Book II, 1270b–1274b

Their arrangements for the office of the elders are also unsatisfactory. For if the elders were decent men, adequately educated in manly virtue, one might perhaps say that the office benefited the city. Yet even then their lifelong authority over important judgments would be open to dispute1270b40 (for the mind, like the body, has its old age).

1271a1But when their education is such that even the lawgiver himself distrusts them as men who are not good, the arrangement is unsafe. There is evidence of both bribe-taking and the giving away of many public benefits to please others among those who have shared in this5 office. For this reason it would be better for them not to be exempt from scrutiny; as things stand, they are. The office of the ephors might seem to subject all the offices to scrutiny. But this gives the ephorate far too great a gift, and this is not the manner in which we say that accounts should be rendered. Moreover, the choice they make of the elders, in its10 method of judgment, is childish, and it is not right that the man who is to be deemed worthy of the office should himself ask for it. For the man worthy of the office ought to hold it, whether he wishes to or not. As things stand, the lawgiver evidently does here what he does in the rest of the constitution. For he makes the citizens ambitious for honor,15 and uses this in the choice of the elders: no one would ask to hold office unless he were ambitious for honor. Yet most of the injustices people commit voluntarily arise, one may say, from ambition for honor and love of money.

As for kingship, whether it is better for cities to possess it1271a20 or not, let that be a separate discussion. Still, it would certainly be better for each king to be judged by his own life, rather than as they are now. It is clear that the lawgiver does not himself think he can make them noble and good. At any rate, he distrusts them as men who are not good enough. For this reason they used to send out as fellow ambassadors25 the kings' enemies, and thought that faction between the kings ensured the city's safety. Nor did the first founder legislate well concerning the common messes called phiditia. For the contribution should rather have come from public funds, as in Crete. Among the Laconians, however, each man must30 contribute, although some are extremely poor and cannot meet this expense. Thus the result is the opposite of the lawgiver's intention. For he wishes the institution of the common messes to be democratic, but when legislated in this way it becomes anything but democratic. Participation35 is not easy for the very poor, and their ancestral condition for participation in the constitution is this: whoever cannot pay this contribution is not to participate in it. Some others have also criticized the law concerning the admirals, and rightly so. For it becomes a cause of faction: alongside the kings,40 who are permanent generals, the office of admiral has been established as almost a second kingship. One might also criticize the lawgiver's underlying purpose1271b1 in the way that Plato too criticized it in the Laws.

For the whole arrangement of the laws is directed toward one part of virtue, military virtue, since this is useful for gaining mastery. Accordingly, they preserved themselves while waging war, but perished once they had gained rule,1271b5 because they did not know how to use leisure and had practiced no other discipline of greater importance than warfare. There is a mistake no less serious than this. For they believe that the goods for which people contend are acquired through virtue rather than vice, and in this they are right. But that they suppose these goods superior to virtue10 is not right. The Spartans' public finances are also in a poor state. There is nothing in the city's treasury, although they are compelled to wage great wars, and their contributions are badly managed. For because most of the land belongs to the Spartans, they do not examine one another's15 contributions. The lawgiver has achieved the opposite of what is advantageous: he has made the city poor in money and its private citizens lovers of money. Let this suffice, then, concerning the constitution of the Lacedaemonians, for these are the points one might chiefly criticize.

1271b20The Cretan constitution is close to this one. In a few respects it is no worse, but for the most part it is less finely worked out. For the Laconians' constitution seems, and indeed is said, to have imitated the Cretan constitution in most respects; and most ancient arrangements are less fully articulated than newer ones. They say25 that when Lycurgus went abroad after giving up his guardianship of King Charilaus, he spent most of his time in Crete because of their kinship. For the Lyctians were colonists of the Laconians, and those who came to found the colony found the system of laws already established30 among the inhabitants of that time. For this reason the neighboring inhabitants still use them in the same manner, on the understanding that Minos first established the system of laws. The island also seems naturally suited and well situated for rule over the Greeks. For it commands the whole sea, around which nearly all the Greeks35 are settled. It lies a short distance from the Peloponnese on one side, and from Asia, in the region of Triopium and Rhodes, on the other. For this reason Minos also gained mastery of the sea, subdued some of the islands and settled others, and finally, after attacking Sicily, ended his life40 there near Camicus.

