---
type: article
status: Published
slug: "politics"
title: "Politics"
author: "Aristotle"
tradition: "greek"
language: "grc"
genre: "political philosophy"
period: "c. 335–323 BCE"
source_url: "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PerseusDL/canonical-greekLit/01b725d835e6e733062ffd79e0efdbae1ba06e5c/data/tlg0086/tlg035/tlg0086.tlg035.perseus-grc2.xml"
certainty: observed
source: "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PerseusDL/canonical-greekLit/01b725d835e6e733062ffd79e0efdbae1ba06e5c/data/tlg0086/tlg035/tlg0086.tlg035.perseus-grc2.xml"
unknowns: none known
---
# Politics

## Original

### Book I, 1252a–1255b

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ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν (τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δῆλον ὡς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δὲ
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καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἡ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας. αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ καλουμένη πόλις καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν (πλήθει γὰρ καὶ ὀλιγότητι νομίζουσι
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διαφέρειν ἀλλʼ οὐκ εἴδει τούτων ἕκαστον, οἷον ἂν μὲν ὀλίγων, δεσπότην, ἂν δὲ πλειόνων, οἰκονόμον, ἂν δʼ ἔτι πλειόνων, πολιτικὸν ἢ βασιλικόν, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσαν μεγάλην οἰκίαν ἢ μικρὰν πόλιν· καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ βασιλικόν, ὅταν μὲν αὐτὸς ἐφεστήκῃ, βασιλικόν, ὅταν
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δὲ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης κατὰ μέρος ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος, πολιτικόν· ταῦτα δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ)· δῆλον δʼ ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθετον μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη διαιρεῖν (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐλάχιστα
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μόρια τοῦ παντός), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται σκοποῦντες ὀψόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων καὶ εἴ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων.

εἰ δή τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα βλέψειεν,
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ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστʼ ἂν οὕτω θεωρήσειεν. ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γενέσεως ἕνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι,
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οἷον αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον), ἄρχον δὲ καὶ ἀρχόμενον φύσει, διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον τῷ σώματι ταῦτα πονεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δοῦλον· διὸ δεσπότῃ καὶ δούλῳ ταὐτὸ συμφέρει.

φύσει μὲν
[Bekker 1252b]
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οὖν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν, πενιχρῶς, ἀλλʼ ἓν πρὸς ἕν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλʼ ἑνὶ
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δουλεῦον)· ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει τάξιν. αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι τὸ φύσει ἄρχον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ γίνεται ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλης καὶ δούλου. διό φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ
βαρβάρων δʼ Ἕλληνας ἄρχειν εἰκός,
(Eur. IA 1400) ὡς ταὐτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ὄν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων
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τῶν δύο κοινωνιῶν οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὀρθῶς Ἡσίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας
οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα γυναῖκά τε βοῦν τʼ ἀροτῆρα·
(Hes. WD 405) ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντʼ οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησίν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν οἶκός ἐστιν, οὓς Χαρώνδας μὲν καλεῖ ὁμοσιπύους, Ἐπιμενίδης
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δὲ ὁ Κρὴς ὁμοκάπους· ἡ δʼ ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κώμη. μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἔοικεν ἡ κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας εἶναι, οὓς καλοῦσί τινες ὁμογάλακτας, παῖδάς τε καὶ παίδων παῖδας. διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ
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ἔθνη· ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνῆλθον· πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι, διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει Ὅμηρος
θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος
παίδων ἠδʼ ἀλόχων.
(Hom. Od. 9.114) σποράδες γάρ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾤκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ
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βασιλεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύοντο, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἑαυτοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

ἡ δʼ ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις, ἤδη πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν τοῦ
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ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἔστιν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων, ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας. ἔτι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον·

[Bekker 1253a]
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ἡ δʼ αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἤτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν, ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος· ὥσπερ
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καὶ ὁ ὑφʼ Ὁμήρου λοιδορηθεὶς
ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιος·
(Hom. Il. 9.63) ἅμα γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής, ἅτε περ ἄζυξ ὢν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς. διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου μᾶλλον, δῆλον. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον
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δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων· ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζῴοις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις), ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ
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τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον· τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστιν.
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τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χείρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν λιθίνην (διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη), πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλʼ ὁμώνυμα.
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ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει πρότερον ἢ ἕκαστος, δῆλον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἕκαστος χωρισθείς, ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἕξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος διʼ αὐτάρκειαν οὐθὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.

φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐν
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πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν· ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθὲν βέλτιστον τῶν ζῴων ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ χωρισθεὶς νόμου καὶ δίκης χείριστον πάντων. χαλεπωτάτη γὰρ ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὅπλα· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὅπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ
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ἀρετῇ, οἷς ἐπὶ τἀναντία ἔστι χρῆσθαι μάλιστα. διὸ ἀνοσιώτατον καὶ ἀγριώτατον ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἐδωδὴν χείριστον. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν· ἡ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις.

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ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν ἐξ ὧν μορίων ἡ πόλις συνέστηκεν, ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν· πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται πόλις ἐξ οἰκιῶν. οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη ἐξ ὧν πάλιν οἰκία συνέστηκεν· οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων. ἐπεὶ
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δʼ ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις πρῶτον ἕκαστον ζητητέον, πρῶτα δὲ καὶ ἐλάχιστα μέρη οἰκίας δεσπότης καὶ δοῦλος, καὶ πόσις καὶ ἄλοχος, καὶ πατὴρ καὶ τέκνα, περὶ τριῶν ἂν τούτων σκεπτέον εἴη τί ἕκαστον καὶ ποῖον δεῖ εἶναι. ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ γαμική (ἀνώνυμον γὰρ ἡ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς
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σύζευξις) καὶ τρίτον τεκνοποιητική (καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ ὠνόμασται ἰδίῳ ὀνόματι). ἔστωσαν δὴ αὗται τρεῖς ἃς εἴπομεν. ἔστι δέ τι μέρος ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι οἰκονομία, τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτῆς· ὅπως δʼ ἔχει, θεωρητέον· λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς καλουμένης χρηματιστικῆς. πρῶτον δὲ
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περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου εἴπωμεν, ἵνα τά τε πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρείαν ἴδωμεν, κἂν εἴ τι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι περὶ αὐτῶν δυναίμεθα λαβεῖν βέλτιον τῶν νῦν ὑπολαμβανομένων. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη τέ τις εἶναι ἡ δεσποτεία, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομία καὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ βασιλική,
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καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἀρχόμενοι· τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν (νόμῳ γὰρ τὸν μὲν δοῦλον εἶναι τὸν δʼ ἐλεύθερον, φύσει δʼ οὐθὲν διαφέρειν)· διόπερ οὐδὲ δίκαιον· βίαιον γάρ.

ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας (ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον
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καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν), ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς ὡρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει ἀποτελεσθήσεσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ. τῶν δʼ ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δὲ ἔμψυχα (οἷον τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἴαξ ἄψυχον ὁ δὲ πρῳρεὺς ἔμψυχον· ὁ
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γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνου εἴδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν)· οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζωήν ἐστι, καὶ ἡ κτῆσις πλῆθος ὀργάνων ἐστί, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἔμψυχον, καὶ ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων πᾶς ὑπηρέτης. εἰ γὰρ ἠδύνατο ἕκαστον τῶν ὀργάνων κελευσθὲν ἢ προαισθανόμενον ἀποτελεῖν
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τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον, καὶ ὥσπερ τὰ Δαιδάλου φασὶν ἢ τοὺς τοῦ Ἡφαίστου τρίποδας, οὕς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτομάτους θεῖον δύεσθαι ἀγῶνα, οὕτως αἱ κερκίδες ἐκέρκιζον αὐταὶ καὶ τὰ πλῆκτρα ἐκιθάριζεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει οὔτε τοῖς ἀρχιτέκτοσιν
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ὑπηρετῶν οὔτε τοῖς δεσπόταις δούλων.

τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ὄργανα ποιητικὰ ὄργανά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα πρακτικόν· ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς κερκίδος ἕτερόν τι γίνεται παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῆς κλίνης ἡ χρῆσις μόνον.
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ἔτι δʼ ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποίησις εἴδει καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις, καὶ δέονται ἀμφότεραι ὀργάνων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν. ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποίησις, ἐστιν· διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν. τὸ δὲ κτῆμα λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μόριον. τό γὰρ μόριον οὐ
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μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἄλλου· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κτῆμα. διὸ ὁ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δούλου δεσπότης μόνον, ἐκείνου δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν· ὁ δὲ δοῦλος οὐ μόνον δεσπότου δοῦλός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου.

τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δούλου καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον· ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὑτοῦ φύσει
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ἀλλʼ ἄλλου ἄνθρωπος ὤν, οὗτος φύσει δοῦλός ἐστιν, ἄλλου δʼ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος ὃς ἂν κτῆμα ᾖ ἄνθρωπος ὤν, κτῆμα δὲ ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστόν.

πότερον δʼ ἔστι τις φύσει τοιοῦτος ἢ οὔ, καὶ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ δίκαιόν τινι δουλεύειν ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα δουλεία παρὰ φύσιν ἐστί, μετὰ ταῦτα
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σκεπτέον. οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν. τὸ γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἐστί, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἔνια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τὰ δʼ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν. καὶ εἴδη πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ
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ἀρχομένων ἔστιν (καὶ ἀεὶ βελτίων ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ τῶν βελτιόνων ἀρχομένων, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου· τὸ γὰρ ἀποτελούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν βελτιόνων βέλτιον ἔργον· ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει τὸ δʼ ἄρχεται, ἔστι τι τούτων ἔργον)· ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων συνέστηκε καὶ γίνεται ἕν τι κοινόν, εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτε ἐκ
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διῃρημένων, ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον, καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἁπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ἐμψύχοις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἔστι τις ἀρχή, οἷον ἁρμονίας. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως· τὸ δὲ ζῷον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς
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καὶ σώματος, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δʼ ἀρχόμενον. δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὸ φύσει, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλτιστα διακείμενον καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἄνθρωπον θεωρητέον, ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο δῆλον·

τῶν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν ἢ
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μοχθηρῶς ἐχόντων δόξειεν ἂν ἄρχειν πολλάκις τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὸ φαύλως καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν.

ἔστι δʼ οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, πρῶτον ἐν ζῴῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πολιτικήν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος
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ἄρχει δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῆς ὀρέξεως πολιτικὴν ἢ βασιλικήν· ἐν οἷς φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν καὶ συμφέρον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τῷ σώματι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος, τὸ δʼ ἐξ ἴσου ἢ ἀνάπαλιν βλαβερὸν πᾶσιν.
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πάλιν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὡσαύτως· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἥμερα τῶν ἀγρίων βελτίω τὴν φύσιν, τούτοις δὲ πᾶσι βέλτιον ἄρχεσθαι ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπου· τυγχάνει γὰρ σωτηρίας οὕτως. ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν κρεῖττον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δʼ ἀρχόμενον. τὸν
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αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος καὶ ἄνθρωπος θηρίου (διάκεινται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὅσων ἐστὶν ἔργον ἡ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐστʼ ἀπʼ αὐτῶν βέλτιστον), οὗτοι μέν εἰσι φύσει δοῦλοι, οἷς βέλτιόν ἐστιν
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ἄρχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἔστι γὰρ φύσει δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι (διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστίν), καὶ ὁ κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῷα οὐ λόγῳ αἰσθανόμενα ἀλλὰ παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ. καὶ ἡ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρόν·
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ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῷ σώματι βοήθεια γίνεται παρʼ ἀμφοῖν, παρά τε τῶν δούλων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμέρων ζῴων. βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν, τὰ δʼ ὀρθὰ καὶ ἄχρηστα πρὸς
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τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διῃρημένος εἴς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν χρείαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικήν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τοὐναντίον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχάς· ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὡς εἰ τοσοῦτον γένοιντο διάφοροι
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τὸ σῶμα μόνον ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους πάντες φαῖεν ἂν ἀξίους εἶναι τούτοις δουλεύειν. εἰ δʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτʼ ἀληθές, πολὺ δικαιότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο διωρίσθαι· ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥᾴδιον ἰδεῖν
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τό τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.

ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι, φανερόν, οἷς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεύειν καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστιν.

ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τἀναντία φάσκοντες τρόπον τινὰ λέγουσιν ὀρθῶς, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. διχῶς γὰρ λέγεται τὸ δουλεύειν
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καὶ ὁ δοῦλος. ἔστι γάρ τις καὶ κατὰ νόμον δοῦλος καὶ δουλεύων· ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογία τίς ἐστιν ἐν ᾧ τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναί φασιν. τοῦτο δὴ τὸ δίκαιον πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὥσπερ ῥήτορα γράφονται παρανόμων, ὡς δεινὸν ὂν εἰ τοῦ βιάσασθαι δυναμένου
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καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν κρείττονος ἔσται δοῦλον καὶ ἀρχόμενον τὸ βιασθέν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὕτως δοκεῖ τοῖς δʼ ἐκείνως, καὶ τῶν σοφῶν. αἴτιον δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως, καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴ τυγχάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ
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ἔστιν ἀεὶ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινος, ὥστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν (διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν ἄνοια δοκεῖν τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῖς δʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον, τὸ τὸν κρείττονα ἄρχειν)· ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λόγων
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οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν οὐθὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἅτεροι λόγοι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν. ὅλως δʼ ἀντεχόμενοί τινες, ὡς οἴονται, δικαίου τινός (ὁ γὰρ νόμος δίκαιόν τι) τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν τιθέασι δικαίαν, ἅμα δʼ οὔ φασιν· τήν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δικαίαν
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εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδαμῶς ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μή, συμβήσεται τοὺς εὐγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας δούλους εἶναι καὶ ἐκ δούλων, ἐὰν συμβῇ πραθῆναι ληφθέντας. διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται λέγειν δούλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. καίτοι ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωσιν,
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οὐθὲν ἄλλο ζητοῦσιν ἢ τὸ φύσει δοῦλον ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴπομεν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναί τινας φάναι τοὺς μὲν πανταχοῦ δούλους τοὺς δʼ οὐδαμοῦ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ εὐγενείας· αὑτοὺς μὲν γὰρ οὐ μόνον παρʼ αὑτοῖς εὐγενεῖς ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ νομίζουσιν, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους οἴκοι μόνον,
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ὡς ὄν τι τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς εὐγενὲς καὶ ἐλεύθερον τὸ δʼ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ Θεοδέκτου Ἑλένη φησὶ
θείων δʼ ἀπʼ ἀμφοῖν ἔκγονον ῥιζωμάτων
τίς ἂν προσειπεῖν ἀξιώσειεν λάτριν;
ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐθενὶ ἀλλʼ ἢ ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ διορίζουσι
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τὸ δοῦλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον, καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεῖς καὶ τοὺς
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δυσγενεῖς.

### Book I, 1255b–1258b

ἀξιοῦσι γάρ, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐκ θηρίων γίνεσθαι θηρίον, οὕτω καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθόν. ἡ δὲ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν πολλάκις, οὐ μέντοι δύναται.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ λόγον ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις,
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καὶ οὐκ εἰσί τινες οἱ μὲν φύσει δοῦλοι οἱ δʼ ἐλεύθεροι, δῆλον, καὶ ὅτι ἔν τισι διώρισται τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὧν συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ δουλεύειν τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ἄρχεσθαι τὸ δʼ ἄρχειν ἣν πεφύκασιν ἀρχὴν ἄρχειν, ὥστε καὶ δεσπόζειν, τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἀσυμφόρως ἐστὶν ἀμφοῖν (τὸ
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γὰρ αὐτὸ συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ, καὶ σώματι καὶ ψυχῇ, ὁ δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἷον ἔμψυχόν τι τοῦ σώματος κεχωρισμένον δὲ μέρος· διὸ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστί τι καὶ φιλία δούλῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς φύσει τούτων ἠξιωμένοις, τοῖς δὲ μὴ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον,
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ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμον καὶ βιασθεῖσι, τοὐναντίον).

φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτική, οὐδὲ πᾶσαι ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρχαί, ὥσπερ τινές φασιν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθέρων φύσει ἡ δὲ δούλων ἐστίν, καὶ ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ μοναρχία (μοναρχεῖται γὰρ πᾶς οἶκος),
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ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἀρχή. ὁ μὲν οὖν δεσπότης οὐ λέγεται κατʼ ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιόσδʼ εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος καὶ ὁ ἐλεύθερος. ἐπιστήμη δʼ ἂν εἴη καὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ δουλική, δουλικὴ μὲν οἵαν περ ὁ ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐπαίδευεν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ λαμβάνων τις μισθὸν
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ἐδίδασκε τὰ ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα τοὺς παῖδας· εἴη δʼ ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖον τῶν τοιούτων μάθησις, οἷον ὀψοποιικὴ καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα γένη τῆς διακονίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἕτερα ἑτέρων τὰ μὲν ἐντιμότερα ἔργα τὰ δʼ ἀναγκαιότερα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν
δοῦλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου.
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αἱ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦται πᾶσαι δουλικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι· δεσποτικὴ δʼ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ χρηστικὴ δούλων. ὁ γὰρ δεσπότης οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτᾶσθαι τοὺς δούλους, ἀλλʼ ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι δούλοις. ἔστι δʼ αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα οὐδὲ σεμνόν· ἃ γὰρ τὸν δοῦλον ἐπίστασθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἐκεῖνον δεῖ
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ταῦτα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιτάττειν. διὸ ὅσοις ἐξουσία μὴ αὐτοὺς κακοπαθεῖν, ἐπίτροπός τις λαμβάνει ταύτην τὴν τιμήν, αὐτοὶ δὲ πολιτεύονται ἢ φιλοσοφοῦσιν. ἡ δὲ κτητικὴ ἑτέρα ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, οἷον ἡ δικαία, πολεμική τις οὖσα ἢ θηρευτική. περὶ μὲν οὖν δούλου καὶ δεσπότου τοῦτον διωρίσθω τὸν
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τρόπον.

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ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἦν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις πότερον ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἐστιν
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ἢ μέρος τι, ἢ ὑπηρετική, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετική, πότερον ὡς ἡ κερκιδοποιικὴ τῇ ὑφαντικῇ ἢ ὡς ἡ χαλκουργικὴ τῇ ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ (οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ὑπηρετοῦσιν, ἀλλʼ ἡ μὲν ὄργανα παρέχει, ἡ δὲ τὴν ὕλην· λέγω δὲ ὕλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐξ οὗ τι ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον, οἷον ὑφάντῃ μὲν ἔρια
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ἀνδριαντοποιῷ δὲ χαλκόν). ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ τῇ χρηματιστικῇ, δῆλον (τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσασθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρήσασθαι· τίς γὰρ ἔσται ἡ χρησομένη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν;)· πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστί τι ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμφισβήτησιν·
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εἰ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρῆσαι πόθεν χρήματα καὶ κτῆσις ἔσται, ἥ δὲ κτῆσις πολλὰ περιείληφε μέρη καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος, ὥστε πρῶτον ἡ γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἢ ἕτερόν τι γένος, καὶ καθόλου ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ κτῆσις; ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴδη γε πολλὰ τροφῆς,
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διὸ καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ζῆν ἄνευ τροφῆς, ὥστε αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποιήκασι διαφέροντας τῶν ζῴων. τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἀγελαῖα τὰ δὲ σποραδικά ἐστιν, ὁποτέρως συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν
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ζῳοφάγα τὰ δὲ καρποφάγα τὰ δὲ παμφάγα αὐτῶν εἶναι, ὥστε πρὸς τὰς ῥᾳστώνας καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὴν τούτων ἡ φύσις τοὺς βίους αὐτῶν διώρισεν, ἐπεὶ δʼ οὐ ταὐτὸ ἑκάστῳ ἡδὺ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἑτέροις, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ζῳοφάγων καὶ τῶν καρποφάγων οἱ βίοι πρὸς ἄλληλα διεστᾶσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ
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καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρουσιν οἱ τούτων βίοι. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀργότατοι νομάδες εἰσίν (ἡ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμέρων τροφὴ ζῴων ἄνευ πόνου γίνεται σχολάζουσιν· ἀναγκαίου δʼ ὄντος μεταβάλλειν τοῖς κτήνεσι διὰ τὰς νομὰς καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀναγκάζονται συνακολουθεῖν, ὥσπερ γεωργίαν ζῶσαν
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γεωργοῦντες)· οἱ δʼ ἀπὸ θήρας ζῶσι, καὶ θήρας ἕτεροι ἑτέρας, οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ λῃστείας, οἱ δʼ ἀφʼ ἁλιείας, ὅσοι λίμνας καὶ ἕλη καὶ ποταμοὺς ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτην προσοικοῦσιν, οἱ δʼ ἀπʼ ὀρνίθων ἢ θηρίων ἀγρίων· τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ζῇ καὶ τῶν ἡμέρων καρπῶν.

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οἱ μὲν οὖν βίοι τοσοῦτοι σχεδόν εἰσιν, ὅσοι γε αὐτόφυτον ἔχουσι τὴν ἐργασίαν καὶ μὴ διʼ ἀλλαγῆς καὶ καπηλείας
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πορίζονται τὴν τροφήν,

νομαδικὸς λῃστρικὸς ἁλιευτικὸς θηρευτικὸς γεωργικός. οἱ δὲ καὶ μιγνύντες ἐκ τούτων ἡδέως ζῶσι, προσαναπληροῦντες τὸν ἐνδεέστερον βίον, ᾗ τυγχάνει ἐλλείπων πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκης εἶναι, οἷον οἱ μὲν
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νομαδικὸν ἅμα καὶ λῃστρικόν, οἱ δὲ γεωργικὸν καὶ θηρευτικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους· ὡς ἂν ἡ χρεία συναναγκάζῃ, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διάγουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη κτῆσις ὑπʼ αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως διδομένη πᾶσιν, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθύς, οὕτω καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν.
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καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνεκτίκτει τῶν ζῴων τοσαύτην τροφὴν ὥσθʼ ἱκανὴν εἶναι μέχρις οὗ ἂν δύνηται αὐτὸ αὑτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθέν, οἷον ὅσα σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἢ ᾠοτοκεῖ· ὅσα δὲ ζῳοτοκεῖ, τοῖς γεννωμένοις ἔχει τροφὴν ἐν αὑτοῖς μέχρι τινός, τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γάλακτος
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φύσιν. ὥστε ὁμοίως δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις οἰητέον τά τε φυτὰ τῶν ζῴων ἕνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἥμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν, τῶν δʼ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τά γε πλεῖστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοηθείας ἕνεκεν, ἵνα
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καὶ ἐσθὴς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μηθὲν μήτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν. διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητική πως ἔσται (ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς), ᾗ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρός τε τὰ θηρία καὶ
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τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἄρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουσιν, ὡς φύσει δίκαιον τοῦτον ὄντα τὸν πόλεμον.

ἓν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἐστίν, καθὸ δεῖ ἤτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ ὧν ἔστι θησαυρισμὸς χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαίων, καὶ χρησίμων
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εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. καὶ ἔοικεν ὅ γʼ ἀληθινὸς πλοῦτος ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. ἡ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἄπειρός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ Σόλων φησὶ ποιήσας
πλούτου δʼ οὐθὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται.
(Sol. Fr. 13.71) κεῖται γὰρ ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις·
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οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἄπειρον οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστι τέχνης οὔτε πλήθει οὔτε μεγέθει, ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος ὀργάνων πλῆθός ἐστιν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι τις κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ διʼ ἣν αἰτίαν, δῆλον.

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ἔστι δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἣν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν, χρηματιστικήν, διʼ ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ
[Bekker 1257a]
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πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως·

ἣν ὡς μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ λεχθείσῃ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν· ἔστι δʼ οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ εἰρημένῃ οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνης. ἔστι δʼ ἡ μὲν φύσει ἡ δʼ οὐ φύσει αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἐμπειρίας
[Bekker 1257a line 5]
τινὸς καὶ τέχνης γίνεται μᾶλλον. λάβωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐντεῦθεν. ἑκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσίς ἐστιν, ἀμφότεραι δὲ καθʼ αὑτὸ μὲν ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁμοίως καθʼ αὑτό, ἀλλʼ ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡ δʼ οὐκ οἰκεία τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον ὑποδήματος ἥ τε ὑπόδεσις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική. ἀμφότεραι
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γὰρ ὑποδήματος χρήσεις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττόμενος τῷ δεομένῳ ὑποδήματος ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἢ τροφῆς χρῆται τῷ ὑποδήματι ᾗ ὑπόδημα, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν χρῆσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκεν γέγονε. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ
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μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἡ καπηλική· ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγήν). ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ
[Bekker 1257a line 20]
κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλʼ ἤδη πλειόνων τῆς κοινωνίας οὔσης. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὑτῶν ἐκοινώνουν πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἑτέρων, ὧν κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ἔτι πολλὰ ποιεῖ καὶ τῶν
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βαρβαρικῶν ἐθνῶν, κατὰ τὴν ἀλλαγήν. αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς αὑτὰ καταλλάττονται, ἐπὶ πλέον δʼ οὐθέν, οἷον οἶνον πρὸς σῖτον διδόντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβλητικὴ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε χρηματιστικῆς ἐστιν εἶδος οὐδέν
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(εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας ἦν)· ἐκ μέντοι ταύτης ἐγένετʼ ἐκείνη κατὰ λόγον. ξενικωτέρας γὰρ γενομένης τῆς βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι ὧν ἐνδεεῖς ἦσαν καὶ ἐκπέμπειν ὧν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρῆσις. οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν
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ἀναγκαίων· διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιοῦτόν τι συνέθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ὃ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὂν εἶχε τὴν χρείαν εὐμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, οἷον σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἁπλῶς ὁρισθὲν μεγέθει καὶ σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον
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καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβαλλόντων, ἵνα ἀπολύσῃ τῆς μετρήσεως αὑτούς· ὁ γὰρ χαρακτὴρ ἐτέθη τοῦ ποσοῦ σημεῖον.

[Bekker 1257b]
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πορισθέντος οὖν ἤδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς θάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἁπλῶς ἴσως γινόμενον, εἶτα διʼ ἐμπειρίας ἤδη τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλεῖστον
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ποιήσει κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ ἡ χρηματιστικὴ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, καὶ ἔργον αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρῆσαι πόθεν ἔσται πλῆθος, ποιητικὴ γὰρ εἶναι πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον πολλάκις τιθέασι νομίσματος πλῆθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτʼ εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν
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καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. ὁτὲ δὲ πάλιν λῆρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δʼ οὐθέν, ὅτι μεταθεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐθενὸς ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστί, καὶ νομίσματος πλουτῶν πολλάκις ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἄτοπον τοιοῦτον
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εἶναι πλοῦτον οὗ εὐπορῶν λιμῷ ἀπολεῖται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μίδαν ἐκεῖνον μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς πάντων αὐτῷ γιγνομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. διὸ ζητοῦσιν ἕτερόν τι τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικήν, ὀρθῶς ζητοῦντες. ἔστι γὰρ ἑτέρα ἡ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ
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κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ αὕτη μὲν οἰκονομική, ἡ δὲ καπηλική, ποιητικὴ πλούτου οὐ πάντως ἀλλὰ διὰ χρημάτων μεταβολῆς. καὶ δοκεῖ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα αὕτη εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐστιν. καὶ ἄπειρος δὴ οὗτος ὁ πλοῦτος, ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς.
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ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς ἄπειρόν ἐστι, καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἄπειρον (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ ἐκεῖνο βούλονται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἄπειρον (πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις), οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος
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πλοῦτος καὶ χρημάτων κτῆσις. τῆς δʼ οἰκονομικῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἔστι πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον. διὸ τῇ μὲν φαίνεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὸς πλούτου πέρας, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γινομένων ὁρῶμεν συμβαῖνον τοὐναντίον· πάντες γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον αὔξουσιν οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι τὸ νόμισμα.
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αἴτιον δὲ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν. ἐπαλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὖσα ἑκατέρας τῆς χρηματιστικῆς. τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστι κτήσεως χρῆσις, ἀλλʼ οὐ κατὰ ταὐτόν, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἕτερον τέλος, τῆς δʼ ἡ αὔξησις. ὥστε δοκεῖ τισι τοῦτʼ εἶναι τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον, καὶ διατελοῦσιν ἢ σῴζειν οἰόμενοι
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δεῖν ἢ αὔξειν τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὐσίαν εἰς ἄπειρον. αἴτιον δὲ ταύτης τῆς διαθέσεως τὸ σπουδάζειν περὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ
[Bekker 1258a]
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μὴ τὸ εὖ ζῆν·

εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὔσης, καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀπείρων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ὅσοι δὲ καὶ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν ἐπιβάλλονται τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς ζητοῦσιν, ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐν τῇ κτήσει φαίνεται ὑπάρχειν,
[Bekker 1258a line 5]
πᾶσα ἡ διατριβὴ περὶ τὸν χρηματισμόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἕτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τοῦτʼ ἐλήλυθεν. ἐν ὑπερβολῇ γὰρ οὔσης τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, τὴν τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς ὑπερβολῆς ποιητικὴν ζητοῦσιν· κἂν μὴ διὰ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς δύνωνται πορίζειν, διʼ ἄλλης αἰτίας τοῦτο πειρῶνται,
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ἑκάστῃ χρώμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. ἀνδρείας γὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ θάρσος, οὐδὲ στρατηγικῆς καὶ ἰατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δʼ ὑγίειαν. οἱ δὲ πάσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικάς, ὡς τοῦτο τέλος ὄν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τέλος ἅπαντα δέον ἀπαντᾶν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τε μὴ
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ἀναγκαίας χρηματιστικῆς, καὶ τίς, καὶ διʼ αἰτίαν τίνα ἐν χρείᾳ ἐσμὲν αὐτῆς, εἴρηται, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀναγκαίας, ὅτι ἑτέρα μὲν αὐτῆς οἰκονομικὴ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφήν, οὐχ ὥσπερ αὕτη ἄπειρος ἀλλʼ ἔχουσα ὅρον.

δῆλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πότερον τοῦ
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οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἐστιν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν (ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ ποιεῖ ἡ πολιτική, ἀλλὰ λαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρῆται αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ τροφὴν τὴν φύσιν δεῖ παραδοῦναι γῆν ἢ θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι), ἐκ δὲ τούτων, ὡς δεῖ ταῦτα διαθεῖναι
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προσήκει τὸν οἰκονόμον. οὐ γὰρ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς ἔρια ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ γνῶναι δὲ τὸ ποῖον χρηστὸν καὶ ἐπιτήδειον, ἢ φαῦλον καὶ ἀνεπιτήδειον. καὶ γὰρ ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις διὰ τί ἡ μὲν χρηματιστικὴ μόριον τῆς οἰκονομίας, ἡ δʼ ἰατρικὴ οὐ μόριον· καίτοι δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς
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κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν, ὥσπερ ζῆν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου καὶ τοῦ ἄρχοντος καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας ἰδεῖν, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἰατροῦ, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ἔστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὔ, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς· μάλιστα δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, δεῖ
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φύσει τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν. φύσεως γάρ ἐστιν ἔργον τροφὴν τῷ γεννηθέντι παρέχειν· παντὶ γάρ, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, τροφὴ τὸ λειπόμενόν ἐστι. διὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ πᾶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων. διπλῆς δʼ οὔσης αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ τῆς μὲν καπηλικῆς τῆς δʼ οἰκονομικῆς,
[Bekker 1258a line 40]
καὶ ταύτης μὲν ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἐπαινουμένης,

τῆς
[Bekker 1258b]
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δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψεγομένης δικαίως (οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλʼ ἀπʼ ἀλλήλων ἐστίν), εὐλογώτατα μισεῖται ἡ ὀβολοστατικὴ διὰ τὸ ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν κτῆσιν καὶ οὐκ ἐφʼ ὅπερ ἐπορίσθη. μεταβολῆς γὰρ ἐγένετο χάριν,
[Bekker 1258b line 5]
ὁ δὲ τόκος αὐτὸ ποιεῖ πλέον (ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα τοῦτʼ εἴληφεν· ὅμοια γὰρ τὰ τικτόμενα τοῖς γεννῶσιν αὐτά ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα ἐκ νομίσματος)· ὥστε καὶ μάλιστα παρὰ φύσιν οὗτος τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστιν.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν διωρίκαμεν ἱκανῶς, τὰ
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πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν δεῖ διελθεῖν. πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλευθέραν ἔχει, τὴν δʼ ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν. ἔστι δὲ χρηματιστικῆς μέρη χρήσιμα· τὸ περὶ τὰ κτήματα ἔμπειρον εἶναι, ποῖα λυσιτελέστατα καὶ ποῦ καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἵππων κτῆσις ποία τις ἢ βοῶν ἢ προβάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
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τῶν λοιπῶν ζῴων (δεῖ γὰρ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλά τε τούτων τίνα λυσιτελέστατα, καὶ ποῖα ἐν ποίοις τόποις· ἄλλα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλαις εὐθηνεῖ χώραις), εἶτα περὶ γεωργίας, καὶ ταύτης ἤδη ψιλῆς τε καὶ πεφυτευμένης, καὶ μελιττουργίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τῶν πλωτῶν ἢ πτηνῶν, ἀφʼ
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ὅσων ἔστι τυγχάνειν βοηθείας. τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκειοτάτης χρηματιστικῆς ταῦτα μόρια καὶ πρῶτα· τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς μέγιστον μὲν ἐμπορία (καὶ ταύτης μέρη τρία, ναυκληρία φορτηγία παράστασις· διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἕτερα ἑτέρων τῷ τὰ μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πλείω πορίζειν τὴν ἐπικαρπίαν),
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δεύτερον δὲ τοκισμός, τρίτον δὲ μισθαρνία (ταύτης δʼ ἡ μὲν τῶν βαναύσων τεχνῶν, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων καὶ τῷ σώματι μόνῳ χρησίμων)· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος χρηματιστικῆς μεταξὺ ταύτης καὶ τῆς πρώτης (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρος καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς), ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς
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καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γιγνομένων, ἀκάρπων μὲν χρησίμων δέ, οἷον ὑλοτομία τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτική. αὕτη δὲ πολλὰ ἤδη περιείληφε γένη· πολλὰ γὰρ εἴδη τῶν ἐκ γῆς μεταλλευομένων ἔστιν. εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τῆς τύχης, βαναυσόταται δʼ ἐν αἷς τὰ
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σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα, δουλικώταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλεῖσται χρήσεις, ἀγεννέσταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς. περὶ ἑκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν.

### Book I, 1258b–1260b

ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔστιν ἐνίοις
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γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων,

οἷον Χαρητίδῃ τῷ Παρίῳ καὶ
[Bekker 1259a]
[Bekker 1259a line 1]
Ἀπολλοδώρῳ τῷ Λημνίῳ περὶ γεωργίας καὶ ψιλῆς καὶ πεφυτευμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις περὶ ἄλλων, ταῦτα μὲν ἐκ τούτων θεωρείτω ὅτῳ ἐπιμελές· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα σποράδην, διʼ ὧν ἐπιτετυχήκασιν ἔνιοι χρηματιζόμενοι,
[Bekker 1259a line 5]
δεῖ συλλέγειν. πάντα γὰρ ὠφέλιμα ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ τοῖς τιμῶσι τὴν χρηματιστικήν, οἷον καὶ τὸ Θάλεω τοῦ Μιλησίου· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κατανόημά τι χρηματιστικόν, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνῳ μὲν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν προσάπτουσι, τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι ὄν. ὀνειδιζόντων γὰρ αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν πενίαν ὡς ἀνωφελοῦς
[Bekker 1259a line 10]
τῆς φιλοσοφίας οὔσης, κατανοήσαντά φασιν αὐτὸν ἐλαιῶν φορὰν ἐσομένην ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας, ἔτι χειμῶνος ὄντος εὐπορήσαντα χρημάτων ὀλίγων ἀρραβῶνας διαδοῦναι τῶν ἐλαιουργίων τῶν τʼ ἐν Μιλήτῳ καὶ Χίῳ πάντων, ὀλίγου μισθωσάμενον ἅτʼ οὐθενὸς ἐπιβάλλοντος· ἐπειδὴ δʼ ὁ καιρὸς
[Bekker 1259a line 15]
ἧκε, πολλῶν ζητουμένων ἅμα καὶ ἐξαίφνης, ἐκμισθοῦντα ὃν τρόπον ἠβούλετο, πολλὰ χρήματα συλλέξαντα ἐπιδεῖξαι ὅτι ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι πλουτεῖν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ἂν βούλωνται, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ περὶ ὃ σπουδάζουσιν. Θαλῆς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσασθαι τῆς σοφίας· ἔστι δʼ, ὥσπερ
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εἴπομεν, καθόλου τὸ τοιοῦτον χρηματιστικόν, ἐάν τις δύνηται μονοπωλίαν αὑτῷ κατασκευάζειν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἔνιαι τοῦτον ποιοῦνται τὸν πόρον, ὅταν ἀπορῶσι χρημάτων· μονοπωλίαν γὰρ τῶν ὠνίων ποιοῦσιν. ἐν Σικελίᾳ δέ τις τεθέντος παρʼ αὐτῷ νομίσματος συνεπρίατο πάντα τὸν σίδηρον ἐκ
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τῶν σιδηρείων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὡς ἀφίκοντο ἐκ τῶν ἐμπορίων οἱ ἔμποροι, ἐπώλει μόνος, οὐ πολλὴν ποιήσας ὑπερβολὴν τῆς τιμῆς· ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις ἐπέλαβεν ἑκατόν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν Διονύσιος αἰσθόμενος τὰ μὲν χρήματα ἐκέλευσεν ἐκκομίσασθαι, μὴ μέντοι γε ἔτι
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μένειν ἐν Συρακούσαις, ὡς πόρους εὑρίσκοντα τοῖς αὑτοῦ πράγμασιν ἀσυμφόρους· τὸ μέντοι ὅραμα Θάλεω καὶ τοῦτο ταὐτόν ἐστιν· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς ἐτέχνασαν γενέσθαι μονοπωλίαν. χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς. πολλαῖς γὰρ πόλεσι δεῖ χρηματισμοῦ καὶ τοιούτων
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πόρων, ὥσπερ οἰκίᾳ, μᾶλλον δέ· διόπερ τινὲς καὶ πολιτεύονται τῶν πολιτευομένων ταῦτα μόνον.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἦν, ἓν μὲν δεσποτική, περὶ ἧς εἴρηται πρότερον, ἓν δὲ πατρική, τρίτον δὲ γαμική (καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἄρχει καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθέρων
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μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς,

ἀλλὰ
[Bekker 1259b]
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γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς· τό τε γὰρ ἄρρεν φύσει τοῦ θήλεος ἡγεμονικώτερον, εἰ μή που συνέστηκε παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον τοῦ νεωτέρου καὶ ἀτελοῦς)—ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς
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πλείσταις μεταβάλλει τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον (ἐξ ἴσου γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηδέν), ὅμως δέ, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄρχῃ τὸ δʼ ἄρχηται, ζητεῖ διαφορὰν εἶναι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἄμασις εἶπε τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποδανιπτῆρος λόγον· τὸ δʼ ἄρρεν ἀεὶ πρὸς
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τὸ θῆλυ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλική· τὸ γὰρ γεννῆσαν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἄρχον καὶ κατὰ πρεσβείαν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς εἶδος ἀρχῆς. διὸ καλῶς Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπὼν
πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε
(Hom. Il. 1.544) τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἁπάντων. φύσει γὰρ
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τὸν βασιλέα διαφέρειν μὲν δεῖ, τῷ γένει δʼ εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ὅπερ πέπονθε τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεώτερον καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον.

φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείων ἡ σπουδὴ τῆς οἰκονομίας περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀψύχων κτῆσιν, καὶ
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περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τούτων ἢ περὶ τὴν τῆς κτήσεως, ὃν καλοῦμεν πλοῦτον, καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μᾶλλον ἢ δούλων. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δούλων ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, πότερον ἔστιν ἀρετή τις δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἄλλη τιμιωτέρα τούτων, οἷον σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ
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τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἕξεων, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία παρὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας (ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφοτέρως· εἴτε γὰρ ἔστιν, τί διοίσουσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων; εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, ὄντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγου κοινωνούντων ἄτοπον). σχεδὸν δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδός,
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πότερα καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, καὶ δεῖ τὴν γυναῖκα εἶναι σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ παῖς ἔστι καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ σώφρων, ἢ οὔ; καθόλου δὴ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἄρχοντος, πότερον ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἑτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλοκαγαθίας,
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διὰ τί τὸν μὲν ἄρχειν δέοι ἂν τὸν δὲ ἄρχεσθαι καθάπαξ; οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οἷόν τε διαφέρειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν εἴδει διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οὐδέν. εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν δεῖ τὸν δὲ μή, θαυμαστόν. εἴτε γὰρ ὁ ἄρχων μὴ ἔσται σώφρων καὶ δίκαιος,
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πῶς ἄρξει καλῶς; εἴθʼ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, πῶς ἀρχθήσεται
[Bekker 1260a]
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καλῶς;

ἀκόλαστος γὰρ ὢν καὶ δειλὸς οὐδὲν ποιήσει τῶν προσηκόντων. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν ἀμφοτέρους ἀρετῆς, ταύτης δʼ εἶναι διαφοράς, (ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἀρχομένων). καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ὑφήγηται τὰ περὶ τὴν
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ψυχήν· ἐν ταύτῃ γάρ ἐστι φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δʼ ἀρχόμενον, ὧν ἑτέραν φαμὲν εἶναι ἀρετήν, οἷον τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε φύσει πλείω τὰ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου
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ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδός, καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλʼ ἐνυπάρχει διαφερόντως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μέν, ἀλλʼ ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μέν, ἀλλʼ ἀτελές.
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διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν διανοητικὴν ἀρετήν (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), τῶν δʼ ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς. ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον, δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν
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τρόπον, ἀλλʼ ὅσον ἑκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστιν ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδʼ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλʼ ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρεία ἡ δʼ ὑπηρετική, ὁμοίως δʼ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας.

δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον
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ἐπισκοποῦσιν· καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετή, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων· πολὺ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὁριζομένων. διὸ δεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ποιητὴς εἴρηκε περὶ γυναικός, οὕτω νομίζειν ἔχειν
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περὶ πάντων·
γυναικὶ κόσμον ἡ σιγὴ φέρει,
(Soph. Aj. 293) ἀλλʼ ἀνδρὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο. ἐπεὶ δʼ ὁ παῖς ἀτελής, δῆλον ὅτι τούτου μὲν καὶ
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ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὑτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δούλου πρὸς δεσπότην. ἔθεμεν δὲ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸν δοῦλον, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικρᾶς, καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως μήτε διʼ ἀκολασίαν μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψῃ τῶν ἔργων. ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις, τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον εἰ ἀληθές, ἆρα καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας δεήσει ἔχειν ἀρετήν· πολλάκις γὰρ διʼ ἀκολασίαν ἐλλείπουσι τῶν ἔργων. ἢ διαφέρει τοῦτο πλεῖστον; ὁ μὲν γὰρ
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δοῦλος κοινωνὸς ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορρώτερον, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπιβάλλει ἀρετῆς ὅσον περ καὶ δουλείας·

ὁ γὰρ βάναυσος τεχνίτης
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ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν, καὶ ὁ μὲν δοῦλος τῶν φύσει, σκυτοτόμος δʼ οὐθείς, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς αἴτιον εἶναι δεῖ τῷ δούλῳ τὸν δεσπότην, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν
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ἔργων δεσποτικήν. διὸ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ λόγου τοὺς δούλους ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ φάσκοντες ἐπιτάξει χρῆσθαι μόνον· νουθετητέον γὰρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παῖδας.

ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· περὶ δʼ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρός, τῆς τε περὶ
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ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλίας, τί τὸ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἐστι, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ διώκειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον ἐπελθεῖν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταῦτα δʼ οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν
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ἀρετήν, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, εἴπερ τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίαν καὶ τὸ τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαίους καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας σπουδαίας. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ διαφέρειν· αἱ μὲν γὰρ γυναῖκες ἥμισυ μέρος τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν παίδων οἱ
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κοινωνοὶ γίνονται τῆς πολιτείας. ὥστʼ, ἐπεὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων διώρισται, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐν ἄλλοις λεκτέον, ἀφέντες ὡς τέλος ἔχοντας τοὺς νῦν λόγους, ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι λέγωμεν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῶν ἀποφηναμένων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης.

### Book II, 1260b–1264a

[Bekker 1260b]
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ἐπεὶ δὲ προαιρούμεθα θεωρῆσαι περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς πολιτικῆς, τίς κρατίστη πασῶν τοῖς δυναμένοις ζῆν ὅτι μάλιστα κατʼ εὐχήν, δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκέψασθαι πολιτείας,
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αἷς τε χρῶνταί τινες τῶν πόλεων τῶν εὐνομεῖσθαι λεγομένων, κἂν εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τυγχάνουσιν ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρημέναι καὶ δοκοῦσαι καλῶς ἔχειν, ἵνα τό τʼ ὀρθῶς ἔχον ὀφθῇ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρʼ αὐτὰς ἕτερον μὴ δοκῇ πάντως εἶναι σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ
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καλῶς ἔχειν ταύτας τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχούσας, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην δοκῶμεν ἐπιβαλέσθαι τὴν μέθοδον. ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιητέον ἥπερ πέφυκεν ἀρχὴ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἤτοι πάντας πάντων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας, ἢ μηδενός, ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ μή. τὸ μὲν οὖν μηδενὸς κοινωνεῖν φανερὸν
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ὡς ἀδύνατον (ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία κοινωνία τίς ἐστι, καὶ πρῶτον ἀνάγκη τοῦ τόπου κοινωνεῖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος εἷς ὁ τῆς
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μιᾶς πόλεως,

οἱ δὲ πολῖται κοινωνοὶ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως)· ἀλλὰ πότερον ὅσων ἐνδέχεται κοινωνῆσαι, πάντων βέλτιον κοινωνεῖν τὴν μέλλουσαν οἰκήσεσθαι πόλιν καλῶς, ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δʼ οὒ βέλτιον; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν
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καὶ κτημάτων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας ἀλλήλοις, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης φησὶ δεῖν κοινὰ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι καὶ τὰς κτήσεις. τοῦτο δὴ πότερον ὡς νῦν οὕτω βέλτιον ἔχειν, ἢ κατὰ τὸν ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ γεγραμμένον νόμον;

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ἔχει δὴ δυσχερείας ἄλλας τε πολλὰς τὸ πάντων εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας κοινάς, καὶ διʼ ἣν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νενομοθετῆσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων. ἔτι δὲ πρός, τὸ τέλος ὅ φησι τῇ πόλει δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ὡς μὲν εἴρηται νῦν, ἀδύνατον, πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελεῖν, οὐδὲν διώρισται.
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λέγω δὲ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὡς ἄριστον ὂν ὅτι μάλιστα πᾶσαν· λαμβάνει γὰρ ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὁ Σωκράτης. καίτοι φανερόν ἐστιν ὡς προϊοῦσα καὶ γινομένη μία μᾶλλον οὐδὲ πόλις ἔσται· πλῆθος γάρ τι τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, γινομένη τε μία μᾶλλον οἰκία μὲν ἐκ πόλεως ἄνθρωπος δʼ ἐξ οἰκίας
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ἔσται· μᾶλλον γὰρ μίαν τὴν οἰκίαν τῆς πόλεως φαίημεν ἄν, καὶ τὸν ἕνα τῆς οἰκίας· ὥστʼ εἰ καὶ δυνατός τις εἴη τοῦτο δρᾶν, οὐ ποιητέον· ἀναιρήσει γὰρ τὴν πόλιν.

οὐ μόνον δʼ ἐκ πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἴδει διαφερόντων. οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων. ἕτερον γὰρ συμμαχία
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καὶ πόλις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῷ χρήσιμον, κἂν ᾖ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἴδει (βοηθείας γὰρ χάριν ἡ συμμαχία πέφυκεν), ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σταθμὸς πλεῖον ἑλκύσειε, ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ ἓν γενέσθαι εἴδει διαφέρειν (διοίσει δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνους,
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ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὦσι κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλʼ οἷον Ἀρκάδες). διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σῴζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καὶ ἴσοις ἀνάγκη τοῦτʼ εἶναι· ἅμα γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε πάντας ἄρχειν, ἀλλʼ ἢ κατʼ ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ κατά τινα ἄλλην τάξιν ἢ χρόνου. καὶ συμβαίνει δὴ τὸν
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τρόπον τοῦτον ὥστε πάντας ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ μετέβαλλον οἱ σκυτεῖς καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μὴ ἀεὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ σκυτοτόμοι καὶ τέκτονες ἦσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ βέλτιον οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν πολιτικήν, δῆλον ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ βέλτιον ἄρχειν, εἰ δυνατόν, ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν διὰ τὸ τὴν
[Bekker 1261b]
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φύσιν ἴσους εἶναι πάντας,

ἅμα δὲ καὶ δίκαιον, εἴτʼ ἀγαθὸν εἴτε φαῦλον τὸ ἄρχειν. πάντας αὐτοῦ μετέχειν, τοῦτό γε μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἴκειν τό ἀνομοίους εἶναι ἔξω ἀρχῆς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχουσιν οἱ δʼ ἄρχονται κατὰ μέρος
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ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἀρχόντων ἕτεροι ἑτέρας ἄρχουσιν ἀρχάς. φανερὸν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὡς οὔτε πέφυκε μίαν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ λέγουσί τινες, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν ὡς μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅτι τὰς πόλεις ἀναιρεῖ· καίτοι τό γε ἑκάστου ἀγαθὸν σῴζει ἕκαστον.
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ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατʼ ἄλλον τρόπον φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ λίαν ἑνοῦν ζητεῖν τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄμεινον. οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αὐταρκέστερον ἑνός, πόλις δʼ οἰκίας, καὶ βούλεταί γʼ ἤδη τότε εἶναι πόλις ὅταν αὐτάρκη συμβαίνῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλήθους· εἴπερ οὖν αἱρετώτερον τὸ αὐταρκέστερον, καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἓν τοῦ
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μᾶλλον αἱρετώτερον.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ εἰ τοῦτο ἄριστόν ἐστι, τὸ μίαν ὅτι μάλιστʼ εἶναι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυσθαι φαίνεται κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πάντες ἅμα λέγωσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐμόν· τοῦτο γὰρ οἴεται ὁ Σωκράτης σημεῖον εἶναι τοῦ τὴν
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πόλιν τελέως εἶναι μίαν. τὸ γὰρ πάντες διττόν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς ἕκαστος, τάχʼ ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον ὃ βούλεται ποιεῖν ὁ Σωκράτης (ἕκαστος γὰρ υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ φήσει τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ γυναῖκα δὴ τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου δὴ τῶν συμβαινόντων ὡσαύτως)· νῦν δʼ οὐχ οὕτως φήσουσιν οἱ
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κοιναῖς χρώμενοι ταῖς γυναιξὶ καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις, ἀλλὰ πάντες μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δʼ αὐτῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν πάντες μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δʼ αὐτῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν παραλογισμός τίς ἐστι τὸ λέγειν πάντας, φανερόν (τὸ γὰρ πάντες καὶ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια, διὰ τὸ διττὸν καὶ
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ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐριστικοὺς ποιεῖ συλλογισμούς· διό ἐστι τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὡδὶ μὲν καλὸν ἀλλʼ οὐ δυνατόν, ὡδὶ δʼ οὐδὲν ὁμονοητικόν)· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἑτέραν ἔχει βλάβην τὸ λεγόμενον. ἥκιστα γὰρ ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνει τὸ πλείστων κοινόν· τῶν γὰρ ἰδίων μάλιστα φροντίζουσιν, τῶν δὲ κοινῶν
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ἧττον, ἢ ὅσον ἑκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει· πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς ἑτέρου φροντίζοντος ὀλιγωροῦσι μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς οἰκετικαῖς διακονίαις οἱ πολλοὶ θεράποντες ἐνίοτε χεῖρον ὑπηρετοῦσι τῶν ἐλαττόνων. γίνονται δʼ ἑκάστῳ χίλιοι τῶν πολιτῶν υἱοί, καὶ οὗτοι οὐχ ὡς ἑκάστου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυχόντος ὁ τυχὼν
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ὁμοίως ἐστὶν υἱός·

ὥστε πάντες ὁμοίως ὀλιγωρήσουσιν.

ἔτι οὕτως ἕκαστος ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εὖ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ κακῶς, ὁπόστος τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὤν, οἷον ἐμὸς ἢ τοῦ δεῖνος, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λέγων καθʼ ἕκαστον τῶν χιλίων, ἢ ὅσων ἡ
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πόλις ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο διστάζων· ἄδηλον γὰρ ᾧ συνέβη γενέσθαι τέκνον καὶ σωθῆναι γενόμενον. καίτοι πότερον οὕτω κρεῖττον τὸ ἐμὸν λέγειν ἕκαστον, τὸ αὐτὸ ἐμὸν προσαγορεύοντα δισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων, ἢ μᾶλλον ὡς νῦν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ ἐμὸν λέγουσιν; ὁ μὲν γὰρ υἱὸν αὑτοῦ ὁ δὲ ἀδελφὸν αὑτοῦ
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προσαγορεύει τὸν αὐτόν, ὁ δʼ ἀνεψιόν, ἢ κατʼ ἄλλην τινὰ συγγένειαν ἢ πρὸς αἵματος ἢ κατʼ οἰκειότητα καὶ κηδείαν αὑτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἕτερος φράτορα φυλέτην. κρεῖττον γὰρ ἴδιον ἀνεψιὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον υἱόν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ διαφυγεῖν δυνατὸν τὸ μή τινας
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ὑπολαμβάνειν ἑαυτῶν ἀδελφούς τε καὶ παῖδας καὶ πατέρας καὶ μητέρας· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ὁμοιότητας αἳ γίνονται τοῖς τέκνοις πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν περὶ ἀλλήλων τὰς πίστεις. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ συμβαίνειν τινὲς τῶν τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευομένων· εἶναι γάρ τισι
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τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, τὰ μέντοι γινόμενα τέκνα διαιρεῖσθαι κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας. εἰσὶ δέ τινες καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, οἷον ἵπποι καὶ βόες, αἳ σφόδρα πεφύκασιν ὅμοια ἀποδιδόναι τὰ τέκνα τοῖς γονεῦσιν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ κληθεῖσα Δικαία ἵππος.

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ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δυσχερείας οὐ ῥᾴδιον εὐλαβηθῆναι τοῖς ταύτην κατασκευάζουσι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οἷον αἰκίας καὶ φόνους ἀκουσίους τοὺς δὲ ἑκουσίους, καὶ μάχας καὶ λοιδορίας· ὧν οὐδὲν ὅσιόν ἐστι γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ τοὺς μὴ πόρρω τῆς συγγενείας ὄντας, ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ἄπωθεν·
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ἃ καὶ πλεῖον συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀγνοούντων ἢ γνωριζόντων, καὶ γενομένων τῶν μὲν γνωριζομένων ἐνδέχεται τὰς νομιζομένας γίνεσθαι λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μή, οὐδεμίαν. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ κοινοὺς ποιήσαντα τοὺς υἱοὺς τὸ συνεῖναι μόνον ἀφελεῖν τῶν ἐρώντων, τὸ δʼ ἐρᾶν μὴ κωλῦσαι, μηδὲ τὰς χρήσεις
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τὰς ἄλλας ἃς πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν εἶναι πάντων ἐστὶν ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ ἀδελφῷ πρὸς ἀδελφόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν μόνον. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὴν συνουσίαν ἀφελεῖν διʼ ἄλλην μὲν αἰτίαν μηδεμίαν, ὡς λίαν δὲ ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς ἡδονῆς γινομένης, ὅτι δʼ ὁ μὲν πατὴρ ἢ υἱός, οἱ δʼ ἀδελφοὶ ἀλλήλων,
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μηδὲν οἴεσθαι διαφέρειν.

ἔοικε δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς γεωργοῖς εἶναι χρήσιμον τὸ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς παῖδας
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ἢ τοῖς φύλαξιν·

ἧττον γὰρ ἔσται φιλία κοινῶν ὄντων τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεωτερίζειν. ὅλως δὲ συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη τοὐναντίον διὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον νόμον ὧν προσήκει
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τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους αἰτίους γίνεσθαι, καὶ διʼ ἣν αἰτίαν ὁ Σωκράτης οὕτως οἴεται δεῖν τάττειν τὰ περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. φιλίαν τε γὰρ οἰόμεθα μέγιστον εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεσιν (οὕτως γὰρ ἂν ἥκιστα στασιάζοιεν), καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ἐπαινεῖ μάλισθʼ ὁ Σωκράτης,
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ὃ καὶ δοκεῖ κἀκεῖνος εἶναί φησι τῆς φιλίας ἔργον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἴσμεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην ὡς τῶν ἐρώντων διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμούντων συμφῦναι καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων ἀμφοτέρους ἕνα· ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρους ἐφθάρθαι ἢ τὸν ἕνα,
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ἐν δὲ τῇ πόλει τὴν φιλίαν ἀναγκαῖον ὑδαρῆ γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν τοιαύτην, καὶ ἥκιστα λέγειν τὸν ἐμὸν ἢ υἱὸν πατέρα ἢ πατέρα υἱόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ μικρὸν γλυκὺ εἰς πολὺ ὕδωρ μειχθὲν ἀναίσθητον ποιεῖ τὴν κρᾶσιν, οὕτω συμβαίνει καὶ τὴν οἰκειότητα τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων
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τούτων, διαφροντίζειν ἥκιστα ἀναγκαῖον ὂν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἢ πατέρα ὡς υἱῶν ἢ υἱὸν ὡς πατρός, ἢ ὡς ἀδελφοὺς ἀλλήλων. δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἃ μάλιστα ποιεῖ κήδεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φιλεῖν, τό τε ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν· ὧν οὐδέτερον οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν τοῖς οὕτω πολιτευομένοις. ἀλλὰ
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μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν τὰ γινόμενα τέκνα, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τεχνιτῶν εἰς τοὺς φύλακας, τὰ δʼ ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκείνους, πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν τίνα ἔσται τρόπον· καὶ γινώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς διδόντας καὶ μεταφέροντας τίσι τίνας διδόασιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ πάλαι λεχθέντα μᾶλλον
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ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν, οἷον αἰκίας ἔρωτας φόνους· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι προσαγορεύσουσιν ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τέκνα καὶ πατέρας καὶ μητέρας οἵ τε εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας δοθέντες τοὺς φύλακας καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξιν τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας, ὥστʼ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων τι πράττειν διὰ τὴν
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συγγένειαν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας κοινωνίας διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

ἐχόμενον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τίνα τρόπον δεῖ κατασκευάζεσθαι τοῖς μέλλουσι πολιτεύεσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, πότερον κοινὴν ἢ μὴ κοινὴν
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εἶναι τὴν κτῆσιν. τοῦτο δʼ ἄν τις καὶ χωρὶς σκέψαιτο ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας νενομοθετημένων,

λέγω
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δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν πότερον κἂν ᾖ ἐκεῖνα χωρίς, καθʼ ὃν νῦν τρόπον ἔχει πᾶσι, τάς γε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις, οἷον τὰ μὲν γήπεδα χωρίς, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντας ἀναλίσκειν (ὅπερ ἔνια ποιεῖ
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τῶν ἐθνῶν), ἢ τοὐναντίον τὴν μὲν γῆν κοινὴν εἶναι καὶ γεωργεῖν κοινῇ, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς διαιρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας χρήσεις (λέγονται δέ τινες καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κοινωνεῖν τῶν βαρβάρων), ἢ καὶ τὰ γήπεδα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς κοινούς. ἑτέρων μὲν οὖν ὄντων τῶν γεωργούντων ἄλλος ἂν εἴη τρόπος καὶ
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ῥᾴων, αὐτῶν δʼ αὑτοῖς διαπονούντων τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις πλείους ἂν παρέχοι δυσκολίας. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀπολαύσεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις μὴ γινομένων ἴσων ἀλλʼ ἀνίσων ἀναγκαῖον ἐγκλήματα γίνεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολαύοντας μὲν ἢ λαμβάνοντας πολλά, ὀλίγα δὲ πονοῦντας, τοῖς ἐλάττω μὲν λαμβάνουσι,
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πλείω δὲ πονοῦσιν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων χαλεπόν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων. δηλοῦσι δʼ αἱ τῶν συναποδήμων κοινωνίαι· σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι διαφέρονται ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσκρούοντες ἀλλήλοις. ἔτι δὲ τῶν θεραπόντων τούτοις μάλιστα
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προσκρούομεν οἷς πλεῖστα προσχρώμεθα πρὸς τὰς διακονίας τὰς ἐγκυκλίους.

τὸ μὲν οὖν κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις ταύτας τε καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας ἔχει δυσχερείας, ὃν δὲ νῦν τρόπον ἔχει καὶ ἐπικοσμηθὲν ἔθεσι καὶ τάξει νόμων ὀρθῶν, οὐ μικρὸν ἂν διενέγκαι. ἕξει γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαθόν·
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λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ἐκ τοῦ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίας. δεῖ γὰρ πὼς μὲν εἶναι κοινάς, ὅλως δʼ ἰδίας. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμέλειαι διῃρημέναι τὰ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ ποιήσουσιν, μᾶλλον δʼ ἐπιδώσουσιν ὡς πρὸς ἴδιον ἑκάστου προσεδρεύοντος· διʼ ἀρετὴν δʼ ἔσται πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι,
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κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. ἔστι δὲ καὶ νῦν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐν ἐνίαις πόλεσιν οὕτως ὑπογεγραμμένον, ὡς οὐκ ὂν ἀδύνατον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς καλῶς οἰκουμέναις τὰ μὲν ἔστι τὰ δὲ γένοιτʼ ἄν· ἰδίαν γὰρ ἕκαστος τὴν κτῆσιν ἔχων τὰ μὲν χρήσιμα ποιεῖ τοῖς φίλοις, τοῖς δὲ χρῆται
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κοινοῖς, οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τοῖς τε δούλοις χρῶνται τοῖς ἀλλήλων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἰδίοις, ἔτι δʼ ἵπποις καὶ κυσίν, κἂν δεηθῶσιν ἐφοδίων ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἰδίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινάς· ὅπως δὲ γίνωνται τοιοῦτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου
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τοῦτʼ ἔργον ἴδιόν ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀμύθητον ὅσον διαφέρει τὸ νομίζειν ἴδιόν τι.

μὴ γὰρ οὐ μάτην τὴν πρὸς
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αὑτὸν αὐτὸς ἔχει φιλίαν ἕκαστος, ἀλλʼ ἔστι τοῦτο φυσικόν. τὸ δὲ φίλαυτον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ φιλεῖν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ φιλεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλοῦσί γε πάντες ὡς εἰπεῖν
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ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ βοηθῆσαι φίλοις ἢ ξένοις ἢ ἑταίροις ἥδιστον· ὃ γίνεται τῆς κτήσεως ἰδίας οὔσης. ταῦτά τε δὴ οὐ συμβαίνει τοῖς λίαν ἓν ποιοῦσι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀναιροῦσιν ἔργα δυοῖν ἀρεταῖν φανερῶς, σωφροσύνης μὲν τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας
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(ἕργον γὰρ καλὸν ἀλλοτρίας οὔσης ἀπέχεσθαι διὰ σωφροσύνην), ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις· οὔτε γὰρ ἔσται φανερὸς ἐλευθέριος ὤν, οὔτε πράξει πρᾶξιν ἐλευθέριον οὐδεμίαν· ἐν τῇ γὰρ χρήσει τῶν κτημάτων τὸ τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος ἔργον ἐστίν.

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εὐπρόσωπος μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν· ὁ γὰρ ἀκροώμενος ἄσμενος ἀποδέχεται, νομίζων ἔσεσθαι φιλίαν τινὰ θαυμαστὴν πᾶσι πρὸς ἅπαντας, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορῇ τις τῶν νῦν ὑπαρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν ὡς γινομένων διὰ τὸ μὴ
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κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκας τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ ψευδομαρτυριῶν κρίσεις καὶ πλουσίων κολακείας· ὧν οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνησίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κεκτημένους καὶ κοινωνοῦντας πολλῷ διαφερομένους μᾶλλον ὁρῶμεν ἢ τοὺς χωρὶς
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τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντας· ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν ὀλίγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοινωνιῶν διαφερομένους, πρὸς πολλοὺς συμβάλλοντες τοὺς κεκτημένους ἰδίᾳ τὰς κτήσεις. ἔτι δὲ δίκαιοιν μὴ μόνον λέγειν ὅσων στερήσονται κακῶν κοινωνήσαντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσων ἀγαθῶν· φαίνεται δʼ εἶναι πάμπαν ἀδύνατος ὁ βίος.

αἴτιον
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δὲ τῷ Σωκράτει τῆς παρακρούσεως χρὴ νομίζειν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ οὖσαν ὀρθήν. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναί πως μίαν καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ πάντως. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς οὐκ ἔσται προϊοῦσα πόλις, ἔστι δʼ ὡς ἔσται μέν, ἐγγὺς δʼ οὖσα τοῦ μὴ πόλις εἶναι χείρων πόλις, ὥσπερ κἂν εἴ τις τὴν
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συμφωνίαν ποιήσειεν ὁμοφωνίαν ἢ τὸν ῥυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν. ἀλλὰ δεῖ πλῆθος ὄν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, διὰ τὴν παιδείαν κοινὴν καὶ μίαν ποιεῖν· καὶ τόν γε μέλλοντα παιδείαν εἰσάγειν καὶ νομίζοντα διὰ ταύτης ἔσεσθαι τὴν πόλιν σπουδαίαν ἄτοπον τοῖς τοιούτοις οἴεσθαι διορθοῦν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς
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ἔθεσι καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συσσιτίοις ὁ
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νομοθέτης ἐκοίνωσε.

### Book II, 1264a–1267a

δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι χρὴ προσέχειν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν, εἰ ταῦτα καλῶς εἶχεν· πάντα γὰρ σχεδὸν εὕρηται μέν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνῆκται, τοῖς δʼ οὐ χρῶνται
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γινώσκοντες. μάλιστα δʼ ἂν γένοιτο φανερὸν εἴ τις τοῖς ἔργοις ἴδοι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν κατασκευαζομένην· οὐ γὰρ δυνήσεται μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν, τὰ μὲν εἰς συσσίτια τὰ δὲ εἰς φατρίας καὶ φυλάς. ὥστε οὐδὲν ἄλλο συμβήσεται νενομοθετημένον πλὴν μὴ γεωργεῖν
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τοὺς φύλακας· ὅπερ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν.

οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας τίς ἔσται τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν, οὔτʼ εἴρηκεν ὁ Σωκράτης οὔτε ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν. καίτοι σχεδὸν τό γε πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως τὸ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν γίνεται πλῆθος, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν διώρισται, πότερον
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καὶ τοῖς γεωργοῖς κοινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις ἢ καὶ καθʼ ἕκαστον ἰδίας, ἔτι δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας ἰδίους ἢ κοινούς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κοινὰ πάντα πάντων, τί διοίσουσιν οὗτοι ἐκείνων τῶν φυλάκων; ἢ τί πλεῖον αὐτοῖς ὑπομένουσι τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν, ἢ τί μαθόντες ὑπομενοῦσι
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τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐὰν μή τι σοφίζωνται τοιοῦτον οἷον Κρῆτες; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ τἆλλα ταὐτὰ τοῖς δούλοις ἐφέντες μόνον ἀπειρήκασι τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων κτῆσιν. εἰ δέ, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι, καὶ παρʼ ἐκείνοις ἔσται τὰ τοιαῦτα, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῆς κοινωνίας; ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ πόλει
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δύο πόλεις ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ ταύτας ὑπεναντίας ἀλλήλαις. ποιεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οἷον φρουρούς, τοὺς δὲ γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας· ἐγκλήματα δὲ καὶ δίκαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν φησὶ κακά, πάνθʼ ὑπάρξει καὶ τούτοις. καίτοι λέγει ὁ Σωκράτης
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ὡς οὐ πολλῶν δεήσονται νομίμων διὰ τὴν παιδείαν, οἷον ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορανομικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, ἀποδιδοὺς μόνον τὴν παιδείαν τοῖς φύλαξιν. ἔτι δὲ κυρίους ποιεῖ τῶν κτημάτων τοὺς γεωργοὺς τοὺς ἀποφορὰν φέροντας· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς εἶναι χαλεποὺς καὶ φρονημάτων
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πλήρεις, ἢ τὰς παρʼ ἐνίοις εἱλωτείας τε καὶ πενεστείας καὶ δουλείας. ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἴτʼ ἀναγκαῖα ταῦθʼ ὁμοίως εἴτε μή, νῦν γε οὐδὲν διώρισται. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων τίς ἡ τούτων τε πολιτεία καὶ παιδεία καὶ νόμοι τίνες. ἔστι δʼ οὔθʼ εὑρεῖν ῥᾴδιον, οὔτε τὸ διαφέρον μικρὸν, τὸ ποιούς τινας εἶναι
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τούτους πρὸς τὸ σῴζεσθαι τὴν τῶν φυλάκων κοινωνίαν.

