Book II, 1267a–1270b

Equality of wealth among the citizens is, then, of some advantage in preventing faction among them, though its importance is, so to speak, slight. For the1267a40 more cultivated may resent it, thinking themselves worthy of more than an equal share; hence they often appear to launch attacks and stir up faction.

Furthermore,1267b1 human wickedness is insatiable. At first a payment of two obols alone is enough; but once this has become customary, people always want more, until they reach the point of having no limit. For desire is by nature unlimited, and its fulfillment is what most people5 live for. The principle for dealing with such matters, rather than equalizing wealth, is to form those who are decent by nature so that they do not wish to take more than their share, and the inferior so that they cannot. This will be so if they are weaker and are not treated unjustly. Nor has he properly explained equality of wealth. For10 he equalizes only landed property, but wealth also consists of slaves, livestock, and money, as well as an abundance of what are called furnishings. We must therefore seek either equality in all these things or some moderate arrangement, or leave them all alone. His legislation also appears to make the city small,15 if indeed all the artisans are to be public slaves and contribute nothing to the city's citizen population. But if those who perform public work must be public slaves, the arrangement should be like that at Epidamnus, or the one Diophantus once established at Athens. Concerning the constitution of Phaleas,20 these considerations should enable one to judge, more or less, whether anything he has said is sound or unsound.

Hippodamus of Miletus, the son of Euryphon, invented the division of cities into blocks and laid out the Piraeus. In his other habits too he was unusually extravagant through his love of distinction, to such a degree1267b25 that some thought his way of life excessively elaborate, with his abundant hair and costly adornment, and also his clothing, cheap but warm, not only in winter but in the summer months as well; and he wished to be learned about nature as a whole. He was the first of those not taking part in public life to attempt to speak about the constitution30 that is best. He designed a city with a population of ten thousand men, divided into three parts: he made one part artisans, another farmers, and the third those who fought in its defense and possessed arms. He also divided the territory into three parts, sacred, public, and private: the land from which35 they would provide the customary offerings to the gods was sacred; that from which the defenders would obtain their livelihood was common; and the farmers' land was private. He thought there were only three kinds of laws, since the matters giving rise to lawsuits were three in number: outrage, injury, and death. He also legislated for a single law court with40 sovereign authority, to which all cases thought to have been wrongly decided must be referred. He constituted it from certain elders1268a1 chosen for the purpose.

He thought judgments in the law courts should not be given by casting votes. Instead, each juror should bring a tablet on which, if he found wholly against the defendant, he would write the penalty; if he acquitted him wholly, he would leave it blank; and if he accepted one part but not another, this would1268a5 be specified. For he thought the existing law was not well framed, since it compelled jurors to commit perjury by deciding one way or the other. He also made a law that those who discovered something advantageous to the city should receive an honor, and that the children of those who died in war should be maintained at public expense, as though this had not yet been10 legislated elsewhere. This law now exists both at Athens and in other cities. All rulers were to be chosen by the people, and he made the people consist of the three parts of the city. Those chosen were to attend to public affairs, the affairs of foreigners, and those of orphans.

These, then, are most of the provisions, and1268a15 the most noteworthy, in Hippodamus's arrangement. One might first question the division of the citizen population. For the artisans, the farmers, and those who possess arms all share in the constitution, though the farmers have no arms, and the artisans neither land nor arms,20 so that they become almost slaves of those who possess arms. It is therefore impossible for them to share in all the honors, since the generals, the guardians of the citizens, and, so to speak, the most authoritative offices must be drawn from those who possess arms. Yet if they have no share in the constitution, how can they be well disposed25 toward it? Moreover, those who possess arms must be stronger than both the other parts. This is not easy unless they are numerous; but if they are, why must the others share in the constitution and have authority over the appointment of rulers? Furthermore, what use are the farmers to the city? Artisans30 are necessary, since every city needs artisans, and they can live by their craft, as in other cities. If the farmers provided those who possess arms with food, they would reasonably be a part of the city; but as things stand, they have private land and will farm it privately.35 Furthermore, if the defenders themselves farm the common land from which they are to obtain their food, the fighting and farming elements will not be separate, as the legislator wishes. But if those who farm it are different both from those who farm the private land and from the fighters, this will in turn be a fourth part of the city, having no40 share, but standing outside the constitution. Yet if one makes the farmers of the private and the common land the same people, there will be a difficulty about the quantity of produce that1268b1 each will raise for two households,

