Niccolò Machiavelli · Complete work
Chapter X
Chapter X of 27. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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In che modo le forze di tutti i Principati si debbino misurare.
Conviene avere, nell’esaminare le qualità di questi Principati, un’altra considerazione; cioè se un Principe ha tanto Stato, che possa, bisognando, per sè medesimo reggersi, ovvero se ha sempre necessità della defensione d’altri. E, per chiarire meglio questa parte, dico, come io giudico potersi coloro reggere per sè medesimi, che possono o per abbondanzia d’uomini, o di danari, mettere insieme un esercito giusto, e fare una giornata con qualunque li viene ad assaltare; e così giudico coloro aver sempre necessità d’altri, che non possono comparire contro gli inimici in campagna, ma sono necessitati rifuggirsi dentro alle mura, e guardare quelle. Nel primo caso si è discorso; e per l’avvenire diremo quello che ne occorre. Nel secondo caso non si può dire altro, salvo che confortare tali Principi a munire e fortificare la terra propria, e del paese non tenere alcun conto. E qualunque arà bene fortificata la sua terra, e circa gli altri governi con i sudditi si sia maneggiato, come di sopra è detto, e di sotto si dirà, sarà sempre assaltato con gran rispetto; perchè gli uomini sono sempre nimici delle imprese, dove si vegga difficultà; nè si può vedere facilità assaltando uno che abbia la sua terra gagliarda, e non sia odiato dal popolo.
Le città d’Alemagna sono liberissime, hanno poco contado, ed ubbidiscono all’Imperadore quando le vogliono, e non temono nè questo, nè altro potente che l’abbino intorno, perchè le sono in modo fortificate, che ciascuno pensa la espugnazione di esse dovere essere tediosa e difficile, perchè tutte hanno fossi e mura convenienti, hanno artiglieria a sufficienza, e tengono sempre nelle canove pubbliche da mangiare e da bere, e da ardere per un anno. Ed oltre a questo, per potere tenere la plebe pasciuta, e senza perdita del pubblico, hanno sempre in comune per un anno da poter dar loro da lavorare in quelli esercizi che siano il nervo e la vita di quella città, e dell’industria de’ quali la plebe si pasca; tengono ancora gli esercizi militari in riputazione, e sopra questo hanno molti ordini a mantenerli. Un Principe adunque che abbia una città forte, e non si facci odiare, non può essere assaltato; e se pur fusse chi lo assaltasse, se ne partirebbe con vergogna; perchè le cose del mondo sono sì varie, che egli è quasi impossibile che uno possa con gli eserciti stare un anno ozioso, e campeggiarlo. E chi replicasse, se il popolo arà le sue possessioni fuora, e veggale ardere, non arà pazienza; e il lungo assedio e la carità propria gli farà dimenticare il Principe; rispondo che un Principe potente ed animoso supererà sempre quelle difficultà, dando ora speranza a’ sudditi che il male non sia lungo, ora timore della crudeltà del nimico, ora assicurandosi con destrezza di quelli che gli paressono troppo arditi.
Oltre a questo il nimico debbe ragionevolmente ardere e rovinare il paese loro in su la giunta sua, e ne’ tempi quando gli animi degli uomini sono ancora caldi, e volenterosi alla difesa; e però tanto meno il Principe debbe dubitare, perchè dopo qualche giorno che gli animi sono raffredditi, sono di già fatti i danni, sono ricevuti i mali, e non vi è più rimedio; ed allora tanto più si vengono ad unire col loro Principe, parendo che esso abbia con loro obligo, essendo state loro arse le case, e rovinate le possessioni per la difesa sua. E la natura degli uomini è, così obligarsi per li beneficii che essi fanno, come per quelli che essi ricevono. Onde se si considera bene tutto, non fia difficile a un Principe prudente tenere prima e poi fermi gli animi de’ suoi cittadini nella ossidione, quando non gli manchi da vivere, nè da difendersi.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication for fidelity, Machiavelli’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
How the Strength of Every Principality Should Be Measured
In examining the character of these principalities, we must consider one further point: whether a Prince possesses a state strong enough to stand on its own when necessary, or always needs the defense of others. To make this clearer, I judge those able to stand on their own who, through an abundance of men or money, can assemble an adequate army and give battle to anyone who attacks them. I judge those always in need of others who cannot meet their enemies in the field, but are forced to take refuge within their walls and defend them. The first case has been discussed, and I shall say more about it when the occasion arises. In the second, nothing can be said except to urge such Princes to provision and fortify their own city, and to take no account of the surrounding countryside. Anyone who has fortified his city well and governed his subjects in the ways I have described above and shall describe below will always be attacked with great caution. For men are always averse to undertakings that appear difficult, and there can be no appearance of ease in attacking someone whose city is strong and whose people do not hate him.