ἀλλὰ
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μὴν εἴ γε τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας ποιήσει κοινὰς τὰς δὲ κτήσεις ἰδίας, τίς οἰκονομήσει ὥσπερ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἱ ἄνδρες αὐτῶν—κἂν εἰ κοιναὶ αἱ κτήσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναῖκες; ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραβολήν,
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ὅτι δεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τὰς γυναῖκας τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οἷς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν.

ἐπισφαλὲς δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὡς καθίστησιν ὁ Σωκράτης. ἀεὶ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας· τοῦτο δὲ στάσεως αἴτιον γίνεται καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μηδὲν ἀξίωμα κεκτημένοις, ἦ που δῆθεν παρά γε θυμοειδέσι
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καὶ πολεμικοῖς ἀνδράσιν. ὅτι δʼ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ποιεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ ὁτὲ μὲν ἄλλοις ὁτὲ δὲ ἄλλοις μέμεικται ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὁ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χρυσός, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. φησὶ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐθὺς γινομένοις μεῖξαι χρυσόν, τοῖς δʼ ἄργυρον, χαλκὸν δὲ καὶ σίδηρον
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τοῖς τεχνίταις μέλλουσιν ἔσεσθαι καὶ γεωργοῖς. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφαιρούμενος τῶν φυλάκων, ὅλην φησὶ δεῖν εὐδαίμονα ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν τὸν νομοθέτην. ἀδύνατον δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅλην, μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἢ μὴ πάντων μερῶν ἢ τινῶν ἐχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν
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ὧνπερ τὸ ἄρτιον· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τῷ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν, τῶν δὲ μερῶν μηδετέρῳ, τὸ δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ οἱ φύλακες μὴ εὐδαίμονες, τίνες ἕτεροι; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἵ γε τεχνῖται καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν βαναύσων. ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτεία περὶ ἧς ὁ Σωκράτης εἴρηκεν ταύτας
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τε τὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἐλάττους ἑτέρας.

σχεδὸν δὲ παραπλησίως καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς Νόμους ἔχει τοὺς ὕστερον γραφέντας, διὸ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα πολιτείας ἐπισκέψασθαι μικρὰ βέλτιον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ περὶ ὀλίγων πάμπαν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, περί τε γυναικῶν
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καὶ τέκνων κοινωνίας, πῶς ἔχειν δεῖ, καὶ περὶ κτήσεως, καὶ τῆς πολιτείας τὴν τάξιν (διαιρεῖται γὰρ εἰς δύο μέρη τὸ πλῆθος τῶν οἰκούντων, τὸ μὲν εἰς τοὺς γεωργούς, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ προπολεμοῦν μέρος· τρίτον δʼ ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ κύριον τῆς πόλεως), περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν,
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πότερον οὐδεμιᾶς μεθέξουσιν ἤ τινος ἀρχῆς, καὶ πότερον ὅπλα δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ τούτους καὶ συμπολεμεῖν ἢ μή, περὶ τούτων οὐδὲν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας οἴεται δεῖν συμπολεμεῖν καὶ παιδείας μετέχειν τῆς αὐτῆς τοῖς φύλαξιν, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα τοῖς ἔξωθεν πεπλήρωκε
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τὸν λόγον καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας, ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ γίνεσθαι
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τῶν φυλάκων.

τῶν δὲ Νόμων τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον μέρος νόμοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, ὀλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν, καὶ ταύτην βουλόμενος κοινοτέραν ποιεῖν ταῖς πόλεσι κατὰ μικρὸν περιάγει πάλιν πρὸς τὴν ἑτέραν πολιτείαν. ἔξω γὰρ
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τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίας καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τὰ ἄλλα ταὐτὰ ἀποδίδωσιν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς πολιτείαις· καὶ γὰρ παιδείαν τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπεχομένους ζῆν, καὶ περὶ συσσιτίων ὡσαύτως· πλὴν ἐν ταύτῃ φησὶ δεῖν εἶναι συσσίτια καὶ γυναικῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν χιλίων
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τῶν ὅπλα κεκτημένων, ταύτην δὲ πεντακισχιλίων.

τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ τὸ ζητητικόν, καλῶς δὲ πάντα ἴσως χαλεπόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον πλῆθος δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι χώρας δεήσει τοῖς τοσούτοις Βαβυλωνίας
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ἤ τινος ἄλλης ἀπεράντου τὸ πλῆθος, ἐξ ἧς ἀργοὶ πεντακισχίλιοι θρέψονται, καὶ περὶ τούτους γυναικῶν καὶ θεραπόντων ἕτερος ὄχλος πολλαπλάσιος. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι κατʼ εὐχήν, μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον. λέγεται δʼ ὡς δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην πρὸς δύο βλέποντα τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους, πρός τε
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τὴν χώραν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἔτι δὲ καλῶς ἔχει προσθεῖναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τόπους, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δεῖ τὴν πόλιν ζῆν βίον πολιτικόν (οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν αὐτὴν τοιούτοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὅπλοις ἃ χρήσιμα κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν χώραν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω
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τόπους)· εἰ δέ τις μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποδέχεται βίον, μήτε τὸν ἴδιον μήτε τὸν κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, ὅμως οὐδὲν ἧττον δεῖ φοβεροὺς εἶναι τοῖς πολεμίοις, μὴ μόνον ἐλθοῦσιν εἰς τὴν χώραν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπελθοῦσιν.

καὶ τὸ πλῆθος δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ὁρᾶν δεῖ, μή ποτε βέλτιον ἑτέρως διορίσαι τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον. τοσαύτην γὰρ
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εἶναί φησι δεῖν ὥστε ζῆν σωφρόνως, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἶπεν ὥστε ζῆν εὖ. τοῦτο δʼ ἄρʼ ἐστι καθόλου μᾶλλον, ἐπειδὴ ἔστι σωφρόνως μὲν ταλαιπώρως δὲ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ βελτίων ὅρος τὸ σωφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθερίως (χωρὶς γὰρ ἑκατέρῳ τῷ μὲν τὸ τρυφᾶν ἀκολουθήσει, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἐπιπόνως), ἐπεὶ μόναι γʼ
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εἰσὶν ἕξεις αἱρεταὶ περὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας χρῆσιν αὗται, οἷον οὐσίᾳ πράως μὲν ἢ ἀνδρείως χρῆσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν, σωφρόνως δὲ καὶ ἐλευθερίως ἔστιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἕξεις ἀναγκαῖον περὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι ταύτας. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἰσάζοντα τὸ περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλʼ ἀφεῖναι
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τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἀόριστον ὡς ἱκανῶς ἀνομαλισθησομένην εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πλῆθος διὰ τὰς ἀτεκνίας ὁσωνοῦν γεννωμένων,

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ὅτι δοκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν συμβαίνειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις. δεῖ δὲ τοῦτʼ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶς ἔχειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις τότε καὶ νῦν· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀπορεῖ, διὰ τὸ μερίζεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας εἰς ὁποσονοῦν πλῆθος, τότε δὲ ἀδιαιρέτων οὐσῶν ἀνάγκη τοὺς παράζυγας
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μηδὲν ἔχειν, ἐάν τʼ ἐλάττους ὦσι τὸ πλῆθος ἐάν τε πλείους. μᾶλλον δὲ δεῖν ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν ὡρίσθαι τῆς οὐσίας τὴν τεκνοποιίαν, ὥστε ἀριθμοῦ τινὸς μὴ πλείονα γεννᾶν, τοῦτο δὲ τιθέναι τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἂν συμβαίνῃ τελευτᾶν τινας τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρὸς τὴν
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τῶν ἄλλων ἀτεκνίαν. τὸ δʼ ἀφεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι, πενίας ἀναγκαῖον αἴτιον γίνεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις, ἡ δὲ πενία στάσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ κακουργίαν. Φείδων μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ὢν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς οἴκους ἴσους ᾠήθη δεῖν διαμένειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν,
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καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον τοὺς κλήρους ἀνίσους εἶχον πάντες κατὰ μέγεθος· ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις τοὐναντίον ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων πῶς οἰόμεθα βέλτιον ἂν ἔχειν, λεκτέον ὕστερον· ἐλλέλειπται δʼ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας πῶς ἔσονται διαφέροντες τῶν ἀρχομένων. φησὶ γὰρ
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δεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἑτέρου τὸ στημόνιον ἐρίου γίνεται τῆς κρόκης, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἔχειν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἐφίησι γίνεσθαι μείζονα μέχρι πενταπλασίας, διὰ τί τοῦτʼ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς μέχρι τινός; καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκοπέδων δὲ διαίρεσιν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, μή ποτʼ οὐ
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συμφέρει πρὸς οἰκονομίαν· δύο γὰρ οἰκόπεδα ἑκάστῳ ἔνειμε διελὼν χωρίς, χαλεπὸν δὲ οἰκίας δύο οἰκεῖν.

ἡ δὲ σύνταξις ὅλη βούλεται μὲν εἶναι μήτε δημοκρατία μήτε ὀλιγαρχία, μέση δὲ τούτων, ἣν καλοῦσι πολιτείαν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὁπλιτευόντων ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς κοινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκευάζει
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ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, καλῶς εἴρηκεν ἴσως· εἰ δʼ ὡς ἀρίστην μετὰ τὴν πρώτην πολιτείαν, οὐ καλῶς. τάχα γὰρ τὴν τῶν Λακώνων ἄν τις ἐπαινέσειε μᾶλλον, ἢ κἂν ἄλλην τινὰ ἀριστοκρατικωτέραν. ἔνιοι μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν ὡς δεῖ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐξ ἁπασῶν εἶναι τῶν πολιτειῶν μεμειγμένην,
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διὸ καὶ τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπαινοῦσιν (εἶναι γὰρ αὐτὴν οἱ μὲν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μοναρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας φασίν, λέγοντες τὴν μὲν βασιλείαν μοναρχίαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, δημοκρατεῖσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι τοὺς
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ἐφόρους· οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐφορείαν εἶναι τυραννίδα, δημοκρατεῖσθαι δὲ κατά τε τὰ συσσίτια καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν
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καθʼ ἡμέραν)·

ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις εἴρηται τούτοις ὡς δέον συγκεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος, ἃς ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἄν τις θείη πολιτείας ἢ χειρίστας πασῶν. βέλτιον οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πλείους μιγνύντες· ἡ γὰρ ἐκ
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πλειόνων συγκειμένη πολιτεία βελτίων. ἔπειτʼ οὐδʼ ἔχουσα φαίνεται μοναρχικὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλʼ ὀλιγαρχικὰ καὶ δημοκρατικά· μᾶλλον δʼ ἐγκλίνειν βούλεται πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων καταστάσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αἱρετῶν κληρωτοὺς κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν, τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐπορωτέροις
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ἐπάναγκες ἐκκλησιάζειν εἶναι καὶ φέρειν ἄρχοντας ἤ τι ποιεῖν ἄλλο τῶν πολιτικῶν, τοὺς δʼ ἀφεῖσθαι, τοῦτο δʼ ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι πλείους ἐκ τῶν εὐπόρων εἶναι τοὺς ἄρχοντας, καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων. ὀλιγαρχικὴν δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ τὴν τῆς βουλῆς αἵρεσιν. αἱροῦνται
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μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐπάναγκες, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τιμήματος, εἶτα πάλιν ἴσους ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου· εἶτʼ ἐκ τῶν τρίτων, πλὴν οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες ἦν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου μόνοις ἐπάναγκες τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις· εἶτʼ ἐκ τούτων ἴσον ἀφʼ ἑκάστου τιμήματος
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ἀποδεῖξαί φησι δεῖν ἀριθμόν. ἔσονται δὴ πλείους οἱ ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων καὶ βελτίους διὰ τὸ ἐνίους μὴ αἱρεῖσθαι τῶν δημοτικῶν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπάναγκες. ὡς μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνιστάναι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν, ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν καὶ τῶν ὕστερον ῥηθησομένων,
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ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης πολιτείας ἡ σκέψις· ἔχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων τὸ ἐξ αἱρετῶν αἱρετοὺς ἐπικίνδυνον. εἰ γάρ τινες συστῆναι θέλουσι καὶ μέτριοι τὸ πλῆθος, αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν τούτων αἱρεθήσονται βούλησιν. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις τοῦτον ἔχει
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τὸν τρόπον.

εἰσὶ δέ τινες πολιτεῖαι καὶ ἄλλαι, αἱ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν, πᾶσαι δὲ τῶν καθεστηκυιῶν καὶ καθʼ ἃς πολιτεύονται νῦν ἐγγύτερόν εἰσι τούτων ἀμφοτέρων. οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὔτε τὴν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς
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γυναῖκας ἄλλος κεκαινοτόμηκεν, οὔτε περὶ τὰ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν, ἀλλʼ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄρχονται μᾶλλον. δοκεῖ γάρ τισι τὸ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι μέγιστον τετάχθαι καλῶς· περὶ γὰρ τούτων ποιεῖσθαί φασι τὰς στάσεις πάντας. διὸ Φαλέας ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος τοῦτʼ εἰσήνεγκε πρῶτος·
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φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἴσας εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν.

τοῦτο
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δὲ κατοικιζομέναις μὲν εὐθὺς οὐ χαλεπὸν ᾤετο ποιεῖν, τὰς δʼ ἤδη κατοικουμένας ἐργωδέστερον μέν, ὅμως δὲ τάχιστʼ ἂν ὁμαλισθῆναι τῷ τὰς προῖκας τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους διδόναι μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μή, τοὺς δὲ πένητας μὴ διδόναι μὲν λαμβάνειν
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δέ. Πλάτων δὲ τοὺς Νόμους γράφων μέχρι μέν τινος ᾤετο δεῖν ἐᾶν, πλεῖον δὲ τοῦ πενταπλασίαν εἶναι τῆς ἐλαχίστης μηδενὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξουσίαν εἶναι κτήσασθαι, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο λανθάνειν τοὺς οὕτω νομοθετοῦντας, ὃ λανθάνει νῦν, ὅτι τὸ τῆς οὐσίας τάττοντας
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πλῆθος προσήκει καὶ τῶν τέκνων τὸ πλῆθος τάττειν· ἐὰν γὰρ ὑπεραίρῃ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μέγεθος ὁ τῶν τέκνων ἀριθμός, ἀνάγκη τόν γε νόμον λύεσθαι, καὶ χωρὶς τῆς λύσεως φαῦλον τὸ πολλοὺς ἐκ πλουσίων γίνεσθαι πένητας· ἔργον γὰρ μὴ νεωτεροποιοὺς εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους. διότι μὲν οὖν ἔχει
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τινὰ δύναμιν εἰς τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἡ τῆς οὐσίας ὁμαλότης, καὶ τῶν πάλαι τινὲς φαίνονται διεγνωκότες, οἷον καὶ Σόλων ἐνομοθέτησεν, καὶ παρʼ ἄλλοις ἔστι νόμος ὃς κωλύει κτᾶσθαι γῆν ὁπόσην ἂν βούληταί τις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν πωλεῖν οἱ νόμοι κωλύουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Λοκροῖς νόμος
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ἐστὶ μὴ πωλεῖν ἐὰν μὴ φανερὰν ἀτυχίαν δείξῃ συμβεβηκυῖαν, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς παλαιοὺς κλήρους διασῴζειν (τοῦτο δὲ λυθὲν καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα δημοτικὴν ἐποίησε λίαν τὴν πολιτείαν αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συνέβαινεν ἀπὸ τῶν ὡρισμένων τιμημάτων εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζειν)· ἀλλʼ ἔστι τὴν ἰσότητα μὲν
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ὑπάρχειν τῆς οὐσίας, ταύτην δʼ ἢ λίαν εἶναι πολλήν, ὥστε τρυφᾶν, ἢ λίαν ὀλίγην, ὥστε ζῆν γλίσχρως. δῆλον οὖν ὡς οὐχ ἱκανὸν τὸ τὰς οὐσίας ἴσας ποιῆσαι τὸν νομοθέτην, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέσου στοχαστέον. ἔτι δʼ εἴ τις καὶ τὴν μετρίαν τάξειεν οὐσίαν πᾶσιν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας
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ὁμαλίζειν ἢ τὰς οὐσίας, τοῦτο δʼ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ παιδευομένοις ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἂν εἴπειεν ὁ Φαλέας ὅτι ταῦτα τυγχάνει λέγων αὐτός· οἴεται γὰρ δυοῖν τούτοιν ἰσότητα δεῖν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, κτήσεως καὶ παιδείας. ἀλλὰ τήν τε παιδείαν ἥτις ἔσται δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ τὸ μίαν
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εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐδὲν ὄφελος· ἔστι γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν μὲν εἶναι καὶ μίαν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην εἶναι τοιαύτην ἐξ ἧς ἔσονται προαιρετικοὶ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τιμῆς ἢ συναμφοτέρων.

ἔτι στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τοὐναντίον δὲ περὶ
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ἑκάτερον· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἄνισον,

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οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἐὰν ἴσαι· ὅθεν καὶ
ἐν δὲ ἰῇ τιμῇ ἠμὲν κακὸς ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός.
(Hom. Il. 9.319) οὐ μόνον δʼ οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τἀναγκαῖα ἀδικοῦσιν, ὧν ἄκος εἶναι νομίζει τὴν ἰσότητα τῆς οὐσίας, ὥστε μὴ λωποδυτεῖν διὰ τὸ ῥιγοῦν ἢ
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πεινῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν· ἐὰν γὰρ μείζω ἔχωσιν ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τὴν ταύτης ἰατρείαν ἀδικήσουσιν· οὐ τοίνυν διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂν ἐπιθυμοῖεν ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἄνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς. τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων; τοῖς μὲν οὐσία βραχεῖα
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καὶ ἐργασία, τοῖς δὲ σωφροσύνη· τρίτον δʼ, εἴ τινες βούλοιντο διʼ αὑτῶν χαίρειν, οὐκ ἂν ἐπιζητοῖεν εἰ μὴ παρὰ φιλοσοφίας ἄκος. αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι ἀνθρώπων δέονται· ἐπεὶ ἀδικουσί γε τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἀλλʼ οὐ διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα (οἷον τυραννοῦσιν οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ῥιγῶσιν· διὸ καὶ
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αἱ τιμαὶ μεγάλαι, ἂν ἀποκτείνῃ τις οὐ κλέπτην ἀλλὰ τύραννον)· ὥστε πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας βοηθητικὸς μόνον ὁ τρόπος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας. ἔτι τὰ πολλὰ βούλεται κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρὸς αὑτοὺς πολιτεύσονται καλῶς, δεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιῶντας καὶ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πάντας.
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ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν πολιτείαν συντετάχθαι πρὸς τὴν πολεμικὴν ἰσχύν, περὶ ἧς ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν εἴρηκεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς κτήσεως. δεῖ γὰρ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς χρήσεις ἱκανὴν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν κινδύνους· διόπερ οὔτε τοσοῦτον δεῖ πλῆθος ὑπάρχειν ὅσου οἱ
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πλησίον καὶ κρείττους ἐπιθυμήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἔχοντες ἀμύνειν οὐ δυνήσονται τοὺς ἐπιόντας, οὔθʼ οὕτως ὀλίγην ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι πόλεμον ὑπενεγκεῖν μηδὲ τῶν ἴσων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων. ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν διώρικεν, δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνειν, ὅ τι συμφέρει πλῆθος οὐσίας. ἴσως οὖν ἄριστος ὅρος τὸ μὴ λυσιτελεῖν
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τοῖς κρείττοσι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν πολεμεῖν, ἀλλʼ οὕτως ὡς ἂν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. οἷον Εὔβουλος Αὐτοφραδάτου μέλλοντος Ἀταρνέα πολιορκεῖν ἐκέλευσεν αὐτόν, σκεψάμενον ἐν πόσῳ χρόνῳ λήψεται τὸ χωρίον, λογίσασθαι τοῦ χρόνου τούτου τὴν δαπάνην· ἐθέλειν γὰρ ἔλαττον
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τούτου λαβὼν ἐκλιπεῖν ἤδη τὸν Ἀταρνέα· ταῦτα δʼ εἰπὼν ἐποίησε τὸν Αὐτοφραδάτην σύννουν γενόμενον παύσασθαι τῆς πολιορκίας.

### Book II, 1267a–1270b

ἔστι μὲν οὖν τι τῶν συμφερόντων τὸ τὰς οὐσίας ἴσας εἶναι τοῖς πολίταις πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οἱ
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χαρίεντες ἀγανακτοῖεν ὡς οὐκ ἴσων ὄντες ἄξιοι, διὸ καὶ φαίνονται πολλάκις ἐπιτιθέμενοι καὶ στασιάζοντες·

ἔτι δʼ
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ἡ πονηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄπληστον, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἱκανὸν διωβελία μόνον, ὅταν δʼ ἤδη τοῦτʼ ᾖ πάτριον, ἀεὶ δέονται τοῦ πλείονος, ἕως εἰς ἄπειρον ἔλθωσιν. ἄπειρος γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἧς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ
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ζῶσιν. τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἀρχή, μᾶλλον τοῦ τὰς οὐσίας ὁμαλίζειν, τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς τῇ φύσει τοιούτους παρασκευάζειν ὥστε μὴ βούλεσθαι πλεονεκτεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστίν, ἂν ἥττους τε ὦσι καὶ μὴ ἀδικῶνται. οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὐδὲ τὴν ἰσότητα τῆς οὐσίας εἴρηκεν. περὶ
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γὰρ τὴν τῆς γῆς κτῆσιν ἰσάζει μόνον, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δούλων καὶ βοσκημάτων πλοῦτος καὶ νομίσματος, καὶ κατασκευὴ πολλὴ τῶν καλουμένων ἐπίπλων· ἢ πάντων οὖν τούτων ἰσότητα ζητητέον ἢ τάξιν τινὰ μετρίαν, ἢ πάντα ἐατέον. φαίνεται δʼ ἐκ τῆς νομοθεσίας κατασκευάζων τὴν πόλιν μικράν,
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εἴ γʼ οἱ τεχνῖται πάντες δημόσιοι ἔσονται καὶ μὴ πλήρωμά τι παρέξονται τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλʼ εἴπερ δεῖ δημοσίους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους, δεῖ (καθάπερ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ τε καὶ ὡς Διόφαντός ποτε κατεσκεύαζεν Ἀθήνησι) τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας
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σχεδὸν ἐκ τούτων ἄν τις θεωρήσειεν, εἴ τι τυγχάνει καλῶς εἰρηκὼς ἢ μὴ καλῶς.

Ἱππόδαμος δὲ Εὐρυφῶντος Μιλήσιος (ὃς καὶ τὴν τῶν πόλεων διαίρεσιν εὗρε καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατέτεμεν, γενόμενος καὶ περὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον περιττότερος διὰ φιλοτιμίαν οὕτως
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ὥστε δοκεῖν ἐνίοις ζῆν περιεργότερον τριχῶν τε πλήθει καὶ κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ, ἔτι δὲ ἐσθῆτος εὐτελοῦς μὲν ἀλεεινῆς δέ, οὐκ ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τοὺς θερινοὺς χρόνους, λόγιος δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν εἶναι βουλόμενος) πρῶτος τῶν μὴ πολιτευομένων ἐνεχείρησέ τι περὶ πολιτείας
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εἰπεῖν τῆς ἀρίστης. κατεσκεύαζε δὲ τὴν πόλιν τῷ πλήθει μὲν μυρίανδρον, εἰς τρία δὲ μέρη διῃρημένην· ἐποίει γὰρ ἓν μὲν μέρος τεχνίτας, ἓν δὲ γεωργούς, τρίτον δὲ τὸ προπολεμοῦν καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχον. διῄρει δʼ εἰς τρία μέρη τὴν χώραν, τὴν μὲν ἱερὰν τὴν δὲ δημοσίαν τὴν δʼ ἰδίαν· ὅθεν
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μὲν τὰ νομιζόμενα ποιήσουσι πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἱεράν, ἀφʼ ὧν δʼ οἱ προπολεμοῦντες βιώσονται, κοινήν, τὴν δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν ἰδίαν. ᾤετο δʼ εἴδη καὶ τῶν νόμων εἶναι τρία μόνον· περὶ ὧν γὰρ αἱ δίκαι γίνονται, τρία ταῦτʼ εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὕβριν βλάβην θάνατον. ἐνομοθέτει δὲ καὶ δικαστήριον ἓν τὸ
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κύριον, εἰς ὃ πάσας ἀνάγεσθαι δεῖν τὰς μὴ καλῶς κεκρίσθαι δοκούσας δίκας· τοῦτο δὲ κατεσκεύαζεν ἐκ τινῶν γερόντων
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αἱρετῶν.

τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐ διὰ ψηφοφορίας ᾤετο γίγνεσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἕκαστον πινάκιον, ἐν ᾧ γράφειν, εἰ καταδικάζοι ἁπλῶς, τὴν δίκην, εἰ δʼ ἀπολύοι ἁπλῶς, κενόν, εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή, τοῦτο
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διορίζειν. νῦν γὰρ οὐκ ᾤετο νενομοθετῆσθαι καλῶς· ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἐπιορκεῖν ἢ ταῦτα ἢ ταῦτα δικάζοντας. ἔτι δὲ νόμον ἐτίθει περὶ τῶν εὑρισκόντων τι τῇ πόλει συμφέρον, ὅπως τυγχάνωσι τιμῆς, καὶ τοῖς παισὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τελευτώντων ἐκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι τὴν τροφήν, ὡς οὔπω τοῦτο
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παρʼ ἄλλοις νενομοθετημένον (ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις οὗτος ὁ νόμος νῦν καὶ ἐν ἑτέραις τῶν πόλεων)· τοὺς δʼ ἄρχοντας αἱρετοὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι πάντας. δῆμον δʼ ἐποίει τὰ τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως· τοὺς δʼ αἱρεθέντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κοινῶν καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ ὀρφανικῶν.

τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα καὶ
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τὰ μάλιστα ἀξιόλογα τῆς Ἱπποδάμου τάξεως ταῦτʼ ἐστίν· ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις πρῶτον μὲν τὴν διαίρεσιν τοῦ πλήθους τῶν πολιτῶν. οἵ τε γὰρ τεχνῖται καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντες κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας πάντες, οἱ μὲν γεωργοὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅπλα, οἱ δὲ τεχνῖται οὔτε γῆν οὔτε ὅπλα,
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ὥστε γίνονται σχεδὸν δοῦλοι τῶν τὰ ὅπλα κεκτημένων. μετέχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν ἀδύνατον (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τὰ ὅπλα ἐχόντων καθίστασθαι καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πολιτοφύλακας καὶ τὰς κυριωτάτας ἀρχὰς ὡς εἰπεῖν)· μὴ μετέχοντας δὲ τῆς πολιτείας πῶς οἷόν τε φιλικῶς ἔχειν
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πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν; ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ κρείττους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ ὅπλα γε κεκτημένους ἀμφοτέρων τῶν μερῶν. τοῦτο δʼ οὐ ῥᾴδιον μὴ πολλοὺς ὄντας· εἰ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἔσται, τί δεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας καὶ κυρίους εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων καταστάσεως; ἔτι οἱ γεωργοὶ τί χρήσιμοι τῇ πόλει; τεχνίτας μὲν
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γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι (πᾶσα γὰρ δεῖται πόλις τεχνιτῶν), καὶ δύνανται διαγίγνεσθαι καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης· οἱ δὲ γεωργοὶ πορίζοντες μὲν τοῖς τὰ ὅπλα κεκτημένοις τὴν τροφὴν εὐλόγως ἂν ἦσάν τι τῆς πόλεως μέρος, νῦν δʼ ἰδίαν ἔχουσιν καὶ ταύτην ἰδίᾳ γεωργήσουσιν.
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ἔτι δὲ τὴν κοινήν, ἀφʼ ἧς οἱ προπολεμοῦντες ἕξουσι τὴν τροφήν, εἰ μὲν αὐτοὶ γεωργήσουσιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μάχιμον ἕτερον καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν, βούλεται δʼ ὁ νομοθέτης· εἰ δʼ ἕτεροί τινες ἔσονται τῶν τε τὰ ἴδια γεωργούντων καὶ τῶν μαχίμων, τέταρτον αὖ μόριον ἔσται τοῦτο τῆς πόλεως, οὐδενὸς
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μετέχον, ἀλλὰ ἀλλότριον τῆς πολιτείας· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τις τοὺς αὐτοὺς θήσει τούς τε τὴν ἰδίαν καὶ τοὺς τὴν κοινὴν γεωργοῦντας, τό τε πλῆθος ἄπορον ἔσται τῶν καρπῶν ἐξ ὧν
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ἕκαστος γεωργήσει δύο οἰκίαις,

καὶ τίνος ἕνεκεν οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κλήρων αὑτοῖς τε τὴν τροφὴν λήψονται καὶ τοῖς μαχίμοις παρέξουσιν; ταῦτα δὴ πάντα πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχήν. οὐ καλῶς δʼ οὐδʼ ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως
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ἔχει νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν διαιροῦντα, τῆς δίκης ἁπλῶς γεγραμμένης, καὶ γίνεσθαι τὸν δικαστὴν διαιτητήν. τοῦτο δὲ ἐν μὲν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεται (κοινολογοῦνται γὰρ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῆς κρίσεως), ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον τούτου τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ πολλοὶ
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παρασκευάζουσιν ὅπως οἱ δικασταὶ μὴ κοινολογῶνται πρὸς ἀλλήλους. ἔπειτα πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ταραχώδης ἡ κρίσις, ὅταν ὀφείλειν μὲν ὁ δικαστὴς οἴηται, μὴ τοσοῦτον δʼ ὅσον ὁ δικαζόμενος; ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἴκοσι μνᾶς, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς κρινεῖ δέκα μνᾶς (ἢ ὁ μὲν πλέον ὁ δʼ ἔλασσον), ἄλλος δὲ πέντε,
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ὁ δὲ τέτταρας, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι μεριοῦσιν· οἱ δὲ πάντα καταδικάσουσιν, οἱ δʼ οὐδέν. τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῆς διαλογῆς τῶν ψήφων; ἔτι δʼ οὐδὲν ἐπιορκεῖν ἀναγκάζει τὸν ἁπλῶς ἀποδικάσαντα ἢ καταδικάσαντα, εἴπερ ἁπλῶς τὸ ἔγκλημα γέγραπται, δικαίως· οὐ γὰρ μηδὲν
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ὀφείλειν ὁ ἀποδικάσας κρίνει, ἀλλὰ τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς· ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνος ἤδη ἐπιορκεῖ, ὁ καταδικάσας, μὴ νομίζων ὀφείλειν τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς.

περὶ δὲ τοῦ τοῖς εὑρίσκουσί τι τῇ πόλει συμφέρον ὡς δεῖ γίνεσθαί τινα τιμήν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσφαλὲς τὸ νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλʼ εὐόφθαλμον ἀκοῦσαι μόνον· ἔχει
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γὰρ συκοφαντίας καὶ κινήσεις, ἂν τύχῃ, πολιτείας. ἐμπίπτει δʼ εἰς ἄλλο πρόβλημα καὶ σκέψιν ἑτέραν· ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πότερον βλαβερὸν ἢ συμφέρον ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ κινεῖν τοὺς πατρίους νόμους, ἂν ᾖ τις ἄλλος βελτίων. διόπερ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λεχθέντι ταχὺ συγχωρεῖν, εἴπερ μὴ συμφέρει
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κινεῖν, ἐνδέχεται δʼ εἰσηγεῖσθαί τινας νόμων λύσιν ἢ πολιτείας ὡς κοινὸν ἀγαθόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πεποιήμεθα μνείαν, ἔτι μικρὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ διαστείλασθαι βέλτιον. ἔχει γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀπορίαν, καὶ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ κινεῖν. ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν τοῦτο συνενήνοχεν,
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οἷον ἰατρικὴ κινηθεῖσα παρὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ γυμναστικὴ καὶ ὅλως αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις, ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ μίαν τούτων θετέον καὶ τὴν πολιτικήν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταύτην ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοίως ἔχειν. σημεῖον δʼ ἂν γεγονέναι φαίη τις ἐπʼ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων· τοὺς γὰρ ἀρχαίους νόμους λίαν ἁπλοῦς
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εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικούς. ἐσιδηροφοροῦντό τε γὰρ οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐωνοῦντο παρʼ ἀλλήλων, ὅσα τε λοιπὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐστί που νομίμων εὐήθη πάμπαν ἐστίν,

[Bekker 1269a]
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οἷον ἐν Κύμῃ περὶ τὰ φονικὰ νόμος ἔστιν, ἂν πλῆθός τι παράσχηται μαρτύρων ὁ διώκων τὸν φόνον τῶν αὑτοῦ συγγενῶν, ἔνοχον εἶναι τῷ φόνῳ τὸν φεύγοντα. ζητοῦσι δʼ ὅλως οὐ τὸ πάτριον ἀλλὰ τἀγαθὸν πάντες· εἰκός τε τοὺς
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πρώτους, εἴτε γηγενεῖς ἦσαν εἴτʼ ἐκ φθορᾶς τινος ἐσώθησαν, ὁμοίους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους, ὥσπερ καὶ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν γηγενῶν, ὥστε ἄτοπον τὸ μένειν ἐν τοῖς τούτων δόγμασιν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐδὲ τοὺς γεγραμμένους ἐᾶν ἀκινήτους βέλτιον. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας,
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καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν ἀδύνατον ἀκριβῶς πάντα γραφῆναι· καθόλου γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον γράφειν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις περὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστόν εἰσιν.

ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι κινητέοι καὶ τινὲς καὶ ποτὲ τῶν νόμων εἰσίν· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἐπισκοποῦσιν εὐλαβείας ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι πολλῆς. ὅταν γὰρ
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ᾖ τὸ μὲν βέλτιον μικρόν, τὸ δʼ ἐθίζειν εὐχερῶς λύειν τοὺς νόμους φαῦλον, φανερὸν ὡς ἐατέον ἐνίας ἁμαρτίας καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὠφελήσεται κινήσας ὅσον βλαβήσεται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἀπειθεῖν ἐθισθείς. ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν· οὐ γὰρ
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ὅμοιον τὸ κινεῖν τέχνην καὶ νόμον· ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἰσχὺν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, τοῦτο δʼ οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος, ὥστε τὸ ῥᾳδίως μεταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἑτέρους νόμους καινοὺς ἀσθενῆ ποιεῖν ἐστι τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν. ἔτι δʼ εἰ
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καὶ κινητέοι, πότερον πάντες καὶ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἢ οὔ; καὶ πότερον τῷ τυχόντι ἢ τισίν; ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχει μεγάλην διαφοράν. διὸ νῦν μὲν ἀφῶμεν ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν· ἄλλων γάρ ἐστι καιρῶν.

περὶ δὲ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας καὶ τῆς Κρητικῆς,
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σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, δύο εἰσὶν αἱ σκέψεις, μία μὲν εἴ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς πρὸς τὴν ἀρίστην νενομοθέτηται τάξιν, ἑτέρα δʼ εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείας. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς πολιτεύεσθαι
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τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν σχολήν, ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστιν· τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὑπάρχειν, οὐ ῥᾴδιον λαβεῖν. ἥ τε γὰρ Θετταλῶν πενεστεία πολλάκις ἐπέθετο τοῖς Θετταλοῖς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς Λάκωσιν οἱ εἵλωτες (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐφεδρεύοντες τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι διατελοῦσιν)· περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρῆτας
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οὐδέν πω τοιοῦτον συμβέβηκεν. αἴτιον δʼ ἴσως τὸ τὰς γειτνιώσας
[Bekker 1269b]
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πόλεις,

καίπερ πολεμούσας ἀλλήλαις, μηδεμίαν εἶναι σύμμαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ συμφέρειν ταῖς καὶ αὐταῖς κεκτημέναις περιοίκους, τοῖς δὲ Λάκωσιν οἱ γειτνιῶντες ἐχθροὶ πάντες ἦσαν, Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μεσήνιοι καὶ Ἀρκάδες·
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ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς Θετταλοῖς κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἀφίσταντο διὰ τὸ πολεμεῖν ἔτι τοῖς προσχώροις, Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ Περραιβοῖς καὶ Μάγνησιν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ τό γε τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἐργῶδες εἶναι, τίνα δεῖ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλῆσαι τρόπον· ἀνιέμενοί τε γὰρ ὑβρίζουσι καὶ τῶν ἴσων ἀξιοῦσιν
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ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς κυρίοις, καὶ κακοπαθῶς ζῶντες ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μισοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἐξευρίσκουσι τὸν βέλτιστον τρόπον οἷς τοῦτο συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν εἱλωτείαν.

ἔτι δʼ ἡ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἄνεσις καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως. ὥσπερ γὰρ
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οἰκίας μέρος ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνή, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πόλιν ἐγγὺς τοῦ δίχα διῃρῆσθαι δεῖ νομίζειν εἴς τε τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ὥστʼ ἐν ὅσαις πολιτείαις φαύλως ἔχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς πόλεως εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν ἀνομοθέτητον. ὅπερ ἐκεῖ συμβέβηκεν· ὅλην γὰρ
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τὴν πόλιν ὁ νομοθέτης εἶναι βουλόμενος καρτερικήν, κατὰ μὲν τοὺς ἄνδρας φανερός ἐστι τοιοῦτος ὤν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐξημέληκεν· ζῶσι γὰρ ἀκολάστως πρὸς ἅπασαν ἀκολασίαν καὶ τρυφερῶς. ὥστʼ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον, ἄλλως τε κἂν τύχωσι γυναικοκρατούμενοι,
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καθάπερ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ πολεμικῶν γενῶν, ἔξω Κελτῶν ἢ κἂν εἴ τινες ἕτεροι φανερῶς τετιμήκασι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας συνουσίαν. ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος οὐκ ἀλόγως συζεῦξαι τὸν Ἄρην πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρρένων ὁμιλίαν
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ἢ πρὸς τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν φαίνονται κατοκώχιμοι πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι. διὸ παρὰ τοῖς Λάκωσι τοῦθʼ ὑπῆρχεν, καὶ πολλὰ διῳκεῖτο ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν. καίτοι τί διαφέρει γυναῖκας ἄρχειν ἢ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἄρχεσθαι; ταὐτὸ γὰρ συμβαίνει. χρησίμου δʼ
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οὔσης τῆς θρασύτητος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ, πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, βλαβερώταται καὶ πρὸς ταῦθʼ αἱ τῶν Λακώνων ἦσαν. ἐδήλωσαν δʼ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς· χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἑτέραις πόλεσιν, θόρυβον δὲ παρεῖχον πλείω τῶν πολεμίων. ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν
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οὖν ἔοικε συμβεβηκέναι τοῖς Λάκωσιν εὐλόγως ἡ τῶν γυναικῶν
[Bekker 1270a]
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ἄνεσις.

ἔξω γὰρ τῆς οἰκείας διὰ τὰς στρατείας ἀπεξενοῦντο πολὺν χρόνον, πολεμοῦντες τόν τε πρὸς Ἀργείους πόλεμον καὶ πάλιν τὸν πρὸς Ἀρκάδας καὶ Μεσηνίους· σχολάσαντες δὲ αὑτοὺς μὲν παρεῖχον τῷ νομοθέτῃ προωδοπεποιημένους
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διὰ τὸν στρατιωτικὸν βίον (πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει μέρη τῆς ἀρετῆς), τὰς δὲ γυναῖκάς φασι μὲν ἄγειν ἐπιχειρῆσαι τὸν Λυκοῦργον ὑπὸ τοὺς νόμους, ὡς δʼ ἀντέκρουον, ἀποστῆναι πάλιν. αἰτίαι μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αὗται τῶν γενομένων, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἁμαρτίας· ἀλλʼ ἡμεῖς
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οὐ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν, τίνι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἔχοντα μὴ καλῶς ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον, οὐ μόνον ἀπρέπειάν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς καθʼ αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ συμβάλλεσθαί τι πρὸς τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν.
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μετὰ γὰρ τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς κτήσεως ἐπιτιμήσειεν ἄν τις. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν συμβέβηκε κεκτῆσθαι πολλὴν λίαν οὐσίαν, τοῖς δὲ πάμπαν μικράν· διόπερ εἰς ὀλίγους ἧκεν ἡ χώρα. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν νόμων τέτακται φαύλως· ὠνεῖσθαι μὲν γάρ, ἢ
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πωλεῖν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν, ἐποίησεν οὐ καλόν, ὀρθῶς ποιήσας, διδόναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν ἐξουσίαν ἔδωκε τοῖς βουλομένοις· καίτοι ταὐτὸ συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἐκείνως τε καὶ οὕτως. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν σχεδὸν τῆς πάσης χώρας τῶν πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο, τῶν τʼ ἐπικλήρων πολλῶν γινομένων,
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καὶ διὰ τὸ προῖκας διδόναι μεγάλας. καίτοι βέλτιον ἦν μηδεμίαν ἢ ὀλίγην ἢ καὶ μετρίαν τετάχθαι. νῦν δʼ ἔξεστι δοῦναί τε τὴν ἐπίκληρον ὅτῳ ἂν βούληται, κἂν ἀποθάνῃ μὴ διαθέμενος, ὃν ἂν καταλίπῃ κληρονόμον, οὗτος ᾧ ἂν θέλῃ δίδωσιν. τοιγαροῦν δυναμένης τῆς χώρας χιλίους ἱππεῖς
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τρέφειν καὶ πεντακοσίους, καὶ ὁπλίτας τρισμυρίους, οὐδὲ χίλιοι τὸ πλῆθος ἦσαν. γέγονε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν δῆλον ὅτι φαύλως αὐτοῖς εἶχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην· μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλʼ ἀπώλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν. λέγουσι δʼ ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτέρων
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βασιλέων μετεδίδοσαν τῆς πολιτείας, ὥστʼ οὐ γίνεσθαι τότε ὀλιγανθρωπίαν, πολεμούντων πολὺν χρόνον, καί φασιν εἶναί ποτε τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καὶ μυρίους· οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ, εἴτʼ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ ταῦτα εἴτε μή, βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῆς κτήσεως ὡμαλισμένης πληθύειν ἀνδρῶν τὴν πόλιν. ὑπεναντίος δὲ
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καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν τεκνοποιίαν νόμος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν.

[Bekker 1270b]
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βουλόμενος γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης ὡς πλείστους εἶναι τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας, προάγεται τοὺς πολίτας ὅτι πλείστους ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτοῖς νόμος τὸν μὲν γεννήσαντα τρεῖς υἱοὺς ἄφρουρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τέτταρας ἀτελῆ πάντων. καίτοι
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φανερὸν ὅτι πολλῶν γινομένων, τῆς δὲ χώρας οὕτω διῃρημένης, ἀναγκαῖον πολλοὺς γίνεσθαι πένητας.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορείαν ἔχει φαύλως. ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ κυρία μὲν αὐτὴ τῶν μεγίστων αὐτοῖς ἐστιν, γίνονται δʼ ἐκ τοῦ δήμου παντός, ὥστε πολλάκις ἐμπίπτουσιν ἄνθρωποι σφόδρα
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πένητες εἰς τὸ ἀρχεῖον, οἳ διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὤνιοι ἦσαν. ἐδήλωσαν δὲ πολλάκις μὲν καὶ πρότερον, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἐν τοῖς Ἀνδρίοις· διαφθαρέντες γὰρ ἀργυρίῳ τινές, ὅσον ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῖς, ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ἀπώλεσαν, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι λίαν μεγάλην καὶ ἰσοτύραννον δημαγωγεῖν
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αὐτοὺς ἠναγκάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς, ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ συνεπιβλάπτεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν· δημοκρατία γὰρ ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας συνέβαινεν. συνέχει μὲν οὖν τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ ἀρχεῖον τοῦτο—ἡσυχάζει γὰρ ὁ δῆμος διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς μεγίστης ἀρχῆς, ὥστʼ εἴτε διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην εἴτε διὰ
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τύχην τοῦτο συμπέπτωκεν, συμφερόντως ἔχει τοῖς πράγμασιν· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μέλλουσαν σῴζεσθαι πάντα βούλεσθαι τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν κατὰ ταὐτά· οἱ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχουσιν, οἱ δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ διὰ τὴν γερουσίαν (ἆθλον γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ
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αὕτη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστιν), ὁ δὲ δῆμος διὰ τὴν ἐφορείαν (καθίσταται γὰρ ἐξ ἁπάντων)—ἀλλʼ αἱρετὴν ἔδει τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι ταύτην ἐξ ἁπάντων μέν, μὴ τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον ὃν νῦν (παιδαριώδης γάρ ἐστι λίαν). ἔτι δὲ καὶ κρίσεών εἰσι μεγάλων κύριοι, ὄντες οἱ τυχόντες, διόπερ οὐκ αὐτογνώμονας
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βέλτιον κρίνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ τοὺς νόμους. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ δίαιτα τῶν ἐφόρων οὐχ ὁμολογουμένη τῷ βουλήματι τῆς πόλεως· αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀνειμένη λίαν ἐστίν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ σκληρόν, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρτερεῖν ἀλλὰ λάθρᾳ τὸν νόμον
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ἀποδιδράσκοντας ἀπολαύειν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν.

### Book II, 1270b–1274b

ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν οὐ καλῶς αὐτοῖς. ἐπιεικῶν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πεπαιδευμένων ἱκανῶς πρὸς ἀνδραγαθίαν τάχʼ ἂν εἴπειέ τις συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει, καίτοι τό γε διὰ βίου κυρίους εἶναι κρίσεων μεγάλων ἀμφισβητήσιμον
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(ἕστι γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ σώματος, καὶ διανοίας γῆρας)·

[Bekker 1271a]
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τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον πεπαιδευμένων ὥστε καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην αὐτὸν ἀπιστεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οὐκ ἀσφαλές. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ καταδωροδοκούμενοι καὶ καταχαριζόμενοι πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν οἱ κεκοινωνηκότες τῆς
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ἀρχῆς ταύτης. διόπερ βέλτιον αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀνευθύνους εἶναι· νῦν δʼ εἰσίν. δόξειε δʼ ἂν ἡ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴ πάσας εὐθύνειν τὰς ἀρχάς· τοῦτο δὲ τῇ ἐφορείᾳ μέγα λίαν τὸ δῶρον, καὶ τὸν τρόπον οὐ τοῦτον λέγομεν διδόναι δεῖν τὰς εὐθύνας. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἣν ποιοῦνται τῶν γερόντων κατά τε
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τὴν κρίσιν ἐστὶ παιδαριώδης, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν αἰτεῖσθαι τὸν ἀξιωθησόμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς. νῦν δʼ ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν ὁ νομοθέτης φαίνεται ποιῶν· φιλοτίμους γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολίτας
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τούτῳ κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν γερόντων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἄρχειν αἰτήσαιτο μὴ φιλότιμος ὤν. καίτοι τῶν γʼ ἀδικημάτων τῶν γʼ ἑκουσίων τὰ πλεῖστα συμβαίνει σχεδὸν διὰ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ διὰ φιλοχρηματίαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

περὶ δὲ βασιλείας, εἰ μὲν βέλτιόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν
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ἢ μὴ βέλτιον, ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος· ἀλλὰ μὴν βέλτιόν γε μὴ καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον ἕκαστον κρίνεσθαι τῶν βασιλέων. ὅτι δʼ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐδʼ αὐτὸς οἴεται δύνασθαι ποιεῖν καλοὺς κἀγαθούς, δῆλον· ἀπιστεῖ γοῦν ὡς οὐκ οὖσιν ἱκανῶς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν· διόπερ ἐξέπεμπον συμπρεσβευτὰς
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τοὺς ἐχθρούς, καὶ σωτηρίαν ἐνόμιζον τῇ πόλει εἶναι τὸ στασιάζειν τοὺς βασιλεῖς. οὐ καλῶς δʼ οὐδὲ περὶ τὰ συσσίτια τὰ καλούμενα φιδίτια νενομοθέτηται τῷ καταστήσαντι πρῶτον. ἔδει γὰρ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν σύνοδον, καθάπερ ἐν Κρήτῃ· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Λάκωσιν ἕκαστον δεῖ
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φέρειν, καὶ σφόδρα πενήτων ἐνίων ὄντων καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀνάλωμα οὐ δυναμένων δαπανᾶν, ὥστε συμβαίνει τοὐναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τῆς προαιρέσεως. βούλεται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρατικὸν εἶναι τὸ κατασκεύασμα τῶν συσσιτίων, γίνεται δʼ ἥκιστα δημοκρατικὸν οὕτω νενομοθετημένον. μετέχειν μὲν
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γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τοῖς λίαν πένησιν, ὅρος δὲ τῆς πολιτείας οὗτός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ πάτριος, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον τοῦτο τὸ τέλος φέρειν μὴ μετέχειν αὐτῆς· τῷ δὲ περὶ τοὺς ναυάρχους νόμῳ καὶ ἕτεροί τινες ἐπιτετιμήκασιν, ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶντες. στάσεως γὰρ γίνεται αἴτιος· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν,
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οὖσι στρατηγοῖς ἀιδίοις, ἡ ναυαρχία σχεδὸν ἑτέρα βασιλεία καθέστηκεν. καὶ ὡδὶ δὲ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐπιτιμήσειεν
[Bekker 1271b]
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ἄν τις, ὅπερ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις ἐπιτετίμηκεν·

πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστί, τὴν πολεμικήν· αὕτη γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοιγαροῦν ἐσῴζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες
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διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν μηδὲ ἠσκηκέναι μηδεμίαν ἄσκησιν ἑτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. τούτου δὲ ἁμάρτημα οὐκ ἔλαττον· νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τἀγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα διʼ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἢ κακίας, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κρείττω τῆς ἀρετῆς
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ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς. φαύλως δʼ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ κοινὰ χρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ τῆς πόλεως ἔστιν οὐδὲν πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένοις πολεμεῖν, εἰσφέρουσί τε κακῶς· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν εἶναι τὴν πλείστην γῆν οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν ἀλλήλων τὰς
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εἰσφοράς. ἀποβέβηκέ τε τοὐναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμφέροντος· τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς δʼ ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἃ μάλιστʼ ἄν τις ἐπιτιμήσειεν.

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ἡ δὲ Κρητικὴ πολιτεία πάρεγγυς μέν ἐστι ταύτης, ἔχει δὲ μικρὰ μὲν οὐ χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἧττον γλαφυρῶς. καὶ γὰρ ἔοικε καὶ λέγεταί γε τὰ πλεῖστα μεμιμῆσθαι τὴν Κρητικὴν πολιτείαν ἡ τῶν Λακώνων· τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀρχαίων ἧττον διήρθρωται τῶν νεωτέρων. φασὶ
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γὰρ τὸν Λυκοῦργον, ὅτε τὴν ἐπιτροπείαν τὴν Χαριλάου τοῦ βασιλέως καταλιπὼν ἀπεδήμησεν, τότε τὸν πλεῖστον διατρῖψαι χρόνον περὶ Κρήτην διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν· ἄποικοι γὰρ οἱ Λύκτιοι τῶν Λακώνων ἦσαν, κατέλαβον δʼ οἱ πρὸς τὴν ἀποικίαν ἐλθόντες τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων ὑπάρχουσαν
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ἐν τοῖς τότε κατοικοῦσιν. διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον χρῶνται αὐτοῖς, ὡς κατασκευάσαντος Μίνω πρώτου τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων. δοκεῖ δʼ ἡ νῆσος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πεφυκέναι καὶ κεῖσθαι καλῶς· πάσῃ γὰρ ἐπίκειται τῇ θαλάττῃ, σχεδὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων
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ἱδρυμένων περὶ τὴν θάλατταν πάντων· ἀπέχει γὰρ τῇ μὲν τῆς Πελοποννήσου μικρόν, τῇ δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας τοῦ περὶ Τριόπιον τόπου καὶ Ῥόδου. διὸ καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχὴν κατέσχεν ὁ Μίνως, καὶ τὰς νήσους τὰς μὲν ἐχειρώσατο τὰς δʼ ᾤκισεν, τέλος δὲ ἐπιθέμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησεν
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ἐκεῖ περὶ Καμικόν.

ἔχει δʼ ἀνάλογον ἡ Κρητικὴ τάξις πρὸς τὴν Λακωνικήν. γεωργοῦσί τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν οἱ εἵλωτες
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τοῖς δὲ Κρησὶν οἱ περίοικοι,

καὶ συσσίτια παρʼ ἀμφοτέροις ἔστιν, καὶ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλουν οἱ Λάκωνες οὐ φιδίτια ἀλλὰ ἀνδρεῖα, καθάπερ οἱ Κρῆτες, ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν ἐλήλυθεν. ἔτι δὲ τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις. οἱ μὲν
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γὰρ ἔφοροι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλουμένοις κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἔφοροι πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰσίν· οἱ δὲ γέροντες τοῖς γέρουσιν, οὓς καλοῦσιν οἱ Κρῆτες βουλήν, ἴσοι· βασιλεία δὲ πρότερον μὲν ἦν, εἶτα κατέλυσαν οἱ Κρῆτες, καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν οἱ
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κόσμοι τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔχουσιν· ἐκκλησίας δὲ μετέχουσι πάντες, κυρία δʼ οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀλλʼ ἢ συνεπιψηφίσαι τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς γέρουσι καὶ τοῖς κόσμοις.

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων ἔχει βέλτιον τοῖς Κρησὶν ἢ τοῖς Λάκωσιν. ἐν μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαίμονι κατὰ κεφαλὴν ἕκαστος εἰσφέρει τὸ τεταγμένον,
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εἰ δὲ μή, μετέχειν νόμος κωλύει τῆς πολιτείας, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, ἐν δὲ Κρήτῃ κοινοτέρως· ἀπὸ πάντων γὰρ τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημάτων δημοσίων, καὶ ἐκ τῶν φόρων οὓς φέρουσιν οἱ περίοικοι, τέτακται μέρος τὸ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰς κοινὰς
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λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ τοῖς συσσιτίοις, ὥστʼ ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέφεσθαι πάντας, καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ ἄνδρας· πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὀλιγοσιτίαν ὡς ὠφέλιμον πολλὰ πεφιλοσόφηκεν ὁ νομοθέτης, καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάζευξιν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἵνα μὴ πολυτεκνῶσι, τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας ποιήσας
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ὁμιλίαν, περὶ ἧς εἰ φαύλως ἢ μὴ φαύλως, ἕτερος ἔσται τοῦ διασκέψασθαι καιρός. ὅτι δὴ τὰ περὶ τὰ συσσίτια βέλτιον τέτακται τοῖς Κρησὶν ἢ τοῖς Λάκωσι, φανερόν· τὰ δὲ περὶ τοὺς κόσμους ἔτι χεῖρον τῶν ἐφόρων. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει κακὸν τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον, ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτοις
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(γίνονται γὰρ οἱ τυχόντες), ὃ δʼ ἐκεῖ συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐνταῦθʼ οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐκεῖ μὲν γάρ, διὰ τὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι, μετέχων ὁ δῆμος τῆς μεγίστης ἀρχῆς βούλεται μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν· ἐνταῦθα δʼ οὐκ ἐξ ἁπάντων αἱροῦνται τοὺς κόσμους ἀλλʼ ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν, καὶ τοὺς γέροντας
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ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων, περὶ ὧν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄν τις εἴπειε λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γινομένων· τὸ γὰρ ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ τὸ διὰ βίου μεῖζόν ἐστι γέρας τῆς ἀξίας αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἄρχειν ἀλλʼ αὐτογνώμονας ἐπισφαλές. τὸ δʼ ἡσυχάζειν μὴ μετέχοντα
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τὸν δῆμον οὐδὲν σημεῖον τοῦ τετάχθαι καλῶς. οὐδὲν γὰρ λήμματος ἔστι τοῖς κόσμοις ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐφόροις, πόρρω γʼ
[Bekker 1272b]
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ἀποικοῦσιν ἐν νήσῳ τῶν διαφθερούντων.

ἣν δὲ ποιοῦνται τῆς ἁμαρτίας ταύτης ἰατρείαν, ἄτοπος καὶ οὐ πολιτικὴ ἀλλὰ δυναστευτική. πολλάκις γὰρ ἐκβάλλουσι συστάντες τινὲς τοὺς κόσμους ἢ τῶν συναρχόντων αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν· ἔξεστι
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δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ τοῖς κόσμοις ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα βέλτιον γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον ἢ κατʼ ἀνθρώπων βούλησιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλὴς ὁ κανών. πάντων δὲ φαυλότατον τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν, ἣν καθιστᾶσι πολλάκις οἳ ἂν μὴ δίκας βούλωνται δοῦναι τῶν δυνατῶν· ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὡς ἔχει τι
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πολιτείας ἡ τάξις, ἀλλʼ οὐ πολιτεία ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ δυναστεία μᾶλλον. εἰώθασι δὲ διαλαμβάνοντες τὸν δῆμον καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἀναρχίαν ποιεῖν καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καίτοι τί διαφέρει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ διά τινος χρόνου μηκέτι πόλιν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην, ἀλλὰ λύεσθαι τὴν πολιτικὴν
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κοινωνίαν; ἔστι δʼ ἐπικίνδυνος οὕτως ἔχουσα πόλις, τῶν βουλομένων ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένων. ἀλλά, καθάπερ εἴρηται, σῴζεται διὰ τὸν τόπον· ξενηλασίας γὰρ τὸ πόρρω πεποίηκεν. διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιοίκων μένει τοῖς Κρησίν, οἱ δʼ εἵλωτες ἀφίστανται πολλάκις. οὔτε γὰρ ἐξωτερικῆς
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ἀρχῆς κοινωνοῦσιν οἱ Κρῆτες, νεωστί τε πόλεμος ξενικὸς διαβέβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον, ὃς πεποίηκε φανερὰν τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῶν ἐκεῖ νόμων. περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτης εἰρήσθω τοσαῦθʼ ἡμῖν τῆς πολιτείας.

πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ δοκοῦσι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι καλῶς καὶ
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πολλὰ περιττῶς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, μάλιστα δʼ ἔνια παραπλησίως τοῖς Λάκωσιν. αὗται γὰρ αἱ τρεῖς πολιτεῖαι ἀλλήλαις τε σύνεγγύς πώς εἰσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολὺ διαφέρουσιν, ἥ τε Κρητικὴ καὶ ἡ Λακωνικὴ καὶ τρίτη τούτων ἡ τῶν Καρχηδονίων. καὶ πολλὰ τῶν τεταγμένων ἔχει παρʼ
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αὐτοῖς καλῶς· σημεῖον δὲ πολιτείας συντεταγμένης τὸ τὸν δῆμον ἑκουσίον διαμένειν ἐν τῇ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ μήτε στάσιν, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, γεγενῆσθαι μήτε τύραννον. ἔχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ τὰ μὲν συσσίτια τῶν ἑταιριῶν τοῖς φιδιτίοις, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἑκατὸν
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καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχὴν τοῖς ἐφόροις (πλὴν ὃ οὐ χεῖρον· οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων εἰσί, ταύτην δʼ αἱροῦνται τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀριστίνδην), τοὺς δὲ βασιλεῖς καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ βασιλεῦσι καὶ γέρουσιν· καὶ βέλτιον δὲ τοὺς βασιλεῖς μήτε καθʼ αὑτὸ εἶναι γένος μήτε τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν,
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εἰ δέ τι διαφέρει, ἐκ τούτων αἱρετοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ καθʼ ἡλικίαν. μεγάλων γὰρ κύριοι καθεστῶτες, ἂν εὐτελεῖς ὦσι
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μεγάλα βλάπτουσι,

καὶ ἔβλαψαν ἤδη τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα τῶν ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἂν διὰ τὰς παρεκβάσεις κοινὰ τυγχάνει πάσαις ὄντα ταῖς εἰρημέναις πολιτείαις· τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας
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καὶ τῆς πολιτείας τὰ μὲν εἰς δῆμον ἐκκλίνει μᾶλλον, τὰ δʼ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὲν προσάγειν τὰ δὲ μὴ προσάγειν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον οἱ βασιλεῖς κύριοι μετὰ τῶν γερόντων, ἂν ὁμογνωμονῶσι πάντες, εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ τούτων ὁ δῆμος. ἃ δʼ ἂν εἰσφέρωσιν οὗτοι, οὐ
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διακοῦσαι μόνον ἀποδιδόασι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσὶ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις ἀντειπεῖν ἔξεστιν, ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἑτέραις πολιτείαις οὐκ ἔστιν. τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας κυρίας οὔσας πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων ὑφʼ αὑτῶν αἱρετὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἑκατὸν
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ταύτας αἱρεῖσθαι, τὴν μεγίστην ἀρχήν, ἔτι δὲ ταύτας πλείονα ἄρχειν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων (καὶ γὰρ ἐξεληλυθότες ἄρχουσι καὶ μέλλοντες) ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ ἀμίσθους καὶ μὴ κληρωτὰς ἀριστοκρατικὸν θετέον, καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχείων δικάζεσθαι πάσας
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(καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπʼ ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι). παρεκβαίνει δὲ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ἡ τάξις τῶν Καρχηδονίων μάλιστα πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατά τινα διάνοιαν ἣ συνδοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀριστίνδην ἀλλὰ καὶ πλουτίνδην οἴονται δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας· ἀδύνατον
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γὰρ τὸν ἀποροῦντα καλῶς ἄρχειν καὶ σχολάζειν. εἴπερ οὖν τὸ μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι πλουτίνδην ὀλιγαρχικὸν τὸ δὲ κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἀριστοκρατικόν, αὕτη τις ἂν εἴη τάξις τρίτη, καθʼ ἥνπερ συντέτακται καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τὰ περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν· αἱροῦνται γὰρ εἰς δύο ταῦτα βλέποντες, καὶ μάλιστα
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τὰς μεγίστας, τούς τε βασιλεῖς καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς.

δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ἁμάρτημα νομοθέτου τὴν παρέκβασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ταύτην. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ τοῦθʼ ὁρᾶν ἐστι τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων, ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνωνται σχολάζειν καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον ἄρχοντες ἀλλὰ μηδʼ
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ἰδιωτεύοντες. εἰ δὲ δεῖ βλέπειν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν σχολῆς, φαῦλον τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ὠνητὰς εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, τήν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν. ἔντιμον γὰρ ὁ νόμος οὗτος ποιεῖ τὸν πλοῦτον μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην φιλοχρήματον. ὅ τι δʼ ἂν ὑπολάβῃ τίμιον εἶναι τὸ
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κύριον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δόξαν ἀκολουθεῖν τούτοις. ὅπου δὲ μὴ μάλιστα ἀρετὴ τιμᾶται, ταύτην
[Bekker 1273b]
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οὐχ οἷόν τε βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν.

ἐθίζεσθαι δʼ εὔλογον κερδαίνειν τοὺς ὠνουμένους, ὅταν δαπανήσαντες ἄρχωσιν· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ πένης μὲν ὢν ἐπιεικὴς δὲ βουλήσεται κερδαίνειν, φαυλότερος δʼ ὢν οὐ βουλήσεται δαπανήσας.
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διὸ δεῖ τοὺς δυναμένους ἄριστʼ ἀρχεῖν, τούτους ἄρχειν. βέλτιον δʼ, εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν εὐπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς. φαῦλον δʼ ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλείους ἀρχὰς τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρχειν· ὅπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις· ἓν γὰρ
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ὑφʼ ἑνὸς ἔργον ἄριστʼ ἀποτελεῖται. δεῖ δʼ ὅπως γίνηται τοῦθʼ ὁρᾶν τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ προστάττειν τὸν αὐτὸν αὐλεῖν καὶ σκυτοτομεῖν. ὥσθʼ ὅπου μὴ μικρὰ ἡ πόλις, πολιτικώτερον πλείονας μετέχειν τῶν ἀρχῶν, καὶ δημοτικώτερον· κοινότερόν τε γὰρ καθάπερ εἴπομεν καὶ κάλλιον ἕκαστον ἀποτελεῖται
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τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θᾶττον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις διὰ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν διελήλυθε τὸ ἄρχειν καὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι. ὀλιγαρχικῆς δʼ οὔσης τῆς πολιτείας ἄριστα ἐκφεύγουσι τῷ πλουτεῖν αἰεί τι τοῦ δήμου μέρος, ἐκπέμποντες ἐπὶ
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τὰς πόλεις. τούτῳ γὰρ ἰῶνται καὶ ποιοῦσι μόνιμον τὴν πολιτείαν. ἀλλὰ τουτί ἐστι τύχης ἔργον, δεῖ δὲ ἀστασιάστους εἶναι διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην. νῦν δέ, ἂν ἀτυχία γένηταί τις καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀποστῇ τῶν ἀρχομένων, οὐδὲν ἔστι φάρμακον διὰ τῶν νόμων τῆς ἡσυχίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων
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πολιτείας καὶ Κρητικῆς καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων, αἵπερ δικαίως εὐδοκιμοῦσι, τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.

τῶν δὲ ἀποφηναμένων τι περὶ πολιτείας ἔνιοι μὲν οὐκ ἐκοινώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδʼ ὡντινωνοῦν, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ἰδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον, περὶ ὧν εἴ τι ἀξιόλογον, εἴρηται
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σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων, ἔνιοι δὲ νομοθέται γεγόνασιν, οἱ μὲν ταῖς οἰκείαις πόλεσιν οἱ δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀθνείων τισί, πολιτευθέντες αὐτοί· καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν νόμων ἐγένοντο δημιουργοὶ μόνον, οἱ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας, οἷον καὶ Λυκοῦργος καὶ Σόλων· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέστησαν.
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περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων εἴρηται, Σόλωνα δʼ ἔνιοι μὲν οἴονται νομοθέτην γενέσθαι σπουδαῖον· ὀλιγαρχίαν τε γὰρ καταλῦσαι λίαν ἄκρατον οὖσαν, καὶ δουλεύοντα τὸν δῆμον παῦσαι, καὶ δημοκρατίαν καταστῆσαι τὴν πάτριον, μείξαντα καλῶς τὴν πολιτείαν· εἶναι γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ
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πάγῳ βουλὴν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς ἀριστοκρατικόν, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια δημοτικόν.

ἔοικε δὲ Σόλων
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ἐκεῖνα μὲν ὑπάρχοντα πρότερον οὐ καταλῦσαι, τήν τε βουλὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἵρεσιν, τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστῆσαι, τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων. διὸ καὶ μέμφονταί τινες αὐτῷ· λῦσαι γὰρ θάτερα, κύριον ποιήσαντα τὸ δικαστήριον
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πάντων, κληρωτὸν ὄν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦτʼ ἴσχυσεν, ὥσπερ τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ χαριζόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν μετέστησαν· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον
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ἕκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν προήγαγεν αὔξων εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν. φαίνεται δʼ οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνος γενέσθαι τοῦτο προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμπτώματος (τῆς ναυαρχίας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος ἐφρονηματίσθη καὶ δημαγωγοὺς ἔλαβε φαύλους ἀντιπολιτευομένων
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τῶν ἐπιεικῶν), ἐπεὶ Σόλων γε ἔοικε τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἀποδιδόναι τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν (μηδὲ γὰρ τούτου κύριος ὢν ὁ δῆμος δοῦλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος), τὰς δʼ ἀρχὰς ἐκ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων κατέστησε πάσας, ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσιομεδίμνων
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καὶ ζευγιτῶν καὶ τρίτου τέλους τῆς καλουμένης ἱππάδος· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον τὸ θητικόν, οἷς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῆς μετῆν.