and why will they not simply take their own food from the same land and the same allotments and also provide it for the fighters? All these matters, then, involve great confusion. Nor is the law concerning judgment1268b5 well framed: it requires the juror to make distinctions in his verdict, though the claim is stated without qualification, and turns the juror into an arbitrator. This is possible in arbitration even when there are several arbitrators, since they confer with one another about the judgment. In the law courts, however, it is not possible; indeed, precisely the opposite is what most legislators10 arrange for: jurors must not confer with one another. Again, how will the judgment not be confused when the juror thinks something is owed, but not as much as the litigant claims? The litigant claims twenty minas, but the juror will award ten minas, or the one more and the other less; another juror will award five,15 and another four. Plainly, they will divide the amount in this way, while some will award the whole claim and others nothing. What, then, will be the method of counting the votes? Furthermore, nothing compels a juror who acquits or condemns without qualification to commit perjury, provided the charge is stated without qualification and he judges justly. For the juror who acquits does not judge that nothing20 is owed, but that the twenty minas are not owed. Rather, it is the juror who condemns while not believing the twenty minas are owed who commits perjury.

As for the proposal that those who discover something advantageous to the city should receive an honor, it is unsafe to legislate this: it merely sounds attractive. For it opens the way1268b25 to malicious accusations and, perhaps, changes of constitution. It also leads into another problem and a further inquiry. Some question whether it is harmful or advantageous to cities to change their ancestral laws when another law is better. Hence it is not easy to agree quickly to the proposal just mentioned, if indeed it is not advantageous30 to make changes; and some may propose the abolition of laws or of a constitution as a common good. Since we have mentioned the matter, it is better to make a few further distinctions about it. For, as we said, it presents a difficulty, and making changes might seem better. At any rate, this has proved advantageous in the other sciences:35 medicine, for example, has changed from ancestral practice, as have physical training and, in general, all the arts and capacities. Since political science too must be counted as one of these, it is clear that the same must necessarily hold for it. One might say that the facts themselves provide evidence, since the ancient laws were exceedingly simple40 and barbarous. For the Greeks used to carry arms and buy their wives from one another, and whatever remains anywhere of the ancient customs is altogether naive,

1269a1such as the law at Cyme concerning homicide: if the person prosecuting a murder produces a certain number of witnesses from among his own relatives, the defendant is guilty of murder. In general, everyone seeks not what is ancestral but what is good. It is likely that the5 first people, whether they were born from the earth or survived some destruction, were like ordinary, foolish people, as is indeed said of the earthborn; so it is absurd to abide by their decisions. Moreover, it is no better to leave even written laws unchanged. For just as in the other arts,10 so too in the political order it is impossible for everything to be set down precisely in writing. What is written must be general, but actions concern particulars.

From these considerations, then, it is evident that some laws must sometimes be changed. But viewed in another way, the matter would seem to call for great caution. For when1269a15 the improvement is slight, while it is bad to accustom people to abolishing laws readily, it is evident that some errors of legislators and rulers should be allowed to stand. For the benefit from making the change will not be as great as the harm from becoming accustomed to disobeying the rulers. The example drawn from the arts is also misleading; for it is not20 the same to change an art as to change a law. Law has no strength to secure obedience apart from habit, and habit develops only over a long time. Thus, to change readily from existing laws to other, new laws is to weaken the power of law. Furthermore, if25 laws indeed must be changed, should all of them be changed, and in every constitution, or not? And should anyone at all make changes, or only certain people? These things make a great difference. Let us therefore leave this inquiry for now; it belongs to another occasion.

