; they offer you their blood, their possessions, their lives, and their children, as I said above, when the need is far off. But when it draws near, they turn against you. And the Prince who has built entirely on their words, finding himself without any other preparations, comes to ruin. For friendships bought at a price, rather than won by greatness and nobility of spirit, are paid for but not possessed, and cannot be called upon when the time comes. Men hesitate less to injure someone who makes himself loved than someone who makes himself feared: love is held by a bond of obligation which, because men are wicked, they break whenever their own advantage is at stake; fear is held by the dread of punishment, which never leaves them. Nevertheless, the Prince must make himself feared in such a way that, if he does not gain love, he avoids hatred; for it is entirely possible to be feared without being hated. He will achieve this if he keeps his hands off the property of his citizens and subjects, and off their women. If he must act against someone's life, let him do so when there is proper justification and an evident cause; but above all he must keep his hands off the property of others, for men sooner forget the death of their father than the loss of their inheritance.\n\nMoreover, grounds for seizing property are never lacking. Whoever begins to live by plunder always finds grounds for taking what belongs to others; by contrast, grounds for taking a life are rarer and more quickly exhausted. But when the Prince is with his armies and commands a great multitude of soldiers, then it is absolutely necessary not to care about a reputation for cruelty; for without that reputation an army cannot be kept united or ready for action. Among the remarkable deeds of Hannibal is this: although he led a vast army, made up of men of countless nations, to fight in foreign lands, no dissension ever arose among them or against their commander, in bad fortune or good. This could only have come from his inhuman cruelty, which, together with his innumerable other virtues, made him always revered and feared in the eyes of his soldiers; without it, his other virtues would not have sufficed to produce that effect. Thoughtless writers admire his deeds on the one hand and condemn their chief cause on the other. That his other virtues would not have sufficed can be seen in Scipio, a man exceptionally rare not only in his own time but in all recorded history: his armies in Spain rebelled against him. This came from nothing but his excessive mercy, which allowed his soldiers more freedom than military discipline permitted. Fabius Maximus reproached him for this in the Senate, calling him a corrupter of Roman military discipline. When the people of Locri were ruined by one of Scipio's lieutenants, Scipio did not avenge them or punish the lieutenant's insolence; all this arose from his easygoing nature. So much so that someone wishing to defend him in the Senate said that there were many men who knew better how to avoid making mistakes themselves than how to correct the mistakes of others. In time, this disposition would have harmed Scipio's fame and glory if he had continued to exercise supreme command; but because he lived under the government of the Senate, this harmful quality of his was not only concealed, but counted to his glory. I conclude, then, returning to the question of being feared and loved: since men love according to their own will and fear according to the Prince's, a wise Prince must build on what is his own, not on what belongs to others; he must only take care to avoid hatred, as I have said.\n\n### Chapter XVIII\n\nHow Princes Should Keep Their Word\n\nEveryone understands how praiseworthy it is for a Prince to keep his word and live with integrity rather than cunning. Yet experience in our own times shows that the Princes who have accomplished great things have held their promises in little regard, and have known how to turn men's minds by cunning; in the end they have overcome those who relied on loyalty. You must therefore know that there are two ways of fighting: one with laws, the other with force. The first belongs to men, the second to beasts; but because the first is often insufficient, one must resort to the second. A Prince must therefore know how to use both the beast and the man. Ancient writers taught Princes this lesson under a veil when they wrote that Achilles and many other Princes of old were entrusted to Chiron the centaur to be brought up under his discipline. To have a teacher half beast and half man means nothing other than that a Prince must know how to use both natures, for neither can endure without the other. Since a Prince must know how to use the beast well, he should take from it the fox and the lion: the lion cannot defend itself against traps, nor the fox against wolves. He must therefore be a fox to recognize traps and a lion to frighten wolves. Those who rely on the lion alone do not understand the matter. Thus a prudent ruler cannot, and should not, keep his word when keeping it would work against him and the reasons that led him to give it have ceased to exist. If all men were good, this rule would not be good; but since they are wicked and would not keep their word to you, you are not bound to keep yours to them. Nor will a Prince ever lack legitimate grounds for disguising his failure to keep it.\n\nCountless modern examples of this could be given, showing how many treaties of peace and how many promises have been rendered void and worthless by the faithlessness of Princes; and the one who best knew how to play the fox has fared best. But he must know how to disguise this nature well, and be a great pretender and concealer. Men are so simple, and so governed by their immediate needs, that anyone who deceives will always find someone willing to be deceived. I will not pass over one recent example. Pope Alexander never did anything but deceive men, nor did he ever think of anything else, and he always found people he could deceive. No man ever asserted a thing more persuasively or confirmed it with greater oaths, yet no man kept his word less; nevertheless, his deceptions always succeeded, for he understood this side of the world well. A Prince, then, need not actually possess all the qualities mentioned above, but he must appear to possess them. Indeed, I will venture to say that to possess them and always practice them is harmful, while to appear to possess them is useful: to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, and upright, and to be so, but to have a mind so disposed that, when necessity requires, you can and know how to turn to their opposites. It must be understood that a Prince, and especially a new Prince, cannot observe everything for which men are held to be good, since he is often compelled, to preserve the state, to act against humanity, against charity, against religion. He must therefore have a mind ready to turn as the winds and changes of fortune command; and, as I said above, not depart from good when he can, but know how to enter into evil when compelled.\n\nA Prince, then, must take great care that nothing ever passes his lips which is not full of the five qualities mentioned above, so that, to see and hear him, he appears all mercy, all integrity, all humanity, all religion. Of these, none is more necessary to appear to have than the last; for men in general judge more with their eyes than with their hands, since everyone can see, but few can feel. Everyone sees what you seem to be; few experience what you are, and those few dare not oppose the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them. In the actions of all men, and especially of Princes, where there is no court to which one can appeal, people look to the outcome. Let a Prince, then, make it his aim to live and preserve the state: his means will always be judged honorable and praised by everyone. For the common people are always taken in by appearances and by the result, and the world is made up of common people; the few find a place only when the many have nothing to lean on. A certain Prince of our times, whom it is better not to name, preaches nothing but peace and fidelity; yet had he kept either, he would have lost his state and his reputation many times over.\n\n### Chapter XIX\n\nWhy a Prince Must Avoid Being Despised and Hated\n\nHaving spoken of the most important of the qualities mentioned above, I want to discuss the others briefly under this general rule: a Prince must take care, as I have said in part already, to avoid whatever makes him hated or despised. Whenever he avoids these things, he will have done his duty, and the other charges brought against him will pose no danger. Above all, as I have said, he becomes hated by being rapacious, by seizing the property and the women of his subjects; from this he must abstain. So long as the great body of men is deprived of neither property nor honor, they live content, and he has only the ambition of a few to contend with, which can be restrained in many ways and with ease. He becomes contemptible when he is thought fickle, frivolous, effeminate, timid, or irresolute. A Prince must guard against these qualities as against a reef, and strive to make his actions show greatness, courage, gravity, and strength. In the private affairs of his subjects he must insist that his judgment be irrevocable, and maintain such a reputation that no one thinks of deceiving or manipulating him. A Prince who inspires this opinion of himself is held in high esteem; against a man held in high esteem conspiracies are hard to mount and attacks hard to undertake, provided he is known to be capable and revered by his own people. For a Prince has two things to fear: one within his state, from his subjects, and the other outside it, from foreign powers. Against the latter he defends himself with good arms and good allies; and if he has good arms he will always have good allies. Affairs at home will always remain secure when those abroad remain secure, unless they are disturbed by a conspiracy. Even if foreign affairs turn against him, if he is organized and has lived as I have said, he will withstand every assault so long as he does not abandon himself, as I said Nabis of Sparta did. But as for his subjects, when foreign affairs are quiet, he must fear that they may conspire in secret. Against this a Prince can largely protect himself by avoiding hatred and contempt, and by keeping the people satisfied with him; achieving this is necessary, as I explained at length above. One of a Prince's strongest remedies against conspiracies is not to be hated or despised by the people at large. The conspirator always believes that by killing the Prince he will satisfy the people; but if he thinks he will offend them, he cannot bring himself to take that course, for the difficulties on the conspirators' side are endless. Experience shows that there have been many conspiracies and few successful ones. A conspirator cannot act alone, nor can he recruit anyone except those he believes to be discontented. The moment you reveal your intentions to a discontented man, you give him a means of satisfying himself: by exposing you he may hope to gain every advantage. Seeing a certain profit on one side and an uncertain one, full of danger, on the other, he must either be an exceptionally loyal friend or an utterly determined enemy of the Prince to keep faith with you. To put the matter briefly, the conspirator has nothing on his side but fear, jealousy, and the suspicion of punishment, which dismays him. The Prince, by contrast, is defended by the majesty of the principality, the laws, and the protection of his friends and his state. When the goodwill of the people is added to all these, it is impossible for anyone to be so rash as to conspire. Ordinarily a conspirator has cause to fear before committing the crime; in this case he must fear afterward as well, since once the deed is done the people are his enemies and he can hope for no refuge. Countless examples could be given of this, but I shall be content with one that occurred within our fathers' memory.\n\nMesser Annibale Bentivoglio, grandfather of the present Messer Annibale and Prince in Bologna, was murdered by the Canneschi, who had conspired against him. He left no heir but Messer Giovanni, then an infant in swaddling clothes. Immediately after the murder the people rose and killed every one of the Canneschi. This came about because of the goodwill the house of Bentivoglio enjoyed among the people of Bologna at that time. So great was it that, with no one left to govern the state after Annibale's death, they heard that a Bentivoglio child was living in Florence, until then believed to be the son of a blacksmith. The Bolognese went to Florence to fetch him and gave him the government of their city, which he governed until Messer Giovanni reached an age fit to govern. I conclude, then, that a Prince need have little concern about conspiracies when the people bear him goodwill; but when they are his enemies and hate him, he must fear everything and everyone. Well-ordered states and wise Princes have taken every care not to drive the great to desperation, and to satisfy the people and keep them content, for this is one of a Prince's most important concerns. Among the kingdoms well ordered and governed in our time is France. It has innumerable sound institutions on which the king's freedom and security depend, foremost among them the Parlement and its authority. The founder of that kingdom knew the ambition and insolence of the powerful and judged that a bit in their mouths was needed to restrain them. Knowing, on the other hand, the hatred of the people at large for the great, a hatred founded on fear, and wishing to protect the people, he did not want this to be the king's personal responsibility. He thus relieved the king of the burden he would incur with the great by favoring the common people, or with the common people by favoring the great. Instead he established a third judge who, without laying the burden on the king, would curb the great and support the lesser people. No arrangement could have been better or more prudent, or a greater source of security for the king and the kingdom. From this another useful principle follows: Princes should have others administer measures that bring blame, but should dispense favors themselves. I conclude once again that a Prince must respect the great, but must not make himself hated by the people.\n\nTo many, perhaps, the lives and deaths of several Roman emperors will seem to furnish examples contrary to my view: some of them lived honorably throughout and displayed great strength of character, yet lost the empire or were killed by their own men conspiring against them. To answer these objections I shall examine the qualities of certain emperors, showing that the causes of their ruin are consistent with what I have argued, and I shall also bring forward matters worth noting for readers of the history of those times. It will suffice to take all the emperors who succeeded to the empire from Marcus the Philosopher to Maximinus: Marcus, his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julianus, Severus, Antoninus, his son Caracalla, Macrinus, Elagabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. First it must be noted that, whereas other Princes have only the ambition of the great and the insolence of the people to contend with, the Roman emperors faced a third difficulty: they had to endure the cruelty and greed of their soldiers. This was so difficult that it caused the ruin of many, since it was hard to satisfy both soldiers and people. The people love peace, and therefore love moderate Princes; the soldiers love a Prince of military spirit who is insolent, cruel, and rapacious. They wanted him to exercise these qualities upon the people so that they could receive double pay and indulge their greed and cruelty. Thus emperors who lacked, by nature or by skill, a reputation strong enough to hold both groups in check always came to ruin. Most of them, especially those who came to the principality as new men, recognized the difficulty of these opposing dispositions and chose to satisfy the soldiers, making little of the injury done to the people. This course was necessary: since Princes cannot avoid being hated by someone, they must first strive not to be hated by the people at large; when they cannot achieve this, they must use every means to escape the hatred of the more powerful groups. Thus the emperors who, being new, needed exceptional support attached themselves more readily to the soldiers than to the people. Whether this helped them, however, depended on whether the Prince knew how to maintain their respect.\n\nFor these reasons Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, all men of modest lives, lovers of justice, enemies of cruelty, humane and kind, all met unhappy ends except Marcus. Marcus alone lived and died in the highest honor, for he inherited the empire and did not have to owe it to either soldiers or people. Moreover, possessing many virtues that made him venerable, throughout his life he kept both groups within their proper bounds and was never hated or despised. Pertinax, however, was made emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, who had grown accustomed to living without restraint under Commodus and could not endure the honorable life to which Pertinax wanted to bring them back. He thus earned their hatred; and when contempt for his age was added to that hatred, he fell at the very beginning of his rule. Here we must observe that hatred is earned by good deeds as well as bad ones. Therefore, as I said above, a Prince who wishes to preserve his state is often forced not to be good. When the group whose support you judge necessary to your survival—whether people, soldiers, or great men—is corrupt, you must follow its disposition and satisfy it; then good deeds become your enemies. But let us turn to Alexander. His goodness was such that among the praises bestowed on him is this: in the fourteen years he held the empire, he never put anyone to death without a trial. Nevertheless, because he was thought effeminate and a man who let his mother govern him, he fell into contempt; the army conspired against him and killed him.\n\nIf, by contrast, you examine the qualities of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus, Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them exceedingly cruel and rapacious. To satisfy the soldiers they spared the people no kind of injury; and all except Severus came to unhappy ends. Severus possessed such ability that, by keeping the soldiers his friends, he could always rule successfully, although he burdened the people. His qualities made him so remarkable in the eyes of soldiers and people alike that the latter stood in a kind of stunned amazement, while the former remained respectful and satisfied. And because the deeds of this new Prince were great, I want to show briefly how well he knew how to play the fox and the lion, whose natures, as I said above, a Prince must imitate.\n\nWhen Severus recognized the weakness of the emperor Julianus, he persuaded the army he commanded in Slavonia that they ought to march on Rome to avenge the death of Pertinax, whom the imperial guard had killed. Under this pretext, without showing that he aspired to the empire, he led the army against Rome and reached Italy before news of his departure arrived. On reaching Rome he was elected emperor by a frightened Senate, and Julianus was killed. After this beginning Severus still faced two obstacles to making himself master of the entire state: one in Asia, where Niger, commander of the Asian armies, had had himself proclaimed emperor; the other in the west, where Albinus also aspired to the empire. Judging it dangerous to declare himself the enemy of both, he decided to attack Niger and deceive Albinus. He wrote to Albinus that, having been elected emperor by the Senate, he wished to share that dignity with him. He sent him the title of Caesar and, by a decree of the Senate, made him his colleague; Albinus accepted all this as genuine. But after Severus had defeated and killed Niger and pacified the east, he returned to Rome and complained before the Senate that Albinus, showing little gratitude for the benefits he had received, had treacherously tried to kill him. Severus was therefore compelled, he said, to punish his ingratitude. He then sought Albinus out in France and took both his state and his life. Whoever examines Severus's actions closely will find him a most ferocious lion and a most cunning fox; he will see that Severus was feared and revered by all, yet not hated by the armies. Nor will he be surprised that a new man was able to hold so great an empire, for his immense reputation always protected him from the hatred the people might have conceived on account of his plunder. But Antoninus, his son, was himself a man of extraordinary qualities. He had excellent traits that made him admirable in the eyes of the people and dear to the soldiers: he was a military man, able to endure every hardship, disdainful of delicate food and every other luxury. This made him beloved by all the armies. Nevertheless, his savagery and cruelty were so great and so unheard of—for after many individual killings he put to death a large part of the people of Rome and the entire population of Alexandria—that he became an object of intense hatred throughout the world. Even those around him began to fear him, and he was killed by a centurion in the midst of his army. It should be noted that Princes cannot avoid deaths of this kind, which result from the resolve of a determined and relentless mind: anyone who does not care whether he dies can carry out such a killing. Yet a Prince need fear such deaths less, for they are exceedingly rare. He must take care only not to do grave injury to any of those who serve him and whom he keeps near him in the service of his principality. Antoninus had done just that: he had put a brother of that centurion to death with contempt, threatened the centurion daily, and nevertheless kept him as a bodyguard. It was a reckless course, bound to bring ruin, as it did. But let us turn to Commodus. He had every opportunity to keep the empire, having inherited it as the son of Marcus: he needed only to follow in his father's footsteps to satisfy both people and soldiers. But he had a cruel and brutal nature, and in order to exercise his rapacity upon the people he set out to indulge the armies and let them live without restraint. At the same time he failed to uphold his dignity, often descending into the theaters to fight gladiators and doing other utterly base things, unworthy of the imperial majesty. He became contemptible in the eyes of the soldiers; hated on one side and despised on the other, he was conspired against and killed.\n\nIt remains to describe the qualities of Maximinus. He was a most warlike man. When the armies had grown weary of the softness of Alexander, whom I discussed above, and Alexander had been killed, they elected Maximinus to the empire. He did not hold it for long, because two things made him hated and despised. The first was his very low origin: he had tended sheep in Thrace. This was common knowledge everywhere and brought him into great contempt in everyone's eyes. The second was that, having delayed going to Rome at the beginning of his principality to take possession of the imperial seat, he acquired a reputation for extreme cruelty: through his prefects he had committed many acts of cruelty in Rome and throughout the empire. Thus the whole world was stirred to indignation by the lowliness of his birth and, on the other hand, to hatred by fear of his ferocity. First Africa, then the Senate together with the entire people of Rome, and all Italy, conspired against him. His own army joined them: while besieging Aquileia, it met with difficulty taking the city, grew weary of his cruelty, and, seeing that he had so many enemies, feared him less and killed him. I do not wish to discuss Elagabalus, Macrinus, or Julianus, who, being wholly contemptible, were quickly extinguished; instead I shall come to the conclusion of this argument. I say that the Princes of our own time face less difficulty in having to satisfy the soldiers exceptionally in their government. Although soldiers must receive some consideration, the matter is soon settled, since none of these Princes has armies bound over many years to the government and administration of the provinces, as the armies of the Roman Empire were. If it was then necessary to satisfy the soldiers rather than the people, it was because the soldiers had more power than the people. Now it is more necessary for all Princes, except the Turk and the Sultan, to satisfy the people rather than the soldiers, because the people have more power. I except the Turk because he always keeps about him twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand horsemen, upon whom the security and strength of his kingdom depend; he must keep them his friends, setting aside every other consideration for the people. The Sultan's kingdom is similar: being wholly in the hands of the soldiers, it too requires him to keep them his friends without regard for the people. You should note that the Sultan's state differs from all other principalities. It resembles the Christian papacy, which cannot be called either a hereditary or a new principality. The heirs and rulers who succeed a dead Prince are not his children, but the man elected to that office by those authorized to choose him. Since this order has stood for a long time, it cannot be called a new principality, for it has none of the difficulties belonging to new principalities. Though the Prince is new, the institutions of the state are old and prepared to receive him as if he were their hereditary lord.\n\nBut to return to our subject, I say that anyone who considers the preceding argument will see that either hatred or contempt caused the ruin of the emperors I have named. He will also understand why, although some acted in one way and others in the opposite way, one in each case met a fortunate end and the others unfortunate ends. For Pertinax and Alexander, being new Princes, found it useless and harmful to try to imitate Marcus, who held an inherited principality; likewise it was ruinous for Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to imitate Severus, since they lacked the ability needed to follow in his footsteps. Therefore a new Prince in a principality cannot imitate Marcus's actions, nor need he imitate those of Severus. Rather, he must take from Severus the qualities needed to establish his state, and from Marcus those that are fitting and glorious for preserving a state already established and secure.