νομοθέται δʼ ἐγένοντο Ζάλευκός τε Λοκροῖς τοῖς ἐπιζεφυρίοις, καὶ Χαρώνδας ὁ Καταναῖος τοῖς αὑτοῦ πολίταις καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς Χαλκιδικαῖς πόλεσι ταῖς περὶ Ἰταλίαν
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καὶ Σικελίαν. πειρῶνται δέ τινες καὶ συνάγειν ὡς Ὀνομακρίτου μὲν γενομένου πρώτου δεινοῦ περὶ νομοθεσίαν, γυμνασθῆναι δʼ αὐτὸν ἐν Κρήτῃ, Λοκρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντα, κατὰ τέχνην μαντικήν· τούτου δὲ γενέσθαι Θάλητα ἑταῖρον, Θάλητος δʼ ἀκροατὴν Λυκοῦργον καὶ Ζάλευκον, Ζαλεύκου
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δὲ Χαρώνδαν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λέγουσιν ἀσκεπτότερον τῶν χρόνων ἔχοντες. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ὁ Κορίνθιος νομοθέτης Θηβαίοις. ἦν δʼ ὁ Φιλόλαος τὸ μὲν γένος τῶν Βακχιαδῶν, ἐραστὴς δὲ γενόμενος Διοκλέους τοῦ νικήσαντος Ὀλυμπίασιν, ὡς ἐκεῖνος τὴν πόλιν ἔλιπε διαμισήσας τὸν
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ἔρωτα τὸν τῆς μητρὸς Ἀλκυόνης, ἀπῆλθεν εἰς Θήβας· κἀκεῖ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησαν ἀμφότεροι. καὶ νῦν ἔτι δεικνύουσι τοὺς τάφους αὐτῶν ἀλλήλοις μὲν εὐσυνόπτους ὄντας, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν Κορινθίων χώραν τὸν μὲν σύνοπτον τὸν δʼ οὐ σύνοπτον· μυθολογοῦσι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὕτω τάξασθαι τὴν ταφήν, τὸν μὲν
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Διοκλέα διὰ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τοῦ πάθους, ὅπως μὴ ἄποπτος ἔσται ἡ Κορινθία ἀπὸ τοῦ χώματος, τὸν δὲ Φιλόλαον ὅπως
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ἄποπτος.

ᾤκησαν μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν παρὰ τοῖς Θηβαίοις, νομοθέτης δʼ αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο Φιλόλαος περί τʼ ἄλλων τινῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδοποιίας, οὓς καλοῦσιν ἐκεῖνοι νόμους θετικούς· καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἰδίως ὑπʼ ἐκείνου νενομοθετημένον,
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ὅπως ὁ ἀριθμὸς σῴζηται τῶν κλήρων. Χαρώνδου δʼ ἴδιον μὲν οὐδέν ἐστι πλὴν αἱ δίκαι τῶν ψευδομαρτυριῶν (πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσκηψιν), τῇ δʼ ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρώτερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν.

Φαλέου δʼ ἴδιον ἡ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀνομάλωσις, Πλάτωνος δʼ ἥ
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τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης καὶ τὰ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν, ἔτι δʼ ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος, τὸ τοὺς νήφοντας συμποσιαρχεῖν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἄσκησιν ὅπως ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνωνται κατὰ τὴν μελέτην, ὡς δέον μὴ τὴν μὲν χρήσιμον εἶναι τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν δὲ
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ἄχρηστον. Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν εἰσί, πολιτείᾳ δʼ ὑπαρχούσῃ τοὺς νόμους ἔθηκεν· ἴδιον δʼ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις οὐδὲν ἔστιν ὅ τι καὶ μνείας ἄξιον, πλὴν ἡ χαλεπότης διὰ τὸ τῆς ζημίας μέγεθος. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιττακὸς νόμων δημιουργὸς ἀλλʼ οὐ πολιτείας· νόμος δʼ ἴδιος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοὺς μεθύοντας, ἄν
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τι πταίσωσι, πλείω ζημίαν ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφόντων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλείους ὑβρίζειν μεθύοντας ἢ νήφοντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν συγγνώμην ἀπέβλεψεν, ὅτι δεῖ μεθύουσιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Ἀνδροδάμας Ῥηγῖνος νομοθέτης Χαλκιδεῦσι τοῖς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, οὗ τὰ περί τε τὰ φονικὰ
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καὶ τὰς ἐπικλήρους ἐστίν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἴδιόν γε οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἔχοι τις ἄν. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, τάς τε κυρίας καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρημένας, ἔστω τεθεωρημένα τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

### Book III, 1274b–1278a

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τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τίς ἑκάστη καὶ ποία τις, σχεδὸν πρώτη σκέψις περὶ πόλεως ἰδεῖν, τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἡ πόλις. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες
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τὴν πόλιν πεπραχέναι τὴν πρᾶξιν, οἱ δʼ οὐ τὴν πόλιν ἀλλὰ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὸν τύραννον· τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου πᾶσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν πραγματείαν οὖσαν περὶ πόλιν, ἡ δὲ πολιτεία τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων ἐστὶ τάξις τις. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ πόλις τῶν συγκειμένων, καθάπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὅλων
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μὲν συνεστώτων δʼ ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων, δῆλον ὅτι πρότερον ὁ πολίτης ζητητέος· ἡ γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλῆθός ἐστιν.

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ὥστε τίνα χρὴ καλεῖν πολίτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολίτης ἐστὶ σκεπτέον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πολίτης ἀμφισβητεῖται πολλάκις· οὐ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες εἶναι πολίτην· ἔστι γάρ ὅστις ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολίτης ὢν ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πολλάκις
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οὐκ ἔστι πολίτης. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλως πως τυγχάνοντας ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, οἷον τοὺς ποιητοὺς πολίτας, ἀφετέον· ὁ δὲ πολίτης οὐ τῷ οἰκεῖν που πολίτης ἐστίν (καὶ γὰρ μέτοικοι καὶ δοῦλοι κοινωνοῦσι τῆς οἰκήσεως), οὐδʼ οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες οὕτως ὥστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι
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(τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσιν καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει· πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ τούτων τελέως οἱ μέτοικοι μετέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ νέμειν ἀνάγκη προστάτην, ὥστε ἀτελῶς πως μετέχουσι τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας), ἀλλὰ καθάπερ καὶ παῖδας τοὺς μήπω διʼ ἡλικίαν
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ἐγγεγραμμένους καὶ τοὺς γέροντας τοὺς ἀφειμένους φατέον εἶναι μέν πως πολίτας, οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ λίαν ἀλλὰ προστιθέντας τοὺς μὲν ἀτελεῖς τοὺς δὲ παρηκμακότας ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον (οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει· δῆλον γὰρ τὸ λεγόμενον). ζητοῦμεν γὰρ τὸν ἁπλῶς πολίτην καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα
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τοιοῦτον ἔγκλημα διορθώσεως δεόμενον, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων καὶ φυγάδων ἔστι τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ διαπορεῖν καὶ λύειν. πολίτης δʼ ἁπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς. τῶν δʼ ἀρχῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι διῃρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον, ὥστʼ ἐνίας μὲν ὅλως δὶς
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τὸν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τινῶν ὡρισμένων χρόνων· ὁ δʼ ἀόριστος, οἷον ὁ δικαστὴς καὶ ὁ ἐκκλησιαστής. τάχα μὲν οὖν ἂν φαίη τις οὐδʼ ἄρχοντας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους, οὐδὲ μετέχειν διὰ ταῦτʼ ἀρχῆς· καίτοι γελοῖον τοὺς κυριωτάτους ἀποστερεῖν ἀρχῆς. ἀλλὰ διαφερέτω μηδέν· περὶ ὀνόματος
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γὰρ ὁ λόγος· ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ, τί δεῖ ταῦτʼ ἄμφω καλεῖν. ἔστω δὴ διορισμοῦ χάριν ἀόριστος ἀρχή. τίθεμεν δὴ πολίτας τοὺς οὕτω μετέχοντας.

ὁ μὲν οὖν μάλιστʼ ἂν ἐφαρμόσας πολίτης ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς λεγομένους πολίτας σχεδὸν τοιοῦτός ἐστιν· δεῖ δὲ
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μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑποκείμενα διαφέρει τῷ εἴδει, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστι πρῶτον τὸ δὲ δεύτερον τὸ δʼ ἐχόμενον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν ἔνεστιν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα, τὸ κοινόν, ἢ γλίσχρως. τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρῶμεν εἴδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρας τὰς δὲ
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προτέρας οὔσας·

τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτημένας καὶ παρεκβεβηκυίας ἀναγκαῖον ὑστέρας εἶναι τῶν ἀναμαρτήτων (τὰς δὲ παρεκβεβηκυίας πῶς λέγομεν, ὕστερον ἔσται φανερόν). ὥστε καὶ τὸν πολίτην ἕτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν καθʼ ἑκάστην πολιτείαν.
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διόπερ ὁ λεχθεὶς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστʼ ἐστὶ πολίτης, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐνδέχεται μέν, οὐ μὴν ἀναγκαῖον. ἐν ἐνίαις γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δῆμος, οὐδʼ ἐκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν ἀλλὰ συγκλήτους, καὶ τὰς δίκας δικάζουσι κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει τῶν
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ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας, οἱ δὲ γέροντες τὰς φονικάς, ἑτέρα δʼ ἴσως ἀρχή τις ἑτέρας. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα· πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαί τινες κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας. ἀλλʼ ἔχει διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμός. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις οὐχ ὁ ἀόριστος ἄρχων ἐκκλησιαστής
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ἐστι καὶ δικαστής, ἀλλὰ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὡρισμένος· τούτων γὰρ ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τισὶν ἀποδέδοται τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ δικάζειν ἢ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τινῶν. τίς μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν· ᾧ γὰρ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἤδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταύτης
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τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν.

ὁρίζονται δὲ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν πολίτην τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν καὶ μὴ θατέρου μόνον, οἷον πατρὸς ἢ μητρός, οἱ δὲ καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐπὶ πλέον ζητοῦσιν, οἷον ἐπὶ πάππους δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ πλείους.
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οὕτω δὲ ὁριζομένων πολιτικῶς καὶ ταχέως, ἀποροῦσί τινες τὸν τρίτον ἐκεῖνον ἢ τέταρτον, πῶς ἔσται πολίτης. Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Λεοντῖνος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δʼ εἰρωνευόμενος, ἔφη, καθάπερ ὅλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὁλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιημένους·
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εἶναι γάρ τινας λαρισοποιούς. ἔστι δʼ ἁπλοῦν. εἰ γὰρ μετεῖχον κατὰ τὸν ῥηθέντα διορισμὸν τῆς πολιτείας, ἦσαν πολῖται· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ δυνατὸν ἐφαρμόττειν τὸ ἐκ πολίτου ἢ ἐκ πολίτιδος ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οἰκησάντων ἢ κτισάντων.

ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἔχει ἀπορίαν, ὅσοι
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μετέσχον μεταβολῆς γενομένης πολιτείας, οἷον Ἀθήνησιν ἐποίησε Κλεισθένης μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολήν· πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους. τὸ δʼ ἀμφισβήτημα πρὸς τούτους ἐστὶν οὐ τίς πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἀδίκως ἢ δικαίως. καίτοι κἂν τοῦτό τις ἔτι προσαπορήσειεν,

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ἆρʼ εἰ μὴ δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης, ὡς ταὐτὸ δυναμένου τοῦ τʼ ἀδίκου καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς. ἐπεὶ δʼ ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἄρχοντάς τινας ἀδίκως, οὓς ἄρχειν μὲν φήσομεν ἀλλʼ οὐ δικαίως, ὁ δὲ πολίτης ἀρχῇ τινὶ διωρισμένος ἐστίν (ὁ γὰρ κοινωνῶν τῆς
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τοιᾶσδε ἀρχῆς πολίτης ἐστίν, ὡς ἔφαμεν), δῆλον ὅτι πολίτας μὲν εἶναι φατέον καὶ τούτους·

περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαίως ἢ μὴ δικαίως συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν. ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πόθʼ ἡ πόλις ἔπραξε καὶ πότε οὐχ ἡ πόλις, οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται
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δημοκρατία (τότε γὰρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλαια ἔνιοι βούλονται διαλύειν, ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβόντος, οὔτʼ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἐνίας τῶν πολιτειῶν τῷ κρατεῖν οὔσας, ἀλλὰ οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον)· εἴπερ οὖν καὶ δημοκρατοῦνταί τινες κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ὁμοίως
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τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι ταύτης τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος. ἔοικε δʼ οἰκεῖος ὁ λόγος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης πως ποτὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλλʼ ἑτέραν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιοτάτη τῆς ἀπορίας
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ζήτησις περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διαζευχθῆναι τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἕτερον τοὺς δʼ ἕτερον οἰκῆσαι τόπον.

ταύτην μὲν οὖν πραοτέραν θετέον τὴν ἀπορίαν, πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως λεγομένης, ἐστί πως εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως· ὁμοίως
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δὲ καὶ τῶν τὸν αὐτὸν κατοικούντων ἀνθρώπων πότε δεῖ νομίζειν μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς τείχεσιν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν Πελοποννήσῳ περιβαλεῖν ἓν τεῖχος. τοιαύτη δʼ ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλὼν καὶ πᾶσα ἥτις ἔχει περιγραφὴν μᾶλλον ἔθνους ἢ πόλεως· ἧς γέ φασιν ἑαλωκυίας τρίτην
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ἡμέραν οὐκ αἰσθέσθαι τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως.

ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν χρήσιμος ἡ σκέψις (περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τό τε πόσον καὶ πότερον ἔθνος ἓν ἢ πλείω συμφέρει, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τὸν πολιτικόν)· ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον,
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πότερον ἕως ἂν ᾖ τὸ γένος ταὐτὸ τῶν κατοικούντων, τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ αἰεὶ τῶν μὲν φθειρομένων τῶν δὲ γινομένων, ὥσπερ καὶ ποταμοὺς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ κρήνας τὰς αὐτάς, καίπερ αἰεὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιγινομένου νάματος τοῦ δʼ ὑπεξιόντος, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους
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φατέον εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, τὴν δὲ
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πόλιν ἑτέραν;

εἴπερ γάρ ἐστι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἔστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, γινομένης ἑτέρας τῷ εἴδει καὶ διαφερούσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν καὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν
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ὁτὲ μὲν κωμικὸν ὁτὲ δὲ τραγικὸν ἕτερον εἶναί φαμεν, τῶν αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἑτέραν, ἂν εἶδος ἕτερον ᾖ τῆς συνθέσεως, οἷον ἁρμονίαν τῶν αὐτῶν φθόγγων ἑτέραν εἶναι λέγομεν, ἂν ὁτὲ μὲν ᾖ Δώριος ὁτὲ δὲ Φρύγιος. εἰ δὴ τοῦτον
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ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερὸν ὅτι μάλιστα λεκτέον τὴν αὐτὴν πόλιν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας· ὄνομα δὲ καλεῖν ἕτερον ἢ ταὐτὸν ἔξεστι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων αὐτὴν καὶ πάμπαν ἑτέρων ἀνθρώπων. εἰ δὲ δίκαιον διαλύειν ἢ μὴ διαλύειν, ὅταν εἰς ἑτέραν μεταβάλῃ πολιτείαν
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ἡ πόλις, λόγος ἕτερος.

τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρημένων ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου θετέον, ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε τοῦτο τυχεῖν δεῖ ζητήσεως, τὴν τοῦ πολίτου τύπῳ τινὶ πρῶτον ληπτέον.
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ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ πλωτὴρ εἷς τις τῶν κοινωνῶν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν πολίτην φαμέν. τῶν δὲ πλωτήρων καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων τὴν δύναμιν (ὁ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐρέτης, ὁ δὲ κυβερνήτης, ὁ δὲ πρῳρεύς, ὁ δʼ ἄλλην τινʼ ἔχων τοιαύτην ἐπωνυμίαν) δῆλον ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀκριβέστατος ἑκάστου λόγος
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ἴδιος ἔσται τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινός τις ἐφαρμόσει πᾶσιν. ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν πάντων· τούτου γὰρ ἕκαστος ὀρέγεται τῶν πλωτήρων. ὁμοίως τοίνυν καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστί, κοινωνία δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία·
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διὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. εἴπερ οὖν ἔστι πλείω πολιτείας εἴδη, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, τὴν τελείαν· τὸν δʼ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμὲν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὄντα σπουδαῖον μὴ
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κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθʼ ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ, φανερόν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατʼ ἄλλον τρόπον ἔστι διαποροῦντας ἐπελθεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἁπάντων σπουδαίων ὄντων εἶναι πόλιν, δεῖ γʼ ἕκαστον τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸν ἔργον εὖ ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀπʼ ἀρετῆς·
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ἐπειδὴ ἀδύνατον ὁμοίους εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας,

οὐκ ἂν
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εἴη μία ἀρετὴ πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου δεῖ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχειν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ πάντας ἀναγκαῖον ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ἐν
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τῇ σπουδαίᾳ πόλει πολίτας. ἔτι ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἡ πόλις, ὥσπερ ζῷον εὐθὺς ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, καὶ ψυχὴ ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως, καὶ οἰκία ἐξ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, καὶ κτῆσις ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ πόλις ἐξ ἁπάντων τε τούτων καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐξ ἄλλων ἀνομοίων
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συνέστηκεν εἰδῶν, ἀνάγκη μὴ μίαν εἶναι τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων ἀρετήν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν χορευτῶν κορυφαίου καὶ παραστάτου.

διότι μὲν τοίνυν ἁπλῶς οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων· ἀλλʼ ἆρα ἔσται τινὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμὲν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν
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σπουδαῖον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δʼ εὐθὺς ἑτέραν εἶναι λέγουσί τινες ἄρχοντος, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται οἱ τῶν βασιλέων υἱεῖς ἱππικὴν καὶ πολεμικὴν παιδευόμενοι, καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ
μή μοι τὰ κόμψʼ … ἀλλʼ ὧν πόλει δεῖ,
(Eur. Fr. 16)
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ὡς οὖσάν τινα ἄρχοντος παιδείαν. εἰ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἄρχοντός τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πολίτης δʼ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἁπλῶς ἂν εἴη πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός, τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρχοντος καὶ πολίτου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτʼ ἴσως Ἰάσων ἔφη πεινῆν ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ, ὡς
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οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ἰδιώτης εἶναι.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινεῖταί γε τὸ δύνασθαι ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πολίτου δοκεῖ που ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς. εἰ οὖν τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἀρχικήν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ πολίτου ἄμφω, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄμφω ἐπαινετὰ ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ οὖν
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ποτε δοκεῖ ἀμφότερα, καὶ οὐ ταὐτὰ δεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα μανθάνειν καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἀμφότερʼ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν, τοὐντεῦθεν ἂν κατίδοι τις. ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχὴ δεσποτική· ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα λέγομεν, ἃ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἄρχοντα οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον,
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ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον· θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδῶδες. λέγω δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰς διακονικὰς πράξεις. δούλου δʼ εἴδη πλείω λέγομεν· αἱ γὰρ ἐργασίαι πλείους. ὧν ἓν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χερνῆτες· οὗτοι δʼ εἰσίν, ὥσπερ σημαίνει καὶ τοὔνομʼ αὐτούς, οἱ ζῶντες ἀπὸ
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τῶν χειρῶν,

ἐν οἷς ὁ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἐστίν. διὸ παρʼ ἐνίοις οὐ μετεῖχον οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρχῶν, πρὶν δῆμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα τῶν ἀρχομένων οὕτως οὐ δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐδὲ τὸν
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πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν μανθάνειν, εἰ μή ποτε χρείας χάριν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὸν μὲν δεσπότην τὸν δὲ δοῦλον.

ἀλλʼ ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ καθʼ ἣν ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων. ταύτην γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, ἣν δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντα ἀρχόμενον
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μαθεῖν, οἷον ἱππαρχεῖν ἱππαρχηθέντα, στρατηγεῖν στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα. διὸ λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο καλῶς, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εὖ ἄρξαι μὴ ἀρχθέντα. τούτων δὲ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἑτέρα, δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ
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ἄρχειν, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπʼ ἀμφότερα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἄμφω, καὶ εἰ ἕτερον εἶδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχικῆς. καὶ γὰρ ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐ μία ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀρετή, οἷον δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλʼ εἴδη
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ἔχουσα καθʼ ἃ ἄρξει καὶ ἄρξεται, ὥσπερ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἑτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία (δόξαι γὰρ ἂν εἶναι δειλὸς ἀνήρ, εἰ οὕτως ἀνδρεῖος εἴη ὥσπερ γυνὴ ἀνδρεία, καὶ γυνὴ λάλος, εἰ οὕτω κοσμία εἴη ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἀγαθός· ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἑτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός· τοῦ μὲν
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γὰρ κτᾶσθαι τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἔργον ἐστίν). ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη. τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἔοικεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθής· ὥσπερ αὐλοποιὸς γὰρ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ὁ δʼ ἄρχων
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αὐλητὴς ὁ χρώμενος. πότερον μὲν οὖν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου ἢ ἑτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἑτέρα, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων.

περὶ δὲ τὸν πολίτην ἔτι λείπεταί τις τῶν ἀποριῶν. ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πότερον πολίτης ἐστὶν ᾧ κοινωνεῖν ἔξεστιν
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ἀρχῆς, ἢ καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολίτας θετέον; εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτους θετέον οἷς μὴ μέτεστιν ἀρχῶν, οὐχ οἷόν τε παντὸς εἶναι πολίτου τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετήν (οὗτος γὰρ πολίτης)· εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς τῶν τοιούτων πολίτης, ἐν τίνι μέρει θετέος ἕκαστος; οὐδὲ γὰρ μέτοικος οὐδὲ ξένος. ἢ διά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον
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οὐδὲν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν ἄτοπον;

οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ δοῦλοι τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν, οὐδʼ οἱ ἀπελεύθεροι. τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές, ὡς οὐ πάντας θετέον πολίτας ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις, ἐπεὶ οὐδʼ οἱ παῖδες ὡσαύτως πολῖται καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες, ἀλλʼ
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οἱ μὲν ἁπλῶς οἱ δʼ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· πολῖται μὲν γάρ εἰσιν, ἀλλʼ ἀτελεῖς. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις παρʼ ἐνίοις ἦν δοῦλον τὸ βάναυσον ἢ ξενικόν, διόπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι καὶ νῦν· ἡ δὲ βελτίστη πόλις οὐ ποιήσει βάναυσον πολίτην. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὗτος πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πολίτου ἀρετὴν ἣν εἴπομεν
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λεκτέον οὐ παντός, οὐδʼ ἐλευθέρου μόνον, ἀλλʼ ὅσοι τῶν ἔργων εἰσὶν ἀφειμένοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. τῶν δʼ ἀναγκαίων οἱ μὲν ἑνὶ λειτουργοῦντες τὰ τοιαῦτα δοῦλοι, οἱ δὲ κοινοὶ βάναυσοι καὶ θῆτες. φανερὸν δʼ ἐντεῦθεν μικρὸν ἐπισκεψαμένοις πῶς ἔχει περὶ αὐτῶν· αὐτὸ γὰρ φανὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ποιεῖ
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δῆλον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ πλείους εἰσὶν αἱ πολιτεῖαι, καὶ εἴδη πολίτου ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλείω, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ ἀρχομένου πολίτου, ὥστʼ ἐν μὲν τινὶ πολιτείᾳ τὸν βάναυσον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὸν θῆτα πολίτας, ἐν τισὶ δʼ ἀδύνατον, οἷον εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἣν καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ ἐν ᾗ κατʼ ἀρετὴν
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αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατʼ ἀξίαν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τʼ ἐπιτηδεῦσαι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζῶντα βίον βάναυσον ἢ θητικόν. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις θῆτα μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι πολίτην (ἀπὸ τιμημάτων γὰρ μακρῶν αἱ μεθέξεις τῶν ἀρχῶν), βάναυσον δὲ ἐνδέχεται· πλουτοῦσι γὰρ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν
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τεχνιτῶν. ἐν Θήβαις δὲ νόμος ἦν τὸν διὰ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀπεσχημένον τῆς ἀγορᾶς μὴ μετέχειν ἀρχῆς. ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ πολιτείαις προσεφέλκει τινὰς καὶ τῶν ξένων ὁ νόμος· ὁ γὰρ ἐκ πολίτιδος ἔν τισι δημοκρατίαις πολίτης ἐστίν, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόθους παρὰ πολλοῖς. οὐ
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μὴν ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ διʼ ἔνδειαν τῶν γνησίων πολιτῶν ποιοῦνται πολίτας τοὺς τοιούτους (διὰ γὰρ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν οὕτω χρῶνται τοῖς νόμοις), εὐποροῦντες δὴ ὄχλου κατὰ μικρὸν παραιροῦνται τοὺς ἐκ δούλου πρῶτον ἢ δούλης, εἶτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν, τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστῶν πολίτας ποιοῦσιν.

### Book III, 1278a–1281b

ὅτι
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μὲν οὖν εἴδη πλείω πολίτου, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι λέγεται μάλιστα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησεν
ὡς εἴ τινʼ ἀτίμητον μετανάστην·
(Hom. Il. 9.648) (Hom. Il. 16.59) ὥσπερ μέτοικος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων. ἀλλʼ ἐστὶν ὅπου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστίν, ἀπάτης χάριν τῶν συνοικούντων
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ἐστίν.

πότερον μὲν οὖν ἑτέραν ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν θετέον,
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καθʼ ἣν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι καὶ πολίτης σπουδαῖος, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς τινὸς δʼ ἕτερος, κἀκεῖνος οὐ πᾶς ἀλλʼ ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ κύριος ἢ δυνάμενος εἶναι κύριος, ἢ καθʼ αὑτὸν ἢ μετʼ ἄλλων, τῆς τῶν
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κοινῶν ἐπιμελείας.

ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισται, τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον, πότερον μίαν θετέον πολιτείαν ἢ πλείους, κἂν εἰ πλείους, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, καὶ διαφοραὶ τίνες αὐτῶν εἰσιν. ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα
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τῆς κυρίας πάντων. κύριον μὲν γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτευμα δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία. λέγω δʼ οἷον ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις κύριος ὁ δῆμος, οἱ δʼ ὀλίγοι τοὐναντίον ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, φαμὲν δὲ καὶ πολιτείαν ἑτέραν εἶναι τούτων. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον ἐροῦμεν λόγον
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καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὑποθετέον δὴ πρῶτον τίνος χάριν συνέστηκε πόλις, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴδη πόσα τῆς περὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς ζωῆς. εἴρηται δὴ κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, ἐν οἷς περὶ οἰκονομίας διωρίσθη καὶ δεσποτείας, καὶ ὅτι φύσει μέν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πολιτικόν.
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διὸ καὶ μηδὲν δεόμενοι τῆς παρὰ ἀλλήλων βοηθείας οὐκ ἔλαττον ὀρέγονται τοῦ συζῆν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον συνάγει, καθʼ ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἑκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ τέλος, καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι καὶ χωρίς· συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ καὶ
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συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἴσως γὰρ ἔνεστί τι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόνον· ἂν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλῃ λίαν, δῆλον δʼ ὡς καρτεροῦσι πολλὴν κακοπάθειαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γλιχόμενοι τοῦ ζῆν, ὡς ἐνούσης τινὸς εὐημερίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ
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γλυκύτητος φυσικῆς.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς γε τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους ῥᾴδιον διελεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις διοριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δεσποτεία, καίπερ ὄντος κατʼ ἀλήθειαν τῷ τε φύσει δούλῳ καὶ τῷ φύσει δεσπότῃ ταὐτοῦ συμφέροντος, ὅμως ἄρχει
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πρὸς τὸ τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον οὐδὲν ἧττον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τοῦ δούλου κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φθειρομένου τοῦ δούλου σῴζεσθαι τὴν δεσποτείαν. ἡ δὲ τέκνων ἀρχὴ καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης, ἣν δὴ καλοῦμεν οἰκονομικήν ἤτοι τῶν ἀρχομένων χάριν ἐστὶν ἢ κοινοῦ τινὸς ἀμφοῖν, καθʼ
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αὑτὸ μὲν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ὥσπερ ὁρῶμεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
[Bekker 1279a]
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τέχνας,

οἷον ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικήν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ κἂν αὐτῶν εἶεν. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸν παιδοτρίβην ἕνα τῶν γυμναζομένων ἐνίοτʼ εἶναι καὶ αὐτόν, ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερνήτης εἷς ἐστιν ἀεὶ τῶν πλωτήρων· ὁ μὲν οὖν παιδοτρίβης
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ἢ κυβερνήτης σκοπεῖ τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀγαθόν, ὅταν δὲ τούτων εἷς γένηται καὶ αὐτός, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχει τῆς ὠφελείας. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πλωτήρ, ὁ δὲ τῶν γυμναζομένων εἷς γίνεται, παιδοτρίβης ὤν. διὸ καὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ᾖ κατʼ ἰσότητα τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστηκυῖα καὶ
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καθʼ ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος ἀξιοῦσιν ἄρχειν, πρότερον μέν, ᾗ πέφυκεν, ἀξιοῦντες ἐν μέρει λειτουργεῖν, καὶ σκοπεῖν τινα πάλιν τὸ αὑτοῦ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἄρχων ἐσκόπει τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον· νῦν δὲ διὰ τὰς ὠφελείας τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς βούλονται συνεχῶς
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ἄρχειν, οἷον εἰ συνέβαινεν ὑγιαίνειν ἀεὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι νοσακεροῖς οὖσιν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἴσως ἐδίωκον τὰς ἀρχάς. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὡς ὅσαι μὲν πολιτεῖαι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον σκοποῦσιν, αὗται μὲν ὀρθαὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι κατὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον, ὅσαι δὲ τὸ σφέτερον μόνον τῶν ἀρχόντων,
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ἡμαρτημέναι πᾶσαι καὶ παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν· δεσποτικαὶ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐστίν.

διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τὰς πολιτείας ἐπισκέψασθαι, πόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσί, καὶ πρῶτον τὰς ὀρθὰς αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ παρεκβάσεις ἔσονται
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φανεραὶ τούτων διορισθεισῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταὐτόν, πολίτευμα δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δʼ εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἕνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλούς, ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἷς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν ὀρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
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τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ τοῦ πλήθους παρεκβάσεις. ἢ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φατέον εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἢ δεῖ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος. καλεῖν δʼ εἰώθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν
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πλειόνων δʼ ἑνὸς ἀριστοκρατίαν (ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς), ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. (συμβαίνει δʼ εὐλόγως· ἕνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν
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κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἢ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δʼ ἤδη χαλεπὸν
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ἠκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν,

ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικήν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλήθει γίγνεται· διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα.) παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων
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τυραννὶς μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας, δημοκρατία δὲ πολιτείας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστι μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, ἡ δʼ ὀλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν
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οὐδεμία αὐτῶν.

δεῖ δὲ μικρῷ διὰ μακροτέρων εἰπεῖν τίς ἑκάστη τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας, τῷ δὲ περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδέ
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τι καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἕκαστον ἀλήθειαν. ἔστι δὲ τυραννὶς μὲν μοναρχία, καθάπερ εἴρηται, δεσποτικὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας, ὀλιγαρχία δʼ ὅταν ὦσι κύριοι τῆς πολιτείας οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες, δημοκρατία δὲ τοὐναντίον ὅταν οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι πλῆθος οὐσίας ἀλλʼ ἄποροι.
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πρώτη δʼ ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμόν ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ εἶεν οἱ πλείους, ὄντες εὔποροι, κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δʼ ἐστὶν ὅταν ᾖ κύριον τὸ πλῆθος—ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν κἂν εἴ που συμβαίνοι τοὺς ἀπόρους ἐλάττους μὲν εἶναι τῶν εὐπόρων, κρείττους δʼ ὄντας κυρίους εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅπου δʼ ὀλίγον κύριον
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πλῆθος, ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναί φασιν—οὐκ ἂν καλῶς δόξειεν διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν κἄν εἴ τις συνθεὶς τῇ μὲν εὐπορίᾳ τὴν ὀλιγότητα τῇ δʼ ἀπορίᾳ τὸ πλῆθος οὕτω προσαγορεύῃ τὰς πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχίαν μὲν ἐν ᾗ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν οἱ εὔποροι, ὀλίγοι τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες, δημοκρατίαν
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δὲ ἐν ᾗ οἱ ἄποροι, πολλοὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες, ἄλλην ἀπορίαν ἔχει. τίνας γὰρ ἐροῦμεν τὰς ἄρτι λεχθείσας πολιτείας, τὴν ἐν ᾗ πλείους οἱ εὔποροι καὶ τὴν ἐν ᾗ ἐλάττους οἱ ἄποροι, κύριοι δʼ ἑκάτεροι τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴπερ μηδεμία ἄλλη πολιτεία παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας ἔστιν; ἔοικε τοίνυν ὁ
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λόγος ποιεῖν δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὀλίγους ἢ πολλοὺς εἶναι κυρίους συμβεβηκός ἐστιν, τὸ μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τὸ δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις, διὰ τὸ τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ὀλίγους, πολλοὺς δʼ εἶναι τοὺς ἀπόρους πανταχοῦ (διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει τὰς ῥηθείσας αἰτίας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφορᾶς), ᾧ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἥ τε
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δημοκρατία καὶ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων πενία καὶ πλοῦτός
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ἐστιν,

καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μέν, ὅπου ἂν ἄρχωσι διὰ πλοῦτον, ἄν τʼ ἐλάττους ἄν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου δʼ οἱ ἄποροι, δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλούς. εὐποροῦσι
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μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγοι, τῆς δὲ ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσι πάντες· διʼ ἃς αἰτίας ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας.

ληπτέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνας ὅρους λέγουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τό τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν. πάντες γὰρ ἅπτονται δικαίου τινός, ἀλλὰ
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μέχρι τινὸς προέρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον. οἷον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις· καὶ τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίσοις· οἱ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ οἷς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς. τὸ δʼ αἴτιον
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ὅτι περὶ αὑτῶν ἡ κρίσις· σχεδὸν δʼ οἱ πλεῖστοι φαῦλοι κριταὶ περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τισίν, καὶ διῄρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπί τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς, τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, μάλιστα
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μὲν διὰ τὸ λεχθὲν ἄρτι, διότι κρίνουσι τὰ περὶ αὑτοὺς κακῶς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τινὸς ἑκατέρους δίκαιόν τι νομίζουσι δίκαιον λέγειν ἁπλῶς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν κατά τι ἄνισοι ὦσιν, οἷον χρήμασιν, ὅλως οἴονται ἄνισοι εἶναι, οἱ δʼ ἂν κατά τι ἴσοι, οἷον ἐλευθερίᾳ, ὅλως
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ἴσοι.

τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον οὐ λέγουσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτημάτων χάριν ἐκοινώνησαν καὶ συνῆλθον, τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι τῆς πόλεως ὅσον περ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, ὥσθʼ ὁ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν λόγος δόξειεν ἂν ἰσχύειν (οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἴσον μετέχειν τῶν ἑκατὸν μνῶν τὸν εἰσενέγκαντα μίαν μνᾶν τῷ
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δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγινομένων)· εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἕνεκεν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ εὖ ζῆν (καὶ γὰρ ἂν δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἦν πόλις· νῦν δʼ οὐκ ἔστι, διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν), μήτε συμμαχίας ἕνεκεν, ὅπως
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ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικῶνται, μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους—καὶ γὰρ ἂν Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ πάντες οἷς ἔστι σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὡς μιᾶς ἂν πολῖται πόλεως ἦσαν· εἰσὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς συνθῆκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν
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καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας. ἀλλʼ οὔτʼ ἀρχαὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ
[Bekker 1280b]
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τούτοις κοιναὶ καθεστᾶσιν,

ἀλλʼ ἕτεραι παρʼ ἑκατέροις, οὔτε τοῦ ποίους τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ φροντίζουσιν ἅτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους, οὐδʼ ὅπως μηδεὶς ἄδικος ἔσται τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθήκας μηδὲ μοχθηρίαν ἕξει μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως μηδὲν ἀδικήσουσιν
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ἀλλήλους. περὶ δʼ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς διασκοποῦσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας. ᾗ καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι δεῖ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι τῇ γʼ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀνομαζομένῃ πόλει, μὴ λόγου χάριν. γίγνεται γὰρ ἡ κοινωνία συμμαχία, τῶν ἄλλων τόπῳ διαφέρουσα μόνον, τῶν ἄπωθεν
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συμμάχων. καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη καί, καθάπερ ἔφη Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλʼ οὐχ οἷος ποιεῖν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας. ὅτι δὲ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερόν. εἰ γάρ τις καὶ συναγάγοι τοὺς τόπους εἰς ἕν, ὥστε ἅπτεσθαι τὴν Μεγαρέων πόλιν καὶ
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Κορινθίων τοῖς τείχεσιν, ὅμως οὐ μία πόλις· οὐδʼ εἰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπιγαμίας ποιήσαιντο· καίτοι τοῦτο τῶν ἰδίων ταῖς πόλεσι κοινωνημάτων ἐστίν. ὁμοίως δʼ οὐδʼ εἴ τινες οἰκοῖεν χωρὶς μέν, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἄπωθεν ὥστε μὴ κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλʼ εἴησαν αὐτοῖς νόμοι τοῦ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν περὶ
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τὰς μεταδόσεις, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν εἴη τέκτων ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς ὁ δὲ σκυτοτόμος ὁ δʼ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶεν μύριοι, μὴ μέντοι κοινωνοῖεν ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων, οἷον ἀλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας, οὐδʼ οὕτω πω πόλις.

διὰ τίνα δή ποτʼ αἰτίαν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς
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κοινωνίας. εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνέλθοιεν οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες (ἕκαστος μέντοι χρῷτο τῇ ἰδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὥσπερ πόλει) καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπιμαχίας οὔσης βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας μόνον, οὐδʼ οὕτως ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν πόλις τοῖς ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν, εἴπερ ὁμοίως ὁμιλοῖεν συνελθόντες καὶ χωρίς. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι
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ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνία τόπου, καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδʼ ὑπαρχόντων τούτων ἁπάντων ἤδη πόλις, ἀλλʼ ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζωῆς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους.
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οὐκ ἔσται μέντοι τοῦτο μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα κατοικούντων τόπον καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίαις. διὸ κηδεῖαί τʼ ἐγένοντο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φατρίαι καὶ θυσίαι καὶ διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία. τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν,
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ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν. πόλις δὲ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν
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κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους,

τοῦτο δʼ ἐστίν, ὡς φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πράξεων χάριν θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦ συζῆν. διόπερ ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλεῖστον εἰς τὴν
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τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλεῖον ἢ τοῖς κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἴσοις ἢ μείζοσι κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίσοις, ἢ τοῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον ὑπερέχουσι κατʼ ἀρετὴν δʼ ὑπερεχομένοις. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντες οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντες μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου
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λέγουσι, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. ἢ γάρ τοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἢ τοὺς πλουσίους, ἢ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς, ἢ τὸν βέλτιστον ἕνα πάντων, ἢ τύραννον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν. τί γάρ; ἂν οἱ πένητες διὰ τὸ
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πλείους εἶναι διανέμωνται τὰ τῶν πλουσίων, τοῦτʼ οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν; ἔδοξε γὰρ νὴ Δία τῷ κυρίῳ δικαίως. τὴν οὖν ἀδικίαν τί χρὴ λέγειν τὴν ἐσχάτην; πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων, οἱ πλείους τὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων ἂν διανέμωνται, φανερὸν ὅτι φθείρουσι τὴν πόλιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἥ γʼ ἀρετὴ φθείρει τὸ
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ἔχον αὐτήν, οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον οὐχ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι δίκαιον. ἔτι καὶ τὰς πράξεις ὅσας ὁ τύραννος ἔπραξεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάσας δικαίας· βιάζεται γὰρ ὢν κρείττων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τοὺς πλουσίους. ἀλλʼ ἆρα τοὺς ἐλάττους δίκαιον ἄρχειν
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καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους; ἂν οὖν κἀκεῖνοι ταῦτα ποιῶσι καὶ διαρπάζωσι καὶ ἀφαιρῶνται τὰ κτήματα τοῦ πλήθους, τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ δίκαιον· καὶ θάτερον ἄρα. ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ὅτι πάντα φαῦλα καὶ οὐ δίκαια, φανερόν· ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄρχειν δεῖ καὶ κυρίους εἶναι πάντων; οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἄλλους
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ἀτίμους εἶναι πάντας, μὴ τιμωμένους ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς· τιμὰς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀρχόντων δʼ αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους. ἀλλʼ ἕνα τὸν σπουδαιότατον ἄρχειν βέλτιον; ἀλλʼ ἔτι τοῦτο ὀλιγαρχικώτερον· οἱ γὰρ ἄτιμοι πλείους. ἀλλʼ ἴσως φαίη τις
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ἂν τὸ κύριον ὅλως ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαῦλον, ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἂν οὖν ᾖ νόμος μὲν ὀλιγαρχικὸς δὲ ἢ δημοκρατικός, τί διοίσει περὶ τῶν ἠπορημένων; συμβήσεται γὰρ ὁμοίως τὰ λεχθέντα πρότερον.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἔστω τις ἕτερος λόγος·
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ὅτι δὲ δεῖ κύριον εἶναι μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους μὲν ὀλίγους δέ, δόξειεν ἂν λύεσθαι καί τινʼ ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, τάχα δὲ κἂν ἀλήθειαν. τοὺς γὰρ πολλούς, ὧν ἕκαστός ἐστιν
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οὐ σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ,

ὅμως ἐνδέχεται συνελθόντας εἶναι βελτίους ἐκείνων, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστον ἀλλʼ ὡς σύμπαντας, οἷον τὰ συμφορητὰ δεῖπνα τῶν ἐκ μιᾶς δαπάνης χορηγηθέντων· πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἕκαστον μόριον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως,
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καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντας ὥσπερ ἕνα ἄνθρωπον τὸ πλῆθος, πολύποδα καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλὰς ἔχοντʼ αἰσθήσεις, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ καὶ κρίνουσιν ἄμεινον οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰ τῆς μουσικῆς ἔργα καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν· ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλο τι μόριον, πάντα δὲ
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πάντες. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἑκάστου τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν μὴ καλῶν τοὺς καλούς φασι, καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῷ συνῆχθαι τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρὶς εἰς ἕν, ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε κάλλιον ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τουδὶ μὲν τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν
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ἑτέρου δέ τινος ἕτερον μόριον.

εἰ μὲν οὖν περὶ πάντα δῆμον καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος ἐνδέχεται ταύτην εἶναι τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὀλίγους σπουδαίους, ἄδηλον, ἴσως δὲ νὴ Δία δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον (ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κἂν ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἁρμόσειε λόγος· καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν
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ἔνιοι τῶν θηρίων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν;)· ἀλλὰ περὶ τὶ πλῆθος οὐδὲν εἶναι κωλύει τὸ λεχθὲν ἀληθές. διὸ καὶ τὴν πρότερον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν λύσειεν ἄν τις διὰ τούτων καὶ τὴν ἐχομένην αὐτῆς, τίνων δεῖ κυρίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν. τοιοῦτοι δʼ εἰσὶν ὅσοι μήτε
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πλούσιοι μήτε ἀξίωμα ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς μηδὲ ἕν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἀσφαλές (διά τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ διʼ ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀνάγκη τὰ δʼ ἁμαρτάνειν αὐτούς)· τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μηδὲ μετέχειν φοβερόν (ὅταν γὰρ ἄτιμοι πολλοὶ καὶ πένητες ὑπάρχωσι,
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πολεμίων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην). λείπεται δὴ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτούς. διόπερ καὶ Σόλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νομοθετῶν τάττουσιν ἐπί τε τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἄρχειν δὲ κατὰ μόνας οὐκ ἐῶσιν. πάντες μὲν γὰρ
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ἔχουσι συνελθόντες ἱκανὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ μιγνύμενοι τοῖς βελτίοσι τὰς πόλεις ὠφελοῦσιν, καθάπερ ἡ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφὴ μετὰ τῆς καθαρᾶς τὴν πᾶσαν ποιεῖ χρησιμωτέραν τῆς ὀλίγης· χωρὶς δʼ ἕκαστος ἀτελὴς περὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἐστίν.

### Book III, 1281b–1285a

ἔχει δʼ ἡ τάξις αὕτη τῆς πολιτείας ἀπορίαν πρώτην μὲν ὅτι
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δόξειεν ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ κρῖναι τίς ὀρθῶς ἰάτρευκεν, οὗπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεῦσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ὑγιᾶ τὸν κάμνοντα τῆς νόσου τῆς παρούσης· οὗτος δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ ἰατρός.

ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ
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περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. ὥσπερ οὖν ἰατρὸν δεῖ διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἰατροῖς, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις. ἰατρὸς δʼ ὅ τε δημιουργὰς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην (εἰσὶ γάρ
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τινες τοιοῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰς τέχνας)· ἀποδίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς εἰδόσιν. ἔπειτα καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν δόξειεν ἔχειν τρόπον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἑλέσθαι ὀρθῶς τῶν εἰδότων ἔργον ἐστίν, οἷον γεωμέτρην τε τῶν γεωμετρικῶν καὶ
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κυβερνήτην τῶν κυβερνητικῶν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἐνίων ἔργων καὶ τεχνῶν μετέχουσι καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τινες, ἀλλʼ οὔ τι τῶν εἰδότων γε μᾶλλον. ὥστε κατὰ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ πλῆθος ποιητέον κύριον οὔτε τῶν ἀρχαιρεσιῶν οὔτε τῶν εὐθυνῶν. ἀλλʼ ἴσως οὐ πάντα ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς
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διά τε τὸν πάλαι λόγον, ἂν ᾖ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες (ἔσται γὰρ ἕκαστος μὲν χείρων κριτὴς τῶν εἰδότων, ἅπαντες δὲ συνελθόντες ἢ βελτίους ἢ οὐ χείρους), καὶ ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων οὔτε μόνον ὁ ποιήσας οὔτʼ ἄριστʼ ἂν κρίνειεν, ὅσων τἆργα γινώσκουσι καὶ οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες τὴν τέχνην, οἷον
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οἰκίαν οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ γνῶναι τοῦ ποιήσαντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον ὁ χρώμενος αὐτῇ κρινεῖ (χρῆται δʼ ὁ οἰκονόμος), καὶ πηδάλιον κυβερνήτης τέκτονος, καὶ θοίνην ὁ δαιτυμὼν ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁ μάγειρος.

ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν τάχα δόξειέ τις ἂν οὕτω λύειν ἱκανῶς· ἄλλη δʼ ἐστὶν ἐχομένη ταύτης.
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δοκεῖ γὰρ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μειζόνων εἶναι κυρίους τοὺς φαύλους τῶν ἐπιεικῶν, αἱ δʼ εὔθυναι καὶ αἱ τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱρέσεις εἰσὶ μέγιστον· ἃς ἐν ἐνίαις πολιτείαις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τοῖς δήμοις ἀποδιδόασιν· ἡ γὰρ ἐκκλησία κυρία πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. καίτοι τῆς μὲν ἐκκλησίας μετέχουσι καὶ
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βουλεύουσι καὶ δικάζουσιν ἀπὸ μικρῶν τιμημάτων καὶ τῆς τυχούσης ἡλικίας, ταμιεύουσι δὲ καὶ στρατηγοῦσι καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχὰς ἄρχουσιν ἀπὸ μεγάλων. ὁμοίως δή τις ἂν λύσειε καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν. ἴσως γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ταῦτʼ ὀρθῶς. οὐ γὰρ ὁ δικαστὴς οὐδʼ ὁ βουλευτὴς οὐδʼ ὁ ἐκκλησιαστὴς
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ἄρχων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος· τῶν δὲ ῥηθέντων ἕκαστος μόριόν ἐστι τούτων (λέγω δὲ μόριον τὸν βουλευτὴν καὶ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστὴν καὶ τὸν δικαστήν)· ὥστε δικαίως κύριον μειζόνων τὸ πλῆθος· ἐκ γὰρ πολλῶν ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ τὸ δικαστήριον. καὶ τὸ τίμημα
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δὲ πλεῖον τὸ πάντων τούτων ἢ τὸ τῶν καθʼ ἕνα καὶ κατʼ ὀλίγους μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχόντων. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν διωρίσθω
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τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον·

ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία ποιεῖ φανερὸν οὐδὲν οὕτως ἕτερον ὡς ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυρίους κειμένους ὀρθῶς, τὸν ἄρχοντα δέ, ἄν τε εἷς ἄν τε πλείους ὦσι, περὶ τούτων εἶναι κυρίους περὶ ὅσων ἐξαδυνατοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι
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λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι καθόλου διορίσαι περὶ πάντων. ὁποίους μέντοι τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδέν πω δῆλον, ἀλλʼ ἔτι μένει τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν. ἅμα γὰρ καὶ ὁμοίως ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι, καὶ δικαίους ἢ ἀδίκους.
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πλὴν τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι τοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δικαίους τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς παρεκβεβηκυίας οὐ δικαίους.

ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις
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ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ κυριωτάτῃ πασῶν, αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις, ἔστι δὲ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον, δοκεῖ δὴ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ μέχρι γέ τινος ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς
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διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν (τὶ γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ δεῖν τοῖς ἴσοις ἴσον εἶναι φασιν), ποίων δὴ ἰσότης ἐστὶ καὶ ποίων ἀνισότης, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτʼ ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικήν. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις κατὰ παντὸς ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθοῦ δεῖν ἀνίσως νενεμῆσθαι τὰς ἀρχάς,
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εἰ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ μηδὲν διαφέροιεν ἀλλʼ ὅμοιοι τυγχάνοιεν ὄντες· τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατʼ ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτʼ ἀληθές, ἔσται καὶ κατὰ χρῶμα καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ καθʼ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλεονεξία τις τῶν πολιτικῶν δικαίων τοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν.
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ἢ τοῦτο ἐπιπόλαιον τὸ ψεῦδος; φανερὸν δʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων· τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν τὴν τέχνην οὐ δοτέον πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν τοῖς εὐγενεστέροις (οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐλήσουσι βέλτιον), δεῖ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον ὑπερέχοντι διδόναι καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὴν ὑπεροχήν. εἰ
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δὲ μήπω δῆλον τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ προαγαγοῦσιν ἔσται φανερόν. εἰ γὰρ εἴη τις ὑπερέχων μὲν κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικήν, πολὺ δʼ ἐλλείπων κατʼ εὐγένειαν ἢ κάλλος, εἰ καὶ μεῖζον ἕκαστον ἐκείνων ἀγαθόν ἐστι τῆς αὐλητικῆς (λέγω δὲ τήν τʼ εὐγένειαν καὶ τὸ κάλλος), καὶ κατὰ
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τὴν ἀναλογίαν ὑπερέχουσι πλέον τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἢ ἐκεῖνος κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικήν, ὅμως τούτῳ δοτέον τοὺς διαφέροντας
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τῶν αὐλῶν.

δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἔργον συμβάλλεσθαι τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τῆς εὐγενείας, συμβάλλονται δʼ οὐδέν.

ἔτι κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον πᾶν ἀγαθὸν πρὸς πᾶν ἂν εἴη συμβλητόν. εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τὶ μέγεθος, καὶ
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ὅλως ἂν τὸ μέγεθος ἐνάμιλλον εἴη καὶ πρὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν· ὥστʼ εἰ πλεῖον ὁδὶ διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ ὁδὶ κατʼ ἀρετήν, καὶ πλεῖον ὑπερέχει ὅλως ἀρετὴ μεγέθους, εἴη ἂν συμβλητὰ πάντα. τοσόνδε γὰρ μέγεθος εἰ κρεῖττον τοσοῦδε, τοσόνδε δῆλον ὡς ἴσον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἀδύνατον,
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δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν εὐλόγως οὐ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀνισότητʼ ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν (εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν βραδεῖς οἱ δὲ ταχεῖς, οὐδὲν διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τοὺς μὲν πλεῖον τοὺς δʼ ἔλαττον ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ἡ τούτων διαφορὰ λαμβάνει τὴν τιμήν)· ἀλλʼ ἐξ ὧν πόλις συνέστηκεν,
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ἐν τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν. διόπερ εὐλόγως ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τιμῆς οἱ εὐγενεῖς καὶ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ πλούσιοι. δεῖ γὰρ ἐλευθέρους τʼ εἶναι καὶ τίμημα φέροντας, οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη πόλις ἐξ ἀπόρων πάντων, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἐκ δούλων· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ δεῖ τούτων, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
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δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι πόλιν δυνατόν· πλὴν ἄνευ μὲν τῶν προτέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι καλῶς.

πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνιά γε τούτων ὀρθῶς ἀμφισβητεῖν, πρὸς μέντοι ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν
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ἡ παιδεία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ μάλιστα δικαίως ἂν ἀμφισβητοίησαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δʼ οὔτε πάντων ἴσον ἔχειν δεῖ τοὺς ἴσους ἕν τι μόνον ὄντας, οὔτε ἄνισον τοὺς ἀνίσους καθʼ ἕν, ἀνάγκη πάσας εἶναι τὰς τοιαύτας πολιτείας περεκβάσεις. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερον
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ὅτι διαμφισβητοῦσι τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως πάντες, ἁπλῶς δʼ οὐ πάντες δικαίως· οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν ὅτι πλεῖον μέτεστι τῆς χώρας αὐτοῖς, ἡ δὲ χώρα κοινόν, ἔτι πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια πιστοὶ μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον· οἱ δὲ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων (πολῖται γὰρ μᾶλλον
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οἱ γενναιότεροι τῶν ἀγεννῶν, ἡ δʼ εὐγένεια παρʼ ἑκάστοις οἴκοι τίμιος)· ἔτι διότι βελτίους εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐκ βελτιόνων, εὐγένεια γάρ ἐστιν ἀρετὴ γένους· ὁμοίως δὲ φήσομεν δικαίως καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀμφισβητεῖν, κοινωνικὴν γὰρ ἀρετὴν εἶναί φαμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ᾗ πάσας ἀναγκαῖον ἀκολουθεῖν
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τὰς ἄλλας· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ πλείους πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάττους, καὶ γὰρ κρείττους καὶ πλουσιώτεροι καὶ βελτίους εἰσίν, ὡς λαμβανομένων τῶν πλειόνων πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάττους.

ἆρʼ οὖν
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εἰ πάντες εἶεν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει, λέγω δʼ οἷον οἵ τʼ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ οἱ εὐγενεῖς, ἔτι δὲ πλῆθος ἄλλο τι πολιτικόν, πότερον ἀμφισβήτησις ἔσται τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται; καθʼ ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀναμφισβήτητος
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ἡ κρίσις τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ (τοῖς γὰρ κυρίοις διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἡ δὲ τῷ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστη τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον)· ἀλλʼ ὅμως σκοπῶμεν, ὅταν περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ταῦθʼ ὑπάρχῃ χρόνον, πῶς διοριστέον. εἰ δὴ τὸν
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ἀριθμὸν εἶεν ὀλίγοι πάμπαν οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα δεῖ διελεῖν τρόπον; ἢ τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ δυνατοὶ διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὥστʼ εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν; ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία τις πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς διαμφισβητοῦντας περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν. δόξαιεν
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γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲν λέγειν δίκαιον οἱ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀξιοῦντες ἄρχειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ κατὰ γένος· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἴ τις πάλιν εἷς πλουσιώτερος ἁπάντων ἐστί, δηλονότι κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον τοῦτον ἄρχειν τὸν ἕνα ἁπάντων δεήσει, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν εὐγενείᾳ διαφέροντα τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων
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διʼ ἐλευθερίαν. ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἴσως συμβήσεται καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς· εἰ γάρ τις εἷς ἀμείνων ἀνὴρ εἴη τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων ὄντων, τοῦτον εἶναι δεῖ κύριον κατὰ ταὐτὸ δίκαιον. οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναί γε δεῖ κύριον διότι κρείττους εἰσὶ τῶν
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ὀλίγων, κἂν εἷς ἢ πλείους μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐλάττους δὲ τῶν πολλῶν κρείττους ὦσι τῶν ἄλλων, τούτους ἂν δέοι κυρίους εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πλῆθος. πάντα δὴ ταῦτʼ ἔοικε φανερὸν ποιεῖν ὅτι τούτων τῶν ὅρων οὐδεὶς ὀρθός ἐστι καθʼ ὃν ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτοὶ μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δʼ ἄλλους ὑπὸ σφῶν ἄρχεσθαι
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πάντας. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἀξιοῦντας κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ πλοῦτον, ἔχοιεν ἂν λέγειν τὰ πλήθη λόγον τινὰ δίκαιον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ποτὲ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι βέλτιον· τῶν ὀλίγων καὶ πλουσιώτερον, οὐχ ὡς καθʼ ἕκαστον ἀλλʼ ὡς
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ἀθρόους. διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν ἣν ζητοῦσι καὶ προβάλλουσί τινες ἐνδέχεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν. ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πότερον τῷ νομοθέτῃ νομοθετητέον, βουλομένῳ τίθεσθαι τοὺς ὀρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιόνων συμφέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειόνων, ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθέν·
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τὸ δʼ ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως· τὸ δʼ ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν· πολίτης δὲ κοινῇ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαί
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ἐστι,

καθʼ ἑκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἕτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατʼ ἀρετήν.

εἰ δέ τις ἔστιν εἷς τοσοῦτον διαφέρων κατʼ ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, ἢ πλείους μὲν ἑνὸς μὴ
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μέντοι δυνατοὶ πλήρωμα παρασχέσθαι πόλεως, ὥστε μὴ συμβλητὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετὴν πάντων μηδὲ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων, εἰ πλείους, εἰ δʼ εἷς, τὴν ἐκείνου μόνον, οὐκέτι θετέον τούτους μέρος πόλεως· ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἴσων, ἄνισοι τοσοῦτον κατʼ
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ἀρετὴν ὄντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. ὅθεν δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ τοὺς ἴσους καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος· αὐτοὶ γάρ εἰσι νόμος. καὶ γὰρ γελοῖος ἂν εἴη νομοθετεῖν τις
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πειρώμενος κατʼ αὐτῶν. λέγοιεν γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἅπερ Ἀντισθένης ἔφη τοὺς λέοντας δημηγορούντων τῶν δασυπόδων καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀξιούντων πάντας ἔχειν. διὸ καὶ τίθενται τὸν ὀστρακισμὸν αἱ δημοκρατούμεναι πόλεις, διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· αὗται γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν τὴν ἰσότητα μάλιστα πάντων,
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ὥστε τοὺς δοκοῦντας ὑπερέχειν δυνάμει διὰ πλοῦτον ἢ πολυφιλίαν ἤ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἰσχὺν ὠστράκιζον καὶ μεθίστασαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως χρόνους ὡρισμένους. μυθολογεῖται δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀργοναύτας τὸν Ἡρακλέα καταλιπεῖν διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἄγειν τὴν Ἀργὼ
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μετὰ τῶν πλωτήρων τῶν ἄλλων, ὡς ὑπερβάλλοντα πολύ. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ψέγοντας τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ τὴν Περιάνδρου Θρασυβούλῳ συμβουλίαν οὐχ ἁπλῶς οἰητέον ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμᾶν (φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περίανδρον εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πεμφθέντα κήρυκα περὶ τῆς συμβουλίας, ἀφαιροῦντα δὲ τοὺς
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ὑπερέχοντας τῶν σταχύων ὁμαλῦναι τὴν ἄρουραν· ὅθεν ἀγνοοῦντος μὲν τοῦ κήρυκος τοῦ γιγνομένου τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀπαγγείλαντος δὲ τὸ συμπεσόν, συννοῆσαι τὸν Θρασύβουλον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ἄνδρας ἀναιρεῖν). τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ μόνον συμφέρει τοῖς τυράννοις, οὐδὲ μόνον οἱ τύραννοι ποιοῦσιν,
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ἀλλʼ ὁμοίως ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τὰς δημοκρατίας· ὁ γὰρ ὀστρακισμὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν τρόπον τινὰ τῷ κολούειν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας καὶ φυγαδεύειν. τὸ δʼ αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη ποιοῦσιν οἱ κύριοι τῆς δυνάμεως, οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περὶ Σαμίους καὶ
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Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους (ἐπεὶ γὰρ θᾶττον ἐγκρατῶς ἔσχον τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐταπείνωσαν αὐτοὺς παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας),

ὁ δὲ Περσῶν
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βασιλεὺς Μήδους καὶ Βαβυλωνίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς πεφρονηματισμένους διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτʼ ἐπʼ ἀρχῆς ἐπέκοπτε πολλάκις.

τὸ δὲ πρόβλημα καθόλου περὶ πάσας ἐστὶ τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς ὀρθάς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ παρεκβεβηκυῖαι
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πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι τοῦτο δρῶσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπισκοπούσας τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν· οὔτε γὰρ γραφεὺς ἐάσειεν ἂν τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας ἔχειν τὸ ζῷον, οὐδʼ εἰ
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διαφέροι τὸ κάλλος, οὔτε ναυπηγὸς πρύμναν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι μορίων τῶν τῆς νεώς, οὐδὲ δὴ χοροδιδάσκαλος τὸν μεῖζον καὶ κάλλιον τοῦ παντὸς χοροῦ φθεγγόμενον ἐάσει συγχορεύειν. ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει τοὺς μονάρχους συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὠφελίμου
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ταῖς πόλεσιν οὔσης τοῦτο δρῶσιν. διὸ κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογουμένας ὑπεροχὰς ἔχει τι δίκαιον πολιτικὸν ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ τὸν ὀστρακισμόν. βέλτιον μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὕτω συστῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν ὥστε μὴ δεῖσθαι τοιαύτης ἰατρείας· δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς, ἂν συμβῇ, πειρᾶσθαι τοιούτῳ
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τινὶ διορθώματι διορθοῦν. ὅπερ οὐκ ἐγίγνετο περὶ τὰς πόλεις· οὐ γὰρ ἔβλεπον πρὸς τὸ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς οἰκείας συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ στασιαστικῶς ἐχρῶντο τοῖς ὀστρακισμοῖς. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς παρεκβεβηκυίαις πολιτείαις ὅτι μὲν ἰδίᾳ συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστι, φανερόν, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἁπλῶς
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δίκαιον, καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν· ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχήν, οἷον ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλὰ ἄν τις γένηται διαφέρων κατʼ ἀρετήν, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ φαῖεν ἂν δεῖν ἐκβάλλειν καὶ μεθιστάναι τὸν τοιοῦτον·
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ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου· παραπλήσιον γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ Διὸς ἄρχειν ἀξιοῖεν, μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς. λείπεται τοίνυν, ὅπερ ἔοικε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ πάντας ἀσμένως, ὥστε βασιλέας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους ἀιδίους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

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ἴσως δὲ καλῶς ἔχει μετὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους μεταβῆναι καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ βασιλείας· φαμὲν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν μίαν εἶναι ταύτην. σκεπτέον δὲ πότερον συμφέρει τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς οἰκήσεσθαι καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρᾳ βασιλεύεσθαι, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλʼ ἄλλη τις πολιτεία μᾶλλον,
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ἢ τισὶ μὲν συμφέρει τισὶ δʼ οὐ συμφέρει. δεῖ δὴ πρῶτον διελέσθαι πότερον ἕν τι γένος ἔστιν αὐτῆς ἢ πλείους
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ἔχει διαφοράς.

ῥᾴδιον δὴ τοῦτό γε καταμαθεῖν, ὅτι πλείω τε γένη περιέχει καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶν οὐχ εἷς πασῶν. ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι βασιλεία μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ νόμον, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κυρία πάντων,
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ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἐξέλθῃ τὴν χώραν ἡγεμών ἐστι τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον· ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποδέδοται τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ βασιλεία οἷον στρατηγία τις αὐτοκρατόρων καὶ ἀίδιός ἐστιν· κτεῖναι γὰρ οὐ κύριος, εἰ μὴ ἔν τινι καιρῷ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν ταῖς
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πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις, ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ. δηλοῖ δʼ Ὅμηρος· ὁ γὰρ Ἀγαμέμνων κακῶς μὲν ἀκούων ἠνείχετο ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτεῖναι κύριος ἦν· λέγει γοῦν
ὃν δέ κʼ ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης …
… οὔ οἱ
ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας ἠδʼ οἰωνούς·
πὰρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος.
(Hom. Il. 2.391)

### Book III, 1285a–1288b

ἓν μὲν
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οὖν τοῦτʼ εἶδος βασιλείας, στρατηγία διὰ βίου, τούτων δʼ αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσὶν αἱ δʼ αἱρεταί· παρὰ ταύτην δʼ ἄλλο μοναρχίας εἶδος, οἷαι παρʼ ἐνίοις εἰσὶ βασιλεῖαι τῶν βαρβάρων. ἔχουσι δʼ αὗται τὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαι παραπλησίαν τυραννίσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ νόμον καὶ πάτριαι· διὰ
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γὰρ τὸ δουλικώτεροι εἶναι τὰ ἤθη φύσει οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες. τυραννικαὶ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτόν εἰσιν, ἀσφαλεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ πάτριαι καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ βασιλικὴ
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καὶ οὐ τυραννικὴ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. οἱ γὰρ πολῖται φυλάττουσιν ὅπλοις τοὺς βασιλεῖς, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ξενικόν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον καὶ ἑκόντων οἱ δʼ ἀκόντων ἄρχουσιν, ὥσθʼ οἱ μὲν παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οἱ δʼ ἐπὶ τοὺς πολίτας ἔχουσι τὴν φυλακήν.

δύο μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα
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μοναρχίας, ἕτερον δʼ ὅπερ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἕλλησιν, οὓς καλοῦσιν αἰσυμνήτας. ἔστι δὲ τοῦθʼ ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν αἱρετὴ τυραννίς, διαφέρουσα δὲ τῆς βαρβαρικῆς οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ νόμον ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ πάτριος εἶναι μόνον. ἦρχον δʼ οἱ μὲν διὰ βίου τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην, οἱ δὲ μέχρι τινῶν ὡρισμένων
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χρόνων ἢ πράξεων, οἷον εἵλοντό ποτε Μυτιληναῖοι Πιττακὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας ὧν προειστήκεσαν Ἀντιμενίδης καὶ Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής. δηλοῖ δʼ Ἀλκαῖος ὅτι τύραννον εἵλοντο τὸν Πιττακὸν ἔν τινι τῶν σκολιῶν μελῶν· ἐπιτιμᾷ γὰρ ὅτι τὸν κακοπάτριδα Πίττακον πόλιος τᾶς ἀχόλω καὶ
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βαρυδαίμονος ἐστάσαντο τύραννον μέγʼ ἐπαινέοντες ἀόλλεες.

αὗται μὲν οὖν εἰσί τε καὶ ἦσαν διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικαὶ εἶναι τυραννικαί, διὰ δὲ τὸ αἱρεταὶ καὶ ἑκόντων βασιλικαί· τέταρτον δʼ εἶδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἡρωικοὺς
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χρόνους ἑκούσιαί τε καὶ πάτριαι γιγνόμεναι κατὰ νόμον. διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλήθους εὐεργέτας κατὰ τέχνας ἢ πόλεμον, ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἢ πορίσαι χώραν, ἐγίγνοντο βασιλεῖς ἑκόντων καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι πάτριοι. κύριοι δʼ ἦσαν τῆς τε κατὰ πόλεμον ἡγεμονίας
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καὶ τῶν θυσιῶν, ὅσαι μὴ ἱερατικαί, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰς δίκας ἔκρινον. τοῦτο δʼ ἐποίουν οἱ μὲν οὐκ ὀμνύοντες οἱ δʼ ὀμνύοντες· ὁ δʼ ὅρκος ἦν τοῦ σκήπτρου ἐπανάτασις. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων καὶ τὰ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἔνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια συνεχῶς ἦρχον· ὕστερον
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δὲ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παριέντων τῶν βασιλέων, τὰ δὲ τῶν ὄχλων παραιρουμένων, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν αἱ θυσίαι κατελείφθησαν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι μόνον, ὅπου δʼ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν εἶναι βασιλείαν, ἐν τοῖς ὑπερορίοις τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μόνον εἶχον.