Concerning the constitution of the Lacedaemonians and that of Crete,1269a30 and indeed nearly all other constitutions, there are two inquiries: one is whether anything has been legislated well or badly with reference to the best arrangement; the other is whether anything runs counter to the basic aim and character of the constitution they have set before themselves. It is agreed that a city intending to be well governed35 must have leisure from necessary tasks; but how to secure this is not easy to determine. For the serf class of Thessaly has often attacked the Thessalians, as have the helots the Laconians: they are constantly lying in wait, as it were, for their misfortunes. Among the Cretans,40 however, nothing of the kind has yet occurred. Perhaps the reason is that the neighboring1269b1 cities,

although they make war on one another, never ally themselves with those who revolt, since this would not be advantageous to cities that themselves possess dependent populations. All the Laconians' neighbors, however, were enemies: the Argives, Messenians, and Arcadians.1269b5 For in Thessaly too the serfs first revolted because the Thessalians were still at war with their neighbors, the Achaeans, Perrhaebians, and Magnesians. Even if there were no other difficulty, the matter of supervision at least seems troublesome: in what manner should one deal with them? If given freedom, they become insolent and think themselves worthy of equal standing10 with their masters; if made to live in hardship, they plot against them and hate them. It is clear, then, that those whose system of helotry has these results have not discovered the best method.

Furthermore, the laxity in matters concerning women is harmful both to the constitution's aim and to the city's happiness. For just as1269b15 man and woman are parts of a household, it is clear that a city too must be regarded as divided roughly in two, into its male and female populations. Thus, in all constitutions where the arrangements concerning women are bad, half the city must be regarded as unregulated by law. This is precisely what has happened there. For the whole20 city was to be capable of endurance, as the legislator wished; he has plainly achieved this with the men but has neglected the women. They live without restraint, in every kind of indulgence and in luxury. Wealth must therefore be honored in such a constitution, especially if the people happen to be ruled by women,25 as are most military and warlike peoples, apart from the Celts and any others who have openly honored sexual intercourse with males. For the first teller of the myth seems not without reason to have joined Ares with Aphrodite: all such people evidently fall captive either to intercourse with males30 or to intercourse with women. Hence this was the case among the Laconians, and many affairs were administered by women during their period of rule. Yet what difference is there between women ruling and rulers being ruled by women? The result is the same. Whatever use35 boldness has, it is in none of the ordinary pursuits, but, if anywhere, in war; even in this respect, the Laconian women were most harmful. They showed this during the Theban invasion: they were of no use, as in other cities, but caused more uproar than the enemy. From the outset, then,40 it seems reasonable that among the Laconians the women came to enjoy this1270a1 laxity.

For they spent a long time away from their own land on military campaigns, fighting the war against the Argives and then those against the Arcadians and Messenians. When they had leisure, they presented themselves to the legislator already prepared1270a5 by military life, for it contains many elements of virtue. As for the women, they say that Lycurgus tried to bring them under the laws, but when they resisted he abandoned the attempt. These, then, are the causes of what came about, and therefore plainly of this error too. But we10 are not examining whom we should or should not excuse, but what is right and what is not. As was said earlier, the unsatisfactory condition of matters concerning women seems not only to bring a certain impropriety to the constitution in itself, but also to contribute to the love of money.15 For after what has now been said, one might criticize the inequality of property. Some of them have come to possess far too much wealth, and others extremely little; hence the land has passed into the hands of a few. The laws too have regulated this badly. For buying or20 selling one's existing property was made dishonorable by the legislator, and rightly so; yet he allowed anyone who wished to give it away or bequeath it. But the same result necessarily follows by either route. Moreover, nearly two-fifths of the whole territory belongs to women, both because many become heiresses25 and because large dowries are given. Yet it would have been better to prescribe no dowry, or a small or moderate one. As things stand, a man may give his heiress in marriage to anyone he wishes, and if he dies without making arrangements, whoever he leaves as his heir may give her to anyone he wishes. Consequently, though the territory can support a thousand cavalrymen30 and five hundred more, and thirty thousand hoplites, their total number was not even a thousand. The facts themselves have made it clear that this arrangement was bad for them: the city could not withstand a single blow, but was destroyed because of its lack of men. They say that under the earlier35 kings they gave others a share in the constitution, so that there was then no shortage of men despite their long wars; and they say that the Spartans once numbered as many as ten thousand. Nevertheless, whether this is true or not, it is better for the city's number of men to grow through an equalization of property. But40 the law concerning the begetting of children also runs counter to this reform.