The Cretan arrangement corresponds to the Laconian. For the helots cultivate the land for the latter,1272a1 and the neighboring inhabitants for the Cretans,

and both have common messes. In ancient times, at least, the Laconians called these not phiditia but andreia, as the Cretans do, which also makes clear that they came from there. There is also the arrangement of the constitution. The1272a5 ephors have the same power as those called cosmoi in Crete, except that the ephors number five and the cosmoi ten. The elders correspond to the elders whom the Cretans call the council. There was formerly kingship, but the Cretans later abolished it, and the10 cosmoi hold the command in war. Everyone participates in the assembly, but it has authority over nothing except to approve by vote what the elders and cosmoi have resolved.

The Cretans' arrangements for the common messes, then, are better than the Laconians'. For in Lacedaemon each man contributes the prescribed amount per head,1272a15 and if he does not, the law prevents him from participating in the constitution, as was also said earlier. In Crete, however, the arrangement is more communal. From all the produce of the public crops and herds, and from the tribute paid by the neighboring inhabitants, a portion is assigned to the gods and public20 services, and another to the common messes, so that all are fed at public expense—women, children, and men. The lawgiver has devised many measures to encourage moderation in eating as beneficial, and to keep men apart from women so that they may not have many children, making males25 their partners in intercourse for this purpose. Whether this is bad or not will be considered on another occasion. It is clear, then, that the Cretans' arrangements for the common messes are better than the Laconians'. But the arrangements concerning the cosmoi are worse still than those concerning the ephors. For the evil that belongs to the office of the ephors belongs to these as well30 (for any chance persons may hold it), while the advantage it offers the constitution there is absent here. There, because the choice is made from everyone, the people share in the greatest office and wish the constitution to endure. Here, however, they choose the cosmoi not from everyone but from certain families, and the elders35 from those who have served as cosmoi. Concerning these one might make the same arguments as concerning the elders in Lacedaemon. For their exemption from scrutiny and their lifelong tenure are honors greater than their worth, and their ruling not according to written laws but by their own judgment is unsafe. That the people remain quiet without sharing40 in office is no sign that the arrangement is good. For the cosmoi have no opportunity for gain as the ephors do, being far1272b1 removed, on their island, from those who would corrupt them.

The remedy they employ for this defect is strange, and belongs not to constitutional government but to the domination of a powerful group. For often some of the cosmoi's fellow officeholders or private citizens combine and expel them. The cosmoi are also permitted1272b5 to resign their office before their term is over. It would be better for all these things to take place according to law rather than according to men's wishes, for this is not a secure standard. Worst of all is the suspension of the cosmoi's office by the powerful, which those among them who do not wish to submit to justice often bring about. This also makes clear that the arrangement has something10 of a constitution, but is not a constitution; it is rather the domination of a powerful group. They habitually divide the people and their friends into opposing camps, produce anarchy, stir up faction, and fight one another. Yet how does such a situation differ from the city's ceasing for a time to be a city, and the political15 community's dissolution? A city in this condition is in danger from those who wish and are able to attack it. But, as has been said, it is preserved by its location: its remoteness has brought about the exclusion of foreigners. For this reason too the Cretans' neighboring inhabitants remain subject, whereas the helots frequently revolt. For the Cretans have no share in foreign20 rule, and recently a war from abroad has crossed over to the island and revealed the weakness of the laws there. Let this suffice, then, for our account of this constitution.