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βασιλείας μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα, τέτταρα τὸν ἀριθμόν, μία μὲν ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἡρωικοὺς χρόνους (αὕτη δʼ ἦν ἑκόντων μέν, ἐπὶ τισὶ δʼ ὡρισμένοις· στρατηγός τε γὰρ ἦν καὶ δικαστὴς ὁ βασιλεύς, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κύριος), δευτέρα δʼ ἡ βαρβαρική (αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἐκ γένους ἀρχὴ δεσποτικὴ
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κατὰ νόμον), τρίτη δὲ ἣν αἰσυμνητείαν προσαγορεύουσιν (αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν αἱρετὴ τυραννίς), τετάρτη δʼ ἡ Λακωνικὴ τούτων (αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς στρατηγία κατὰ γένος ἀίδιος). αὗται μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων· πέμπτον δʼ εἶδος βασιλείας, ὅταν ᾖ πάντων
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κύριος εἷς ὤν, ὥσπερ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἑκάστη τῶν κοινῶν, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ βασιλεία τις οἰκίας ἐστίν, οὕτως ἡ παμβασιλεία πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων οἰκονομία.

Σχεδὸν δὴ δύο ἐστὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν εἴδη βασιλείας περὶ ὧν σκεπτέον, αὕτη τε
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καὶ ἡ Λακωνική· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων αἱ πολλαὶ μεταξὺ τούτων εἰσίν· ἐλαττόνων μὲν γὰρ κύριοι τῆς παμβασιλείας, πλειόνων δʼ εἰσὶ τῆς Λακωνικῆς. ὥστε τὸ σκέμμα σχεδὸν περὶ δυοῖν ἐστιν, ἓν μὲν πότερον συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσι στρατηγὸν ἀίδιον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτον ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατὰ μέρος,

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ἢ οὐ συμφέρει, ἓν δὲ πότερον ἕνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων, ἢ οὐ συμφέρει. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἢ πολιτείας (ἐν ἁπάσαις γὰρ ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι τοῦτο ταῖς πολιτείαις),
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ὥστʼ ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην· ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασιλείας πολιτείας εἶδός ἐστιν, ὥστε περὶ τούτου δεῖ θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνούσας. ἀρχὴ δʼ ἐστὶ τῆς ζητήσεως αὕτη, πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἄρχεσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων.

δοκοῦσι δὴ τοῖς
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νομίζουσι συμφέρειν βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ καθόλου μόνον οἱ νόμοι λέγειν, ἀλλʼ οὐ πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττειν, ὥστʼ ἐν ὁποιᾳοῦν τέχνῃ τὸ κατὰ γράμματʼ ἄρχειν ἠλίθιον (καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ μετὰ τὴν τετρήμερον κινεῖν ἔξεστι τοῖς ἰατροῖς, ἐὰν δὲ πρότερον, ἐπὶ τῷ αὑτοῦ κινδύνῳ). φανερὸν τοίνυν ὡς
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οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους ἀρίστη πολιτεία, διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀκεῖνον δεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸν λόγον, τὸν καθόλου, τοῖς ἄρχουσιν. κρεῖττον δʼ ᾧ μὴ πρόσεστι τὸ παθητικὸν ὅλως ἢ ᾧ συμφυές· τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δʼ ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τοῦτʼ
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ἔχειν πᾶσαν. ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἂν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτου βουλεύσεται περὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστα κάλλιον. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀνάγκη νομοθέτην αὐτὸν εἶναι, δῆλον, καὶ κεῖσθαι νόμους, ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ᾗ παρεκβαίνουσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν γʼ ἄλλων εἶναι δεῖ κυρίους· ὅσα δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν τὸν νόμον κρίνειν ἢ
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ὅλως ἢ εὖ, πότερον ἕνα τὸν ἄριστον δεῖ ἄρχειν ἢ πάντας; καὶ γὰρ νῦν συνιόντες δικάζουσι καὶ βουλεύονται καὶ κρίνουσιν, αὗται δʼ αἱ κρίσεις εἰσὶ πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστον. καθʼ ἕνα μὲν οὖν συμβαλλόμενος ὁστισοῦν ἴσως χείρων· ἀλλʼ ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ δʼ ἑστίασις συμφορητὸς
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καλλίων μιᾶς καὶ ἁπλῆς· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἄμεινον ὄχλος πολλὰ ἢ εἷς ὁστισοῦν.

ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιάφθορον τὸ πολύ—καθάπερ ὕδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθορώτερον· τοῦ δʼ ἑνὸς ὑπʼ ὀργῆς κρατηθέντος ἤ τινος ἑτέρου πάθους τοιούτου ἀναγκαῖον διεφθάρθαι τὴν κρίσιν,
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ἐκεῖ δʼ ἔργον ἅμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. ἔστω δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες ἀλλʼ ἢ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ δὴ τοῦτο μὴ ῥᾴδιον ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλʼ εἰ πλείους εἶεν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολῖται, πότερον ὁ εἷς ἀδιαφθορώτερος
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ἄρχων, ἢ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀγαθοὶ
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δὲ πάντες;

ἢ δῆλον ὡς οἱ πλείους; ἀλλʼ οἱ μὲν στασιάσουσιν ὁ δὲ εἷς ἀστασίαστος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτʼ ἀντιθετέον ἴσως ὅτι σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχήν, ὥσπερ κἀκεῖνος ὁ εἷς. εἰ δὴ τὴν μὲν τῶν πλειόνων ἀρχὴν ἀγαθῶν δʼ ἀνδρῶν πάντων ἀριστοκρατίαν
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θετέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς βασιλείαν, αἱρετώτερον ἂν εἴη ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρὶς δυνάμεως οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἂν ᾖ λαβεῖν πλείους ὁμοίους. καὶ διὰ τοῦτʼ ἴσως ἐβασιλεύοντο πρότερον, ὅτι σπάνιον ἦν εὑρεῖν ἄνδρας πολὺ διαφέροντας κατʼ ἀρετήν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε
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μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις. ἔτι δʼ ἀπʼ εὐεργεσίας καθίστασαν τοὺς βασιλεῖς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔργον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συνέβαινε γίγνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετήν, οὐκέτι ὑπέμενον ἀλλʼ ἐζήτουν κοινόν τι καὶ πολιτείαν καθίστασαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ χείρους γιγνόμενοι ἐχρηματίζοντο ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν,
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ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν εὔλογον γενέσθαι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας· ἔντιμον γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλοῦτον. ἐκ δὲ τούτων πρῶτον εἰς τυραννίδας μετέβαλλον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τυραννίδων εἰς δημοκρατίαν· αἰεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες διʼ αἰσχροκέρδειαν ἰσχυρότερον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ὥστʼ ἐπιθέσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι δημοκρατίας.
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ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μείζους εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς πόλεις, ἴσως οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον ἔτι γίγνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἑτέραν παρὰ δημοκρατίαν.

εἰ δὲ δή τις ἄριστον θείη τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, πῶς ἕξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων; πότερον καὶ τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν; ἀλλὰ γιγνομένων ὁποῖοί τινες
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ἔτυχον, βλαβερόν. ἀλλʼ οὐ παραδώσει κύριος ὢν τοῖς τέκνοις. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔτι τοῦτο ῥᾴδιον πιστεῦσαι· χαλεπὸν γάρ, καὶ μείζονος ἀρετῆς ἢ κατʼ ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν. ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πότερον ἔχειν δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα βασιλεύειν ἰσχύν τινα περὶ αὑτόν, ᾗ δυνήσεται
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βιάζεσθαι τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους πειθαρχεῖν, ἢ πῶς ἐνδέχεται τὴν ἀρχὴν διοικεῖν; εἰ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἴη κύριος, μηδὲν πράττων κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, ὅμως ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν ᾗ φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους. τάχα μὲν οὖν τὰ περὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ χαλεπὸν
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διορίσαι· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν μὲν ἔχειν ἰσχύν, εἶναι δὲ τοσαύτην τὴν ἰσχὺν ὥστε ἑκάστου μὲν καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἥττω, καθάπερ οἵ τʼ ἀρχαῖοι τὰς φυλακὰς ἐδίδοσαν, ὅτε καθισταῖέν τινα τῆς πόλεως ὃν ἐκάλουν αἰσυμνήτην ἢ τύραννον, καὶ Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτʼ ᾔτει τοὺς φύλακας, συνεβούλευε
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τοῖς Συρακουσίοις διδόναι τοσούτους τοὺς φύλακας.

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περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν πάντα πράττοντος ὅ τε λόγος ἐφέστηκε νῦν καὶ ποιητέον τὴν σκέψιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον λεγόμενος βασιλεὺς οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδος, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, πολιτείας (ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ὑπάρχειν
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ἐνδέχεται στρατηγίαν ἀίδιον, οἷον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ, καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἕνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχή τις ἔστι καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον, καὶ περὶ Ὀποῦντα δὲ κατά τι μέρος ἔλαττον)· περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης (αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶ καθʼ ἣν ἄρχει πάντων κατὰ
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τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεύς) δοκεῖ δέ τισιν οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἕνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅπου συνέστηκεν ἐξ ὁμοίων ἡ πόλις· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις φύσει τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀξίαν κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, ὥστʼ εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ἴσην ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους τροφὴν ἢ
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ἐσθῆτα βλαβερὸν τοῖς σώμασιν, οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς τιμάς· ὁμοίως τοίνυν καὶ τὸ ἄνισον τοὺς ἴσους· διόπερ οὐδένα μᾶλλον ἄρχειν ἢ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος τοίνυν ὡσαύτως. τοῦτο δʼ ἤδη νόμος· ἡ γὰρ τάξις νόμος. τὸν ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἕνα
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τινά, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον τοῦτον, κἂν εἴ τινας ἄρχειν βέλτιον, τούτους καταστατέον νομοφύλακας καὶ ὑπηρέτας τοῖς νόμοις· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναί τινας ἀρχάς, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἕνα τοῦτον εἶναί φασι δίκαιον, ὁμοίων γε ὄντων πάντων. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδʼ ἄνθρωπος
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ἂν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλʼ ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἔτι δʼ ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δίδωσιν ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ πειρωμένοις ἄμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν
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μόνους, ὁ δʼ ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον· ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας. διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεῦδος, ὅτι τὸ κατὰ γράμματα ἰατρεύεσθαι φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ αἱρετώτερον χρῆσθαι
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τοῖς ἔχουσι τὰς τέχνας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φιλίαν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλʼ ἄρνυνται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς κάμνοντας ὑγιάσαντες· οἱ δʼ ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰώθασι πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς ἰατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύωσι πιστευθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς διαφθείρειν
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διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν ζητήσαιεν ἂν μᾶλλον.

ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονταί γʼ ἐφʼ ἑαυτοὺς
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οἱ ἰατροὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους ἰατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυμναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περί τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ νόμος τὸ
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μέσον. ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη εἰσίν, ὥστʼ εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμματα ἄνθρωπος ἄρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλʼ οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἔθος.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον ἐφορᾶν πολλὰ τὸν ἕνα· δεήσει ἄρα πλείονας εἶναι τοὺς ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἄρχοντας,
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ὥστε τί διαφέρει τοῦτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸν ἕνα καταστῆσαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ἔτι, ὃ καὶ πρότερον εἰρημένον ἐστίν, εἴπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἄρχειν δίκαιος, τοῦ γε ἑνὸς οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίους· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ
σύν τε δύʼ ἐρχομένω
(Hom. Il. 10.224) καὶ ἡ εὐχὴ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος
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τοιοῦτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες.
(Hom. Il. 2.372) εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἐνίων αἱ ἀρχαὶ κύριαι κρίνειν, ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος ἀδυνατεῖ διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ περὶ ὧν γε δυνατός, οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητεῖ περὶ τούτων ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἄριστα ὁ νόμος ἄρξειε καὶ κρίνειεν. ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληφθῆναι τοῖς νόμοις τὰ
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δὲ ἀδύνατα, ταῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἃ ποιεῖ διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον τὸν ἄριστον νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἄριστον· περὶ ὧν γὰρ βουλεύονται νομοθετῆσαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό γʼ ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι τὸν κρινοῦντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐχ
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ἕνα μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλούς.

κρίνει γὰρ ἕκαστος ἄρχων πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἄτοπον τʼ ἴσως ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν εἰ βέλτιον ἴδοι τις δυοῖν ὄμμασι καὶ δυσὶν ἀκοαῖς κρίνων καὶ πράττων δυσὶ ποσὶ καὶ χερσίν, ἢ πολλοὶ πολλοῖς· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὀφθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ μόναρχοι ποιοῦσιν
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αὑτῶν καὶ ὦτα καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας· τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ αὑτοῖς φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαίρεσιν· εἰ δὲ φίλοι κἀκείνου καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὅ γε φίλος ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος, ὥστʼ εἰ τούτους οἴεται δεῖν ἄρχειν, τοὺς ἴσους καὶ ὁμοίους ἄρχειν οἴεται
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δεῖν ὁμοίως. ἃ μὲν οὖν οἱ διαμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν λέγουσι, σχεδὸν ταῦτʼ ἐστίν.

ἀλλʼ ἴσως ταῦτʼ ἐπὶ μὲν τινῶν ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἐπὶ δὲ τινῶν οὐχ οὕτως. ἔστι γάρ τι φύσει δεσποτικὸν καὶ ἄλλο βασιλευτικὸν καὶ ἄλλο πολιτικὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον ἄλλο ἄλλοις· τυραννικὸν δʼ οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ
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φύσιν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν ὅσαι παρεκβάσεις εἰσί· ταῦτα γὰρ γίνεται παρὰ φύσιν.

ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
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γε φανερὸν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ἴσοις οὔτε συμφέρον ἐστὶν οὔτε δίκαιον ἕνα κύριον εἶναι πάντων, οὔτε μὴ νόμων ὄντων, ἀλλʼ ὡς αὐτὸν ὄντα νόμον, οὔτε νόμων ὄντων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδʼ ἂν κατʼ ἀρετὴν
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ἀμείνων ᾖ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τίς δʼ ὁ τρόπος, λεκτέον· εἴρηται δέ πως ἤδη καὶ πρότερον.

πρῶτον δὲ διοριστέον τί τὸ βασιλευτὸν καὶ τί τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ τί τὸ πολιτικόν. βασιλευτὸν μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν γένος ὑπερέχον κατʼ ἀρετὴν πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικήν, ἀριστοκρατικὸν
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δὲ ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν πλῆθος ἄρχεσθαι δυνάμενον τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, πολιτικὸν δὲ ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι πλῆθος πολεμικὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατʼ ἀξίαν διανέμοντα
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τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς. ὅταν οὖν ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕνα τινὰ συμβῇ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατʼ ἀρετὴν τοσοῦτον ὥσθʼ ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον πάντων, καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἕνα τοῦτον. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται πρότερον,
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οὐ μόνον οὕτως ἔχει κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον ὃ προφέρειν εἰώθασιν οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες, οἵ τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς καὶ οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχικὰς καὶ πάλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικάς (πάντες γὰρ καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτήν), ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν. οὔτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἢ
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φυγαδεύειν οὐδʼ ὀστρακίζειν δή που τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἐστίν, οὔτʼ ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. ὥστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος τοῦτον ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς.
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περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας, τίνας ἔχει διαφοράς, καὶ πότερον οὐ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ συμφέρει, καὶ τίσι, καὶ πῶς, διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς φαμεν εἶναι τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, τούτων δʼ ἀναγκαῖον ἀρίστην εἶναι τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων οἰκονομουμένην, τοιαύτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἐν ᾗ συμβέβηκεν
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ἢ ἕνα τινὰ συμπάντων ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ πλῆθος ὑπερέχον εἶναι κατʼ ἀρετήν, τῶν μὲν ἄρχεσθαι δυναμένων τῶν δʼ ἄρχειν πρὸς τὴν αἱρετωτάτην ζωήν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις ἐδείχθη λόγοις ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ πολίτου τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
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καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνήρ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλιν συστήσειεν ἄν τις ἀριστοκρατουμένην ἢ βασιλευομένην,

ὥστʼ ἔσται
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καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθη ταὐτὰ σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαῖον ἄνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικόν. διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἤδη πειρατέον λέγειν τῆς ἀρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς.
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ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν σκέψιν.

### Book IV, 1288b–1291b

[Bekker 1288b]
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ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ταῖς μὴ κατὰ μόριον γινομέναις, ἀλλὰ περὶ γένος ἕν τι τελείαις οὔσαις, μιᾶς ἐστι θεωρῆσαι τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἁρμόττον, οἷον ἄσκησις σώματι ποία τε ποίῳ συμφέρει, καὶ τίς ἀρίστη (τῷ γὰρ κάλλιστα πεφυκότι καὶ κεχορηγημένῳ τὴν ἀρίστην
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ἀναγκαῖον ἁρμόττειν), καὶ τίς τοῖς πλείστοις μία πᾶσιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν), ἔτι δʼ ἐάν τις μὴ τῆς ἱκνουμένης ἐπιθυμῇ μήθʼ ἕξεως μήτʼ ἐπιστήμης τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγωνίαν, μηδὲν ἧττον τοῦ παιδοτρίβου καὶ τοῦ γυμναστικοῦ παρασκευάσαι γε καὶ ταύτην ἐστὶ τὴν δύναμιν. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο
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καὶ περὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ περὶ ναυπηγίαν καὶ ἐσθῆτα καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην τέχνην ὁρῶμεν συμβαῖνον. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πολιτείαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἐπιστήμης τὴν ἀρίστην θεωρῆσαι τίς ἐστι καὶ ποία τις ἂν οὖσα μάλιστʼ εἴη κατʼ εὐχὴν μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος τῶν ἐκτός, καὶ τίς τίσιν ἁρμόττουσα (πολλοῖς
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γὰρ τῆς ἀρίστης τυχεῖν ἴσως ἀδύνατον, ὥστε τὴν κρατίστην τε ἁπλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην οὐ δεῖ λεληθέναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικόν), ἔτι δὲ τρίτην τὴν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως (δεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὴν δοθεῖσαν δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πῶς ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ γενομένη
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τίνα τρόπον ἂν σῴζοιτο πλεῖστον χρόνον· λέγω δὲ οἷον εἴ τινι πόλει συμβέβηκε μήτε τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτεύεσθαι πολιτείαν, ἀχορήγητον δὲ εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, μήτε τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἀλλά τινα φαυλοτέραν), παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τὴν μάλιστα πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἁρμόττουσαν
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δεῖ γνωρίζειν, ὥσθʼ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀποφαινομένων περὶ πολιτείας, καὶ εἰ τἆλλα λέγουσι καλῶς, τῶν γε χρησίμων διαμαρτάνουσιν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὴν ἀρίστην δεῖ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν δυνατήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ῥᾴω καὶ κοινοτέραν ἁπάσαις· νῦν δʼ οἱ μὲν τὴν ἀκροτάτην καὶ δεομένην πολλῆς
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χορηγίας ζητοῦσι μόνον, οἱ δὲ μᾶλλον κοινήν τινα λέγοντες, τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ἀναιροῦντες πολιτείας, τὴν Λακωνικὴν
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ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἐπαινοῦσι·

χρὴ δὲ τοιαύτην εἰσηγεῖσθαι τάξιν ἧς ῥᾳδίως ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων καὶ πεισθήσονται καὶ δυνήσονται κοινωνεῖν, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔργον τὸ ἐπανορθῶσαι πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μεταμανθάνειν
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ἢ μανθάνειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· διὸ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις πολιτείαις δεῖ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν τὸν πολιτικόν, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἀγνοοῦντα πόσα πολιτείας ἔστιν εἴδη. νῦν δὲ μίαν δημοκρατίαν οἴονταί τινες εἶναι καὶ μίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
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τοῦτʼ ἀληθές. ὥστε δεῖ τὰς διαφορὰς μὴ λανθάνειν τὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν, πόσαι, καὶ συντίθενται ποσαχῶς. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης καὶ νόμους τοὺς ἀρίστους ἰδεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἑκάστῃ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἁρμόττοντας. πρὸς γὰρ τὰς πολιτείας τοὺς νόμους δεῖ τίθεσθαι καὶ τίθενται πάντες, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰς πολιτείας
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πρὸς τοὺς νόμους. πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἑκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν· νόμοι δʼ οἱ κεχωρισμένοι τῶν δηλούντων τὴν πολιτείαν, καθʼ οὓς δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἄρχειν καὶ φυλάττειν τοὺς
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παραβαίνοντας αὐτούς. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὰς διαφορὰς ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἔχειν τῆς πολιτείας ἑκάστης καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν νόμων θέσεις· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τοὺς αὐτοὺς νόμους συμφέρειν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐδὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις πάσαις, εἴπερ δὴ πλείους καὶ μὴ μία δημοκρατία μηδὲ ὀλιγαρχία
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μόνον ἔστιν.

ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μεθόδῳ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν διειλόμεθα τρεῖς μὲν τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, βασιλείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν πολιτείαν, τρεῖς δὲ τὰς τούτων παρεκβάσεις, τυραννίδα μὲν βασιλείας ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας δημοκρατίαν
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δὲ πολιτείας, καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας εἴρηται (τὸ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας θεωρῆσαι ταὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν τῶν ὀνομάτων· βούλεται γὰρ ἑκατέρα κατʼ ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην), ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων ἀριστοκρατία καὶ βασιλεία, καὶ πότε
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δεῖ βασιλείαν νομίζειν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν περὶ πολιτείας διελθεῖν τῆς τῷ κοινῷ προσαγορευομένης ὀνόματι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, ὀλιγαρχίας τε καὶ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος. φανερὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τῶν παρεκβάσεων τίς χειρίστη καὶ δευτέρα τίς. ἀνάγκη γὰρ
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τὴν μὲν τῆς πρώτης καὶ θειοτάτης παρέκβασιν εἶναι χειρίστην, τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τοὔνομα μόνον ἔχειν οὐκ
[Bekker 1289b]
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οὖσαν,

ἢ διὰ πολλὴν ὑπεροχὴν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ βασιλεύοντος· ὥστε τὴν τυραννίδα χειρίστην οὖσαν πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν (ἡ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία διέστηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας), μετριωτάτην δὲ
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τὴν δημοκρατίαν. ἤδη μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφήνατο καὶ τῶν πρότερον οὕτως, οὐ μὴν εἰς ταὐτὸ βλέψας ἡμῖν. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἔκρινε πασῶν μὲν οὐσῶν ἐπιεικῶν, οἷον ὀλιγαρχίας τε χρηστῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, χειρίστην δημοκρατίαν, φαύλων δὲ ἀρίστην· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅλως ταύτας ἐξημαρτημένας εἶναί φαμεν,
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καὶ βελτίω μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν λέγειν, ἧττον δὲ φαύλην. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης κρίσεως ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν· ἡμῖν δὲ πρῶτον μὲν διαιρετέον πόσαι διαφοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴπερ ἔστιν εἴδη πλείονα τῆς τε δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, ἔπειτα τίς κοινοτάτη καὶ
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τίς αἱρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλη τετύχηκεν ἀριστοκρατικὴ καὶ συνεστῶσα καλῶς, ἀλλʼ οὐ ταῖς πλείσταις ἁρμόττουσα πόλεσι, τίς ἐστιν, ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τίς τίσιν αἱρετή (τάχα γὰρ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαία δημοκρατία μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχίας, τοῖς δʼ αὕτη μᾶλλον ἐκείνης),
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μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τίνα τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι τὸν βουλόμενον ταύτας τὰς πολιτείας, λέγω δὲ δημοκρατίας τε καθʼ ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ πάλιν ὀλιγαρχίας· τέλος δέ, πάντων τούτων ὅταν ποιησώμεθα συντόμως τὴν ἐνδεχομένην μνείαν, πειρατέον ἐπελθεῖν τίνες φθοραὶ καὶ τίνες σωτηρίαι τῶν πολιτειῶν
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καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας ταῦτα μάλιστα γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν.

τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι πλείους πολιτείας αἴτιον ὅτι πάσης ἔστι μέρη πλείω πόλεως τὸν ἀριθμόν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐξ οἰκιῶν συγκειμένας πάσας ὁρῶμεν τὰς πόλεις, ἔπειτα πάλιν τούτου
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τοῦ πλήθους τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς δʼ ἀπόρους τοὺς δὲ μέσους, καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων τὸ μὲν ὁπλιτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἄνοπλον. καὶ τὸν μὲν γεωργικὸν δῆμον ὁρῶμεν ὄντα, τὸν δʼ ἀγοραῖον, τὸν δὲ βάναυσον. καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων εἰσὶ διαφοραὶ καὶ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ μεγέθη
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τῆς οὐσίας, οἷον ἱπποτροφίας (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον μὴ πλουτοῦντας ποιεῖν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων ὅσαις πόλεσιν ἐν τοῖς ἵπποις ἡ δύναμις ἦν, ὀλιγαρχίαι παρὰ τούτοις ἦσαν· ἐχρῶντο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους ἵπποις πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας, οἷον Ἐρετριεῖς καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς καὶ Μάγνητες οἱ ἐπὶ
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Μαιάνδρῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολλοὶ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν)· ἔτι πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφοραῖς ἐστιν ἡ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἡ δὲ
[Bekker 1290a]
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κατʼ ἀρετήν,

κἂν εἴ τι δὴ τοιοῦτον ἕτερον εἴρηται πόλεως εἶναι μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ διείλομεν ἐκ πόσων μερῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ πᾶσα πόλις· τούτων γὰρ τῶν μερῶν ὁτὲ μὲν πάντα μετέχει τῆς πολιτείας ὁτὲ δʼ
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ἐλάττω ὁτὲ δὲ πλείω. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείας, εἴδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτʼ εἴδει διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὐτῶν. πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξις ἐστί, ταύτας δὲ διανέμονται πάντες ἢ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων ἢ κατά τινʼ αὐτῶν ἰσότητα
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κοινήν, λέγω δʼ οἷον τῶν ἀπόρων ἢ τῶν εὐπόρων ἢ κοινήν τινʼ ἀμφοῖν. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα πολιτείας εἶναι τοσαύτας ὅσαι περ τάξεις κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχάς εἰσι καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν μορίων.

μάλιστα δὲ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι δύο, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πνευμάτων λέγεται τὰ μὲν βόρεια τὰ δὲ νότια, τὰ
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δʼ ἄλλα τούτων παρεκβάσεις, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν δύο, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. τὴν γὰρ ἀριστοκρατίαν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας εἶδος τιθέασιν ὡς οὖσαν ὀλιγαρχίαν τινά, καὶ τὴν καλουμένην πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πνεύμασι τὸν μὲν ζέφυρον τοῦ βορέου, τοῦ δὲ νότου τὸν εὖρον. ὁμοίως
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δʼ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας, ὥς φασί τινες· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τίθενται εἴδη δύο, τὴν δωριστὶ καὶ τὴν φρυγιστί, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα συντάγματα τὰ μὲν Δώρια τὰ δὲ Φρύγια καλοῦσιν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν εἰώθασιν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν· ἀληθέστερον δὲ καὶ βέλτιον ὡς ἡμεῖς διείλομεν, δυοῖν
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ἢ μιᾶς οὔσης τῆς καλῶς συνεστηκυίας τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι παρεκβάσεις, τὰς μὲν τῆς εὖ κεκραμένης ἁρμονίας τὰς δὲ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχικὰς μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας, τὰς δʼ ἀνειμένας καὶ μαλακὰς δημοτικάς.

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οὐ δεῖ δὲ τιθέναι δημοκρατίαν, καθάπερ εἰώθασί τινες νῦν, ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ὅπου κύριον τὸ πλῆθος (καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ πλέον μέρος κύριον), οὐδʼ ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου κύριοι ὀλίγοι τῆς πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ εἴησαν οἱ πάντες χίλιοι καὶ τριακόσιοι, καὶ τούτων οἱ χίλιοι πλούσιοι,
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καὶ μὴ μεταδιδοῖεν ἀρχῆς τοῖς τριακοσίοις καὶ πένησιν ἐλευθέροις οὖσι καὶ τἆλλα ὁμοίοις, οὐθεὶς ἂν φαίη δημοκρατεῖσθαι τούτους· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ πένητες ὀλίγοι μὲν εἶεν, κρείττους δὲ τῶν εὐπόρων πλειόνων ὄντων, οὐδεὶς ἂν ὀλιγαρχίαν προσαγορεύσειεν οὐδὲ τὴν τοιαύτην, εἰ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὖσι
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πλουσίοις μὴ μετείη τῶν τιμῶν.

μᾶλλον τοίνυν λεκτέον ὅτι
[Bekker 1290b]
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δῆμος μέν ἐστιν ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι κύριοι ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχία δʼ ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς δʼ ὀλίγους· ἐλεύθεροι μὲν γὰρ πολλοί, πλούσιοι δʼ ὀλίγοι. καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἰ κατὰ μέγεθος διενέμοντο τὰς ἀρχάς, ὥσπερ
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ἐν Αἰθιοπίᾳ φασί τινες, ἢ κατὰ κάλλος, ὀλιγαρχία ἦν ἄν· ὀλίγον γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν καλῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν μεγάλων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τούτοις μόνον ἱκανῶς ἔχει διωρίσθαι τὰς πολιτείας ταύτας· ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ πλείονα μόρια καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας εἰσίν, ἔτι διαληπτέον ὡς οὔτʼ ἂν οἱ
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ἐλεύθεροι ὀλίγοι ὄντες πλειόνων καὶ μὴ ἐλευθέρων ἄρχωσι, δῆμος, οἷον ἐν Ἀπολλωνίᾳ τῇ ἐν τῷ Ἰονίῳ καὶ ἐν Θήρᾳ (ἐν τούτων γὰρ ἑκατέρᾳ τῶν πόλεων ἐν ταῖς τιμαῖς ἦσαν οἱ διαφέροντες κατʼ εὐγένειαν καὶ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας, ὀλίγοι ὄντες, πολλῶν), οὔτε ἂν οἱ πλούσιοι διὰ τὸ
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κατὰ πλῆθος ὑπερέχειν, δῆμος, οἷον ἐν Κολοφῶνι τὸ παλαιόν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἐκέκτηντο μακρὰν οὐσίαν οἱ πλείους πρὶν γενέσθαι τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λυδούς), ἀλλʼ ἔστι δημοκρατία μὲν ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἄποροι πλείους ὄντες κύριοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχία δʼ ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενέστεροι
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ὀλίγοι ὄντες.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διʼ ἣν αἰτίαν, εἴρηται· διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγωμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ οὐχ ἓν μέρος ἀλλὰ πλείω πᾶσαν ἔχειν πόλιν.
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ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ζῴου προῃρούμεθα λαβεῖν εἴδη, πρῶτον ἂν ἀποδιωρίζομεν ἅπερ ἀναγκαῖον πᾶν ἔχειν ζῷον (οἷον ἔνιά τε τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τὸ τῆς τροφῆς ἐργαστικὸν καὶ δεκτικόν, οἷον στόμα καὶ κοιλίαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἷς κινεῖται μορίοις ἕκαστον αὐτῶν)· εἰ δὲ τοσαῦτα εἴη μόνον, τούτων δʼ εἶεν
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διαφοραί (λέγω δʼ οἷον στόματός τινα πλείω γένη καὶ κοιλίας καὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν κινητικῶν μορίων), ὁ τῆς συζεύξεως τῆς τούτων ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιήσει πλείω γένη ζῴων (οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ταὐτὸν ζῷον ἔχειν πλείους στόματος διαφοράς, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδʼ ὤτων), ὥσθʼ ὅταν ληφθῶσι
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τούτων πάντες οἱ ἐνδεχόμενοι συνδυασμοί, ποιήσουσιν εἴδη ζῴου, καὶ τοσαῦτʼ εἴδη τοῦ ζῴου ὅσαι περ αἱ συζεύξεις τῶν ἀναγκαίων μορίων εἰσίν—τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ τῶν εἰρημένων πολιτειῶν. καὶ γὰρ αἱ πόλεις οὐκ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἀλλʼ ἐκ πολλῶν σύγκεινται μερῶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις. ἓν
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μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν πλῆθος, οἱ καλούμενοι γεωργοί,

[Bekker 1291a]
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δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καλούμενον βάναυσον (ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ὧν ἄνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι· τούτων δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὰς δὲ εἰς τρυφὴν ἢ τὸ καλῶς ζῆν), τρίτον δὲ τὸ ἀγοραῖον (λέγω δʼ ἀγοραῖον
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τὸ περὶ τὰς πράσεις καὶ τὰς ὠνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας διατρῖβον), τέταρτον δὲ τὸ θητικόν, πέμπτον δὲ γένος τὸ προπολεμῆσον, ὃ τούτων οὐθὲν ἧττόν ἐστιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἰ μέλλουσι μὴ δουλεύσειν τοῖς ἐπιοῦσιν. μὴ γὰρ ἓν τῶν ἀδυνάτων ᾖ πόλιν ἄξιον εἶναι καλεῖν τὴν φύσει δούλην·
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αὐτάρκης γὰρ ἡ πόλις, τὸ δὲ δοῦλον οὐκ αὔταρκες. διόπερ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ κομψῶς τοῦτο, οὐχ ἱκανῶς δὲ εἴρηται. φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐκ τεττάρων τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων πόλιν συγκεῖσθαι, λέγει δὲ τούτους ὑφάντην καὶ γεωργὸν καὶ σκυτοτόμον καὶ οἰκοδόμον· πάλιν δὲ προστίθησιν, ὡς οὐκ αὐτάρκων
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τούτων, χαλκέα καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις βοσκήμασιν, ἔτι δʼ ἔμπορόν τε καὶ κάπηλον· καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίνεται πλήρωμα τῆς πρώτης πόλεως, ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων τε χάριν πᾶσαν πόλιν συνεστηκυῖαν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ μᾶλλον, ἴσον τε δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν. τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν
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οὐ πρότερον ἀποδίδωσι μέρος πρὶν ἢ τῆς χώρας αὐξομένης καὶ τῆς τῶν πλησίον ἁπτομένης εἰς πόλεμον καταστῶσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέτταρσι καὶ τοῖς ὁποσοισοῦν κοινωνοῖς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τινα τὸν ἀποδώσοντα καὶ κρινοῦντα τὸ δίκαιον. εἴπερ οὖν καὶ ψυχὴν ἄν τις θείη ζῴου μόριον
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μᾶλλον ἢ σῶμα, καὶ πόλεων τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον θετέον τῶν εἰς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν συντεινόντων, τὸ πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ μετέχον δικαιοσύνης δικαστικῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ βουλευόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συνέσεως πολιτικῆς ἔργον. καὶ ταῦτʼ εἴτε κεχωρισμένως ὑπάρχει τισὶν εἴτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς, οὐθὲν διαφέρει
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πρὸς τὸν λόγον· καὶ γὰρ ὁπλιτεύειν καὶ γεωργεῖν συμβαίνει τοῖς αὐτοῖς πολλάκις. ὥστε εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκεῖνα θετέα μόρια τῆς πόλεως, φανερὸν ὅτι τό γε ὁπλιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι μόριον τῆς πόλεως.

ἕβδομον δὲ τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν, ὃ καλοῦμεν εὐπόρους. ὄγδοον δὲ τὸ δημιουργικὸν
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καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λειτουργοῦν, εἴπερ ἄνευ ἀρχόντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν εἶναί τινας τοὺς δυναμένους ἄρχειν καὶ λειτουργοῦντας ἢ συνεχῶς ἢ κατὰ μέρος τῇ πόλει ταύτην τὴν λειτουργίαν. λοιπὰ δὲ περὶ ὧν τυγχάνομεν διωρικότες ἀρτίως, τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ τὸ κρῖνον
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περὶ τῶν δικαίων τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. εἴπερ οὖν ταῦτα δεῖ γινέσθαι ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ καλῶς γενέσθαι καὶ δικαίως,

[Bekker 1291b]
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ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μετέχοντας εἶναί τινας ἀρετῆς τῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἄλλας δυνάμεις τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν ἐνδέχεσθαι δοκεῖ πολλοῖς, οἷον τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς προπολεμοῦντας καὶ γεωργοῦντας καὶ τεχνίτας, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς βουλευομένους
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τε καὶ κρίνοντας· ἀντιποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς πάντες, καὶ τὰς πλείστας ἀρχὰς ἄρχειν οἴονται δύνασθαι· ἀλλὰ πένεσθαι καὶ πλουτεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀδύνατον. διὸ ταῦτα μέρη μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ πόλεως, οἱ εὔποροι καὶ οἱ ἄποροι. ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ
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πολλοὺς ταῦτα ἐναντία μέρη φαίνεται τῶν τῆς πόλεως μορίων. ὥστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τούτων καθιστᾶσι, καὶ δύο πολιτεῖαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, δημοκρατία καὶ ὀλιγαρχία.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσι πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνας
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αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον· ὅτι δὲ ἔστι καὶ δημοκρατίας εἴδη πλείω καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας, λέγωμεν. φανερὸν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. εἴδη γὰρ πλείω τοῦ τε δήμου καὶ τῶν λεγομένων γνωρίμων ἔστιν, οἷον δήμου μὲν εἴδη ἓν μὲν οἱ γεωργοί, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἀγοραῖον τὸ περὶ
[Bekker 1291b line 20]
ὠνὴν καὶ πρᾶσιν διατρῖβον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν πολεμικὸν τὸ δὲ χρηματιστικὸν τὸ δὲ πορθμευτικὸν τὸ δʼ ἁλιευτικόν (πολλαχοῦ γὰρ ἕκαστα τούτων πολύοχλα, οἷον ἁλιεῖς μὲν ἐν Τάραντι καὶ Βυζαντίῳ, τριηρικὸν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν, ἐμπορικὸν δὲ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ καὶ Χίῳ, πορθμευτικὸν
[Bekker 1291b line 25]
δʼ ἐν Τενέδῳ), πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ χερνητικὸν καὶ τὸ μικρὰν ἔχον οὐσίαν ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι σχολάζειν, ἔτι τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον, κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον πλήθους εἶδος· τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων πλοῦτος εὐγένεια ἀρετὴ παιδεία καὶ τὰ τούτοις λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν
[Bekker 1291b line 30]
διαφοράν.

δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστι πρώτη μὲν ἡ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. ἴσον γάρ φησιν ὁ νόμος ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης δημοκρατίας τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπερέχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ κυρίους εἶναι ὁποτερουσοῦν, ἀλλʼ ὁμοίους ἀμφοτέρους. εἴπερ γὰρ ἐλευθερία μάλιστʼ ἔστιν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ,
[Bekker 1291b line 35]
καθάπερ ὑπολαμβάνουσί τινες, καὶ ἰσότης, οὕτως ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, κοινωνούτων ἁπάντων μάλιστα τῆς πολιτείας ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείων ὁ δῆμος, κύριον δὲ τὸ δόξαν τοῖς πλείοσιν, ἀνάγκη δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ταύτην. ἓν μὲν οὖν εἶδος δημοκρατίας τοῦτο, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμημάτων
[Bekker 1291b line 40]
εἴναι, βραχέων δὲ τούτων ὄντων· δεῖ δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ ἐξουσίαν εἶναι μετέχειν καὶ τὸν ἀποβάλλοντα μὴ μετέχειν·

### Book IV, 1292a–1295a

[Bekker 1292a]
[Bekker 1292a line 1]
ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν ἅπαντας τοὺς πολίτας ὅσοι ἀνυπεύθυνοι, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ παντὶ μετεῖναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐὰν μόνον ᾖ πολίτης, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τἆλλα
[Bekker 1292a line 5]
μὲν εἶναι ταὐτά, κύριον δʼ εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ᾖ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος· συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημοκρατουμέναις οὐ γίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλʼ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσιν ἐν προεδρίᾳ·
[Bekker 1292a line 10]
ὅπου δʼ οἱ νόμοι μή εἰσι κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί. μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοί εἰσιν οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες. Ὅμηρος δὲ ποίαν λέγει οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πολυκοιρανίην, πότερον ταύτην ἢ ὅταν πλείους ὦσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ὡς ἕκαστος,
[Bekker 1292a line 15]
ἄδηλον. ὁ δʼ οὖν τοιοῦτος δῆμος, ἅτε μόναρχος ὤν, ζητεῖ μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου, καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός, ὥστε οἱ κόλακες ἔντιμοι, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος δῆμος ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχιῶν τῇ τυραννίδι. διότι καὶ τὸ ἦθος τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἄμφω δεσποτικὰ τῶν βελτιόνων, καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα
[Bekker 1292a line 20]
ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὰ ἐπιτάγματα, καὶ ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον. καὶ μάλιστα δʼ ἑκάτεροι παρʼ ἑκατέροις ἰσχύουσιν, οἱ μὲν κόλακες παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις, οἱ δὲ δημαγωγοὶ παρὰ τοῖς δήμοις τοῖς τοιούτοις. αἴτιοι δέ εἰσι τοῦ εἶναι τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς νόμους
[Bekker 1292a line 25]
οὗτοι, πάντα ἀνάγοντες εἰς τὸν δῆμον· συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι μεγάλοις διὰ τὸ τὸν μὲν δῆμον πάντων εἶναι κύριον, τῆς δὲ τοῦ δήμου δόξης τούτους· πείθεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τούτοις. ἔτι δʼ οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸν δῆμόν φασι δεῖν κρίνειν, ὁ δὲ ἀσμένως δέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν· ὥστε καταλύονται
[Bekker 1292a line 30]
πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί. εὐλόγως δὲ ἂν δόξειεν ἐπιτιμᾶν ὁ φάσκων τὴν τοιαύτην εἶναι δημοκρατίαν οὐ πολιτείαν. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία. δεῖ γὰρ τὸν μὲν νόμον ἄρχειν πάντων τῶν δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστα τὰς ἀρχάς, καὶ ταύτην πολιτείαν κρίνειν. ὥστʼ εἴπερ ἐστὶ δημοκρατία
[Bekker 1292a line 35]
μία τῶν πολιτειῶν, φανερὸν ὡς ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις, ἐν ᾗ ψηφίσμασι πάντα διοικεῖται, οὐδὲ δημοκρατία κυρίως· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψήφισμα εἶναι καθόλου. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατίας εἴδη διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ εἴδη ἓν μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι
[Bekker 1292a line 40]
τὰς ἀρχὰς τηλικούτων ὥστε τοὺς ἀπόρους μὴ μετέχειν, πλείους ὄντας, ἐξεῖναι δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας,

ἄλλο
[Bekker 1292b]
[Bekker 1292b line 1]
δέ, ὅταν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μακρῶν ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἱρῶνται αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας (ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ πάντων τούτων τοῦτο ποιῶσι, δοκεῖ τοῦτʼ εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατικόν, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων, ὀλιγαρχικόν)· ἕτερον δʼ εἶδος ὀλιγαρχίας,
[Bekker 1292b line 5]
ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσίῃ, τέταρτον δʼ, ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ τε τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν καὶ ἄρχῃ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλʼ οἱ ἄρχοντες. καὶ ἔστιν ἀντίστροφος αὕτη ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὥσπερ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις, καὶ περὶ ἧς τελευταίας εἴπαμεν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις· καὶ καλοῦσι
[Bekker 1292b line 10]
δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν δυναστείαν.

ὀλιγαρχίας μὲν οὖν εἴδη τοσαῦτα καὶ δημοκρατίας· οὐ δεῖ δὲ λανθάνειν ὅτι πολλαχοῦ συμβέβηκεν ὥστε τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους μὴ δημοτικὴν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἔθος καὶ τὴν ἀγωγὴν πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικῶς, ὁμοίως
[Bekker 1292b line 15]
δὲ πάλιν παρʼ ἄλλοις τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι πολιτείαν δημοτικωτέραν, τῇ δʼ ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι μᾶλλον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο μάλιστα μετὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν· οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς μεταβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαπῶσι τὰ πρῶτα μικρὰ πλεονεκτοῦντες παρʼ ἀλλήλων,
[Bekker 1292b line 20]
ὥσθʼ οἱ μὲν νόμοι διαμένουσιν οἱ προϋπάρχοντες, κρατοῦσι δʼ οἱ μεταβαλόντες τὴν πολιτείαν.

ὅτι δʼ ἔστι τοσαῦτα εἴδη δημοκρατίας καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν ἐστιν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ πάντα τὰ εἰρημένα μέρη τοῦ δήμου κοινωνεῖν τῆς πολιτείας,
[Bekker 1292b line 25]
ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή. ὅταν μὲν οὖν τὸ γεωργικὸν καὶ τὸ κεκτημένον μετρίαν οὐσίαν κύριον ᾖ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύονται κατὰ νόμους (ἔχουσι γὰρ ἐργαζόμενοι ζῆν, οὐ δύνανται δὲ σχολάζειν, ὥστε τὸν νόμον ἐπιστήσαντες ἐκκλησιάζουσι τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκκλησίας), τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μετέχειν ἔξεστιν ὅταν
[Bekker 1292b line 30]
κτήσωνται τὸ τίμημα τὸ διωρισμένον ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων· διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτησαμένοις ἔξεστι μετέχειν· ὅλως μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐξεῖναι σχολάζειν ἀδύνατον μὴ προσόδων οὐσῶν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν εἶδος ἓν δημοκρατίας διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος διὰ τὴν
[Bekker 1292b line 35]
ἐχομένην διαίρεσιν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ πᾶσιν ἐξεῖναι τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος, μετέχειν μέντοι δυναμένους σχολάζειν· διόπερ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ δημοκρατίᾳ οἱ νόμοι ἄρχουσι, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόσοδον. τρίτον δʼ εἶδος τὸ πᾶσιν ἐξεῖναι, ὅσοι ἂν ἐλεύθεροι ὦσι, μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας, μὴ μέντοι
[Bekker 1292b line 40]
μετέχειν διὰ τὴν προειρημένην αἰτίαν, ὥστʼ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ἄρχειν τὸν νόμον.

τέταρτον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας
[Bekker 1293a]
[Bekker 1293a line 1]
ἡ τελευταία τοῖς χρόνοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γεγενημένη. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μείζους γεγονέναι πολὺ τὰς πόλεις τῶν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς καὶ προσόδων ὑπάρχειν εὐπορίας, μετέχουσι μὲν πάντες τῆς πολιτείας διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλήθους, κοινωνοῦσι δὲ καὶ
[Bekker 1293a line 5]
πολιτεύονται διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι σχολάζειν καὶ τοὺς ἀπόρους, λαμβάνοντας μισθόν. καὶ μάλιστα δὲ σχολάζει τὸ τοιοῦτον πλῆθος· οὐ γὰρ ἐμποδίζει αὐτοὺς οὐθὲν ἡ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια, τοὺς δὲ πλουσίους ἐμποδίζει, ὥστε πολλάκις οὐ κοινωνοῦσι τῆς ἐκκλησίας οὐδὲ τοῦ δικάζειν. διὸ γίνεται τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων
[Bekker 1293a line 10]
πλῆθος κύριον τῆς πολιτείας, ἀλλʼ οὐχ οἱ νόμοι.

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατίας εἴδη τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταύτας τὰς ἀνάγκας ἐστίν, τάδε δὲ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας· ὅταν μὲν πλείους ἔχωσιν οὐσίαν, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ μὴ πολλὴν λίαν, τὸ τῆς πρώτης ὀλιγαρχίας εἶδός ἐστιν· ποιοῦσι γὰρ ἐξουσίαν μετέχειν
[Bekker 1293a line 15]
τῷ κτωμένῳ, καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἀνάγκη μὴ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ τὸν νόμον εἶναι κύριον (ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλεῖον ἀπέχωσι τῆς μοναρχίας, καὶ μήτε τοσαύτην ἔχωσιν οὐσίαν ὥστε σχολάζειν ἀμελοῦντες μήθʼ οὕτως ὀλίγην ὥστε τρέφεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως,
[Bekker 1293a line 20]
ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἀξιοῦν αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτούς)· ἐὰν δὲ δὴ ἐλάττους ὦσιν οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες ἢ οἱ τὸ πρότερον, πλείω δέ, τὸ τῆς δευτέρας ὀλιγαρχίας γίνεται εἶδος· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἰσχύοντες πλεονεκτεῖν ἀξιοῦσιν, διὸ αὐτοὶ μὲν αἱροῦνται ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα βαδίζοντας,
[Bekker 1293a line 25]
διὰ δὲ τὸ μήπω οὕτως ἰσχυροὶ εἶναι ὥστʼ ἄνευ νόμου ἄρχειν τὸν νόμον τίθενται τοιοῦτον. ἐὰν δʼ ἐπιτείνωσι τῷ ἐλάττονες ὄντες μείζονας οὐσίας ἔχειν, ἡ τρίτη ἐπίδοσις γίνεται τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, τὸ διʼ αὑτῶν μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχειν, κατὰ νόμον δὲ τὸν κελεύοντα τῶν τελευτώντων διαδέχεσθαι τοὺς
[Bekker 1293a line 30]
υἱεῖς. ὅταν δὲ ἤδη πολὺ ὑπερτείνωσι ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς πολυφιλίαις, ἐγγὺς ἡ τοιαύτη δυναστεία μοναρχίας ἐστίν, καὶ κύριοι γίνονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁ νόμος· καὶ τὸ τέταρτον εἶδος τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τοῦτʼ ἐστίν, ἀντίστροφον τῷ τελευταίῳ τῆς δημοκρατίας.

[Bekker 1293a line 35]
ἔτι δʼ εἰσὶ δύο πολιτεῖαι παρὰ δημοκρατίαν τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν λέγουσί τε πάντες καὶ εἴρηται τῶν τεττάρων πολιτειῶν εἶδος ἕν (λέγουσι δὲ τέτταρας μοναρχίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν δημοκρατίαν, τέταρτον δὲ τὴν καλουμένην ἀριστοκρατίαν)· πέμπτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἣ προσαγορεύεται
[Bekker 1293a line 40]
τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν (πολιτείαν γὰρ καλοῦσιν), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ πολλάκις γίνεσθαι λανθάνει τοὺς πειρωμένους ἀριθμεῖν τὰ τῶν πολιτειῶν εἴδη, καὶ χρῶνται ταῖς τέτταρσι μόνον
[Bekker 1293b]
[Bekker 1293b line 1]
(ὥσπερ Πλάτων) ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις.

ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἧς διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις (τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἁπλῶς κατʼ ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν μόνην δίκαιον
[Bekker 1293b line 5]
προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγαθός ἐστιν, οἱ δʼ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσὶ τὴν αὑτῶν)· οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ εἰσί τινες αἳ πρός τε τὰς ὀλιγαρχουμένας ἔχουσι διαφορὰς καὶ καλοῦνται ἀριστοκρατίαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην πολιτείαν.
[Bekker 1293b line 10]
ὅπου γὰρ μὴ μόνον πλουτίνδην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀριστίνδην αἱροῦνται τὰς ἀρχάς, αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία διαφέρει τε ἀμφοῖν καὶ ἀριστοκρατικὴ καλεῖται. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιουμέναις κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς εἰσὶν ὅμως τινὲς οἱ εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἐπιεικεῖς. ὅπου οὖν ἡ πολιτεία βλέπει εἴς τε
[Bekker 1293b line 15]
πλοῦτον καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ δῆμον, οἷον ἐν Καρχηδόνι, αὕτη ἀριστοκρατική ἐστιν, καὶ ἐν αἷς εἰς τὰ δύο μόνον, οἷον ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων, εἴς τε ἀρετὴν καὶ δῆμον, καὶ ἔστι μίξις τῶν δύο τούτων, δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς. ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ταῦτα δύο εἴδη,
[Bekker 1293b line 20]
καὶ τρίτον ὅσαι τῆς καλουμένης πολιτείας ῥέπουσι πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μᾶλλον.

λοιπὸν δʼ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν περί τε τῆς ὀνομαζομένης πολιτείας εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ τυραννίδος. ἐτάξαμεν δʼ οὕτως οὐκ οὖσαν οὔτε ταύτην παρέκβασιν οὔτε τὰς ἄρτι ῥηθείσας ἀριστοκρατίας, ὅτι
[Bekker 1293b line 25]
τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς πᾶσαι διημαρτήκασι τῆς ὀρθοτάτης πολιτείας, ἔπειτα καταριθμοῦνται μετὰ τούτων εἰσί τʼ αὐτῶν αὗται παρεκβάσεις ἅσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατʼ ἀρχὴν εἴπομεν. τελευταῖον δὲ περὶ τυραννίδος εὔλογόν ἐστι ποιήσασθαι μνείαν διὰ τὸ πασῶν ἥκιστα ταύτην εἶναι πολιτείαν, ἡμῖν δὲ τὴν
[Bekker 1293b line 30]
μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας. διʼ ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν τέτακται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, εἴρηται· νῦν δὲ δεικτέον ἡμῖν περὶ πολιτείας. φανερωτέρα γὰρ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς διωρισμένων τῶν περὶ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν μίξις ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. εἰώθασι
[Bekker 1293b line 35]
δὲ καλεῖν τὰς μὲν ἀποκλινούσας ὡς πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατίας διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν παιδείαν καὶ εὐγένειαν τοῖς εὐπορωτέροις. ἔτι δὲ δοκοῦσιν ἔχειν οἱ εὔποροι ὧν ἕνεκεν οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἀδικοῦσιν· ὅθεν καὶ καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς καὶ γνωρίμους
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τούτους προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ἀριστοκρατία βούλεται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀπονέμειν τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας εἶναί φασιν ἐκ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν μᾶλλον.

[Bekker 1294a]
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δοκεῖ δʼ εἶναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ ἀριστοκρατουμένην πόλιν ἀλλὰ πονηροκρατουμένην, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ εὐνομουμένην. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ εὐνομία τὸ εὖ κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους, μὴ πείθεσθαι δέ. διὸ μίαν μὲν εὐνομίαν
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ὑποληπτέον εἶναι τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς κειμένοις νόμοις, ἑτέραν δὲ τὸ καλῶς κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους οἷς ἐμμένουσιν (ἔστι γὰρ πείθεσθαι καὶ κακῶς κειμένοις). τοῦτο δὲ ἐνδέχεται διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν ἐνδεχομένων αὐτοῖς, ἢ τοῖς ἁπλῶς ἀρίστοις.

δοκεῖ δὲ ἀριστοκρατία μὲν εἶναι μάλιστα τὸ τὰς
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τιμὰς νενεμῆσθαι κατʼ ἀρετήν (ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ὅρος ἀρετή, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, δήμου δʼ ἐλευθερία)· τὸ δʼ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσιν, ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἐν δήμοις, ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τῷ πλείονι μέρει τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς πολιτείας, τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ κύριον.
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ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι τοῦτο τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος καλεῖται· μόνον γὰρ ἡ μίξις στοχάζεται τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθερίας· (σχεδὸν γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις οἱ εὔποροι τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν δοκοῦσι κατέχειν χώραν)· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τῆς ἰσότητος
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τῆς πολιτείας, ἐλευθερία πλοῦτος ἀρετή (τὸ γὰρ τέταρτον, ὃ καλοῦσιν εὐγένειαν, ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς δυσίν· ἡ γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστιν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή), φανερὸν ὅτι τὴν μὲν τοῖν δυοῖν μίξιν, τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πολιτείαν λεκτέον, τὴν δὲ τῶν τριῶν ἀριστοκρατίαν μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων παρὰ τὴν
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ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρώτην. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστι καὶ ἕτερα πολιτείας εἴδη παρὰ μοναρχίαν τε καὶ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν, εἴρηται, καὶ ποῖα ταῦτα, καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων αἵ τʼ ἀριστοκρατίαι καὶ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας· καὶ ὅτι οὐ πόρρω αὗται ἀλλήλων, φανερόν.

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τίνα δὲ τρόπον γίνεται παρὰ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἡ καλουμένη πολιτεία, καὶ πῶς αὐτὴν δεῖ καθιστάναι, λέγωμεν ἐφεξῆς τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ἔσται καὶ οἷς ὁρίζονται τὴν δημοκρατίαν καὶ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν· ληπτέον γὰρ τὴν τούτων διαίρεσιν, εἶτα ἐκ τούτων ἀφʼ ἑκατέρας
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ὥσπερ σύμβολον λαμβάνοντας συνθετέον. εἰσὶ δὲ ὅροι τρεῖς τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ μίξεως. ἢ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ληπτέον ἃ ἑκάτεροι νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον περὶ τοῦ δικάζειν (ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τοῖς εὐπόροις ζημίαν τάττουσιν ἂν μὴ δικάζωσι, τοῖς δʼ ἀπόροις οὐδένα μισθόν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις
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τοῖς μὲν ἀπόροις μισθόν, τοῖς δʼ εὐπόροις οὐδεμίαν ζημίαν· κοινὸν δὲ καὶ μέσον τούτων ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, διὸ καὶ
[Bekker 1294b]
[Bekker 1294b line 1]
πολιτικόν, μέμεικται γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν)·

εἷς μὲν οὖν οὗτος τοῦ συνδυασμοῦ τρόπος, ἕτερος δὲ τὸ τὸ μέσον λαμβάνειν ὧν ἑκάτεροι τάττουσιν, οἷον ἐκκλησιάζειν οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τιμήματος οὐθενὸς ἢ μικροῦ πάμπαν, οἱ δʼ ἀπὸ μακροῦ τιμήματος, κοινὸν
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δέ γε οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέσον ἑκατέρου τίμημα τούτων. τρίτον δʼ ἐκ δυοῖν ταγμάτοιν, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ νόμου τὰ δʼ ἐκ τοῦ δημοκρατικοῦ. λέγω δʼ οἷον δοκεῖ δημοκρατικὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸ κληρωτὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, τὸ δʼ αἱρετὰς ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ δημοκρατικὸν μὲν τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ
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τιμήματος, ὀλιγαρχικὸν δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τιμήματος· ἀριστοκρατικὸν τοίνυν καὶ πολιτικὸν τὸ ἐξ ἑκατέρας ἑκάτερον λαβεῖν, ἐκ μὲν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τὸ αἱρετὰς ποιεῖν τὰς ἀρχάς, ἐκ δὲ τῆς δημοκρατίας τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος.

ὁ μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς μίξεως οὗτος· τοῦ δʼ εὖ μεμεῖχθαι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν
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ὅρος, ὅταν ἐνδέχηται λέγειν τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο πάσχουσιν οἱ λέγοντες διὰ τὸ μεμεῖχθαι καλῶς· πέπονθε δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἐμφαίνεται γὰρ ἑκάτερον ἐν αὐτῷ τῶν ἄκρων· ὅπερ συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν. πολλοὶ γὰρ
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ἐγχειροῦσι λέγειν ὡς δημοκρατίας οὔσης διὰ τὸ δημοκρατικὰ πολλὰ τὴν τάξιν ἔχειν, οἷον πρῶτον τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν τῶν παίδων (ὁμοίως γὰρ οἱ τῶν πλουσίων τρέφονται τοῖς τῶν πενήτων, καὶ παιδεύονται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν ἂν δύναιντο καὶ τῶν πενήτων οἱ παῖδες), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐχομένης
[Bekker 1294b line 25]
ἡλικίας, καὶ ὅταν ἄνδρες γένωνται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον (οὐθὲν γὰρ διάδηλος ὁ πλούσιος καὶ ὁ πένης οὕτω) τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ταὐτὰ πᾶσιν ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις, καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα οἱ πλούσιοι τοιαύτην οἵαν ἄν τις παρασκευάσαι δύναιτο καὶ τῶν πενήτων ὁστισοῦν· ἔτι τὸ δύο τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχὰς τὴν
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μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι τὸν δῆμον, τῆς δὲ μετέχειν (τοὺς μὲν γὰρ γέροντας αἱροῦνται, τῆς δʼ ἐφορείας μετέχουσιν)· οἱ δʼ ὀλιχαρχίαν διὰ τὸ πολλὰ ἔχειν ὀλιγαρχικά, οἷον τὸ πάσας αἱρετὰς εἶναι καὶ μηδεμίαν κληρωτήν, καὶ ὀλίγους εἶναι κυρίους θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά. δεῖ δʼ ἐν
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τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ μεμειγμένῃ καλῶς ἀμφότερα δοκεῖν εἶναι καὶ μηδέτερον, καὶ σῴζεσθαι διʼ αὑτῆς καὶ μὴ ἔξωθεν, καὶ διʼ αὑτῆς μὴ τῷ πλείους ἔξωθεν εἶναι τοὺς βουλομένους (εἴη γὰρ ἂν καὶ πονηρᾷ πολιτείᾳ τοῦθʼ ὑπάρχον’ ἀλλὰ τῷ μηδʼ ἂν βούλεσθαι πολιτείαν ἑτέραν μηθὲν τῶν τῆς πόλεως μορίων
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ὅλως. τίνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι πολιτείαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ὀνομαζομένας ἀριστοκρατίας, νῦν εἴρηται.

[Bekker 1295a]
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περὶ δὲ τυραννίδος ἦν ἡμῖν λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ὡς ἐνούσης πολυλογίας περὶ αὐτήν, ἀλλʼ ὅπως λάβῃ τῆς μεθόδου τὸ μέρος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτην τίθεμεν τῶν πολιτειῶν τι μέρος. περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας διωρίσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις,
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ἐν οἷς περὶ τῆς μάλιστα λεγομένης βασιλείας ἐποιούμεθα τὴν σκέψιν, πότερον ἀσύμφορος ἢ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν, καὶ τίνα καὶ πόθεν δεῖ καθιστάναι, καὶ πῶς· τυραννίδος δʼ εἴδη δύο μὲν διείλομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν καὶ
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πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν, διὰ τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι ἀμφοτέρας ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς (ἔν τε γὰρ τῶν βαρβάρων τισὶν αἱροῦνται αὐτοκράτορας μονάρχους, καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἕλλησιν ἐγίγνοντό τινες μόναρχοι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὓς ἐκάλουν αἰσυμνήτας), ἔχουσι δέ τινας πρὸς ἀλλήλας αὗται
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διαφοράς, ἦσαν δὲ διὰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ νόμον βασιλικαὶ καὶ διὰ τὸ μοναρχεῖν ἑκόντων, τυραννικαὶ δὲ διὰ τὸ δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῶν γνώμην· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος τυραννίδος, ἥπερ μάλιστʼ εἶναι δοκεῖ τυραννίς, ἀντίστροφος οὖσα τῇ παμβασιλείᾳ. τοιαύτην δʼ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τυραννίδα τὴν μοναρχίαν
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ἥτις ἀνυπεύθυνος ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ βελτιόνων πάντων πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῆς συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. διόπερ ἀκούσιος· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἑκὼν ὑπομένει τῶν ἐλευθέρων τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν. τυραννίδος μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας.

### Book IV, 1295a–1299a

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τίς δʼ ἀρίστη πολιτεία καὶ τίς ἄριστος βίος ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μήτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν συγκρίνουσι τὴν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, μήτε πρὸς παιδείαν ἣ φύσεως δεῖται καὶ χορηγίας τυχηρᾶς, μήτε πρὸς πολιτείαν τὴν κατʼ εὐχὴν γινομένην, ἀλλὰ βίον τε τὸν τοῖς
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πλείστοις κοινωνῆσαι δυνατὸν καὶ πολιτείαν ἧς τὰς πλείστας πόλεις ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν; καὶ γὰρ ἃς καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατίας, περὶ ὧν νῦν εἴπομεν, τὰ μὲν ἐξωτέρω πίπτουσι ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων, τὰ δὲ γειτνιῶσι τῇ καλουμένῃ πολιτείᾳ (διὸ περὶ ἀμφοῖν ὡς μιᾶς λεκτέον). ἡ δὲ δὴ κρίσις περὶ
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ἁπάντων τούτων ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ καλῶς ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται τὸ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι τὸν κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον, μεσότητα δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, τὸν μέσον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι βίον βέλτιστον, τὸ τῆς ἑκάστοις ἐνδεχομένης τυχεῖν μεσότητος· τοὺς δὲ αὐτοὺς τούτους ὅρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
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καὶ πόλεως ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καὶ πολιτείας· ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία
[Bekker 1295b]
[Bekker 1295b line 1]
βίος τίς ἐστι πόλεως.

ἐν ἁπάσαις δὴ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔστι τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως, οἱ μὲν εὔποροι σφόδρα, οἱ δὲ ἄποροι σφόδρα, οἱ δὲ τρίτοι οἱ μέσοι τούτων. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὁμολογεῖται τὸ μέτριον ἄριστον καὶ τὸ μέσον, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τῶν
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εὐτυχημάτων ἡ κτῆσις ἡ μέση βελτίστη πάντων. ῥᾴστη γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχεῖν, ὑπέρκαλον δὲ ἢ ὑπερίσχυρον ἢ ὑπερευγενῆ ἢ ὑπερπλούσιον ὄντα, ἢ τἀναντία τούτοις, ὑπέρπτωχον ἢ ὑπερασθενῆ ἢ σφόδρα ἄτιμον, χαλεπὸν τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθεῖν· γίγνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὑβρισταὶ καὶ μεγαλοπόνηροι
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μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοῦργοι καὶ μικροπόνηροι λίαν, τῶν δʼ ἀδικημάτων τὰ μὲν γίγνεται διʼ ὕβριν τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν. ἔτι δὲ ἥκισθʼ οὗτοι φυγαρχοῦσι καὶ σπουδαρχοῦσιν, ταῦτα δʼ ἀμφότερα βλαβερὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ μὲν ἐν ὑπεροχαῖς εὐτυχημάτων ὄντες, ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ φίλων
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καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, ἄρχεσθαι οὔτε βούλονται οὔτε ἐπίστανται (καὶ τοῦτʼ εὐθὺς οἴκοθεν ὑπάρχει παισὶν οὖσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὴν τρυφὴν οὐδʼ ἐν τοῖς διδασκαλείοις ἄρχεσθαι σύνηθες αὐτοῖς), οἱ δὲ καθʼ ὑπερβολὴν ἐν ἐνδείᾳ τούτων ταπεινοὶ λίαν. ὥσθʼ οἱ μὲν ἄρχειν οὐκ ἐπίστανται, ἀλλʼ ἄρχεσθαι
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δουλικὴν ἀρχήν, οἱ δʼ ἄρχεσθαι μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἀρχήν, ἄρχειν δὲ δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν. γίνεται οὖν δούλων καὶ δεσποτῶν πόλις, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐλευθέρων, καὶ τῶν μὲν φθονούντων τῶν δὲ καταφρονούντων· ἃ πλεῖστον ἀπέχει φιλίας καὶ κοινωνίας πολιτικῆς· ἡ γὰρ κοινωνία φιλικόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁδοῦ βούλονται
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κοινωνεῖν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. βούλεται δέ γε ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων ὅτι μάλιστα, τοῦτο δʼ ὑπάρχει μάλιστα τοῖς μέσοις. ὥστʼ ἀναγκαῖον ἄριστα πολιτεύεσθαι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν φαμὲν φύσει τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. καὶ σῴζονται δʼ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὗτοι μάλιστα τῶν πολιτῶν. οὔτε
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γὰρ αὐτοὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ὥσπερ οἱ πένητες, ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οὔτε τῆς τούτων ἕτεροι, καθάπερ τῆς τῶν πλουσίων οἱ πένητες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· καὶ διὰ τὸ μήτʼ ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι μήτʼ ἐπιβουλεύειν ἀκινδύνως διάγουσιν. διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ηὔξατο Φωκυλίδης
πολλὰ μέσοισιν ἄριστα· μέσος θέλω ἐν πόλει εἶναι.

δῆλον
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ἄρα ὅτι καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρίστη ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων, καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐνδέχεται εὖ πολιτεύεσθαι πόλεις ἐν αἷς δὴ πολὺ τὸ μέσον καὶ κρεῖττον, μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφοῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, θατέρου μέρους· προστιθέμενον γὰρ ποιεῖ ῥοπὴν καὶ κωλύει γίνεσθαι τὰς ἐναντίας ὑπερβολάς. διόπερ εὐτυχία
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μεγίστη τοὺς πολιτευομένους οὐσίαν ἔχειν μέσην καὶ ἱκανήν,

[Bekker 1296a]
[Bekker 1296a line 1]
ὡς ὅπου οἱ μὲν πολλὰ σφόδρα κέκτηνται οἱ δὲ μηθέν, ἢ δῆμος ἔσχατος γίγνεται ἢ ὀλιγαρχία ἄκρατος, ἢ τυραννὶς διʼ ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπερβολάς· καὶ γὰρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας τῆς νεανικωτάτης καὶ ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας γίγνεται τυραννίς, ἐκ δὲ
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τῶν μέσων καὶ τῶν σύνεγγυς πολὺ ἧττον. τὴν δʼ αἰτίαν ὕστερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐροῦμεν. ὅτι δʼ ἡ μέση βελτίστη, φανερόν· μόνη γὰρ ἀστασίαστος· ὅπου γὰρ πολὺ τὸ διὰ μέσου, ἥκιστα στάσεις καὶ διαστάσεις γίγνονται τῶν πολιτῶν. καὶ αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἀστασιαστότεραι
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διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι πολὺ τὸ μέσον· ἐν δὲ ταῖς μικραῖς ῥᾴδιόν τε διαλαβεῖν εἰς δύο πάντας, ὥστε μηθὲν καταλιπεῖν μέσον, καὶ πάντες σχεδὸν ἄποροι ἢ εὔποροί εἰσι. καὶ αἱ δημοκρατίαι δὲ ἀσφαλέστεραι τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν εἰσι καὶ πολυχρονιώτεραι διὰ τοὺς μέσους (πλείους τε γάρ
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εἰσι καὶ μᾶλλον μετέχουσι τῶν τιμῶν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἢ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις), ἐπεὶ ὅταν ἄνευ τούτων τῷ πλήθει ὑπερτείνωσιν οἱ ἄποροι, κακοπραγία γίνεται καὶ ἀπόλλυνται ταχέως. σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τὸ τοὺς βελτίστους νομοθέτας εἶναι τῶν μέσων πολιτῶν· Σόλων τε γὰρ ἦν τούτων
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(δηλοῖ δʼ ἐκ τῆς ποιήσεως) καὶ Λυκοῦργος (οὐ γὰρ ἦν βασιλεύς) καὶ Χαρώνδας καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἄλλων.