1270b1For the legislator, wishing the Spartans to be as numerous as possible, encourages the citizens to have as many children as possible. They have a law exempting the father of three sons from garrison duty, and the father of four from all public obligations. Yet5 it is evident that if many children are born while the territory is divided in this way, many must become poor.

Moreover, the arrangements concerning the ephorate are bad. This office has sovereign authority over their most important affairs, but the ephors are drawn from the whole people, so that men who are very1270b10 poor often come into office, and their poverty makes them open to purchase. They have shown this often before, and now in the affair of the Andrians: some of them, corrupted by money, did all they could to destroy the whole city. Because the office is excessively powerful and equal to a tyranny, courting15 them became necessary even for the kings, so that in this respect too the constitution suffered further harm: it changed from an aristocracy into a democracy. This office does, then, hold the constitution together. For the people remain quiet because they share in the greatest office; thus, whether this has come about through the legislator or by20 chance, it is advantageous to their affairs. For if a constitution is to be preserved, all parts of the city must wish it to exist and to remain unchanged. The kings have this disposition because of their own honor, the noble and good because of the council of elders, since this office is a prize25 for virtue, and the people because of the ephorate, since it is drawn from everyone. But although this office should be chosen from everyone, it should not be chosen in the present manner, which is altogether childish. Furthermore, the ephors have authority over important judgments though they are ordinary people; hence, rather than their own discretion,30 written rules and the laws should guide their judgments. The ephors' way of life is also inconsistent with the city's intention. Their own is excessively lax, while in the case of others it goes too far toward severity, so that they cannot endure it, but secretly evade the law35 and enjoy bodily pleasures.

So equal wealth among citizens does help keep them from forming factions against each other. But its help isn't very great, you might say. For people1267a40 of refinement might resent it, thinking they deserve more than equal shares. That's why we often see them attacking the government and forming factions.

What's more,1267b1 human wickedness is never satisfied. At first, just a payment of two small coins called obols is enough. But once that has become the established practice, people always want more, until they go on without limit. Desire has no limit by nature, and satisfying it is what most people5 live for. So the starting point in these matters isn't so much to equalize wealth. It's to shape people who are decent by nature so they don't want more than their share, and bad people so they can't get it. This happens if they are weaker and aren't treated unjustly. His account of equal wealth isn't right either. For10 he makes only landed property equal. But wealth also consists of slaves, livestock, money, and large stocks of what are called household goods. So we must either seek equality in all these things, or some moderate arrangement, or leave them all alone. His legislation also seems to make the city small,15 if all the craftsmen are to be publicly owned and aren't to form part of the city's population. But if those who do public work must be publicly owned, the arrangement must be like the one in Epidamnus, or the one Diophantus once set up in Athens. So, concerning Phaleas's constitution,20 these points should be enough to let us judge whether anything he has said is right or wrong.

Hippodamus of Miletus, the son of Euryphon, invented the division of cities into districts and laid out Piraeus. In other parts of his life too, his wish to stand out made him so unconventional1267b25 that some people thought he was overdoing things, with his mass of hair and expensive ornaments. He also wore cheap but warm clothing, not just in winter but in summer too. He wanted to be knowledgeable about nature as a whole. He was the first person who didn't take part in public life to attempt an account of the constitution30 that is best. He designed a city with a population of ten thousand men, divided into three groups. One group consisted of craftsmen, one of farmers, and the third of those who fought in its defense and had arms. He also divided the land into three parts: sacred, public, and private. The land that provided35 for the customary worship of the gods was sacred. The land that supported those who fought in the city's defense was common land, and the farmers' land was private. He also thought there were only three kinds of law. There were, he said, only three things that lawsuits concerned: violent abuse, damage, and killing. He also established a single law court as the40 authoritative one. All cases thought to have been wrongly decided were to be referred to it. He made this court consist of certain elderly men1268a1 chosen for the task.