\n\n### Chapter XX\n\nWhether Fortresses and Many Other Things Princes Often Do Are Useful or Harmful\n\nSome Princes, to hold their states securely, have disarmed their subjects; others have kept the territories under them divided into factions; others have fostered hostility against themselves; others have set about winning over those they suspected at the beginning of their rule; some have built fortresses, and some have razed and destroyed them. Although no definite judgment can be given on any of these measures without examining the particular states in which such a decision would have to be made, I shall speak as broadly as the subject itself permits. Now a new Prince has never disarmed his subjects; on the contrary, when he has found them unarmed, he has always armed them. For by arming them, you make those arms yours; those you suspect become loyal, those already loyal remain so, and your subjects become your supporters. And because you cannot arm all your subjects, if you favor those you do arm, you can deal with the others more securely: the distinction they see in their treatment binds the armed men to you, while the rest excuse it, judging it necessary that those who face more danger and bear more responsibility should have greater reward. But when you disarm them, you begin to offend them and show that you distrust them, whether through fear of their courage or of their loyalty; either opinion breeds hatred of you. And because you cannot remain without arms, you must turn to mercenary troops, whose nature we have discussed above; even if they were good, they could never be numerous enough to defend you against powerful enemies and subjects you suspect. Thus, as I have said, a new Prince in a new principality has always established his own armed forces there. Histories are full of examples. But when a Prince acquires a new state to be joined as a member to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm that state, except for those who declared themselves for you in its conquest; and even these, in time and as occasions arise, must be made soft and unmanly. You must arrange matters so that all the arms in your state are in the hands of your own soldiers, who live close to you in your original state.\n\nOur forebears, including those accounted wise, used to say that Pistoia must be held through factions and Pisa through fortresses; accordingly they fostered divisions in some subject city in order to possess it more easily. In those days, when Italy was in a certain balance, this may have been well done; but I do not think it can be prescribed today. I do not believe that divisions deliberately created ever do any good. Indeed, when an enemy approaches, divided cities must fall at once, for the weaker faction will always join the foreign forces, and the other will be unable to hold out. Moved, I believe, by the reasons just given, the Venetians fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their subject cities. Though they never let them come to bloodshed, they kept these quarrels alive so that the citizens, occupied with their differences, would not rise against them. As became clear, this did them no good: after their defeat at Vailà, one of those factions immediately took courage and stripped them of the whole state. Such methods therefore betray a Prince's weakness. In a strong principality such divisions will never be allowed: they are useful only in peacetime, when they make subjects easier to manage; with the coming of war, the arrangement reveals its own deception.\n\nWithout doubt Princes become great when they overcome the difficulties and opposition raised against them. Thus fortune, especially when she wishes to make a new Prince great—for he has greater need to win a reputation than a hereditary Prince—causes enemies to arise and enterprises to be undertaken against him, so that he has cause to overcome them and climb higher on the ladder his enemies have provided. Many therefore judge that a wise Prince, when the opportunity offers, should cunningly foster some hostility against himself, so that suppressing it will increase his greatness. Princes, particularly new ones, have found greater loyalty and greater use in men considered suspect at the outset of their rule than in those they trusted from the beginning. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, governed his state more through those who had been suspect than through the others. But no general rule can be given here, for the matter varies with the circumstances. I shall say only this: men who were enemies at the beginning of a principality, and whose position requires them to seek support in order to maintain themselves, can always be won over by the Prince with the greatest ease. They are all the more compelled to serve him faithfully when they recognize how necessary it is for them to erase through deeds the bad opinion once held of them. Thus the Prince always draws more use from them than from men who, serving him with too much assurance, neglect his affairs. And since the subject calls for it, I do not wish to neglect a warning to a Prince who has newly taken a state through support from within it: he should consider closely what moved his supporters to support him. If it was not a natural affection for him, but merely dissatisfaction with the former government, he will find it very hard to keep them as friends, for he will be unable to satisfy them. If he carefully examines the reason for this in examples drawn from ancient and modern affairs, he will see that it is much easier to win the friendship of men who were content with the former state, and therefore were his enemies, than of men who, discontented with it, became his friends and helped him seize it.\n\nPrinces have customarily built fortresses to hold their states more securely: these serve as a bridle and restraint on those who might plot against them, and provide a safe refuge from a first assault. I commend the practice, for it has long been used. Nevertheless, in our own day Messer Niccolò Vitelli was seen to tear down two fortresses in Città di Castello in order to hold that state. Guid'Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, returning to the state from which Cesare Borgia had expelled him, demolished every fortress in that province down to its foundations, judging that without them he would be less likely to lose the state again. The Bentivoglio, on their return to Bologna, did likewise. Fortresses, then, are useful or not according to the times; if they benefit you in one respect, they harm you in another. The question can be considered in this way: the Prince who fears his people more than foreigners should build fortresses; the one who fears foreigners more than his people should do without them. The castle of Milan, which Francesco Sforza built there, has brought and will bring more war upon the House of Sforza than any other disturbance in that state. Therefore the best fortress there is consists in not being hated by the people. Even if you have fortresses, they will not save you when the people hate you; once the people take up arms, foreigners willing to help them are never lacking. In our times fortresses have been of use to no Prince, as far as can be seen, except to the Countess of Forlì when her husband Count Girolamo was killed. By means of her fortress she escaped the first onslaught of the people, waited for help from Milan, and recovered the state; at that time circumstances prevented foreigners from helping the people. Later, however, her fortresses were of little use even to her when Cesare Borgia attacked and her hostile people joined forces with the foreigner. Thus, both then and before, she would have been safer from the people's hatred than behind fortresses. All these things considered, I shall praise both the man who builds fortresses and the man who does not; but I shall blame anyone who, trusting in fortresses, thinks it of little consequence to be hated by the people.\n\n### Chapter XXI\n\nHow a Prince Should Conduct Himself to Win a Reputation\n\nNothing makes a Prince so esteemed as great undertakings and rare examples of his own conduct. In our own times we have Ferdinand, King of Aragon and now King of Spain. He may almost be called a new Prince, for from being a weak king he has become, in fame and glory, the foremost king of Christendom. Consider his actions and you will find them all very great, some extraordinary. At the beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and that enterprise was the foundation of his power. At first he undertook it at leisure, with no fear of interference. He kept the barons of Castile occupied with it; thinking of that war, they did not think of making changes, while he acquired reputation and authority over them without their noticing. With money from the Church and the people he was able to maintain his armies; that long war laid the foundation of the military power that has since brought him honor. Moreover, so that he could undertake greater enterprises, he made constant use of religion and turned to a pious cruelty, driving the Marranos out of his kingdom and despoiling them. No example could be more remarkable or more extraordinary. Under the same cloak he attacked Africa, launched his enterprise in Italy, and lately attacked France. Thus he has always planned great things, which have kept his subjects' minds in suspense and wonder, occupied with their outcome. And these actions have followed one upon another so closely that they have never given men time to settle down and act against him.\n\nIt also greatly helps a Prince to furnish rare examples of himself in domestic government, such as those told of Messer Bernabò of Milan: when someone has done something extraordinary, whether good or bad, in civic life, he should find a way to reward or punish the deed that will be much talked about. Above all, a Prince should strive in every action to acquire a reputation for greatness and excellence. A Prince is also esteemed when he is a true friend or a true enemy: that is, when he openly takes one side against another without reservation. This course will always be more useful than remaining neutral. For if two powerful neighbors come to blows, either the victor will be someone you have reason to fear, or he will not. In either case, it will always serve you better to declare yourself and wage a vigorous war. In the first case, if you do not declare yourself, you will always be the victor's prey, to the pleasure and satisfaction of the defeated; and you will have neither a claim nor anything else to defend you, nor anyone to take you in. The victor does not want doubtful friends who failed to help him in adversity, and the loser will not receive you, because you refused to take your arms in hand and share his fortune.\n\nAntiochus crossed into Greece at the invitation of the Aetolians, to drive out the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the Romans, urging them to stand aside; meanwhile the Romans urged them to take up arms on their side. The matter came before the council of the Achaeans, where Antiochus's envoy urged them to remain neutral. The Roman envoy replied: \"As for the claim that keeping out of our war would be best and most useful for your state, nothing could be further from the truth. For if you keep out of it, you will remain, without favor or reputation, the prize of the victor.\" It will always happen that the one who is not your friend asks you to be neutral, while the one who is your friend asks you to declare yourself with arms. Irresolute Princes, in order to escape immediate dangers, most often take the neutral course, and most often come to ruin. But when a Prince boldly declares himself for one side, and his ally wins, then even if that ally is powerful and you remain at his mercy, he is indebted to you and a bond of affection has been formed. Men are never so shameless that they would oppress you with so conspicuous an example of ingratitude. Besides, victories are never so complete that the victor need have no regard for anything, especially justice. If your ally loses, he will receive you, help you as long as he can, and you become the companion of a fortune that may rise again. In the second case, when the combatants are such that you have no reason to fear the victor, it is all the more prudent to take a side: with the help of one who ought, if he were wise, to save his opponent, you bring about that opponent's ruin; and once your ally wins, he remains at your mercy. With your help it is impossible for him not to win. Here it should be noted that a Prince must take care never to ally himself with someone more powerful than himself to attack a third party, unless necessity compels him, as I said above. For if that ally wins, you remain at his mercy, and Princes should avoid being at the mercy of others as far as they can. The Venetians allied themselves with France against the Duke of Milan, although they could have avoided that alliance; it brought about their ruin. But when such an alliance cannot be avoided, as happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain marched with their armies against Lombardy, then the Prince should join them for the reasons given above. Nor should any state believe it can make a choice free of danger; rather, it should expect every choice to be uncertain. Such is the order of things: we never try to escape one difficulty without falling into another. Prudence consists in knowing how to discern the character of the difficulties and in accepting the lesser evil as the good.\n\nA Prince should also show himself a lover of virtue and honor those who excel in every art. Furthermore, he should encourage his citizens to practice their occupations in peace, in trade, agriculture, and every other human calling, so that one man does not refrain from improving his property for fear of losing it, nor another from opening a business for fear of taxes. Instead, he should offer rewards to those who wish to do these things, and to anyone who in any way plans to enlarge his city or his state. Beyond this, at fitting times of the year he should keep the people engaged with festivals and spectacles. And because every city is divided into guilds or districts, he should pay attention to these associations, meet with them from time to time, and set an example of humanity and magnificence, while always preserving the majesty of his rank; for this must never be absent from anything he does.\n\n### Chapter XXII\n\nOn the Secretaries of Princes\n\nThe choice of ministers is no small matter for a Prince; whether they are good or not depends on the Prince's judgment. The first conjecture we make about a ruler and his intelligence comes from looking at the men around him. When they are capable and loyal, he can always be judged wise, for he has known how to recognize their abilities and keep their loyalty. But when they are otherwise, we can always judge him unfavorably, because his first error was in choosing them. No one who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as minister to Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, failed to judge Pandolfo a most prudent man for having him as his minister. There are three kinds of minds: one understands things for itself; another understands what is shown to it by others; the third understands neither on its own nor through what others show it. The first is outstanding, the second excellent, the third useless.\n\nIt followed necessarily, then, that if Pandolfo was not of the first kind, he was of the second. For whenever a man has the judgment to recognize the good and bad in what another man does and says, even if he has no ideas of his own, he recognizes his minister's bad actions and good ones, praises the latter, and corrects the former. The minister cannot hope to deceive him and so remains honest. As for how a Prince can recognize a minister, there is a method that never fails. When you see a minister think more of himself than of you, seeking his own advantage in everything he does, such a man will never be a good minister, and you will never be able to trust him. For a man who has another's state in his hands must never think of himself, but of the Prince; he must never bring anything to the Prince's attention that does not concern the Prince. For his part, to keep his minister honest, the Prince must think of him: honor him, make him rich, bind him to himself, and share honors and responsibilities with him. Then the many honors and riches bestowed on him will leave him with no desire for more, and his many responsibilities will make him fear any change, knowing that he cannot stand without the Prince. When Princes and ministers are constituted in this way, they can trust one another; otherwise the outcome will always be harmful to one or the other.\n\n### Chapter XXIII\n\nHow to Avoid Flatterers\n\nI do not want to leave out an important subject, and an error against which princes can defend themselves only with difficulty unless they are exceptionally prudent or choose their advisers well. I mean flatterers, of whom courts are full, because men take such pleasure in their own affairs, and deceive themselves about them so thoroughly, that they can scarcely guard against this plague; yet in trying to guard against it they risk falling into contempt. For there is no other way to protect oneself from flattery than to let men understand that they will not offend you by speaking the truth; but when anyone may tell you the truth, you lose their respect. A prudent Prince, therefore, must take a third course: he must choose wise men within his state and give only them the freedom to speak the truth to him, and only on matters he asks about, not on others. But he must ask them about everything and hear their opinions, then make his own decision as he sees fit. He must behave toward these advisers, and toward each of them, so that all know the more freely they speak, the more welcome their words will be. Apart from them he must listen to no one, adhere to what he has decided, and remain firm in his decisions. Whoever does otherwise either comes to grief through flatterers or constantly changes course as opinions shift, and so loses esteem. On this subject I want to offer a modern example. Father Luca, a man in the service of Maximilian, the present emperor, said of His Majesty that he consulted no one and never did anything in his own way. This arose from his taking the opposite course to the one I have described: the emperor is secretive, shares his plans with no one, and asks no one's advice about them. But when he begins to put them into effect, they become known and come to light; then those around him begin to contradict them, and, easily swayed, he abandons them. Hence what he does one day he undoes the next; no one can ever tell what he wants or plans to do, and no one can rely on his decisions.\n\nA Prince, then, should always seek counsel, but when he wishes, not when others wish. Indeed, he should discourage everyone from advising him about anything unless he asks for advice. He himself, however, should ask questions freely and then, on the matters he has asked about, listen patiently to the truth; and if he learns that anyone is withholding it for some reason, he should be angered. Many believe that a Prince reputed to be prudent owes his reputation not to his own nature but to the good advisers around him; they are certainly mistaken. For it is an unfailing general rule that a Prince who is not wise in his own right cannot be well advised, unless by chance he places himself entirely in the hands of one exceptionally prudent man, who governs him in every respect. In that case he might be well governed, but it would not last long, for that governor would soon take his state from him. If instead he consults more than one adviser, a Prince who is not himself wise will never receive counsel that agrees, nor will he know how to reconcile their advice himself. Each adviser will think of his own interests, and the Prince will know neither how to correct them nor how to recognize what they are doing. Nor can they be expected to be otherwise, for men will always turn out badly unless necessity makes them good. We may conclude, then, that good counsel, whoever gives it, must spring from the prudence of the Prince, and not the prudence of the Prince from good counsel.\n\n### Chapter XXIV\n\nWhy the Princes of Italy Have Lost Their States\n\nWhen the measures discussed above are prudently observed, they make a new Prince appear long established, and at once render him more secure and more firmly settled in his state than if he had ruled there for generations. For the actions of a new Prince are watched far more closely than those of a hereditary one; and when they are recognized as worthy, they win men over and bind them to him much more strongly than ancient blood. Men are far more taken with present things than with things past, and when they find good in the present, they enjoy it and seek nothing more. Indeed, they will defend the Prince in every way, provided he does not fail himself in other matters. Thus he will have twice the glory for founding a new principality and adorning and strengthening it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and good examples; just as a man born a Prince will have twice the shame if he loses his state through his own lack of prudence. And if we consider the rulers who have lost their states in Italy in our time, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others, we will find in them, first, a common failing in their arms, for reasons already discussed at length. Then we will see that some of them had the people as enemies, or, if they had the people as friends, did not know how to secure themselves against the great. For without such failings, states with enough strength to put an army in the field are not lost.\n\nPhilip of Macedon—not the father of Alexander the Great, but the one defeated by Titus Quinctius—possessed no very large state compared with the power of the Romans and of Greece, which attacked him. Yet because he was a man of war who knew how to keep the people on his side and protect himself against the great, he sustained the war against them for many years; and though in the end he lost control of some cities, he nevertheless kept his kingdom. Therefore, let these princes of ours, who held their principalities for many years and then lost them, blame not fortune but their own indolence. They had never imagined in quiet times that things could change—a common failing of men, who do not reckon with storms in fair weather. When adversity came, they thought of fleeing, not of defending themselves, and hoped that the people, weary of the victors' insolence, would call them back. When other means have failed, that course is a good one; but it is very bad to have abandoned all other remedies for its sake. One should never fall in the belief that someone will later pick one up. Either that does not happen, or, if it does, it brings you no security, since such a defense is base and does not depend on you. The only defenses that are good, sure, and enduring are those that depend on you yourself and on your own ability.\n\n### Chapter XXV\n\nHow Much Power Fortune Has over Human Affairs, and How She May Be Resisted\n\nI am not unaware that many have held, and still hold, the opinion that the affairs of the world are so governed by fortune and by God that men cannot alter them through their own prudence, and indeed have no remedy against them at all. For this reason they might judge that there is little point in laboring hard over anything, and that they should let chance rule them. This opinion has gained more credence in our time because of the great changes we have seen, and see every day, beyond all human conjecture. When I reflect on this, I am sometimes inclined partly to agree with them. Nevertheless, so that our free will is not extinguished, I judge that it may be true that fortune governs half our actions, but leaves the other half, or a little less, for us to govern. I compare her to one of those destructive rivers which, when it rises in fury, floods the plains, tears down trees and buildings, strips earth from one place and deposits it in another. Everyone flees before it; everyone yields to its violence, powerless to resist. Yet though such a river is like this, it does not follow that men cannot make provision in quiet times, building embankments and barriers, so that when it rises again it must flow along a channel, or at least its force will not be so unbridled and destructive.\n\nThe same is true of fortune: she shows her power where no disciplined ability has been prepared to resist her, and directs her assault where she knows no embankments or barriers have been built to hold her back. If you consider Italy, the seat of these upheavals and the place from which they have spread, you will see a plain without embankments or any defenses. Had she been protected by sufficient ability, as Germany, Spain, and France are, this flood would not have brought about such great changes, or it would not have reached us at all. Let this suffice concerning resistance to fortune in general. Turning now to particulars, I say that we see a Prince prosper today and fall tomorrow, without seeing him change his nature or qualities in any way. I believe this arises first from causes I have discussed at length above: that a Prince who relies wholly on fortune falls when she changes. I also believe that the man whose manner of acting accords with the character of the times prospers, and that the man whose manner of acting is at odds with the times fails. For we see men pursuing the ends each sets before himself—glory and riches—by different means: one with caution, another with force; one by violence, another by cunning; one with patience, another with its opposite. And each can reach his goal by these different means. We also see two cautious men, one of whom achieves his purpose and the other does not; likewise, two men may prosper equally by following different methods, one cautious and the other impetuous. This arises solely from whether the character of the times agrees with their manner of acting. Hence, as I have said, two men acting differently can obtain the same result, while of two acting alike one reaches his goal and the other does not. Changes in fortune also depend on this: if times and circumstances turn out so that a man who proceeds with caution and patience is acting wisely, he prospers; but if times and circumstances change, he falls because he does not change his way of acting. Nor is there anyone so prudent that he knows how to adapt himself to this, both because he cannot turn aside from the course to which nature inclines him and because, having always prospered by following one road, he cannot persuade himself to leave it. Thus the cautious man, when the time comes to act with force, does not know how, and so he falls; but if he changed his nature with the times and circumstances, his fortune would not change. Pope Julius II acted impetuously in everything, and found times and circumstances so well suited to his manner of acting that he always succeeded. Consider his first undertaking, against Bologna, while Messer Giovanni Bentivoglio was still alive. The Venetians were displeased by it, and the King of Spain was likewise discussing the undertaking with France. Nevertheless, the pope, in his fierceness and impetuosity, set out on the expedition himself. His move kept both Spain and the Venetians in suspense and at a standstill: the Venetians through fear, Spain through its desire to recover the entire Kingdom of Naples. At the same time he drew the King of France behind him; for when that king saw him on the move, and wished to make a friend of him in order to humble the Venetians, he judged that he could not refuse him his troops without openly affronting him.