Niccolò Machiavelli · Complete work
Chapter IX
Chapter IX of 27. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Del Principato civile.
Ma venendo all’altra parte quando un Principe cittadino, non per scelleratezza o altra intollerabile violenza, ma con il favore degli altri suoi cittadini diventa Principe della sua patria, il qual si può chiamare Principato civile, nè al pervenirvi è necessario o tutta virtù, o tutta fortuna, ma piuttosto un’astuzia fortunata; dico, che si ascende a questo Principato o col favore del popolo, o col favore de’ grandi. Perchè in ogni città si trovano questi duoi umori diversi, e nascono da questo, che il popolo desidera non esser comandato nè oppresso da’ grandi, e i grandi desiderano comandare e opprimere il popolo; e da questi duoi appetiti diversi surge nelle città uno de’ tre effetti, o Principato, o Libertà, o Licenza. Il Principato è causato o dal popolo, o da’ grandi, secondochè l’una, o l’altra di queste parte ne ha l’occasione; perchè vedendo i grandi non poter resistere al popolo, cominciano a voltare la riputazione ad uno di loro, e lo fanno Principe, per poter sotto l’ombra sua sfogare l’appetito loro. Il popolo ancora volta la riputazione ad un solo, vedendo non poter resistere alli grandi, e lo fa Principe, per essere con l’autorità sua difeso. Colui che viene al Principato con l’aiuto de’ grandi, si mantiene con più difficultà, che quello che diventa con l’aiuto del popolo; perchè si trova Principe con di molti intorno che a loro pare essere eguali a lui; e per questo non gli può nè comandare, nè maneggiare a suo modo. Ma colui che arriva al Principato con il favor popolare, vi si trova solo, e ha intorno o nessuno o pochissimi che non sieno parati ad ubbidire. Oltre a questo, non si può con onestà satisfare a’ grandi, e senza ingiuria d’altri, ma sibbene al popolo; perchè quello del popolo è più onesto fine che quel de’ grandi, volendo questi opprimere, e quello non essere oppresso. Aggiungesi ancora, che del popolo nimico il Principe non si può mai assicurare per essere troppi; de’ grandi si può assicurare per essere pochi.
Il peggio che possa aspettare un Principe dal popolo nimico, è l’essere abbandonato da lui; ma da’ grandi nimici non solo debbe temere di essere abbandonato, ma che ancor loro gli venghino contro; perchè essendo in quelli più vedere e più astuzia, avanzano sempre tempo per salvarsi, e cercano gradi con quello che sperano che vinca. È necessitato ancora il Principe vivere sempre con quel medesimo popolo, ma può ben fare senza quelli medesimi grandi, potendo farne e disfarne ogni dì, e torre e dare, quando gli piace, riputazione loro. E per chiarire meglio questa parte, dico, come i grandi si debbono considerare in duoi modi principalmente, cioè o si governano in modo col procedere loro, che si obbligano in tutto alla tua fortuna, o no; quelli che si obbligano, e non sieno rapaci, si debbono onorare ed amare; quelli che non si obbligano, si hanno a considerare in duoi modi: o fanno questo per pusillanimità e difetto naturale d’animo, ed allora ti debbi servir di loro, e di quelli massime che sono di buon consiglio; perchè nelle prosperità te ne onori, e nelle avversità non hai da temere. Ma quando non si obbligano ad arte, e per cagione ambiziosa, è segno come e’ pensano più a sè, che a te. E da quelli si deve il Principe guardare, e tenergli come se fussero scoperti nimici, perchè sempre nelle avversità l’aiuteranno rovinare. Debbe pertanto uno che diventa Principe per favore del popolo, mantenerselo amico; il che gli fia facile, non domandando lui se non di non essere oppresso. Ma uno che contro il popolo diventi Principe con il favor de’ grandi, deve innanzi ogni altra cosa cercare di guadagnarsi il popolo; il che gli fia facile, quando pigli la protezione sua. E perchè gli uomini, quando hanno bene da chi credevano aver male, si obbligano più al beneficatore loro, diventa il popolo suddito più suo benevolo, che se si fusse condotto al Principato per li suoi favori; e puosselo il Principe guadagnare in molti modi, li quali perchè variano secondo il suggetto, non se ne può dare certa regola; però si lasceranno indietro.