The cities of Germany are very free. They have little territory beyond their walls and obey the Emperor when they choose. They fear neither him nor any other neighboring power, because they are so well fortified that anyone contemplating their capture expects a long and difficult task. All have proper ditches and walls and enough artillery; in their public storehouses they always keep a year's supply of food, drink, and fuel. Furthermore, so that the common people may be fed without expense to the public treasury, they always keep in communal reserve the means to give them a year's work in the trades that are the sinew and life of each city, and by which the common people earn their living. They also hold military training in high esteem and have many institutions to sustain it. A Prince, then, who has a strong city and does not make himself hated cannot be attacked; and if anyone did attack him, that man would depart in disgrace. For the affairs of the world are so changeable that it is almost impossible for someone to keep an army idle in the field besieging him for a year. If anyone objects that the people, seeing their property outside the walls go up in flames, will lose patience, and that a long siege and concern for their own interests will make them forget the Prince, I answer that a powerful and courageous Prince will always overcome those difficulties. At one moment he will give his subjects hope that their suffering will not last long, at another he will make them fear the enemy's cruelty, and at another he will discreetly secure himself against those who seem too bold.
Besides this, the enemy will naturally burn and ruin their countryside upon his arrival, when men's spirits are still ardent and eager for defense. The Prince therefore has less cause to fear: a few days later, when their ardor has cooled, the damage has already been done, the suffering endured, and there is no remedy. Then they become all the more united with their Prince, since it seems that he owes them a debt: their houses were burned and their property ruined in his defense. It is human nature to feel bound by the benefits one gives as much as by those one receives. Considering everything, then, a prudent Prince will find it no difficult matter to keep his citizens' spirits firm both at the beginning and throughout a siege, provided they have food and the means to defend themselves.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication.
How to Measure the Strength of Every Principality
There is another question to consider when judging these principalities. Does a Prince have enough power to stand on his own when necessary, or does he always need someone else to defend him? To make this clear, I believe that a Prince can stand on his own if he has enough men or money to put together a proper army and fight a battle against anyone who attacks him. Those who cannot face an enemy in the field and must retreat behind their walls to defend them will always need others. I have discussed the first case and will return to it where necessary. As for the second, all I can say is that these Princes should arm and fortify their own cities and pay no attention to the surrounding countryside. Anyone who fortifies his city well and deals with his subjects as I have said above and will say below will always make an attacker think twice. People dislike undertakings that look difficult, and attacking a man with a strong city who is not hated by his people does not look easy.
The cities of Germany have a great deal of freedom. They hold little surrounding territory and obey the emperor only when they want to. They fear neither him nor any other powerful neighbor. Their defenses are so strong that everyone expects taking them to be a long and difficult job. Every city has suitable ditches and walls, enough artillery, and a year's supply of food, drink, and fuel in public storehouses. Beyond this, they can keep the common people fed without draining public funds: they keep enough resources in common to give them a year's work in the trades that are the city's mainstay and that provide their living. They also hold military training in high regard and have many rules to keep it going. So a Prince who has a strong city and does not make himself hated cannot be attacked successfully. If anyone does attack, he will leave in disgrace. Conditions in the world change so much that an army can hardly sit idle for a whole year while laying siege to a city. Someone might reply that the people will see their property outside the walls burning and lose patience. A long siege and concern for their own interests will make them forget their Prince. My answer is that a strong and courageous Prince will always overcome these difficulties. At one moment he can give his subjects hope that their suffering will not last long; at another he can make them fear the enemy's cruelty. He can also discreetly protect himself against anyone he thinks is becoming too bold.
Besides, the enemy will probably burn and ruin the countryside when he first arrives, while the people are still full of energy and eager to defend themselves. The Prince therefore has less reason to worry. After a few days their initial excitement will cool, but the damage will already have been done, the losses suffered, and nothing can put things right. They will then draw closer to their Prince. They will feel he owes them something because their houses have been burned and their property ruined in his defense. Human beings feel a bond through the good they do for others as well as through the good they receive. Taking all this into account, a sensible Prince should have little trouble keeping his citizens determined both at the beginning of a siege and afterward, provided they have food and the means to defend themselves.