\n\nThus, by his impetuous move, Julius achieved what no other pope could have achieved with all the prudence in the world. Had he waited to leave Rome until agreements were settled and everything arranged, as any other pope would have done, he would never have succeeded. The King of France would have found a thousand excuses, and the others would have raised a thousand fears. I will pass over his other actions: they were all of the same kind, and all turned out well for him; and the shortness of his life kept him from experiencing the reverse. For if times had come when he needed to proceed with caution, he would have fallen: he would never have departed from the ways to which his nature inclined him. I conclude, then, that as fortune changes while men remain fixed in their ways, they prosper when the two agree and fail when they do not. I do judge, however, that it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because Fortune is a woman, and to keep her down it is necessary to beat and strike her. We see that she yields more readily to men who do this than to those who act coolly. Therefore, like a woman, she is always a friend to the young, because they are less cautious, fiercer, and command her with greater audacity.\n\n### Chapter XXVI\n\nAn Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians\n\nHaving considered all the matters discussed above, and asking myself whether the times now at hand in Italy might honor a new Prince, whether there is material here that would give a prudent and able man the opportunity to establish a new order, bringing honor to himself and benefit to all her people, I find so many circumstances working in favor of a new Prince that I cannot imagine a time better suited to the task. And if, as I have said, the people of Israel had to be enslaved in Egypt for the ability of Moses to be revealed, the Persians oppressed by the Medes for the greatness and spirit of Cyrus to be known, and the Athenians scattered for the excellence of Theseus to shine forth, so now, for the ability of an Italian spirit to be known, Italy had to be brought to her present condition: more enslaved than the Hebrews, more subjugated than the Persians, more scattered than the Athenians, leaderless and without order, beaten, stripped, torn, overrun, and made to endure ruin of every kind. And although before now some glimmer appeared in one man or another, enough to make us think he was appointed by God to redeem her, we have seen him afterward, at the height of his endeavors, cast aside by fortune. Italy, left as though lifeless, now waits for someone to heal her wounds, to put an end to the plunder and sack of Lombardy, the pillage and exactions inflicted on the Kingdom of Naples and Tuscany, and to cure the sores that have festered in her for so long.\n\nWe see her praying to God to send someone to redeem her from these barbarian cruelties and outrages. We see her ready and willing to follow a banner, if only someone will take it up. Nor can she now place greater hope in anyone than in your illustrious house, which, through its ability and fortune, favored by God and by the Church, whose head is now one of your own, may lead this redemption. This will not be very difficult for you if you set before yourselves the deeds and lives of the men named above. Though those men were rare and marvelous, they were men nonetheless, and each of them had a lesser opportunity than this one. Their undertaking was neither more just nor easier than yours, nor was God a better friend to them than to you. Here there is the highest justice, for a war is just when it is necessary, and arms are sacred when they are the only hope. Here there is the greatest readiness; and where readiness is great, difficulty cannot be great, provided your house adopts the methods of those whom I have held up as models for you. Beyond this, we see here wonders without precedent, brought about by God: the sea has opened, a cloud has shown you the way, the rock has poured forth water, manna has rained down here. Everything has come together for your greatness; the rest you must do yourselves. God does not wish to do everything, lest he take from us our free will and that share of glory which belongs to us. And it is no wonder that none of the Italians named before has been able to do what we may hope your illustrious house will do, or that, amid so many upheavals in Italy and so many campaigns, her military ability has always seemed extinguished. The reason is that her old institutions were no good, and no one has yet known how to devise new ones. Nothing brings so much honor to a man rising to power as the new laws and institutions he devises. When these are well founded and have greatness in them, they make him revered and admired; and in Italy there is no lack of material on which to build an order of any kind. There is great ability in her members, if only it were not lacking in her leaders. Look at duels and encounters between small numbers: the Italians are superior in strength, agility, and ingenuity. But when it comes to armies, they make no showing; and this all comes from the weakness of their commanders, for those who have knowledge will not obey, while everyone thinks he has it, and no one has yet risen so far through ability and fortune that the rest will yield to him. Hence, in all this time and all the wars fought over the past twenty years, whenever an army has been wholly Italian it has always performed badly. The Taro bears witness to this first, then Alessandria, Capua, Genoa, Vailà, Bologna, and Mestre.\n\nIf, then, your illustrious house wishes to follow those excellent men who redeemed their countries, it must, before all else, as the true foundation of every undertaking, provide itself with arms of its own; for no soldiers can be more loyal, more trustworthy, or better. And though each of them is good in himself, together they will become better still when they see themselves commanded by their own Prince, and honored and maintained by him. You must therefore prepare these forces, so that Italian ability can defend Italy against outsiders. And although Swiss and Spanish infantry are held to be formidable, both have a weakness, so that a third formation might not only withstand them but expect to overcome them. The Spaniards cannot stand against cavalry, and the Swiss have reason to fear infantry that confronts them with a resolve equal to their own. Thus experience has shown, and will show, that the Spaniards cannot withstand French cavalry and that the Swiss can be defeated by Spanish infantry. And although this last point has not been fully proved, there was a demonstration of it at the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry faced the German battalions, which use the same formation as the Swiss. The Spaniards, by agility of body and with the help of their bucklers, got in beneath the Germans' pikes and could strike them safely, while the Germans had no remedy; and if the cavalry had not charged the Spaniards, they would have destroyed them all. Knowing, then, the weakness of each of these kinds of infantry, one can organize a new force that will withstand cavalry and have no fear of infantry. This will be achieved not by a different kind of weapon, but by a change in formations. Such innovations, when established, bring reputation and greatness to a new Prince. Let this opportunity not pass, then, so that after so long Italy may see a redeemer of her own appear. I cannot express with what love he would be welcomed in all those regions that have suffered from these foreign floods, with what thirst for vengeance, what steadfast loyalty, what devotion, what tears. What gates would be closed to him? What people would refuse him obedience? What envy could stand against him? What Italian would withhold allegiance? The stench of this barbarian rule offends everyone. Let your illustrious house, then, take up this charge with the spirit and the hopes with which just undertakings are embraced, so that under its banner our country may be ennobled, and under its auspices these words of Petrarch may come true:\n\nVirtue against fury\nWill take up arms, and the fight will be brief;\nFor ancient valor\nIs not yet dead in Italian hearts.","download_url":"https://mouseia.org/api/works/prince/translations/trn_prince_mouseia.txt"},{"id":"trn_prince_plain","translator":"Mouseia","kind":"plain","note":"Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication.","text":"### Dedication\n\nMost people who want to win favor with a Prince come before him with the things they value most, or the things they see that he likes best. That is why Princes are often given horses, weapons, gold cloth, precious stones, and other fine things worthy of their rank. I want to offer Your Magnificence some sign of my service to you. Of everything I own, nothing is dearer to me, or more valuable in my eyes, than what I know about the actions of great men. I learned this from long experience of events in our own time and from constant reading about the past. I have spent a long time carefully thinking through and examining this knowledge. Now I have put it into a small book and send it to Your Magnificence. I judge this work unworthy of your attention. Even so, I trust that your kindness will lead you to accept it. I cannot give you a greater gift than the chance to understand in a very short time everything I have learned over many years, through so much hardship and danger. I have not dressed up this work with long passages, grand or inflated words, or any of the other outward flourishes that many writers use to present and decorate their work. I wanted nothing to embellish it, so that only the truth of its contents and the importance of its subject might make it welcome. Nor should it seem presumptuous for a man of low and humble standing to dare to discuss and lay down rules for the government of Princes. People who draw maps stand on low ground to see what mountains and high places are like; to see what low places are like, they stand high in the mountains. In the same way, a Prince must know the people well, while an ordinary citizen is best placed to know Princes. So please accept this small gift, Your Magnificence, in the spirit in which I send it. If you read it and consider it carefully, you will see in it my deepest wish: that you reach the greatness promised to you by fortune and by your other qualities. And if Your Magnificence ever looks down from the height of your position to the low place where I am, you will see how undeservedly I suffer from a great and constant run of bad fortune.\n\n### Chapter I\n\nHow Many Kinds of Principalities There Are, and How They Are Acquired\n\nEvery state and every dominion that has held or now holds power over people has been or is either a republic or a principality. Principalities are either hereditary, when the ruler's family has held power for a long time, or new. New principalities are either entirely new, as Milan was for Francesco Sforza, or they are territories added to the hereditary state of the Prince who acquires them, as the Kingdom of Naples is to the King of Spain. These acquired dominions are either used to living under a Prince or used to being free. They are gained either with someone else's arms or with one's own, either through fortune or through ability.\n\n### Chapter II\n\nOn Hereditary Principalities\n\nI will set aside republics, because I have discussed them at length elsewhere. I will deal only with principalities. I will pick up the threads laid out above and discuss how these principalities can be governed and held. In hereditary states, where people are used to the ruler's family, keeping power is much easier than it is in new states. The Prince only needs to avoid breaking with the ways of his ancestors, then adapt to events as they arise. If he has ordinary ability, he will always keep his state unless an extraordinary and overwhelming force takes it from him. Even if he loses it, he will regain it whenever the person who seized it suffers a setback. In Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84 and those of Pope Julius in '10 for no other reason than that his family had ruled there for so long. A hereditary Prince has fewer reasons and less need to offend his subjects, so he is likely to be loved more. Unless extraordinary faults make them hate him, it is natural for his people to wish him well. Under a long, unbroken rule, memories of change and the reasons for it die away. Every change leaves a foothold for the next one.\n\n### Chapter III\n\nOn Mixed Principalities\n\nBut a new principality brings difficulties. When it is not entirely new but is added to an old one, forming what we might call a mixed principality, its troubles begin with a natural difficulty common to all new principalities. People are glad to change rulers because they believe they will be better off. That belief makes them take up arms against their ruler. Then they learn from experience that they have made things worse. This follows from another ordinary and unavoidable fact: a new Prince always has to hurt the people whose land he takes over. His troops and the many other injuries that come with conquest see to that. So everyone you hurt in taking a principality becomes your enemy. Yet you cannot keep the friendship of the people who helped you take it. You cannot give them all they expected, and you cannot use harsh measures against them because you owe them a debt. Even a man with a very strong army needs the support of local people to enter a province. For these reasons Louis XII, king of France, took Milan quickly and lost it just as quickly. The first time, Ludovico's own forces were enough to take it back. The people who had opened the gates to Louis found that the benefits they had expected were an illusion. They could not put up with the troubles brought by their new Prince. It is true, though, that once a ruler takes a rebellious territory a second time, it is harder to lose. The rebellion gives him a reason to secure his position with fewer restraints: he can punish offenders, find out who is suspect, and strengthen weak points. The first time France lost Milan, all it took was Duke Ludovico making trouble on the border. The second time, the whole world had to turn against France. Its armies had to be destroyed and driven out of Italy. This happened for the reasons just given. Even so, Milan was taken from France both times. I have discussed the general reasons for the first loss. Now we must look at the second and ask what Louis could have done, and what someone in his position can do, to hold a conquest better than the king of France did. Here is my answer. A state added to a ruler's old state either belongs to the same region and speaks the same language or it does not. If it does, it is very easy to hold, especially if its people are not used to living free. To hold it securely, you need only end the line of the Prince who ruled it before. Keep the old conditions in other respects, and, where customs do not differ, people will live quietly. That is what we have seen with Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy, which have long been part of France. Their languages differ somewhat, but their customs are similar, so the people can easily live together. Anyone who takes such lands and wants to keep them must attend to two things. First, the former Prince's bloodline must be wiped out. Second, their laws and taxes must not be changed. In very little time the new lands will become one body with his old principality. But when states are taken in a region whose language, customs, and institutions differ, holding them is difficult. It takes great fortune and considerable skill. One of the best and most effective ways to hold them is for the conqueror to go and live there.\n\nLiving there would make possession more secure and lasting. The Turk did this in Greece. Despite all the other measures he took to hold that state, he could not have kept it if he had not gone to live there. When you live in a province, you see trouble starting and can deal with it quickly. When you do not, you hear of trouble only after it has grown so large that you can no longer fix it. Your officials also cannot strip the province bare. Your subjects are satisfied because they can appeal to their Prince nearby. If they want to behave well, they have more reason to love him; if they want to behave otherwise, they have more reason to fear him. An outsider who wants to attack the state will think twice. Living there therefore makes the state very hard to lose. The next best solution is to send settlers to one or two places that serve as keys to the state. You must either do this or keep a large force of cavalry and infantry there. Settlements cost the Prince little. He can send and maintain the settlers at little or no expense to himself. He hurts only the people whose fields and houses he takes to give to the newcomers, and they are a very small part of the state. Left poor and scattered, the injured people cannot harm him. Everyone else is unharmed and so settles down easily. They are also afraid to cause trouble, in case they suffer the same fate as those who lost their property. In short, these settlements cost little, are more loyal, and hurt fewer people. As I said, the people they do hurt are too poor and scattered to strike back. Note that you must either treat people well or destroy their ability to resist. People take revenge for small injuries; they cannot take revenge for grave ones. If you injure someone, then, you must do it in a way that leaves you no reason to fear his revenge. If instead of settlers you keep troops there, the cost is far greater. Guarding the state uses up all its revenue, so the conquest becomes a loss to you. It does far more harm as well. The whole state suffers as the army moves its quarters from place to place. Everyone feels this hardship, and everyone becomes your enemy. These enemies can hurt you because, although beaten, they are still in their own homes. A garrison is therefore useless in every respect, while settlements are useful. A ruler in a region with different customs must also become the leader and defender of its weaker neighbors. He must try to weaken its stronger powers and take care that no foreigner as powerful as himself enters it for any reason. Someone in the region who is unhappy, either out of ambition or fear, will always invite such an outsider in. This is how the Aetolians brought the Romans into Greece. Wherever else the Romans entered, local people invited them. This is how it works: as soon as a powerful outsider enters a region, all its weaker powers join him. They resent the power that has been above them. He has no trouble winning them over. They all willingly unite at once with the state he has taken there. He need only make sure they do not gain too much power or authority. With his own forces and their support, he can easily bring down the stronger powers and become master of the whole region. Whoever mishandles this will soon lose his conquest. While he still holds it, he will face endless difficulties and troubles.\n\nThe Romans followed these rules well in the provinces they took. They sent settlers and cultivated ties with the weaker powers without making them stronger. They brought the stronger powers down and did not let powerful foreigners gain a foothold. Greece alone will serve as an example. The Romans maintained ties with the Achaeans and Aetolians, humbled the kingdom of Macedon, and drove out Antiochus. But they never let the Achaeans or Aetolians expand their states, whatever those peoples had done for them. Philip's arguments never persuaded them to be his friends without first weakening him. And Antiochus's power never made them agree to let him hold any state in that region. In these cases the Romans did what all wise Princes should do. They watched not only for present troubles but for future ones and worked hard to prevent them. When you see trouble from far away, you can easily deal with it. If you wait until it comes close, it is too late for treatment because the disease has become incurable. It is like the disease doctors call a hectic fever. At first it is easy to cure but hard to recognize. As time passes without recognition or treatment, it becomes easy to recognize but hard to cure. The same is true in affairs of state. A prudent ruler alone can see troubles coming from far away, and then he can deal with them quickly. But if they go unnoticed until they have grown plain to everyone, there is no cure left. The Romans saw problems coming and always dealt with them. They never let them develop just to avoid a war. They knew that war cannot be avoided this way; it can only be postponed to someone else's advantage. So they chose to fight Philip and Antiochus in Greece rather than fight them later in Italy. They could have avoided both wars at the time, but they chose not to. They never liked the saying constantly on the lips of today's wise men, \"Enjoy the benefits of time.\" They preferred to rely on their own ability and good judgment. Time drives everything forward and can bring good as well as bad, or bad as well as good.\n\nBut let us return to France and see whether it did any of these things. I will talk about Louis rather than Charles, because Louis held territory in Italy longer, making his actions easier to see. You will see that he did the opposite of what a ruler must do to hold a state with different customs. King Louis came into Italy at the invitation of the Venetians, who hoped his arrival would win them half of Lombardy. I do not blame the king for coming or for making that choice. He wanted to establish a foothold in Italy, but he had no friends there. Indeed, King Charles's conduct had closed every door to him. Louis had to accept what alliances he could find. His plan would have worked well if he had made no mistakes in the rest of his dealings. Once the king took Lombardy, he immediately regained the standing Charles had lost. Genoa submitted, and the Florentines became his friends. The marquis of Mantua, the duke of Ferrara, the Bentivoglio family, the lady of Forlì, the lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, and Piombino, and the people of Lucca, Pisa, and Siena all came forward to be his friends. The Venetians could then see how rash their decision had been. To acquire two towns in Lombardy, they had made the king master of two-thirds of Italy. Think how easily he could have kept his standing there if he had followed the rules given above. He had many allies, all weak and all afraid of either the Church or the Venetians. They had to stay with him. If he had kept them safe and defended them, he could easily have used their support to protect himself against the other major powers. But as soon as he reached Milan, he did the opposite. He helped Pope Alexander take Romagna. He did not see that this decision weakened him by taking away his friends and those who had put themselves in his hands. It made the Church strong by adding extensive worldly power to the religious power that already gave it so much authority. Having made this first mistake, he had to keep going. To put a stop to Alexander's ambition and prevent him from becoming master of Tuscany, Louis had to come back to Italy. Nor was it enough that he had made the Church powerful and lost his friends. He wanted the kingdom of Naples, so he divided it with the king of Spain. He had been the arbiter of Italy, but now he brought in a partner. Ambitious Italians and people unhappy with Louis now had someone else to turn to. He could have left a king in Naples who depended on him and received a pension from him. Instead he removed that king and put in one who could drive Louis himself out. Wanting to gain more is natural and ordinary. When people have the power to do it, they will always be praised, not blamed. But if they lack the power and insist on doing it anyway, that is a mistake and deserves blame. If France had the strength to attack Naples alone, it should have done so. If it did not, it should not have divided the kingdom. Sharing Lombardy with the Venetians was excusable because it gave France a foothold in Italy. Sharing Naples was blameworthy because there was no such need for it.\n\nLouis had therefore made five mistakes. He destroyed the weaker powers. He increased the power of one strong power in Italy. He brought in an extremely powerful foreigner. He did not come to live there. And he did not establish settlements there. Even so, these mistakes might not have hurt him during his lifetime if he had not made a sixth: taking the Venetians' state from them. If he had not made the Church powerful or brought Spain into Italy, it would have been reasonable and necessary to weaken the Venetians. But after making those first choices, he should never have allowed their ruin. As long as the Venetians remained strong, they would have kept others from trying to take Lombardy. They would not have allowed anyone else to take it unless they themselves became its masters. Others would not have wanted to take it from France only to give it to the Venetians. Nor would they have dared to confront France and Venice together. Someone might say that King Louis gave Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom of Naples to Spain to avoid a war. My answer is the one already given: you must never allow trouble to develop simply to avoid a war. You do not avoid it; you put it off to your disadvantage. Others might point to the promise the king made to the Pope to carry out the campaign for him in exchange for the annulment of Louis's marriage and a cardinal's hat for Rouen. I answer with what I will say later about the promises Princes make and how they should keep them.\n\nKing Louis lost Lombardy because he followed none of the methods used by rulers who have conquered provinces and wanted to keep them. There is nothing surprising about this. It is only natural. I talked about this at Nantes with the cardinal of Rouen when Duke Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was commonly called, was taking Romagna. The cardinal told me that Italians did not understand warfare. I replied that the French did not understand statecraft. If they did, they would not let the Church grow so powerful. Experience has shown that France caused the rise of the Church and Spain in Italy, and that these powers in turn caused France's ruin. From this comes a general rule that almost never fails: whoever makes someone else powerful brings about his own ruin. For the new power was built with that person's skill or force, and the one who has become powerful distrusts both.