φανερὸν δʼ ἐκ τούτων καὶ διότι αἱ πλεῖσται πολιτεῖαι αἱ μὲν δημοκρατικαί εἰσιν αἱ δʼ ὀλιγαρχικαί. διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ταύταις πολλάκις ὀλίγον εἶναι τὸ μέσον, αἰεὶ ὁπότεροι ἂν ὑπερέχωσιν,
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εἴθʼ οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες εἴθʼ ὁ δῆμος, οἱ τὸ μέσον ἐκβαίνοντες καθʼ αὑτοὺς ἄγουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, ὥστε ἢ δῆμος γίγνεται ἢ ὀλιγαρχία. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις διὰ τὸ στάσεις γίγνεσθαι καὶ μάχας πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις, ὁποτέροις ἂν μᾶλλον συμβῇ κρατῆσαι τῶν ἐναντίων, οὐ καθιστᾶσι
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κοινὴν πολιτείαν οὐδʼ ἴσην, ἀλλὰ τῆς νίκης ἆθλον τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῆς πολιτείας λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν δημοκρατίαν οἱ δʼ ὀλιγαρχίαν ποιοῦσιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρὸς τὴν παρʼ αὑτοῖς ἑκάτεροι πολιτείαν ἀποβλέποντες οἱ μὲν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
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καθίστασαν οἱ δʼ ὀλιγαρχίας, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πόλεων συμφέρον σκοποῦντες ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν, ὥστε διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἢ μηδέποτε τὴν μέσην γίνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἢ ὀλιγάκις καὶ παρʼ ὀλίγοις· εἷς γὰρ ἀνὴρ συνεπείσθη μόνος τῶν πρότερον ἐφʼ ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων ταύτην
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ἀποδοῦναι τὴν τάξιν, ἤδη δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔθος
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καθέστηκε μηδὲ βούλεσθαι τὸ ἴσον,

ἀλλʼ ἢ ἄρχειν ζητεῖν ἢ κρατουμένους ὑπομένειν. τίς μὲν οὖν ἀρίστη πολιτεία, καὶ διὰ τίνʼ αἰτίαν, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν· τῶν δʼ ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, ἐπειδὴ πλείους δημοκρατίας καὶ πλείους ὀλιγαρχίας φαμὲν
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εἶναι, ποίαν πρώτην θετέον καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐχομένην τῷ τὴν μὲν εἶναι βελτίω τὴν δὲ χείρω, διωρισμένης τῆς ἀρίστης οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. ἀεὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι βελτίω τὴν ἐγγύτατα ταύτης, χείρω δὲ τὴν ἀφεστηκυῖαν τοῦ μέσου πλεῖον, ἂν μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν κρίνῃ τις. λέγω
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δὲ τὸ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν, ὅτι πολλάκις, οὔσης ἄλλης πολιτείας αἱρετωτέρας, ἐνίοις οὐδὲν κωλύει συμφέρειν ἑτέραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν.

τίς δὲ πολιτεία τίσι καὶ ποία συμφέρει ποίοις, ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων διελθεῖν. ληπτέον δὴ πρῶτον περὶ
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πασῶν καθόλου ταὐτόν· δεῖ γὰρ κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ βουλόμενον μέρος τῆς πόλεως τοῦ μὴ βουλομένου μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν. ἔστι δὲ πᾶσα πόλις ἔκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ. λέγω δὲ ποιὸν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν πλοῦτον παιδείαν εὐγένειαν, ποσὸν δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχήν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιὸν
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ὑπάρχειν ἑτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε μερῶν ἡ πόλις, ἄλλῳ δὲ μέρει τὸ ποσόν, οἷον πλείους τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν γενναίων τοὺς ἀγεννεῖς ἢ τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς ἀπόρους, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχειν τῷ ποσῷ ὅσον λείπεται τῷ ποιῷ. διὸ ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα συγκριτέον. ὅπου
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μὲν οὖν ὑπερέχει τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος τὴν εἰρημένην ἀναλογίαν, ἐνταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν, καὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος δημοκρατίας κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ δήμου ἑκάστου, οἷον ἐὰν μὲν τὸ τῶν γεωργῶν ὑπερτείνῃ πλῆθος, τὴν πρώτην δημοκρατίαν, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ τῶν βαναύσων καὶ μισθαρνούντων,
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τὴν τελευταίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς μεταξὺ τούτων· ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ γνωρίμων μᾶλλον ὑπερτείνει τῷ ποιῷ ἢ λείπεται τῷ ποσῷ, ἐνταῦθα ὀλιγαρχίαν, καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἕκαστον εἶδος κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλήθους.

δεῖ δʼ
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ἀεὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ προσλαμβάνειν τοὺς μέσους· ἄν τε γὰρ ὀλιγαρχικοὺς τοὺς νόμους τιθῇ, στοχάζεσθαι χρὴ τῶν μέσων, ἐάν τε δημοκρατικούς, προσάγεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις τούτους. ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν μέσων ὑπερτείνει πλῆθος ἢ συναμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων ἢ καὶ θατέρου μόνον, ἐνταῦθʼ ἐνδέχεται
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πολιτείαν εἶναι μόνιμον.

οὐθὲν γὰρ φοβερὸν μή
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ποτε συμφωνήσωσιν οἱ πλούσιοι τοῖς πένησιν ἐπὶ τούτους· οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἅτεροι βουλήσονται δουλεύειν τοῖς ἑτέροις, κοινοτέραν δʼ, ἂν ζητῶσιν, οὐδεμίαν εὑρήσουσιν ἄλλην ταύτης. ἐν μέρει γὰρ ἄρχειν οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείνειαν διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν
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τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους· πανταχοῦ δὲ πιστότατος ὁ διαιτητής, διαιτητὴς δʼ ὁ μέσος. ὅσῳ δʼ ἂν ἄμεινον ἡ πολιτεία μειχθῇ, τοσούτῳ μονιμωτέρα. διαμαρτάνουσι δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς βουλομένων ποιεῖν πολιτείας, οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ πλεῖον νέμειν τοῖς εὐπόροις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ
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παρακρούεσθαι τὸν δῆμον. ἀνάγκη γὰρ χρόνῳ ποτὲ ἐκ τῶν ψευδῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀληθὲς συμβῆναι κακόν· αἱ γὰρ πλεονεξίαι τῶν πλουσίων ἀπολλύασι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν ἢ αἱ τοῦ δήμου.

ἔστι δʼ ὅσα προφάσεως χάριν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις σοφίζονται
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πρὸς τὸν δῆμον πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν, περὶ ἐκκλησίαν, περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, περὶ δικαστήρια, περὶ ὅπλισιν, περὶ γυμνασίαν· περὶ ἐκκλησίαν μὲν τὸ ἐξεῖναι ἐκκλησιάζειν πᾶσι, ζημίαν δὲ ἐπικεῖσθαι τοῖς εὐπόροις ἐὰν μὴ ἐκκλησιάζωσιν, ἢ μόνοις ἢ μείζω πολλῷ, περὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς
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τὸ τοῖς μὲν ἔχουσι τίμημα μὴ ἐξεῖναι ἐξόμνυσθαι, τοῖς δʼ ἀπόροις ἐξεῖναι, καὶ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια τοῖς μὲν εὐπόροις εἶναι ζημίαν ἂν μὴ δικάζωσι, τοῖς δʼ ἀπόροις ἄδειαν, ἢ τοῖς μὲν μεγάλην τοῖς δὲ μικράν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Χαρώνδου νόμοις. ἐνιαχοῦ δʼ ἔξεστι μὲν πᾶσιν ἀπογραψαμένοις
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ἐκκλησιάζειν καὶ δικάζειν, ἐὰν δὲ ἀπογραψάμενοι μήτʼ ἐκκλησιάζωσι μήτε δικάζωσιν, ἐπίκεινται μεγάλαι ζημίαι τούτοις, ἵνα διὰ μὲν τὴν ζημίαν φεύγωσι τὸ ἀπογράφεσθαι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀπογράφεσθαι μὴ δικάζωσι μηδʼ ἐκκλησιάζωσιν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὅπλα κεκτῆσθαι
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καὶ τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι νομοθετοῦσιν. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀπόροις ἔξεστι μὴ κεκτῆσθαι, τοῖς δʼ εὐπόροις ἐπιζήμιον μὴ κεκτημένοις, κἂν μὴ γυμνάζωνται, τοῖς μὲν οὐδεμία ζημία, τοῖς δʼ εὐπόροις ἐπιζήμιον, ὅπως οἱ μὲν διὰ τὴν ζημίαν μετέχωσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι μὴ μετέχωσιν. ταῦτα
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μὲν οὖν ὀλιγαρχικὰ σοφίσματα τῆς νομοθεσίας· ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις πρὸς ταῦτʼ ἀντισοφίζονται. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀπόροις μισθὸν πορίζουσιν ἐκκλησιάζουσι καὶ δικάζουσιν, τοῖς δʼ εὐπόροις οὐδεμίαν τάττουσι ζημίαν. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι εἴ τις βούλεται μιγνύναι δικαίως, δεῖ τὰ παρʼ ἑκατέροις συνάγειν
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καὶ τοῖς μὲν μισθὸν πορίζειν τοῖς δὲ ζημίαν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν κοινωνοῖεν ἅπαντες, ἐκείνως δʼ ἡ πολιτεία γίγνεται
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τῶν ἑτέρων μόνον.

δεῖ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι μὲν ἐκ τῶν τὰ ὅπλα ἐχόντων μόνον· τοῦ δὲ τιμήματος τὸ πλῆθος ἁπλῶς μὲν ὁρισαμένους οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν τοσοῦτον δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ σκεψαμένους τὸ ποῖον ἐπιβάλλει μακρότατον ὥστε
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τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι πλείους τῶν μὴ μετεχόντων, τοῦτο τάττειν. ἐθέλουσι γὰρ οἱ πένητες καὶ μὴ μετέχοντες τῶν τιμῶν ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν, ἐὰν μήτε ὑβρίζῃ τις αὐτοὺς μήτε ἀφαιρῆται μηθὲν τῆς οὐσίας. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐ ῥᾴδιον· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ συμβαίνει χαρίεντας εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας
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τοῦ πολιτεύματος. καὶ εἰώθασι δέ, ὅταν πόλεμος ᾖ, ὀκνεῖν, ἂν μὴ λαμβάνωσι τροφήν, ἄποροι δὲ ὦσιν· ἐὰν δὲ πορίζῃ τις τροφήν, βούλονται πολεμεῖν.

ἔστι δὲ ἡ πολιτεία παρʼ ἐνίοις οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῶν ὁπλιτευόντων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡπλιτευκότων· ἐν Μαλιεῦσι δὲ ἡ μὲν πολιτεία
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ἦν ἐκ τούτων, τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς ᾑροῦντο ἐκ τῶν στρατευομένων. καὶ ἡ πρώτη δὲ πολιτεία ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο μετὰ τὰς βασιλείας ἐκ τῶν πολεμούντων, ἡ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ τῶν ἱππέων (τὴν γὰρ ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ὁ πόλεμος εἶχεν· ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ συντάξεως ἄχρηστον
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τὸ ὁπλιτικόν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐμπειρίαι καὶ τάξεις ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις οὐχ ὑπῆρχον, ὥστʼ ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν εἶναι τὴν ἰσχύν), αὐξανομένων δὲ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἰσχυσάντων μᾶλλον πλείους μετεῖχον τῆς πολιτείας· διόπερ ἃς νῦν καλοῦμεν πολιτείας, οἱ πρότερον ἐκάλουν
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δημοκρατίας· ἦσαν δὲ αἱ ἀρχαῖαι πολιτεῖαι εὐλόγως ὀλιγαρχικαὶ καὶ βασιλικαί. διʼ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν γὰρ οὐκ εἶχον πολὺ τὸ μέσον, ὥστʼ ὀλίγοι τε ὄντες τὸ πλῆθος καὶ κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν φαῦλοι ὑπέμενον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι. διὰ τίνα μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἰτίαν αἱ πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τί
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παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας ἕτεραι (δημοκρατία τε γὰρ οὐ μία τὸν ἀριθμόν ἐστι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως), ἔτι δὲ τίνες αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν συμβαίνει, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τίς ἀρίστη τῶν πολιτειῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον εἰπεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποία ποίοις ἁρμόττει τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴρηται.

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πάλιν δὲ καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς περὶ ἑκάστης λέγωμεν περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς, λαβόντες ἀρχὴν τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ τρία μόρια τῶν πολιτειῶν πασῶν, περὶ ὧν δεῖ θεωρεῖν τὸν σπουδαῖον νομοθέτην ἑκάστῃ τὸ συμφέρον· ὧν ἐχόντων καλῶς ἀνάγκη τὴν πολιτείαν ἔχειν καλῶς, καὶ τὰς
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πολιτείας ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν ἐν τῷ διαφέρειν ἕκαστον τούτων. ἔστι δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων ἓν μὲν τί τὸ βουλευόμενον
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περὶ τῶν κοινῶν,

δεύτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τίνας δεῖ καὶ τίνων εἶναι κυρίας, καὶ ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν, τρίτον δέ τί τὸ δικάζον. κύριον δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης, καὶ συμμαχίας
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καὶ διαλύσεως, καὶ περὶ νόμων, καὶ περὶ θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς καὶ δημεύσεως, καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν αἱρέσεως καὶ τῶν εὐθυνῶν. ἀναγκαῖον δʼ ἤτοι πᾶσι τοῖς πολίταις ἀποδίδοσθαι πάσας ταύτας τὰς κρίσεις ἢ τισὶ πάσας (οἷον ἀρχῇ τινὶ μιᾷ ἢ πλείοσιν, ἢ ἑτέραις ἑτέρας) ἢ τινὰς μὲν αὐτῶν πᾶσι τινὰς δὲ τισίν.

τὸ
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μὲν οὖν πάντας καὶ περὶ ἁπάντων δημοτικόν· τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ ἰσότητα ζητεῖ ὁ δῆμος. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ τρόποι τοῦ πάντας πλείους, εἷς μὲν τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντας ἀθρόους (ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Τηλεκλέους ἐστὶ τοῦ Μιλησίου· καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις δὲ πολιτείαις βουλεύονται αἱ συναρχίαι συνιοῦσαι,
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εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζουσι πάντες κατὰ μέρος ἐκ τῶν φυλῶν καὶ τῶν μορίων τῶν ἐλαχίστων παντελῶς, ἕως ἂν διεξέλθῃ διὰ πάντων), συνιέναι δὲ μόνον περί τε νόμων θέσεως καὶ τῶν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ἀκουσομένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων· ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος τὸ
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πάντας ἀθρόους, συνιέναι δὲ μόνον πρός τε τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας αἱρησομένους καὶ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας καὶ περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ πρὸς εὐθύνας, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα τὰς ἀρχὰς βουλεύεσθαι τὰς ἐφʼ ἑκάστοις τεταγμένας, αἱρετὰς οὔσας ἐξ ἁπάντων ἢ κληρωτάς· ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος τὸ περὶ
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τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας ἀπαντᾶν τοὺς πολίτας, καὶ περὶ πολέμου βουλευσομένους καὶ συμμαχίας, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα τὰς ἀρχὰς διοικεῖν αἱρετὰς οὔσας, ὅσας ἐνδέχεται, τοιαῦται δʼ εἰσὶν ὅσας ἄρχειν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς ἐπισταμένους· τέταρτος δὲ τρόπος τὸ πάντας περὶ πάντων βουλεύεσθαι συνιόντας,
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τὰς δʼ ἀρχὰς περὶ μηθενὸς κρίνειν ἀλλὰ μόνον προανακρίνειν, ὅνπερ ἡ τελευταία δημοκρατία νῦν διοικεῖται τρόπον, ἣν ἀνάλογόν φαμεν εἶναι ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τε δυναστευτικῇ καὶ μοναρχίᾳ τυραννικῇ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οἱ τρόποι δημοκρατικοὶ πάντες, τὸ δὲ τινὰς περὶ πάντων ὀλιγαρχικόν.
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ἔχει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διαφορὰς πλείους. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μετριωτέρων αἱρετοί τε ὦσι καὶ πλείους διὰ τὴν μετριότητα τοῦ τιμήματος, καὶ περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κινῶσιν ἀλλʼ ἀκολουθῶσι, καὶ ἐξῇ κτωμένῳ τὸ τίμημα μετέχειν, ὀλιγαρχία μὲν πολιτικὴ δέ ἐστιν ἡ
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τοιαύτη διὰ τὸ μετριάζειν· ὅταν δὲ μὴ πάντες τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι
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μετέχωσιν ἀλλʼ πρόκριτοι,

κατὰ νόμον δʼ ἄρχωσιν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, ὀλιγαρχικόν· ὅταν δὲ καὶ αἱρῶνται αὐτοὶ αὑτοὺς οἱ κύριοι τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, καὶ ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσίῃ καὶ κύριοι τῶν νόμων ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχικὴν ἀναγκαῖον
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εἶναι τὴν τάξιν ταύτην. ὅταν δὲ τινῶν τινές, οἷον πολέμου μὲν καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ εὐθυνῶν πάντες, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὗτοι αἱρετοί, μὴ κληρωτοί, ἀριστοκρατία ἡ πολιτεία. ἐὰν δʼ ἐνίων μὲν αἱρετοὶ ἐνίων δὲ κληρωτοί, καὶ κληρωτοὶ ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐκ προκρίτων, ἢ κοινῇ αἱρετοὶ
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καὶ κληρωτοί, τὰ μὲν πολιτείας ἀριστοκρατικῆς ἐστι τούτων, τὰ δὲ πολιτείας αὐτῆς.

διῄρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, καὶ διοικεῖ ἑκάστη πολιτεία κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν· συμφέρει δὲ δημοκρατίᾳ τῇ μάλιστʼ εἶναι δοκούσῃ δημοκρατίᾳ νῦν (λέγω
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δὲ τοιαύτην ἐν ᾗ κύριος ὁ δῆμος καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐστίν) πρὸς τὸ βουλεύεσθαι βέλτιον τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις (τάττουσι γὰρ ζημίαν τούτοις οὓς βούλονται δικάζειν, ἵνα δικάζωσιν, οἱ δὲ δημοτικοὶ μισθὸν τοῖς ἀπόροις), τοῦτο δὴ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας ποιεῖν
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(βουλεύσονται γὰρ βέλτιον κοινῇ βουλευόμενοι πάντες, ὁ μὲν δῆμος μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων, οὗτοι δὲ μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους), συμφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ αἱρετοὺς εἶναι τοὺς βουλευομένους, ἢ κληρωτοὺς ἴσους ἐκ τῶν μορίων, συμφέρει δέ, κἂν ὑπερβάλλωσι πολὺ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ δημοτικοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἢ μὴ πᾶσι
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διδόναι μισθόν, ἀλλʼ ὅσοι σύμμετροι πρὸς τὸ τῶν γνωρίμων πλῆθος, ἢ ἀποκληροῦν τοὺς πλείους· ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ἢ προσαιρεῖσθαί τινας ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους, ἢ κατασκευάσαντας ἀρχεῖον οἷον ἐν ἐνίαις πολιτείαις ἐστὶν οὓς καλοῦσι προβούλους καὶ νομοφύλακας, περὶ τούτων χρηματίζειν
[Bekker 1298b line 30]
περὶ ὧν ἂν οὗτοι προβουλεύσωσιν (οὕτω γὰρ μεθέξει ὁ δῆμος τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, καὶ λύειν οὐθὲν δυνήσεται τῶν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν), ἔτι ἢ ταὐτὰ ψηφίζεσθαι τὸν δῆμον ἢ μηθὲν ἐναντίον τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις, ἢ τῆς συμβουλῆς μὲν μεταδιδόναι πᾶσι, βουλεύεσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας. καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον
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δὲ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις γιγνομένου δεῖ ποιεῖν. ἀποψηφιζόμενον μὲν γὰρ κύριον δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος, καταψηφιζόμενον δὲ μὴ κύριον, ἀλλʼ ἐπαναγέσθω πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνεστραμμένως ποιοῦσιν· οἱ γὰρ ὀλίγοι ἀποψηφισάμενοι μὲν κύριοι, καταψηφισάμενοι
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δὲ οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλʼ ἐπανάγεται εἰς τοὺς πλείους
[Bekker 1299a]
[Bekker 1299a line 1]
αἰεί.

### Book IV, 1299a–1301a

περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ βουλευομένου καὶ τοῦ κυρίου δεῖ τῆς πολιτείας τοῦτον διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον.

ἐχομένη δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς διαίρεσις. ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς πολιτείας πολλὰς διαφοράς,
[Bekker 1299a line 5]
πόσαι τε ἀρχαί, καὶ κύριαι τίνων, καὶ περὶ χρόνου, πόσος ἑκάστης ἀρχῆς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἑξαμήνους, οἱ δὲ διʼ ἐλάττονος, οἱ δʼ ἐνιαυσίας, οἱ δὲ πολυχρονιωτέρας ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχάς), καὶ πότερον εἶναι δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀιδίους ἢ πολυχρονίους ἢ μηδέτερον ἀλλὰ πλεονάκις τοὺς αὐτούς, ἢ
[Bekker 1299a line 10]
μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν δὶς ἀλλʼ ἅπαξ μόνον, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὴν κατάστασιν τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐκ τίνων δεῖ γίνεσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ τίνων καὶ πῶς. περὶ πάντων γὰρ τούτων δεῖ δύνασθαι διελεῖν κατὰ πόσους ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι τρόπους, κἄπειτα προσαρμόσαι ποίαις ποῖοι πολιτείαις συμφέρουσιν. ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο
[Bekker 1299a line 15]
διορίσαι ῥᾴδιον, ποίας δεῖ καλεῖν ἀρχάς· πολλῶν γὰρ ἐπιστατῶν ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία δεῖται, διόπερ οὐ πάντας οὔτε τοὺς αἱρετοὺς οὔτε τοὺς κληρωτοὺς ἄρχοντας θετέον, οἷον τοὺς ἱερεῖς πρῶτον (τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς θετέον)· ἔτι δὲ καὶ χορηγοὶ καὶ κήρυκες δʼ αἱροῦνται καὶ πρεσβευταί.
[Bekker 1299a line 20]
εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν πολιτικαὶ τῶν ἐπιμελειῶν, ἢ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν πρός τινα πρᾶξιν, οἷον στρατηγὸς στρατευομένων, ἢ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ὁ γυναικονόμος ἢ παιδονόμος· αἱ δʼ οἰκονομικαί (πολλάκις γὰρ αἱροῦνται σιτομέτρας)· αἱ δʼ ὑπηρετικαὶ καὶ πρὸς ἅς, ἂν εὐπορῶσι, τάττουσι δούλους.
[Bekker 1299a line 25]
μάλιστα δʼ ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀρχὰς λεκτέον ταύτας ὅσαις ἀποδέδοται βουλεύσασθαί τε περὶ τινῶν καὶ κρῖναι καὶ ἐπιτάξαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιτάττειν ἀρχικώτερόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διαφέρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν (οὐ γάρ πω κρίσις γέγονεν ἀμφισβητούντων περὶ
[Bekker 1299a line 30]
τοῦ ὀνόματος), ἔχει δέ τινʼ ἄλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν.

ποῖαι δʼ ἀρχαὶ καὶ πόσαι ἀναγκαῖαι εἰ ἔσται πόλις, καὶ ποῖαι ἀναγκαῖαι μὲν οὔ, χρήσιμοι δὲ πρὸς σπουδαίαν πολιτείαν, μᾶλλον ἄν τις ἀπορήσειε πρὸς ἅπασάν τε δὴ πολιτείαν καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς μικρὰς πόλεις. ἐν μὲν γὰρ δὴ
[Bekker 1299a line 35]
ταῖς μεγάλαις ἐνδέχεταί τε καὶ δεῖ μίαν τετάχθαι πρὸς ἓν ἔργον (πολλούς τε γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἀρχεῖα ἐνδέχεται βαδίζειν διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας, ὥστε τὰς μὲν διαλείπειν πολὺν χρόνον τὰς δʼ ἅπαξ ἄρχειν, καὶ βέλτιον ἕκαστον ἔργον τυγχάνει τῆς ἐπιμελείας μονοπραγματούσης
[Bekker 1299b]
[Bekker 1299b line 1]
ἢ πολυπραγματούσης)·

ἐν δὲ ταῖς μικραῖς ἀνάγκη συνάγειν εἰς ὀλίγους πολλὰς ἀρχάς (διὰ γὰρ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι πολλοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς εἶναι· τίνες γὰρ οἱ τούτοις ἔσονται διαδεξόμενοι πάλιν;). δέονται δʼ ἐνίοτε τῶν
[Bekker 1299b line 5]
αὐτῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ νόμων αἱ μικραὶ ταῖς μεγάλαις· πλὴν αἱ μὲν δέονται πολλάκις τῶν αὐτῶν, ταῖς δʼ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ τοῦτο συμβαίνει, διόπερ οὐθὲν κωλύει πολλὰς ἐπιμελείας ἅμα προστάττειν (οὐ γὰρ ἐμποδιοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις), καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν ἀναγκαῖον τὰ ἀρχεῖα οἷον
[Bekker 1299b line 10]
ὀβελισκολύχνια ποιεῖν. ἐὰν οὖν ἔχωμεν λέγειν πόσας ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν πάσῃ πόλει, καὶ πόσας οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν δεῖ δʼ ὑπάρχειν, ῥᾷον ἄν τις εἰδὼς ταῦτα συνίδοι ποίας ἁρμόττει συνάγειν ἀρχὰς εἰς μίαν ἀρχήν. ἁρμόττει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο μὴ λεληθέναι, ποίων δεῖ κατὰ τόπον
[Bekker 1299b line 15]
ἀρχεῖα πολλὰ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ποίων πανταχοῦ μίαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι κυρίαν, οἷον εὐκοσμίας πότερον ἐν ἀγορᾷ μὲν ἀγορανόμον, ἄλλον δὲ κατʼ ἄλλον τόπον, ἢ πανταχοῦ τὸν αὐτόν· καὶ πότερον κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα δεῖ διαιρεῖν ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, λέγω δʼ οἷον ἕνα τῆς εὐκοσμίας, ἢ παίδων
[Bekker 1299b line 20]
ἄλλον καὶ γυναικῶν· καὶ κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας δέ, πότερον διαφέρει καθʼ ἑκάστην καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν γένος ἢ οὐθέν, οἷον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ καὶ μοναρχίᾳ πότερον αἱ αὐταὶ μέν εἰσιν ἀρχαὶ κύριαι, οὐκ ἐξ ἴσων δʼ οὐδʼ ἐξ ὁμοίων, ἀλλʼ ἑτέρων ἐν ἑτέραις, οἷον ἐν μὲν
[Bekker 1299b line 25]
ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ἐκ τῶν πλουσίων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἢ τυγχάνουσι μέν τινες οὖσαι καὶ κατʼ αὐτὰς τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔστι δʼ ὅπου συμφέρουσιν αἱ αὐταὶ καὶ ὅπου διαφέρουσαι (ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ ἁρμόττει μεγάλας
[Bekker 1299b line 30]
ἔνθα δʼ εἶναι μικρὰς τὰς αὐτάς).

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἴδιαί τινες εἰσίν, οἷον ἡ τῶν προβούλων· αὕτη γὰρ οὐ δημοκρατική. βουλὴ δὲ δημοτικόν· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναί τι τοιοῦτον ᾧ ἐπιμελὲς ἔσται τοῦ δήμου προβουλεύειν, ὅπως ἀσχολῶν ἔσται, τοῦτο δʼ, ἐὰν ὀλίγοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχικόν· τοὺς
[Bekker 1299b line 35]
δὲ προβούλους ὀλίγους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος, ὥστʼ ὀλιγαρχικόν. ἀλλʼ ὅπου ἄμφω αὗται αἱ ἀρχαί, οἱ πρόβουλοι καθεστᾶσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς βουλευταῖς· ὁ μὲν γὰρ βουλευτὴς δημοτικόν, ὁ δὲ πρόβουλος ὀλιγαρχικόν. καταλύεται δὲ καὶ τῆς βουλῆς ἡ δύναμις ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δημοκρατίαις ἐν
[Bekker 1300a]
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αἷς αὐτὸς συνιὼν ὁ δῆμος χρηματίζει περὶ πάντων.

τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνειν εἴωθεν ὅταν εὐπορία τις ᾖ μισθοῦ τοῖς ἐκκλησιάζουσιν· σχολάζοντες γὰρ συλλέγονταί τε πολλάκις καὶ ἅπαντα αὐτοὶ κρίνουσιν. παιδονόμος δὲ καὶ γυναικονόμος,
[Bekker 1300a line 5]
καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος ἄρχων κύριός ἐστι τοιαύτης ἐπιμελείας, ἀριστοκρατικόν, δημοκρατικὸν δʼ οὔ (πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε κωλύειν ἐξιέναι τὰς τῶν ἀπόρων;), οὐδʼ ὀλιγαρχικόν (τρυφῶσι γὰρ αἱ τῶν ὀλιγαρχούντων).

ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω νῦν, περὶ δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν καταστάσεις
[Bekker 1300a line 10]
πειρατέον ἐξ ἀρχῆς διελθεῖν. εἰσὶ δʼ αἱ διαφοραὶ ἐν τρισὶν ὅροις, ὧν συντιθεμένων ἀναγκαῖον πάντας εἰλῆφθαι τοὺς τρόπους. ἔστι δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων ἓν μὲν τίνες οἱ καθιστάντες τὰς ἀρχάς, δεύτερον δὲ ἐκ τίνων, λοιπὸν δὲ τίνα τρόπον. ἑκάστου δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων διαφοραὶ τρεῖς
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εἰσιν. ἢ γὰρ πάντες οἱ πολῖται καθιστᾶσιν ἢ τινές, καὶ ἢ ἐκ πάντων ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων (οἷον ἢ τιμήματι ἢ γένει ἢ ἀρετῇ ἤ τινι τοιούτῳ ἄλλῳ, ὥσπερ ἐν Μεγάροις ἐκ τῶν συγκατελθόντων καὶ συμμαχεσαμένων πρὸς τὸν δῆμον)· καὶ ταῦτα ἢ αἱρέσει ἢ κλήρῳ (πάλιν ταῦτα συνδυαζόμενα,
[Bekker 1300a line 20]
λέγω δὲ τὰς μὲν τινὲς τὰς δὲ πάντες, καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δʼ ἐκ τινῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ).

τούτων δʼ ἑκάστης ἔσονται τῆς διαφορᾶς τρόποι τέσσαρες. ἢ γὰρ πάντες ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει, ἢ πάντες ἐκ πάντων κλήρῳ—καί ἢ ἐξ ἁπάντων, ἢ ὡς ἀνὰ μέρος,
[Bekker 1300a line 25]
οἷον κατὰ φυλὰς καὶ δήμους καὶ φατρίας, ἕως ἂν διέλθῃ διὰ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, ἢ ἀεὶ ἐξ ἁπάντων, —ἢ καὶ τὰ μὲν οὕτως τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως· πάλιν εἰ τινὲς οἱ καθιστάντες, ἢ ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει ἢ ἐκ πάντων κλήρῳ, ἢ ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει ἢ ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, ἢ τὰ μὲν οὕτως τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως, λέγω
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δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει τὰ δὲ κληρῷ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει τὰ δὲ κληρῷ· ὥστε δώδεκα οἱ τρόποι γίνονται χωρὶς τῶν δύο συνδυασμῶν. τούτων δʼ αἱ μὲν τρεῖς καταστάσεις δημοτικαί, τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει ἢ κλήρῳ γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δʼ αἱρέσει τῶν ἀρχῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ πάντας ἅμα μὲν καθιστάναι,
[Bekker 1300a line 35]
ἐξ ἁπάντων δʼ ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ αἱρέσει ἢ ἀμφοῖν, ἢ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δʼ ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν (τὸ δὲ ἀμφοῖν λέγω τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δʼ αἱρέσει) πολιτικόν, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων ἢ αἱρέσει καθιστάναι ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ ἀμφοῖν (τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δʼ αἱρέσει)
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ὀλιγαρχικόν· ὀλιγαρχικώτερον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. τὸ δὲ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δʼ ἐκ τινῶν πολιτικὸν ἀριστοκρατικῶς,

[Bekker 1300b]
[Bekker 1300b line 1]
ἢ τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει τὰς δὲ κληρῷ, τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ (μὴ γινομένου δʼ, ὁμοίως), καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν. τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐξ ἁπάντων τό τε ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει πάντας
[Bekker 1300b line 5]
ἀριστοκρατικόν. οἱ μὲν οὖν τρόποι τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοσοῦτοι τὸν ἀριθμόν εἰσι, καὶ διῄρηνται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας οὕτως· τίνα δὲ τίσι συμφέρει καὶ πῶς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὰς καταστάσεις, ἅμα ταῖς δυνάμεσι τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν ἔσται φανερόν. λέγω δὲ δύναμιν ἀρχῆς οἷον τὴν κυρίαν
[Bekker 1300b line 10]
τῶν προσόδων καὶ τὴν κυρίαν τῆς φυλακῆς· ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος δυνάμεως οἷον στρατηγίας καὶ τῆς τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν συμβολαίων κυρίας.

λοιπὸν δὲ τῶν τριῶν τὸ δικαστικὸν εἰπεῖν. ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τούτων τοὺς τρόπους κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν. ἔστι
[Bekker 1300b line 15]
δὲ διαφορὰ τῶν δικαστηρίων ἐν τρισὶν ὅροις, ἐξ ὧν τε καὶ περὶ ὧν καὶ πῶς. λέγω δὲ ἐξ ὧν μέν, πότερον ἐκ πάντων ἢ ἐκ τινῶν· περὶ ὧν δέ, πόσα εἴδη δικαστηρίων· τὸ δὲ πῶς, πότερον κλήρῳ ἢ αἱρέσει. πρῶτον οὖν διαιρείσθω πόσα εἴδη δικαστηρίων. ἔστι δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὀκτώ, ἓν μὲν εὐθυντικόν,
[Bekker 1300b line 20]
ἄλλο δὲ εἴ τίς τι τῶν κοινῶν ἀδικεῖ, ἕτερον ὅσα εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει, τέταρτον καὶ ἄρχουσι καὶ ἰδιώταις ὅσα περὶ ζημιώσεων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, πέμπτον τὸ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων καὶ ἐχόντων μέγεθος, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα τό τε φονικὸν καὶ τὸ ξενικόν (φονικοῦ μὲν οὖν εἴδη, ἄν τʼ
[Bekker 1300b line 25]
ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δικασταῖς ἄν τʼ ἐν ἄλλοις, περί τε τῶν ἐκ προνοίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκουσίων, καὶ ὅσα ὁμολογεῖται μέν, ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου, τέταρτον δὲ ὅσα τοῖς φεύγουσι φόνου ἐπὶ καθόδῳ ἐπιφέρεται, οἷον Ἀθήνησι λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐν Φρεαττοῖ δικαστήριον· συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα
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ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ ὀλίγα καὶ ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις πόλεσιν· τοῦ δὲ ξενικοῦ ἓν μὲν ξένοις πρὸς ξένους, ἄλλο δὲ ξένοις πρὸς ἀστούς), ἔτι δὲ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μικρῶν συναλλαγμάτων, ὅσα δραχμιαῖα καὶ πεντάδραχμα καὶ μικρῷ πλείονος. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτων γίνεσθαι κρίσιν, οὐκ
[Bekker 1300b line 35]
ἐμπίπτει δὲ εἰς δικαστῶν πλῆθος.

ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἀφείσθω καὶ τῶν φονικῶν καὶ τῶν ξενικῶν, περὶ δὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν λέγωμεν, περὶ ὧν μὴ γινομένων καλῶς διαστάσεις γίνονται καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ κινήσεις. ἀνάγκη δʼ ἤτοι πάντας περὶ πάντων κρίνειν τῶν διῃρημένων αἱρέσει
[Bekker 1300b line 40]
ἢ κλήρῳ, ἢ πάντας περὶ πάντων τὰ μὲν κλήρῳ τὰ δʼ αἱρέσει, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων τῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν κλήρῳ τοὺς δʼ
[Bekker 1301a]
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αἱρετούς.

οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οἱ τρόποι τέτταρες τὸν ἀριθμόν· τοσοῦτοι δʼ ἕτεροι καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος. πάλιν γὰρ ἐκ τινῶν καὶ οἱ δικάζοντες περὶ πάντων αἱρέσει, ἢ ἐκ τινῶν περὶ πάντων κλήρῳ, ἢ τὰ μὲν κλήρῳ τὰ δὲ αἱρέσει, ἢ ἔνια δικαστήρια
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περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκ κληρωτῶν καὶ αἱρετῶν. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθησαν, οἱ τρόποι ἀντίστροφοι τοῖς εἰρημένοις· ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ συνδυαζόμενα, λέγω δʼ οἷον τὰ μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰ δʼ ἐκ τινῶν τὰ δʼ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν (οἷον εἰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δικαστηρίου εἶεν οἱ μὲν ἐκ πάντων οἱ δʼ ἐκ τινῶν), καὶ ἢ
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κλήρῳ ἢ αἱρέσει ἢ ἀμφοῖν. ὅσους μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται τρόπους εἶναι τὰ δικαστήρια, εἴρηται· τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα δημοτικά,
[Bekker 1301a line 12]
ὅσα ἐκ πάντων περὶ πάντων, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα ὀλιγαρχικά, ὅσα ἐκ τινῶν περὶ πάντων, τὰ δὲ τρίτα ἀριστοκρατικὰ καὶ πολιτικά, ὅσα τὰ μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰ δʼ
[Bekker 1301a line 15]
ἐκ τινῶν.

### Book V, 1301a–1304b

[Bekker 1301a]
[Bekker 1301a line 19]
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ὧν προειλόμεθα σχεδὸν
[Bekker 1301a line 20]
εἴρηται περὶ πάντων· ἐκ τίνων δὲ μεταβάλλουσιν αἱ πολιτεῖαι καὶ πόσων καὶ ποίων, καὶ τίνες ἑκάστης πολιτείας φθοραί, καὶ ἐκ ποίων εἰς ποίας μάλιστα μεθίστανται, ἔτι δὲ σωτηρίαι τίνες καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης εἰσίν, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τίνων ἂν μάλιστα σῴζοιτο τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστη, σκεπτέον
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ἐφεξῆς τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν, ὅτι πολλαὶ γεγένηνται πολιτεῖαι πάντων μὲν ὁμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατʼ ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, τούτου δʼ ἁμαρτανόντων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. δῆμος μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἴσους ὁτιοῦν ὄντας οἴεσθαι ἁπλῶς ἴσους
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εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ὁμοίως, ἁπλῶς ἴσοι εἶναι νομίζουσιν), ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίσους ἕν τι ὄντας ὅλως εἶναι ἀνίσους ὑπολαμβάνειν (κατʼ οὐσίαν γὰρ ἄνισοι ὄντες ἁπλῶς ἄνισοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι). εἶτα οἱ μὲν ὡς ἴσοι ὄντες πάντων τῶν ἴσων ἀξιοῦσι μετέχειν· οἱ δʼ ὡς ἄνισοι
[Bekker 1301a line 35]
ὄντες πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦσιν, τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἄνισον. ἔχουσι μὲν οὖν τι πᾶσαι δίκαιον, ἡμαρτημέναι δʼ ἁπλῶς εἰσιν. καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἑκάτεροι τυγχάνουσιν ἔχοντες μετέχωσι τῆς πολιτείας, στασιάζουσιν. πάντων δὲ δικαιότατα μὲν ἂν στασιάζοιεν,
[Bekker 1301a line 40]
ἥκιστα δὲ τοῦτο πράττουσιν, οἱ κατʼ ἀρετὴν διαφέροντες·

[Bekker 1301b]
[Bekker 1301b line 1]
μάλιστα γὰρ εὔλογον ἀνίσους ἁπλῶς εἶναι τούτους μόνον. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ κατὰ γένος ὑπερέχοντες οὐκ ἀξιοῦσι τῶν ἴσων αὑτοὺς διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα ταύτην· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος.

ἀρχαὶ
[Bekker 1301b line 5]
μὲν οὖν ὡς εἰπεῖν αὗται καὶ πηγαὶ τῶν στάσεών εἰσιν, ὅθεν στασιάζουσιν· διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται διχῶς· ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ὅπως ἐκ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἄλλην μεταστήσωσιν, οἷον ἐκ δημοκρατίας ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ δημοκρατίαν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἢ πολιτείαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν
[Bekker 1301b line 10]
ἐκ τούτων, ἢ ταύτας ἐξ ἐκείνων, ὁτὲ δʼ οὐ πρὸς τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν προαιροῦνται τὴν αὐτήν, διʼ αὑτῶν δʼ εἶναι βούλονται ταύτην, οἷον τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὴν μοναρχίαν· ἔτι περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οἷον ἢ ὀλιγαρχίαν οὖσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι
[Bekker 1301b line 15]
ἢ εἰς τὸ ἧττον, ἢ δημοκρατίαν οὖσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον δημοκρατεῖσθαι ἢ εἰς τὸ ἧττον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν, ἢ ἵνα ἐπιταθῶσιν ἢ ἀνεθῶσιν· ἔτι πρὸς τὸ μέρος τι κινῆσαι τῆς πολιτείας, οἷον ἀρχήν τινα καταστῆσαι ἢ ἀνελεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονί φασι Λύσανδρόν
[Bekker 1301b line 20]
τινες ἐπιχειρῆσαι καταλῦσαι τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ Παυσανίαν τὸν βασιλέα τὴν ἐφορείαν, καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ δὲ μετέβαλεν ἡ πολιτεία κατὰ μόριον (ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν φυλάρχων βουλὴν ἐποίησαν, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἡλιαίαν ἐπάναγκές ἐστιν ἔτι τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι βαδίζειν τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν
[Bekker 1301b line 25]
ἐπιψηφίζηται ἀρχή τις, ὀλιγαρχικὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ὁ εἷς ἦν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ). πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἄνισον ἡ στάσις, οὐ μὴ τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὑπάρχει ἀνάλογον (ἀΐδιος γὰρ βασιλεία ἄνισος, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐν ἴσοις)· ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἴσον ζητοῦντες στασιάζουσιν. ἔστι δὲ διττὸν τὸ ἴσον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
[Bekker 1301b line 30]
ἀριθμῷ τὸ δὲ κατʼ ἀξίαν ἐστίν. λέγω δὲ ἀριθμῷ μὲν τὸ πλήθει ἢ μεγέθει ταὐτὸ καὶ ἴσον, κατʼ ἀξίαν δὲ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ, οἷον ὑπερέχει κατʼ ἀριθμὸν μὲν ἴσῳ τὰ τρία τοῖν δυοῖν καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἑνός, λόγῳ δὲ τὰ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἑνός· ἴσον γὰρ μέρος τὰ δύο τῶν τεττάρων καὶ
[Bekker 1301b line 35]
τὸ ἓν τοῖν δυοῖν· ἄμφω γὰρ ἡμίση. ὁμολογοῦντες δὲ τὸ ἁπλῶς εἶναι δίκαιον τὸ κατʼ ἀξίαν, διαφέρονται, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον, οἱ μὲν ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τὶ ἴσοι ὦσιν, ὅλως ἴσοι νομίζουσιν εἶναι, οἱ δʼ ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τὶ ἄνισοι, πάντων ἀνίσων ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς. διὸ καὶ μάλιστα δύο γίνονται
[Bekker 1301b line 40]
πολιτεῖαι, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία· εὐγένεια γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ
[Bekker 1302a]
[Bekker 1302a line 1]
ἐν ὀλίγοις,

ταῦτα δʼ ἐν πλείοσιν· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἑκατόν, εὔποροι δὲ πολλαχοῦ. τὸ δὲ ἁπλῶς πάντῃ καθʼ ἑκατέραν τετάχθαι τὴν ἰσότητα φαῦλον. φανερὸν δʼ ἐκ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος· οὐδεμία γὰρ μόνιμος
[Bekker 1302a line 5]
ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν. τούτου δʼ αἴτιον ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἡμαρτημένου μὴ ἀπαντᾶν εἰς τὸ τέλος κακόν τι. διὸ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ἀριθμητικῇ ἰσότητι χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῇ κατʼ ἀξίαν.

ὅμως δὲ ἀσφαλεστέρα καὶ ἀστασίαστος μᾶλλον ἡ δημοκρατία τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας. ἐν μὲν
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γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ἐγγίνονται δύο, ἥ τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους στάσις καὶ ἔτι ἡ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μόνον, αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὑτόν, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐγγίνεται τῷ δήμῳ στάσις· ἔτι δὲ ἡ ἐκ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ δήμου ἢ ἡ τῶν ὀλίγων·
[Bekker 1302a line 15]
ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἀσφαλεστάτη τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν.

ἐπεὶ δὲ σκοποῦμεν ἐκ τίνων αἵ τε στάσεις γίνονται καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, ληπτέον καθόλου πρῶτον τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν. εἰσὶ δὴ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν τρεῖς τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἃς διοριστέον καθʼ αὑτὰς τύπῳ
[Bekker 1302a line 20]
πρῶτον. δεῖ γὰρ λαβεῖν πῶς τε ἔχοντες στασιάζουσι καὶ τίνων ἕνεκεν, καὶ τρίτον τίνες ἀρχαὶ γίνονται τῶν πολιτικῶν ταραχῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους στάσεων. τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς ἔχειν πως πρὸς τὴν μεταβολὴν αἰτίαν καθόλου μάλιστα θετέον περὶ ἧς ἤδη τυγχάνομεν εἰρηκότες. οἱ μὲν
[Bekker 1302a line 25]
γὰρ ἰσότητος ἐφιέμενοι στασιάζουσιν ἂν νομίζωσιν ἔλαττον ἔχειν ὄντες ἴσοι τοῖς πλεονεκτοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ τῆς ἀνισότητος καὶ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς ἂν ὑπολαμβάνωσιν ὄντες ἄνισοι μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀλλʼ ἴσον ἢ ἔλαττον (τούτων δʼ ἔστι μὲν ὀρέγεσθαι δικαίως, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀδίκως)· ἐλάττους τε γὰρ ὄντες
[Bekker 1302a line 30]
ὅπως ἴσοι ὦσι στασιάζουσι, καὶ ἴσοι ὄντες ὅπως μείζους. πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες στασιάζουσιν, εἴρηται· περὶ ὧν δὲ στασιάζουσιν ἐστὶ κέρδος καὶ τιμὴ καὶ τἀναντία τούτοις. καὶ γὰρ ἀτιμίαν φεύγοντες καὶ ζημίαν, ἢ ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν ἢ τῶν φίλων, στασιάζουσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. αἱ δʼ αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ
[Bekker 1302a line 35]
τῶν κινήσεων, ὅθεν αὐτοί τε διατίθενται τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων, ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἑπτὰ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, ἔστι δʼ ὡς πλείους. ὧν δύο μέν ἐστι ταὐτὰ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡσαύτως· διὰ κέρδος γὰρ καὶ διὰ τιμὴν καὶ παροξύνονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐχ ἵνα κτήσωνται
[Bekker 1302a line 40]
σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον,

ἀλλʼ ἑτέρους
[Bekker 1302b]
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ὁρῶντες τοὺς μὲν δικαίως τοὺς δʼ ἀδίκως πλεονεκτοῦντας τούτων· ἔτι διὰ ὕβριν, διὰ φόβον, διὰ ὑπεροχήν, διὰ καταφρόνησιν, διὰ αὔξησιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· ἔτι δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον διʼ ἐριθείαν, διʼ ὀλιγωρίαν, διὰ μικρότητα,
[Bekker 1302b line 5]
διὰ ἀνομοιότητα. Τούτων δὲ ὕβρις μὲν καὶ κέρδος τίνα ἔχουσι δύναμιν καὶ πῶς αἴτια, σχεδόν ἐστι φανερόν· ὑβριζόντων τε γὰρ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ πλεονεκτούντων στασιάζουσι καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τὰς διδούσας τὴν ἐξουσίαν· ἡ δὲ πλεονεξία γίνεται ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν
[Bekker 1302b line 10]
ἰδίων ὁτὲ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν. —δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμή, καὶ τί δύναται καὶ πῶς αἰτία στάσεως· καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἀτιμαζόμενοι καὶ ἄλλους ὁρῶντες τιμωμένους στασιάζουσιν· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδίκως μὲν γίνεται ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἢ τιμῶνταί τινες ἢ ἀτιμάζωνται, δικαίως δὲ ὅταν κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν.
[Bekker 1302b line 15]
—διʼ ὑπεροχὴν δέ, ὅταν τις ᾖ τῇ δυνάμει μείζων (ἢ εἷς ἢ πλείους) ἢ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ πολιτεύματος· γίνεσθαι γὰρ εἴωθεν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων μοναρχία ἢ δυναστεία· διὸ ἐνιαχοῦ εἰώθασιν ὀστρακίζειν, οἷον ἐν Ἄργει καὶ Ἀθήνησιν· καίτοι βέλτιον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁρᾶν ὅπως μὴ ἐνέσονται
[Bekker 1302b line 20]
τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχοντες, ἢ ἐάσαντας γενέσθαι ἰᾶσθαι ὕστερον. —διὰ δὲ φόβον στασιάζουσιν οἵ τε ἠδικηκότες, δεδιότες μὴ δῶσι δίκην, καὶ οἱ μέλλοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι, βουλόμενοι φθάσαι πρὶν ἀδικηθῆναι, ὥσπερ ἐν Ῥόδῳ συνέστησαν οἱ γνώριμοι ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας.
[Bekker 1302b line 25]
—διὰ καταφρόνησιν δὲ καὶ στασιάζουσι καὶ ἐπιτίθενται, οἷον ἔν τε ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, ὅταν πλείους ὦσιν οἱ μὴ μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας (κρείττους γὰρ οἴονται εἶναι), καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ εὔποροι καταφρονήσαντες τῆς ἀταξίας καὶ ἀναρχίας, οἷον καὶ ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις
[Bekker 1302b line 30]
μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένων ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη, καὶ ἡ Μεγαρέων διʼ ἀταξίαν καὶ ἀναρχίαν ἡττηθέντων, καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνος τυραννίδος, καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ ὁ δῆμος πρὸ τῆς ἐπαναστάσεως.

γίνονται δὲ καὶ διʼ αὔξησιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεταβολαὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. ὥσπερ
[Bekker 1302b line 35]
γὰρ σῶμα ἐκ μερῶν σύγκειται καὶ δεῖ αὐξάνεσθαι ἀνάλογον ἵνα μένῃ ἡ συμμετρία, εἰ δὲ μή, φθείρεται, ὅταν ὁ μὲν ποὺς τεττάρων πηχῶν ᾖ τὸ δʼ ἄλλο σῶμα δυοῖν σπιθαμαῖν, ἐνίοτε δὲ κἂν εἰς ἄλλου ζῴου μεταβάλοι μορφήν, εἰ μὴ μόνον κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν
[Bekker 1302b line 40]
αὐξάνοιτο παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, οὕτω καὶ πόλις σύγκειται
[Bekker 1303a]
[Bekker 1303a line 1]
ἐκ μερῶν,

ὧν πολλάκις λανθάνει τι αὐξανόμενον, οἷον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις καὶ πολιτείαις. συμβαίνει δʼ ἐνίοτε τοῦτο καὶ διὰ τύχας, οἷον ἐν Τάραντι ἡττηθέντων καὶ ἀπολομένων πολλῶν γνωρίμων ὑπὸ τῶν
[Bekker 1303a line 5]
Ἰαπύγων μικρὸν ὕστερον τῶν Μηδικῶν δημοκρατία ἐγένετο ἐκ πολιτείας, καὶ ἐν Ἄργει τῶν ἐν τῇ ἑβδόμῃ ἀπολομένων ὑπὸ Κλεομένους τοῦ Λάκωνος ἠναγκάσθησαν παραδέξασθαι τῶν περιοίκων τινάς, καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἀτυχούντων πεζῇ οἱ γνώριμοι ἐλάττους ἐγένοντο διὰ τὸ ἐκ καταλόγου
[Bekker 1303a line 10]
στρατεύεσθαι ὑπὸ τὸν Λακωνικὸν πόλεμον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις, ἧττον δέ· πλειόνων γὰρ τῶν εὐπόρων γινομένων ἢ τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐξανομένων μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δυναστείας. —μεταβάλλουσι δʼ αἱ πολιτεῖαι καὶ ἄνευ στάσεως διά τε τὰς ἐριθείας, ὥσπερ
[Bekker 1303a line 15]
ἐν Ἡραίᾳ (ἐξ αἱρετῶν γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο ἐποίησαν κληρωτάς, ὅτι ᾑροῦντο τοὺς ἐριθευομένους), καὶ διʼ ὀλιγωρίαν, ὅταν ἐάσωσιν εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς κυρίας παριέναι τοὺς μὴ τῇ πολιτείᾳ φίλους, ὥσπερ ἐν Ὠρεῷ κατελύθη ἡ ὀλιγαρχία τῶν ἀρχόντων γενομένου Ἡρακλεοδώρου, ὃς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας
[Bekker 1303a line 20]
πολιτείαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν κατεσκεύασεν. —ἔτι διὰ τὸ παρὰ μικρόν. λέγω δὲ παρὰ μικρόν, ὅτι πολλάκις λανθάνει μεγάλη γινομένη μετάβασις τῶν νομίμων, ὅταν παρορῶσι τὸ μικρόν, ὥσπερ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ μικρὸν ἦν τὸ τίμημα, τέλος δʼ ἀπʼ οὐθενὸς ἦρχον, ὡς ἔγγιον ἢ μηθὲν διαφέρον τοῦ
[Bekker 1303a line 25]
μηθὲν τὸ μικρόν.

στασιωτικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον, ἕως ἂν συμπνεύσῃ· ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδʼ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος πλήθους πόλις γίγνεται, οὕτως οὐδʼ ἐν τῷ τυχόντι χρόνῳ· διὸ ὅσοι ἤδη συνοίκους ἐδέξαντο ἢ ἐποίκους, οἱ πλεῖστοι διεστασίασαν· οἷον Τροιζηνίοις Ἀχαιοὶ συνῴκησαν Σύβαριν, εἶτα πλείους οἱ
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Ἀχαιοὶ γενόμενοι ἐξέβαλον τοὺς Τροιζηνίους, ὅθεν τὸ ἄγος συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις· καὶ ἐν Θουρίοις Συβαρῖται τοῖς συνοικήσασιν (πλεονεκτεῖν γὰρ ἀξιοῦντες ὡς σφετέρας τῆς χώρας ἐξέπεσον)· καὶ Βυζαντίοις οἱ ἔποικοι ἐπιβουλεύοντες φωραθέντες ἐξέπεσον διὰ μάχης· καὶ Ἀντισσαῖοι τοὺς Χίων
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φυγάδας εἰσδεξάμενοι διὰ μάχης ἐξέβαλον· Ζαγκλαῖοι δὲ Σαμίους ὑποδεξάμενοι ἐξέπεσον αὐτοί· καὶ Ἀπολλωνιᾶται οἱ ἐν τῷ Εὐξείνῳ πόντῳ ἐποίκους ἐπαγαγόμενοι ἐστασίασαν·

καὶ Συρακούσιοι μετὰ τὰ τυραννικὰ τοὺς ξένους
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καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους πολίτας ποιησάμενοι ἐστασίασαν καὶ εἰς μάχην ἦλθον· καὶ Ἀμφιπολῖται δεξάμενοι Χαλκιδέων ἐποίκους ἐξέπεσον ὑπὸ τούτων οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν. στασιάζουσι δʼ ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἀδικούμενοι, ὅτι
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οὐ μετέχουσι τῶν ἴσων, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἴσοι ὄντες, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ γνώριμοι, ὅτι μετέχουσι τῶν ἴσων οὐκ ἴσοι ὄντες. στασιάζουσι δὲ ἐνίοτε αἱ πόλεις καὶ διὰ τοὺς τόπους, ὅταν μὴ εὐφυῶς ἔχῃ ἡ χώρα πρὸς τὸ μίαν εἶναι πόλιν, οἷον ἐν Κλαζομεναῖς οἱ ἐπὶ Χύτρῳ πρὸς τοὺς
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ἐν νήσῳ, καὶ Κολοφώνιοι καὶ Νοτιεῖς· καὶ Ἀθήνησιν οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰσὶν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δημοτικοὶ οἱ τὸν Πειραιᾶ οἰκοῦντες τῶν τὸ ἄστυ. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις αἱ διαβάσεις τῶν ὀχετῶν, καὶ τῶν πάνυ σμικρῶν, διασπῶσι τὰς φάλαγγας, οὕτως ἔοικε πᾶσα διαφορὰ ποιεῖν διάστασιν.
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μεγίστη μὲν οὖν ἴσως διάστασις ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία, εἶτα πλοῦτος καὶ πενία, καὶ οὕτως δὴ ἑτέρα ἑτέρας μᾶλλον, ὧν μία καὶ ἡ εἰρημένη ἐστί.

Γίγνονται μὲν οὖν αἱ στάσεις οὐ περὶ μικρῶν ἀλλʼ ἐκ μικρῶν, στασιάζουσι δὲ περὶ μεγάλων. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ αἱ μικραὶ ἰσχύουσιν, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις
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γένωνται, οἷον συνέβη καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις. μετέβαλε γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ἐκ δύο νεανίσκων στασιασάντων τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὄντων, περὶ ἐρωτικὴν αἰτίαν. θατέρου γὰρ ἀποδημοῦντος ἅτερος ὤν τὸν ἐρώμενον αὐτοῦ ὑπεποιήσατο, πάλιν δʼ ἐκεῖνος τούτῳ χαλεπήνας τὴν γυναῖκα
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αὐτοῦ ἀνέπεισεν ὡς αὑτὸν ἐλθεῖν· ὅθεν προσλαμβάνοντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι διεστασίασαν πάντας. διόπερ ἀρχομένων εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεῖ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ διαλύειν τὰς τῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ δυναμένων στάσεις· ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ γίνεται τὸ ἁμάρτημα, ἡ δʼ ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἥμισυ εἶναι παντός,
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ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ μικρὸν ἁμάρτημα ἀνάλογόν ἐστι πρὸς τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν. ὅλως δὲ αἱ τῶν γνωρίμων στάσεις συναπολαύειν ποιοῦσι καὶ τὴν ὅλην πόλιν, οἷον ἐν Ἑστιαίᾳ συνέβη μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά, δύο ἀδελφῶν περὶ τῆς πατρῴας νομῆς διενεχθέντων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπορώτερος,
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ὡς οὐκ ἀποφαίνοντος τὴν οὐσίαν οὐδὲ τὸν θησαυρὸν ὃν εὗρεν ὁ πατήρ, προσηγάγετο τοὺς δημοτικούς, ὁ δʼ ἕτερος ἔχων οὐσίαν πολλὴν τοὺς εὐπόρους. καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐκ κηδείας γενομένης διαφορᾶς ἀρχὴ πασῶν ἐγένετο τῶν στάσεων τῶν
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ὕστερον·

ὁ μὲν γὰρ οἰωνισάμενός τι σύμπτωμα, ὡς ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν νύμφην, οὐ λαβὼν ἀπῆλθεν, οἱ δʼ ὡς ὑβρισθέντες ἐνέβαλον τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων θύοντος, κἄπειτα ὡς ἱερόσυλον ἀπέκτειναν. καὶ περὶ Μυτιλήνην δὲ ἐξ ἐπικλήρων
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στάσεως γενομένης πολλῶν ἐγένετο ἀρχὴ κακῶν καὶ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐν ᾧ Πάχης ἔλαβε τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν· Τιμοφάνους γὰρ τῶν εὐπόρων τινὸς καταλιπόντος δύο θυγατέρας, ὁ περιωσθεὶς καὶ οὐ λαβὼν τοῖς υἱέσιν αὑτοῦ Δέξανδρος ἦρξε τῆς στάσεως καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους παρώξυνε,
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πρόξενος ὢν τῆς πόλεως. καὶ ἐν Φωκεῦσιν ἐξ ἐπικλήρου στάσεως γενομένης περὶ Μνασέαν τὸν Μνάσωνος πατέρα καὶ Εὐθυκράτη τὸν Ὀνομάρχου, ἡ στάσις αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἱεροῦ πολέμου κατέστη τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν. μετέβαλε δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ ἡ πολιτεία ἐκ γαμικῶν· ὑπομνηστευσάμενος
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γάρ τις θυγατέρα, ὡς ἐζημίωσεν αὐτὸν ὁ τοῦ ὑπομνηστευθέντος πατήρ, γενόμενος τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἅτερος συμπαρέλαβε τοὺς ἐκτὸς τῆς πολιτείας ὡς ἐπηρεασθείς.

μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ εἰς δῆμον καὶ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐκ τοῦ εὐδοκιμῆσαί τι ἢ αὐξηθῆναι ἢ ἀρχεῖον ἢ μόριον τῆς πόλεως,
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οἷον ἡ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴ εὐδοκιμήσασα ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ἔδοξε συντονωτέραν ποιῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος γενόμενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμῖνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν,
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καὶ ἐν Ἄργει οἱ γνώριμοι εὐδοκιμήσαντες περὶ τὴν ἐν Μαντινείᾳ μάχην τὴν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπεχείρησαν καταλύειν τὸν δῆμον, καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλεν, καὶ ἐν Χαλκίδι Φόξον
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τὸν τύραννον μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων ὁ δῆμος ἀνελὼν εὐθὺς εἴχετο τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ πάλιν ὡσαύτως Περίανδρον συνεκβαλὼν τοῖς ἐπιθεμένοις ὁ δῆμος τὸν τύραννον εἰς ἑαυτὸν περιέστησε τὴν πολιτείαν. καὶ ὅλως δὴ δεῖ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνειν, ὡς οἱ δυνάμεως αἴτιοι γενόμενοι,
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καὶ ἰδιῶται καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ φυλαὶ καὶ ὅλως μέρος καὶ ὁποινοῦν πλῆθος, στάσιν κινοῦσιν· ἢ γὰρ οἱ τούτοις φθονοῦντες τιμωμένοις ἄρχουσι τῆς στάσεως, ἢ οὗτοι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν οὐ θέλουσι μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἴσων. κινοῦνται δʼ αἱ πολιτεῖαι καὶ ὅταν τἀναντία εἶναι δοκοῦντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἰσάζῃ
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ἀλλήλοις,

οἷον οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ ὁ δῆμος, μέσον δʼ ᾖ μηθὲν ἢ μικρὸν πάμπαν· ἂν γὰρ πολὺ ὑπερέχῃ ὁποτερονοῦν τῶν μερῶν, πρὸς τὸ φανερῶς κρεῖττον τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ θέλει κινδυνεύειν. διὸ καὶ οἱ κατʼ ἀρετὴν διαφέροντες οὐ ποιοῦσι στάσιν
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ὡς εἰπεῖν· ὀλίγοι γὰρ γίγνονται πρὸς πολλούς. καθόλου μὲν οὖν περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰτίαι τῶν στάσεων καὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν τοῦτον ἔχουσι τὸν τρόπον· κινοῦσι δὲ τὰς πολιτείας ὁτὲ μὲν διὰ βίας ὁτὲ δὲ διʼ ἀπάτης, διὰ βίας μὲν ἢ εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἢ ὕστερον ἀναγκάζοντες.
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καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπάτη διττή. ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐξαπατήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἑκόντων μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, εἶθʼ ὕστερον βίᾳ κατέχουσιν ἀκόντων, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν Τετρακοσίων τὸν δῆμον ἐξηπάτησαν φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλέα χρήματα παρέξειν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, ψευσάμενοι
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δὲ κατέχειν ἐπειρῶντο τὴν πολιτείαν· ὁτὲ δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πείσαντες καὶ ὕστερον πάλιν πεισθέντων ἑκόντων ἄρχουσιν αὐτῶν. ἁπλῶς μὲν οὖν περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων συμβέβηκε γίνεσθαι τὰς μεταβολάς.

### Book V, 1304b–1308a

καθʼ ἕκαστον δʼ εἶδος πολιτείας ἐκ τούτων μερίζοντας
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τὰ συμβαίνοντα δεῖ θεωρεῖν. αἱ μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίαι μάλιστα μεταβάλλουσι διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἰδίᾳ συκοφαντοῦντες τοὺς τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντας συστρέφουσιν αὐτούς (συνάγει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐχθίστους ὁ κοινὸς φόβος), τὰ δὲ κοινῇ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπάγοντες. καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ
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πολλῶν ἄν τις ἴδοι γιγνόμενον οὕτω. καὶ γὰρ ἐν Κῷ ἡ δημοκρατία μετέβαλε πονηρῶν ἐγγενομένων δημαγωγῶν (οἱ γὰρ γνώριμοι συνέστησαν)· καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ· μισθοφοράν τε γὰρ οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἐπόριζον, καὶ ἐκώλυον ἀποδιδόναι τὰ ὀφειλόμενα τοῖς τριηράρχοις, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας
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δίκας ἠναγκάσθησαν συστάντες καταλῦσαι τὸν δῆμον. κατελύθη δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ ὁ δῆμος μετὰ τὸν ἀποικισμὸν εὐθὺς διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς· ἀδικούμενοι γὰρ ὑπʼ αὐτῶν οἱ γνώριμοι ἐξέπιπτον, ἔπειτα ἀθροισθέντες οἱ ἐκπίπτοντες καὶ κατελθόντες κατέλυσαν τὸν δῆμον. παραπλησίως
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δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν Μεγάροις κατελύθη δημοκρατία· οἱ γὰρ δημαγωγοί, ἵνα χρήματα ἔχωσι δημεύειν, ἐξέβαλον πολλοὺς τῶν γνωρίμων, ἕως πολλοὺς ἐποίησαν τοὺς φεύγοντας, οἱ δὲ κατιόντες ἐνίκησαν μαχόμενοι τὸν δῆμον καὶ κατέστησαν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.

συνέβη δὲ ταὐτὸν καὶ περὶ
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Κύμην ἐπὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας ἣν κατέλυσε Θρασύμαχος. σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄν τις ἴδοι θεωρῶν τὰς μεταβολὰς τοῦτον ἐχούσας τὸν τρόπον. ὁτὲ μὲν γάρ, ἵνα χαρίζωνται, ἀδικοῦντες τοὺς γνωρίμους συνιστᾶσιν, ἢ τὰς οὐσίας
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ἀναδάστους ποιοῦντες ἢ τὰς προσόδους ταῖς λειτουργίαις, ὁτὲ δὲ διαβάλλοντες, ἵνʼ ἔχωσι δημεύειν τὰ κτήματα τῶν πλουσίων.