The Carthaginians too seem to take part in public life well, and1272b25 in many respects better than others, while in some respects above all they resemble the Laconians. For these three constitutions—the Cretan, the Laconian, and, third, the Carthaginian—are in a way close to one another and differ greatly from the others. Many of their institutions are30 well arranged. A sign of a well-ordered constitution is that the people willingly remain within its constitutional order, and that neither any faction worth mentioning nor any tyrant has arisen. Its resemblances to the Laconian constitution are these: the common messes of the associations correspond to the phiditia, the hundred35 and four hold an office corresponding to the ephors (with this improvement: the ephors are drawn from any chance persons, whereas they choose this office according to merit), and the kings and the council of elders correspond to the kings and elders there. It is also better that the kings should neither come from one fixed family nor from any chance family,40 but, if some family is distinguished, that they should be chosen from its members rather than according to age. For since they have authority over important matters, if they are worthless,1273a1 they do great harm,

and have already harmed the city of the Lacedaemonians.

Most of the points that one might criticize as deviations happen to be common to all the constitutions mentioned. Of those that depart from the underlying principle of aristocracy1273a5 and polity, some incline more toward democracy, others toward oligarchy. For the kings, together with the elders, have authority to bring some matters before the people and not others, if they all agree; otherwise, the people have authority over these matters too. When these rulers introduce a matter, they10 allow the people not merely to hear the rulers' resolutions, but to have authority to judge them; and anyone who wishes may speak against the proposals, which is not possible in the other constitutions. That the boards of five, which have authority over many important matters, are chosen by their own members, and that the office of the hundred15 is chosen by these boards—the greatest office—and furthermore these boards hold office longer than the others (for they exercise rule both after leaving office and before entering it), is oligarchic. But their being unpaid and not chosen by lot must be counted aristocratic, as must anything else of this kind, and the fact that all cases are judged by the governing bodies20 (and not different cases by different bodies, as in Lacedaemon). The Carthaginian arrangement departs from aristocracy chiefly toward oligarchy, following a view that most people share. For they think that rulers should be chosen not only according to merit but also according to wealth, since it is impossible25 for a man without resources to rule well and have leisure. If, then, choice according to wealth is oligarchic and choice according to virtue aristocratic, this would be a third kind of arrangement, the very one according to which the Carthaginians have also ordered their constitution. For they make their choices with an eye to both these things, especially30 for the greatest offices, those of the kings and generals.

This deviation from aristocracy must be regarded as a mistake on the lawgiver's part. For one of the most necessary things is to see to this from the outset: that the best men can have leisure and do nothing unseemly, not only while holding office but also1273a35 while living as private citizens. But if one must also consider affluence for the sake of leisure, it is bad that the greatest offices, kingship and the generalship, should be for sale. For this law makes wealth more honored than virtue, and makes the whole city love money. Whatever the40 sovereign body considers honorable, the opinion of the other citizens must necessarily follow. And wherever virtue is not honored above all, that1273b1 constitution cannot be securely governed as an aristocracy.

It is reasonable to expect those who buy offices to become accustomed to making a profit from them, when they hold office after spending money. For it would be strange if a poor but decent man wished to make a profit, while an inferior man who had spent money did not.1273b5 For this reason those who can rule best ought to rule. Even if the lawgiver had neglected the affluence of decent men, it would be better at least to take care that they have leisure while holding office. It would also seem bad for the same man to hold several offices, a practice highly regarded among the Carthaginians. For one10 work is best accomplished by one person. The lawgiver must see that this happens, and not assign the same man to play the flute and make shoes. Thus, where the city is not small, it accords better with constitutional government, and is more democratic, for more people to share in the offices. For, as we have said, participation is more widely shared, and each task is accomplished better,15 with the same tasks also accomplished faster. This is clear in military and naval affairs: in both, ruling and being ruled have extended, so to speak, through everyone. Although their constitution is oligarchic, they escape its dangers very well by constantly enriching some portion of the people, sending them out to20 the cities. For by this means they remedy its defects and make the constitution lasting. But this is the work of chance, whereas they ought to be free of faction through the lawgiver's work. As things stand, if some misfortune occurs and the multitude of the ruled revolts, the laws provide no remedy for restoring peace. Such, then, is the state of the Lacedaemonians'25 constitution, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian, which are justly held in high regard.