\n\n### Chapter IV\n\nWhy the Kingdom of Darius, Conquered by Alexander, Did Not Rebel Against Alexander's Successors After His Death\n\nGiven how hard it is to hold a newly conquered state, someone might wonder how Alexander the Great became ruler of Asia in a few years and then, almost as soon as he had conquered it, died without the whole state rebelling. A rebellion would have seemed likely. Yet his successors kept it, and their only trouble in holding it came from their own ambition and the conflicts it caused among them. My answer is that the principalities we know of are governed in two different ways. In one, there is a Prince and everyone else is his servant. They help govern his kingdom as officials only because he appoints them and allows them to do so. In the other, there is a Prince and there are barons. The barons hold their rank through their family lines, not through the ruler's favor. These barons have lands and subjects of their own. Their subjects recognize them as rulers and feel a natural loyalty toward them. In a state governed by a Prince and his servants, the Prince has more authority. Throughout his territory, no one recognizes any other person as a superior. If people obey someone else, they obey him as an official or agent, not because they have any special affection for him. Examples of these two kinds of government in our own time are the Turk and the King of France. The Turk's whole monarchy is governed by one ruler; all the others are his servants. He divides his kingdom into sanjaks, sends different governors to them, and replaces and moves them as he sees fit. But the King of France is surrounded by a long-established group of lords. Their subjects recognize and love them. They have privileges that the king cannot take away without putting himself in danger. So anyone who examines these two states will find that the Turk's state is hard to conquer, but very easy to hold once conquered.\n\nThe Turk's kingdom is hard to conquer because an invader cannot expect to be invited in by its nobles. Nor can he count on a rebellion by the people close to the ruler to make his undertaking easier. This follows from the reasons I have given. Since they are all servants and depend on him, they are harder to bribe. Even if they could be bribed, they would be of little use: for the reasons already given, they cannot bring the people with them. An attacker of the Turk must therefore expect to face a united state. He must rely on his own forces more than on disorder among his enemies. But once he has defeated the ruler in the field so completely that the ruler cannot raise another army, he need only worry about the Prince's family line. If that line is wiped out, there is no one left to fear, because the other officials have no standing with the people. Just as the conqueror could not rely on them before his victory, he need not fear them afterward.\n\nThe opposite happens in kingdoms governed like France. You can enter such a kingdom easily by winning over one of its barons, since there are always dissatisfied people who want change. For the reasons I have given, these men can open a way into the state and help you win. But once you have won, holding it brings endless problems, both with those who helped you and with those you defeated. Wiping out the Prince's family line is not enough. The remaining lords can lead fresh uprisings. You cannot satisfy them or get rid of them all, so you lose the state as soon as an opportunity arises. Now consider what kind of government Darius had. It was like the Turk's kingdom. Alexander therefore had to attack all of it and defeat its army in the field. After that victory, with Darius dead, Alexander's hold on the state was secure for the reasons I have explained. If his successors had stayed united, they could have enjoyed it without further effort. No disturbances arose in that kingdom except the ones they stirred up themselves. But it is impossible to hold states organized like France in such peace. That is why the Romans faced frequent rebellions in Spain, France, and Greece. Those territories had many principalities, and as long as people remembered them, Rome's hold on the territories remained uncertain. Once the memory of those principalities faded, Roman power and the long duration of Roman rule made its possession secure. Later, even when Romans fought one another, each side could draw support from parts of those territories according to the influence it had gained there. Since the families of their former rulers had died out, the people recognized no rulers but the Romans. Given all this, no one should be surprised that Alexander found it easy to hold Asia while others, such as Pyrrhus and many more, struggled to keep their conquests. The difference lay not in the conquerors' greater or lesser ability, but in the different kinds of territory they conquered.\n\n### Chapter V\n\nHow to Govern Cities or Principalities That Lived Under Their Own Laws Before They Were Conquered\n\nWhen conquered states have been used to living under their own laws and in freedom, as I have described, there are three ways to hold them. The first is to destroy them. The second is to go and live there yourself. The third is to let them keep their laws, collect a regular payment from them, and set up a government run by a few people who will keep the state friendly to you. Because that government owes its existence to the Prince who created it, its members know that they cannot survive without his friendship and power. They must do everything they can to keep his support. If you want to preserve a city that is used to freedom, it is easier to hold it through its own citizens than by any other means.\n\nTake the Spartans and the Romans as examples. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes by setting up governments run by a few people, but they lost both cities anyway. The Romans destroyed Capua, Carthage, and Numantia in order to hold them, and did not lose them. They tried to hold Greece much as the Spartans had held their cities: they left it free and let it keep its laws. This did not work. To hold Greece, they had to destroy many of its cities. In fact, destruction is the only sure way to possess such cities. Whoever takes control of a city used to living in freedom but fails to destroy it can expect that city to destroy him. In rebellion, its people can always rally around the name of freedom and their old institutions. Time and favors never make them forget those things. Whatever the conqueror does or plans, unless he divides or scatters the inhabitants, they will not forget that name or those institutions. At the first opportunity they will turn to them, as Pisa did after so many years of subjection to the Florentines. But when cities or provinces are used to living under a Prince and his family line has died out, they are used to obeying a ruler and no longer have their old Prince. They cannot agree among themselves on a new one, and they do not know how to live freely. So they are slower to take up arms. A new Prince can win them over and make his hold on them secure more easily. In republics, however, hatred and the desire for revenge are stronger. The memory of their former freedom will not and cannot let them rest. The safest course is therefore to destroy them or to live there yourself.\n\n### Chapter VI\n\nNew Principalities Won with One's Own Arms and Ability\n\nNo one should be surprised if I use the greatest examples when I discuss principalities that are entirely new, with a new Prince ruling a new state. People nearly always follow paths others have taken and imitate what others have done. Yet they cannot follow those paths exactly or match the ability of the people they imitate. A sensible person should therefore follow the paths taken by great people and imitate the very best. Then, even if he cannot reach their level of ability, he will show some trace of it. He should act like a skilled archer who knows that his target is far away and knows how far his bow can shoot. He aims much higher than the target, not because he expects the arrow to reach that height, but because aiming high will let him hit the target. So I say that in entirely new principalities, with a new Prince, the difficulty of holding them depends on how much ability the conqueror has. A private person who becomes a Prince must have either ability or fortune. Either one seems to ease many of the difficulties to some extent. Still, those who have relied less on fortune have kept their states longer. It also helps when a Prince has no other states and is therefore forced to live in the new one himself. Turning to those who became Princes through their own ability rather than fortune, the finest examples are Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and others like them. We should perhaps leave Moses out of the discussion, since he simply carried out God's commands. Even so, he deserves admiration for the grace that made him worthy of speaking with God.\n\nConsider Cyrus and the others who conquered or founded kingdoms: all were remarkable. Look at what each of them did and the institutions they set up, and you will find that they were no different from Moses, although Moses had such a great teacher. If we examine their lives and deeds, we can see that fortune gave them only an opportunity. This gave them material they could shape as they wished. Without that opportunity, their inner ability would have gone to waste. Without their ability, the opportunity would have been wasted. Moses needed to find the people of Israel enslaved in Egypt and oppressed by the Egyptians, so that they would be willing to follow him out of slavery. For Romulus to become King of Rome and found that city, he had to be unable to stay in Alba and to be abandoned at birth. Cyrus needed to find the Persians unhappy under Median rule and the Medes weakened and softened by a long peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability unless he had found the Athenians scattered. Those opportunities let these men succeed, and their exceptional ability let them recognize the opportunities. As a result, their homelands gained distinction and became very prosperous. Men who become Princes by able means like theirs find it hard to gain a principality but easy to keep it. Part of the difficulty in gaining it comes from the new institutions and ways of doing things they have to introduce to establish their state and make it secure. We must remember that nothing is harder to undertake, less certain to succeed, or more dangerous to manage than taking the lead in introducing new institutions. Everyone who benefits from the old institutions becomes an enemy of the person introducing the new ones. Those who might benefit from the new institutions give him only lukewarm support. In part, they are afraid of their opponents, who have the law on their side. In part, they are skeptical: people do not really believe in new things until they have seen firm proof that those things work. So whenever the opponents get a chance to attack, they attack with the full force of their faction, while the others offer only weak support. Together with those supporters, the reformer is put in danger. To examine this matter properly, we must ask whether people introducing changes can stand on their own or depend on others. In other words, must they plead with others to carry out their work, or can they use force? Those who must plead always come to a bad end and achieve nothing. Those who can rely on their own power and use force rarely fail. That is why all the armed prophets won and the unarmed ones were ruined. There is another reason besides those already given: people change their minds. It is easy to persuade them of something, but hard to keep them convinced. So the reformer must be ready to make them believe by force when they no longer believe willingly.\n\nMoses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus could not have kept their institutions in place for long if they had been unarmed. We saw what happened in our own time to Friar Girolamo Savonarola. His new institutions failed as soon as the people began to doubt him. He had no way to keep those who had believed him firm in their belief or to persuade those who did not believe. Men like these face great difficulty on their way to power. All their dangers come before they have fully succeeded, and they must overcome those dangers through their own ability. Once they do, people begin to respect them. If they have removed those who envied their standing, they remain powerful, secure, honored, and successful. I want to add a less grand example to these great ones. It still bears some resemblance to them, and it will serve for all other examples of its kind: Hiero of Syracuse. He went from private citizen to Prince of Syracuse, and fortune gave him nothing but an opportunity. The Syracusans were under pressure, so they chose him as their commander. He then earned the position of their Prince. Even as a private citizen he had so much ability that a writer said he lacked nothing needed to rule except a kingdom. He disbanded the old army and organized a new one. He ended his old friendships and made new ones. Once he had friends and soldiers who belonged to him, he could build whatever he wanted on that foundation. So gaining power cost him great effort, but holding it cost him little.\n\n### Chapter VII\n\nOn New Principalities Acquired with Other People's Forces and through Fortune\n\nPeople who become Princes from private citizens solely through fortune have little trouble rising to power, but a great deal of trouble keeping it. They meet no difficulties on the way, because they fly there. All the difficulties begin once they are in place. Such people receive a state either for money or as a favor from the person granting it. This happened to many people in the Greek cities of Ionia and the Hellespont. Darius made them Princes so that they would hold those cities for his security and glory. It also happened to those emperors who rose from private life to imperial power by bribing the soldiers. These men depend entirely on the will and fortune of the person who raised them, two things that change easily and cannot be relied on. They do not know how to hold their position, and they cannot hold it. They do not know how because, unless a man has exceptional intelligence and ability, it is unreasonable to expect someone who has always lived as a private citizen to know how to command. They cannot hold it because they have no forces that can be their friends and stay loyal to them. Besides, states that spring up at once are like everything else in nature that is born and grows quickly. They cannot develop roots and connections strong enough to keep the first spell of bad weather from destroying them. The only exception is if these suddenly made Princes have enough ability to prepare at once to keep what fortune has put in their laps. They must build afterward the foundations that other Princes laid before coming to power.\n\nI want to give two examples from our own time of these two ways of becoming a Prince, through ability or through fortune: Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco used the proper means and his great ability to rise from private citizen to Duke of Milan. He had won the duchy with a thousand hardships, but kept it with little effort. Cesare Borgia, whom people commonly called Duke Valentino, gained his state through his father's fortune and lost it when that fortune failed. Yet he did everything he could and took every step that a sensible, capable man should take to put down roots in the states that another man's arms and fortune had given him. As I said above, a man who does not lay his foundations first can still lay them later if he has great ability, although this causes trouble for the builder and puts the building at risk. If we consider all the Duke's actions, we will see that he laid strong foundations for his future power. I think it is worth discussing them, because I know no better advice to give a new Prince than the example of what he did. If his measures did not save him, the fault was not his. It was due to an extraordinary and extreme stroke of bad fortune. Pope Alexander VI faced many difficulties, both immediate and future, when he tried to make his son, the Duke, powerful. First, he could see no way to make him lord of a state that was not already part of the Church's lands. He knew the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not allow that, since Faenza and Rimini were already under Venetian protection. He also saw that Italy's armed forces, especially those he might have used, were controlled by people who had reason to fear the Pope's growing power. He could not trust those forces: they all belonged to the Orsini, the Colonna, and their followers. So he had to upset that balance and throw the states of Italy into disorder before he could safely take control of part of them. This proved easy. He found the Venetians already willing, for reasons of their own, to bring the French back into Italy. He did not oppose their plan. Instead, he made it easier by dissolving King Louis's earlier marriage. The king then entered Italy with Venetian help and Alexander's consent. As soon as he reached Milan, the Pope received troops from him for his campaign in Romagna. The king's standing made that campaign possible.\n\nAfter the Duke took Romagna and defeated the Colonna, two things stood in his way as he tried to keep it and conquer more: his own troops, who seemed unreliable, and the wishes of France. He feared that the Orsini troops he had employed might fail him. They might not only stop him from taking more territory but also take away what he had already won. He feared the king might do the same. He saw a sign of the Orsini's intentions when he attacked Bologna after capturing Faenza: they showed little enthusiasm for the attack. He learned what the king had in mind when, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, he attacked Tuscany. The king made him abandon that campaign. The Duke therefore decided to stop relying on other people's fortune and arms. First he weakened the Orsini and Colonna factions in Rome. He won over all their supporters who were gentlemen by making them members of his own household. He gave them large payments and, according to their rank, honored them with military commands and governorships. In a few months, their loyalty to their factions died away and shifted entirely to the Duke.\n\nAfter scattering the Colonna family, he waited for a chance to destroy the Orsini. The chance came at just the right time, and he used it even better. The Orsini realized too late that the growing power of the Duke and the Church meant their ruin, and they held a meeting at Magione, near Perugia. That meeting led to the revolt of Urbino, unrest in Romagna, and countless dangers for the Duke. He overcame them all with French help. Once he had regained his standing, he did not want to depend on France or any other outside force, because he did not want to put those forces to the test. So he turned to deception. He hid his intentions so well that the Orsini made peace with him through Signor Paolo. The Duke did everything he could to reassure Paolo, giving him clothes, money, and horses. Their trustfulness finally brought them into his hands at Senigallia. After killing these leaders and winning their supporters over to his side, the Duke had laid very good foundations for his power. He held all of Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino, and he had won over their people, who had begun to enjoy better conditions. This part of his conduct deserves attention and imitation, so I do not want to pass it over.\n\nWhen the Duke took Romagna, he found that it had been ruled by weak lords. They had robbed their subjects instead of correcting them and had given them reasons to quarrel rather than unite. As a result, the province was full of robberies, feuds, and every other kind of lawlessness. To make it peaceful and obedient to the ruler's authority, he decided it needed good government. He put Messer Ramiro d'Orco in charge, a cruel and decisive man, and gave him complete power. In a short time Ramiro restored peace and unity to the province and earned a great reputation for doing it. The Duke then decided that such sweeping power was no longer suitable. He feared it would become hated, so he set up a civil court in the center of the province. It had an excellent presiding judge, and each city had its own advocate there. The Duke knew that the past severity had produced some hatred toward him. He wanted to clear the people's minds of it and win them completely. So he decided to show that any cruelty had come not from him but from his minister's harsh nature. Seizing an opportunity, he had Ramiro placed in two pieces in the square at Cesena one morning, with a block of wood and a bloody knife beside him. The brutality of the sight left the people both satisfied and stunned. But let us return to where we left off.\n\nThe Duke was now quite powerful and partly safe from immediate dangers. He had armed himself as he wished and had largely destroyed the nearby forces that could harm him. But if he wanted to gain more territory, he still had to reckon with France. He knew the king had belatedly realized his mistake and would not put up with further expansion. So the Duke began looking for new allies and pulling away from France as the French marched toward the Kingdom of Naples to fight the Spaniards besieging Gaeta. His aim was to protect himself against the French. He would soon have succeeded if Alexander had lived. These were the Duke's measures for dealing with immediate matters. He also had to think about the future. First, he had to fear that the next pope might be hostile and might try to take away what Alexander had given him. He planned four ways to prevent that. First, he would wipe out the families of all the lords he had dispossessed, leaving the pope no such opportunity to act against him. Second, he would win over all the gentlemen of Rome so he could use them, as I have said, to keep the pope in check. Third, he would bring as much of the College of Cardinals as possible onto his side. Fourth, he would gain enough territory before the Pope died to withstand an initial attack on his own.\n\nBy the time Alexander died, the Duke had accomplished three of these four things, and he had nearly accomplished the fourth. He killed as many of the dispossessed lords as he could reach; very few escaped. He had won over the Roman gentlemen and had a large share of support in the College. As for gaining new territory, he planned to become lord of Tuscany. He already held Perugia and Piombino and had taken Pisa under his protection. He was ready to move into Pisa without worrying about France. He no longer needed to worry, because the Spaniards had already driven the French from the Kingdom of Naples. Both sides now needed to buy his friendship. After Pisa, Lucca and Siena would quickly yield, partly from hostility toward the Florentines and partly from fear. The Florentines would have had no way to stop him. If this plan had succeeded, as it would have in the very year Alexander died, the Duke would have gained enough strength and standing to stand on his own. He would no longer have depended on anyone else's fortune or force, but only on his own power and ability. Yet Alexander died only five years after the Duke first drew his sword. He left the Duke with only his position in Rome firmly secured; everything else was uncertain. The Duke was between two very powerful enemy armies, and he was deathly ill. Still, he had such fierce spirit and ability, knew so well how to win people over or cast them off, and had laid such strong foundations in so short a time, that he could have faced any difficulty if those armies had not been upon him or if he had been healthy. The soundness of his foundations was clear: Romagna waited for him for more than a month. In Rome, though half dead, he remained safe. And although the Baglioni, Vitelli, and Orsini came to Rome, they gained no support against him. Even if he could not make his preferred candidate pope, he could at least prevent someone he opposed from becoming pope. If he had been healthy when Alexander died, everything would have been easy for him. He told me, in the days when Julius II was made pope, that he had considered everything that might happen on his father's death and found a remedy for it all. The one thing he had never imagined was that he himself would be dying at the same time. Taking all the Duke's actions together, I cannot find fault with him. Instead, as I have done, I think he should be held up as an example to everyone who rises to power through fortune and other people's arms. His ambitions were great, and he could not have acted otherwise. Only Alexander's short remaining life and the Duke's own illness stood in the way of his plans.\n\nAnyone who thinks it necessary, in a new principality, to secure himself against enemies, win friends, prevail by force or deception, make the people love and fear him, make soldiers follow and respect him, destroy those who can or are likely to harm him, and replace old arrangements with new ones should look to this Duke. The same goes for anyone who wants to be strict yet welcome, generous in spirit and in gifts, to get rid of disloyal troops and create a new army, and to keep the friendship of kings and Princes so that they gladly do him favors or hesitate before attacking him. No one will find more recent examples than this man's actions. He can be blamed only for the choice of Julius II as pope. It was a bad choice. As I said, though the Duke could not make his own choice pope, he could prevent a candidate he opposed from becoming pope. He should never have agreed to the election of any cardinal he had offended, or one who would fear him if made pope. People cause harm out of either fear or hatred. Among the cardinals he had offended were San Pietro in Vincoli, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio. All the others would have had reason to fear him if elected, except the cardinal of Rouen and the Spanish cardinals. The Spaniards were tied to him by their connections and obligations; Rouen had power because the Kingdom of France stood behind him. So the Duke should above all have made a Spaniard pope. If he could not do that, he should have agreed to Rouen, not San Pietro in Vincoli. Anyone who believes that new favors make powerful people forget old injuries is mistaken. The Duke made an error in this election, and it caused his final ruin.