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχαίων, ὅτε γένοιτο ὁ αὐτὸς δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγός, εἰς τυραννίδα μετέβαλλον· σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀρχαίων τυράννων ἐκ δημαγωγῶν γεγόνασιν.
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αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ τότε μὲν γίγνεσθαι νῦν δὲ μή, ὅτι τότε μὲν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἦσαν ἐκ τῶν στρατηγούντων (οὐ γάρ πω δεινοὶ ἦσαν λέγειν), νῦν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ηὐξημένης οἱ δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγοῦσι μέν, διʼ ἀπειρίαν δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν οὐκ ἐπιτίθενται, πλὴν εἴ που βραχύ τι γέγονε
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τοιοῦτον. ἐγίγνοντο δὲ τυραννίδες πρότερον μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν καὶ διὰ τὸ μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἐγχειρίζεσθαί τισιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Μιλήτῳ ἐκ τῆς πρυτανείας (πολλῶν γὰρ ἦν καὶ μεγάλων κύριος ὁ πρύτανις). ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ μεγάλας εἶναι τότε τὰς πόλεις, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἰκεῖν τὸν
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δῆμον ἄσχολον ὄντα πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις, οἱ προστάται τοῦ δήμου, ὅτε πολεμικοὶ γένοιντο, τυραννίδι ἐπετίθεντο. πάντες δὲ τοῦτο ἔδρων ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πιστευθέντες, ἡ δὲ πίστις ἦν ἡ ἀπέχθεια ἡ πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους, οἷον Ἀθήνησί τε Πεισίστρατος στασιάσας πρὸς τοὺς πεδιακούς, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις
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τῶν εὐπόρων τὰ κτήνη ἀποσφάξας, λαβὼν παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐπινέμοντας, καὶ Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφναίου καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἠξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος, διὰ τὴν ἔχθραν πιστευθεὶς ὡς δημοτικὸς ὤν. μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς πατρίας δημοκρατίας εἰς τὴν νεωτάτην· ὅπου γὰρ αἱρεταὶ
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μὲν αἱ ἀρχαί, μὴ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων δέ, αἱρεῖται δὲ ὁ δῆμος, δημαγωγοῦντες οἱ σπουδαρχιῶντες εἰς τοῦτο καθιστᾶσιν ὥστε κύριον εἶναι τὸν δῆμον καὶ τῶν νόμων. ἄκος δὲ τοῦ μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἧττον τὸ τὰς φυλὰς φέρειν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντα τὸν δῆμον. τῶν μὲν οὖν δημοκρατιῶν
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αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται πᾶσαι σχεδὸν διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας.

αἱ δʼ ὀλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι διὰ δύο μάλιστα τρόπους τοὺς φανερωτάτους, ἕνα μὲν ἐὰν ἀδικῶσι τὸ πλῆθος· πᾶς γὰρ ἱκανὸς γίνεται προστάτης, μάλιστα δʼ ὅταν ἐξ
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αὐτῆς συμβῇ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας γίνεσθαι τὸν ἡγεμόνα, καθάπερ ἐν Νάξῳ Λύγδαμις, ὃς καὶ ἐτυράννησεν ὕστερον τῶν
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Ναξίων.

ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀρχὴ στάσεως διαφοράς. ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν εὐπόρων, οὐ τῶν ὄντων δʼ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, γίγνεται κατάλυσις, ὅταν ὀλίγοι σφόδρα ὦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τιμαῖς, οἷον ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ καὶ ἐν
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Ἴστρῳ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσι συμβέβηκεν· οἱ γὰρ μὴ μετέχοντες τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐκίνουν, ἕως μετέλαβον οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πρότερον τῶν ἀδελφῶν, ὕστερον δʼ οἱ νεώτεροι πάλιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχουσιν ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν ἅμα πατήρ τε καὶ υἱός, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ ὁ πρεσβύτερος καὶ ὁ νεώτερος
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ἀδελφός· καὶ ἔνθα μὲν πολιτικωτέρα ἐγένετο ἡ ὀλιγαρχία, ἐν Ἴστρῳ δʼ εἰς δῆμον ἀπετελεύτησεν, ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ δʼ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων εἰς ἑξακοσίους ἦλθεν· μετέβαλε δὲ καὶ ἐν Κνίδῳ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία στασιασάντων τῶν γνωρίμων αὐτῶν πρὸς αὑτοὺς διὰ τὸ ὀλίγους μετέχειν καί, καθάπερ εἴρηται, εἰ πατήρ,
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υἱὸν μὴ μετέχειν, μηδʼ εἰ πλείους ἀδελφοί, ἀλλʼ ἢ τὸν πρεσβύτατον· ἐπιλαβόμενος γὰρ στασιαζόντων ὁ δῆμος, καὶ λαβὼν προστάτην ἐκ τῶν γνωρίμων, ἐπιθέμενος ἐκράτησεν, ἀσθενὲς γὰρ τὸ στασιάζον· καὶ ἐν Ἐρυθραῖς δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Βασιλιδῶν ὀλιγαρχίας ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις, καίπερ
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καλῶς ἐπιμελομένων τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, ὅμως διὰ τὸ ὑπʼ ὀλίγων ἄρχεσθαι ἀγανακτῶν ὁ δῆμος μετέβαλε τὴν πολιτείαν.

κινοῦνται δʼ αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξ αὑτῶν καὶ διὰ φιλονεικίαν δημαγωγούντων (ἡ δημαγωγία δὲ διττή, ἡ μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀλίγοις—ἐγγίγνεται γὰρ δημαγωγὸς
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κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγοι ὦσιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Τριάκοντα Ἀθήνησιν οἱ περὶ Χαρικλέα ἴσχυσαν τοὺς Τριάκοντα δημαγωγοῦντες, καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τετρακοσίοις οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον— ἡ δʼ ὅταν τὸν ὄχλον δημαγωγῶσιν οἱ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ὄντες, οἷον ἐν Λαρίσῃ οἱ πολιτοφύλακες διὰ τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς
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τὸν ὄχλον ἐδημαγώγουν, καὶ ἐν ὅσαις ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐχ οὗτοι αἱροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἄρχοντές εἰσιν, ἀλλʼ αἱ μὲν ἀρχαὶ ἐκ τιμημάτων μεγάλων εἰσὶν ἢ ἑταιριῶν, αἱροῦνται δʼ οἱ ὁπλῖται ἢ ὁ δῆμος, ὅπερ ἐν Ἀβύδῳ συνέβαινεν, καὶ ὅπου τὰ δικαστήρια μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πολιτεύματός ἐστι—δημαγωγοῦντες
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γὰρ πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ ἐγένετο τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ—ἔτι δʼ ὅταν ἔνιοι εἰς ἐλάττους ἕλκωσι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν· οἱ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον ζητοῦντες ἀναγκάζονται βοηθὸν ἐπαγαγέσθαι τὸν δῆμον). γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ ὅταν
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ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἴδια ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς· καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι καινοτομεῖν ζητοῦσι, καὶ ἢ τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθενται αὐτοὶ ἢ
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κατασκευάζουσιν ἕτερον

(ὥσπερ Ἱππαρῖνος Διονύσιον ἐν Συρακούσαις, καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει ᾧ ὄνομα ἦν Κλεότιμος τοὺς ἐποίκους τοὺς Χαλκιδέων ἤγαγε, καὶ ἐλθόντων διεστασίασεν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τοὺς εὐπόρους, καὶ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ὁ τὴν πρᾶξιν τὴν
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πρὸς Χάρητα πράξας ἐνεχείρησε μεταβαλεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν)· ὁτὲ μὲν οὖν ἐπιχειροῦσί τι κινεῖν, ὁτὲ δὲ κλέπτουσι τὰ κοινά, ὅθεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς στασιάζουσιν ἢ οὗτοι ἢ οἱ πρὸς τούτους μαχόμενοι κλέπτοντας, ὅπερ ἐν Ἀπολλωνίᾳ συνέβη τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ. ὁμονοοῦσα δὲ ὀλιγαρχία
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οὐκ εὐδιάφθορος ἐξ αὑτῆς. σημεῖον δὲ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ πολιτεία· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ὀλίγοι ὄντες πολλῶν κύριοί εἰσι διὰ τὸ χρῆσθαι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καλῶς.

καταλύονται δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ἑτέραν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐμποιῶσιν. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὅταν τοῦ παντὸς πολιτεύματος ὀλίγου ὄντος τῶν
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μεγίστων ἀρχῶν μὴ μετέχωσιν οἱ ὀλίγοι πάντες, ὅπερ ἐν Ἤλιδι συνέβη ποτέ· τῆς πολιτείας γὰρ διʼ ὀλίγων οὔσης τῶν γερόντων ὀλίγοι πάμπαν ἐγίνοντο διὰ τὸ ἀιδίους εἶναι ἐνενήκοντα ὄντας, τὴν δʼ αἵρεσιν δυναστευτικὴν εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίαν τῇ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γερόντων. γίγνεται δὲ μεταβολὴ
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τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ, ἐν μὲν πολέμῳ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἀπιστίαν στρατιώταις ἀναγκαζομένων χρῆσθαι (ᾧ γὰρ ἂν ἐγχειρίσωσιν, οὗτος πολλάκις γίνεται τύραννος, ὥσπερ ἐν Κορίνθῳ Τιμοφάνης· ἂν δὲ πλείους, οὗτοι αὑτοῖς περιποιοῦνται δυναστείαν·
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ὁτὲ δὲ ταῦτα δεδιότες μεταδιδόασι τῷ πλήθει τῆς πολιτείας διὰ τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ χρῆσθαι)· ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐγχειρίζουσι τὴν φυλακὴν στρατιώταις καὶ ἄρχοντι μεσιδίῳ, ὃς ἐνίοτε γίνεται κύριος ἀμφοτέρων, ὅπερ συνέβη ἐν Λαρίσῃ
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ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀλευαδῶν ἀρχῆς τῶν περὶ Σῖμον, καὶ ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἑταιριῶν ὧν ἦν μία ἡ Ἰφιάδου.

γίνονται δὲ στάσεις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ περιωθεῖσθαι ἑτέρους ὑφʼ ἑτέρων τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ αὐτῶν καὶ καταστασιάζεσθαι κατὰ γάμους ἢ δίκας, οἷον ἐκ γαμικῆς μὲν αἰτίας αἱ εἰρημέναι
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πρότερον (καὶ τὴν ἐν Ἐρετρίᾳ δʼ ὀλιγαρχίαν τὴν τῶν ἱππέων Διαγόρας κατέλυσεν ἀδικηθεὶς περὶ γάμον), ἐκ δὲ δικαστηρίου κρίσεως ἡ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ στάσις ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ ἐν Θήβαις, ἐπʼ αἰτίᾳ μοιχείας δικαίως μὲν στασιαστικῶς δὲ ποιησαμένων τὴν κόλασιν τῶν μὲν ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ κατʼ Εὐρυτίωνος,
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τῶν δʼ ἐν Θήβαις κατʼ Ἀρχίου

(ἐφιλονείκησαν γὰρ αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐχθροὶ ὥστε δεθῆναι ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐν τῷ κύφωνι). πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἄγαν δεσποτικὰς εἶναι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τινῶν δυσχερανάντων κατελύθησαν,
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ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Κνίδῳ καὶ ἡ ἐν Χίῳ ὀλιγαρχία. γίγνονται δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μεταβολαὶ καὶ τῆς καλουμένης πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν ἐν ὅσαις ἀπὸ τιμήματος βουλεύουσι καὶ δικάζουσι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἄρχουσιν. πολλάκις γὰρ τὸ ταχθὲν πρῶτον τίμημα πρὸς
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τοὺς παρόντας καιρούς, ὥστε μετέχειν ἐν μὲν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ὀλίγους ἐν δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοὺς μέσους, εὐετηρίας γιγνομένης διʼ εἰρήνην ἢ διʼ ἄλλην τινʼ εὐτυχίαν συμβαίνει πολλαπλασίου γίγνεσθαι τιμήματος ἀξίας τὰς αὐτὰς κτήσεις, ὥστε πάντας πάντων μετέχειν, ὁτὲ μὲν ἐκ προσαγωγῆς καὶ
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κατὰ μικρὸν γινομένης τῆς μεταβολῆς καὶ λανθανούσης, ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ θᾶττον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ὀλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι καὶ στασιάζουσι διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας (ὅλως δὲ καὶ αἱ δημοκρατίαι καὶ αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξίστανται ἐνίοτε οὐκ εἰς τὰς ἐναντίας πολιτείας ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, οἷον
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ἐκ τῶν ἐννόμων δημοκρατιῶν καὶ ὀλιγαρχιῶν εἰς τὰς κυρίους καὶ ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκείνας).

ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις γίνονται αἱ στάσεις αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ ὀλίγους τῶν τιμῶν μετέχειν, ὅπερ εἴρηται κινεῖν καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν
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εἶναί πως (ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ ὀλίγοι οἱ ἄρχοντες, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταὐτὸν ὀλίγοι)· ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γε διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ ἀριστοκρατία ὀλιγαρχία εἶναι. μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ὅταν ᾖ τι πλῆθος τῶν πεφρονηματισμένων ὡς ὁμοίων κατʼ ἀρετήν, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι οἱ λεγόμενοι Παρθενίαι
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(ἑκ τῶν ὁμοίων γὰρ ἦσαν), οὓς φωράσαντες ἐπιβουλεύσαντας ἀπέστειλαν Τάραντος οἰκιστάς, ἢ ὅταν τινὲς ἀτιμάζωνται μεγάλοι ὄντες καὶ μηθενὸς ἥττους κατʼ ἀρετὴν ὑπό τινων ἐντιμοτέρων, οἷον Λύσανδρος ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων, ἢ ὅταν ἀνδρώδης τις ὢν μὴ μετέχῃ τῶν τιμῶν, οἷον Κινάδων
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ὁ τὴν ἐπʼ Ἀγησιλάου συστήσας ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας· ἔτι ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἀπορῶσι λίαν οἱ δʼ εὐπορῶσιν (καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τοῦτο γίνεται· συνέβη δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ὑπὸ τὸν Μεσηνιακὸν πόλεμον· δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς καλουμένης
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Εὐνομίας·

θλιβόμενοι γάρ τινες διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἠξίουν ἀνάδαστον ποιεῖν τὴν χώραν)· ἔτι ἐάν τις μέγας ᾖ καὶ δυνάμενος ἔτι μείζων εἶναι, ἵνα μοναρχῇ, ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι δοκεῖ Παυσανίας ὁ στρατηγήσας κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν
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πόλεμον, καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι Ἄννων.

λύονται δὲ μάλιστα αἵ τε πολιτεῖαι καὶ αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦ δικαίου παρέκβασιν. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ μὴ μεμεῖχθαι καλῶς ἐν μὲν τῇ πολιτείᾳ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὴν ἀρετήν,
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μάλιστα δὲ τὰ δύο· λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο δῆμον καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν. ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαί τε πειρῶνται μιγνύναι καὶ αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἀριστοκρατιῶν. διαφέρουσι γὰρ τῶν ὀνομαζομένων πολιτειῶν αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι τούτῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτʼ εἰσὶν αἱ μὲν ἧττον αἱ δὲ μᾶλλον μόνιμοι αὐτῶν·
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τὰς γὰρ ἀποκλινούσας μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀριστοκρατίας καλοῦσιν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος πολιτείας· διόπερ ἀσφαλέστεραι αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἑτέρων εἰσίν· κρεῖττόν τε γὰρ τὸ πλεῖον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσιν ἴσον ἔχοντες, οἱ δʼ ἐν ταῖς εὐπορίαις, ἂν ἡ πολιτεία διδῷ τὴν ὑπεροχήν,
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ὑβρίζειν ζητοῦσι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν. ὅλως δʼ ἐφʼ ὁπότερον ἂν ἐγκλίνῃ ἡ πολιτεία, ἐπὶ τοῦτο μεθίσταται ἑκατέρων τὸ σφέτερον αὐξανόντων, οἷον ἡ μὲν πολιτεία εἰς δῆμον, ἀριστοκρατία δʼ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν· ἢ εἰς τἀναντία, οἷον ἡ μὲν ἀριστοκρατία εἰς δῆμον (ὡς ἀδικούμενοι γὰρ περισπῶσιν εἰς
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τοὐναντίον οἱ ἀπορώτεροι), αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν (μόνον γὰρ μόνιμον τὸ κατʼ ἀξίαν ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ αὑτῶν)· συνέβη δὲ τὸ εἰρημένον ἐν Θουρίοις. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀπὸ πλείονος τιμήματος εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς ἔλαττον μετέβη καὶ εἰς ἀρχεῖα πλείω, διὰ δὲ τὸ τὴν χώραν ὅλην
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τοὺς γνωρίμους συγκτήσασθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον (ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία ὀλιγαρχικωτέρα ἦν, ὥστε ἐδύναντο πλεονεκτεῖν) ὁ δὲ δῆμος γυμνασθεὶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν φρουρῶν ἐγένετο κρείττων, ἕως ἀφεῖσαν τῆς χώρας ὅσοι πλείω ἦσαν ἔχοντες.

ἔτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικὰς
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εἶναι μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν οἱ γνώριμοι, οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἔρχονται· καὶ ἔξεστι ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον, καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτῳ θέλουσιν, διὸ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πόλις ἀπώλετο ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας, ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὐδʼ ἂν
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ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμειγμένῃ.

μάλιστα δὲ λανθάνουσιν αἱ
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ἀριστοκρατίαι μεταβάλλουσαι τῷ λύεσθαι κατὰ μικρόν, ὅπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καθόλου κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, ὅτι αἴτιον τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ τὸ μικρόν ἐστιν· ὅταν γάρ τι προῶνται τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, μετὰ τοῦτο
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καὶ ἄλλο μικρῷ μεῖζον εὐχερέστερον κινοῦσιν, ἕως ἂν πάντα κινήσωσι τὸν κόσμον. συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Θουρίων πολιτείας. νόμου γὰρ ὄντος διὰ πέντε ἐτῶν στρατηγεῖν, γενόμενοί τινες πολεμικοὶ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ παρὰ τῷ πλήθει τῶν φρουρῶν εὐδοκιμοῦντες, καταφρονήσαντες τῶν ἐν τοῖς
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πράγμασι καὶ νομίζοντες ῥᾳδίως κατασχήσειν, τοῦτον τὸν νόμον λύειν ἐπεχείρησαν πρῶτον, ὥστʼ ἐξεῖναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς συνεχῶς στρατηγεῖν, ὁρῶντες τὸν δῆμον αὐτοὺς χειροτονήσοντα προθύμως. οἱ δʼ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ καλούμενοι σύμβουλοι, ὁρμήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἐναντιοῦσθαι
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συνεπείσθησαν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τοῦτον κινήσαντας τὸν νόμον ἐάσειν τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν, ὕστερον δὲ βουλόμενοι κωλύειν ἄλλων κινουμένων οὐκέτι πλέον ἐποίουν οὐθέν, ἀλλὰ μετέβαλεν ἡ τάξις πᾶσα τῆς πολιτείας εἰς δυναστείαν τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν.

πᾶσαι δʼ αἱ πολιτεῖαι
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λύονται ὁτὲ μὲν ἐξ αὑτῶν ὁτὲ δʼ ἔξωθεν, ὅταν ἐναντία πολιτεία ᾖ ἢ πλησίον ἢ πόρρω μὲν ἔχουσα δὲ δύναμιν. ὅπερ συνέβαινεν ἐπʼ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι πανταχοῦ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες τοὺς δήμους κατέλυον. ὅθεν μὲν οὖν αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται
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τῶν πολιτειῶν καὶ αἱ στάσεις, εἴρηται σχεδόν.

περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης πολιτείας ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δῆλον ὅτι, εἴπερ ἔχομεν διʼ ὧν φθείρονται αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἔχομεν καὶ διʼ ὧν σῴζονται· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τἀναντία ποιητικά, φθορὰ δὲ
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σωτηρίᾳ ἐναντίον. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς εὖ κεκραμέναις πολιτείαις, εἰπερ ἄλλο τι δεῖ τηρεῖν ὅπως μηθὲν παρανομῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα τὸ μικρὸν φυλάττειν· λανθάνει γὰρ παραδυομένη ἡ παρανομία, ὥσπερ τὰς οὐσίας τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα ἀναιρεῖ πολλάκις γινόμενον. λανθάνει γὰρ ἡ δαπάνη
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διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀθρόα γίγνεσθαι· παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια ὑπʼ αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος εἰ ἕκαστον μικρόν, καὶ πάντα· τοῦτο δʼ ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὔ· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον καὶ τὰ πάντα οὐ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ σύγκειται ἐκ μικρῶν.

μίαν μὲν οὖν φυλακὴν ταύτην πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν
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δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι· ἔπειτα μὴ πιστεύειν τοῖς σοφίσματος χάριν
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πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος συγκειμένοις,

ἐξελέγχεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔργων (ποῖα δὲ λέγομεν τῶν πολιτειῶν σοφίσματα, πρότερον εἴρηται). ἔτι δʼ ὁρᾶν ὅτι ἔνιαι μένουσιν οὐ μόνον ἀριστοκρατίαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι οὐ διὰ τὸ ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι
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τὰς πολιτείας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ εὖ χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς γινομένους καὶ τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι, τοὺς μὲν μὴ μετέχοντας τῷ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τῷ τοὺς ἡγεμονικοὺς αὐτῶν εἰσάγειν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς μὲν φιλοτίμους μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἰς ἀτιμίαν τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς
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εἰς κέρδος, πρὸς αὑτοὺς δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας τῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλήλοις δημοτικῶς. ὃ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πλήθους ζητοῦσιν οἱ δημοτικοί, τὸ ἴσον, τοῦτʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων οὐ μόνον δίκαιον ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστίν. διὸ ἐὰν πλείους ὦσιν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι, πολλὰ συμφέρει τῶν δημοτικῶν νομοθετημάτων,
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οἷον τὸ ἑξαμήνους τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, ἵνα πάντες οἱ ὅμοιοι μετέχωσιν· ἔστι γὰρ ὥσπερ δῆμος ἤδη οἱ ὅμοιοι (διὸ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐγγίγνονται δημαγωγοὶ πολλάκις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον), ἔπειθʼ ἧττον εἰς δυναστείας ἐμπίπτουσιν αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαι (οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ῥᾴδιον κακουργῆσαι
[Bekker 1308a line 20]
ὀλίγον χρόνον ἄρχοντας καὶ πολύν, ἐπεὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ δημοκρατίαις γίγνονται τυραννίδες· ἢ γὰρ οἱ μέγιστοι ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ ἐπιτίθενται τυραννίδι, ἔνθα μὲν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἔνθα δʼ οἱ δυνάσται, ἢ οἱ τὰς μεγίστας ἔχοντες ἀρχάς, ὅταν πολὺν χρόνον ἄρχωσιν).

### Book V, 1308a–1311b

σῴζονται
[Bekker 1308a line 25]
δʼ αἱ πολιτεῖαι οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ πόρρω εἶναι τῶν διαφθειρόντων, ἀλλʼ ἐνίοτε καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐγγύς· φοβούμενοι γὰρ διὰ χειρῶν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν. ὥστε δεῖ τοὺς τῆς πολιτείας φροντίζοντας φόβους παρασκευάζειν, ἵνα φυλάττωσι καὶ μὴ καταλύωσιν ὥσπερ νυκτερινὴν φυλακὴν
[Bekker 1308a line 30]
τὴν τῆς πολιτείας τήρησιν, καὶ τὸ πόρρω ἐγγὺς ποιεῖν. ἔτι τὰς τῶν γνωρίμων φιλονεικίας καὶ στάσεις καὶ διὰ τῶν νόμων πειρᾶσθαι δεῖ φυλάττειν, καὶ τοὺς ἔξω τῆς φιλονεικίας ὄντας πρὶν παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτούς, ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ γινόμενον κακὸν γνῶναι οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀλλὰ πολιτικοῦ
[Bekker 1308a line 35]
ἀνδρός. πρὸς δὲ τὴν διὰ τὰ τιμήματα γιγνομένην μεταβολὴν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ πολιτείας, ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τοῦτο μενόντων μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν τιμημάτων εὐπορίας δὲ νομίσματος γιγνομένης, συμφέρει τοῦ τιμήματος ἐπισκοπεῖν τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ παρελθόν, ἐν ὅσαις μὲν
[Bekker 1308a line 40]
πόλεσι τιμῶνται κατʼ ἐνιαυτόν, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον,

[Bekker 1308b]
[Bekker 1308b line 1]
ἐν δὲ ταῖς μείζοσι διὰ τριετηρίδος ἢ πενταετηρίδος, κἂν ᾖ πολλαπλάσιον ἢ πολλοστημόριον τοῦ πρότερον, ἐν ᾧ αἱ τιμήσεις κατέστησαν τῆς πολιτείας, νόμον εἶναι καὶ τὰ τιμήματα ἐπιτείνειν ἢ ἀνιέναι, ἐὰν μὲν ὑπερβάλλῃ, ἐπιτείνοντας
[Bekker 1308b line 5]
κατὰ τὴν πολλαπλασίωσιν, ἐὰν δʼ ἐλλείπῃ, ἀνιέντας καὶ ἐλάττω ποιοῦντας τὴν τίμησιν. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις, μὴ ποιούντων οὕτως μὲν ἔνθα μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἔνθα δὲ δυναστείαν γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει, ἐκείνως δὲ ἐκ μὲν πολιτείας δημοκρατίαν, ἐκ δʼ ὀλιγαρχίας
[Bekker 1308b line 10]
πολιτείαν ἢ δῆμον.

κοινὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ καὶ πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ μήτʼ αὐξάνειν λίαν μηθένα παρὰ τὴν συμμετρίαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πειρᾶσθαι μικρὰς καὶ πολυχρονίους διδόναι τιμὰς ἢ ταχὺ μεγάλας (διαφθείρονται γάρ, καὶ φέρειν οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς
[Bekker 1308b line 15]
εὐτυχίαν), εἰ δὲ μή, μή τοί γʼ ἀθρόας δόντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι πάλιν ἀθρόας, ἀλλʼ ἐκ προσαγωγῆς· καὶ μάλιστα μὲν πειρᾶσθαι τοῖς νόμοις οὕτω ῥυθμίζειν ὥστε μηδένα ἐγγίγνεσθαι πολὺ ὑπερέχοντα δυνάμει μήτε φίλων μήτε χρημάτων, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀποδημητικὰς ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παραστάσεις αὐτῶν.
[Bekker 1308b line 20]
ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τοὺς ἰδίους βίους νεωτερίζουσιν, δεῖ ἐμποιεῖν ἀρχήν τινα τὴν ἐποψομένην τοὺς ζῶντας ἀσυμφόρως πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἐν δὲ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν ἑκάστῃ· καὶ τὸ εὐημεροῦν δὲ τῆς πόλεως
[Bekker 1308b line 25]
ἀνὰ μέρος φυλάττεσθαι διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας· τούτου δʼ ἄκος τὸ αἰεὶ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις μορίοις ἐγχειρίζειν τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἀρχάς (λέγω δʼ ἀντικεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς τῷ πλήθει, καὶ τοὺς ἀπόρους τοῖς εὐπόροις), καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι ἢ συμμιγνύναι τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν
[Bekker 1308b line 30]
εὐπόρων ἢ τὸ μέσον αὔξειν (τοῦτο γὰρ διαλύει τὰς διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα στάσεις). μέγιστον δὲ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ τὸ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ οἰκονομίᾳ οὕτω τετάχθαι ὥστε μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς κερδαίνειν.

τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχικαῖς δεῖ τηρεῖν. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἀγανακτοῦσιν εἰργόμενοι
[Bekker 1308b line 35]
τοῦ ἄρχειν οἱ πολλοί, ἀλλὰ καὶ χαίρουσιν ἐάν τις ἐᾷ πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις σχολάζειν, ὥστʼ ἐὰν οἴωνται τὰ κοινὰ κλέπτειν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, τότε γʼ ἀμφότερα λυπεῖ, τό τε τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχειν καὶ τὸ τῶν κερδῶν· μοναχῶς δὲ καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα εἶναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν,
[Bekker 1308b line 40]
εἰ τοῦτο κατασκευάσειέ τις.

ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοὺς
[Bekker 1309a]
[Bekker 1309a line 1]
γνωρίμους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἔχειν ἃ βούλονται ἀμφοτέρους. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ἄρχειν δημοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ τοὺς γνωρίμους εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατικόν, τοῦτο δʼ ἔσται ὅταν μὴ ᾖ κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν· οἱ γὰρ ἄποροι
[Bekker 1309a line 5]
οὐ βουλήσονται ἄρχειν τῷ μηδὲν κερδαίνειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ εὔποροι δυνήσονται διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι τῶν κοινῶν· ὥστε συμβήσεται τοῖς μὲν ἀπόροις γίγνεσθαι εὐπόροις διὰ τὸ διατρίβειν πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις, τοῖς δὲ γνωρίμοις μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων.
[Bekker 1309a line 10]
τοῦ μὲν οὖν μὴ κλέπτεσθαι τὰ κοινὰ ἡ παράδοσις γιγνέσθω τῶν χρημάτων παρόντων πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ ἀντίγραφα κατὰ φατρίας καὶ λόχους καὶ φυλὰς τιθέσθωσαν· τοῦ δὲ ἀκερδῶς ἄρχειν τιμὰς εἶναι δεῖ νενομοθετημένας τοῖς εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. δεῖ δʼ ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις τῶν
[Bekker 1309a line 15]
εὐπόρων φείδεσθαι, μὴ μόνον τῷ τὰς κτήσεις μὴ ποιεῖν ἀναδάστους, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς καρπούς, ὃ ἐν ἐνίαις τῶν πολιτειῶν λανθάνει γιγνόμενον, βέλτιον δὲ καὶ βουλομένους κωλύειν λειτουργεῖν τὰς δαπανηρὰς μὲν μὴ χρησίμους δὲ λειτουργίας, οἷον χορηγίας καὶ λαμπαδαρχίας καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται·
[Bekker 1309a line 20]
ἐν δʼ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τῶν ἀπόρων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι πολλήν, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀφʼ ὧν λήμματα ἔστι τούτοις ἀπονέμειν, κἄν τις ὑβρίσῃ τῶν εὐπόρων εἰς τούτους, μείζω τὰ ἐπιτίμια εἶναι ἢ ἂν σφῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰς κληρονομίας μὴ κατὰ δόσιν εἶναι ἀλλὰ κατὰ γένος, μηδὲ πλειόνων ἢ μιᾶς
[Bekker 1309a line 25]
τὸν αὐτὸν κληρονομεῖν. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὁμαλώτεραι αἱ οὐσίαι εἶεν καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων εἰς εὐπορίαν ἂν καθίσταιντο πλείους. συμφέρει δὲ καὶ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ ἰσότητα ἢ προεδρίαν νέμειν τοῖς ἧττον κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας, ἐν μὲν δήμῳ τοῖς εὐπόροις, ἐν δʼ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ
[Bekker 1309a line 30]
τοῖς ἀπόροις, πλὴν ὅσαι ἀρχαὶ κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας, ταύτας δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας ἐγχειρίζειν μόνοις ἢ πλείοσιν.

τρία δέ τινα χρὴ ἔχειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἄρξειν τὰς κυρίας ἀρχάς, πρῶτον μὲν φιλίαν πρὸς τὴν καθεστῶσαν
[Bekker 1309a line 35]
πολιτείαν, ἔπειτα δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς, τρίτον δʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολιτείᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν (εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταὐτὸν τὸ δίκαιον κατὰ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶναι διαφοράς). ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν, ὅταν μὴ συμβαίνῃ ταῦτα
[Bekker 1309a line 40]
πάντα περὶ τὸν αὐτόν, πῶς χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν·

[Bekker 1309b]
[Bekker 1309b line 1]
οἷον εἰ στρατηγικὸς μέν τις εἴη, πονηρὸς δὲ καὶ μὴ τῇ πολιτείᾳ φίλος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος καὶ φίλος, πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν; ἔοικε δὲ δεῖν βλέπειν εἰς δύο, τίνος πλεῖον μετέχουσι πάντες καὶ τίνος ἔλαττον· διὸ ἐν στρατηγίᾳ μὲν
[Bekker 1309b line 5]
εἰς τὴν ἐμπειρίαν μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς (ἔλαττον γὰρ στρατηγίας μετέχουσι, τῆς δʼ ἐπιεικείας πλεῖον), ἐν δὲ φυλακῇ καὶ ταμιείᾳ τἀναντία (πλείονος γὰρ ἀρετῆς δεῖται ἢ ὅσην οἱ πολλοὶ ἔχουσιν, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη κοινὴ πᾶσιν).

ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις, ἂν δύναμις ὑπάρχῃ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας φιλία,
[Bekker 1309b line 10]
τί δεῖ τῆς ἀρετῆς; ποιήσει γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ δύο. ἢ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τοὺς τὰ δύο ταῦτα ἔχοντας ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι, ὥστε καθάπερ καὶ αὑτοῖς οὐχ ὑπηρετοῦσιν εἰδότες καὶ φιλοῦντες αὑτούς, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν οὐθὲν κωλύει ἔχειν ἐνίους; ἁπλῶς δέ, ὅσα ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὡς συμφέροντα λέγομεν
[Bekker 1309b line 15]
ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἅπαντα ταῦτα σῴζει τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον μέγιστον στοιχεῖον, τὸ τηρεῖν ὅπως κρεῖττον ἔσται τὸ βουλόμενον τὴν πολιτείαν πλῆθος τοῦ μὴ βουλομένου. παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν, ὃ νῦν λανθάνει τὰς παρεκβεβηκυίας πολιτείας, τὸ μέσον·
[Bekker 1309b line 20]
πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν δοκούντων δημοτικῶν λύει τὰς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας. οἱ δʼ οἰόμενοι ταύτην εἶναι μίαν ἀρετὴν ἕλκουσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι, καθάπερ ῥὶς ἔστι παρεκβεβηκυῖα μὲν τὴν εὐθύτητα τὴν καλλίστην πρὸς τὸ γρυπὸν ἢ τὸ σιμόν, ἀλλʼ
[Bekker 1309b line 25]
ὅμως ἔτι καλὴ καὶ χάριν ἔχουσα πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἐπιτείνῃ τις ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀποβαλεῖ τὴν μετριότητα τοῦ μορίου, τέλος δʼ οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲ ῥῖνα ποιήσει φαίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τῶν ἐναντίων, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ
[Bekker 1309b line 30]
περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μορίων, συμβαίνει δὴ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας. καὶ γὰρ ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν ἔστιν ὥστʼ ἔχειν ἱκανῶς, καίπερ ἐξεστηκυίας τῆς βελτίστης τάξεως· ἐὰν δέ τις ἐπιτείνῃ μᾶλλον ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν, πρῶτον μὲν χείρω ποιήσει τὴν πολιτείαν, τέλος δʼ οὐδὲ πολιτείαν.
[Bekker 1309b line 35]
διὸ δεῖ τοῦτο μὴ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν πολιτικόν, ποῖα σῴζει τῶν δημοτικῶν καὶ ποῖα φθείρει τὴν δημοκρατίαν, καὶ ποῖα τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. οὐδετέραν μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ἄνευ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τοῦ πλήθους, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ὁμαλότης
[Bekker 1309b line 40]
γένηται τῆς οὐσίας ἄλλην ἀνάγκη εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν,

[Bekker 1310a]
[Bekker 1310a line 1]
ὥστε φθείροντες τοῖς καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν νόμοις φθείρουσι τὰς πολιτείας.

ἁμαρτάνουσι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ δημαγωγοί, ὅπου τὸ πλῆθος κύριον τῶν νόμων· δύο γὰρ
[Bekker 1310a line 5]
ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ τὴν πόλιν, μαχόμενοι τοῖς εὐπόροις, δεῖ δὲ τοὐναντίον αἰεὶ δοκεῖν λέγειν ὑπὲρ εὐπόρων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικούς, καὶ τοὺς ὅρκους ἐναντίους ἢ νῦν ὀμνύναι τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικούς· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐνίαις ὀμνύουσι καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι καὶ βουλεύσω
[Bekker 1310a line 10]
ὅ τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν, χρὴ δὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ὑποκρίνεσθαι τοὐναντίον, ἐπισημαινομένους ἐν τοῖς ὅρκοις ὅτι οὐκ ἀδικήσω τὸν δῆμον.

μέγιστον δὲ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων πρὸς τὸ διαμένειν τὰς πολιτείας, οὗ νῦν ὀλιγωροῦσι πάντες, τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας. ὄφελος γὰρ οὐθὲν τῶν
[Bekker 1310a line 15]
ὠφελιμωτάτων νόμων καὶ συνδεδοξασμένων ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν πολιτευομένων, εἰ μὴ ἔσονται εἰθισμένοι καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, εἰ μὲν οἱ νόμοι δημοτικοί, δημοτικῶς, εἰ δʼ ὀλιγαρχικοί, ὀλιγαρχικῶς. εἴπερ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐφʼ ἑνὸς ἀκρασία, ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ πόλεως. ἔστι δὲ τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι
[Bekker 1310a line 20]
πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ τοῦτο, τὸ ποιεῖν οἷς χαίρουσιν οἱ ὀλιγαρχοῦντες ἢ οἱ δημοκρατίαν βουλόμενοι, ἀλλʼ οἷς δυνήσονται οἱ μὲν ὀλιγαρχεῖν οἱ δὲ δημοκρατεῖσθαι. νῦν δʼ ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οἱ τῶν ἀρχόντων υἱοὶ τρυφῶσιν, οἱ δὲ τῶν ἀπόρων γίγνονται γεγυμνασμένοι καὶ πεπονηκότες,
[Bekker 1310a line 25]
ὥστε καὶ βούλονται μᾶλλον καὶ δύνανται νεωτερίζειν· ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῖς μάλιστα εἶναι δοκούσαις δημοκρατικαῖς τοὐναντίον τοῦ συμφέροντος καθέστηκεν, αἴτιον δὲ τούτου ὅτι κακῶς ὁρίζονται τὸ ἐλεύθερον. δύο γάρ ἐστιν οἷς ἡ δημοκρατία δοκεῖ ὡρίσθαι, τῷ τὸ πλεῖον εἶναι κύριον καὶ τῇ
[Bekker 1310a line 30]
ἐλευθερίᾳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον ἴσον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἴσον δʼ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τῷ πλήθει, τοῦτʼ εἶναι κύριον, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ ἴσον τὸ ὅ τι ἂν βούληταί τις ποιεῖν· ὥστε ζῇ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δημοκρατίαις ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, καὶ εἰς ὃ χρῄζων, ὡς φησὶν Εὐριπίδης· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ φαῦλον· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ
[Bekker 1310a line 35]
οἴεσθαι δουλείαν εἶναι τὸ ζῆν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ σωτηρίαν. ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν αἱ πολιτεῖαι μεταβάλλουσι καὶ φθείρονται, καὶ διὰ τίνων σῴζονται καὶ διαμένουσιν, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν τοσαῦτά ἐστιν.

λείπεται δʼ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας, ἐξ ὧν τε
[Bekker 1310a line 40]
φθείρεται καὶ διʼ ὧν σῴζεσθαι πέφυκεν.

σχεδὸν δὲ παραπλήσια
[Bekker 1310b]
[Bekker 1310b line 1]
τοῖς εἰρημένοις περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τὰς βασιλείας καὶ τὰς τυραννίδας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ βασιλεία κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ὑστάτης σύγκειται καὶ δημοκρατίας·
[Bekker 1310b line 5]
διὸ δὴ καὶ βλαβερωτάτη τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ἐστίν, ἅτε ἐκ δυοῖν συγκειμένη κακῶν καὶ τὰς παρεκβάσεις καὶ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἔχουσα τὰς παρʼ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτειῶν. ὑπάρχει δʼ ἡ γένεσις εὐθὺς ἐξ ἐναντίων ἑκατέρᾳ τῶν μοναρχιῶν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ βασιλεία πρὸς βοήθειαν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς
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ἐπιεικέσι γέγονεν, καὶ καθίσταται βασιλεὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς ἢ πράξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἢ καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν τοιούτου γένους, ὁ δὲ τύραννος ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τοῦ πλήθους ἐπὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους, ὅπως ὁ δῆμος ἀδικῆται μηδὲν ὑπʼ αὐτῶν. φανερὸν δʼ ἐκ τῶν συμβεβηκότων. σχεδὸν
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γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν, πιστευθέντες ἐκ τοῦ διαβάλλειν τοὺς γνωρίμους. αἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κατέστησαν τῶν τυραννίδων, ἤδη τῶν πόλεων ηὐξημένων, αἱ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἐκ τε τῶν βασιλέων παρεκβαινόντων τὰ πάτρια καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας ἀρχῆς
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ὀρεγομένων, αἱ δὲ ἐκ τῶν αἱρετῶν ἐπὶ τὰς κυρίας ἀρχάς (τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον οἱ δῆμοι καθίστασαν πολυχρονίους τὰς δημιουργίας καὶ τὰς θεωρίας), αἱ δʼ ἐκ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν, αἱρουμένων ἕνα τινὰ κύριον ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς. πᾶσι γὰρ ὑπῆρχε τοῖς τρόποις τούτοις τὸ κατεργάζεσθαι ῥᾳδίως,
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εἰ μόνον βουληθεῖεν, διὰ τὸ δύναμιν προϋπάρχειν τοῖς μὲν βασιλικῆς ἀρχῆς τοῖς δὲ τὴν τῆς τιμῆς· οἷον Φείδων μὲν περὶ Ἄργος καὶ ἕτεροι τύραννοι κατέστησαν βασιλείας ὑπαρχούσης, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ Φάλαρις ἐκ τῶν τιμῶν, Παναίτιος δʼ ἐν Λεοντίνοις καὶ Κύψελος ἐν Κορίνθῳ
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καὶ Πεισίστρατος Ἀθήνησι καὶ Διονύσιος ἐν Συρακούσαις καὶ ἕτεροι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐκ δημαγωγίας. καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, ἡ βασιλεία τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν. κατʼ ἀξίαν γάρ ἐστιν, ἢ κατʼ ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν ἢ κατὰ γένος, ἢ κατʼ εὐεργεσίας, ἢ κατὰ ταῦτά τε καὶ δύναμιν. ἅπαντες
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γὰρ εὐεργετήσαντες ἢ δυνάμενοι τὰς πόλεις ἢ τὰ ἔθνη εὐεργετεῖν ἐτύγχανον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης, οἱ μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον κωλύσαντες δουλεύειν, ὥσπερ Κόδρος, οἱ δʼ ἐλευθερώσαντες, ὥσπερ Κῦρος, ἢ κτίσαντες ἢ κτησάμενοι χώραν, ὥσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ
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Μολοττῶν. βούλεται δʼ ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶναι φύλαξ,

ὅπως οἱ
[Bekker 1311a]
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μὲν κεκτημένοι τὰς οὐσίας μηθὲν ἄδικον πάσχωσιν, ὁ δὲ δῆμος μὴ ὑβρίζηται μηθέν· ἡ δὲ τυραννίς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπει κοινόν, εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ὠφελείας χάριν. ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς τυραννικὸς μὲν τὸ ἡδύ,
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βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλόν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλεονεκτημάτων τὰ μὲν χρήματα τυραννικὰ, τὰ δʼ εἰς τιμὴν βασιλικὰ μᾶλλον· καὶ φυλακὴ βασιλικὴ μὲν πολιτική, τυραννικὴ δὲ διὰ ξένων.

ὅτι δʼ ἡ τυραννὶς ἔχει κακὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τὰ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, φανερόν· ἐκ μὲν ὀλιγαρχίας
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τὸ τὸ τέλος εἶναι πλοῦτον (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ διαμένειν ἀναγκαῖον μόνως τήν τε φυλακὴν καὶ τὴν τρυφήν), καὶ τὸ τῷ πλήθει μηδὲν πιστεύειν (διὸ καὶ τὴν παραίρεσιν ποιοῦνται τῶν ὅπλων), καὶ τὸ κακοῦν τὸν ὄχλον καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως ἀπελαύνειν καὶ διοικίζειν ἀμφοτέρων κοινόν, καὶ
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τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος· ἐκ δημοκρατίας δὲ τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῖς γνωρίμοις καὶ διαφθείρειν λάθρᾳ καὶ φανερῶς καὶ φυγαδεύειν ὡς ἀντιτέχνους καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐμποδίους. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐπιβουλάς, τῶν μὲν ἄρχειν αὐτῶν βουλομένων, τῶν δὲ μὴ
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δουλεύειν. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Θρασύβουλον συμβούλευμά ἐστιν, ἡ τῶν ὑπερεχόντων σταχύων κόλουσις, ὡς δέον αἰεὶ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν πολιτῶν ἀναιρεῖν. καθάπερ οὖν σχεδὸν ἐλέχθη, τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρχὰς δεῖ νομίζειν περί τε τὰς πολιτείας εἶναι τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ περὶ τὰς μοναρχίας·
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διά τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ διὰ φόβον καὶ διὰ καταφρόνησιν ἐπιτίθενται πολλοὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων ταῖς μοναρχίαις, τῆς δὲ ἀδικίας μάλιστα διʼ ὕβριν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἰδίων στέρησιν.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τέλη ταὐτά, καθάπερ κἀκεῖ, καὶ περὶ τὰς τυραννίδας καὶ τὰς βασιλείας·
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μέγεθος γὰρ ὑπάρχει πλούτου καὶ τιμῆς τοῖς μονάρχοις, ὧν ἐφίενται πάντες. τῶν δʼ ἐπιθέσεων αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα γίγνονται τῶν ἀρχόντων, αἱ δʼ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. αἱ μὲν οὖν διʼ ὕβριν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα. τῆς δʼ ὕβρεως οὔσης πολυμεροῦς, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν αἴτιον γίγνεται τῆς ὀργῆς· τῶν δʼ ὀργιζομένων
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σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι τιμωρίας χάριν ἐπιτίθενται, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὑπεροχῆς. οἷον ἡ μὲν τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν διὰ τὸ προπηλακίσαι μὲν τὴν Ἁρμοδίου ἀδελφὴν ἐπηρεάσαι δʼ Ἁρμόδιον (ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἁρμόδιος διὰ τὴν ἀδελφήν, ὁ δὲ Ἀριστογείτων διὰ τὸν Ἁρμόδιον), ἐπεβούλευσαν δὲ καὶ Περιάνδρῳ
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τῷ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ τυράννῳ διὰ τὸ συμπίνοντα μετὰ
[Bekker 1311b]
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τῶν παιδικῶν ἐρωτῆσαι αὐτὸν εἰ ἤδη ἐξ αὐτοῦ κύει·

ἡ δὲ Φιλίππου ὑπὸ Παυσανίου διὰ τὸ ἐᾶσαι ὑβρισθῆναι αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἄτταλον, καὶ ἡ Ἀμύντου τοῦ μικροῦ ὑπὸ Δέρδα διὰ τὸ καυχήσασθαι εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ
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τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρᾳ τῷ Κυπρίῳ· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμένος. πολλαὶ δʼ ἐπιθέσεις γεγένηνται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχῦναι τῶν μονάρχων τινάς. οἷον καὶ ἡ Κραταίου εἰς Ἀρχέλαον· αἰεὶ γὰρ βαρέως εἶχε πρὸς τὴν ὁμιλίαν, ὥστε ἱκανὴ καὶ
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ἐλάττων ἂν ἐγένετο πρόφασις—ἢ διότι τῶν θυγατέρων οὐδεμίαν ἔδωκεν ὁμολογήσας αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν προτέραν, κατεχόμενος ὑπὸ πολέμου πρὸς Σίρραν καὶ Ἀρράβαιον, ἔδωκε τῷ βασιλεῖ τῷ τῆς Ἐλιμείας, τὴν δὲ νεωτέραν τῷ υἱεῖ Ἀμύντᾳ, οἰόμενος οὕτως ἂν ἐκεῖνον ἥκιστα διαφέρεσθαι
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καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῆς Κλεοπάτρας· ἀλλὰ τῆς γε ἀλλοτριότητος ὑπῆρχεν ἀρχὴ τὸ βαρέως φέρειν πρὸς τὴν ἀφροδισιαστικὴν χάριν. συνεπέθετο δὲ καὶ Ἑλλανοκράτης ὁ Λαρισαῖος διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· ὡς γὰρ χρώμενος αὐτοῦ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ οὐ κατῆγεν ὑποσχόμενος, διʼ ὕβριν καὶ οὐ διʼ ἐρωτικὴν ἐπιθυμίαν
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ᾤετο εἶναι τὴν γεγενημένην ὁμιλίαν. Πύθων δὲ καὶ Ἡρακλείδης οἱ Αἴνιοι Κότυν διέφθειραν τῷ πατρὶ τιμωροῦντες, Ἀδάμας δʼ ἀπέστη Κότυος διὰ τὸ ἐκτμηθῆναι παῖς ὢν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ὑβρισμένος.

### Book V, 1311b–1315a

πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰκισθῆναι πληγαῖς ὀργισθέντες οἱ μὲν διέφθειραν,
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οἱ δʼ ἐνεχείρησαν ὡς ὑβρισθέντες, καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ βασιλικὰς δυναστείας. οἷον ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ τοὺς Πενθιλίδας Μεγακλῆς περιιόντας καὶ τύπτοντας ταῖς κορύναις ἐπιθέμενος μετὰ τῶν φίλων ἀνεῖλεν, καὶ ὕστερον Σμέρδης Πενθίλον πληγὰς λαβὼν καὶ παρὰ τῆς γυναικὸς
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ἐξελκυσθεὶς διέφθειρεν. καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δʼ ἐπιθέσεως Δεκάμνιχος ἡγεμὼν ἐγένετο, παροξύνων τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους πρῶτος· αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς ὅτι αὐτὸν ἐξέδωκε μαστιγῶσαι Εὐριπίδῃ τῷ ποιητῇ· ὁ δʼ Εὐριπίδης ἐχαλέπαινεν εἰπόντος τι αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσωδίαν τοῦ στόματος. καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ
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διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας οἱ μὲν ἀνῃρέθησαν οἱ δʼ ἐπεβουλεύθησαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διὰ φόβον· ἓν γάρ τι τοῦτο τῶν αἰτίων ἦν, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ περὶ τὰς μοναρχίας· οἷον Ξέρξην Ἀρταπάνης φοβούμενος τὴν διαβολὴν τὴν περὶ Δαρεῖον, ὅτι ἐκρέμασεν οὐ κελεύσαντος Ξέρξου, ἀλλʼ οἰόμενος
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συγγνώσεσθαι ὡς ἀμνημονοῦντα διὰ τὸ δειπνεῖν. αἱ δὲ διὰ
[Bekker 1312a]
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καταφρόνησιν,

ὥσπερ Σαρδανάπαλλον ἰδών τις ξαίνοντα μετὰ τῶν γυναικῶν (εἰ ἀληθῆ ταῦτα οἱ μυθολογοῦντες λέγουσιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπʼ ἐκείνου, ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ ἄλλου γε ἂν γένοιτο τοῦτο ἀληθές), καὶ Διονυσίῳ τῷ ὑστέρῳ Δίων ἐπέθετο διὰ τὸ
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καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶν τούς τε πολίτας οὕτως ἔχοντας καὶ αὐτὸν ἀεὶ μεθύοντα. καὶ τῶν φίλων δέ τινες ἐπιτίθενται διὰ καταφρόνησιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πιστεύεσθαι καταφρονοῦσιν ὡς λήσοντες. καὶ οἱ οἰόμενοι δύνασθαι κατασχεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν τρόπον τινὰ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν ἐπιτίθενται· ὡς
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δυνάμενοι γὰρ καὶ καταφρονοῦντες τοῦ κινδύνου διὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπιχειροῦσι ῥᾳδίως, ὥσπερ οἱ στρατηγοῦντες τοῖς μονάρχοις, οἷον Κῦρος Ἀστυάγει καὶ τοῦ βίου καταφρονῶν καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν ἐξηργηκέναι αὐτὸν δὲ τρυφᾶν, καὶ Σεύθης ὁ Θρᾷξ Ἀμαδόκῳ στρατηγὸς ὤν.
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οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ πλείω τούτων ἐπιτίθενται, οἷον καὶ καταφρονοῦντες καὶ διὰ κέρδος, ὥσπερ Ἀριοβαρζάνῃ Μιθριδάτης μάλιστα δὲ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἐγχειροῦσιν οἱ τὴν φύσιν μὲν θρασεῖς, τιμὴν δʼ ἔχοντες πολεμικὴν παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις· ἀνδρεία γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχουσα θράσος ἐστίν, διʼ ἃς
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ἀμφοτέρας, ὡς ῥᾳδίως κρατήσοντες, ποιοῦνται τὰς ἐπιθέσεις.

τῶν δὲ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἐπιτιθεμένων ἕτερος τρόπος ἔστι τῆς αἰτίας παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους πρότερον. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἔνιοι τοῖς τυράννοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν ὁρῶντες κέρδη τε μεγάλα καὶ τιμὰς μεγάλας οὔσας αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ τῶν διὰ φιλοτιμίαν
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ἐπιτιθεμένων ἕκαστος προαιρεῖται κινδυνεύειν· ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν, οὗτοι δʼ ὥσπερ κἂν ἄλλης τινὸς γενομένης πράξεως περιττῆς καὶ διʼ ἣν ὀνομαστοὶ γίγνονται καὶ γνώριμοι τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς μονάρχοις ἐγχειροῦσιν, οὐ κτήσασθαι βουλόμενοι
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μοναρχίαν ἀλλὰ δόξαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἐλάχιστοί γε τὸν ἀριθμόν εἰσιν οἱ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὁρμῶντες· ὑποκεῖσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τοῦ σωθῆναι μηδὲν φροντίζειν, ἂν μὴ μέλλῃ κατασχήσειν τὴν πρᾶξιν. οἷς ἀκολουθεῖν μὲν δεῖ τὴν Δίωνος ὑπόληψιν, οὐ ῥᾴδιον δʼ αὐτὴν ἐγγενέσθαι πολλοῖς·
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ἐκεῖνος γὰρ μετʼ ὀλίγων ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ Διονύσιον οὕτως ἔχειν φάσκων ὡς ὅποι περ ἂν δύνηται προελθεῖν, ἱκανὸν αὑτῷ τοσοῦτον μετασχεῖν τῆς πράξεως, οἷον εἰ μικρὸν ἐπιβάντα τῆς γῆς εὐθὺς συμβαίη τελευτῆσαι τοῦτον καλῶς ἔχειν αὑτῷ τὸν θάνατον.

φθείρεται δὲ τυραννὶς ἕνα
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μὲν τρόπον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστη πολιτειῶν, ἔξωθεν,

[Bekker 1312b]
[Bekker 1312b line 1]
ἐὰν ἐναντία τις ᾖ πολιτεία κρείττων (τὸ μὲν γὰρ βούλεσθαι δῆλον ὡς ὑπάρξει διὰ τὴν ἐναντιότητα τῆς προαιρέσεως· ἃ δὲ βούλονται, δυνάμενοι πράττουσι πάντες), ἐναντίαι δʼ αἱ πολιτεῖαι, δῆμος μὲν τυραννίδι καθʼ Ἡσίοδον
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ὡς κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ δημοκρατία ἡ τελευταία τυραννίς ἐστιν), βασιλεία δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατία διὰ τὴν ἐναντιότητα τῆς πολιτείας (διὸ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πλείστας κατέλυσαν τυραννίδας καὶ Συρακούσιοι κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ὃν ἐπολιτεύοντο καλῶς)· ἕνα δʼ ἐξ αὑτῆς, ὅταν οἱ μετέχοντες
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στασιάζωσιν, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν περὶ Γέλωνα καὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν περὶ Διονύσιον, ἡ μὲν Γέλωνος Θρασυβούλου τοῦ Ἱέρωνος ἀδελφοῦ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Γέλωνος δημαγωγοῦντος καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὰς ὁρμῶντος, ἵνʼ αὐτὸς ἄρχῃ, τῶν δὲ οἰκείων συστησάντων ἵνα μὴ ἡ τυραννὶς ὅλως καταλυθῇ ἀλλὰ Θρασύβουλος, οἱ
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δὲ συστάντες αὐτῶν, ὡς καιρὸν ἔχοντες, ἐξέβαλον ἅπαντας αὐτούς· Διονύσιον δὲ Δίων στρατεύσας, κηδεστὴς ὢν καὶ προσλαβὼν τὸν δῆμον, ἐκεῖνον ἐκβαλὼν διεφθάρη. δύο δὲ οὐσῶν αἰτιῶν διʼ ἃς μάλιστʼ ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς τυραννίσι, μίσους καὶ καταφρονήσεως, θάτερον μὲν ἀεὶ τούτων ὑπάρχει
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τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ μῖσος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ καταφρονεῖσθαι πολλαὶ γίνονται τῶν καταλύσεων. σημεῖον δέ· τῶν μὲν γὰρ κτησαμένων οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ διεφύλαξαν τὰς ἀρχάς, οἱ δὲ παραλαβόντες εὐθὺς ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπολλύασι πάντες. ἀπολαυστικῶς γὰρ ζῶντες εὐκαταφρόνητοί τε γίνονται καὶ
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πολλοὺς καιροὺς παραδιδόασι τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. μόριον δέ τι τοῦ μίσους καὶ τὴν ὀργὴν δεῖ τιθέναι· τρόπον γάρ τινα τῶν αὐτῶν αἰτία γίνεται πράξεων. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πρακτικώτερον τοῦ μίσους· συντονώτερον γὰρ ἐπιτίθενται διὰ τὸ μὴ χρῆσθαι λογισμῷ τὸ πάθος (μάλιστα δὲ συμβαίνει
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τοῖς θυμοῖς ἀκολουθεῖν διὰ τὴν ὕβριν, διʼ ἣν αἰτίαν ἥ τε τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν κατελύθη τυραννὶς καὶ πολλαὶ τῶν ἄλλων), ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μῖσος· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀργὴ μετὰ λύπης πάρεστιν, ὥστε οὐ ῥᾴδιον λογίζεσθαι, ἡ δʼ ἔχθρα ἄνευ λύπης.

ὡς δὲ ἐν κεφαλαίοις εἰπεῖν, ὅσας αἰτίας εἰρήκαμεν
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τῆς τε ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ἀκράτου καὶ τελευταίας καὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας τῆς ἐσχάτης, τοσαύτας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος θετέον· καὶ γὰρ αὗται τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι διαιρεταὶ τυραννίδες. βασιλεία δʼ ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἔξωθεν ἥκιστα φθείρεται, διὸ καὶ πολυχρόνιός ἐστιν· ἐξ αὐτῆς δʼ αἱ πλεῖσται φθοραὶ
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συμβαίνουσιν. φθείρεται δὲ κατὰ δύο τρόπους,

ἕνα μὲν
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στασιασάντων τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς βασιλείας, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τυραννικώτερον πειρωμένων διοικεῖν, ὅταν εἶναι κύριοι πλειόνων ἀξιῶσι καὶ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. οὐ γίγνονται δʼ ἔτι βασιλεῖαι νῦν, ἀλλʼ ἄν περ γίγνωνται, μοναρχίαι, τυραννίδες
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μᾶλλον, διὰ τὸ τὴν βασιλείαν ἑκούσιον μὲν ἀρχὴν εἶναι, μειζόνων δὲ κυρίαν, πολλοὺς δʼ εἶναι τοὺς ὁμοίους, καὶ μηδένα διαφέροντα τοσοῦτον ὥστε ἀπαρτίζειν πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς. ὥστε διὰ μὲν τοῦτο ἑκόντες οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν· ἂν δὲ διʼ ἀπάτης ἄρξῃ τις ἢ βίας,
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ἤδη δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι τυραννίς. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ γένος βασιλείαις τιθέναι δεῖ τῆς φθορᾶς αἰτίαν πρὸς ταῖς εἰρημέναις καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς εὐκαταφρονήτους, καὶ τὸ δύναμιν μὴ κεκτημένους τυραννικὴν ἀλλὰ βασιλικὴν τιμὴν ὑβρίζειν· ῥᾳδία γὰρ ἐγίνετο ἡ κατάλυσις· μὴ βουλομένων
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γὰρ εὐθὺς οὐκ ἔσται βασιλεύς, ἀλλὰ τύραννος καὶ μὴ βουλομένων. φθείρονται μὲν οὖν αἱ μοναρχίαι διὰ ταύτας καὶ τοιαύτας ἑτέρας αἰτίας.

σῴζονται δὲ δῆλον ὡς ἁπλῶς μὲν εἰπεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὡς δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστον τῷ τὰς μὲν βασιλείας ἄγειν
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ἐπὶ τὸ μετριώτερον. ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐλαττόνων ὦσι κύριοι, πλείω χρόνον ἀναγκαῖον μένειν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀρχήν· αὐτοί τε γὰρ ἧττον γίγνονται δεσποτικοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἴσοι μᾶλλον, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων φθονοῦνται ἧττον. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ περὶ Μολοττοὺς πολὺν χρόνον βασιλεία διέμεινεν,
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καὶ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε εἰς δύο μέρη διαιρεθῆναι τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ πάλιν Θεοπόμπου μετριάσαντος τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν ἐπικαταστήσαντος· τῆς γὰρ δυνάμεως ἀφελὼν ηὔξησε τῷ χρόνῳ τὴν βασιλείαν, ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ ἐποίησεν οὐκ ἐλάττονʼ ἀλλὰ
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μείζονʼ αὐτήν. ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα ἀποκρίνασθαί φασιν αὐτόν, εἰποῦσαν εἰ μηδὲν αἰσχύνεται τὴν βασιλείαν ἐλάττω παραδιδοὺς τοῖς υἱέσιν ἢ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβεν· οὐ δῆτα φάναι· παραδίδωμι γὰρ πολυχρονιωτέραν.

αἱ δὲ τυραννίδες σῴζονται κατὰ δύο τρόπους τοὺς ἐναντιωτάτους,
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ὧν ἅτερός ἐστιν ὁ παραδεδομένος καὶ καθʼ ὃν διοικοῦσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων τὴν ἀρχήν. τούτων δὲ τὰ πολλά φασι καταστῆσαι Περίανδρον τὸν Κορίνθιον· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῆς Περσῶν ἀρχῆς ἔστι τοιαῦτα λαβεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τά τε πάλαι λεχθέντα πρὸς σωτηρίαν, ὡς οἷόν τε,
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τῆς τυραννίδος, τὸ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας κολούειν καὶ τοὺς φρονηματίας ἀναιρεῖν, καὶ μήτε συσσίτια ἐᾶν μήτε ἑταιρίαν μήτε παιδείαν μήτε ἄλλο μηθὲν τοιοῦτον,

ἀλλὰ πάντα
[Bekker 1313b]
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φυλάττειν ὅθεν εἴωθε γίγνεσθαι δύο, φρόνημά τε καὶ πίστις, καὶ μήτε σχολὰς μήτε ἄλλους συλλόγους ἐπιτρέπειν γίγνεσθαι σχολαστικούς, καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν ἐξ ὧν ὅτι μάλιστα
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ἀγνῶτες ἀλλήλοις ἔσονται πάντες (ἡ γὰρ γνῶσις πίστιν ποιεῖ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους)· καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας αἰεὶ φανεροὺς εἶναι καὶ διατρίβειν περὶ θύρας (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἥκιστα λανθάνοιεν τί πράττουσι, καὶ φρονεῖν ἂν ἐθίζοιντο μικρὸν αἰεὶ δουλεύοντες)· καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα Περσικὰ
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καὶ βάρβαρα τυραννικά ἐστιν (πάντα γὰρ ταὐτὸν δύναται)· καὶ τὸ μὴ λανθάνειν πειρᾶσθαι ὅσα τυγχάνει τις λέγων ἢ πράττων τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλʼ εἶναι κατασκόπους, οἷον περὶ Συρακούσας αἱ ποταγωγίδες καλούμεναι, καὶ οὓς ὠτακουστὰς ἐξέπεμπεν Ἱέρων, ὅπου τις εἴη συνουσία καὶ σύλλογος
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(παρρησιάζονταί τε γὰρ ἧττον, φοβούμενοι τοὺς τοιούτους, κἂν παρρησιάζωνται, λανθάνουσιν ἧττον)· καὶ τὸ διαβάλλειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συγκρούειν καὶ φίλους φίλοις καὶ τὸν δῆμον τοῖς γνωρίμοις καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ τὸ πένητας ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους τυραννικόν, ὅπως μήτε φυλακὴ
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τρέφηται καὶ πρὸς τῷ καθʼ ἡμέραν ὄντες ἄσχολοι ὦσιν ἐπιβουλεύειν. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτου αἵ τε πυραμίδες αἱ περὶ Αἴγυπτον καὶ τὰ ἀναθήματα τῶν Κυψελιδῶν καὶ τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου ἡ οἰκοδόμησις ὑπὸ τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν, καὶ τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργα Πολυκράτεια (πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα
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δύναται ταὐτόν, ἀσχολίαν καὶ πενίαν τῶν ἀρχομένων)· καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν, οἷον ἐν Συρακούσαις (ἐν πέντε γὰρ ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν εἰσενηνοχέναι συνέβαινεν). ἔστι δὲ καὶ πολεμοποιὸς ὁ τύραννος, ὅπως δὴ ἄσχολοί τε ὦσι καὶ ἡγεμόνος ἐν χρείᾳ διατελῶσιν ὄντες. καὶ ἡ
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μὲν βασιλεία σῴζεται διὰ τῶν φίλων, τυραννικὸν δὲ τὸ μάλιστʼ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς φίλοις, ὡς βουλομένων μὲν πάντων δυναμένων δὲ μάλιστα τούτων.

καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν δὲ γιγνόμενα τὴν τελευταίαν τυραννικὰ πάντα, γυναικοκρατία τε περὶ τὰς οἰκίας, ἵνʼ ἐξαγγέλλωσι κατὰ τῶν
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ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων ἄνεσις διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν οἱ δοῦλοι καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τοῖς τυράννοις, εὐημεροῦντάς τε ἀναγκαῖον εὔνους εἶναι καὶ ταῖς τυραννίσι καὶ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ δῆμος εἶναι βούλεται μόναρχος. διὸ καὶ ὁ κόλαξ παρʼ ἀμφοτέροις ἔντιμος, παρὰ
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μὲν τοῖς δήμοις ὁ δημαγωγός (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ δημαγωγὸς τοῦ δήμου κόλαξ), παρὰ δὲ τοῖς τυράννοις οἱ ταπεινῶς ὁμιλοῦντες,
[Bekker 1314a]
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ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔργον κολακείας.

καὶ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο πονηρόφιλον ἡ τυραννίς· κολακευόμενοι γὰρ χαίρουσιν, τοῦτο δʼ οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς ποιήσειε φρόνημα ἔχων ἐλεύθερον, ἀλλὰ φιλοῦσιν οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς, ἢ οὐ κολακεύουσιν. καὶ χρήσιμοι οἱ πονηροὶ εἰς τὰ πονηρά·
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ἥλῳ γὰρ ὁ ἧλος, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία. καὶ τὸ μηδενὶ χαίρειν σεμνῷ μηδʼ ἐλευθέρῳ τυραννικόν (αὑτὸν γὰρ εἶναι μόνον ἀξιοῖ τοιοῦτον ὁ τύραννος, ὁ δʼ ἀντισεμνυνόμενος καὶ ἐλευθεριάζων ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ δεσποτικὸν τῆς τυραννίδος· μισοῦσιν οὖν ὥσπερ καταλύοντας τὴν
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ἀρχήν)· καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι συσσίτοις καὶ συνημερευταῖς ξενικοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικοῖς τυραννικόν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους τοὺς δʼ οὐκ ἀντιποιουμένους—ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τυραννικὰ μὲν καὶ σωτήρια τῆς ἀρχῆς, οὐθὲν δʼ ἐλλείπει μοχθηρίας. ἔστι δʼ ὡς εἰπεῖν πάντα ταῦτα περιειλημμένα
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τρισὶν εἴδεσιν. στοχάζεται γὰρ ἡ τυραννὶς τριῶν, ἑνὸς μὲν τοῦ μικρὰ φρονεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους (οὐθενὶ γὰρ ἂν μικρόψυχος ἐπιβουλεύσειεν), δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ διαπιστεῖν ἀλλήλοις (οὐ καταλύεται γὰρ πρότερον τυραννὶς πρὶν ἢ πιστεύσωσί τινες ἑαυτοῖς· διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι πολεμοῦσιν ὡς βλαβεροῖς
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πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι δεσποτικῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πιστοὺς καὶ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἶναι καὶ μὴ καταγορεύειν μήτε ἑαυτῶν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων)· τρίτον δʼ ἀδυναμία τῶν πραγμάτων (οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις, ὥστε οὐδὲ τυραννίδα καταλύειν μὴ
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δυνάμεως ὑπαρχούσης). εἰς οὓς μὲν οὖν ὅρους ἀνάγεται τὰ βουλεύματα τῶν τυράννων, οὗτοι τρεῖς τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες· πάντα γὰρ ἀναγάγοι τις ἂν τὰ τυραννικὰ πρὸς ταύτας τὰς ὑποθέσεις, τὰ μὲν ὅπως μὴ πιστεύωσιν ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δʼ ὅπως μὴ δύνωνται, τὰ δʼ ὅπως μικρὸν φρονῶσιν.

