Niccolò Machiavelli · Complete work
Chapter IV
Chapter IV of 27. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Perchè il Regno di Dario da Alessandro occupato non si ribellò dalli successori di Alessandro dopo la sua morte.
Considerate le difficultà, le quali si hanno in tenere uno Stato acquistato di nuovo, potrebbe alcuno maravigliarsi, donde nacque che Alessandro Magno diventò Signore dell’Asia in pochi anni, e, non l’avendo appena occupata, morì, donde pareva ragionevole che tutto quello Stato si ribellasse; nondimeno li successori suoi se lo mantennero, e non ebbono a tenerselo altra difficultà, che quella che intra loro medesimi per propria ambizione nacque. Rispondo come i Principati, de’ quali si ha memoria, si trovano governati in due modi diversi, o per un Principe, e tutti gli altri servi, i quali come ministri per grazia e concessione sua aiutano governare quel Regno; o per un Principe e per Baroni, i quali non per grazia del Signore, ma per antichità di sangue tengono quel grado. Questi tali Baroni hanno Stati e sudditi propri, li quali gli riconoscono per Signori, e hanno in loro naturale affezione. Quelli Stati che si governano per un Principe e per servi, hanno il loro Principe con più autorità; perchè in tutta la sua provincia non è alcuno che riconosca per superiore se non lui; e se ubbidiscono altri, lo fanno come a ministro e ufficiale, e non gli portano particolare amore. Gli esempi di queste due diversità di governi sono, ne’ nostri tempi, il Turco e il Re di Francia. Tutta la monarchia del Turco è governata da un Signore; gli altri sono suoi servi; e distinguendo il suo Regno in Sangiacchi, vi manda diversi amministratori, e gli muta e varia come pare a lui. Ma il Re di Francia è posto in mezzo di una moltitudine antica di Signori, ricognosciuti da’ loro sudditi, ed amati da quelli; hanno le loro preminenzie, nè le può il Re torre loro senza suo pericolo. Chi considera adunque l’uno e l’altro di questi Stati, troverà difficultà nell’acquistare lo Stato del Turco; ma vinto che sia, è facilità grande a tenerlo.
Le cagioni della difficultà in potere occupare il Regno del Turco sono per non potere l’occupatore essere chiamato da’ Principi di quel Regno, nè sperare con la ribellione di quelli che egli ha d’intorno, potere facilitare la sua impresa; il che nasce dalle ragioni sopraddette. Perchè essendogli tutti schiavi ed obbligati, si possono con più difficultà corrompere; e quando bene si corrompessino, se ne può sperare poco utile, non potendo quelli trarsi dietro i popoli, per le ragioni assegnate. Onde chi assalta il Turco è necessario pensare di averlo a trovare unito, e li conviene sperare più nelle forze proprie, che ne’ disordini di altri; ma vinto che fusse, e rotto alla campagna, in modo che non possa rifare eserciti, non si ha a dubitare d’altro, che del sangue del Principe, il quale spento, non resta alcuno di chi si abbia a temere, non avendo li altri credito con gli popoli; e come il vincitore avanti la vittoria non poteva sperare in loro, così non debbe dopo quella temere di loro.