\n\n### Chapter VIII\n\nOn Those Who Have Gained a Principality Through Crime\n\nThere are two other ways for a private person to become a Prince. Neither can be explained entirely by fortune or ability, so I should not leave them out. One could be discussed at greater length in a work about republics. The first way is to rise to a principality through wicked and criminal acts. The second is for a private citizen to become Prince of his own country with the support of his fellow citizens. I will explain the first with two examples, one ancient and one modern. I will not otherwise discuss the merits of this way of gaining power. These examples should be enough for anyone who finds himself forced to imitate them. Agathocles of Sicily became king of Syracuse, though he came not just from private life but from the lowest and humblest position. He was born the son of a potter and led a criminal life at every stage of his rise. Even so, his crimes went together with such strength of mind and body that, when he joined the army, he rose through its ranks to become praetor of Syracuse. Once he held that office, he decided to become Prince. He meant to take by force, and without owing anyone for it, the power that had been granted to him by agreement. He made his plan known to Hamilcar the Carthaginian, who was campaigning with his armies in Sicily. Then one morning he called together the people and senate of Syracuse, as though they were to discuss public business. At a prearranged signal, he had his soldiers kill all the senators and the richest citizens. With them dead, he seized and held the principality of the city without any civil opposition. The Carthaginians defeated him twice and finally besieged him. Yet he not only defended his city: he left part of his force to guard it and attacked Africa with the rest. Soon he had freed Syracuse from the siege and reduced the Carthaginians to desperate straits. They had to make peace with him, accepting possession of Africa and leaving Sicily to Agathocles.\n\nAnyone who considers this man's actions and abilities will find little or nothing to put down to fortune. As I said, he did not reach the principality through anyone's favor. He won his way up through military ranks at the cost of a thousand hardships and dangers, then kept his power through bold and dangerous decisions. But killing one's fellow citizens, betraying friends, and having no loyalty, pity, or religion cannot be called virtue. Such methods can win power, but not glory. If we look at Agathocles' skill in facing and escaping danger, and at his courage in enduring and overcoming setbacks, there is no reason to rank him below the finest commanders. Yet his savage cruelty, his inhumanity, and his countless crimes prevent us from praising him as one of the greatest men. So what he achieved cannot be credited either to fortune or to virtue; he gained it without either. In our own times, during the reign of Pope Alexander, Oliverotto da Fermo had been orphaned as a young child some years earlier. His maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, brought him up. While Oliverotto was still young, Giovanni sent him to serve as a soldier under Paolo Vitelli, so that military training might help him rise to a high rank. After Paolo died, Oliverotto served under his brother Vitellozzo. He was clever and strong in body and spirit, and soon became one of the leading men in the army. But he felt it was beneath him to serve someone else. With the help of certain citizens of Fermo, who preferred their country's subjection to its freedom, and with the support of the Vitelli family, he planned to seize Fermo. He wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, after many years away from home, he wanted to visit his uncle and his city and look into his inheritance. He said that all his efforts had been aimed at winning honor. To show his fellow citizens that he had not wasted his time, he wanted to arrive in style, accompanied by a hundred horsemen who were his friends and servants. He asked Giovanni to arrange for the people of Fermo to give him an honorable welcome. This, he said, would honor not only Oliverotto but Giovanni himself, since Giovanni had raised him.\n\nGiovanni did everything an uncle should for his nephew. He arranged a fine welcome from the people of Fermo and lodged Oliverotto in his own house. After a few days, Oliverotto had made all the preparations needed for the crime he planned. He held a lavish banquet and invited Giovanni Fogliani and all the leading men of Fermo. When the meal and the other entertainments customary at such feasts were over, Oliverotto deliberately brought up weighty subjects. He spoke about the power of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare, and about their campaigns. As Giovanni and the others answered him, Oliverotto suddenly rose. He said these matters should be discussed in a more private place and went into a room, followed by Giovanni and all the other citizens. They had barely sat down when soldiers came out of hiding in the room and killed Giovanni and all the others. After the murders, Oliverotto mounted his horse, rode through the town, and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace. Fear forced the officials to obey him and establish a government with Oliverotto as Prince. He killed everyone whose discontent might make them a threat. Then he strengthened his position with new civilian and military arrangements. In the year he held the principality, he became not only secure in Fermo but feared by all his neighbors. Like Agathocles, he would have been hard to overthrow if he had not let Cesare Borgia deceive him. As I said earlier, Cesare captured the Orsini and Vitelli at Senigallia. He captured Oliverotto there as well. A year after killing his uncle, Oliverotto was strangled alongside Vitellozzo, the man who had taught him both his military skills and his crimes.\n\nSomeone may wonder how Agathocles and others like him could commit countless acts of betrayal and cruelty yet live safely for many years in their own country, defend themselves against foreign enemies, and never face a conspiracy from their own citizens. Many others have been unable to keep their states through cruelty even in peacetime, let alone in the uncertain times of war. I believe the difference lies in whether cruelty is used well or badly. Cruelty can be called well used, if it is right to say anything good of evil, when it is committed once, out of the need to make one's position secure. It must not be continued afterward, and the ruler must turn to doing as much good as possible for his subjects. Cruelty is badly used when it starts small but grows over time instead of coming to an end. Those who follow the first course may find a way, before God and men, to maintain their rule, as Agathocles did. Those who follow the second cannot maintain it. A man who takes over a state should therefore think through every cruel act he needs to commit and do them all at once. Then he will not have to return to them every day. By not repeating them, he can make people feel safe and win them over with benefits. If fear or bad advice leads him to do otherwise, he must always keep a knife in his hand. He can never count on his subjects, since each fresh injury keeps them from trusting him. Injuries should be done all at once so that they are felt less sharply and cause less resentment. Benefits should be given little by little so that people appreciate them more. Above all, a Prince should live with his subjects in such a way that no event, good or bad, forces him to change his conduct. When hard times bring a need for harsh measures, it is too late to use them. Any good he does then is useless to him, because people think he was forced to do it and feel no gratitude.\n\n### Chapter IX\n\nOn the Civil Principality\n\nNow let us turn to the other way: a citizen becomes Prince of his own country with the support of his fellow citizens, not through crime or other unbearable violence. This can be called a civil principality. It takes neither pure ability nor pure fortune to gain it, but rather a kind of cleverness helped by luck. A man rises to this principality with the support either of the people or of the powerful. Every city has these two groups with different aims. The people do not want to be ruled or oppressed by the powerful, while the powerful want to rule and oppress the people. These opposing desires produce one of three results in a city: a principality, freedom, or lawlessness. A principality comes from either the people or the powerful, depending on which group has the opportunity. When the powerful see that they cannot withstand the people, they begin to rally around one of their own and make him Prince. Under his protection they can then satisfy their desire to dominate. The people also rally around one person and make him Prince when they see that they cannot withstand the powerful. They do so to gain his protection. A man who becomes Prince with the help of the powerful has a harder time holding on to power than one who becomes Prince with the people's help. He finds himself surrounded by many people who think they are his equals, so he cannot command or deal with them as he wishes. The man who reaches power with popular support stands alone. Few or none of those around him are unwilling to obey him. What is more, a Prince cannot satisfy the powerful honestly and without harming others. He can satisfy the people, since their aim is more reasonable: the powerful want to oppress others, and the people simply want to avoid oppression. There is another point. A Prince can never make himself safe from a hostile people, because there are too many of them. He can make himself safe from hostile powerful men, because there are few of them.\n\nThe worst a Prince can expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned. Hostile powerful men may not only abandon him but turn against him. They are more perceptive and cunning, so they act early to protect themselves and seek positions with whoever they expect to win. A Prince must always live with the same people, but he need not keep the same powerful men. He can raise them up or bring them down every day, and give or take away their standing whenever he likes. To make this clearer, there are two main kinds of powerful men. Some bind their future entirely to yours; others do not. Those who commit themselves to you and are not greedy deserve honor and affection. Of those who do not commit themselves, some hold back because they lack courage or strength of character. You should make use of them, especially the ones who give good advice. They will bring you credit in good times, and you need not fear them in bad times. But if they hold back deliberately out of ambition, they are thinking more of themselves than of you. A Prince should be on guard against them and treat them like open enemies. When things go wrong, they will always help bring him down. A man who becomes Prince with the people's support must therefore keep their friendship. That will be easy, since all they ask is not to be oppressed. But a man who becomes Prince through the support of the powerful and against the people's wishes must make winning over the people his first concern. He can do this easily if he takes them under his protection. When people receive good treatment from someone they expected to treat them badly, they feel all the more indebted to him. The people then become more loyal to him than they would have been if they had helped him gain power in the first place. A Prince can win them over in many ways. These depend on the circumstances, so no fixed rule can be given, and I will leave them aside.\n\nI will say only this: a Prince must have the people on his side. Otherwise, he has no way out when things go badly. Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, stood up to a siege by all of Greece and a highly successful Roman army. He defended his country and his state against them. When danger came, all he had to do was secure himself against a few men. That would not have been enough if the people had been his enemies. Nor should anyone use the worn-out saying that a man who builds on the people builds on mud to argue against me. The saying is true when a private citizen relies on the people and imagines they will rescue him if enemies or officials come after him. He may often find himself mistaken, as the Gracchi did in Rome and Messer Giorgio Scali did in Florence. But suppose it is a Prince who relies on the people. He can issue orders, he has courage, he does not panic when things go wrong, and he has made the other necessary preparations. If his spirit and his arrangements keep the whole population confident, he will not be let down by the people. He will find that his foundations are sound. Such principalities are often in danger when they are about to move from a civilian form of government to absolute rule. Their Princes govern either directly or through magistrates. In the latter case their position is weaker and more dangerous, because they depend entirely on the will of the citizens appointed as magistrates. Especially in a crisis, those officials can easily take away a Prince's power by opposing him or simply refusing to obey him. In a moment of danger the Prince has no time to take absolute authority. Citizens and subjects are used to taking orders from the magistrates, and they will not obey his own orders during a crisis. In uncertain times he will always find few people he can trust. A Prince like this cannot rely on what he sees in peaceful times, when the citizens need the state. Then everyone hurries to his side and makes promises. Everyone offers to die for him when death is far away. But when the state needs its citizens in hard times, few are there. This is a particularly dangerous lesson to learn because a Prince gets only one chance to learn it. A wise Prince must therefore find a way to make his citizens need his government at all times and in every kind of situation. Then they will always remain loyal to him.\n\n### Chapter X\n\nHow to Measure the Strength of Every Principality\n\nThere is another question to consider when judging these principalities. Does a Prince have enough power to stand on his own when necessary, or does he always need someone else to defend him? To make this clear, I believe that a Prince can stand on his own if he has enough men or money to put together a proper army and fight a battle against anyone who attacks him. Those who cannot face an enemy in the field and must retreat behind their walls to defend them will always need others. I have discussed the first case and will return to it where necessary. As for the second, all I can say is that these Princes should arm and fortify their own cities and pay no attention to the surrounding countryside. Anyone who fortifies his city well and deals with his subjects as I have said above and will say below will always make an attacker think twice. People dislike undertakings that look difficult, and attacking a man with a strong city who is not hated by his people does not look easy.\n\nThe cities of Germany have a great deal of freedom. They hold little surrounding territory and obey the emperor only when they want to. They fear neither him nor any other powerful neighbor. Their defenses are so strong that everyone expects taking them to be a long and difficult job. Every city has suitable ditches and walls, enough artillery, and a year's supply of food, drink, and fuel in public storehouses. Beyond this, they can keep the common people fed without draining public funds: they keep enough resources in common to give them a year's work in the trades that are the city's mainstay and that provide their living. They also hold military training in high regard and have many rules to keep it going. So a Prince who has a strong city and does not make himself hated cannot be attacked successfully. If anyone does attack, he will leave in disgrace. Conditions in the world change so much that an army can hardly sit idle for a whole year while laying siege to a city. Someone might reply that the people will see their property outside the walls burning and lose patience. A long siege and concern for their own interests will make them forget their Prince. My answer is that a strong and courageous Prince will always overcome these difficulties. At one moment he can give his subjects hope that their suffering will not last long; at another he can make them fear the enemy's cruelty. He can also discreetly protect himself against anyone he thinks is becoming too bold.\n\nBesides, the enemy will probably burn and ruin the countryside when he first arrives, while the people are still full of energy and eager to defend themselves. The Prince therefore has less reason to worry. After a few days their initial excitement will cool, but the damage will already have been done, the losses suffered, and nothing can put things right. They will then draw closer to their Prince. They will feel he owes them something because their houses have been burned and their property ruined in his defense. Human beings feel a bond through the good they do for others as well as through the good they receive. Taking all this into account, a sensible Prince should have little trouble keeping his citizens determined both at the beginning of a siege and afterward, provided they have food and the means to defend themselves.\n\n### Chapter XI\n\nChurch Principalities\n\nThe only kind of principality left to discuss is the church principality. All the difficulties come before a ruler takes possession. Such principalities are gained through ability or fortune, but can be kept without either. They are supported by long-established religious institutions. These are so powerful that they keep their rulers in power no matter how those rulers act or live. These rulers alone have states that they do not defend, and subjects that they do not govern. Yet no one takes their states away because they are undefended. Their subjects do not mind being left ungoverned, and neither think of leaving nor can leave them. So these are the only secure and fortunate principalities. But they are governed by causes beyond human understanding. I will say no more about those causes. Since God raises up and preserves these principalities, it would be presumptuous and reckless for a person to discuss them. Still, someone might ask how the Church has grown so powerful in worldly affairs. Before Pope Alexander, the Italian powers paid little attention to its worldly power. So did every baron and lord, however minor. Now a king of France trembles before it. The Church has been able to drive him out of Italy and to ruin the Venetians. Though everyone knows this, I think it is worth recalling some of it.\n\nBefore Charles, king of France, entered Italy, the country was under the rule of the pope, the Venetians, the king of Naples, the duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These powers had two main concerns: to keep a foreign army out of Italy, and to prevent any one of them from taking more territory. The two they watched most closely were the pope and the Venetians. To hold back the Venetians, all the others had to unite, as they did in the defense of Ferrara. To keep the pope weak, they made use of the barons of Rome. Those barons were divided into two factions, the Orsini and the Colonna. There was always some cause for trouble between them. With arms in hand right under the pope's nose, they kept the papacy weak and ailing. A forceful pope sometimes came to power, as Sixtus did. But neither fortune nor skill could ever free him from these problems. The short length of a pope's reign was the reason. A pope lived ten years on average, barely enough time to bring down one of the factions. Suppose one pope had almost wiped out the Colonna. The next might rise to power as an enemy of the Orsini and restore the Colonna. He would not have time to wipe out the Orsini either. That is why the pope's worldly forces had little standing in Italy. Then Pope Alexander VI came to power. More than any pope before him, he showed how much a pope could achieve with money and armed force. Using Duke Valentino and the opportunity created by the French invasion, he did all the things I described earlier in discussing the duke's actions. His aim was to make the duke powerful, not the Church. Even so, everything he did increased the Church's power. After Alexander died and the duke was removed, the Church inherited the results of his efforts.\n\nThen Pope Julius came to power. He found the Church strong and in control of all Romagna. The barons of Rome had been crushed, and Alexander's blows had destroyed their factions. Julius also found a way open to raise money on a scale no pope before Alexander had used. Julius not only continued these policies but took them further. He planned to win Bologna, destroy the Venetians, and drive the French out of Italy. He succeeded in all these efforts. He deserves even more credit because he did everything to strengthen the Church, not any private person. He kept the Orsini and Colonna factions in the condition in which he found them. Some leaders among them could have caused trouble, but two things kept them in check. One was the Church's power, which frightened them. The other was their lack of cardinals, who are the source of trouble between the factions. These factions will never stay quiet if they have cardinals. Cardinals build up their factions inside and outside Rome, and the barons are forced to defend those factions. So the ambitions of church leaders produce disputes and unrest among the barons. His Holiness Pope Leo has therefore inherited a very powerful papacy. We may hope that, if his predecessors made it great through arms, he will make it greater still and worthy of respect through his goodness and his many other virtues.\n\n### Chapter XII\n\nKinds of Armed Forces and Mercenary Soldiers\n\nI have now looked closely at all the kinds of principality that I set out to discuss at the start. I have considered some of the reasons they prosper or fail, and shown how many rulers have tried to gain and hold them. What remains is to discuss, in general, the ways each of these principalities can attack and defend itself. I have already said that a Prince must have sound foundations. Otherwise he is bound to fall. The chief foundations of every state, whether new, old, or partly new, are good laws and good arms. There cannot be good laws where there are no good arms, and where there are good arms there must be good laws. So I will leave the laws aside and discuss the arms. The forces a Prince uses to defend his state are either his own, mercenaries, auxiliaries, or a mixture. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous. If a ruler bases his state on mercenary forces, he will never be stable or safe. They lack unity, seek their own advancement, and have no discipline or loyalty. They are brave among friends and cowardly before enemies. They do not fear God or keep faith with people. Your ruin is delayed only until an attack is delayed. In peacetime they rob you; in war your enemies do.\n\nThe reason is that a small wage is the only thing that makes them willing to serve in the field. It is not enough to make them willing to die for you. They are happy to be your soldiers as long as you are not at war. But as soon as war comes, they run away or leave. It should take little effort to convince anyone of this. Italy's ruin today has no other cause than its long reliance on mercenary troops. Those troops once made some gains for a few rulers and looked brave when facing each other. But when a foreigner arrived, they showed what they really were. That is why Charles, king of France, was able to take Italy with a piece of chalk. People who said that our sins were to blame spoke the truth. But the sins were not the ones they imagined. They were the ones I have described. Since these were the sins of princes, those princes have also paid the price. I want to show more clearly how harmful these forces are.\n\nMercenary commanders are either capable men or they are not. If they are capable, you cannot trust them. They always seek power for themselves, either by crushing you, their employer, or by crushing others against your wishes. If a commander lacks ability, he will usually ruin you. Someone may answer that any person who commands troops, mercenary or not, will do the same thing. I would reply that armed forces must be commanded either by a Prince or by a republic. A Prince should go himself and act as commander. A republic should send its own citizens. If the citizen it sends proves incompetent, it should replace him. If he proves capable, it should use laws to prevent him from going too far. Experience shows that princes who command their own forces and republics with their own armed citizens make great gains. Mercenary forces only do harm. A republic armed with its own troops is much less likely to fall under the rule of one of its citizens than a republic armed with foreign troops. Rome and Sparta remained armed and free for many centuries. The Swiss are very well armed and very free. For an old example of mercenary forces, consider the Carthaginians. After their first war with the Romans ended, their mercenary soldiers nearly overpowered them, even though the Carthaginians had put their own citizens in command. After Epaminondas died, the Thebans appointed Philip of Macedon to command their army. After winning, he took away their freedom. When Duke Filippo died, the Milanese hired Francesco Sforza to fight the Venetians. Once he had beaten the enemy at Caravaggio, he joined them to crush the Milanese, who had employed him. Sforza's father was employed by Queen Joanna of Naples. He suddenly left her without an army. To avoid losing her kingdom, she had to place herself in the hands of the king of Aragon. It may be said that the Venetians and Florentines have expanded their territories with mercenary forces in the past, and that their commanders defended them instead of making themselves princes. My answer is that the Florentines were lucky in this respect. Among the able commanders they had reason to fear, some did not win, some faced rivals, and others pursued their ambitions elsewhere. Giovanni Acuto did not win. Since he did not win, no one could find out whether he was loyal. But everyone will admit that if he had won, the Florentines would have been at his mercy. Sforza always had the followers of Braccio against him; each side kept an eye on the other. Francesco turned his ambition toward Lombardy, and Braccio toward the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But let us turn to something that happened recently.\n\nThe Florentines made Paolo Vitelli their commander. He was an extremely shrewd man who had risen from a private position to great renown. If he had captured Pisa, no one can deny that the Florentines would have had to stick with him. Had he gone over to their enemies as a soldier, they would have had no way to stop him. If they kept him, they would have had to obey him. Look at the Venetians' gains. They acted safely and gloriously as long as they fought with their own troops. This was before they began campaigning on land. Their nobles and armed common people fought with skill. But when they started fighting on land, they gave up this strength and adopted the customs of the rest of Italy. At the start of their expansion on land, they had little territory and a strong reputation, so they had little to fear from their commanders. But when they expanded their territory under Carmignuola, they saw their mistake. They recognized his great ability after defeating the duke of Milan under his command. On the other hand, they saw that he was reluctant to fight, and decided that they could not win any more with him. They did not want to dismiss him, and could not do so without losing what they had gained. To protect themselves, therefore, they felt compelled to kill him.