He thought decisions in law courts shouldn't be made by casting votes. Instead, each juror should bring a tablet. If he found fully against the defendant, he should write the penalty on it. If he acquitted him fully, he should leave it blank. If he found against him on some points but not others, that distinction1268a5 should be specified. He thought the current law was unsatisfactory, because it forced jurors to break their oath by deciding one way or the other. He also made a law that people who discovered something useful to the city should receive an honor. The children of those who died in war were to be supported at public expense, as if this hadn't yet been10 made law anywhere else. But this law now exists in Athens and in other cities too. All the rulers were to be chosen by the people. He made the people consist of the city's three groups. Those chosen were to oversee public affairs, affairs concerning foreigners, and affairs concerning orphans.

These, then, are most of the proposals, and1268a15 the most important ones, in Hippodamus's arrangement. The first difficulty someone might raise concerns his division of the citizens. The craftsmen, the farmers, and those who have arms all share in the constitution. Yet the farmers have no arms, and the craftsmen have neither land nor arms,20 so they become practically slaves of those who own arms. They can't, then, share in all the public honors. The generals, the guardians of the citizens, and practically all the most authoritative offices must be appointed from those who have arms. But if the others don't share in the constitution, how can they be friendly25 toward it? Those who own arms must also be stronger than both the other groups. That isn't easy unless there are many of them. But if that is the case, why should the others share in the constitution and have authority over the appointment of rulers? Also, what use are the farmers to the city? Craftsmen30 are necessary, since every city needs them. And they can live by their craft, as they do in other cities. If the farmers supplied food to those who own arms, it would make sense for them to be part of the city. As things stand, though, they have private land and will farm it for themselves.35 And what about the common land that is to provide food for those who fight in the city's defense? If they farm it themselves, the fighting group and the farming group won't be separate, as the lawgiver wants them to be. If the farmers of this land are different both from those who farm their private land and from the fighters, they will form a fourth part of the city. They will have no40 share in anything, but will stand outside the constitution. On the other hand, if someone makes the same people farm both the private land and the common land, there will be a problem with the amount of produce that1268b1 each farmer must grow for two households.

And why won't they simply get their own food and supply the fighters from the same land and the same plots? All these arrangements are very confused. The law about decisions in court1268b5 isn't right either. It asks for a divided judgment when the claim has been stated without division, and makes the juror into an arbitrator. This is possible in arbitration, even with several arbitrators, because they discuss the decision with one another. But it isn't possible in law courts. In fact, the opposite is what most lawgivers10 arrange: they keep jurors from discussing the case with one another. Besides, how can the decision avoid confusion when a juror thinks something is owed, but not as much as the claimant asks? The claimant asks for twenty money-units called minas, but the juror will award ten minas, or one will award more and another less. Another awards five,15 and another four. Clearly, they will divide the award in this way. Some will award the whole amount, and others nothing. How, then, will the votes be counted? Also, nothing forces a person who simply rejects or accepts the claim to break his oath, if the claim has been stated without division and he judges justly. The person who rejects it doesn't judge that nothing20 is owed, but that the twenty minas aren't owed. It is the person who accepts the claim, without thinking the twenty minas are owed, who breaks his oath.