Conchiuderò solo che ad un Principe è necessario avere il popolo amico, altrimenti non ha nelle avversità rimedio. Nabide Principe degli Spartani sostenne l’ossidione di tutta Grecia e di uno esercito Romano vittoriosissimo, e difese contro a quelli la patria sua e il suo Stato, e gli bastò solo, sopravvenendo il pericolo, assicurarsi di pochi. Che se egli avessi avuto il popolo nemico, questo non gli bastava. E non sia alcuno che ripugni a questa mia opinione con quel proverbio trito, che chi fonda in sul populo fonda in sul fango; perchè quello è vero, quando un cittadino privato vi fa su fondamento, e dassi ad intendere che il popolo lo liberi quando esso fusse oppresso dagl’inimici, o da’ magistrati; in questo caso si potrebbe trovare spesso ingannato, come intervenne in Roma a’ Gracchi, ed a Firenze a Messer Giorgio Scali. Ma essendo un Principe quello che sopra vi si fonda, che possa comandare, e sia un uomo di cuore, nè si sbigottisca nelle avversità, e non manchi delle altre preparazioni, e tenga con l’animo e ordini suoi animato l’universale, non si troverà ingannato da lui, e gli parrà aver fatti i suoi fondamenti buoni. Sogliono questi Principati periclitare quando sono per salire dall’ordine civile allo assoluto: perchè questi Principi o comandano per loro medesimi, o per mezzo de’ magistrati. Nell’ultimo caso è più debole e più pericoloso lo Stato loro, perchè egli stanno al tutto con la volontà di quelli cittadini che sono preposti a’ magistrati, li quali, massimamente ne’ tempi avversi, gli possono torre con facilità grande lo Stato o con fargli contro, o col non l’ubbidire; e il Principe non è a tempo ne’ pericoli a pigliare l’autorità assoluta, perchè li cittadini, e sudditi, che sogliono avere li comandamenti da’ magistrati, non sono in quelli frangenti per ubbidire a’ suoi, e arà sempre ne’ tempi dubbi penuria di chi si possa fidare. Perchè simil Principe non può fondarsi sopra quello che vede ne’ tempi quieti, quando i cittadini hanno bisogno dello Stato; perchè allora ognuno corre, ognuno promette, e ciascuno vuole morire per lui quando la morte è discosto; ma ne’ tempi avversi, quando lo Stato ha bisogno de’ cittadini, allora se ne trova pochi. E tanto più è questa esperienza pericolosa, quanto la non si può fare se non una volta. Però uno Principe savio deve pensare un modo, per il quale li suoi cittadini sempre, ed in ogni modo e qualità di tempo, abbino bisogno dello Stato di lui, e sempre poi gli saranno fedeli.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication for fidelity, Machiavelli’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
Of the Civil Principality
Turning now to the other case, when a citizen becomes Prince of his country not through crime or other intolerable violence but with the favor of his fellow citizens—a position that may be called a civil principality, and one attained not by ability alone or fortune alone but rather by fortunate shrewdness—I say that one rises to this principality with the support either of the people or of the nobles. For these two different dispositions are found in every city: the people desire neither to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles desire to rule and oppress the people. From these two opposing appetites arises one of three outcomes in a city: principality, liberty, or license. A principality is brought about either by the people or by the nobles, according to which side finds its opportunity. For when the nobles see that they cannot resist the people, they begin to direct their esteem toward one of their own and make him Prince, so that beneath his protection they may indulge their appetite. The people likewise turn their esteem toward one man when they see that they cannot resist the nobles, and make him Prince so that his authority may protect them. He who comes to the principality with the help of the nobles maintains himself with greater difficulty than he who comes with the help of the people. He finds himself a Prince surrounded by many who consider themselves his equals; he cannot command or manage them as he wishes. But he who attains the principality with popular favor stands alone and has around him either no one, or very few, unwilling to obey. Furthermore, one cannot satisfy the nobles honorably and without injury to others, but one can satisfy the people: the people's aim is more honorable than that of the nobles, since the latter wish to oppress, while the former wish not to be oppressed. Moreover, a Prince can never make himself safe from a hostile people, because they are too many; he can make himself safe from the nobles, because they are few.