Of those who have expressed views about a constitution, some have never participated in any political actions at all, but have spent their lives as private citizens. If any of their views are worth considering, we have discussed1273b30 nearly all of them. Others have themselves taken part in public life and become lawgivers, some for their own cities, others also for certain foreign cities. Of these, some became makers of laws alone, others of a constitution as well, as did Lycurgus and Solon; for these men established both laws and constitutions.35 The Lacedaemonians' constitution has been discussed. Some think that Solon was an excellent lawgiver: that he abolished an excessively unmixed oligarchy, freed the people from slavery, and established the ancestral democracy by blending the constitution well. For the council on the40 Areopagus was oligarchic, the filling of the offices by choice aristocratic, and the law courts democratic.

But Solon seems1274a1 not to have abolished the institutions already in existence—the council and the choice of officeholders—but to have established the people's power by making the law courts open to everyone. For this reason some also blame him: they say that he destroyed the other institutions by making the law court sovereign5 over everything, though it was chosen by lot. For when this grew strong, they courted the people as though courting a tyrant, and changed the constitution into the present democracy. Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the council on the Areopagus, and Pericles established pay for service in the law courts. In this way10 each of the popular leaders advanced it, enlarging it into the present democracy. Yet this seems to have happened not according to Solon's intention, but rather by a concurrence of circumstances (for the people, having brought about naval supremacy during the Persian Wars, became proud and took on bad popular leaders despite opposition15 from the decent men in public life). Solon at least seems to have given the people the most necessary power, that of choosing officeholders and subjecting them to scrutiny (for if the people did not have authority even over this, they would be slaves and enemies), while he appointed all the offices from the notables and the prosperous, from the five-hundred-measure class20 and the yoke-men, and from the third class, called the cavalry class. The fourth was the laboring class, who had a share in no office.

Zaleucus became a lawgiver for the Epizephyrian Locrians, and Charondas of Catana for his own citizens and the other Chalcidian cities in Italy1274a25 and Sicily. Some also attempt to connect them in a succession: Onomacritus was the first skilled in lawgiving, and, being a Locrian living in Crete, received his training there in the art of divination; Thaletas became his companion, Lycurgus and Zaleucus pupils of Thaletas, and Zaleucus's pupil30 was Charondas. But they make these assertions without sufficient attention to the dates. Philolaus of Corinth also became a lawgiver for the Thebans. Philolaus belonged by birth to the Bacchiads and became the lover of Diocles, the victor at Olympia. When Diocles left the city out of hatred for35 his mother Alcyone's love, Philolaus departed for Thebes, and both ended their lives there. Even now people point out their tombs, which are easily visible from one another; but in relation to the territory of the Corinthians, one is visible from it and the other is not. For the story is that they arranged their burial in this way:40 Diocles, because of his loathing for that passion, so that Corinthian territory would not be visible from his burial mound, and Philolaus so that it1274b1 would be visible.

For this reason, then, they lived among the Thebans. Philolaus became their lawgiver on certain other matters and on the bearing of children, in what they call laws of adoption. This is his distinctive legislative provision:1274b5 that the number of land allotments should be preserved. There is nothing distinctive in Charondas except the actions for false testimony (for he was the first to institute the formal challenge to testimony). But in the precision of his laws he is more accomplished even than present-day lawgivers.

Phaleas's distinctive provision is the equalization of property, and Plato's1274b10 the community of women, children, and property, and the common messes for women; also the law concerning drunkenness, that sober men should preside over drinking parties, and training in warfare so that men become ambidextrous through practice, on the ground that one hand should not be useful and the other15 useless. There are laws of Draco, but he laid down his laws for an existing constitution. There is nothing distinctive in his laws worth mentioning, except their harshness owing to the magnitude of the penalties. Pittacus too became a maker of laws, but not of a constitution. His distinctive law is that drunken men, if they20 commit an offense, should pay a greater penalty than sober men. For because more men act outrageously when drunk than when sober, he looked not to the greater indulgence that should be shown to drunken men, but to advantage. Androdamas of Rhegium also became a lawgiver for the Chalcidians in Thrace. His provisions concern homicide25 and heiresses; nevertheless, no one could point to anything distinctive in his work. Let this, then, stand as our examination of constitutions, both those in force and those proposed by certain thinkers.