ὁ μὲν
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οὖν εἷς τρόπος διʼ οὗ γίγνεται σωτηρία ταῖς τυραννίσι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν· ὁ δʼ ἕτερος σχεδὸν ἐξ ἐναντίας ἔχει τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. ἔστι δὲ λαβεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς φθορᾶς τῆς τῶν βασιλειῶν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς βασιλείας εἷς τρόπος τῆς φθορᾶς τὸ ποιεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν τυραννικωτέραν, οὕτω τῆς τυραννίδος
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σωτηρία τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτὴν βασιλικωτέραν, ἓν φυλάττοντα μόνον, τὴν δύναμιν, ὅπως ἄρχῃ μὴ μόνον βουλομένων ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ βουλομένων. προϊέμενος γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο προΐεται καὶ τὸ τυραννεῖν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ὥσπερ ὑπόθεσιν δεῖ μένειν, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δοκεῖν
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ὑποκρινόμενον τὸ βασιλικὸν καλῶς. πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ δοκεῖν
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φροντίζειν τῶν κοινῶν,

μήτε δαπανῶντα εἰς δωρεὰς τοιαύτας ἐφʼ αἷς τὰ πλήθη χαλεπαίνουσιν, ὅταν ἀπʼ αὐτῶν μὲν λαμβάνωσιν ἐργαζομένων καὶ πονούντων γλίσχρως, διδῶσι δʼ ἑταίραις καὶ ξένοις καὶ τεχνίταις ἀφθόνως, λόγον τε
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ἀποδιδόντα τῶν λαμβανομένων καὶ δαπανωμένων, ὅπερ ἤδη πεποιήκασί τινες τῶν τυράννων (οὕτω γὰρ ἄν τις διοικῶν οἰκονόμος ἀλλʼ οὐ τύραννος εἶναι δόξειεν· οὐ δεῖ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι μή ποτε ἀπορήσῃ χρημάτων κύριος ὢν τῆς πόλεως· ἀλλὰ τοῖς γʼ ἐκτοπίζουσι τυράννοις ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας
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καὶ συμφέρει τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἢ καταλιπεῖν ἀθροίσαντας· ἧττον γὰρ ἂν οἱ φυλάττοντες ἐπιτιθεῖντο τοῖς πράγμασιν, εἰσὶ δὲ φοβερώτεροι τῶν τυράννων τοῖς ἀποδημοῦσιν οἱ φυλάττοντες τῶν πολιτῶν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συναποδημοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ὑπομένουσιν)· ἔπειτα τὰς εἰσφορὰς καὶ τὰς λειτουργίας
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δεῖ φαίνεσθαι τῆς τε οἰκονομίας ἕνεκα συνάγοντα, κἄν ποτε δεηθῇ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς καιρούς, ὅλως τε αὑτὸν παρασκευάζειν φύλακα καὶ ταμίαν ὡς κοινῶν ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἰδίων· καὶ φαίνεσθαι μὴ χαλεπὸν ἀλλὰ σεμνόν, ἔτι δὲ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας
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ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον αἰδεῖσθαι· τούτου μέντοι τυγχάνειν οὐ ῥᾴδιον ὄντα εὐκαταφρόνητον, διὸ δεῖ κἂν μὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιῆται ἀλλὰ τῆς πολεμικῆς, καὶ δόξαν ἐμποιεῖν περὶ αὑτοῦ τοιαύτην· ἔτι δὲ μὴ μόνον αὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι μηδένα τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑβρίζοντα, μήτε νέον μήτε
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νέαν, ἀλλὰ μηδʼ ἄλλον μηδένα τῶν περὶ αὐτόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς οἰκείας ἔχειν γυναῖκας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας, ὡς καὶ διὰ γυναικῶν ὕβρεις πολλαὶ τυραννίδες ἀπολώλασιν· περί τε τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς τοὐναντίον ποιεῖν ἢ νῦν τινες τῶν τυράννων ποιοῦσιν (οὐ γὰρ μόνον εὐθὺς
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ἕωθεν τοῦτο δρῶσιν, καὶ συνεχῶς πολλὰς ἡμέρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις βούλονται τοῦτο πράττοντες, ἵνʼ ὡς εὐδαίμονας καὶ μακαρίους θαυμάσωσιν), ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν μετριάζειν τοῖς τοιούτοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τό γε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις διαφεύγειν (οὔτε γὰρ εὐεπίθετος οὔτʼ εὐκαταφρόνητος
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ὁ νήφων, ἀλλʼ ὁ μεθύων, οὐδʼ ὁ ἄγρυπνος, ἀλλʼ ὁ καθεύδων)· τοὐναντίον τε ποιητέον τῶν πάλαι λεχθέντων σχεδὸν πάντων (κατασκευάζειν γὰρ δεῖ καὶ κοσμεῖν τὴν πόλιν ὡς ἐπίτροπον ὄντα καὶ μὴ τύραννον)· ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερόντως (ἧττόν τε
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γὰρ φοβοῦνται τὸ παθεῖν τι παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων,

[Bekker 1315a]
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ἐὰν δεισιδαίμονα νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ φροντίζειν τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἧττον ὡς συμμάχους ἔχοντι καὶ τοὺς θεούς), δεῖ δὲ ἄνευ ἀβελτερίας φαίνεσθαι τοιοῦτον· τούς τε ἀγαθοὺς περί τι γιγνομένους τιμᾶν οὕτως
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ὥστε μὴ νομίζειν ἄν ποτε τιμηθῆναι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν αὐτονόμων ὄντων, καὶ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας τιμὰς ἀπονέμειν αὐτόν, τὰς δὲ κολάσεις διʼ ἑτέρων ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων. κοινὴ δὲ φυλακὴ πάσης μοναρχίας τὸ μηθένα ποιεῖν ἕνα μέγαν, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ, πλείους (τηρήσουσι γὰρ ἀλλήλους),
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ἐὰν δʼ ἄρα τινὰ δέῃ ποιῆσαι μέγαν, μή τοι τό γε ἦθος θρασύν (ἐπιθετικώτατον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἦθος περὶ πάσας τὰς πράξεις), κἂν τῆς δυνάμεώς τινα δοκῇ παραλύειν, ἐκ προσαγωγῆς τοῦτο δρᾶν καὶ μὴ πᾶσαν ἀθρόαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν ἐξουσίαν. ἔτι δὲ πάσης μὲν ὕβρεως εἴργεσθαι,
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παρὰ πάσας δὲ δυεῖν, τῆς τε εἰς τὰ σώματα κολάσεως καὶ τῆς εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν. μάλιστα δὲ ταύτην ποιητέον τὴν εὐλάβειαν περὶ τοὺς φιλοτίμους· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὰ χρήματα ὀλιγωρίαν οἱ φιλοχρήματοι φέρουσι βαρέως, τὴν δʼ εἰς ἀτιμίαν οἵ τε φιλότιμοι καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν
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ἀνθρώπων. διόπερ ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι δεῖ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἢ τὰς μὲν κολάσεις πατρικῶς φαίνεσθαι ποιούμενον καὶ μὴ διʼ ὀλιγωρίαν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἡλικίαν ὁμιλίας διʼ ἐρωτικὰς αἰτίας ἀλλὰ μὴ διʼ ἐξουσίαν, ὅλως δὲ τὰς δοκούσας ἀτιμίας ἐξωνεῖσθαι μείζοσι τιμαῖς. τῶν δʼ ἐπιχειρούντων ἐπὶ
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τὴν τοῦ σώματος διαφθορὰν οὗτοι φοβερώτατοι καὶ δέονται πλείστης φυλακῆς ὅσοι μὴ προαιροῦνται περιποιεῖσθαι τὸ ζῆν διαφθείραντες. διὸ μάλιστα εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεῖ τοὺς ὑβρίζεσθαι νομίζοντας ἢ αὑτοὺς ἢ ὧν κηδόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν· ἀφειδῶς γὰρ ἑαυτῶν ἔχουσιν οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ἐπιχειροῦντες,
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καθάπερ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος εἶπε, χαλεπὸν φάσκων εἶναι θυμῷ μάχεσθαι, ψυχῆς γὰρ ὠνεῖσθαι.

### Book V, 1315a–1316b

ἐπεὶ δʼ αἱ πόλεις ἐκ δύο συνεστήκασι μορίων, ἔκ τε τῶν ἀπόρων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων, μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφοτέρους ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ σῴζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ τοὺς ἑτέρους ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων
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ἀδικεῖσθαι μηδέν, ὁπότεροι δʼ ἂν ὦσι κρείττους, τούτους ἰδίους μάλιστα ποιεῖσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὡς, ἂν ὑπάρξῃ τοῦτο τοῖς πράγμασιν, οὔτε δούλων ἐλευθέρωσιν ἀνάγκη ποιεῖσθαι τὸν τύραννον οὔτε ὅπλων παραίρεσιν· ἱκανὸν γὰρ θάτερον μέρος πρὸς τῇ δυνάμει προστιθέμενον ὥστε κρείττους εἶναι
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τῶν ἐπιτιθεμένων. περίεργον δὲ τὸ λέγειν καθʼ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων· ὁ γὰρ σκοπὸς φανερός,

ὅτι δεῖ μὴ τυραννικὸν
[Bekker 1315b]
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ἀλλʼ οἰκονόμον καὶ βασιλικὸν εἶναι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις καὶ μὴ σφετεριστὴν ἀλλʼ ἐπίτροπον, καὶ τὰς μετριότητας τοῦ βίου διώκειν, μὴ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν γνωρίμους καθομιλεῖν, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς δημαγωγεῖν. ἐκ γὰρ
[Bekker 1315b line 5]
τούτων ἀναγκαῖον οὐ μόνον τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καλλίω καὶ ζηλωτοτέραν τῷ βελτιόνων ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ τεταπεινωμένων μηδὲ μισούμενον καὶ φοβούμενον διατελεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι πολυχρονιωτέραν, ἔτι δʼ αὐτὸν διακεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἦθος ἤτοι καλῶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ ἡμίχρηστον ὄντα,
[Bekker 1315b line 10]
καὶ μὴ πονηρὸν ἀλλʼ ἡμιπόνηρον.

καίτοι πασῶν ὀλιγοχρονιώταται τῶν πολιτειῶν εἰσιν ὀλιγαρχία καὶ τυραννίς. πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐγένετο χρόνον ἡ περὶ Σικυῶνα τυραννίς, ἡ τῶν Ὀρθαγόρου παίδων καὶ αὐτοῦ Ὀρθαγόρου· ἔτη δʼ αὕτη διέμεινεν ἑκατόν. τούτου δʼ αἴτιον
[Bekker 1315b line 15]
ὅτι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ἐχρῶντο μετρίως καὶ πολλὰ τοῖς νόμοις ἐδούλευον, καὶ διὰ τὸ πολεμικὸς γενέσθαι Κλεισθένης οὐκ ἦν εὐκαταφρόνητος, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις ἐδημαγώγουν. λέγεται γοῦν Κλεισθένης τὸν ἀποκρίναντα τῆς νίκης αὐτὸν ὡς ἐστεφάνωσεν· ἔνιοι δʼ εἰκόνα φασὶν
[Bekker 1315b line 20]
εἶναι τοῦ κρίναντος οὕτως τὸν ἀνδριάντα τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ καθήμενον. φασὶ δὲ καὶ Πεισίστρατον ὑπομεῖναί ποτε προσκληθέντα δίκην εἰς Ἄρειον πάγον. δευτέρα δὲ ἡ περὶ Κόρινθον ἡ τῶν Κυψελιδῶν· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη διετέλεσεν ἔτη τρία καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ἓξ μῆνας· Κύψελος μὲν γὰρ ἐτυράννησεν
[Bekker 1315b line 25]
ἔτη τριάκοντα, Περίανδρος δὲ τετταράκοντα καὶ τέτταρα, Ψαμμίτιχος δʼ ὁ Γορδίου τρία ἔτη. τὰ δʼ αἴτια ταὐτὰ καὶ ταύτης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κύψελος δημαγωγὸς ἦν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν διετέλεσεν ἀδορυφόρητος, Περίανδρος δʼ ἐγένετο μὲν τυραννικός, ἀλλὰ πολεμικός. τρίτη δʼ ἡ
[Bekker 1315b line 30]
τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν Ἀθήνησιν. οὐκ ἐγένετο δὲ συνεχής· δὶς γὰρ ἔφυγε Πεισίστρατος τυραννῶν· ὥστʼ ἐν ἔτεσι τριάκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἑπτακαίδεκα ἔτη τούτων ἐτυράννησεν, ὀκτωκαίδεκα δὲ οἱ παῖδες, ὥστε τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο ἔτη τριάκοντα καὶ πέντε. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἡ περὶ Ἱέρωνα καὶ Γέλωνα περὶ
[Bekker 1315b line 35]
Συρακούσας. ἔτη δʼ οὐδʼ αὕτη πολλὰ διέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ σύμπαντα δυεῖν δέοντα εἴκοσι· Γέλων μὲν γὰρ ἑπτὰ τυραννήσας τῷ ὀγδόῳ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησεν, δέκα δʼ Ἱέρων, Θρασύβουλος δὲ τῷ ἑνδεκάτῳ μηνὶ ἐξέπεσεν. αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ τῶν τυραννίδων ὀλιγοχρόνιαι πᾶσαι γεγόνασι παντελῶς.

[Bekker 1315b line 40]
τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς μοναρχίας, ἐξ ὧν τε φθείρονται καὶ πάλιν σῴζονται, σχεδὸν
[Bekker 1316a]
[Bekker 1316a line 1]
εἴρηται περὶ πάντων.

ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ λέγεται μὲν περὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὐ μέντοι λέγεται καλῶς. τῆς τε γὰρ ἀρίστης πολιτείας καὶ πρώτης οὔσης οὐ λέγει τὴν μεταβολὴν ἰδίως. φησὶ γὰρ αἴτιον εἶναι τὸ μὴ
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μένειν μηθὲν ἀλλʼ ἔν τινι περιόδῳ μεταβάλλειν, ἀρχὴν δʼ εἶναι τούτων ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται, λέγων ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός, ὡς τῆς φύσεώς ποτε φυούσης φαύλους καὶ κρείττους τῆς παιδείας, τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ
[Bekker 1316a line 10]
λέγων ἴσως οὐ κακῶς (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ εἶναί τινας οὓς παιδευθῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι σπουδαίους ἄνδρας ἀδύνατον), ἀλλʼ αὕτη τί ἂν ἴδιος εἴη μεταβολὴ τῆς ὑπʼ ἐκείνου λεγομένης ἀρίστης πολιτείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἄλλων πασῶν καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων πάντων; καὶ διά γε τοῦ χρόνου, διʼ ὃν λέγει
[Bekker 1316a line 15]
πάντα μεταβάλλειν, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἅμα ἀρξάμενα γίγνεσθαι ἅμα μεταβάλλει, οἷον εἰ τῇ προτέρᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγένετο τῆς τροπῆς, ἅμα ἄρα μεταβάλλει; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις διὰ τίνʼ αἰτίαν ἐκ ταύτης εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν μεταβάλλει; πλεονάκις γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν μεταβάλλουσι πᾶσαι αἱ πολιτεῖαι ἢ τὴν
[Bekker 1316a line 20]
σύνεγγυς. ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταβολῶν. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς Λακωνικῆς, φησί, μεταβάλλει εἰς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης εἰς δημοκρατίαν, εἰς τυραννίδα δὲ ἐκ δημοκρατίας. καίτοι καὶ ἀνάπαλιν μεταβάλλουσιν, οἷον ἐκ δήμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς μοναρχίαν.

[Bekker 1316a line 25]
ἔτι δὲ τυραννίδος οὐ λέγει οὔτʼ εἰ ἔσται μεταβολὴ οὔτʼ εἰ μὴ ἔσται, οὔτʼ εἰ ἔσται διὰ τίνʼ αἰτίαν καὶ εἰς ποίαν πολιτείαν, τούτου δʼ αἴτιον ὅτι οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἂν εἶχε λέγειν· ἀόριστον γάρ, ἐπεὶ κατʼ ἐκεῖνον δεῖ εἰς τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐγίγνετο συνεχὲς καὶ κύκλος. ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει καὶ
[Bekker 1316a line 30]
εἰς τυραννίδα τυραννίς, ὥσπερ ἡ Σικυῶνος ἐκ τῆς Μύρωνος εἰς τὴν Κλεισθένους, καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Χαλκίδι ἡ Ἀντιλέοντος, καὶ εἰς δημοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν Γέλωνος ἐν Συρακούσαις, καὶ εἰς ἀριστοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ Χαρίλλου ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι. καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα
[Bekker 1316a line 35]
μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσται τῶν ἀρχαίων, ἐν Λεοντίνοις εἰς τὴν Παναιτίου τυραννίδα καὶ ἐν Γέλᾳ εἰς τὴν Κλεάνδρου καὶ ἐν Ῥηγίῳ εἰς τὴν Ἀναξιλάου καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς πόλεσιν ὡσαύτως. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν διὰ
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τοῦτο μεταβάλλειν ὅτι φιλοχρήματοι καὶ χρηματισταὶ οἱ
[Bekker 1316b]
[Bekker 1316b line 1]
ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς,

ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὅτι οἱ πολὺ ὑπερέχοντες ταῖς οὐσίαις οὐ δίκαιον οἴονται εἶναι ἴσον μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως τοὺς κεκτημένους μηθὲν τοῖς κεκτημένοις· ἐν πολλαῖς τε ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐκ ἔξεστι χρηματίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ νόμοι εἰσὶν οἱ
[Bekker 1316b line 5]
κωλύοντες, ἐν Καρχηδόνι δὲ δημοκρατουμένῃ χρηματίζονται καὶ οὔπω μεταβεβλήκασιν.

ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχικήν, πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων. τί γὰρ αὕτη μᾶλλον τῆς Λακωνικῆς πέπονθεν ἢ ὁποιασοῦν ἄλλης, οὗ μὴ πάντες κέκτηνται ἴσα ἢ μὴ πάντες ὁμοίως
[Bekker 1316b line 10]
εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες; οὐδενὸς δὲ πενεστέρου γενομένου ἢ πρότερον οὐδὲν ἧττον μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς δῆμον ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἂν γένωνται πλείους οἱ ἄποροι, καὶ ἐκ δήμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἐὰν κρεῖττον ᾖ τοῦ πλήθους τὸ εὔπορον καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀμελῶσιν οἱ δὲ προσέχωσι τὸν νοῦν. πολλῶν τε οὐσῶν αἰτιῶν διʼ
[Bekker 1316b line 15]
ὧν γίγνονται αἱ μεταβολαί, οὐ λέγει ἀλλʼ ἢ μίαν, ὅτι ἀσωτευόμενοι κατατοκιζόμενοι γίγνονται πένητες, ὡς ἐξ ἀρχῆς πλουσίων ὄντων πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος· ἀλλʼ ὅταν μὲν τῶν ἡγεμόνων τινὲς ἀπολέσωσι τὰς οὐσίας, καινοτομοῦσιν, ὅταν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐθὲν γίγνεται
[Bekker 1316b line 20]
δεινόν, καὶ μεταβάλλουσιν οὐθὲν μᾶλλον οὐδὲ τότε εἰς δῆμον ἢ εἰς ἄλλην πολιτείαν. ἔτι δὲ κἂν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχωσιν, κἂν ἀδικῶνται ἠ ὑβρίζωνται, στασιάζουσι καὶ μεταβάλλουσι τὰς πολιτείας, κἂν μὴ καταδαπανήσωσι τὴν οὐσίαν, διὰ τὸ ἐξεῖναι ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται ποιεῖν· οὗ αἰτίαν τὴν ἄγαν ἐλευθερίαν
[Bekker 1316b line 25]
εἶναί φησιν. πλειόνων δʼ οὐσῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ δημοκρατιῶν, ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης ἑκατέρας λέγει τὰς μεταβολὰς ὁ Σωκράτης.

### Book VI, 1316b–1320b

[Bekker 1316b]
[Bekker 1316b line 31]
πόσαι μὲν οὖν διαφοραὶ καὶ τίνες τοῦ τε βουλευτικοῦ καὶ κυρίου τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τάξεως καὶ περὶ δικαστηρίων, καὶ ποία πρὸς ποίαν συντέτακται πολιτείαν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φθορᾶς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν,
[Bekker 1316b line 35]
ἐκ ποίων τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον· ἐπεὶ δὲ τετύχηκεν εἴδη πλείω δημοκρατίας ὄντα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως πολιτειῶν, ἅμα τε περὶ ἐκείνων εἴ τι λοιπόν, οὐ χεῖρον ἐπισκέψασθαι, καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἑκάστην. ἔτι δὲ καὶ
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τὰς συναγωγὰς αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπισκεπτέον πάντων
[Bekker 1317a]
[Bekker 1317a line 1]
τῶν τρόπων·

ταῦτα γὰρ συνδυαζόμενα ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἐπαλλάττειν, ὥστε ἀριστοκρατίας τε ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι καὶ πολιτείας δημοκρατικωτέρας. λέγω δὲ τοὺς συνδυασμοὺς οὓς δεῖ μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν, οὐκ ἐσκεμμένοι δʼ εἰσὶ νῦν, οἷον ἂν
[Bekker 1317a line 5]
τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενον καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας ὀλιγαρχικῶς ᾖ συντεταγμένον, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια ἀριστοκρατικῶς, ἢ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον ὀλιγαρχικῶς, ἀριστοκρατικῶς δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας, ἢ κατʼ ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον μὴ πάντα συντεθῇ τὰ τῆς πολιτείας
[Bekker 1317a line 10]
οἰκεῖα.

ποία μὲν οὖν δημοκρατία πρὸς ποίαν ἁρμόττει πόλιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ποία τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν ποίῳ πλήθει, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ πολιτειῶν τίς συμφέρει τίσιν, εἴρηται πρότερον· ὅμως δʼ ἐπεὶ δεῖ γενέσθαι δῆλον μὴ μόνον ποία τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀρίστη ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
[Bekker 1317a line 15]
πῶς δεῖ κατασκευάζειν καὶ ταύτας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας, ἐπέλθωμεν συντόμως. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ δημοκρατίας εἴπωμεν· ἅμα γὰρ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀντικειμένης πολιτείας φανερόν, αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἣν καλοῦσί τινες ὀλιγαρχίαν. ληπτέον δὲ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν μέθοδον πάντα τὰ δημοτικὰ καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα
[Bekker 1317a line 20]
ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθεῖν· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συντιθεμένων τὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας εἴδη γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει, καὶ πλείους δημοκρατίας μιᾶς εἶναι καὶ διαφόρους. δύο γάρ εἰσιν αἰτίαι διʼ ἅσπερ αἱ δημοκρατίαι πλείους εἰσί, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ λεχθεῖσα πρότερον, ὅτι διάφοροι οἱ δῆμοι (γίνεται
[Bekker 1317a line 25]
γὰρ τὸ μὲν γεωργικὸν πλῆθος, τὸ δὲ βάναυσον καὶ θητικόν· ὧν τοῦ πρώτου τῷ δευτέρῳ προσλαμβανομένου, καὶ τοῦ τρίτου πάλιν τοῖς ἀμφοτέροις, οὐ μόνον διαφέρει τῷ βελτίω καὶ χείρω γίνεσθαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν), δευτέρα δὲ περὶ ἧς νῦν λέγομεν. τὰ γὰρ ταῖς
[Bekker 1317a line 30]
δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ δοκοῦντʼ εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας οἰκεῖα ταύτης ποιεῖ συντιθέμενα τὰς δημοκρατίας ἑτέρας· τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἐλάττω, τῇ δʼ ἀκολουθήσει πλείονα, τῇ δʼ ἅπαντα ταῦτα. χρήσιμον δʼ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν γνωρίζειν πρός τε τὸ κατασκευάζειν ἣν ἄν τις αὐτῶν τύχῃ βουλόμενος,
[Bekker 1317a line 35]
καὶ πρὸς τὰς διορθώσεις. ζητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες ἅπαντα τὰ οἰκεῖα συναγαγεῖν πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ἁμαρτάνουσι δὲ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς φθορὰς καὶ τὰς σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν εἴρηται πρότερον. νυνὶ δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ ὧν ἐφίενται λέγωμεν.

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ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευθερία (τοῦτο γὰρ λέγειν εἰώθασιν, ὡς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ
[Bekker 1317b]
[Bekker 1317b line 1]
ταύτῃ μετέχοντας ἐλευθερίας·

τούτου γὰρ στοχάζεσθαί φασι πᾶσαν δημοκρατίαν)· ἐλευθερίας δὲ ἓν μὲν τὸ ἐν μέρει ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὸν τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἐστὶ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατʼ ἀξίαν, τούτου δʼ
[Bekker 1317b line 5]
ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου τὸ πλῆθος ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κύριον, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι, τοῦτʼ εἶναι τέλος καὶ τοῦτʼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον· φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν· ὥστε ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις συμβαίνει κυριωτέρους εἶναι τοὺς ἀπόρους τῶν εὐπόρων· πλείους γάρ εἰσι, κύριον δὲ τὸ τοῖς
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πλείοσι δόξαν. ἓν μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐλευθερίας σημεῖον τοῦτο, ὃν τίθενται πάντες οἱ δημοτικοὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρον· ἓν δὲ τὸ ζῆν ὡς βούλεταί τις. τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἔργον εἶναί φασιν, εἴπερ τοῦ δουλεύοντος τὸ ζῆν μὴ ὡς βούλεται. τῆς μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας ὅρος οὗτος δεύτερος· ἐντεῦθεν δʼ ἐλήλυθε
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τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ μηθενός, εἰ δὲ μή, κατὰ μέρος, καὶ συμβάλλεται ταύτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἴσον.

τούτων δʼ ὑποκειμένων καὶ τοιαύτης οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα δημοτικά· τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι τὰς ἀρχὰς πάντας ἐκ πάντων, τὸ ἄρχειν πάντας μὲν
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ἑκάστου ἕκαστον δʼ ἐν μέρει πάντων, τὸ κληρωτὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ πάσας ἢ ὅσαι μὴ ἐμπειρίας δέονται καὶ τέχνης, τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος μηθενὸς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ ὅτι μικροτάτου, τὸ μὴ δὶς τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρχειν μηδεμίαν ἢ ὀλιγάκις ἢ ὀλίγας ἔξω τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον, τὸ ὀλιγοχρονίους εἶναι τὰς
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ἀρχὰς ἢ πάσας ἢ ὅσας ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δικάζειν πάντας καὶ ἐκ πάντων, καὶ περὶ πάντων, ἢ περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων, οἷον περὶ εὐθυνῶν καὶ πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων, τὸ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κυρίαν εἶναι πάντων ἢ τῶν μεγίστων, ἀρχὴν δὲ μηδεμίαν
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μηθενὸς ἢ ὅτι ὀλιγίστων, ἢ τῶν μεγίστων βουλὴν κυρίαν (τῶν δʼ ἀρχῶν δημοτικώτατον βουλή, ὅπου μὴ μισθοῦ εὐπορία πᾶσιν· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς τὴν δύναμιν· εἰς αὑτὸν γὰρ ἀνάγει τὰς κρίσεις πάσας ὁ δῆμος εὐπορῶν μισθοῦ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ πρὸ
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ταύτης), ἔπειτα τὸ μισθοφορεῖν μάλιστα μὲν πάντας, ἐκκλησίαν δικαστήρια ἀρχάς, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τὴν βουλὴν καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας τὰς κυρίας, ἢ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἃς ἀνάγκη συσσιτεῖν μετʼ ἀλλήλων. ἔτι ἐπειδὴ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὁρίζεται,
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τὰ δημοτικὰ δοκεῖ τἀναντία τούτων εἶναι, ἀγένεια πενία βαναυσία· ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ μηδεμίαν ἀίδιον εἶναι,

[Bekker 1318a]
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ἐὰν δέ τις καταλειφθῇ ἐξ ἀρχαίας μεταβολῆς, τό γε περιαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς καὶ ἐξ αἱρετῶν κληρωτοὺς ποιεῖν. τὰ μὲν οὖν κοινὰ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῦτʼ ἐστί· συμβαίνει δʼ ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου τοῦ ὁμολογουμένου εἶναι δημοκρατικοῦ
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(τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἅπαντας κατʼ ἀριθμόν) ἡ μάλιστʼ εἶναι δοκοῦσα δημοκρατία καὶ δῆμος. ἴσον γὰρ τὸ μηθὲν μᾶλλον ἄρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ κυρίους εἶναι μόνους ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐξ ἴσου κατʼ ἀριθμόν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὑπάρχειν νομίζοιεν τήν τʼ ἰσότητα τῇ πολιτείᾳ
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καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.

τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπορεῖται πῶς ἕξουσι τὸ ἴσον, πότερον δεῖ τὰ τιμήματα διελεῖν χιλίοις τὰ τῶν πεντακοσίων καὶ τοὺς χιλίους ἴσον δύνασθαι τοῖς πεντακοσίοις, ἢ οὐχ οὕτω δεῖ τιθέναι τὴν κατὰ τοῦτο ἰσότητα, ἀλλὰ διελεῖν
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μὲν οὕτως, ἔπειτα ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἴσους λαβόντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν χιλίων, τούτους κυρίους εἶναι τῶν αἱρέσεων καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων. πότερον οὖν αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία δικαιοτάτη κατὰ τὸ δημοτικὸν δίκαιον, ἢ μᾶλλον ἡ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος; φασὶ γὰρ οἱ δημοτικοὶ τοῦτο δίκαιον ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσιν,
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οἱ δʼ ὀλιγαρχικοὶ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τῇ πλείονι οὐσίᾳ· κατὰ πλῆθος γὰρ οὐσίας φασὶ κρίνεσθαι δεῖν. ἔχει δʼ ἀμφότερα ἀνισότητα καὶ ἀδικίαν· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅ τι ἂν οἱ ὀλίγοι, τυραννίς (καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν εἷς ἔχῃ πλείω τῶν ἄλλων εὐπόρων, κατὰ τὸ ὀλιγαρχικὸν δίκαιον ἄρχειν δίκαιος μόνος), εἰ
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δʼ ὅ τι ἂν οἱ πλείους κατʼ ἀριθμόν, ἀδικήσουσι δημεύοντες τὰ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον.

τίς ἂν οὖν εἴη ἰσότης ἣν ὁμολογήσουσιν ἀμφότεροι, σκεπτέον ἐξ ὧν ὁρίζονται δικαίων ἀμφότεροι. λέγουσι γὰρ ὡς ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι τῶν πολιτῶν, τοῦτʼ εἶναι δεῖ κύριον·
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ἔστω δὴ τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι πάντως, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη τετύχηκεν ἐξ ὧν ἡ πόλις, πλούσιοι καὶ πένητες, ὅ τι ἂν ἀμφοτέροις δόξῃ ἢ τοῖς πλείοσι, τοῦτο κύριον ἔστω, ἐὰν δὲ τἀναντία δόξῃ, ὅ τι ἂν οἱ πλείους καὶ ὧν τὸ τίμημα πλεῖον· οἷον, εἰ οἱ μὲν δέκα οἱ δὲ εἴκοσιν, ἔδοξε δὲ τῶν μὲν πλουσίων
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τοῖς ἓξ τῶν δʼ ἀπορωτέρων τοῖς πεντεκαίδεκα, προσγεγένηνται τοῖς μὲν πένησι τέτταρες τῶν πλουσίων, τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις πέντε τῶν πενήτων· ὁποτέρων οὖν τὸ τίμημα ὑπερτείνει συναριθμουμένων ἀμφοτέρων ἑκατέροις, τοῦτο κύριον. ἐὰν δὲ ἴσοι συμπέσωσι, κοινὴν εἶναι ταύτην νομιστέον ἀπορίαν ὥσπερ
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νῦν ἐὰν δίχα ἡ ἐκκλησία γένηται ἢ τὸ δικαστήριον·

ἢ
[Bekker 1318b]
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γὰρ ἀποκληρωτέον ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον ποιητέον. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου, κἂν ᾖ πάνυ χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅμως ῥᾷον τυχεῖν ἢ συμπεῖσαι τοὺς δυναμένους πλεονεκτεῖν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ζητοῦσι τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ
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δίκαιον οἱ ἥττους, οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.

δημοκρατιῶν δʼ οὐσῶν τεττάρων βελτίστη μὲν ἡ πρώτη τάξει, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἐλέχθη λόγοις· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν αὕτη. λέγω δὲ πρώτην ὥσπερ ἄν τις διέλοι τοὺς δήμους. βέλτιστος γὰρ δῆμος ὁ γεωργικός
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ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν ὅπου ζῇ τὸ πλῆθος ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἢ νομῆς. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν ἄσχολος, ὥστε μὴ πολλάκις ἐκκλησιάζειν διὰ δὲ τὸ ἔχειν τἀναγκαῖα πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις διατρίβουσι καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἀλλʼ ἥδιον αὐτοῖς
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τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι τοῦ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, ὅπου ἂν μὴ ᾖ λήμματα μεγάλα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον ὀρέγονται τοῦ κέρδους ἢ τῆς τιμῆς. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἀρχαίας τυραννίδας ὑπέμενον καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας ὑπομένουσιν, ἐάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐργάζεσθαι μὴ κωλύῃ μηδʼ
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ἀφαιρῆται μηθέν· ταχέως γὰρ οἱ μὲν πλουτοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἱ δʼ οὐκ ἀποροῦσιν. ἔτι δὲ τὸ κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ ἑλέσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν ἀναπληροῖ τὴν ἔνδειαν, εἴ τι φιλοτιμίας ἔχουσιν, ἐπεὶ παρʼ ἐνίοις δήμοις, κἂν μὴ μετέχωσι τῆς αἱρέσεως τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀλλά τινες αἱρετοὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐκ πάντων,
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ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ, τοῦ δὲ βουλεύεσθαι κύριοι ὦσιν, ἱκανῶς ἔχει τοῖς πολλοῖς· καὶ δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τοῦτʼ εἶναι σχῆμά τι δημοκρατίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ποτʼ ἦν. διὸ δὴ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστὶ τῇ πρότερον ῥηθείσῃ δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ὑπάρχειν εἴωθεν, αἱρεῖσθαι μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ εὐθύνειν καὶ
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δικάζειν πάντας, ἄρχειν δὲ τὰς μεγίστας αἱρετοὺς καὶ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, τὰς μείζους ἀπὸ μειζόνων, ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μὲν μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς δυναμένους. ἀνάγκη δὲ πολιτευομένους οὕτω πολιτεύεσθαί καλῶς (αἱ τε γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν βελτίστων ἔσονται, τοῦ δήμου βουλομένου καὶ τοῖς
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ἐπιεικέσιν οὐ φθονοῦντος), καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι καὶ γνωρίμοις ἀρκοῦσαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν τάξιν· ἄρξονται γὰρ οὐχ ὑπʼ ἄλλων χειρόνων, καὶ ἄρξουσι δικαίως διὰ τὸ τῶν εὐθυνῶν εἶναι κυρίους ἑτέρους. τὸ γὰρ ἐπανακρέμασθαι, καὶ μὴ πᾶν ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ, συμφέρον ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἐξουσία
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τοῦ πράττειν ὅ τι ἂν ἐθέλῃ τις οὐ δύναται φυλάττειν τὸ ἐν
[Bekker 1319a]
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ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαῦλον.

ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὠφελιμώτατον ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἄρχειν τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἀναμαρτήτους ὄντας, μηδὲν ἐλαττουμένου τοῦ πλήθους.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὕτη τῶν δημοκρατιῶν ἀρίστη, φανερόν,
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καὶ διὰ τίνʼ αἰτίαν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν δῆμον· πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν γεωργὸν τὸν δῆμον τῶν τε νόμων τινὲς τῶν παρὰ πολλοῖς κειμένων τὸ ἀρχαῖον χρήσιμοι πάντως, ἢ τὸ ὅλως μὴ ἐξεῖναι κεκτῆσθαι πλείω γῆν μέτρου τινὸς ἢ ἀπό τινος τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ
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καὶ τὴν πόλιν (ἦν δὲ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεσι νενομοθετημένον μηδὲ πωλεῖν ἐξεῖναι τοὺς πρώτους κλήρους· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὃν λέγουσιν Ὀξύλου νόμον εἶναι τοιοῦτόν τι δυνάμενος, τὸ μὴ δανείζειν εἴς τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἑκάστῳ γῆς), νῦν δὲ δεῖ διορθοῦν καὶ τῷ Ἀφυταίων νόμῳ,
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πρὸς γὰρ ὃ λέγομέν ἐστι χρήσιμος· ἐκεῖνοι γάρ, καίπερ ὄντες πολλοὶ κεκτημένοι δὲ γῆν ὀλίγην, ὅμως πάντες γεωργοῦσιν· τιμῶνται γὰρ οὐχ ὅλας τὰς κτήσεις, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τηλικαῦτα μόρια διαιροῦντες ὥστʼ ἔχειν ὑπερβάλλειν ταῖς τιμήσεσι καὶ τοὺς πένητας.

μετὰ δὲ τὸ γεωργικὸν πλῆθος
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βέλτιστος δῆμός ἐστιν ὅπου νομεῖς εἰσι καὶ ζῶσιν ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων· πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει τῇ γεωργίᾳ παραπλησίως, καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις μάλισθʼ οὗτοι γεγυμνασμένοι τὰς ἕξεις καὶ χρήσιμοι τὰ σώματα καὶ δυνάμενοι θυραυλεῖν. τὰ δʼ ἄλλα πλήθη πάντα σχεδόν, ἐξ
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ὧν αἱ λοιπαὶ δημοκρατίαι συνεστᾶσι, πολλῷ φαυλότερα τούτων· ὁ γὰρ βίος φαῦλος, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔργον μετʼ ἀρετῆς ὧν μεταχειρίζεται τὸ πλῆθος τό τε τῶν βαναύσων καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὸ θητικόν, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ τὸ ἄστυ κυλίεσθαι πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον
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γένος ὡς εἰπεῖν ῥᾳδίως ἐκκλησιάζει· οἱ δὲ γεωργοῦντες διὰ τὸ διεσπάρθαι κατὰ τὴν χώραν οὔτʼ ἀπαντῶσιν οὔθʼ ὁμοίως δέονται τῆς συνόδου ταύτης. ὅπου δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει τὴν χώραν τὴν θέσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην ὥστε τὴν χώραν πολὺ τῆς πόλεως ἀπηρτῆσθαι, ῥᾴδιον καὶ δημοκρατίαν ποιεῖσθαι χρηστὴν
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καὶ πολιτείαν· ἀναγκάζεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀποικίας, ὥστε δεῖ, κἂν ἀγοραῖος ὄχλος ᾖ, μὴ ποιεῖν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκκλησίας ἄνευ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλήθους. πῶς μὲν οὖν δεῖ κατασκευάζειν τὴν βελτίστην καὶ πρώτην δημοκρατίαν, εἴρηται· φανερὸν
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δὲ καὶ πῶς τὰς ἄλλας. ἑπομένως γὰρ δεῖ παρεκβαίνειν
[Bekker 1319b]
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καὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀεὶ πλῆθος χωρίζειν.

τὴν δὲ τελευταίαν, διὰ τὸ πάντας κοινωνεῖν, οὔτε πάσης ἐστὶ πόλεως φέρειν, οὔτε ῥᾴδιον διαμένειν μὴ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν εὖ συγκειμένην (ἃ δὲ φθείρειν συμβαίνει καὶ ταύτην
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καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, εἴρηται πρότερον τὰ πλεῖστα σχεδόν). πρὸς δὲ τὸ καθιστάναι ταύτην τὴν δημοκρατίαν καὶ τὸν δῆμον ποιεῖν ἰσχυρὸν εἰώθασιν οἱ προεστῶτες προσλαμβάνειν ὡς πλείστους καὶ ποιεῖν πολίτας μὴ μόνον τοὺς γνησίους ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς νόθους καὶ τοὺς ἐξ ὁποτερουοῦν
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πολίτου, λέγω δὲ οἷον πατρὸς ἢ μητρός· ἅπαν γὰρ οἰκεῖον τοῦτο τῷ τοιούτῳ δήμῳ μᾶλλον. εἰώθασι μὲν οὖν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ κατασκευάζειν οὕτω, δεῖ μέντοι προσλαμβάνειν μέχρι ἂν ὑπερτείνῃ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν μέσων, καὶ τούτου μὴ πέρα προβαίνειν· ὑπερβάλλοντες γὰρ
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ἀτακτοτέραν τε ποιοῦσι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους πρὸς τὸ χαλεπῶς ὑπομένειν τὴν δημοκρατίαν παροξύνουσι μᾶλλον, ὅπερ συνέβη τῆς στάσεως αἴτιον γενέσθαι περὶ Κυρήνην· ὀλίγον μὲν γὰρ πονηρὸν παρορᾶται, πολὺ δὲ γινόμενον ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς μᾶλλόν ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ
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τοιαῦτα κατασκευάσματα χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν τὴν τοιαύτην, οἷς Κλεισθένης τε Ἀθήνησιν ἐχρήσατο βουλόμενος αὐξῆσαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, καὶ περὶ Κυρήνην οἱ τὸν δῆμον καθιστάντες. φυλαί τε γὰρ ἕτεραι ποιητέαι πλείους καὶ φατρίαι, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἱερῶν συνακτέον εἰς ὀλίγα
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καὶ κοινά, καὶ πάντα σοφιστέον ὅπως ἂν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀναμειχθῶσι πάντες ἀλλήλοις, αἱ δὲ συνήθειαι διαζευχθῶσιν αἱ πρότερον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ τυραννικὰ κατασκευάσματα δημοτικὰ δοκεῖ πάντα, λέγω δʼ οἷον ἀναρχία τε δούλων (αὕτη δʼ ἂν εἴη μέχρι του συμφέρουσα) καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ
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παίδων, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ὅπως τις βούλεται παρορᾶν· πολὺ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ βοηθοῦν· ἥδιον γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ ζῆν ἀτάκτως ἢ τὸ σωφρόνως.

ἔστι δὲ ἔργον τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ τῶν βουλομένων συνιστάναι τινὰ τοιαύτην πολιτείαν οὐ τὸ καταστῆσαι μέγιστον
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ἔργον οὐδὲ μόνον, ἀλλʼ ὅπως σῴζηται μᾶλλον· μίαν γὰρ ἢ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἡμέρας οὐ χαλεπὸν μεῖναι πολιτευομένους ὁπωσοῦν. διὸ δεῖ, περὶ ὧν τεθεώρηται πρότερον, τίνες σωτηρίαι καὶ φθοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, εὐλαβουμένους μὲν τὰ φθείροντα,
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τιθεμένους δὲ τοιούτους νόμους, καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους,

[Bekker 1320a]
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οἳ περιλήψονται μάλιστα τὰ σῴζοντα τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ μὴ νομίζειν τοῦτʼ εἶναι δημοτικὸν μηδʼ ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὃ ποιήσει τὴν πόλιν ὅτι μάλιστα δημοκρατεῖσθαι ἢ ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι, ἀλλʼ ὃ πλεῖστον χρόνον. οἱ δὲ νῦν δημαγωγοὶ
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χαριζόμενοι τοῖς δήμοις πολλὰ δημεύουσι διὰ τῶν δικαστηρίων. διὸ δεῖ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιπράττειν τοὺς κηδομένους τῆς πολιτείας, νομοθετοῦντας μηδὲν εἶναι δημόσιον τῶν καταδικαζομένων καὶ φερόμενον πρὸς τὸ κοινόν, ἀλλʼ ἱερόν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικοῦντες οὐθὲν ἧττον εὐλαβεῖς ἔσονται
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(ζημιώσονται γὰρ ὁμοίως), ὁ δʼ ὄχλος ἧττον καταψηφιεῖται τῶν κρινομένων, λήψεσθαι μηδὲν μέλλων. ἔτι δὲ τὰς γινομένας δημοσίας δίκας ὡς ὀλιγίστας αἰεὶ ποιεῖν, μεγάλοις ἐπιτιμίοις τοὺς εἰκῇ γραφομένους κωλύοντας· οὐ γὰρ τοὺς δημοτικοὺς ἀλλὰ τοὺς γνωρίμους εἰώθασιν εἰσάγειν, δεῖ
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δὲ καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ πάντας μάλιστα μὲν εὔνους εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας, εἰ δὲ μή, μή τοί γε ὡς πολεμίους νομίζειν τοὺς κυρίους.

ἐπεὶ δʼ αἱ τελευταῖαι δημοκρατίαι πολυάνθρωποί τέ εἰσι καὶ χαλεπὸν ἐκκλησιάζειν ἀμίσθους, τοῦτο δʼ ὅπου πρόσοδοι μὴ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πολέμιον τοῖς γνωρίμοις
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(ἁπό τε γὰρ εἰσφορᾶς καὶ δημεύσεως ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι καὶ δικαστηρίων φαύλων, ἃ πολλὰς ἤδη δημοκρατίας ἀνέτρεψεν), ὅπου μὲν οὖν πρόσοδοι μὴ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, δεῖ ποιεῖν ὀλίγας ἐκκλησίας, καὶ δικαστήρια πολλῶν μὲν ὀλίγας δʼ ἡμέρας (τοῦτο γὰρ φέρει μὲν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι
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τοὺς πλουσίους τὰς δαπάνας κἂν οἱ μὲν εὔποροι μὴ λαμβάνωσι δικαστικόν, οἱ δʼ ἄποροι, φέρει δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κρίνεσθαι τὰς δίκας πολὺ βέλτιον· οἱ γὰρ εὔποροι πολλὰς μὲν ἡμέρας οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ἀπεῖναι, βραχὺν δὲ χρόνον ἐθέλουσιν), ὅπου δʼ εἰσὶ πρόσοδοι, μὴ ποιεῖν ὃ
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νῦν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ποιοῦσιν (τὰ γὰρ περιόντα νέμουσιν· λαμβάνουσι δὲ ἅμα καὶ πάλιν δέονται τῶν αὐτῶν· ὁ τετρημένος γάρ ἐστι πίθος ἡ τοιαύτη βοήθεια τοῖς ἀπόροις). ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸν ἀληθινῶς δημοτικὸν ὁρᾶν ὅπως τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἄπορον ᾖ· τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μοχθηρὰν εἶναι τὴν δημοκρατίαν.
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τεχναστέον οὖν ὅπως ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος. ἐπεὶ δὲ συμφέρει τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν προσόδων γινόμενα συναθροίζοντας ἀθρόα χρὴ διανέμειν τοῖς ἀπόροις, μάλιστα μὲν εἴ τις δύναται τοσοῦτον ἀθροίζων ὅσον εἰς γηδίου κτῆσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, πρὸς ἀφορμὴν ἐμπορίας καὶ
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γεωργίας,

### Book VI, 1320b–1323a

καί, εἰ μὴ πᾶσι δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φυλὰς ἤ τι μέρος ἕτερον ἐν μέρει διανέμειν, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας συνόδους τοὺς εὐπόρους εἰσφέρειν τὸν μισθόν, ἀφειμένους τῶν ματαίων λειτουργιῶν. τοιοῦτον δέ τινα τρόπον Καρχηδόνιοι
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πολιτευόμενοι φίλον κέκτηνται τὸν δῆμον· ἀεὶ γάρ τινας ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιοικίδας ποιοῦσιν εὐπόρους. χαριέντων δʼ ἐστὶ καὶ νοῦν ἐχόντων γνωρίμων καὶ διαλαμβάνοντας τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀφορμὰς διδόντας τρέπειν ἐπʼ ἐργασίας. καλῶς δʼ ἔχει μιμεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ Ταραντίνων.
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ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ κοινὰ ποιοῦντες τὰ κτήματα τοῖς ἀπόροις ἐπὶ τὴν χρῆσιν εὔνουν παρασκευάζουσι τὸ πλῆθος· ἔτι δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς πάσας ἐποίησαν διττάς, τὰς μὲν αἱρετὰς τὰς δὲ κληρωτάς, τὰς μὲν κληρωτὰς ὅπως ὁ δῆμος αὐτῶν μετέχῃ, τὰς δʼ αἱρετὰς ἵνα πολιτεύωνται βέλτιον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. καὶ
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τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς μερίζοντας τοὺς μὲν κληρωτοὺς τοὺς δʼ αἱρετούς. πῶς μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰς δημοκρατίας κατασκευάζειν, εἴρηται.

σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας πῶς δεῖ φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων. ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων γὰρ δεῖ συνάγειν ἑκάστην ὀλιγαρχίαν,
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πρὸς τὴν ἐναντίαν δημοκρατίαν ἀναλογιζόμενον, τὴν μὲν εὔκρατον μάλιστα τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ πρώτην— αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ σύνεγγυς τῇ καλουμένῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἐν ᾗ δεῖ τὰ τιμήματα διαιρεῖν, τὰ μὲν ἐλάττω τὰ δὲ μείζω ποιοῦντας, ἐλάττω μὲν ἀφʼ ὧν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μεθέξουσιν ἀρχῶν,
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μείζω δʼ ἀφʼ ὧν τῶν κυριωτέρων· τῷ τε κτωμένῳ τὸ τίμημα μετέχειν ἐξεῖναι τῆς πολιτείας, τοσούτου εἰσαγομένου τοῦ δήμου πλήθους διὰ τοῦ τιμήματος μεθʼ οὗ κρείττονες ἔσονται τῶν μὴ μετεχόντων· ἀεὶ δὲ δεῖ παραλαμβάνειν ἐκ τοῦ βελτίονος δήμου τοὺς κοινωνούς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐχομένην
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ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐπιτείνοντας δεῖ μικρὸν κατασκευάζειν. τῇ δʼ ἀντικειμένῃ τῇ τελευταίᾳ δημοκρατίᾳ, τῇ δυναστικωτάτῃ καὶ τυραννικωτάτῃ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν, ὅσῳ περ χειρίστη, τοσούτῳ δεῖ πλείονος φυλακῆς. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ μὲν εὖ σώματα διακείμενα πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῖα τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν
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καλῶς ἔχοντα τοῖς πλωτῆρσιν ἐπιδέχεται πλείους ἁμαρτίας ὥστε μὴ φθείρεσθαι διʼ αὐτάς, τὰ δὲ νοσερῶς ἔχοντα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὰ τῶν πλοίων ἐκλελυμένα καὶ πλωτήρων τετυχηκότα φαύλων οὐδὲ τὰς μικρὰς δύναται φέρειν ἁμαρτίας, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ χείρισται πλείστης δέονται
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φυλακῆς.

τὰς μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας ὅλως ἡ πολυανθρωπία σῴζει (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀντίκειται πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν)· τὴν δʼ ὀλιγαρχίαν δῆλον ὅτι τοὐναντίον ἀπὸ τῆς εὐταξίας δεῖ τυγχάνειν τῆς σωτηρίας.

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ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα μὲν ἔστι μέρη μάλιστα τοῦ πλήθους, γεωργικὸν βαναυσικὸν ἀγοραῖον θητικόν, τέτταρα δὲ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πόλεμον, ἱππικὸν ὁπλιτικὸν ψιλὸν ναυτικόν, ὅπου μὲν συμβέβηκε τὴν χώραν εἶναι ἱππάσιμον, ἐνταῦθα μὲν εὐφυῶς ἔχει κατασκευάζειν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσχυράν
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(ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τοῖς οἰκοῦσι διὰ ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, αἱ δʼ ἱπποτροφίαι τῶν μακρὰς οὐσίας κεκτημένων εἰσίν), ὅπου δʼ ὁπλῖτιν, τὴν ἐχομένην ὀλιγαρχίαν (τὸ γὰρ ὁπλιτικὸν τῶν εὐπόρων ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀπόρων), ἡ δὲ ψιλὴ δύναμις καὶ ναυτικὴ δημοκρατικὴ πάμπαν. νῦν μὲν οὖν
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ὅπου τοιοῦτον πολὺ πλῆθος ἔστιν, ὅταν διαστῶσι, πολλάκις ἀγωνίζονται χεῖρον· δεῖ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο φάρμακον παρὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν λαμβάνειν στρατηγῶν, οἳ συνδυάζουσι πρὸς τὴν ἱππικὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ὁπλιτικὴν τὴν ἁρμόττουσαν τῶν ψιλῶν. ταύτῃ δʼ ἐπικρατοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς διαστάσεσιν οἱ δῆμοι
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τῶν εὐπόρων· ψιλοὶ γὰρ ὄντες πρὸς ἱππικὴν καὶ ὁπλιτικὴν ἀγωνίζονται ῥᾳδίως.

τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων καθιστάναι ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν ἐφʼ ἑαυτούς ἐστι καθιστάναι, δεῖ δὲ διῃρημένης τῆς ἡλικίας, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων πρεσβυτέρων τῶν δὲ νέων, ἔτι μὲν ὄντας νέους τοὺς αὐτῶν υἱεῖς διδάσκεσθαι
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τὰς κούφας καὶ τὰς ψιλὰς ἐργασίας, ἐκκεκριμένους δὲ ἐκ παίδων ἀθλητὰς εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῶν ἔργων· τὴν δὲ μετάδοσιν γίνεσθαι τῷ πλήθει τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἤτοι καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, τοῖς τὸ τίμημα κτωμένοις, ἢ καθάπερ Θηβαίοις, ἀποσχομένοις χρόνον τινὰ τῶν βαναύσων ἔργων, ἢ καθάπερ
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ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ κρίσιν ποιουμένους τῶν ἀξίων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς κυριωτάταις, ἃς δεῖ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κατέχειν, δεῖ προσκεῖσθαι λειτουργίας, ἵνʼ ἑκὼν ὁ δῆμος μὴ μετέχῃ καὶ συγγνώμην ἔχῃ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ὡς μισθὸν πολὺν διδοῦσι τῆς
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ἀρχῆς. ἁρμόττει δὲ θυσίας τε εἰσιόντας ποιεῖσθαι μεγαλοπρεπεῖς καὶ κατασκευάζειν τι τῶν κοινῶν, ἵνα τῶν περὶ τὰς ἑστιάσεις μετέχων ὁ δῆμος καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὁρῶν κοσμουμένην τὰ μὲν ἀναθήμασι τὰ δὲ οἰκοδομήμασιν ἄσμενος ὁρᾷ μένουσαν τὴν πολιτείαν· συμβήσεται δὲ καὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις
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εἶναι μνημεῖα τῆς δαπάνης. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο νῦν οἱ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας οὐ ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον· τὰ λήμματα γὰρ ζητοῦσιν οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τὴν τιμήν. διόπερ εὖ ἔχει λέγειν
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ταύτας εἶναι δημοκρατίας μικράς.

πῶς μὲν οὖν χρὴ καθιστάναι τὰς δημοκρατίας καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

ἀκόλουθον δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐστὶ τὸ διῃρῆσθαι καλῶς
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τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, πόσαι καὶ τίνες καὶ τίνων, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀρχῶν χωρὶς ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, τῶν δὲ πρὸς εὐταξίαν καὶ κόσμον ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι καλῶς. ἔτι δʼ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν μὲν ταῖς μικραῖς ἐλάττους εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μεγάλαις
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πλείους, ὥσπερ τυγχάνει πρότερον εἰρημένον· ποίας οὖν ἁρμόττει συνάγειν καὶ ποίας χωρίζειν, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. πρώτη μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἡ περὶ τὴν ἀγοράν, ἐφʼ ᾗ δεῖ τινα ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὴν ἐφορῶσαν περί τε τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ τὴν εὐκοσμίαν· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον
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πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ μὲν ὠνεῖσθαι τὰ δὲ πωλεῖν πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀναγκαίαν χρείαν, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ὑπογυιότατον πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν, διʼ ἣν δοκοῦσιν εἰς μίαν πολιτείαν συνελθεῖν. ἑτέρα δὲ ἐπιμέλεια ταύτης ἐχομένη καὶ σύνεγγυς ἡ τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄστυ δημοσίων καὶ ἰδίων, ὅπως
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εὐκοσμία ᾖ, καὶ τῶν πιπτόντων οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ ὁδῶν σωτηρία καὶ διόρθωσις, καὶ τῶν ὁρίων τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅπως ἀνεγκλήτως ἔχωσιν, καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἄλλα τῆς ἐπιμελείας ὁμοιότροπα. καλοῦσι δʼ ἀστυνομίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν, ἔχει δὲ μόρια πλείω τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὧν
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ἑτέρους ἐφʼ ἕτερα καθιστᾶσιν ἐν ταῖς πολυανθρωποτέραις πόλεσιν, οἷον τειχοποιοὺς καὶ κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητὰς καὶ λιμένων φύλακας. ἄλλη δʼ ἀναγκαία τε καὶ παραπλησία ταύτῃ· περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μὲν γάρ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ ἄστεως· καλοῦσι δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας τούτους
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οἱ μὲν ἀγρονόμους οἱ δʼ ὑλωρούς. αὗται μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλειαί εἰσι τούτων τρεῖς, ἄλλη δʼ ἀρχὴ πρὸς ἣν αἱ πρόσοδοι τῶν κοινῶν ἀναφέρονται, παρʼ ὧν φυλαττόντων μερίζονται πρὸς ἑκάστην διοίκησιν· καλοῦσι δʼ ἀποδέκτας τούτους καὶ ταμίας. ἑτέρα δʼ ἀρχὴ πρὸς ἣν ἀναγράφεσθαι δεῖ τά τε ἴδια συμβόλαια
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καὶ τὰς κρίσεις τὰς ἐκ τῶν δικαστηρίων· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις καὶ τὰς γραφὰς τῶν δικῶν γίνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ τὰς εἰσαγωγάς. ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν οὖν μερίζουσι καὶ ταύτην εἰς πλείους, ἔστι δʼ οὗ μία κυρία τούτων πάντων· καλοῦνται δὲ ἱερομνήμονες καὶ ἐπιστάται καὶ μνήμονες καὶ τούτοις ἄλλα
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ὀνόματα σύνεγγυς.

μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἐχομένη μὲν ἀναγκαιοτάτη δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ χαλεπωτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τῶν καταδικασθέντων καὶ τῶν προτιθεμένων
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κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφὰς καὶ περὶ τὰς φυλακὰς τῶν σωμάτων.

χαλεπὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστι διὰ τὸ πολλὴν ἔχειν ἀπέχθειαν, ὥστε ὅπου μὴ μεγάλα ἔστι κερδαίνειν, οὔτʼ ἄρχειν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτὴν οὔθʼ ὑπομείναντες ἐθέλουσι πράττειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους·
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ἀναγκαία δʼ ἐστίν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄφελος γίνεσθαι μὲν δίκας περὶ τῶν δικαίων, ταύτας δὲ μὴ λαμβάνειν τέλος, ὥστʼ εἰ μὴ γιγνομένων κοινωνεῖν ἀδύνατον ἀλλήλοις, καὶ πράξεων μὴ γιγνομένων. διὸ βέλτιον μὴ μίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀλλʼ ἄλλους ἐξ ἄλλων δικαστηρίων, καὶ περὶ τὰς προθέσεις
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τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων ὡσαύτως πειρᾶσθαι διαιρεῖν, ἔτι δʼ ἔνια πράττεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τάς τε ἄλλας καὶ τὰς τῶν ἔνων μᾶλλον τὰς νέας, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνεστώτων ἑτέρας καταδικασάσης ἑτέραν εἶναι τὴν πραττομένην, οἷον ἀστυνόμους τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀγορανόμων, τὰς δὲ παρὰ τούτων ἑτέρους.
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ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐλάττων ἀπέχθεια ἐνῇ τοῖς πραττομένοις, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον λήψονται τέλος αἱ πράξεις· τὸ μὲν οὖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς καταδικάσαντας καὶ πραττομένους ἀπέχθειαν ἔχει διπλῆν, τὸ δὲ περὶ πάντων τοὺς αὐτοὺς πολεμίους πᾶσιν ποιεῖ. πολλαχοῦ δὲ δὴ διῄρηται καὶ ἡ φυλάττουσα πρὸς τὴν
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πραττομένην, οἷον Ἀθήνησιν ἡ τῶν Ἕνδεκα καλουμένων. διὸ βέλτιον καὶ ταύτην χωρίζειν, καὶ τὸ σόφισμα ζητεῖν καὶ περὶ ταύτην. ἀναγκαία μὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὐχ ἧττον τῆς εἰρημένης, συμβαίνει δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς φεύγειν μάλιστα ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, τοὺς δὲ μοχθηροὺς οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ποιεῖν κυρίους· αὐτοὶ
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γὰρ δέονται φυλακῆς μᾶλλον ἄλλων ἢ φυλάττειν ἄλλους δύνανται. διὸ δεῖ μὴ μίαν ἀποτεταγμένην ἀρχὴν εἶναι πρὸς αὐτούς, μηδὲ συνεχῶς τὴν αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ τῶν τε νέων, ὅπου τις ἐφήβων ἢ φρουρῶν ἔστι τάξις, καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν δεῖ κατὰ μέρη ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἑτέρους.

ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς
[Bekker 1322a line 30]
ἀρχὰς ὡς ἀναγκαιοτάτας θετέον εἶναι πρώτας, μετὰ δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἀναγκαίας μὲν οὐθὲν ἧττον, ἐν σχήματι δὲ μείζονι τεταγμένας· καὶ γὰρ ἐμπειρίας καὶ πίστεως δέονται πολλῆς. τοιαῦται δʼ εἶεν ἂν αἵ τε περὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ὅσαι τάττονται πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας. δεῖ
[Bekker 1322a line 35]
δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ πυλῶν τε καὶ τειχῶν φυλακῆς ὁμοίως ἐπιμελητὰς εἶναι καὶ ἐξετάσεως καὶ συντάξεως τῶν πολιτῶν. ἔνθα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ἀρχαὶ πλείους εἰσίν, ἔνθα δʼ ἐλάττους, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς πόλεσι μία περὶ πάντων. καλοῦσι δὲ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πολεμάρχους
[Bekker 1322b]
[Bekker 1322b line 1]
τοὺς τοιούτους.

ἔτι δὲ κἂν ὦσιν ἱππεῖς ἢ ψιλοὶ ἢ τοξόται ἢ ναυτικόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ἑκάστων ἐνίοτε καθίσταται ἀρχή, αἳ καλοῦνται ναυαρχίαι καὶ ἱππαρχίαι καὶ ταξιαρχίαι, καὶ κατὰ μέρος δὲ αἱ ὑπὸ ταύτας τριηραρχίαι καὶ λοχαγίαι
[Bekker 1322b line 5]
καὶ φυλαρχίαι καὶ ὅσα τούτων μόρια. τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἕν τι τούτου ἐστὶν εἶδος, ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔνιαι τῶν ἀρχῶν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πᾶσαι, διαχειρίζουσι πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν, ἀναγκαῖον ἑτέραν εἶναι τὴν ληψομένην λογισμὸν καὶ προσευθυνοῦσαν,
[Bekker 1322b line 10]
αὐτὴν μηθὲν διαχειρίζουσαν ἕτερον· καλοῦσι δὲ τούτους οἱ μὲν εὐθύνους οἱ δὲ λογιστὰς οἱ δʼ ἐξεταστὰς οἱ δὲ συνηγόρους. παρὰ πάσας δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ μάλιστα κυρία πάντων ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ πολλάκις ἔχει τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν εἰσφοράν, ἢ προκάθηται τοῦ πλήθους, ὅπου κύριός ἐστιν ὁ
[Bekker 1322b line 15]
δῆμος· δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ συνάγον τὸ κύριον κύριον τῆς πολιτείας. καλεῖται δὲ ἔνθα μὲν πρόβουλοι διὰ τὸ προβουλεύειν, ὅπου δὲ πλῆθός ἐστι, βουλὴ μᾶλλον. αἱ μὲν οὖν πολιτικαὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν σχεδὸν τοσαῦταί τινές εἰσιν· ἄλλο δʼ εἶδος ἐπιμελείας ἡ περὶ τοὺς θεούς, οἷον ἱερεῖς τε καὶ ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν
[Bekker 1322b line 20]
περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τοῦ σῴζεσθαί τε τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἀνορθοῦσθαι τὰ πίπτοντα τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τέτακται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς. συμβαίνει δὲ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ταύτην ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν εἶναι μίαν, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς πόλεσιν, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ πολλὰς καὶ κεχωρισμένας τῆς ἱερωσύνης, οἷον ἱεροποιοὺς
[Bekker 1322b line 25]
καὶ ναοφύλακας καὶ ταμίας τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων. ἐχομένη δὲ ταύτης ἡ πρὸς τὰς θυσίας ἀφωρισμένη τὰς κοινὰς πάσας, ὅσας μὴ τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος, ἀλλʼ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἑστίας ἔχουσι τὴν τιμήν· καλοῦσι δʼ οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντας τούτους οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς οἱ δὲ πρυτάνεις.

αἱ μὲν
[Bekker 1322b line 30]
οὖν ἀναγκαῖαι ἐπιμέλειαί εἰσι περὶ τούτων, ὡς εἰπεῖν συγκεφαλαιωσαμένους, περί τε τὰ δαιμόνια καὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς προσόδους καὶ τὰ ἀναλισκόμενα, καὶ περὶ ἀγορὰν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ καὶ λιμένας καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἔτι περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια, καὶ συναλλαγμάτων ἀναγραφὰς
[Bekker 1322b line 35]
καὶ πράξεις καὶ φυλακὰς καὶ ἐπὶ λογισμούς τε καὶ ἐξετάσεις καὶ προσευθύνας τῶν ἀρχόντων, καὶ τέλος αἳ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενόν εἰσι περὶ τῶν κοινῶν· ἴδιαι δὲ ταῖς σχολαστικωτέραις καὶ μᾶλλον εὐημερούσαις πόλεσιν, ἔτι δὲ φροντιζούσαις εὐκοσμίας, γυναικονομία νομοφυλακία παιδονομία
[Bekker 1323a]
[Bekker 1323a line 1]
γυμνασιαρχία,

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ ἀγῶνας ἐπιμέλεια γυμνικοὺς καὶ Διονυσιακούς, κἂν εἴ τινας ἑτέρας συμβαίνει τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι θεωρίας. τούτων δʼ ἔνιαι φανερῶς εἰσιν οὐ δημοτικαὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, οἷον γυναικονομία καὶ παιδονομία·
[Bekker 1323a line 5]
τοῖς γὰρ ἀπόροις ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ παισὶν ὥσπερ ἀκολούθοις διὰ τὴν ἀδουλίαν. τριῶν δʼ οὐσῶν ἀρχῶν καθʼ ἃς αἱροῦνταί τινες ἀρχὰς τὰς κυρίους, νομοφυλάκων προβούλων βουλῆς, οἱ μὲν νομοφύλακες ἀριστοκρατικόν, ὀλιγαρχικὸν δʼ οἱ πρόβουλοι, βουλὴ δὲ δημοτικόν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν
[Bekker 1323a line 10]
ἀρχῶν, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πασῶν.

### Book VII, 1323a–1326a

[Bekker 1323a]
[Bekker 1323a line 14]
περὶ δὲ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα ποιήσασθαι τὴν
[Bekker 1323a line 15]
προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκη διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τίς αἱρετώτατος βίος. ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος τούτου καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἄδηλον εἶναι πολιτείαν· ἄριστα γὰρ πράττειν προσήκει τοὺς ἄριστα πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μή τι γίγνηται παράλογον. διὸ δεῖ πρῶτον
[Bekker 1323a line 20]
ὁμολογεῖσθαι τίς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἱρετώτατος βίος, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο πότερον κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος. νομίσαντας οὖν ἱκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πρός γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητήσειεν
[Bekker 1323a line 25]
ἂν ὡς οὐ, τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μακαρίοις χρή. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίη μακάριον τὸν μηθὲν μόριον ἔχοντα ἀνδρείας μηδὲ σωφροσύνης μηδὲ δικαιοσύνης μηδὲ φρονήσεως, ἀλλὰ δεδιότα μὲν τὰς παραπετομένας
[Bekker 1323a line 30]
μυίας, ἀπεχόμενον δὲ μηθενός, ἂν ἐπιθυμήσῃ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν, τῶν ἐσχάτων, ἕνεκα δὲ τεταρτημορίου διαφθείροντα τοὺς φιλτάτους φίλους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως ἄφρονα καὶ διεψευσμένον ὥσπερ τι παιδίον ἢ μαινόμενον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὥσπερ πάντες ἂν συγχωρήσειαν,
[Bekker 1323a line 35]
διαφέρονται δʼ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔχειν ἱκανὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν ὁποσονοῦν, πλούτου δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων εἰς ἄπειρον ζητοῦσι τὴν ὑπερβολήν. ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ῥᾴδιον μὲν περὶ τούτων καὶ διὰ τῶν
[Bekker 1323a line 40]
ἔργων λαμβάνειν τὴν πίστιν, ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται καὶ φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνα ταύταις,

[Bekker 1323b]
[Bekker 1323b line 1]
καὶ τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, εἴτʼ ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εἴτʼ ἐν ἀρετῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἴτʼ ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τὸ ἦθος μὲν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν κεκοσμημένοις εἰς ὑπερβολήν, περὶ δὲ τὴν ἔξω κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετριάζουσιν, ἢ τοῖς
[Bekker 1323b line 5]
ἐκεῖνα μὲν κεκτημένοις πλείω τῶν χρησίμων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἐλλείπουσιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον σκοπουμένοις εὐσύνοπτόν ἐστιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρας, ὥσπερ ὄργανόν τι, (πᾶν τε τὸ χρήσιμον εἴς τι), ὧν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ βλάπτειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μηθὲν ὄφελος εἶναι τοῖς
[Bekker 1323b line 10]
ἔχουσιν, τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἕκαστον ἀγαθῶν, ὅσῳ περ ἂν ὑπερβάλλῃ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον χρήσιμον εἶναι, εἰ δεῖ καὶ τούτοις ἐπιλέγειν μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον. ὅλως τε δῆλον ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἑκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν
[Bekker 1323b line 15]
ἥνπερ εἴληχε ταῦτα ὧν φαμεν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας. ὥστʼ εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος τιμιώτερον καὶ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἑκάστου ἀνάλογον τούτων ἔχειν. ἔτι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν ταῦτα πέφυκεν αἱρετὰ καὶ δεῖ πάντας
[Bekker 1323b line 20]
αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκείνων ἕνεκεν τὴν ψυχήν.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἑκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, ὃς εὐδαίμων μέν ἐστι καὶ μακάριος, διʼ οὐθὲν δὲ τῶν
[Bekker 1323b line 25]
ἐξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ διʼ αὑτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιός τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ ταῦτʼ ἀναγκαῖον ἑτέραν εἶναι (τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν τῆς ψυχῆς αἴτιον ταὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη, δίκαιος δʼ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ σώφρων ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην ἐστίν)· ἐχόμενον
[Bekker 1323b line 30]
δʼ ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς. ἀδύνατον δὲ καλῶς πράττειν τοῖς μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσιν· οὐθὲν δὲ καλὸν ἔργον οὔτʼ ἀνδρὸς οὔτε πόλεως χωρὶς ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως· ἀνδρεία δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις
[Bekker 1323b line 35]
τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ μορφὴν ὧν μετασχὼν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔστω πεφροιμιασμένα τῷ λόγῳ· οὔτε γὰρ μὴ θιγγάνειν αὐτῶν δυνατόν, οὔτε πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους ἐπεξελθεῖν ἐνδέχεται λόγους, ἑτέρας γάρ ἐστιν ἔργον σχολῆς
[Bekker 1323b line 40]
ταῦτα· νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἄριστος, καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν,

ὁ μετʼ ἀρετῆς κεχορηγημένης
[Bekker 1324a]
[Bekker 1324a line 1]
ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε μετέχειν τῶν κατʼ ἀρετὴν πράξεων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἐάσαντας ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου, διασκεπτέον ὕστερον, εἴ τις τοῖς εἰρημένοις τυγχάνει μὴ πειθόμενος.