The worst a Prince can expect from a hostile people is that they will abandon him. From hostile nobles he must fear not only abandonment but active opposition: having greater foresight and cunning, they always act in time to save themselves and seek favor with whoever they expect to win. The Prince must also always live with the same people, but he can readily do without the same nobles: he can make and unmake them every day, taking away or granting their standing as he pleases. To make this point clearer, I say that nobles must be considered chiefly in two ways: either their conduct binds them wholly to your fortune, or it does not. Those who bind themselves to you, provided they are not rapacious, should be honored and loved. Those who do not must be considered in two ways. If they hold back from faintheartedness and a natural lack of courage, you should make use of them, especially those whose counsel is good: in prosperity they will bring you honor, and in adversity you need not fear them. But when they deliberately withhold their allegiance out of ambition, it is a sign that they think more of themselves than of you. A Prince should guard against these men and treat them as open enemies, since in adversity they will always help bring him down. Therefore a man who becomes Prince through the favor of the people must keep them friendly; this will be easy, since all they ask is not to be oppressed. But a man who becomes Prince through the favor of the nobles, against the people, must seek above all to win the people to his side. He will find this easy if he takes them under his protection. For when men receive good from someone from whom they expected evil, they become more beholden to their benefactor: the people become more favorably disposed to him than if he had risen to the principality with their own support. A Prince can win them over in many ways; these vary with the circumstances, so no certain rule can be given, and I shall pass them over.
I conclude only that a Prince must have the people as his friends; otherwise he has no remedy in adversity. Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, withstood the siege of all Greece and a most victorious Roman army, defending his country and his state against them. When danger came, it was enough for him to secure himself against a few men. Had the people been his enemies, that would not have sufficed. And let no one object to my opinion with the worn proverb that whoever builds on the people builds on mud. That is true when a private citizen makes the people his foundation and imagines that they will rescue him when enemies or magistrates oppress him. He may often find himself deceived, as the Gracchi did in Rome and Messer Giorgio Scali in Florence. But if the man who relies on the people is a Prince able to command, a man of courage who does not lose heart in adversity, who has made the other necessary preparations and keeps the whole people resolute by his spirit and his institutions, they will not fail him, and he will find that his foundations were sound. Such principalities usually come into danger when they are about to rise from civil government to absolute rule, for these Princes govern either in person or through magistrates. In the latter case their position is weaker and more dangerous, because they depend entirely on the will of those citizens who hold the magistracies. These men can, especially in adverse times, very easily take away their state, either by opposing them or by refusing to obey them. Amid danger the Prince has no time to assume absolute authority, because citizens and subjects accustomed to receiving commands from the magistrates will not obey his commands at such a moment. In uncertain times he will always find few people he can trust. For such a Prince cannot rely on what he observes in quiet times, when citizens need the state. Then everyone runs to his aid, everyone makes promises, and everyone is ready to die for him when death is far away. But in adverse times, when the state needs its citizens, few can be found. This test is all the more dangerous because it can be made only once. A wise Prince must therefore devise a way for his citizens always, in every circumstance and season, to need his state; then they will always remain faithful to him.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication.