Their arrangements for the office of the elders aren't good either. If the elders are decent men and have had enough education to make them good, someone might say that this office benefits the city. Still, it's questionable whether they should have lifelong authority over important decisions1270b40 (for the mind grows old, just as the body does).

1271a1But when their education is such that even the lawgiver himself distrusts them as men who aren't good, it isn't safe. Bribes have clearly been taken, and many public benefits given away to please others, by people who have held this5 office. So it would be better if they had to account for their actions. As things stand, they don't. The office of the supervising officials called ephors might seem to hold all the offices to account. But this gives the ephors far too much power, and this isn't how we say officials should give an account. Also, the choice of elders, in its10 method of judging candidates, is childish. Nor is it right that someone considered worthy of the office should have to apply for it himself. A person worthy of the office should hold it whether he wants to or not. Here the lawgiver clearly does what he does in the rest of the constitution. He makes the citizens eager for honor,15 and uses this in the choice of elders. Nobody would apply for office unless he wanted honor. Yet, by and large, most of the deliberate wrongs people commit come from the love of honor and the love of money.

As for kingship, whether it's better for cities to have it1271a20 or not is a question for another discussion. But it certainly would be better to judge each king by his own life, rather than follow the present practice. It's clear that even the lawgiver himself doesn't think he can make them noble and good. At any rate, he distrusts them as men who aren't good enough. That's why people sent along as fellow ambassadors25 the kings' enemies, and thought that faction between the kings kept the city safe. The person who first established the shared meals called phiditia didn't make good laws about them either. The gathering should have been paid for from public funds instead, as it is in Crete. But among the Spartans everyone must30 contribute, even though some are very poor and can't afford this expense. So the result is the opposite of what the lawgiver intended. He wants the shared meals to be a democratic institution, but with these laws they turn out to be anything but democratic. Taking part35 isn't easy for the very poor. Yet their traditional condition for taking part in the constitution is that anyone who can't pay this contribution is excluded from it. Some others have criticized the law about naval commanders, and they've been right to criticize it. It causes faction. Alongside the kings,40 who are generals for life, the naval command has become almost a second kingship. Someone could also criticize the lawgiver's basic aim1271b1 in the same way that Plato has criticized it in the Laws.

The whole system of laws is directed at just one part of virtue, military virtue. This is useful for gaining control. So they stayed safe while fighting wars, but began to fall apart once they ruled,1271b5 because they didn't know how to use leisure and hadn't practiced any activity more important than warfare. Another mistake is no smaller than this. They think that the good things people fight over are gained through virtue rather than vice, and they're right about that. But they suppose that these things are better than virtue,10 and that's wrong. The Spartans' public finances are badly arranged too. There's nothing in the city's public treasury, even though they're forced to fight major wars, and they pay their contributions badly. Because most of the land belongs to the Spartans, they don't check each other's15 contributions. The lawgiver has achieved the opposite of what's advantageous. He has made the city penniless and its private citizens greedy for money. Let that be enough about the constitution of the Lacedaemonians. These are the things someone would criticize most.

1271b20The Cretan constitution is close to this one. A few of its features are no worse, but most are less carefully worked out. The Spartan constitution seems to have copied the Cretan constitution in most respects, and people say it did. Most older arrangements are less well organized than newer ones. They say25 that when Lycurgus left his guardianship of King Charilaus and went abroad, he spent most of his time in Crete because of their kinship. The people of Lyctus were settlers from Sparta. Those who came to establish the settlement found that this system of laws already existed30 among the people living there then. That's why even now the surrounding inhabitants follow these laws in the same way, on the grounds that Minos first established the system of laws. The island also seems naturally suited and well placed to rule the Greeks. It commands the whole sea, and almost all the Greeks35 are settled around the sea. On one side it's only a short distance from the Peloponnese, and on the other from the part of Asia around Triopium and from Rhodes. That's why Minos gained control of the sea. He conquered some of the islands and settled others. Finally he attacked Sicily and died40 there near Camicus.