\n\nTheir later commanders included Bartolommeo da Bergamo, Ruberto da San Severino, the count of Pitigliano, and others like them. With such men, they had to fear losses rather than hope for gains. That is what happened later at Vailà. In one day they lost what they had gained with so much effort over eight hundred years. These forces bring only slow, late, and feeble gains, but sudden and astonishing losses. Since these examples have led me to Italy, which has long been governed by mercenary forces, I want to go further back into their history. Once we see where these forces came from and how they developed, we can better correct the problem. You should understand that in more recent times, when the Empire began to be driven out of Italy and the pope gained more worldly influence there, Italy split into many states. Many large cities took up arms against their nobles. Those nobles had previously kept them under control with the emperor's support, while the Church supported the cities to increase its own worldly standing. In many other cities, citizens became princes. So Italy came largely into the hands of the Church and a few republics. Priests and these other citizens were not used to warfare, and they began hiring foreigners. The first to give this kind of military service a reputation was Alberigo da Como, a man of Romagna. Braccio and Sforza were among those trained in his methods, and in their time they held Italy's fate in their hands.\n\nAfter them came all the other commanders who have led Italy's armies down to our day. The final result of their skill is that Charles has overrun Italy, Louis has plundered it, Ferdinand has assaulted it, and the Swiss have humiliated it. Their method was, first, to lower the standing of infantry so that their own standing would rise. They did this because they had no states of their own and depended on their trade. A small number of foot soldiers brought them no prestige, while they could not afford to support a large number. So they turned to cavalry, which brought them pay and honor in manageable numbers. It reached the point where an army of twenty thousand soldiers had fewer than two thousand foot soldiers. They also did everything they could to spare themselves and their troops hard work and danger. In battle they did not kill one another, but took one another prisoner without demanding ransom. They did not attack towns at night, and townspeople did not attack their camps at night. They built neither fences nor ditches around their camps, and did not campaign in winter. Their military rules allowed all this. They invented those rules, as I have said, to escape hard work and danger. In this way they have brought Italy into slavery and disgrace.\n\n### Chapter XIII\n\nOn Auxiliary, Mixed, and Native Forces\n\nAuxiliary troops are the other useless kind of troops. You use them when you call on a powerful ruler to come and help defend you with his own forces. Pope Julius did this recently. After his hired troops performed badly in the campaign against Ferrara, he turned to auxiliaries. He arranged for Ferdinand, King of Spain, to help him with his men and armies. Such troops may be good and useful in themselves, but they always harm the person who calls them in. If they lose, you are defeated. If they win, you become their prisoner. Ancient histories are full of examples, but I will stay with this recent one of Pope Julius II. His decision could hardly have been less careful: to get Ferrara, he put himself entirely in a foreign ruler's hands. His good fortune, however, brought about a third outcome, so he did not suffer the result of his bad choice. His auxiliaries were defeated at Ravenna, but the Swiss then appeared and drove off the victors, against everyone's expectations, including his own. He was not taken prisoner by his enemies, because they were driven away, or by his auxiliaries, because the victory came from forces other than theirs.\n\nThe Florentines had no forces of their own at all. They brought ten thousand French troops to Pisa to take it by force. This decision put them in greater danger than at any other time in their troubles. The emperor of Constantinople brought ten thousand Turks into Greece to resist his neighbors. When the war ended, the Turks refused to leave. That was the beginning of Greece's enslavement to the unbelievers. So anyone who wants to make victory impossible should use such forces. They are far more dangerous than hired troops. With auxiliaries, your ruin is already certain: they are united and all obey someone else. Hired troops, even after winning, need more time and a better opportunity to turn against you. They are not one united body; you recruited and paid them yourself. A third party whom you put in command cannot immediately gain enough power over them to harm you. In short, the chief danger of hired troops is their lack of drive, while the chief danger of auxiliaries is their ability. A wise Prince has therefore always avoided both and relied on his own troops. He would rather lose with his own troops than win with someone else's, since he does not regard a victory gained by another's forces as a real victory. I will not hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and what he did.\n\nThe Duke entered Romagna with auxiliary forces, bringing in an entire French army. With them he took Imola and Forlì. But when those troops no longer seemed safe to him, he turned to hired troops, which he judged less dangerous, and hired the Orsini and Vitelli. Then he found them unreliable, disloyal, and dangerous in action. He destroyed them and turned to troops of his own. The difference between these forces is easy to see if we compare the Duke's standing when he had the Orsini and Vitelli with his standing when he depended on his own soldiers and himself. His standing kept rising, but he was not highly regarded until everyone saw that he had full control of his own forces. I meant to stick to recent Italian examples, but I do not want to leave out Hiero of Syracuse, whom I mentioned earlier. As I said, the Syracusans made him commander of their armies. He quickly realized that their hired forces were no use, because their captains were like the Italian captains of our own day. He thought he could neither keep them nor dismiss them, so he had them all cut to pieces. After that he fought with his own troops, not someone else's. I also want to recall a story from the Old Testament that makes the same point.\n\nWhen David offered to fight Goliath, the Philistine challenger, Saul tried to encourage him by giving him his own armor. But once David had put it on, he refused it. He said he could not fight well in it, and chose to face the enemy with his sling and knife instead. In short, someone else's arms either fall off you, weigh you down, or bind you too tightly. Charles VII, father of King Louis XI, freed France from the English through his good fortune and ability. He recognized the need for forces of his own and established units of cavalry and infantry in his kingdom. His son King Louis then disbanded the infantry and began hiring Swiss soldiers. This mistake was repeated by later rulers. As we can now see, it is the cause of the kingdom's dangers. By building up the Swiss reputation, Louis weakened all his own forces. He eliminated the infantry altogether and made his cavalry dependent on foreign troops. They became so used to fighting alongside the Swiss that they believed they could not win without them.\n\nThat is why the French cannot stand up to the Swiss, and without the Swiss they do not prove themselves against anyone else. French armies have thus been mixed: part hired troops and part their own. Taken together, these forces are much better than hired troops alone or auxiliaries alone, but far worse than forces entirely their own. This example is enough: the kingdom of France would be unbeatable if Charles's military system had been maintained or expanded. But people lack foresight. They start something that tastes good at first and fail to notice the poison underneath, as I said earlier about lingering fevers. So a ruler who recognizes the troubles of his principality only when they arise is not truly wise; few people have the wisdom to recognize them sooner. If we look at the first cause of the Roman Empire's decline, we will find that it was simply the decision to hire the Goths. From then on, the empire's forces began to weaken, and all the strength it lost went to the Goths. I conclude, then, that no principality is safe without its own troops. Instead it depends entirely on fortune, having no strength of its own to defend it when trouble comes. Wise people have always held that nothing is as weak or unstable as a reputation for power that is not grounded in one's own forces. Your own troops are those made up of your subjects, your citizens, or men you have trained and brought up. All others are hired troops or auxiliaries. It will be easy to work out how to organize your own forces if you consider the systems I have mentioned above and look at how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many republics and Princes armed and organized their forces. I refer you entirely to those examples.\n\n### Chapter XIV\n\nWhat a Prince Should Do About Military Affairs\n\nA Prince, then, should have no goal or thought, and practice no profession, other than war and its organization and training. This is the only profession that belongs to a ruler. It has such power that it not only keeps people who were born Princes on their thrones, but often raises private citizens to that rank. By contrast, when Princes have cared more about comfort and luxury than arms, they have lost their states. The first thing that makes you lose a state is neglecting the art of war. The thing that lets you gain one is mastering that art. Francesco Sforza was a private citizen who became Duke of Milan because he was armed. His sons avoided the work and hardship of military life and went from being dukes to being private citizens. Being unarmed brings many troubles. One is that people look down on you. This is one of the forms of disgrace a Prince must avoid, as I will explain below. There is no comparison between an armed man and an unarmed one. It is unreasonable to expect the armed man to obey the unarmed man willingly, or the unarmed man to feel safe among armed servants. One will feel contempt, and the other suspicion, so they cannot work well together. A Prince who knows nothing about military affairs therefore suffers more than the other troubles I have mentioned: his soldiers cannot respect him, and he cannot trust them.\n\nSo he must never stop thinking about the practice of war. He should train for it more in peacetime than in wartime, in two ways: through action and through study. In practice, besides keeping his men well organized and trained, he should go hunting regularly. Hunting gets his body used to hardship and helps him learn the lay of the land: how mountains rise, how valleys open, how plains lie, and what rivers and marshes are like. He should pay close attention to all this. Such knowledge helps in two ways. First, he gets to know his own country and can better understand how to defend it. Second, once he has learned the terrain of his own country, he can more easily understand a new area that he needs to examine. The hills, valleys, plains, rivers, and marshes of Tuscany, for example, have things in common with those of other regions. Knowing the terrain of one region thus helps him understand that of others. A Prince without this skill lacks the first thing a commander needs. It teaches him how to find the enemy, choose campsites, lead armies, arrange battles, and lay siege to towns to his advantage.\n\nPhilopoemen, leader of the Achaeans, received many praises from writers. One was that even in peacetime he thought constantly about ways of making war. When he was out in the countryside with friends, he would often stop and ask them: \"If the enemy were on that hill and our army were here, which side would have the advantage? How could we safely advance to meet them while keeping our formation? If we wanted to retreat, how should we do it? If they retreated, how should we pursue them?\" As they walked, he put to his friends every situation that could arise for an army. He listened to their opinions, gave his own, and supported it with reasons. This constant thinking meant that when he led armies, nothing could happen for which he did not have an answer. As for study, a Prince should read histories and examine what outstanding people did. He should see how they acted in wars and study the reasons for their victories and defeats, so he can avoid the latter and copy the former. Above all, he should do what some great people before him did: choose an earlier figure who was praised and admired, and keep that person's deeds and actions constantly in mind as a model. Alexander the Great is said to have followed Achilles, Caesar to have followed Alexander, and Scipio to have followed Cyrus. Anyone who reads Xenophon's account of Cyrus's life can then see in Scipio's life how much honor he gained from following Cyrus. Scipio matched the chastity, friendliness, humanity, and generosity that Xenophon describes in Cyrus. A wise Prince should follow these methods. He should never be idle in times of peace, but should work hard to make them useful. Then, when fortune changes, he will be ready to withstand its blows.\n\n### Chapter XV\n\nThe Qualities for Which People, Especially Princes, Are Praised or Blamed\n\nWe now need to look at how a Prince should act toward his subjects and his friends, and how he should govern them. Many people have written about this, so I may seem presumptuous for writing about it too, especially since my approach differs from theirs. But I want to write something useful for people who understand it. It seems better to follow the practical truth of things than to imagine how they ought to be. Many writers have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist. There is such a gap between how people live and how they ought to live that anyone who ignores what people actually do in favor of what they should do is more likely to destroy himself than to protect himself. A man who insists on being good in every respect is bound to be ruined among so many people who are not good. So a Prince who wants to keep his position must learn how not to be good, and use that knowledge, or not use it, as the need arises.\n\nLet us leave aside imagined ideas about Princes and discuss what really happens. When people talk about anyone, and especially Princes, whose high position makes them more noticeable, they assign them qualities that bring praise or blame. One man is thought generous, another stingy. I use the Tuscan word for stingy, since in our language a greedy man can also mean someone eager to gain by theft, while a stingy man holds back too much from spending what is his own. One man is said to give things away, another to seize them. One is cruel, another merciful. One breaks his word, another keeps it. One is soft and fainthearted, another fierce and bold. One is kind, another arrogant. One is lustful, another chaste. One is honest, another cunning. One is harsh, another easygoing. One is serious, another frivolous. One is religious, another unbelieving, and so on. Everyone would agree that it would be most praiseworthy for a Prince to have all the qualities in this list that are thought good. But human circumstances do not allow him to have them all or always act on them. He must therefore be wise enough to avoid the disgrace of vices that would cost him his state. He should avoid other vices too, if he can. If he cannot, he can let those go with fewer worries. Nor should he worry about being blamed for vices without which he could hardly save his state. If we look closely at everything, we will find that something that looks like a virtue could ruin him if he follows it, while something that looks like a vice could bring him safety and well-being.\n\n### Chapter XVI\n\nOn Generosity and Stinginess\n\nLet us start with the first qualities listed above. It would be good to be thought generous. But generosity harms you if you practice it in a way that does not get noticed. If you practice it well, as you should, people will not recognize it, and you will still be called stingy. So if a Prince wants to keep a reputation for generosity, he cannot pass up any opportunity for lavish spending. He will eventually spend all he has on such things. Then, to keep that reputation, he will have to lay extraordinary burdens on his people, collect taxes aggressively, and do whatever else he can to get money. This will make his subjects hate him. As he grows poor, everyone will think less of him. His generosity will have hurt many people and benefited only a few. The slightest setback will then affect him, and the first danger will put him at risk. If he sees this and tries to change course, he will immediately get a reputation for stinginess.\n\nA Prince cannot practice generosity in a way that earns him a reputation for it without harming himself. If he is wise, then, he should not mind being called stingy. Over time, people will think him more generous. They will see that his careful spending lets him live within his income, defend himself against attackers, and undertake campaigns without placing burdens on his people. In this way he is generous to the countless people from whom he takes nothing, and stingy toward the few to whom he gives nothing. In our own times, only rulers thought stingy have accomplished great things; the others have been ruined. Pope Julius II used his reputation for generosity to gain the papacy. After that, he stopped trying to keep it so that he could fight the King of France. He has fought many wars without imposing an extraordinary tax, because his long practice of careful spending has paid for expenses beyond the usual ones. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken or won so many campaigns if people had thought him generous. A Prince should therefore care little about being called stingy. That way he will not have to rob his subjects, can defend himself, will not become poor and despised, and will not be forced to seize other people's property. Stinginess is one of the vices that enable him to rule. Someone might say: \"Caesar rose to imperial power through generosity. Many others have risen to very high positions because they were generous or were thought generous.\" My answer is this: either you are already a Prince or you are on your way to becoming one. In the first case, generosity of this kind does harm. In the second, it is essential to be thought generous. Caesar was seeking to become ruler of Rome. But if he had lived after gaining power and had not restrained his spending, he would have destroyed the empire. Someone else might reply: \"Many Princes thought extremely generous have achieved great things with their armies.\" My answer is that a Prince spends either his own money and his subjects' money, or someone else's. In the first case he must spend sparingly. In the second he should not hold back at all. A Prince who leads an army that lives on captured goods, plunder, and ransom, and who controls other people's property, needs to be generous with it. Otherwise his soldiers would not follow him. You can give freely from what belongs neither to you nor to your subjects, as Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander did. Spending other people's property does not hurt your reputation; it improves it. Only spending your own money harms you. Nothing uses itself up as quickly as generosity: as you practice it, you lose the means to go on practicing it. You become either poor and despised or, in trying to escape poverty, greedy and hated. Above all, a Prince must avoid being looked down on and being hated. Generosity leads to both. It is wiser, then, to accept a reputation for stinginess, which brings blame but not hatred, than to seek a reputation for generosity and be forced to seize others' property, which brings both blame and hatred.\n\n### Chapter XVII\n\nOn Cruelty and Mercy, and Whether It Is Better to Be Loved or Feared\n\nMoving on to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every Prince should want to be thought merciful rather than cruel. Still, he must take care not to misuse mercy. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel. Yet his cruelty put Romagna back in order, united it, and brought it peace and loyalty. If we look closely, we will see that he was much more merciful than the people of Florence. They let Pistoia be destroyed to avoid being called cruel. So a Prince must not worry about being called cruel if it keeps his subjects united and loyal. With very few punishments, he will show more mercy than those who let disorder spread because they are too merciful. Disorder leads to killings and robberies, which usually harm a whole community. Punishments ordered by a Prince harm only particular people. And of all Princes, a new Prince has the least chance of avoiding a reputation for cruelty, because new states are full of danger. That is why Virgil has Dido excuse the harshness of her rule on the grounds that her kingdom is new, saying:\n\nHarsh circumstances and a new kingdom force me to do these things\nAnd to guard my borders far and wide.\n\nStill, a Prince should not be quick to believe reports or quick to act. He should not frighten himself. He should act with restraint, good judgment, and humanity. Too much trust must not make him careless, and too much distrust must not make him unbearable. This raises a question: is it better to be loved than feared, or feared than loved? The answer is that one would like to be both. But since it is hard to combine them, it is much safer to be feared than loved if one must do without one of the two. For people in general can be called ungrateful, changeable, dishonest, eager to escape danger, and greedy for gain. As long as you do them good, they are all yours. They offer you their blood, possessions, lives, and children, as I said earlier, when you have no immediate need of them. But when you need them, they turn against you. A Prince who has relied entirely on their promises and has made no other preparations will be ruined. Friendships bought with money rather than earned through greatness and nobility of character may be paid for, but they are not truly secured. You cannot count on them when you need them. People are less afraid to offend a man who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared. Love is held together by a sense of obligation, which people break whenever it serves their interests, because they are bad. Fear is held together by the threat of punishment, which never goes away. Still, the Prince must make himself feared without becoming hated, even if he cannot win love. It is quite possible to be feared without being hated. He can do this by leaving the property of his citizens and subjects alone, and by leaving their women alone. If he must take someone's life, he should do so only when there is proper justification and a clear cause. Above all, he must leave other people's property alone, for people forget the death of their father sooner than the loss of their inheritance.\n\nBesides, there is never a shortage of reasons for seizing property. Anyone who starts living by plunder will always find reasons to take what belongs to others. Reasons for taking a life, by contrast, are rarer and run out more quickly. But when a Prince is with his armies and commands a large number of soldiers, he must not worry at all about being called cruel. Without that reputation, he cannot keep an army united and ready for action. Among Hannibal's remarkable achievements is this: he led a huge army, made up of people from countless nations, to fight in foreign lands. Yet no dispute ever arose among his soldiers or against their commander, whether his fortunes were bad or good. This could only have come from his ruthless cruelty. Together with his many other abilities, it made his soldiers always regard him with respect and fear. Without it, his other abilities would not have been enough to produce that result. Thoughtless writers admire his achievements on the one hand and condemn their main cause on the other. We can see that his other abilities would not have been enough by looking at Scipio. He was exceptional not just in his own time but in all recorded history, yet his armies in Spain mutinied against him. The reason was his excessive mercy. He had allowed his soldiers more freedom than military discipline permitted. Fabius Maximus criticized him for this in the Senate, calling him a corrupter of the Roman army. The people of Locri were devastated by one of Scipio's officers, but Scipio did not avenge them or punish the officer's misconduct. This too came from his lenient nature. Someone in the Senate, trying to defend him, said that many men knew better how to avoid mistakes themselves than how to correct other people's mistakes. In time that trait would have damaged Scipio's fame and glory if he had continued to hold command with it. But because he served under the Senate's authority, this harmful trait was not only hidden but counted to his credit. To conclude, then, and return to being feared and loved: people love when they choose, but they fear when the Prince chooses. A wise Prince should rely on what he controls, not on what others control. He must only make sure to avoid being hated, as I have said.\n\n### Chapter XVIII\n\nHow Princes Should Keep Their Word\n\nEveryone understands how praiseworthy it is for a Prince to keep his word, live honestly, and avoid trickery. Still, experience in our own time shows that the Princes who have done great things have cared little about keeping their word. They have known how to outwit people, and in the end they have beaten those who relied on loyalty. You should know, then, that there are two ways to fight: through laws and through force. The first is the way of human beings; the second is the way of animals. But because the first often is not enough, one must turn to the second. A Prince must therefore know how to use both the human and the animal side. Ancient writers taught Princes this lesson indirectly. They wrote that Achilles and many other ancient Princes were entrusted to Chiron the centaur to be brought up under his guidance. Having a teacher who is half animal and half human means only this: a Prince must know how to use both natures, because neither can last without the other. Since a Prince must know how to act like an animal, he should choose the fox and the lion. The lion cannot protect itself from traps, and the fox cannot protect itself from wolves. So he must be a fox to spot traps and a lion to frighten wolves. Those who rely on the lion alone do not understand this. A sensible ruler therefore cannot and should not keep his word when doing so would work against him and the reasons he made his promise no longer exist. If everyone were good, this rule would be wrong. But because people are bad and would not keep their word to you, you do not have to keep yours to them. A Prince will never lack plausible reasons to disguise his failure to keep a promise.