As for giving an honor to people who discover something useful to the city, it isn't safe to make this a law. It merely sounds attractive. For it brings1268b25 malicious accusations and perhaps changes in the constitution. It also leads into another problem and another inquiry. Some people ask whether changing ancestral laws, when another law is better, harms cities or helps them. So it isn't easy to agree quickly with the proposal just mentioned, if it isn't an advantage30 to change laws. Some people may propose abolishing laws or a constitution as a public good. Since we've mentioned the issue, it's better to set out a few further distinctions about it. As we said, it presents a difficulty, and change might seem better. In the other branches of knowledge, at least, change has been beneficial.35 Medicine, for example, has changed from ancestral practices, as have physical training and, in general, all the crafts and skills. So, since political science must be counted as one of these, clearly the same must be true of it too. Someone might say that the facts themselves provide evidence: the ancient laws were far too simple40 and barbaric. The Greeks used to carry weapons and buy wives from one another. And any ancient customs that still survive anywhere are completely foolish.

1269a1For example, in Cyme there is a law about killing: if the person prosecuting the killing produces a certain number of witnesses from among his own relatives, the defendant is guilty of the killing. People generally look for what is good, not for what comes from their ancestors. Probably the5 first humans were ordinary and foolish, whether born from the earth or survivors of some disaster, as the earthborn are in fact said to have been. So it's absurd to stick to their decisions. Besides, it isn't better to leave even written laws unchanged. Just as in the other crafts,10 so in the political arrangement, it's impossible to set everything down precisely in writing. What is written must be general, but actions concern particular cases.

These points make it clear that some laws should sometimes be changed. But if we look at it another way, it would seem to call for great caution. When1269a15 the improvement is small, but getting people used to easily doing away with laws is bad, clearly we must leave some mistakes made by lawgivers and rulers alone. A person won't gain as much from making the change as he'll lose by getting used to disobeying the rulers. The comparison with the crafts is also false. For20 changing a craft isn't like changing a law. Law has no power to secure obedience except through habit, and habit develops only over a long time. So easily switching from existing laws to other, new laws weakens the power of law. Also, even if25 laws should be changed, should all of them be changed, and in every constitution, or not? And should anyone at all make the changes, or only certain people? These distinctions matter a great deal. So let's leave this inquiry aside for now. It belongs to another occasion.

Concerning the constitution of Lacedaemon and that of Crete,1269a30 and practically all other constitutions too, there are two questions. One is whether any law has been made well or badly in relation to the best arrangement. The other is whether anything conflicts with the basic aim and character of the constitution they have set before themselves. It is agreed that a city that is to conduct its public life well35 must have leisure from necessary work. But it's not easy to work out how it can have this. The serfs in Thessaly have often attacked the Thessalians, and the helots, Sparta's serfs, have done the same to the Spartans. They are always, so to speak, waiting to seize on their masters' misfortunes. But among the Cretans40 nothing like this has happened yet. Perhaps the reason is that the neighboring1269b1 cities,

even though they fight one another, never ally themselves with the rebels. Doing so wouldn't be an advantage to them, since they too have dependent populations. But all the Spartans' neighbors were their enemies: the Argives, Messenians, and Arcadians.1269b5 The Thessalians' subjects also rebelled at first because the Thessalians were still at war with their neighbors, the Achaeans, Perrhaebians, and Magnesians. Even if there were no other difficulty, managing these people seems hard: how should one deal with them? If they are given a free hand, they become abusive and claim equality10 with their masters. If they live in hardship, they plot against them and hate them. Clearly, then, those whose helots behave this way haven't found the best way to manage them.

Also, the lack of restraint on women harms both the constitution's aim and the city's happiness. Just as1269b15 a man and a woman are parts of a household, clearly we should think of a city too as divided nearly in half, into its male and female populations. So in any constitution where arrangements for women are bad, we should think of half the city as having no laws. This is what has happened there. The whole20 city was to be capable of endurance, as the lawgiver wanted. He has clearly achieved this with the men, but has neglected the women. They live without restraint, indulging in every kind of excess and in luxury. So wealth must be highly valued in a constitution like this, especially if the men happen to be ruled by women.25 Most military and warlike peoples are ruled by women, except the Celts and any others who have openly honored sexual relations between males. The first person to tell the story seems to have had good reason to pair Ares with Aphrodite. All men of this kind seem to be gripped by a desire for relations with males30 or with women. So this was the case among the Spartans, and many things were managed by women during the time of their rule. Yet what difference is there between women ruling and rulers being ruled by women? The result is the same. Though useful35 in no everyday activity, boldness has a use, if anywhere, in war. Yet even here the Spartan women did the greatest harm. They showed this during the Theban invasion. They were no use, as in other cities, and they caused more confusion than the enemy. From the start,40 then, it seems there was an understandable reason for the Spartan women's1270a1 lack of restraint.