The Cretan system corresponds to the Spartan one. The helots farm for the Spartans,1272a1 and the surrounding inhabitants for the Cretans,

and both have shared meals. In earlier times the Spartans called them not phiditia but andreia, just as the Cretans do. This also makes it clear that they came from Crete. The arrangement of the constitution corresponds too. The1272a5 ephors have the same power as the officials in Crete called cosmoi, except that there are five ephors and ten cosmoi. The elders correspond to the elders whom the Cretans call the council. There used to be kingship, but the Cretans abolished it, and the10 cosmoi lead in war. Everyone takes part in the assembly, but it has no authority except to vote its approval of decisions made by the elders and the cosmoi.

The Cretans' shared meals are better arranged than the Spartans'. In Lacedaemon, each person pays the fixed contribution individually.1272a15 If he doesn't, the law prevents him from taking part in the constitution, as we said before. But in Crete the arrangement is more communal. A share of all the produce from public crops and livestock, and of the taxes paid by the surrounding inhabitants, is set aside, partly for the gods and public20 services, and partly for the shared meals. So everyone—women, children, and men—is fed at public expense. The lawgiver has given much thought to keeping food intake low, believing this to be beneficial. He has also arranged for separation from women, so that people won't have too many children, by making males25 their partners in sexual relations. Whether this is bad or not will be a question to examine another time. It's clear, then, that the shared meals are better arranged among the Cretans than among the Spartans. But the arrangements for the cosmoi are even worse than those for the ephors. The bad feature of the ephors' office exists here too30 (for anyone at all can hold it). But what benefits the constitution there doesn't exist here. There, because the choice is made from everyone, the people have a share in the most important office and want the constitution to last. Here they choose the cosmoi not from everyone but from certain families, and the elders35 from those who have been cosmoi. We could make the same points about them as about those appointed in Lacedaemon. Freedom from having to account for their actions and lifelong tenure are greater honors than they deserve. And it's dangerous for them to rule by their own judgment rather than by written laws. The fact that the people stay quiet without taking part40 is no sign that the arrangements are good. Unlike the ephors, the cosmoi have no opportunity for profit, since they live far away1272b1 on an island, away from those who might corrupt them.

The remedy they use for this fault is strange. It's not constitutional but a matter of personal domination. Often some of the cosmoi's fellow officials or private citizens band together and throw them out. The cosmoi can also1272b5 give up their office before their term is over. All these things would be better done by law than at people's will. That isn't a safe standard. Worst of all is the suspension of the cosmoi's office, which powerful men often bring about when they don't want to face justice. This makes it clear that the system has something10 of a constitution, but isn't a constitution: it's more a system of personal domination. They regularly split the people and their friends into groups, bring about a state without rulers, create factions, and fight one another. Yet how is this different from such a community temporarily ceasing to be a city, with its political15 community broken up? A city in this condition is in danger from anyone willing and able to attack it. But, as we've said, its location keeps it safe. Its distance has had the effect of excluding foreigners. That's also why the Cretans' surrounding inhabitants remain in their position, while the helots often revolt. The Cretans have no share in foreign20 rule, and only recently has a foreign war crossed over to the island. It has made the weakness of their laws clear. Let that be enough of our discussion of this constitution.