\n\nCountless recent examples could be given of peace agreements and promises made worthless by Princes who broke their word. Those who knew best how to act like a fox had the most success. But a Prince must know how to hide this side of himself. He must be very good at pretending to be what he is not and concealing what he is. People are so easily fooled and so driven by their immediate needs that someone who deceives will always find people willing to be deceived. I will mention one recent example. Pope Alexander never did anything but deceive people, and never thought about anything else. He always found people he could deceive. No one ever made claims more convincingly, backed them up with more solemn oaths, or kept them less often. Yet his tricks always worked because he understood this part of human nature so well. A Prince does not actually need to have all the qualities listed above, but he does need to appear to have them. In fact, I will go further: always having and practicing those qualities is harmful, while appearing to have them is useful. He should appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, and honest, and he should be these things. But he must be ready in his mind to do the opposite when he needs to, and know how to do it. Understand this: a Prince, especially a new Prince, cannot always do the things for which people are considered good. To preserve his state, he is often forced to act against humanity, charity, and religion. He must therefore be ready to change course as the winds and shifts of fortune demand. As I said above, he should not turn away from doing good when he can, but he must know how to do wrong when he has to.\n\nA Prince must therefore take great care never to say anything that does not sound full of those five qualities. Anyone who sees or hears him should think he is wholly merciful, wholly honest, wholly humane, and wholly religious. Of all these qualities, appearing religious is the most necessary. People generally judge more by what they see than by what they experience firsthand. Everyone can see what you seem to be; few find out what you really are. Those few do not dare challenge the opinion of the many, who have the power of the state on their side. In judging what anyone does, especially a Prince, there is no court to appeal to, so people look at the outcome. Let a Prince focus on staying alive and preserving his state. His methods will always be judged honorable and praised by everyone. Ordinary people are always taken in by appearances and by how things turn out. The world is made up almost entirely of such people, and the few have no influence when the many have someone to support them. One Prince of our time, whom it would be better not to name, preaches nothing but peace and good faith. If he had ever kept either, he would have lost his state and his reputation many times over.\n\n### Chapter XIX\n\nWhy a Prince Must Avoid Being Despised and Hated\n\nI have discussed the most important of the qualities mentioned above. I want to cover the others briefly under this general rule: a Prince must avoid anything that makes people hate him or look down on him. I have said some of this already. As long as he avoids those things, he has done his part and need not fear blame for his other faults. Above all, as I said, people hate a Prince who takes their property or their women. He must leave both alone. Most people are content if no one takes their property or their honor. He then has only the ambitions of a few people to deal with, and these can be held in check easily and in many ways. People look down on a Prince if they think he is changeable, frivolous, soft, cowardly, or unable to make up his mind. He should avoid these traits as carefully as he would avoid a reef. He should make his actions show greatness, courage, seriousness, and strength. In his private dealings with his subjects, he should make his decisions final. He must build a reputation that keeps anyone from thinking they can trick him or push him around. A Prince with that reputation is highly respected. It is hard to plot against a respected Prince or attack him, as long as people know he is capable and his own subjects respect him. A Prince has two things to fear: his subjects at home and powerful outsiders abroad. He protects himself from the outsiders with good weapons and good allies. If he has good weapons, he will always have good allies. As long as affairs abroad are stable, affairs at home will be stable too, unless a conspiracy upsets them. Even if trouble breaks out abroad, a Prince who is prepared and has lived as I have advised can withstand any assault if he does not give up. That is what Nabis of Sparta did, as I said before. But when there is no trouble abroad, he must fear secret plots among his subjects. He can do much to protect himself by avoiding hatred and contempt and keeping the people satisfied with him. As I have explained at length, this is essential. One of a Prince's strongest defenses against conspiracies is not being hated or looked down on by the people as a whole. A conspirator always thinks the people will be pleased when the Prince dies. If he thinks instead that they will be offended, he will not dare to act. The conspirators already face endless difficulties. Experience shows that there have been many conspiracies but few successes. A conspirator cannot act alone, and he can recruit only people he thinks are unhappy with the Prince. But as soon as he tells one unhappy person what he intends, he gives that person a way to get what he wants: by reporting the plot, the person can expect all kinds of rewards. One choice offers a sure gain; the other is uncertain and dangerous. Only an exceptionally loyal friend or a stubborn enemy of the Prince will keep faith with the conspirator. Put simply, the conspirator is surrounded by fear, distrust, and the prospect of punishment. All this frightens him. The Prince, by contrast, is protected by the authority of the principality, the laws, his friends, and the defenses of the state. Add the goodwill of the people, and no one will be reckless enough to plot against him. Usually a conspirator fears what will happen before the deed. In this case he must also fear what happens afterward. Once he has committed the crime, the people will be his enemy, and he will have nowhere to hide. I could give countless examples, but I will give just one from the time of our fathers.\n\nMesser Annibale Bentivogli, grandfather of the present Messer Annibale, ruled Bologna. The Canneschi plotted against him and killed him. His only surviving heir was Messer Giovanni, still a baby. Immediately after the murder, the people rose up and killed every one of the Canneschi. This happened because the Bentivogli family was so well liked in Bologna at the time. The people's loyalty was so strong that, when Annibale died and no one was left to govern the state, they acted on a report that a Bentivogli son lived in Florence. Until then he had been thought to be a blacksmith's son. The Bolognese went to Florence to fetch him and gave him control of their city. He governed it until Messer Giovanni was old enough to take charge. My conclusion is that a Prince has little to fear from conspiracies when the people like him. If they are hostile and hate him, he must fear everything and everyone. Well-run states and wise Princes have taken great care not to drive the powerful to desperation, while also satisfying the people and keeping them content. This is one of the most important things a Prince must do. France is among the well-run kingdoms of our time. It has many sound institutions that protect the king's freedom and safety. Foremost among them is the Parliament and its authority. The man who organized that kingdom knew how ambitious and unruly the powerful were. He judged that they needed a restraint to keep them in line. He also knew that ordinary people hated the powerful because they feared them, and he wanted to protect the people. He did not want the king personally responsible for this, since favoring the people would put him at odds with the powerful, while favoring the powerful would put him at odds with the people. So he set up a third party, a judge who could restrain the powerful and support the less powerful without placing the burden on the king. Nothing could have been better or wiser, or done more to secure the king and his kingdom. This gives us another important lesson: Princes should have others carry out decisions that will bring blame, and take credit themselves for acts of generosity. I say again that a Prince must respect the powerful without making the people hate him.\n\nSome might think the lives and deaths of several Roman emperors contradict what I have said. They may point to an emperor who lived well throughout his life and showed great strength of character, yet lost the empire or was killed in a plot by his own men. To answer these objections, I will discuss some emperors and show that the causes of their downfall agree with my argument. I will also point out some things worth noting for anyone who reads the history of that period. I will take the emperors who ruled from Marcus the Philosopher to Maximinus: Marcus, his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus, Antoninus, his son Caracalla, Macrinus, Elagabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. First, note that while other Princes have only to deal with the ambitions of the powerful and the unruliness of the people, Roman emperors faced a third problem: the cruelty and greed of their soldiers. This was so hard to manage that it brought down many emperors. It was difficult to satisfy both soldiers and people. The people wanted peace and therefore liked moderate Princes. The soldiers wanted a Prince with a warrior's spirit, someone aggressive, cruel, and greedy. They wanted him to behave this way toward the people so that they could get double pay and satisfy their own greed and cruelty. As a result, emperors who lacked the natural ability or the skill to earn enough respect to keep both groups in check always fell. Most of them, especially those who had just come to power, saw that these groups wanted different things. They chose to satisfy the soldiers and cared little about the harm done to the people. They had to make a choice. A Prince cannot avoid being hated by someone. He should first try not to be hated by the people as a whole. If he cannot manage that, he must do all he can to avoid the hatred of the more powerful group. So new emperors who needed special support generally favored the soldiers over the people. Whether that helped them depended on whether they could keep the soldiers' respect.\n\nThis explains why Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, who all lived modestly, loved justice, rejected cruelty, and were humane and kind, all came to a bad end except Marcus. Marcus alone lived and died greatly honored. He inherited the empire and owed his position to neither soldiers nor people. He also had many qualities that made people respect him. Throughout his life he kept both groups within their limits and was never hated or despised. Pertinax, on the other hand, became emperor against the soldiers' wishes. They had grown used to living without restraint under Commodus. They could not bear the honest way of life Pertinax wanted them to return to. He earned their hatred, and because he was old, they also looked down on him. He fell at the very beginning of his rule. This shows that good actions can earn hatred just as bad actions can. As I said above, a Prince who wants to keep his state is often forced to act badly. If the group he needs for his survival, whether it is the people, soldiers, or powerful men, is corrupt, he must go along with what it wants and satisfy it. In that case, good actions will work against him. Consider Alexander. He was so good that among the things praised about him was this: in the fourteen years he held the empire, he never had anyone killed without a trial. Yet people thought him soft and believed he let his mother govern him. Because they looked down on him, the army plotted against him and killed him.\n\nNow look at the opposite kind of rulers: Commodus, Severus, Antoninus, Caracalla, and Maximinus. They were extremely cruel and greedy. To satisfy the soldiers they stopped at no kind of injury to the people. All but Severus came to a bad end. Severus had so much ability that, by keeping the soldiers on his side, he ruled successfully even though he placed heavy burdens on the people. His qualities made such an impression on soldiers and people alike that the people were left almost stunned, while the soldiers respected him and were content. His actions were remarkable for a new Prince. I want to show briefly how well he played the fox and the lion, whose ways, as I said earlier, a Prince must learn to use.\n\nSeverus saw that the emperor Julian was weak. He commanded an army in the region of Slavonia, and he persuaded it to march on Rome to avenge Pertinax, who had been killed by the imperial guard. Using that cause as a cover and giving no sign that he wanted the empire for himself, he marched his army toward Rome. He reached Italy before anyone knew he had set out. When he arrived in Rome, the Senate chose him as emperor out of fear, and Julian was killed. Severus then faced two obstacles to taking over the whole state. In Asia, Niger, commander of the Asian armies, had himself proclaimed emperor. In the west, Albinus also wanted the empire. Severus thought it dangerous to declare himself an enemy of both men at once, so he decided to attack Niger and deceive Albinus. He wrote to Albinus that, as the Senate had made him emperor, he wanted to share that rank with him. He sent Albinus the title of Caesar and, by a decision of the Senate, made him his colleague. Albinus accepted all this as genuine. After Severus had defeated and killed Niger and settled affairs in the east, he returned to Rome. There he complained to the Senate that Albinus had shown no gratitude for the favors he had received. Severus claimed Albinus had treacherously tried to kill him, so he now had to punish this ingratitude. He then went after Albinus in France and took both his state and his life. Anyone who examines Severus's actions carefully will find a fierce lion and a very cunning fox. He was feared and respected by everyone without being hated by his armies. It is no wonder that a man new to power could hold so great an empire: his immense reputation always protected him from the hatred the people might have felt because he took so much from them. His son Antoninus also had exceptional qualities. The people admired him, and the soldiers liked him. He was a soldier himself, able to endure any hardship and disdainful of fine food and every other comfort. That won him the affection of all the armies. But his savagery and cruelty were extraordinary. After many individual killings, he killed a large part of the people of Rome and all the people of Alexandria. He became hated throughout the world. Even the people around him began to fear him, and a centurion killed him in the middle of his army. A Prince cannot prevent every such death. A determined person who does not care about dying can kill him. Still, he should worry less about such attacks because they are extremely rare. What he must do is avoid seriously wronging anyone he relies on or keeps close to him in the service of his principality. Antoninus had done exactly that. He had killed the centurion's brother in a humiliating way and threatened the centurion every day, yet kept him as a bodyguard. This was a reckless decision, and it ruined him. Now consider Commodus. Keeping the empire would have been easy for him because he had inherited it as the son of Marcus. He only needed to follow his father's example to satisfy both people and soldiers. But he had a cruel, brutal nature. To be free to take what he wanted from the people, he cultivated the armies and let the soldiers do as they pleased. At the same time he lowered his standing by often going into theaters to fight gladiators, and by doing other degrading things unworthy of imperial rank. The soldiers came to look down on him. Hated by one group and despised by the other, he was killed in a conspiracy.\n\nIt remains to describe Maximinus. He was a very warlike man. The armies had grown tired of Alexander's softness, which I discussed above. After Alexander was killed, they chose Maximinus as emperor. He did not hold the empire for long, because two things made people hate him and look down on him. First, he came from a very low background: he had tended sheep in Thrace. Everyone knew this, and it made people despise him. Second, when he first became Prince, he put off going to Rome to take possession of the imperial seat. His prefects meanwhile committed many acts of cruelty in Rome and elsewhere in the empire. This gave him a reputation for extreme cruelty. The whole world was stirred up by contempt for his low birth and hatred born of fear of his ferocity. First Africa, then the Senate and all the people of Rome, and then all Italy plotted against him. His own army joined them. It was besieging Aquileia and having trouble capturing it. The soldiers were sick of his cruelty. Seeing that he had so many enemies, they feared him less and killed him. I will not discuss Elagabalus, Macrinus, or Julian. They were held in such contempt that they were quickly destroyed. Instead I will bring this discussion to a close. Princes today have less trouble with the need to give their soldiers special satisfaction. They must still pay some attention to the soldiers, but the problem does not last long. No Prince today has armies long established together in the government and administration of provinces, as the armies of the Roman Empire were. Back then the soldiers had to be satisfied more than the people because they were more powerful than the people. Today every Prince except the Turk and the Sultan must satisfy the people more than the soldiers, because the people are more powerful. I make an exception for the Turk because he always keeps twelve thousand infantrymen and fifteen thousand horsemen near him. The safety and strength of his kingdom depend on them. He must therefore keep them loyal, even if he has to put every concern about the people aside. The Sultan's kingdom is similar. It is entirely in the soldiers' hands, so he too must keep them loyal without regard for the people. Notice that the Sultan's state differs from all other principalities. It resembles the Christian papacy, which cannot be called either a hereditary or a new principality. The dead Prince's children do not inherit it and become its rulers. Instead, those who have the authority elect someone to the office. Because this arrangement is long established, it cannot be called a new principality. It does not have any of the difficulties of a new one. Even though the Prince is new, the state's institutions are old and are ready to receive him as if he were their hereditary ruler.\n\nTo return to my point: anyone who considers the discussion above will see that hatred or contempt caused the fall of the emperors I have named. They will also understand why one emperor could act in a certain way and succeed, while others who did the same came to a bad end, even though some emperors acted in the opposite way. Pertinax and Alexander were new Princes. It was useless and harmful for them to try to copy Marcus, who had inherited his principality. Likewise, it was ruinous for Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to copy Severus. They lacked the ability needed to follow his example. A new Prince in a principality, then, cannot copy what Marcus did, but he need not copy everything Severus did either. He should take from Severus what he needs to establish his state, and from Marcus what is fitting and honorable when preserving a state that is already established and secure.\n\n### Chapter XX\n\nWhether fortresses and many other things princes often do are useful or harmful.\n\nSome princes have disarmed their subjects to keep their states secure. Others have kept the lands under their rule divided into factions. Some have encouraged hostility against themselves. Others have tried to win over people they distrusted when they first came to power. Some have built fortresses, while others have torn them down and destroyed them. We cannot give a definite answer about any of these things without looking at the particular states where such a decision might be made. Still, I will speak in the general terms the subject allows. A new Prince has never disarmed his subjects. On the contrary, if he has found them unarmed, he has always armed them. When you arm them, their weapons become yours. People you distrusted become loyal, those already loyal stay that way, and your subjects become your supporters. You cannot arm all your subjects. But if you favor those you do arm, you can be more secure with the rest. The armed men see that you treat them differently and feel indebted to you. The others accept it, judging that those who face greater danger and carry greater responsibilities deserve more. But if you disarm your subjects, you begin by offending them. You show that you distrust either their courage or their loyalty. Either judgment makes them hate you. And since you cannot remain unarmed, you must turn to mercenary soldiers, whose nature I have described above. Even if they were good, there could never be enough of them to defend you against powerful enemies and subjects you distrust. Therefore, as I have said, a new Prince in a new principality has always organized its armed forces. History is full of examples. But when a Prince acquires a new state and adds it to his old one, like a new limb, he must disarm the new state. He should make an exception for those who openly took his side during its conquest. Even these men must, with time and the right opportunities, be made soft and unfit for fighting. He must arrange things so that all the armed forces of his state are his own soldiers, the men who live near him in his original state.\n\nOur ancestors and those thought wise used to say that Pistoia had to be held through its factions and Pisa through its fortresses. So they encouraged disputes in some of the towns they ruled, to hold them more easily. This may have worked when Italy was in a kind of balance, but I do not think it can be recommended today. I do not believe divisions deliberately created ever do any good. When an enemy approaches, divided cities are bound to fall at once. The weaker faction will always join the outside forces, and the other faction will not be able to stand against them. The Venetians, I believe, acted for the reasons just given when they kept the Guelph and Ghibelline factions alive in the cities under their rule. They never let the factions come to bloodshed, but they kept their quarrels going so that the citizens, busy fighting among themselves, would not turn against Venice. As events showed, this did not help the Venetians. Once they had been defeated at Vailà, one of those factions immediately took courage and seized their whole state. Methods like these therefore show a Prince's weakness. A strong principality would never allow such divisions. They help only in peacetime, when they make subjects easier to manage. When war comes, the weakness of this arrangement becomes clear.\n\nThere is no doubt that princes become great by overcoming difficulties and opposition. So fortune, especially when it wants to make a new Prince great, gives him enemies and leads them to attack him. A new Prince needs to earn a reputation more than a hereditary one does. By defeating his enemies, he can rise higher on the very ladder they have provided. Many therefore think that a wise Prince should, if he has the chance, cleverly foster some hostility toward himself. Once he has put it down, his greatness will increase. Princes, especially new ones, have found more loyalty and more help among men they first distrusted than among those they trusted at the start. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more through men he had distrusted than through the others. But no general rule can cover this matter, because circumstances vary. I will say only this: a Prince can very easily win over former enemies who need his support to keep their position. Such men feel all the more compelled to serve him faithfully because they know they must erase, through their actions, the bad opinion he once had of them. So the Prince always gets more help from them than from people who feel so secure in his service that they neglect his interests. Since the subject calls for it, I also want to remind a Prince who has gained a new state with the help of people within it to look carefully at why they helped him. If they were not moved by a natural affection for him, but only by dissatisfaction with the previous government, he will find it very hard to keep them as friends. He will never be able to satisfy them. If he examines the reasons for this in examples from ancient and modern times, he will see that it is much easier to make friends with men who were content with the old government, and so were his enemies, than with men who became his friends and helped him take power because they were discontented.\n\nPrinces have customarily built fortresses to hold their states more securely. These serve as a bridle and restraint on those planning to attack them, and as a safe refuge against an initial assault. I approve of this practice because it has long been used. Nevertheless, in our own times Niccolò Vitelli tore down two fortresses in Città di Castello to keep control of that state. When Guidobaldo, Duke of Urbino, returned to the state from which Cesare Borgia had driven him, he demolished every fortress in the region down to its foundations. He judged that without them he would be less likely to lose the state again. The Bentivoglio family did the same when they returned to Bologna. Fortresses, then, are useful or not according to the times. What helps you in one respect harms you in another. Here is how to think about it. A Prince who fears his people more than foreigners should build fortresses. One who fears foreigners more than his people should do without them. The castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has done and will do more harm to the Sforza family than any other disorder in that state. So the best fortress is not to be hated by the people. Even if you have fortresses, they will not save you if the people hate you. Once the people take up arms, foreigners willing to help them are never lacking. In our own times, fortresses seem to have helped no Prince except the Countess of Forlì when her husband, Count Girolamo, was killed. Her fortress let her escape the people's first attack, wait for help from Milan, and recover her state. At the time, conditions kept foreign powers from helping the people. But later her fortresses did her little good when Cesare Borgia attacked her and her hostile subjects joined the foreign invader. Both then and earlier, she would have been safer without the people's hatred than with her fortresses. Taking all this into account, I will praise princes who build fortresses and those who do not. But I will blame anyone who trusts in fortresses and thinks it matters little if the people hate him.\n\n### Chapter XXI\n\nHow a Prince should act to win a reputation.