On the Civil Principality
Now let us turn to the other way: a citizen becomes Prince of his own country with the support of his fellow citizens, not through crime or other unbearable violence. This can be called a civil principality. It takes neither pure ability nor pure fortune to gain it, but rather a kind of cleverness helped by luck. A man rises to this principality with the support either of the people or of the powerful. Every city has these two groups with different aims. The people do not want to be ruled or oppressed by the powerful, while the powerful want to rule and oppress the people. These opposing desires produce one of three results in a city: a principality, freedom, or lawlessness. A principality comes from either the people or the powerful, depending on which group has the opportunity. When the powerful see that they cannot withstand the people, they begin to rally around one of their own and make him Prince. Under his protection they can then satisfy their desire to dominate. The people also rally around one person and make him Prince when they see that they cannot withstand the powerful. They do so to gain his protection. A man who becomes Prince with the help of the powerful has a harder time holding on to power than one who becomes Prince with the people's help. He finds himself surrounded by many people who think they are his equals, so he cannot command or deal with them as he wishes. The man who reaches power with popular support stands alone. Few or none of those around him are unwilling to obey him. What is more, a Prince cannot satisfy the powerful honestly and without harming others. He can satisfy the people, since their aim is more reasonable: the powerful want to oppress others, and the people simply want to avoid oppression. There is another point. A Prince can never make himself safe from a hostile people, because there are too many of them. He can make himself safe from hostile powerful men, because there are few of them.
The worst a Prince can expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned. Hostile powerful men may not only abandon him but turn against him. They are more perceptive and cunning, so they act early to protect themselves and seek positions with whoever they expect to win. A Prince must always live with the same people, but he need not keep the same powerful men. He can raise them up or bring them down every day, and give or take away their standing whenever he likes. To make this clearer, there are two main kinds of powerful men. Some bind their future entirely to yours; others do not. Those who commit themselves to you and are not greedy deserve honor and affection. Of those who do not commit themselves, some hold back because they lack courage or strength of character. You should make use of them, especially the ones who give good advice. They will bring you credit in good times, and you need not fear them in bad times. But if they hold back deliberately out of ambition, they are thinking more of themselves than of you. A Prince should be on guard against them and treat them like open enemies. When things go wrong, they will always help bring him down. A man who becomes Prince with the people's support must therefore keep their friendship. That will be easy, since all they ask is not to be oppressed. But a man who becomes Prince through the support of the powerful and against the people's wishes must make winning over the people his first concern. He can do this easily if he takes them under his protection. When people receive good treatment from someone they expected to treat them badly, they feel all the more indebted to him. The people then become more loyal to him than they would have been if they had helped him gain power in the first place. A Prince can win them over in many ways. These depend on the circumstances, so no fixed rule can be given, and I will leave them aside.
I will say only this: a Prince must have the people on his side. Otherwise, he has no way out when things go badly. Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, stood up to a siege by all of Greece and a highly successful Roman army. He defended his country and his state against them. When danger came, all he had to do was secure himself against a few men. That would not have been enough if the people had been his enemies. Nor should anyone use the worn-out saying that a man who builds on the people builds on mud to argue against me. The saying is true when a private citizen relies on the people and imagines they will rescue him if enemies or officials come after him. He may often find himself mistaken, as the Gracchi did in Rome and Messer Giorgio Scali did in Florence. But suppose it is a Prince who relies on the people. He can issue orders, he has courage, he does not panic when things go wrong, and he has made the other necessary preparations. If his spirit and his arrangements keep the whole population confident, he will not be let down by the people. He will find that his foundations are sound. Such principalities are often in danger when they are about to move from a civilian form of government to absolute rule. Their Princes govern either directly or through magistrates. In the latter case their position is weaker and more dangerous, because they depend entirely on the will of the citizens appointed as magistrates. Especially in a crisis, those officials can easily take away a Prince's power by opposing him or simply refusing to obey him. In a moment of danger the Prince has no time to take absolute authority. Citizens and subjects are used to taking orders from the magistrates, and they will not obey his own orders during a crisis. In uncertain times he will always find few people he can trust. A Prince like this cannot rely on what he sees in peaceful times, when the citizens need the state. Then everyone hurries to his side and makes promises. Everyone offers to die for him when death is far away. But when the state needs its citizens in hard times, few are there. This is a particularly dangerous lesson to learn because a Prince gets only one chance to learn it. A wise Prince must therefore find a way to make his citizens need his government at all times and in every kind of situation. Then they will always remain loyal to him.