Il contrario interviene ne’ Regni governati come è quello di Francia, perchè con facilità puoi entrarvi, guadagnandoti alcuno Barone del Regno; perchè sempre si trova de’ malcontenti, e di quelli che desiderano innovare. Costoro, per le ragioni dette, ti possono aprire la via a quello Stato, e facilitarti la vittoria; la quale dipoi a volerti mantenere, si tira dietro infinite difficultà e con quelli che ti hanno aiutato, e con quelli che tu hai oppressi. Nè ti basta spegnere il sangue del Principe; perchè vi rimangono quelli Signori, che si fanno capi delle nuove alterazioni, e non li potendo nè contentare, nè spegnere, perdi quello stato qualunque volta venga la occasione. Ora se voi considererete di qual natura di governi era quello di Dario, lo troverete simile al Regno del Turco; e però ad Alessandro fu necessario prima urtarlo tutto, e torgli la campagna; dopo la quale vittoria essendo Dario morto, rimase ad Alessandro quello stato sicuro, per le ragioni sopra discorse. E li suoi successori, se fussino stati uniti, se lo potevano godere oziosi; nè in quello Regno nacquero altri tumulti, che quelli che loro proprii suscitarono. Ma gli Stati ordinati, come quello di Francia, è impossibile possedergli con tanta quiete. Di qui nacquero le spesse ribellioni di Spagna, di Francia, e di Grecia da’ Romani, per li spessi Principati che erano in quelli Stati, de’ quali mentre che durò la memoria, sempre furono i Romani incerti di quella possessione; ma spenta la memoria di quelli, con la potenza e diuturnità dell’imperio, ne diventarono sicuri possessori. E poterono dipoi anche quelli, combattendo tra loro, ciascuno tirarsi dietro parte di quelle provincie, secondo l’autorità vi aveva preso dentro; e quelle, per essere il sangue del loro antico Signore spento, non ricognoscevano altri, che i Romani. Considerando adunque queste cose, non si maraviglierà alcuno della facilità che ebbe Alessandro a tenere lo Stato d’Asia, e delle difficultà che hanno avuto gli altri a conservare l’acquistato, come Pirro, e molti altri; il che non è accaduto dalla poca o molta virtù del vincitore, ma dalla disformità del suggetto.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication for fidelity, Machiavelli’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
Why the Kingdom of Darius, Conquered by Alexander, Did Not Rebel Against Alexander’s Successors After His Death
Considering the difficulties involved in holding a newly acquired state, someone might wonder how Alexander the Great became lord of Asia in a few years and died scarcely having conquered it, when it would seem reasonable that the whole state should rebel. Yet his successors held it, and encountered no difficulty in keeping it except what arose among themselves from their own ambition. I answer that the principalities known to us are governed in two different ways: either by a Prince, with all others his servants, who help govern the kingdom as ministers by his grace and permission; or by a Prince and barons, who hold their rank not by their lord’s grace but by the antiquity of their blood. These barons have states and subjects of their own, who recognize them as lords and bear them a natural affection. States governed by a Prince and servants give their Prince greater authority, for throughout his dominion there is no one whom people recognize as their superior except him; if they obey another, they do so as a minister and officer, and bear him no particular love. Examples of these two kinds of government in our own time are the Turk and the King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord; the others are his servants. Dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he sends different administrators there and changes and replaces them as he sees fit. But the King of France stands amid an ancient multitude of lords, recognized and loved by their subjects. They have their privileges, which the king cannot take from them without danger to himself. Whoever considers both these states, then, will find it difficult to conquer the state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, very easy to hold.
The difficulty in conquering the Turk’s kingdom lies in the conqueror’s inability to be invited in by the princes of that kingdom, or to hope that a rebellion among those surrounding its ruler will ease his undertaking. This follows from the reasons already given. Since all of them are servants bound to him, they are harder to corrupt; and even if they were corrupted, little benefit could be expected, since for the reasons stated they cannot draw the people after them. Thus anyone who attacks the Turk must expect to find him united and must rely more on his own forces than on disorders among others. But once he is defeated and routed in the field so that he cannot raise fresh armies, there is nothing left to fear except the Prince’s bloodline. Once that is extinguished, no one remains to be feared, since the others have no standing with the people. Just as the victor could not hope for their help before victory, so he need not fear them afterward.
The reverse occurs in kingdoms governed like France. You can enter such a kingdom easily by winning over one of its barons, for there are always discontented men and men who desire change. For the reasons given, these can open the way into the state and make your victory easier; but afterward, if you wish to retain it, that victory brings endless difficulties, both with those who helped you and with those you oppressed. Nor is it enough to extinguish the Prince’s bloodline, for those lords remain who make themselves leaders of fresh upheavals; and since you can neither satisfy nor eliminate them, you lose the state whenever an opportunity arises. Now, if you consider the nature of Darius’s government, you will find it like that of the Turk. Alexander therefore had first to meet its full force and drive it from the field. After that victory, with Darius dead, the state remained secure in Alexander’s hands for the reasons discussed above. And if his successors had remained united, they could have enjoyed it at their ease; no disturbances arose in that kingdom except those they stirred up themselves. But states organized like France cannot possibly be held so quietly. Hence the frequent rebellions against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, because of the many principalities in those lands. So long as the memory of those principalities endured, the Romans were never secure in their possession; but when their memory was extinguished, Roman power and the long duration of Roman rule made possession secure. Later, even as the Romans fought among themselves, each could draw part of those provinces to his side according to the authority he had gained there; and the provinces, because the bloodline of their former lords was extinct, recognized no one but Romans. Considering these things, no one will wonder at the ease with which Alexander held the state of Asia or at the difficulties others, such as Pyrrhus and many more, have faced in keeping what they had won. The cause was not the greater or lesser ability of the victor, but the differing nature of what was conquered.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication.