The Carthaginians also seem to take part in public life well, and1272b25 to be outstanding in many respects compared with others. Some of their arrangements are especially close to those of the Spartans. These three constitutions—the Cretan, the Spartan, and, third, the Carthaginian—are somewhat close to one another and differ greatly from the rest. Many of their arrangements30 are good. A sign of a well-organized constitution is that the people willingly stay within its constitutional order, and that no faction worth mentioning has occurred, nor any tyrant arisen. Some things correspond to the Spartan constitution. Their associations' shared meals correspond to the phiditia. The hundred35 and four hold an office like that of the ephors. There is a difference that's no worse. The ephors come from anyone at all, but this office is filled by choosing the best. Their kings and council of elders correspond to the kings and elders there. It's also better that the kings don't come from one fixed family, nor from just any family,40 but, if some family stands out, are chosen from its members rather than appointed by age. They have authority over important matters, and if they're worthless,1273a1 they do great harm,

and they have already harmed the city of the Lacedaemonians.

Most of the things one might criticize as deviations turn out to be common to all the constitutions we've discussed. Among the departures from the basic principle of aristocracy1273a5 and constitutional government, some lean more toward the people and others toward oligarchy. If the kings and elders all agree, they have the authority to bring some matters before the people and not others. If they don't agree, the people have authority over these matters too. When these officials bring something forward, they don't10 just let the people hear what the rulers have decided. The people have the authority to decide, and anyone who wants to can speak against the proposals. This doesn't happen in the other constitutions. The boards of five have authority over many important matters and choose their own members. The office of the hundred15 is also filled by their choice. It is the most important office. And they hold power longer than the others, since they exercise it both after leaving office and before entering it. These are oligarchic features. But unpaid offices not assigned by lot should count as aristocratic. The same holds for any other feature of this kind. So should having all lawsuits judged by the officials20 rather than different cases by different officials, as in Lacedaemon. The Carthaginian system departs from aristocracy toward oligarchy chiefly because of a certain idea that most people share. They think rulers should be chosen not just for being the best but also for their wealth. It's impossible,25 they say, for a poor person to rule well and have leisure. So if choosing by wealth is oligarchic and choosing by virtue aristocratic, this would be a third kind of arrangement, the very one the Carthaginians use in their constitution. They choose with both these things in mind, especially30 for the most important offices, the kings and the generals.

We should consider this departure from aristocracy a mistake by the lawgiver. One of the most necessary things is to see to it from the start that the best people can have leisure and don't have to do anything shameful, not only while holding office but also1273a35 as private citizens. Even if we must consider resources as a means to leisure, it's bad for the most important offices, kingship and generalship, to be for sale. This law makes wealth more honored than virtue and makes the whole city love money. Whatever is regarded as valuable by the40 sovereign body must also be valued by the other citizens. Where virtue isn't honored above all, the1273b1 constitution can't be firmly aristocratic.

It's reasonable to expect people who buy their offices to get used to making a profit from them, when they take office after spending money. It would be strange if a poor but decent man wanted to make a profit, while a worse man who had spent money didn't.1273b5 So the people who can rule best should hold office. Even if the lawgiver neglected to provide decent people with resources, it would be better at least to ensure their leisure while they hold office. It also seems bad for the same person to hold several offices, though the Carthaginians think highly of this. One10 job is done best by one person. The lawgiver must see to it that this happens, and not tell the same person to play the flute and make shoes. So, where the city isn't small, having more people share in the offices is more constitutional and more democratic. As we've said, it's more widely shared, and each task gets done better,15 with the same tasks done faster too. This is clear in military and naval affairs. In both, ruling and being ruled extend through practically everyone. Although their constitution is oligarchic, they do very well at avoiding the dangers by continually enriching a section of the people, sending them out to20 their cities. This is how they remedy the problem and keep the constitution stable. But this is the work of luck. They should be free of faction because of the lawgiver. As things stand, if some misfortune happens and the majority of the ruled revolt, the laws offer no remedy to restore peace. So this is how things stand with the Lacedaemonian25 constitution, the Cretan one, and the Carthaginian one, which rightly have good reputations.