The men were away from their own country for long periods on military campaigns. They fought the war against the Argives, and then the war against the Arcadians and Messenians. When they had leisure, they placed themselves in the lawgiver's hands, already prepared1270a5 by military life, which contains many elements of virtue. But they say Lycurgus tried to bring the women under the laws and then gave up when they resisted. These, then, are the causes of what happened, and clearly of this mistake too. But we10 aren't asking who should or shouldn't be forgiven. We're asking what is right and what is wrong. As we said earlier, bad arrangements for women seem not only to make the constitution itself somewhat improper, but also to contribute to the love of money.15 After the points just made, one might criticize the unequal distribution of property. Some of them have come to own far too much wealth, and others very little. That's why the land has passed into so few hands. This has also been badly arranged by the laws. Buying or20 selling one's existing property was made dishonorable by the lawgiver. He was right to do so. But he allowed anyone who wished to give it away or leave it by will. Yet the result must be the same either way. Also, women own nearly two-fifths of all the land, because there are many heiresses25 and because large dowries are given. It would have been better to set no dowry, or a small or moderate one. As things stand, a man may give an heiress in marriage to anyone he wants. If he dies without making a will, the heir he leaves behind gives her to anyone he wants. So, although the country can support a thousand cavalrymen30 and five hundred more, and thirty thousand heavy infantrymen, their numbers were fewer than a thousand. The facts themselves have made it clear that this arrangement was bad for them. The city couldn't withstand a single blow, but was ruined because it had too few men. They say that under the earlier35 kings they gave others a share in the constitution. So there wasn't a shortage of men then, despite the long wars. They say there were once as many as ten thousand Spartans. Whether this is true or not, it's better to increase the city's number of men by equalizing property. But in conflict40 with this reform is the law about having children.

1270b1The lawgiver wants there to be as many Spartans as possible, so he encourages citizens to have as many children as possible. They have a law that a man who has fathered three sons is exempt from guard duty, and one who has fathered four is exempt from all public duties. Yet5 it's clear that, if many children are born while the land is divided in this way, many must become poor.

The arrangements for the supervising officials called ephors are bad too. This office has authority over their most important affairs, but its members come from the whole people. So men who are very1270b10 poor often get into office, and their poverty made them open to bribery. They have shown this many times before, and recently in the affairs of Andros. Some were corrupted by money and, as far as it lay in their power, ruined the whole city. And because the office is far too powerful and equal to a tyranny, courting15 them was necessary even for the kings. This further damaged the constitution in this respect too, since an aristocracy turned into a democracy. Still, this office holds the constitution together. The people stay quiet because they share in the highest office. So whether this came about through the lawgiver or by20 chance, it helps the situation. For a constitution to survive, all parts of the city must want it to exist and remain unchanged. The kings feel this way because of their own honor. The noble and good men feel this way because of the council of elders. This office is a reward25 for virtue. The people feel this way because of the ephors' office. Its members are appointed from everyone. But this office should have been filled by choice from everyone, not in the way it is now, which is far too childish. Also, quite ordinary people have authority over important court decisions. So rather than their own judgment,30 the basis of their decisions should be written rules and the laws. The ephors' way of life also conflicts with the city's aim. Their own life is far too relaxed, while the life imposed on the others goes too far in severity. As a result, they can't endure it, but secretly escape the law35 and enjoy bodily pleasures.