Why the Kingdom of Darius, Conquered by Alexander, Did Not Rebel Against Alexander's Successors After His Death
Given how hard it is to hold a newly conquered state, someone might wonder how Alexander the Great became ruler of Asia in a few years and then, almost as soon as he had conquered it, died without the whole state rebelling. A rebellion would have seemed likely. Yet his successors kept it, and their only trouble in holding it came from their own ambition and the conflicts it caused among them. My answer is that the principalities we know of are governed in two different ways. In one, there is a Prince and everyone else is his servant. They help govern his kingdom as officials only because he appoints them and allows them to do so. In the other, there is a Prince and there are barons. The barons hold their rank through their family lines, not through the ruler's favor. These barons have lands and subjects of their own. Their subjects recognize them as rulers and feel a natural loyalty toward them. In a state governed by a Prince and his servants, the Prince has more authority. Throughout his territory, no one recognizes any other person as a superior. If people obey someone else, they obey him as an official or agent, not because they have any special affection for him. Examples of these two kinds of government in our own time are the Turk and the King of France. The Turk's whole monarchy is governed by one ruler; all the others are his servants. He divides his kingdom into sanjaks, sends different governors to them, and replaces and moves them as he sees fit. But the King of France is surrounded by a long-established group of lords. Their subjects recognize and love them. They have privileges that the king cannot take away without putting himself in danger. So anyone who examines these two states will find that the Turk's state is hard to conquer, but very easy to hold once conquered.
The Turk's kingdom is hard to conquer because an invader cannot expect to be invited in by its nobles. Nor can he count on a rebellion by the people close to the ruler to make his undertaking easier. This follows from the reasons I have given. Since they are all servants and depend on him, they are harder to bribe. Even if they could be bribed, they would be of little use: for the reasons already given, they cannot bring the people with them. An attacker of the Turk must therefore expect to face a united state. He must rely on his own forces more than on disorder among his enemies. But once he has defeated the ruler in the field so completely that the ruler cannot raise another army, he need only worry about the Prince's family line. If that line is wiped out, there is no one left to fear, because the other officials have no standing with the people. Just as the conqueror could not rely on them before his victory, he need not fear them afterward.
The opposite happens in kingdoms governed like France. You can enter such a kingdom easily by winning over one of its barons, since there are always dissatisfied people who want change. For the reasons I have given, these men can open a way into the state and help you win. But once you have won, holding it brings endless problems, both with those who helped you and with those you defeated. Wiping out the Prince's family line is not enough. The remaining lords can lead fresh uprisings. You cannot satisfy them or get rid of them all, so you lose the state as soon as an opportunity arises. Now consider what kind of government Darius had. It was like the Turk's kingdom. Alexander therefore had to attack all of it and defeat its army in the field. After that victory, with Darius dead, Alexander's hold on the state was secure for the reasons I have explained. If his successors had stayed united, they could have enjoyed it without further effort. No disturbances arose in that kingdom except the ones they stirred up themselves. But it is impossible to hold states organized like France in such peace. That is why the Romans faced frequent rebellions in Spain, France, and Greece. Those territories had many principalities, and as long as people remembered them, Rome's hold on the territories remained uncertain. Once the memory of those principalities faded, Roman power and the long duration of Roman rule made its possession secure. Later, even when Romans fought one another, each side could draw support from parts of those territories according to the influence it had gained there. Since the families of their former rulers had died out, the people recognized no rulers but the Romans. Given all this, no one should be surprised that Alexander found it easy to hold Asia while others, such as Pyrrhus and many more, struggled to keep their conquests. The difference lay not in the conquerors' greater or lesser ability, but in the different kinds of territory they conquered.