Some of those who have put forward views on constitutions never took part in any political activity at all, but spent their whole lives as private citizens. If anything about them is worth mentioning, we've discussed1273b30 practically all of it. Others have become lawgivers, some for their own cities and some for foreign cities as well, and have themselves taken part in public life. Some of these made only laws, while others also made constitutions, as Lycurgus and Solon did. They established both laws and constitutions.35 We've already discussed the Lacedaemonian constitution. Some people think Solon was an excellent lawgiver. They say he abolished a system of rule far too purely oligarchic, freed the people from slavery, and established the traditional democracy by mixing the constitution well. The council on the Areopagus,40 they say, was oligarchic, the choice of officeholders aristocratic, and the law courts democratic.

But Solon seems1274a1 not to have abolished the earlier institutions, the council and the choice of officeholders. Rather, he established the people's power by making the law courts open to everyone. This is why some criticize him. They say he broke up the other institutions by giving the law court authority5 over everything, even though its members were assigned by lot. Once it became strong, they courted the people as if they were a tyrant and changed the constitution into the democracy of today. Ephialtes and Pericles cut back the council on the Areopagus, and Pericles introduced pay for service in the law courts. In this way10 each of the popular leaders carried it further, expanding it into today's democracy. But this seems to have happened not by Solon's intention but more as a result of circumstances. The people grew proud after securing naval supremacy in the Persian Wars. They took on bad popular leaders despite opposition15 from the decent citizens. Solon seems to have given the people only the most necessary power: to choose officials and hold them to account (without authority even over this, the people would be slaves and enemies). But he assigned all the offices to the notables and the wealthy, from the class whose property yields five hundred measures of produce,20 the ox-team class, and the third class, called the cavalry class. The fourth was the laboring class, whose members had no share in any office.

The Epizephyrian Locrians had Zaleucus as their lawgiver. Charondas of Catana made laws for his fellow citizens and the other Chalcidian cities of Italy1274a25 and Sicily. Some people also try to link them together. They say Onomacritus was the first expert in lawgiving, and that he trained in Crete in the art of divination, being a Locrian who was staying there. Thaletas, they say, was his associate; Lycurgus and Zaleucus were pupils of Thaletas, and Zaleucus's pupil30 was Charondas. But they say this without examining the dates carefully enough. Philolaus of Corinth also became a lawgiver for the Thebans. Philolaus came from the Bacchiad family and was the lover of Diocles, who won at Olympia. When Diocles left the city because he hated the35 passion of his mother Alcyone, Philolaus went to Thebes. Both ended their lives there. Even now people point out their tombs. Each can easily be seen from the other, but one has a view toward Corinthian territory and the other doesn't. The story is that they arranged their burial this way:40 Diocles, because of his hatred of that passion, wanted Corinthian territory not to be visible from his burial mound, while Philolaus wanted it1274b1 to be visible.

That, then, was why they lived among the Thebans. Philolaus became their lawgiver on several matters, including the bearing of children. They call these laws the adoption laws. This was his particular contribution to their laws,1274b5 to preserve the number of land allotments. Charondas has nothing distinctive except the lawsuits for false testimony (he was the first to introduce a formal challenge to testimony). But the precision of his laws is more carefully worked out than even that of today's lawgivers.

Phaleas' distinctive feature is the equalization of property. Plato's are1274b10 the sharing of women, children, and property, and the women's shared meals. He also had a law about drunkenness: sober people should supervise drinking parties. His military training taught people to use both hands equally well through practice. One hand shouldn't be useful and the other15 useless. There are laws by Draco, but he made them for an existing constitution. There's nothing distinctive in them worth mentioning except their harshness, due to the size of the penalties. Pittacus also made laws but not a constitution. His distinctive law is that drunken people, if they20 commit an offense, should pay a heavier penalty than sober people. More people behave violently when drunk than when sober. So he looked not to forgiveness, on the grounds that drunken people should be more readily forgiven, but to advantage. Androdamas of Rhegium also became a lawgiver for the Chalcidians in Thrace. His laws concern homicide25 and heiresses. But nobody could point to anything distinctive about him. Let this, then, be our examination of constitutions, both those in force and those proposed by particular people.