\n\nNothing makes people respect a Prince as much as great undertakings and striking examples of his conduct. In our own times we have Ferdinand, King of Aragon and now King of Spain. He can almost be called a new Prince: from a weak king, he has become, in fame and glory, the leading king among Christians. If you consider his actions, you will find them all very great, and some extraordinary. At the start of his reign he attacked Granada, and that campaign laid the foundation for his power. First, he undertook it when he was otherwise at peace and had no reason to fear interference. It kept the nobles of Castile occupied. While they thought about the war, they did not think about changing the government. Meanwhile, without their noticing, he gained a reputation and authority over them. He paid for his armies with money from the Church and the people. Through that long war, he established a military force that later brought him honor. Moreover, to undertake still greater campaigns, he always made use of religion. In an act of cruelty presented as an act of faith, he drove the Marranos out of his kingdom and stripped them of their possessions. No example could be more remarkable or more unusual. Under the same cover he attacked Africa, launched a campaign in Italy, and most recently attacked France. In this way he has constantly planned great actions. They have always kept his subjects astonished and waiting to see how things would turn out. One action has followed so closely on another that people have never had time to settle down and act against him.\n\nIt also helps a Prince greatly to set striking examples in his rule at home, like those told about Bernabò of Milan. When someone does something extraordinary in public life, whether good or bad, the Prince should find a way to reward or punish that person that will be talked about widely. Above all, a Prince should try to gain a reputation for greatness and excellence in everything he does. A Prince is also respected when he shows himself to be a true friend or a true enemy. That means openly taking one side against another without holding back. This is always better than remaining neutral. Suppose two powerful neighbors go to war. Either the winner will be someone you must fear, or the winner will not. In either case, it is better to declare your position and fight decisively. In the first case, if you do not take a side, the winner will make you his prey, to the pleasure and satisfaction of the loser. You will have no claim or means to defend yourself, and no one will take you in. A winner does not want untrustworthy friends who failed to help in hard times. A loser will not accept you because you refused to take up arms and share his fate. Antiochus had entered Greece at the invitation of the Aetolians to drive out the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the Romans, urging them to stay out of the conflict. The Romans, on the other hand, urged them to fight on their side. The matter came before the Achaean council. There Antiochus's envoy urged them to remain neutral, and the Roman envoy replied: \"As for the claim that staying out of our war is the best and most useful course for your state, nothing could be further from the truth. If you stay out, you will gain neither favor nor respect, and you will become the victor's prize.\" It always happens that the one who is not your friend will ask you to remain neutral, while the one who is your friend will ask you to show your support with arms. Undecided princes most often choose neutrality to avoid immediate danger, and most often come to ruin. But when a Prince takes a firm stand for one side, and the ally he joins wins, that ally owes him a debt, even if he is powerful and the Prince is left at his mercy. They have formed a bond of affection. People are never so dishonorable that they would crush an ally in such a glaring act of ingratitude. Besides, victories are never so complete that the victor need not show some consideration, especially for justice. If instead your ally loses, he will welcome you and help you as long as he can. You will share the fortunes of someone who may rise again. In the second case, where neither of the two combatants would be dangerous to you if he won, there is all the more reason to join one side. With the help of a man who ought to save his opponent if he were wise, you will bring that opponent down. With your help your ally cannot fail to win, and when he wins he will be at your mercy. Here one must note that a Prince should never join forces with someone more powerful than himself to attack another, unless necessity forces him to do so, as I said above. If that powerful ally wins, you will be at his mercy, and princes should avoid being at anyone else's mercy as far as they can. The Venetians joined with France against the Duke of Milan. They could have avoided that alliance, and it led to their ruin. But when it cannot be avoided, as when the Pope and Spain marched with their armies to attack Lombardy and the Florentines had to choose, a Prince should take a side for the reasons already given. No state should ever expect to find a completely safe course of action. It should expect every choice to carry risks. That is how things work: whenever you try to avoid one problem, you run into another. Good judgment means knowing what kind of problems you face and treating the less bad choice as the good one.\n\nA Prince should also show that he values ability and honor people who excel at every craft. He should encourage his citizens to practice their occupations in peace, whether in trade, farming, or any other work. No one should be afraid to improve his property for fear it will be taken from him, or to open a business for fear of taxes. Instead, the Prince should offer rewards to those who do these things, and to anyone who plans in any way to enlarge his city or his state. At suitable times of year he should also keep the people engaged with festivals and shows. Since every city is divided into guilds or tribes, he should pay attention to these groups and meet with them sometimes. He should show kindness and generosity, while always maintaining the dignity of his position. That must never be lost in anything he does.\n\n### Chapter XXII\n\nOn the secretaries of princes.\n\nA Prince's choice of ministers matters a great deal. They are good or bad according to the Prince's judgment. The first way people judge a ruler and his intelligence is by looking at the men around him. When they are capable and loyal, he can always be considered wise, because he knew how to recognize their ability and keep their loyalty. But when they are not, people can always judge him poorly. Choosing them was his first mistake. Everyone who knew Antonio da Venafro as a minister to Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, judged Pandolfo a very shrewd man for having him as a minister. There are three kinds of minds. One understands things on its own. Another understands what others explain to it. The third understands neither on its own nor through someone else's explanation. The first is outstanding, the second is good, and the third is useless.\n\nPandolfo must therefore have had at least the second kind of mind, if not the first. Whenever a person can judge the good and bad in what another man does and says, even if he cannot come up with ideas himself, he recognizes both the good and the bad work of his minister. He praises the good and corrects the bad. The minister cannot hope to deceive him, and so behaves well. There is one sure way for a Prince to judge a minister. If you see that he thinks more about himself than about you, and looks for his own advantage in everything he does, he will never be a good minister. You will never be able to trust him. A man responsible for someone else's state must never think of himself, only of the Prince. He must never bring up a matter that does not concern the Prince. For his part, the Prince must look after the minister to keep him loyal. He should honor him, make him rich, bind him to himself, and share honors and responsibilities with him. The many honors and riches he receives should leave him wanting no more. His many responsibilities should make him fear any change, knowing he cannot maintain his position without the Prince. When princes and ministers act in these ways, they can trust each other. Otherwise, the outcome will always harm one of them, or both.\n\n### Chapter XXIII\n\nHow to Avoid Flatterers\n\nI do not want to leave out an important subject and a mistake that Princes find hard to guard against unless they are very wise or choose their advisers well. The subject is flattery. Courts are full of flatterers because people take such pleasure in their own affairs, and deceive themselves so much about them, that they have trouble protecting themselves from this plague. Yet trying to protect yourself brings the risk of becoming despised. The only way to guard against flattery is to make people understand that telling you the truth will not offend you. But if everyone can tell you the truth, you lose their respect. A wise Prince should therefore take a third course. He should choose wise men in his state and give only them the freedom to speak the truth to him, and only about the things he asks them about. But he should ask them about everything and listen to their opinions. Then he should make his own decision in his own way. In dealing with these advisers, both together and individually, he should make it clear to each of them that the more openly he speaks, the more welcome his advice will be. He should refuse to listen to anyone else, follow through on what he has decided, and stand firm in his decisions. Anyone who acts differently either comes to ruin because of flatterers or keeps changing his mind as opinions change. As a result, people think less of him. I want to give a modern example of this. Father Luca, an associate of the current Emperor Maximilian, said of His Majesty that he consulted no one and never did anything as he himself intended. This came from doing the opposite of what I have described. The Emperor keeps his plans secret. He shares his secrets with no one and asks no one for an opinion. But when he starts putting his plans into effect, they become known and come to light. Those around him begin to oppose them, and he is easily persuaded to abandon them. That is why he undoes one day what he did the day before. No one can ever tell what he wants or plans to do, and no one can count on his decisions.\n\nA Prince, then, should always seek advice, but when he wants it, not when other people want to give it. In fact, he should discourage everyone from advising him about anything unless he has asked. But he should ask plenty of questions, and then listen patiently to the truth about what he has asked. If he realizes that someone is holding back the truth for any reason, he should be upset. Some people think that a Prince with a reputation for wisdom owes it not to his own abilities but to the good advisers around him. They are certainly mistaken. There is a general rule that never fails: a Prince who is not wise himself cannot be well advised. The only exception would be if he happened to put himself completely under the control of one extremely wise man. In that case, he might be governed well, but not for long, because that man would soon take his state away from him. If a Prince who lacks wisdom seeks advice from several people, he will never get consistent advice, and he will not know how to reconcile their views himself. Each adviser will look after his own interests, and the Prince will not know how to detect or correct this. Nor can advisers be expected to act otherwise: people will always turn out bad unless necessity makes them good. So good advice, whoever gives it, must grow out of the Prince's own good judgment. His good judgment cannot grow out of good advice.\n\n### Chapter XXIV\n\nWhy the Princes of Italy Have Lost Their States\n\nIf a new Prince carefully follows the advice given above, he will seem like a Prince whose family has ruled for generations. It will immediately make him more secure and better established in his state than if he had inherited it long ago. People watch what a new Prince does much more closely than they watch a hereditary Prince. When they see that his actions are good, those actions win their support and loyalty far more than an old family line does. People care much more about what is happening now than about the past. If they find things good now, they enjoy them and ask for nothing else. Indeed, they will do everything they can to defend the Prince, provided he does not fail in his other duties. He will thus win twice the glory: for founding a new principality, and for improving and strengthening it with good laws, good arms, good friends, and good examples. By the same measure, a man born a Prince who loses his principality through poor judgment will suffer twice the shame. Consider the rulers who have lost their states in Italy in our time, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others. First, you will find that they all failed in the matter of arms, for the reasons I have discussed at length above. Next, you will see that some made enemies of their people, while others, even if the people were on their side, did not know how to protect themselves against the powerful. States strong enough to field an army are not lost without these failures.\n\nPhilip of Macedon—not the father of Alexander the Great, but the one defeated by Titus Quinctius—held a small state compared with the power of Rome and Greece, which attacked him. Yet he was a capable soldier who knew how to keep the people on his side and secure himself against the powerful. He held out against them in war for several years. Although he eventually lost control of some cities, he still kept his kingdom. So the Princes of our time who had ruled their principalities for many years before losing them should blame their own laziness, not fortune. In peaceful times they never considered that things could change. People commonly fail to think of storms when the weather is calm. Then, when hard times came, these Princes thought of fleeing instead of defending themselves. They hoped that the people, fed up with the arrogance of the victors, would call them back. When there is no other choice, that is a reasonable plan. But it is a serious mistake to neglect every other remedy and rely on it. You should never let yourself fall on the assumption that someone will pick you up afterward. That may never happen. Even if it does, it gives you no security, because such a defense is weak and does not depend on you. Only defenses that depend on you and your own ability are good, reliable, and lasting.\n\n### Chapter XXV\n\nHow Much Power Fortune Has over Human Affairs and How to Resist It\n\nI know that many people have believed, and still believe, that fortune and God govern events in this world so completely that human judgment cannot change them and there is nothing we can do about them. They might therefore think there is no point in working hard at anything. We might as well let chance take charge. This belief has become more common in our time because we have seen, and still see every day, great changes that no one could have predicted. When I think about this, I am sometimes inclined to agree with them in part. Still, I do not believe that our freedom to choose has disappeared. I think it may be true that fortune controls half of what we do, but leaves us in control of the other half, or nearly that much. Fortune is like a destructive river. When it floods, it covers the plains, knocks down trees and buildings, and carries soil away from one place to deposit it in another. Everyone runs from it. Everyone yields to its force, unable to stop it. But even though it behaves this way, people can prepare for it in quiet times. They can build barriers and embankments so that, when the river rises, its water will either flow down a channel or do less damage because its force is held in check.\n\nFortune works in the same way. It shows its power wherever there is no organized strength to resist it. It directs its force toward places where it knows no barriers or embankments have been built to hold it back. Look at Italy, where these changes began and where they have had such an impact. You will see an open plain without any barriers or defenses. If Italy had been protected by sufficient strength, as Germany, Spain, and France have been, this flood would not have caused such great changes here, or it would never have reached us. That is enough about resisting fortune in general. To turn to a particular case, we see a Prince succeed today and fall tomorrow, even though we cannot see any change in his character or abilities. I believe the chief reason is one I have already discussed at length: a Prince who depends entirely on fortune falls when fortune changes. I also believe a person succeeds when his way of acting fits the times, and fails when it does not. People pursue the goals they set themselves, namely glory and wealth, in different ways. One acts cautiously, another boldly; one uses force, another skill; one is patient, another impatient. Any of these different methods can bring success. You can also see two cautious people, one of whom achieves his goal and the other does not. Or you can see two people succeed equally well using opposite methods, one cautious and the other bold. This happens only because the times either suit their way of acting or do not. That explains what I said: two people can act differently and get the same result, while two people can act in the same way and only one achieves his goal. It also explains why success changes. If the times and circumstances suit someone who acts cautiously and patiently, that person will prosper. But if the times and circumstances change, he will fail because he does not change his methods. No one is wise enough to adapt completely. One reason is that a person cannot turn away from the course his nature inclines him to follow. Another is that anyone who has always prospered by following a particular path cannot convince himself to leave it. So a cautious person does not know how to act boldly when the time comes, and he fails. If he could change his nature along with the times and circumstances, his fortune would not change. Pope Julius II acted boldly in everything he did. The times and circumstances suited his way of acting so well that he always succeeded. Consider his first campaign, against Bologna, while Giovanni Bentivoglio was still alive. The Venetians were unhappy about it. The King of Spain was also discussing this campaign with France. Yet the Pope set out on the expedition himself, acting fiercely and without hesitation. His move kept both Spain and the Venetians waiting without taking action: the Venetians were afraid, while Spain hoped to recover the whole Kingdom of Naples. At the same time he won the support of the King of France. The French king saw that the Pope had already set out, and wanted his friendship in order to weaken the Venetians. He decided that he could not refuse to send his troops without openly insulting him.\n\nBy acting so boldly, Julius achieved something no other pope could have achieved with all the careful planning in the world. If he had waited in Rome until agreements were settled and everything was arranged, as any other pope would have done, he would never have succeeded. The King of France would have found a thousand excuses, and the others would have raised a thousand fears. I will leave aside the rest of Julius's actions. They followed the same pattern, and they all succeeded. His life was too short for him to experience the opposite result. If a time had come when he needed to act cautiously, he would have failed. He would never have turned away from the methods his nature led him to use. So my conclusion is this: fortune changes, but people stick stubbornly to their ways. They succeed when the two match, and fail when they do not. For my part, I think it is better to be bold than cautious. Fortune is a woman, and anyone who wants to keep her under control must beat and shove her. We can see that she yields more readily to men who act this way than to those who proceed cautiously. And so, like a woman, she always favors the young. They are less cautious and more aggressive, and they command her with greater daring.\n\n### Chapter XXVI\n\nAn Appeal to Free Italy from the Foreigners\n\nAfter considering everything discussed above, I have asked myself whether this is a time in Italy when a new Prince could win honor. Is there an opportunity for a wise and capable man to establish a new order that would bring him honor and benefit the people of Italy as a whole? So many things seem to favor a new Prince that I cannot imagine a better time. As I said, the people of Israel had to be enslaved in Egypt for Moses to show his ability. The Persians had to be oppressed by the Medes for Cyrus to show his greatness and courage. The Athenians had to be scattered for Theseus to show his excellence. In the same way, for the ability of an Italian leader to become clear today, Italy had to reach its present state. It had to be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more subject than the Persians, and more scattered than the Athenians. It had to be leaderless and without order, beaten, robbed, torn apart, overrun, and subjected to every kind of ruin. Until now, there have been signs of hope in certain men who seemed chosen by God to save Italy. Yet we have seen fortune turn against them at the height of their efforts. Italy is left almost lifeless. She waits for someone to heal her wounds, put an end to the plunder and sacking of Lombardy and the pillaging and extortion of the Kingdom and Tuscany, and cure the sores that have festered for so long.\n\nWe can see her praying to God to send someone to free her from these foreign acts of cruelty and arrogance. We can also see that she is ready and willing to follow a banner, if only someone will raise it. Today she can place her hopes in no one more than in your illustrious house. With its ability and fortune, and with the support of God and the Church, which it now leads, your house can lead this liberation. This will not be very difficult if you keep in mind the deeds and lives of the men I named above. Those men were rare and remarkable, but they were men. Each had less of an opportunity than you have now. Their cause was no more just or easy than yours, and God was no more on their side than on yours. Justice is strongly on your side here, because a war is just when it is necessary. Taking up arms is right when there is no other hope. The people are completely ready. When they are so ready, the task cannot be very difficult, provided your house follows the methods of the men I have held up as examples. Beyond this, we can see extraordinary signs from God, with no earlier examples: the sea has opened, a cloud has shown you the way, water has flowed from a rock, and manna has rained down here. Everything has worked toward making your house great. What remains is for you to act. God does not want to do everything, because that would take away our free will and our share of the glory. It is no surprise that the Italians I mentioned earlier could not do what we may hope your illustrious house will do. Nor is it surprising that, despite so many upheavals in Italy and so many military campaigns, the country's military ability always seems to have died out. Its old military methods were no good, and no one has yet known how to devise new ones. Nothing brings a man newly come to power more honor than new laws and new institutions of his own making. When they have sound foundations and are great in scope, they make him respected and admired. Italy has ample material for any new form of organization. There is great ability among its ordinary people, if only its leaders had the same. Look at duels and fights between small groups: Italians surpass others in strength, skill, and resourcefulness. But when it comes to whole armies, they fail to stand out. This is entirely due to weak leaders. Those who know what they are doing will not obey, and everyone thinks he knows best. No one has yet risen so far above the others through ability and fortune that they will give way to him. That is why, through all the wars of the last twenty years, an entirely Italian army has always performed badly. The battles of the Taro, Alessandria, Capua, Genoa, Vailà, Bologna, and Mestri bear witness to this, in that order.\n\nIf your illustrious house wants to follow the great men who freed their countries, it must first, as the foundation of every undertaking, provide itself with troops of its own. No soldiers can be more loyal, more dependable, or better. Each will be good on his own, but together they will become even better when they see that their own Prince commands, honors, and supports them. You must prepare such forces so that Italians can use their own ability to defend themselves against outsiders. Swiss and Spanish infantry are feared, but each has a weakness. A third kind of force could stand against both and could reasonably expect to defeat them. The Spaniards cannot stand up to cavalry, while the Swiss have reason to fear foot soldiers who fight as stubbornly as they do. Experience has shown, and will show again, that the Spaniards cannot stand up to French cavalry and that Spanish infantry can destroy the Swiss. We have not yet seen the latter happen fully, but we got a glimpse of it at the battle of Ravenna. There, Spanish infantry faced German formations that used the same methods as the Swiss. The Spaniards, moving quickly and protected by their small shields, got in under the German pikes and could attack safely. The Germans had no answer. If cavalry had not charged the Spaniards, they would have wiped out all the Germans. Once you know the weaknesses of both kinds of infantry, you can create a new force that can stand up to cavalry and has no reason to fear other infantry. This does not call for a new kind of weapon, but for a change in the way troops are organized. Innovations of this kind give a new Prince a great reputation and make him powerful. So this opportunity must not be allowed to pass. After so long, Italy should see someone come to free her. I cannot express how warmly he would be welcomed in every region that has suffered from these foreign invasions. People would thirst for revenge and greet him with steadfast loyalty, devotion, and tears. What doors would be closed to him? What people would refuse to obey him? Who would envy him enough to stand in his way? What Italian would refuse to honor him? Everyone is sick of this foreign rule. Let your illustrious house take up this cause with the spirit and the hopes that belong to a just undertaking. Then this country can gain honor under its banner, and under its leadership the words of Petrarch can come true:\n\nCourage will take up arms against fury,\nAnd the fight will soon be over;\nFor the old strength\nHas not yet died in Italian hearts.","download_url":"https://mouseia.org/api/works/prince/translations/trn_prince_plain.txt"}],"retex_markdown_url":"https://mouseia.org/api/works/prince/retex.md"}}