[Bekker 1324a line 5]
πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον ἑνός τε ἑκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, λοιπόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο. πάντες γὰρ ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν εἶναι τὴν αὐτήν. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν πλούτῳ τὸ ζῆν εὖ τίθενται ἐφʼ ἑνός, οὗτοι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, ἐὰν ᾖ πλουσία,
[Bekker 1324a line 10]
μακαρίζουσιν· ὅσοι τε τὸν τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τιμῶσιν, οὗτοι καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἄρχουσαν εὐδαιμονεστάτην ἂν εἶναι φαῖεν· εἴ τέ τις τὸν ἕνα διʼ ἀρετὴν ἀποδέχεται, καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιοτέραν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτʼ ἤδη δύο ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖται σκέψεως, ἓν μὲν πότερος αἱρετώτερος
[Bekker 1324a line 15]
βίος, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ξενικὸς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος, ἔτι δὲ τίνα πολιτείαν θετέον καὶ ποίαν διάθεσιν πόλεως ἀρίστην, εἴτε πᾶσιν ὄντος αἱρετοῦ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως εἴτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς
[Bekker 1324a line 20]
διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον αἱρετόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προῃρήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν, ἐκεῖνο μὲν πάρεργον ἂν εἴη, τοῦτο δὲ ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείαν ἀρίστην ταύτην τὴν τάξιν καθʼ ἣν κἂν ὁστισοῦν ἄριστα πράττοι καὶ ζῴη
[Bekker 1324a line 25]
μακαρίως, φανερόν ἐστιν· ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ παρʼ αὐτῶν τῶν ὁμολογούντων τὸν μετʼ ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον αἱρετώτατον πότερον ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος αἱρετὸς ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος, οἷον θεωρητικός τις, ὃν μόνον τινές φασιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον. σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτους τοὺς
[Bekker 1324a line 30]
δύο βίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ φιλοτιμότατοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν φαίνονται προαιρούμενοι, καὶ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τῶν νῦν· λέγω δὲ δύο τόν τε πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ μικρὸν ποτέρως ἔχει τὸ ἀληθές· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τόν γε εὖ φρονοῦντα πρὸς τὸν βελτίω σκοπὸν συντάττεσθαι, καὶ τῶν
[Bekker 1324a line 35]
ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστον καὶ κοινῇ τὴν πολιτείαν. νομίζουσι δʼ οἱ μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν δεσποτικῶς μὲν γιγνόμενον μετʼ ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον οὐκ ἔχειν, ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερίᾳ· τούτων δʼ ὥσπερ ἐξ ἐναντίας ἕτεροι τυγχάνουσι δοξάζοντες· μόνον
[Bekker 1324a line 40]
γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τὸν πρακτικὸν εἶναι βίον καὶ πολιτικόν, ἐφʼ ἑκάστης γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐκ εἶναι πράξεις μᾶλλον τοῖς ἰδιώταις
[Bekker 1324b]
[Bekker 1324b line 1]
ἢ τοῖς τὰ κοινὰ πράττουσι καὶ πολιτευομένοις.

οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸν δεσποτικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι μόνον εὐδαίμονά φασιν. παρʼ ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας οὗτος ὅρος καὶ τῶν νόμων ὅπως δεσπόζωσι
[Bekker 1324b line 5]
τῶν πέλας. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χύδην ὡς εἰπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις, ὅμως εἴ πού τι πρὸς ἓν οἱ νόμοι βλέπουσι, τοῦ κρατεῖν στοχάζονται πάντες, ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτῃ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντέτακται σχεδὸν ἥ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλῆθος· ἔτι δʼ ἐν
[Bekker 1324b line 10]
τοῖς ἔθνεσι πᾶσι τοῖς δυναμένοις πλεονεκτεῖν ἡ τοιαύτη τετίμηται δύναμις, οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ Θρᾳξὶ καὶ Κελτοῖς. ἐν ἐνίοις γὰρ καὶ νόμοι τινές εἰσι παροξύνοντες πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην, καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι φασὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμον λαμβάνειν ὅσας ἂν στρατεύσωνται
[Bekker 1324b line 15]
στρατείας· ἦν δέ ποτε καὶ περὶ Μακεδονίαν νόμος τὸν μηθένα ἀπεκταγκότα πολέμιον ἄνδρα περιεζῶσθαι τὴν φορβειάν· ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις οὐκ ἐξῆν πίνειν ἐν ἑορτῇ τινι σκύφον περιφερόμενον τῷ μηθένα ἀπεκταγκότι πολέμιον· ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἴβηρσιν, ἔθνει πολεμικῷ, τοσούτους τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὀβελίσκους
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καταπηγνύουσι περὶ τὸν τάφον ὅσους ἂν διαφθείρῃ τῶν πολεμίων· καὶ ἕτερα δὴ παρʼ ἑτέροις ἔστι τοιαῦτα πολλά, τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατειλημμένα τὰ δὲ ἔθεσιν.

καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν ἄγαν ἄτοπον ἴσως εἶναι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἰ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἔργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἄρχῃ
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καὶ δεσπόζῃ τῶν πλησίον, καὶ βουλομένων καὶ μὴ βουλομένων. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦτο πολιτικὸν ἢ νομοθετικόν, ὅ γε μηδὲ νόμιμόν ἐστιν; οὐ νόμιμον δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδίκως ἄρχειν, κρατεῖν δʼ ἔστι καὶ μὴ δικαίως. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις τοῦτο ὁρῶμεν· οὔτε
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γὰρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἢ πεῖσαι ἢ βιάσασθαι τοῦ μὲν τοὺς θεραπευομένους τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πλωτῆρας. ἀλλʼ ἐοίκασιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν δεσποτικὴν πολιτικὴν οἴεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ ὅπερ αὑτοῖς ἕκαστοι οὔ φασιν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐδὲ συμφέρον, τοῦτʼ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀσκοῦντες·
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αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ παρʼ αὑτοῖς τὸ δικαίως ἄρχειν ζητοῦσι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐδὲν μέλει τῶν δικαίων. ἄτοπον δὲ εἰ μὴ φύσει τὸ μὲν δεσποστόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ οὐ δεσποστόν, ὥστε εἴπερ ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὐ δεῖ πάντων πειρᾶσθαι δεσπόζειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν δεσποστῶν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρεύειν ἐπὶ θοίνην ἢ θυσίαν
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ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτόν· ἔστι δὲ θηρευτὸν ὃ ἂν ἄγριον ᾖ ἐδεστὸν ζῷον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴη γʼ ἂν καὶ
[Bekker 1325a]
[Bekker 1325a line 1]
καθʼ ἑαυτὴν μία πόλις εὐδαίμων,

ἣ πολιτεύεται δηλονότι καλῶς, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται πόλιν οἰκεῖσθαί που καθʼ ἑαυτὴν νόμοις χρωμένην σπουδαίοις, ἧς τῆς πολιτείας ἡ σύνταξις οὐ πρὸς πόλεμον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ἔσται τῶν πολεμίων·
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μηθὲν γὰρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιοῦτον. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι πάσας τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείας καλὰς μὲν θετέον, οὐχ ὡς τέλος δὲ πάντων ἀκρότατον, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνου χάριν ταύτας. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶ τὸ θεάσασθαι πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς πῶς
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μεθέξουσι καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίας. διοίσει μέντοι τῶν ταττομένων ἔνια νομίμων· καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστιν ἰδεῖν, ἐάν τινες ὑπάρχωσι γειτνιῶντες, ποῖα πρὸς ποίους ἀσκητέον ἢ πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἑκάστους χρηστέον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν κἂν ὕστερον τύχοι τῆς προσηκούσης
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σκέψεως, πρὸς τί τέλος δεῖ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν συντείνειν·

πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας μὲν τὸν μετʼ ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον αἱρετώτατον, διαφερομένους δὲ περὶ τῆς χρήσεως αὐτοῦ, λεκτέον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους αὐτούς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκιμάζουσι τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, νομίζοντες τὸν τοῦ ἐλευθέρου
[Bekker 1325a line 20]
βίον ἕτερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἱρετώτατον, οἱ δὲ τοῦτον ἄριστον· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μηθὲν πράττοντα πράττειν εὖ, τὴν δʼ εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι ταὐτόν) ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀμφότεροι λέγουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ δὲ οὐκ ὀρθῶς, οἱ μὲν ὅτι ὁ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίος τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ ἀμείνων.
[Bekker 1325a line 25]
τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές· οὐθὲν γὰρ τό γε δούλῳ ᾗ δοῦλος χρῆσθαι σεμνόν· ἡ γὰρ ἐπίταξις ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδενὸς μετέχει τῶν καλῶν. τὸ μέντοι νομίζειν πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δεσποτείαν οὐκ ὀρθόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔλαττον διέστηκεν ἡ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν δούλων ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ φύσει ἐλεύθερον τοῦ
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φύσει δούλου. διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἱκανῶς ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις. τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν τὸ ἀπρακτεῖν τοῦ πράττειν οὐκ ἀληθές· ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς ἐστιν, ἔτι δὲ πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν τέλος ἔχουσιν αἱ τῶν δικαίων καὶ σωφρόνων πράξεις.

καίτοι τάχʼ ἂν ὑπολάβοι τις τούτων οὕτω διωρισμένων
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ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἄριστον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πλείστων καὶ καλλίστων κύριος εἴη πράξεων. ὥστε οὐ δεῖν τὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχειν παριέναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παίδων μήτε παῖδας πατρὸς μήθʼ ὅλως φίλον φίλου μηθένα ὑπόλογον ποιεῖσθαι μηδὲ
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πρὸς τοῦτο φροντίζειν· τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον αἱρετώτατον, τὸ δʼ εὖ πράττειν ἄριστον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀληθῶς ἴσως λέγουσιν,

εἴπερ
[Bekker 1325b]
[Bekker 1325b line 1]
ὑπάρξει τοῖς ἀποστεροῦσι καὶ βιαζομένοις τὸ τῶν ὄντων αἱρετώτατον· ἀλλʼ ἴσως οὐχ οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλʼ ὑποτίθενται τοῦτο ψεῦδος. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι καλὰς τὰς πράξεις ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τῷ μὴ διαφέροντι τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς ἢ πατὴρ
[Bekker 1325b line 5]
τέκνων ἢ δεσπότης δούλων· ὥστε ὁ παραβαίνων οὐθὲν ἂν τηλικοῦτον κατορθώσειεν ὕστερον ὅσον ἤδη παρεκβέβηκε τῆς ἀρετῆς. τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ ἐν μέρει, τοῦτο γὰρ ἴσον καὶ ὅμοιον· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴσον τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅμοιον τοῖς ὁμοίοις παρὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν
[Bekker 1325b line 10]
παρὰ φύσιν καλόν. διὸ κἂν ἄλλος τις ᾖ κρείττων κατʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων, τούτῳ καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τούτῳ πείθεσθαι δίκαιον. δεῖ δʼ οὐ μόνον ἀρετὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν, καθʼ ἣν ἔσται πρακτικός. ἀλλʼ εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
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εὐπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθʼ ἕκαστον ἄριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους, καθάπερ οἴονταί τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικάς, τὰς τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν γιγνομένας ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον
[Bekker 1325b line 20]
τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὑτῶν ἕνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὥστε καὶ πρᾶξίς τις. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πράξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοίαις ἀρχιτέκτονας. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἀπρακτεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς καθʼ αὑτὰς πόλεις ἱδρυμένας καὶ
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ζῆν οὕτω προῃρημένας· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν· πολλαὶ γὰρ κοινωνίαι πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς μέρεσι τῆς πόλεώς εἰσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ καθʼ ἑνὸς ὁτουοῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ὁ θεὸς εἶχε καλῶς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος, οἷς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις
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παρὰ τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸν αὐτὸν βίον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν ἄριστον ἑκάστῳ τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φανερόν ἐστιν.

ἐπεὶ δὲ πεφροιμίασται τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας ἡμῖν τεθεώρηται πρότερον,
[Bekker 1325b line 35]
ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον ποίας τινὰς δεῖ τὰς ὑποθέσεις εἶναι περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατʼ εὐχὴν συνεστάναι πόλεως. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε πολιτείαν γενέσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην ἄνευ συμμέτρου χορηγίας. διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ προϋποτεθεῖσθαι καθάπερ εὐχομένους, εἶναι μέντοι μηθὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον· λέγω δὲ
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οἷον περί τε πλήθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς, οἷον ὑφάντῃ καὶ ναυπηγῷ,

δεῖ τὴν
[Bekker 1326a]
[Bekker 1326a line 1]
ὕλην ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδείαν οὖσαν πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν (ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν αὕτη τυγχάνῃ παρεσκευασμένη βέλτιον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης εἶναι κάλλιον), οὕτω καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ τῷ νομοθέτῃ δεῖ τὴν οἰκείαν ὕλην ὑπάρχειν
[Bekker 1326a line 5]
ἐπιτηδείως ἔχουσαν.

ἔστι δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας πρῶτον τό τε πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὑπάρχειν δεῖ φύσει, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χώραν ὡσαύτως, πόσην τε εἶναι καὶ ποίαν τινὰ ταύτην. οἴονται μὲν οὖν οἱ πλεῖστοι προσήκειν μεγάλην εἶναι τὴν εὐδαίμονα πόλιν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτʼ
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ἀληθές, ἀγνοοῦσι ποία μεγάλη καὶ ποία μικρὰ πόλις. κατʼ ἀριθμοῦ γὰρ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων κρίνουσι τὴν μεγάλην, δεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος εἰς δὲ δύναμιν ἀποβλέπειν. ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργον, ὥστε τὴν δυναμένην τοῦτο μάλιστʼ ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι μεγίστην, οἷον
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Ἱπποκράτην οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἀλλʼ ἰατρὸν εἶναι μείζω φήσειεν ἄν τις τοῦ διαφέροντος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ δεῖ κρίνειν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντας, οὐ κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλῆθος τοῦτο ποιητέον (ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἴσως ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν
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καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων), ἀλλʼ ὅσοι πόλεώς εἰσι μέρος καὶ ἐξ ὧν συνίσταται πόλις οἰκείων μορίων· ἡ γὰρ τούτων ὑπεροχὴ τοῦ πλήθους μεγάλης πόλεως σημεῖον, ἐξ ἧς δὲ βάναυσοι μὲν ἐξέρχονται πολλοὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὁπλῖται δὲ ὀλίγοι, ταύτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι μεγάλην· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν μεγάλη τε
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πόλις καὶ πολυάνθρωπος.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γε ἐκ τῶν ἔργων φανερόν, ὅτι χαλεπόν, ἴσως δʼ ἀδύνατον, εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν λίαν πολυάνθρωπον· τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς οὐδεμίαν ὁρῶμεν οὖσαν ἀνειμένην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων πίστεως. ὅ τε γὰρ
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νόμος τάξις τίς ἐστι, καὶ τὴν εὐνομίαν ἀναγκαῖον εὐταξίαν εἶναι, ὁ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλων ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξεως· θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἔργον, ἥτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν. διὸ καὶ πόλιν ἧς μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος ὑπάρχει, ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀναγκαῖον·
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ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἔστι τι καὶ πόλεως μεγέθους μέτρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ζῴων φυτῶν ὀργάνων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον οὔτε λίαν μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἕξει τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν, ἀλλʼ ὁτὲ μὲν ὅλως ἐστερημένον ἔσται τῆς φύσεως ὁτὲ
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δὲ φαύλως ἔχον, οἷον πλοῖον σπιθαμιαῖον μὲν οὐκ ἔσται πλοῖον ὅλως, οὐδὲ δυοῖν σταδίοιν,

### Book VII, 1326a–1329b

εἰς δὲ τὶ μέγεθος ἐλθὸν ὁτὲ
[Bekker 1326b]
[Bekker 1326b line 1]
μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα φαύλην ποιήσει τὴν ναυτιλίαν, ὁτὲ δὲ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολήν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις ἡ μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγων λίαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης (ἡ δὲ πόλις αὔταρκες), ἡ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἄγαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις αὐτάρκης ὥσπερ δʼ ἔθνος, ἀλλʼ
[Bekker 1326b line 5]
οὐ πόλις· πολιτείαν γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ὑπάρχειν· τίς γὰρ στρατηγὸς ἔσται τοῦ λίαν ὑπερβάλλοντος πλήθους, ἢ τίς κῆρυξ μὴ Στεντόρειος; διὸ πρώτην μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ἐκ τοσούτου πλήθους ὃ πρῶτον πλῆθος αὔταρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν· ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὴν
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ταύτης ὑπερβάλλουσαν κατὰ πλῆθος εἶναι μείζω πόλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτʼ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀόριστον. τίς δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ὅρος, ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἰδεῖν ῥᾴδιον. εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων τῶν δʼ ἀρχομένων, ἄρχοντος δʼ ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσις ἔργον· πρὸς δὲ τὸ κρίνειν
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περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διανέμειν κατʼ ἀξίαν ἀναγκαῖον γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους, ποῖοί τινές εἰσι, τοὺς πολίτας, ὡς ὅπου τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, φαύλως ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς κρίσεις. περὶ ἀμφότερα γὰρ οὐ δίκαιον αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, ὅπερ ἐν
[Bekker 1326b line 20]
τῇ πολυανθρωπίᾳ τῇ λίαν ὑπάρχει φανερῶς. ἔτι δὲ ξένοις καὶ μετοίκοις ῥᾴδιον μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς πολιτείας· οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν τὸ λανθάνειν διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ πλήθους. δῆλον τοίνυν ὡς οὗτός ἐστι πόλεως ὅρος ἄριστος, ἡ μεγίστη τοῦ πλήθους ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς εὐσύνοπτος. περὶ
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μὲν οὖν μεγέθους πόλεως διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας ἔχει. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποίαν τινά, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν αὐταρκεστάτην πᾶς τις ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν (τοιαύτην δʼ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν παντοφόρον· τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηθενὸς
[Bekker 1326b line 30]
αὔταρκες)· πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει τοσαύτην ὥστε δύνασθαι τοὺς οἰκοῦντας ζῆν σχολάζοντας ἐλευθερίως ἅμα καὶ σωφρόνως. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν ὅρον εἰ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς λέγομεν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον ἀκριβέστερον, ὅταν ὅλως περὶ κτήσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας συμβαίνῃ ποιεῖσθαι
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μνείαν, πῶς δεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῆς· πολλαὶ γὰρ περὶ τὴν σκέψιν ταύτην εἰσὶν ἀμφισβητήσεις διὰ τοὺς ἕλκοντας ἐφʼ ἑκατέραν τοῦ βίου τὴν ὑπερβολήν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν γλισχρότητα τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τρυφήν. τὸ δʼ εἶδος τῆς χώρας οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν (δεῖ δʼ ἔνια
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πείθεσθαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν ἐμπείροις), ὅτι χρὴ μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι δυσέμβολον αὐτοῖς δʼ εὐέξοδον.

[Bekker 1327a]
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ἔτι δʼ ὥσπερ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐσύνοπτον ἔφαμεν εἶναι δεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν χώραν· τὸ δʼ εὐσύνοπτον τὸ εὐβοήθητον εἶναι τὴν χώραν ἐστίν. τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν εἰ χρὴ ποιεῖν κατʼ εὐχήν, πρός τε τὴν θάλατταν προσήκει
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κεῖσθαι καλῶς πρός τε τὴν χώραν. εἷς μὲν οὖν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος (δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἐκβοηθείας κοινὴν εἶναι τῶν τόπων ἁπάντων)· ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν παραπομπάς, ἔτι δὲ τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης, κἂν εἴ τινα ἄλλην ἐργασίαν ἡ χώρα τυγχάνοι κεκτημένη τοιαύτην
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εὐπαρακόμιστον.

περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κοινωνίας, πότερον ὠφέλιμος ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν ἢ βλαβερά, πολλὰ τυγχάνουσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντες· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιξενοῦσθαί τινας ἐν ἄλλοις τεθραμμένους νόμοις ἀσύμφορον εἶναί φασι πρὸς
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τὴν εὐνομίαν, καὶ τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν· γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι τῇ θαλάττῃ διαπέμποντας καὶ δεχομένους ἐμπόρων πλῆθος, ὑπεναντίαν δʼ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, βέλτιον καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μετέχειν
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τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν τῆς θαλάττης, οὐκ ἄδηλον. καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ῥᾷον φέρειν τοὺς πολέμους εὐβοηθήτους εἶναι δεῖ κατʼ ἀμφότερα τοὺς σωθησομένους, καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι τοὺς ἐπιτιθεμένους, εἰ μὴ κατʼ ἄμφω δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ θάτερον ὑπάρξει
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μᾶλλον ἀμφοτέρων μετέχουσιν. ὅσα τʼ ἂν μὴ τυγχάνῃ παρʼ αὑτοῖς ὄντα, δέξασθαι ταῦτα, καὶ τὰ πλεονάζοντα τῶν γιγνομένων ἐκπέμψασθαι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν. αὑτῇ γὰρ ἐμπορικήν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις, δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν· οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πᾶσιν ἀγορὰν προσόδου
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χάριν ταῦτα πράττουσιν· ἣν δὲ μὴ δεῖ πόλιν τοιαύτης μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, οὐδʼ ἐμπόριον δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι τοιοῦτον. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁρῶμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχοντα καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας εὐφυῶς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε μήτε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστυ μήτε πόρρω λίαν,
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ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι τείχεσι καὶ τοιούτοις ἄλλοις ἐρύμασι, φανερὸν ὡς εἰ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῇ πόλει τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ δέ τι βλαβερόν, φυλάξασθαι ῥᾴδιον τοῖς νόμοις φράζοντας καὶ διορίζοντας τίνας οὐ δεῖ καὶ τίνας ἐπιμίσγεσθαι δεῖ
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πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

περὶ δὲ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, ὅτι μὲν βέλτιστον ὑπάρχειν μέχρι τινὸς πλήθους, οὐκ ἄδηλον

(οὐ γὰρ
[Bekker 1327b]
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μόνον αὑτοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πλησίον τισὶ δεῖ καὶ φοβεροὺς εἶναι καὶ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν, ὥσπερ κατὰ γῆν, καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν)· περὶ δὲ πλήθους ἤδη καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀποσκεπτέον τῆς πόλεως. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
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ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζήσεται βίον, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν πρὸς τὰς πράξεις σύμμετρον. τὴν δὲ πολυανθρωπίαν τὴν γιγνομένην περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν ὄχλον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς μέρος εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πόλεως. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβατικὸν
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ἐλεύθερον καὶ τῶν πεζευόντων ἐστίν, ὃ κύριόν ἐστι καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς ναυτιλίας· πλήθους δὲ ὑπάρχοντος περιοίκων καὶ τῶν τὴν χώραν γεωργούντων, ἀφθονίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ναυτῶν. ὁρῶμεν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν ὑπάρχον τισίν, οἷον τῇ πόλει τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν· πολλὰς γὰρ ἐκπληροῦσι
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τριήρεις, κεκτημένοι τῷ μεγέθει πόλιν ἑτέρων ἐμμελεστέραν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ λιμένων τῶν πόλεων καὶ θαλάττης καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἔστω διωρισμένα τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους, τίνα μὲν ὅρον ὑπάρχειν χρή, πρότερον εἴπομεν, ποίους δέ τινας
[Bekker 1327b line 20]
τὴν φύσιν εἶναι δεῖ, νῦν λέγωμεν.

σχεδὸν δὴ κατανοήσειεν ἄν τις τοῦτό γε, βλέψας ἐπί τε τὰς πόλεις τὰς εὐδοκιμούσας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην, ὡς διείληπται τοῖς ἔθνεσιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην θυμοῦ μέν ἐστι πλήρη, διανοίας
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δὲ ἐνδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης, διόπερ ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατελεῖ μᾶλλον, ἀπολίτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίον ἄρχειν οὐ δυνάμενα· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἄθυμα δέ, διόπερ ἀρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεῖ· τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος, ὥσπερ μεσεύει κατὰ
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τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἀμφοῖν μετέχει. καὶ γὰρ ἔνθυμον καὶ διανοητικόν ἐστιν· διόπερ ἐλεύθερόν τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλτιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μιᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας. τὴν αὐτὴν δʼ ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη πρὸς ἄλληλα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει
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τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον, τὰ δὲ εὖ κέκραται πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ διανοητικούς τε εἶναι καὶ θυμοειδεῖς τὴν φύσιν τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐαγώγους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν. ὅπερ γάρ φασί τινες δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικοὺς μὲν
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εἶναι τῶν γνωρίμων πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας ἀγρίους, ὁ θυμός ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικόν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς
[Bekker 1328a]
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δύναμις ᾗ φιλοῦμεν.

σημεῖον δέ· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνῶτας, ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος προσηκόντως τοῖς φίλοις ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμόν·
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σὺ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχεαι.

καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν· ἀρχικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀήττητον ὁ θυμός. οὐ καλῶς δʼ ἔχει λέγειν χαλεποὺς εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνῶτας· πρὸς οὐθένα γὰρ εἶναι χρὴ τοιοῦτον, οὐδέ εἰσιν οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι
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τὴν φύσιν ἄγριοι, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας. τοῦτο δὲ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις πάσχουσιν, ὅπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι νομίσωσιν. καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνει κατὰ λόγον· παρʼ οἷς γὰρ ὀφείλεσθαι τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, πρὸς τῷ βλάβει καὶ ταύτης ἀποστερεῖσθαι
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νομίζουσιν· ὅθεν εἴρηται
χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν
(Eur. Fr. 965) καὶ
οἵ τοι πέρᾳ στέρξαντες, οἵδε καὶ πέρᾳ
μισοῦσιν.
(Anon. fr. 78 (Nauck))

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευομένων, πόσους τε ὑπάρχειν δεῖ καὶ ποίους τινὰς τὴν φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν χώραν πόσην τέ τινα καὶ ποίαν τινά, διώρισται σχεδόν (οὐ γὰρ τὴν
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αὐτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεῖ ζητεῖν διά τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως).

ἐπεὶ δʼ ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων οὐ ταῦτά ἐστι μόρια τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν,
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οὐδʼ ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐξ ἧς ἕν τι τὸ γένος (ἓν γάρ τι καὶ κοινὸν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ταὐτὸ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς, ἄν τε ἴσον ἄν τε ἄνισον μεταλαμβάνωσιν)· οἷον εἴτε τροφὴ τοῦτό ἐστιν εἴτε χώρας πλῆθος εἴτʼ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. ὅταν δʼ ᾖ τὸ μὲν τούτου ἕνεκεν τὸ δʼ οὗ ἕνεκεν, οὐθέν ἔν γε τούτοις
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κοινὸν ἀλλʼ ἢ τῷ μὲν ποιῆσαι τῷ δὲ λαβεῖν· λέγω δʼ οἷον ὀργάνῳ τε παντὶ πρὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον ἔργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς· οἰκίᾳ γὰρ πρὸς οἰκοδόμον οὐθέν ἐστιν ὃ γίγνεται κοινόν, ἀλλʼ ἔστι τῆς οἰκίας χάριν ἡ τῶν οἰκοδόμων τέχνη. διὸ κτήσεως μὲν δεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς
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πόλεως· πολλὰ δʼ ἔμψυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεώς ἐστιν· ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστι τῶν ὁμοίων, ἕνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ἀρίστης. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, αὕτη δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσίς τις τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν ἢ
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μηδέν, δῆλον ὡς τοῦτʼ αἴτιον τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πόλεως εἴδη καὶ διαφορὰς καὶ πολιτείας πλείους·

ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ διʼ
[Bekker 1328b]
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ἄλλων ἕκαστοι τοῦτο θηρεύοντες τούς τε βίους ἑτέρους ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταυτί ἐστιν ὧν ἄνευ πόλις οὐκ ἂν εἴη· καὶ γὰρ ἃ λέγομεν εἶναι μέρη πόλεως ἐν τούτοις ἂν εἴη, διὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. ληπτέον τοίνυν
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τῶν ἔργων τὸν ἀριθμόν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἔσται δῆλον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τροφήν, ἔπειτα τέχνας (πολλῶν γὰρ ὀργάνων δεῖται τὸ ζῆν), τρίτον δὲ ὅπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοινωνοῦντας ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχειν ὅπλα πρός τε τὴν ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθούντων χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν ἀδικεῖν
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ἐπιχειροῦντας), ἔτι χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχωσι καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθʼ αὑτοὺς χρείας καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικάς, πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον τὴν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἐπιμέλειαν, ἣν καλοῦσιν ἱερατείαν, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πάντων ἀναγκαιότατον κρίσιν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων τῶν
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πρὸς ἀλλήλους. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτʼ ἐστὶν ὧν δεῖται πᾶσα πόλις ὡς εἰπεῖν (ἡ γὰρ πόλις πλῆθός ἐστιν οὐ τὸ τυχὸν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ζωὴν αὔταρκες, ὥς φαμεν, ἐὰν δέ τι τυγχάνῃ τούτων ἐκλεῖπον, ἀδύνατον ἁπλῶς αὐτάρκη τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι ταύτην)· ἀνάγκη τοίνυν κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας
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ταύτας συνεστάναι πόλιν· δεῖ ἄρα γεωργῶν τʼ εἶναι πλῆθος, οἳ παρασκευάσουσι τὴν τροφήν, καὶ τεχνίτας, καὶ τὸ μάχιμον, καὶ τὸ εὔπορον, καὶ ἱερεῖς, καὶ κριτὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων.

διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λοιπὸν σκέψασθαι πότερον πᾶσι
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κοινωνητέον πάντων τούτων (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἅπαντας εἶναι καὶ γεωργοὺς καὶ τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς βουλευομένους καὶ δικάζοντας), ἢ καθʼ ἕκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους ὑποθετέον, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἴδια τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταὐτὸ πολιτείᾳ. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν,
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ἐνδέχεται καὶ πάντας κοινωνεῖν πάντων καὶ μὴ πάντας πάντων ἀλλὰ τινὰς τινῶν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἑτέρας· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσι πάντες πάντων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τοὐναντίον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη
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δʼ ἐστὶ καθʼ ἣν ἡ πόλις ἂν εἴη μάλιστʼ εὐδαίμων, τὴν δʼ εὐδαιμονίαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἴρηται πρότερον, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ὡς ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτευομένῃ πόλει καὶ τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίους ἄνδρας ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οὔτε βάναυσον βίον οὔτʼ ἀγοραῖον δεῖ
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ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας (ἀγεννὴς γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίος), οὐδὲ δὴ γεωργοὺς εἶναι τοὺς μέλλοντας
[Bekker 1329a]
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ἔσεσθαι

(δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικάς).

ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ κρῖνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐνυπάρχει καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς
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πόλεως μάλιστα ὄντα, πότερον ἕτερα καὶ ταῦτα θετέον ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδοτέον ἄμφω; φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, διότι τρόπον μέν τινα τοῖς αὐτοῖς τρόπον δέ τινα καὶ ἑτέροις. ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἑτέρας ἀκμῆς ἑκάτερον τῶν ἔργων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῖται φρονήσεως τὸ δὲ δυνάμεως, ἑτέροις· ᾗ δὲ τῶν ἀδυνάτων
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ἐστὶ τοὺς δυναμένους βιάζεσθαι καὶ κωλύειν, τούτους ὑπομένειν ἀρχομένους ἀεί, ταύτῃ δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὅπλων κύριοι καὶ τοῦ μένειν ἢ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν. λείπεται τοίνυν τοῖς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδιδόναι τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην, μὴ ἅμα δέ, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ πέφυκεν ἡ
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μὲν δύναμις ἐν νεωτέροις, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐν πρεσβυτέροις εἶναὶ, ἔοικεν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμῆσθαι συμφέρειν καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστιν· ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατʼ ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ εἶναι περὶ τούτους. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εὐπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολῖται δὲ οὗτοι. τὸ γὰρ
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βάναυσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως, οὐδʼ ἄλλο οὐθὲν γένος ὃ μὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν ἐστιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλʼ εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας. φανερὸν
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δὲ καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων, εἴπερ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους περιοίκους. λοιπὸν δʼ ἐκ τῶν καταριθμηθέντων τὸ τῶν ἱερέων γένος. φανερὰ δὲ καὶ ἡ τούτων τάξις. οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν οὔτε βάναυσον ἱερέα καταστατέον (ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει
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τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεούς)· ἐπεὶ δὲ διῄρηται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς δύο μέρη, τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν, πρέπει δὲ τήν τε θεραπείαν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας, τούτοις ἂν εἴη τὰς περὶ αὐτοὺς ἱερωσύνας ἀποδοτέον.

ὧν μὲν τοίνυν ἄνευ
[Bekker 1329a line 35]
πόλις οὐ συνίσταται καὶ ὅσα μέρη πόλεως, εἴρηται (γεωργοὺς μὲν γὰρ καὶ τεχνίτας καὶ πᾶν τὸ θητικὸν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν), καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ τούτων ἕκαστον, τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος.

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ἔοικε δὲ οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ τοῦτʼ εἶναι γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ὅτι δεῖ διῃρῆσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη
[Bekker 1329b]
[Bekker 1329b line 1]
τὴν πόλιν καὶ τό τε μάχιμον ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν.

ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τε γὰρ ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἔτι καὶ νῦν, τά τε περὶ τὴν Κρήτην, τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Αἴγυπτον Σεσώστριος, ὥς φασιν, οὕτω νομοθετήσαντος, Μίνω δὲ τὰ
[Bekker 1329b line 5]
περὶ Κρήτην. ἀρχαία δὲ ἔοικεν εἶναι καὶ τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλῷ παλαιότερα τούτων. φασὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγιοι τῶν ἐκεῖ κατοικούντων Ἰταλόν τινα γενέσθαι βασιλέα τῆς Οἰνωτρίας, ἀφʼ οὗ τό τε ὄνομα
[Bekker 1329b line 10]
μεταβαλόντας Ἰταλοὺς ἀντʼ Οἰνωτρῶν κληθῆναι καὶ τὴν ἀκτὴν ταύτην τῆς Εὐρώπης Ἰταλίαν τοὔνομα λαβεῖν, ὅση τετύχηκεν ἐντὸς οὖσα τοῦ κόλπου τοῦ Σκυλλητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ Λαμητικοῦ· ἀπέχει δὲ ταῦτα ἀπʼ ἀλλήλων ὁδὸν ἡμισείας ἡμέρας. τοῦτον δὴ λέγουσι τὸν Ἰταλὸν νομάδας τοὺς
[Bekker 1329b line 15]
Οἰνωτροὺς ὄντας ποιῆσαι γεωργούς, καὶ νόμους ἄλλους τε αὐτοῖς θέσθαι καὶ τὰ συσσίτια καταστῆσαι πρῶτον· διὸ καὶ νῦν ἔτι τῶν ἀπʼ ἐκείνου τινὲς χρῶνται τοῖς συσσιτίοις καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐνίοις. ᾤκουν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρηνίαν Ὀπικοὶ καὶ πρότερον καὶ νῦν καλούμενοι τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν
[Bekker 1329b line 20]
Αὔσονες, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ τὸν Ἰόνιον Χῶνες, τὴν καλουμένην Σύρτιν· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χῶνες Οἰνωτροὶ τὸ γένος. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων τάξις ἐντεῦθεν γέγονε πρῶτον, ὁ δὲ χωρισμὸς ὁ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους ἐξ Αἰγύπτου· πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτείνει τοῖς χρόνοις τὴν
[Bekker 1329b line 25]
Μίνω βασιλείαν ἡ Σεσώστριος. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὑρῆσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, μᾶλλον δʼ ἀπειράκις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τὴν χρείαν διδάσκειν εἰκὸς αὐτήν, τὰ δʼ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν ὑπαρχόντων ἤδη τούτων εὔλογον λαμβάνειν τὴν αὔξησιν·
[Bekker 1329b line 30]
ὥστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οἴεσθαι δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαῖα, σημεῖον τὰ περὶ Αἴγυπτόν ἐστιν· οὗτοι γὰρ ἀρχαιότατοι μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, νόμων δὲ τετυχήκασιν ἀεὶ καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς μὲν εὑρημένοις ἱκανῶς χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ παραλελειμμένα
[Bekker 1329b line 35]
πειρᾶσθαι ζητεῖν.

### Book VII, 1329b–1333a

ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὴν χώραν εἶναι τῶν ὅπλα κεκτημένων καὶ τῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετεχόντων, εἴρηται πρότερον, καὶ διότι τοὺς γεωργοῦντας αὐτῶν ἑτέρους εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ πόσην τινὰ χρὴ καὶ ποίαν εἶναι τὴν χώραν· περὶ δὲ τῆς
[Bekker 1329b line 40]
διανομῆς καὶ τῶν γεωργούντων, τίνας καὶ ποίους εἶναι χρή, λεκτέον πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε κοινήν φαμεν εἶναι δεῖν τὴν
[Bekker 1330a]
[Bekker 1330a line 1]
κτῆσιν ὥσπερ τινὲς εἰρήκασιν,

ἀλλὰ τῇ χρήσει φιλικῶς γινομένῃ κοινήν, οὔτʼ ἀπορεῖν οὐθένα τῶν πολιτῶν τροφῆς. περὶ συσσιτίων τε συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖς εὖ κατεσκευασμέναις πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν· διʼ ἣν δʼ αἰτίαν συνδοκεῖ
[Bekker 1330a line 5]
καὶ ἡμῖν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν. δεῖ δὲ τούτων κοινωνεῖν πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐ ῥᾴδιον δὲ τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων τε εἰσφέρειν τὸ συντεταγμένον καὶ διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλλην οἰκίαν. ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς δαπανήματα κοινὰ πάσης τῆς πόλεώς ἐστιν. ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν εἰς δύο μέρη
[Bekker 1330a line 10]
διῃρῆσθαι τὴν χώραν, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἶναι κοινὴν τὴν δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, καὶ τούτων ἑκατέραν διῃρῆσθαι δίχα πάλιν, τῆς μὲν κοινῆς τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μέρος εἰς τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας τὸ δὲ ἕτερον εἰς τὴν τῶν συσσιτίων δαπάνην, τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐσχατιάς,
[Bekker 1330a line 15]
τὸ δὲ ἕτερον πρὸς πόλιν, ἵνα δύο κλήρων ἑκάστῳ νεμηθέντων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τόπων πάντες μετέχωσιν. τό τε γὰρ ἴσον οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας πολέμους ὁμονοητικώτερον. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οἱ μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους
[Bekker 1330a line 20]
ἔχθρας, οἱ δὲ λίαν φροντίζουσι καὶ παρὰ τὸ καλόν. διὸ παρʼ ἐνίοις νόμος ἐστὶ τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τοῖς ὁμόροις μὴ συμμετέχειν βουλῆς τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, ὡς διὰ τὸ ἴδιον οὐκ ἂν δυναμένους βουλεύσασθαι καλῶς. τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν ἀνάγκη διῃρῆσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διὰ τὰς προειρημένας
[Bekker 1330a line 25]
αἰτίας· τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας μάλιστα μέν, εἰ δεῖ κατʼ εὐχήν, δούλους εἶναι, μήτε ὁμοφύλων πάντων μήτε θυμοειδῶν (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πρός τε τὴν ἐργασίαν εἶεν χρήσιμοι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν νεωτερίζειν ἀσφαλεῖς), δεύτερον δὲ βαρβάρους περιοίκους παραπλησίους τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν φύσιν,
[Bekker 1330a line 30]
τούτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι ἰδίους τῶν κεκτημένων τὰς οὐσίας, τοὺς δʼ ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ γῇ κοινούς. τίνα δὲ δεῖ τρόπον χρῆσθαι δούλοις, καὶ διότι βέλτιον πᾶσι τοῖς δούλοις ἆθλον προκεῖσθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.

τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅτι μὲν δεῖ κοινὴν εἶναι τῆς ἠπείρου τε
[Bekker 1330a line 35]
καὶ τῆς θαλάττης καὶ τῆς χώρας ἁπάσης ὁμοίως ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, εἴρηται πρότερον· αὐτῆς δὲ προσάντη τὴν θέσιν εὔχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς τέτταρα βλέποντας, πρῶτον μὲν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς ὑγίειαν (αἵ τε γὰρ πρὸς ἕω τὴν ἔγκλισιν ἔχουσαι καὶ πρὸς τὰ πνεύματα
[Bekker 1330a line 40]
τὰ πνέοντα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνατολῆς ὑγιεινότεραι, δεύτερον δʼ αἱ κατὰ βορέαν· εὐχείμεροι γὰρ αὗται μᾶλλον)·

τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν
[Bekker 1330b]
[Bekker 1330b line 1]
πρὸς τὸ τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλῶς ἔχει. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εὐέξοδον εἶναι χρή, τοῖς δʼ ἐναντίοις δυσπρόσοδον καὶ δυσπερίληπτον, ὑδάτων τε καὶ ναμάτων μάλιστα μὲν ὑπάρχειν πλῆθος
[Bekker 1330b line 5]
οἰκεῖον, εἰ δὲ μή, τοῦτό γε εὕρηται διὰ τοῦ κατασκευάζειν ὑποδοχὰς ὀμβρίοις ὕδασιν ἀφθόνους καὶ μεγάλας, ὥστε μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἰργομένους τῆς χώρας διὰ πόλεμον· ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ περὶ ὑγιείας φροντίζειν τῶν ἐνοικούντων, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κεῖσθαι τὸν τόπον ἔν τε τοιούτῳ καὶ πρὸς
[Bekker 1330b line 10]
τοιοῦτον καλῶς, δεύτερον δὲ ὕδασιν ὑγιεινοῖς χρῆσθαι, καὶ τούτου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν μὴ παρέργως. οἷς γὰρ πλείστοις χρώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πλειστάκις, ταῦτα πλεῖστον συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν· ἡ δὲ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος δύναμις τοιαύτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν. διόπερ ἐν
[Bekker 1330b line 15]
ταῖς εὖ φρονούσαις δεῖ διωρίσθαι πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ πάνθʼ ὅμοια μηδʼ ἀφθονία τοιούτων ᾖ ναμάτων, χωρὶς τά τε εἰς τροφὴν ὕδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν.

περὶ δὲ τόπων ἐρυμνῶν οὐ πάσαις ὁμοίως ἔχει τὸ συμφέρον ταῖς πολιτείαις· οἷον ἀκρόπολις ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ μοναρχικόν,
[Bekker 1330b line 20]
δημοκρατικὸν δʼ ὁμαλότης, ἀριστοκρατικὸν δὲ οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἰσχυροὶ τόποι πλείους. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οἰκήσεων διάθεσις ἡδίων μὲν νομίζεται καὶ χρησιμωτέρα πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις, ἂν εὔτομος ᾖ καὶ κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τὸν Ἱπποδάμειον τρόπον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς
[Bekker 1330b line 25]
ἀσφαλείας τοὐναντίον ὡς εἶχον κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον χρόνον· δυσείσοδος γὰρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσεξερεύνητος τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. διὸ δεῖ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν (ἐνδέχεται γάρ, ἄν τις οὕτως κατασκευάζῃ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς γεωργοῖς ἃς καλοῦσί τινες τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας), καὶ τὴν μὲν
[Bekker 1330b line 30]
ὅλην μὴ ποιεῖν πόλιν εὔτομον, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τόπους· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἕξει καλῶς.

περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν ἔχειν τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιουμένας πόλεις λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, καὶ ταῦθʼ ὁρῶντες ἐλεγχομένας ἔργῳ τὰς ἐκείνως καλλωπισαμένας.
[Bekker 1330b line 35]
ἔστι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ μὴ πολὺ τῷ πλήθει διαφέροντας οὐ καλὸν τὸ πειρᾶσθαι σῴζεσθαι διὰ τῆς τῶν τειχῶν ἐρυμνότητος· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἐνδέχεται πλείω τὴν ὑπεροχὴν γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἐπιόντων τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρετῆς, εἰ δεῖ σῴζεσθαι
[Bekker 1330b line 40]
καὶ μὴ πάσχειν κακῶς μηδὲ ὑβρίζεσθαι, τὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρυμνότητα τῶν τειχῶν οἰητέον εἶναι πολεμικωτάτην,

[Bekker 1331a]
[Bekker 1331a line 1]
ἄλλως τε καὶ νῦν εὑρημένων τῶν περὶ τὰ βέλη καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς εἰς ἀκρίβειαν πρὸς τὰς πολιορκίας. ὅμοιον γὰρ τὸ τείχη μὴ περιβάλλειν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀξιοῦν καὶ τὸ τὴν χώραν εὐέμβολον ζητεῖν καὶ περιαιρεῖν τοὺς
[Bekker 1331a line 5]
ὀρεινοὺς τόπους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ταῖς οἰκήσεσι ταῖς ἰδίαις μὴ περιβάλλειν τοίχους ὡς ἀνάνδρων ἐσομένων τῶν κατοικούντων. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτό γε δεῖ λανθάνειν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν περιβεβλημένοις τείχη περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔξεστιν ἀμφοτέρως χρῆσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, καὶ ὡς ἐχούσαις τείχη καὶ ὡς μὴ
[Bekker 1331a line 10]
ἐχούσαις, τοῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημένοις οὐκ ἔξεστιν. εἰ δὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον περιβλητέον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέον, ὅπως καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔχῃ τῇ πόλει πρεπόντως καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας, τάς τε ἄλλας καὶ τὰς νῦν ἐπεξευρημένας. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις
[Bekker 1331a line 15]
ἐπιμελές ἐστι διʼ ὧν τρόπων πλεονεκτήσουσιν, οὕτω τὰ μὲν εὕρηται τὰ δὲ δεῖ ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ τοὺς φυλαττομένους· ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδʼ ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἐπιτίθεσθαι τοῖς εὖ παρεσκευασμένοις.

ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὸ μὲν πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν συσσιτίοις
[Bekker 1331a line 20]
κατανενεμῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τείχη διειλῆφθαι φυλακτηρίοις καὶ πύργοις κατὰ τόπους ἐπικαίρους, δῆλον ὡς ταῦτα προκαλεῖται παρασκευάζειν ἔνια τῶν συσσιτίων ἐν τούτοις τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ τοῦτον ἄν τις διακοσμήσειε τὸν τρόπον· τὰς δὲ τοῖς θείοις ἀποδεδομένας οἰκήσεις
[Bekker 1331a line 25]
καὶ τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχείων συσσίτια ἁρμόττει τόπον ἐπιτήδειόν τε ἔχειν καὶ τὸν αὐτόν, ὅσα μὴ τῶν ἱερῶν ὁ νόμος ἀφορίζει χωρὶς ἤ τι μαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθόχρηστον. εἴη δʼ ἂν τοιοῦτος ὁ τόπος ὅστις ἐπιφάνειάν τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς θέσεως ἀρετὴν ἱκανῶς καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειτνιῶντα
[Bekker 1331a line 30]
μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρυμνοτέρως. πρέπει δʼ ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν τόπον τοιαύτης ἀγορᾶς εἶναι κατασκευὴν οἵαν καὶ περὶ Θετταλίαν νομίζουσιν ἣν ἐλευθέραν καλοῦσιν, αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἣν δεῖ καθαρὰν εἶναι τῶν ὠνίων πάντων, καὶ μήτε βάναυσον μήτε γεωργὸν μήτʼ ἄλλον μηδένα τοιοῦτον παραβάλλειν
[Bekker 1331a line 35]
μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων. εἴη δʼ ἂν εὔχαρις ὁ τόπος, εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἔχοι τὴν τάξιν ἐνταῦθα· πρέπει γὰρ διῃρῆσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς νεωτέροις ἄρχοντάς τινας διατρίβειν, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ
[Bekker 1331a line 40]
τοῖς ἄρχουσιν· ἡ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων παρουσία μάλιστα ἐμποιεῖ τὴν ἀληθινὴν αἰδῶ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐλευθέρων
[Bekker 1331b]
[Bekker 1331b line 1]
φόβον.

τὴν δὲ τῶν ὠνίων ἀγορὰν ἑτέραν τε δεῖ ταύτης εἶναι καὶ χωρίς, ἔχουσαν τόπον εὐσυνάγωγον τοῖς τε ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης πεμπομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας πᾶσιν.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ προεστὸς διαιρεῖται τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἱερεῖς
[Bekker 1331b line 5]
καὶ εἰς ἄρχοντας, πρέπει καὶ τῶν ἱερέων συσσίτια περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν. τῶν δʼ ἀρχείων ὅσα περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια ποιεῖται τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, περί τε γραφὰς δικῶν καὶ τὰς κλήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τοιαύτην διοίκησιν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀγορανομίαν καὶ τὴν καλουμένην
[Bekker 1331b line 10]
ἀστυνομίαν, πρὸς ἀγορᾷ μὲν δεῖ καὶ συνόδῳ τινὶ κοινῇ κατεσκευάσθαι, τοιοῦτος δʼ ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἀγοράν ἐστι τόπος· ἐνσχολάζειν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἄνω τίθεμεν, ταύτην δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις. μεμιμῆσθαι δὲ χρὴ τὴν εἰρημένην τάξιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τοῖς
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ἄρχουσιν οὓς καλοῦσιν οἱ μὲν ὑλωροὺς οἱ δὲ ἀγρονόμους καὶ φυλακτήρια καὶ συσσίτια πρὸς φυλακὴν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, ἔτι δὲ ἱερὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν εἶναι νενεμημένα, τὰ μὲν θεοῖς τὰ δὲ ἥρωσιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν νῦν ἀκριβολογουμένους καὶ λέγοντας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀργόν ἐστιν· οὐ
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γὰρ χαλεπόν ἐστι τὰ τοιαῦτα νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ποιῆσαι μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν εὐχῆς ἔργον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ συμβῆναι τύχης. διὸ περὶ μὲν τῶν τοιούτων τό γε ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν.

περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ἐκ τίνων καὶ ποίων
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δεῖ συνεστάναι τὴν μέλλουσαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν μακαρίαν καὶ πολιτεύσεσθαι καλῶς, λεκτέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ δύʼ ἐστὶν ἐν οἷς γίγνεται τὸ εὖ πᾶσι, τούτοιν δʼ ἐστὶν ἓν μὲν ἐν τῷ τὸν σκοπὸν κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὀρθῶς, ἓν δὲ τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερούσας πράξεις εὑρίσκειν (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ
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ταῦτα καὶ διαφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμφωνεῖν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοπὸς ἔκκειται καλῶς, ἐν δὲ τῷ πράττειν τοῦ τυχεῖν αὐτοῦ διαμαρτάνουσιν, ὁτὲ δὲ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὸ τέλος πάντων ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλος ἔθεντο φαῦλον, ὁτὲ δὲ ἑκατέρου διαμαρτάνουσιν, οἷον περὶ ἰατρικήν· οὔτε γὰρ
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ποῖόν τι δεῖ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον εἶναι σῶμα κρίνουσιν ἐνίοτε καλῶς, οὔτε πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὅρον τυγχάνουσι τῶν ποιητικῶν· δεῖ δʼ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμαις ταῦτα ἀμφότερα κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις), ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ τε εὖ ζῆν καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφίενται
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πάντες, φανερόν, ἀλλὰ τούτων τοῖς μὲν ἐξουσία τυγχάνει τοῖς δὲ οὔ, διά τινα τύχην ἢ φύσιν

(δεῖται γὰρ καὶ χορηγίας
[Bekker 1332a]
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τινὸς τὸ ζῆν καλῶς, τούτου δὲ ἐλάττονος μὲν τοῖς ἄμεινον διακειμένοις, πλείονος δὲ τοῖς χεῖρον), οἱ δʼ εὐθὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχούσης. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ προκείμενόν ἐστι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἰδεῖν, αὕτη δʼ
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ἐστὶ καθʼ ἣν ἄριστʼ ἂν πολιτεύοιτο πόλις, ἄριστα δʼ ἂν πολιτεύοιτο καθʼ ἣν εὐδαιμονεῖν μάλιστα ἐνδέχεται τὴν πόλιν, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δεῖ, τί ἐστι, μὴ λανθάνειν.

φαμὲν δὲ (καὶ διωρίσμεθα ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὄφελος) ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ ταύτην
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οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς. λέγω δʼ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τἀναγκαῖα, τὸ δʼ ἁπλῶς τὸ καλῶς· οἷον τὰ περὶ τὰς δικαίας πράξεις, αἱ δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις ἀπʼ ἀρετῆς μέν εἰσιν, ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως ἔχουσιν (αἱρετώτερον μὲν γὰρ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων
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μήτε τὸν ἄνδρα μήτε τὴν πόλιν), αἱ δʼ ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας ἁπλῶς εἰσι κάλλισται πράξεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον κακοῦ τινὸς ἀναίρεσίς ἐστιν, αἱ τοιαῦται δὲ πράξεις τοὐναντίον· κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσι καὶ γεννήσεις. χρήσαιτο δʼ ἂν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ καὶ πενίᾳ καὶ νόσῳ καὶ
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ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς φαύλαις καλῶς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μακάριον ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐστίν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διώρισται κατὰ τοὺς ἠθικοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος, ᾧ διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγαθά ἐστι τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά, δῆλον δʼ ὅτι καὶ τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαῖον σπουδαίας καὶ καλὰς εἶναι ταύτας
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ἁπλῶς)· διὸ καὶ νομίζουσιν ἄνθρωποι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αἴτια τὰ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμπρὸν καὶ καλῶς αἰτιῷντο τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης.

ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν, τὰ δὲ παρασκευάσαι τὸν νομοθέτην. διὸ κατατυχεῖν εὐχόμεθα
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τῇ τῆς πόλεως συστάσει ὧν ἡ τύχη κυρία (κυρίαν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τίθεμεν)· τὸ δὲ σπουδαίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν οὐκέτι τύχης ἔργον ἀλλʼ ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως. ἀλλὰ μὴν σπουδαία γε πόλις ἐστὶ τῷ τοὺς πολίτας τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίους· ἡμῖν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολῖται
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μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας. τοῦτʼ ἄρα σκεπτέον, πῶς ἀνὴρ γίνεται σπουδαῖος. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαίους εἶναι, μὴ καθʼ ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἱρετώτερον· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθʼ ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ πάντας. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίγνονται διὰ τριῶν. τὰ τρία δὲ
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ταῦτά ἐστι φύσις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι δεῖ πρῶτον, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῴων· εἶτα καὶ ποιόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἔνια δὲ οὐθὲν ὄφελος
[Bekker 1332b]
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φῦναι·

τὰ γὰρ ἔθη μεταβαλεῖν ποιεῖ· ἔνια γὰρ εἶσι, διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα, διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῴων μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει ζῇ, μικρὰ δʼ ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ
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καὶ λόγῳ· μόνος γὰρ ἔχει λόγον· ὥστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις. πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς καὶ τὴν φύσιν πράττουσι διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πεισθῶσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον. τὴν μὲν τοίνυν φύσιν οἵους εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐχειρώτους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρότερον·
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τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργον ἤδη παιδείας. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθιζόμενοι μανθάνουσι τὰ δʼ ἀκούοντες.

ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων, τοῦτο δὴ σκεπτέον, εἰ ἑτέρους εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ
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βίου· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν δεήσει καὶ τὴν παιδείαν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν εἴησαν τοσοῦτον διαφέροντες ἅτεροι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἥρωας ἡγούμεθα τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, εὐθὺς πρῶτον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πολλὴν ἔχοντες ὑπερβολήν, εἶτα κατὰ
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τὴν ψυχήν, ὥστε ἀναμφισβήτητον εἶναι καὶ φανερὰν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, δῆλον ὅτι βέλτιον ἀεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δʼ ἄρχεσθαι καθάπαξ· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτʼ οὐ ῥᾴδιον λαβεῖν οὐδʼ ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν Ἰνδοῖς φησι Σκύλαξ εἶναι τοὺς βασιλέας τοσοῦτον διαφέροντας
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τῶν ἀρχομένων, φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας ἀναγκαῖον πάντας ὁμοίως κοινωνεῖν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. τό τε γὰρ ἴσον ταὐτὸν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, καὶ χαλεπὸν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συνεστηκυῖαν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον. μετὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑπάρχουσι νεωτερίζειν
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βουλόμενοι πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν χώραν, τοσούτους τε εἶναι τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι τὸ πλῆθος ὥστʼ εἶναι κρείττους πάντων τούτων ἕν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γε δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀναμφισβήτητον. πῶς οὖν ταῦτʼ ἔσται καὶ πῶς μεθέξουσι, δεῖ σκέψασθαι
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τὸν νομοθέτην. εἴρηται δὲ πρότερον περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἡ γὰρ φύσις δέδωκε τὴν διαίρεσιν ποιήσασα αὐτὸ τὸ γένει ταὐτὸ τὸ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὧν τοῖς μὲν ἄρχεσθαι πρέπει τοῖς δʼ ἄρχειν· ἀγανακτεῖ δὲ οὐδεὶς καθʼ ἡλικίαν ἀρχόμενος, οὐδὲ νομίζει εἶναι κρείττων, ἄλλως τε
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καὶ μέλλων ἀντιλαμβάνειν τοῦτον τὸν ἔρανον ὅταν τύχῃ τῆς ἱκνουμένης ἡλικίας.

ἔστι μὲν ἄρα ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατέον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἑτέρους.

ὥστε καὶ τὴν
[Bekker 1333a]
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παιδείαν ἔστιν ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον, ἔστιδʼ ὡς ἑτέραν εἶναι. τὸν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχθῆναί φασι δεῖν πρῶτον. (ἔστι δὲ ἀρχή, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴρηται λόγοις, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἄρχοντος χάριν ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀρχομένου.
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τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν δεσποτικὴν εἶναί φαμεν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐλευθέρων. διαφέρει δʼ ἔνια τῶν ἐπιταττομένων οὐ τοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλὰ τῷ τίνος ἕνεκα. διὸ πολλὰ τῶν εἶναι δοκούντων διακονικῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν νέων τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καλὸν διακονεῖν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν οὐχ οὕτω διαφέρουσιν
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αἱ πράξεις καθʼ αὑτὰς ὡς ἐν τῷ τέλει καὶ τῷ τίνος ἕνεκεν.) ἐπεὶ δὲ πολίτου καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός, τὸν δʼ αὐτὸν ἀρχόμενόν τε δεῖν γίγνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄρχοντα ὕστερον, τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευτέον, ὅπως ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ
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γίγνωνται, καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, καὶ τί τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς.

διῄρηται δὲ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔχει λόγον καθʼ αὑτό, τὸ δʼ οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καθʼ αὑτὸ λόγῳ δʼ ὑπακούειν δυνάμενον· ὧν φαμεν τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι καθʼ ἃς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς λέγεταί πως. τούτων δὲ ἐν
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ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον τὸ τέλος, τοῖς μὲν οὕτω διαιροῦσιν ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν οὐκ ἄδηλον πῶς λεκτέον. αἰεὶ γὰρ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονός ἐστιν ἕνεκεν, καὶ τοῦτο φανερὸν ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν· βέλτιον δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον. διῄρηταί τε διχῇ, καθʼ ὅνπερ εἰώθαμεν τρόπον διαιρεῖν·
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ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρακτικός ἐστι λόγος ὁ δὲ θεωρητικός. ὡσαύτως οὖν ἀνάγκη διῃρῆσθαι καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος δηλονότι. καὶ τὰς πράξεις δʼ ἀνάλογον ἐροῦμεν ἔχειν, καὶ δεῖ τὰς τοῦ φύσει βελτίονος αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγχάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τοῦθʼ αἱρετώτατον
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οὗ τυχεῖν ἔστιν ἀκροτάτου. διῄρηται δὲ καὶ πᾶς ὁ βίος εἰς ἀσχολίαν καὶ σχολὴν καὶ εἰς πόλεμον καὶ εἰρήνην, καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλά. περὶ ὧν ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν αἵρεσιν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν
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αὐτῶν, πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν, ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολῆς, τὰ δʼ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τῶν καλῶν ἕνεκεν. πρὸς πάντα μὲν τοίνυν τῷ πολιτικῷ βλέποντι νομοθετητέον, καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις αὐτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ τέλη. τὸν
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αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων αἱρέσεις· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολεῖν δύνασθαι καὶ πολεμεῖν,

### Book VII, 1333b–1337a

[Bekker 1333b]
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μᾶλλον δʼ εἰρήνην ἄγειν καὶ σχολάζειν, καὶ τἀναγκαῖα καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα δὲ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ δεῖ μᾶλλον. ὥστε πρὸς τούτους τοὺς σκοποὺς καὶ παῖδας ἔτι ὄντας παιδευτέον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας, ὅσαι δέονται
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παιδείας.

οἱ δὲ νῦν ἄριστα δοκοῦντες πολιτεύεσθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ ταύτας καταστήσαντες τὰς πολιτείας, οὔτε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον τέλος φαίνονται συντάξαντες τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οὔτε πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν
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πρὸς τὰς χρησίμους εἶναι δοκούσας καὶ πλεονεκτικωτέρας. παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν ὕστερόν τινες γραψάντων ἀπεφήναντο τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν· ἐπαινοῦντες γὰρ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν ἄγανται τοῦ νομοθέτου τὸν σκοπόν, ὅτι πάντα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν. ἃ
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καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐστὶν εὐέλεγκτα καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελήλεγκται νῦν. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζηλοῦσι τὸ πολλῶν δεσπόζειν, ὅτι πολλὴ χορηγία γίγνεται τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, οὕτω καὶ Θίβρων ἀγάμενος φαίνεται τὸν τῶν Λακώνων νομοθέτην, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος τῶν
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γραφόντων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῶν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ γεγυμνάσθαι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους πολλῶν ἦρχον· καίτοι δῆλον ὡς ἐπειδὴ νῦν γε οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει τοῖς Λάκωσι τὸ ἄρχειν, οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, οὐδʼ ὁ νομοθέτης ἀγαθός. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο γελοῖον, εἰ μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος
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πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποβεβλήκασι τὸ ζῆν καλῶς. οὐκ ὀρθῶς δʼ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἣν δεῖ τιμῶντα φαίνεσθαι τὸν νομοθέτην· τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν ἡ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ καλλίων καὶ μᾶλλον μετʼ ἀρετῆς. ἔτι δὲ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τὴν πόλιν εὐδαίμονα νομίζειν
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καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι κρατεῖν ἤσκησεν ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν· ταῦτα γὰρ μεγάλην ἔχει βλάβην. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ δυναμένῳ τοῦτο πειρατέον διώκειν, ὅπως δύνηται τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἄρχειν· ὅπερ ἐγκαλοῦσιν οἱ Λάκωνες Παυσανίᾳ τῷ βασιλεῖ, καίπερ
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ἔχοντι τηλικαύτην τιμήν.

οὔτε δὴ πολιτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων λόγων καὶ νόμων οὐθεὶς οὔτε ὠφέλιμος οὔτε ἀληθής ἐστιν. ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἄριστα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ, τόν τε νομοθέτην ἐμποιεῖν δεῖ ταῦτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τήν τε τῶν πολεμικῶν ἄσκησιν οὐ τούτου χάριν δεῖ μελετᾶν, ἵνα καταδουλώσωνται
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τοὺς ἀναξίους, ἀλλʼ ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὶ μὴ δουλεύσωσιν ἑτέροις, ἔπειτα ὅπως ζητῶσι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς
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ὠφελείας ἕνεκα τῶν ἀρχομένων,

ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντων δεσποτείας· τρίτον δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν τῶν ἀξίων δουλεύειν. ὅτι δὲ δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην μᾶλλον σπουδάζειν ὅπως καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην νομοθεσίαν τοῦ σχολάζειν
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ἕνεκεν τάξῃ καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γιγνόμενα τοῖς λόγοις. αἱ γὰρ πλεῖσται τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσαι μὲν σῴζονται, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπόλλυνται. τὴν γὰρ βαφὴν ἀνιᾶσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἄγοντες. αἴτιος δʼ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχολάζειν.

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ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τῷ τε ἀρίστῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ, φανερὸν ὅτι δεῖ τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετὰς ὑπάρχειν· τέλος γάρ,
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ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, εἰρήνη μὲν πολέμου σχολὴ δʼ ἀσχολίας. χρήσιμοι δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἰσι πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγὴν ὧν τε ἐν τῇ σχολῇ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ὧν ἐν τῇ ἀσχολίᾳ. δεῖ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν ὅπως ἐξῇ σχολάζειν· διὸ σώφρονα τὴν πόλιν εἶναι προσήκει
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καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ καρτερικήν· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παροιμίαν, οὐ σχολὴ δούλοις, οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι κινδυνεύειν ἀνδρείως δοῦλοι τῶν ἐπιόντων εἰσίν. ἀνδρείας μὲν οὖν καὶ καρτερίας δεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολήν, σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς χρόνοις,
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καὶ μᾶλλον εἰρήνην ἄγουσι καὶ σχολάζουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει δικαίους εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἡ δὲ τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπόλαυσις καὶ τὸ σχολάζειν μετʼ εἰρήνης ὑβριστὰς ποιεῖ μᾶλλον. πολλῆς οὖν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης καὶ πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἄριστα δοκοῦντας πράττειν
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καὶ πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας, οἷον εἴ τινές εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταί φασιν, ἐν μακάρων νήσοις· μάλιστα γὰρ οὗτοι δεήσονται φιλοσοφίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον σχολάζουσιν ἐν ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν. διότι μὲν οὖν τὴν μέλλουσαν εὐδαιμονήσειν
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καὶ σπουδαίαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν τούτων δεῖ τῶν ἀρετῶν μετέχειν, φανερόν. αἰσχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος μὴ δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν τῷ σχολάζειν χρῆσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἀσχολοῦντας μὲν καὶ πολεμοῦντας φαίνεσθαι ἀγαθούς, εἰρήνην δʼ ἄγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀνδραποδώδεις.
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διὸ δεῖ μὴ καθάπερ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλις τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν.

ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταύτῃ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων,
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τῷ μὴ νομίζειν ταὐτὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γίνεσθαι ταῦτα μᾶλλον διὰ τινὸς ἀρετῆς· ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω τε ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν […]. […] καὶ ὅτι διʼ αὑτήν, φανερὸν
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ἐκ τούτων· πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον.

τυγχάνομεν δὴ διῃρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους καὶ λόγου δεῖ. τούτων δὲ ποίους μέν τινας εἶναι χρὴ τὴν φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι πότερον παιδευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ δεῖ
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πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑποθέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίως ἦχθαι. φανερὸν δὴ τοῦτό γε πρῶτον μέν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς ἐστι καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπό τινος ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τέλους,
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ὁ δὲ λόγος ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, ὥστε πρὸς τούτους τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐθῶν δεῖ παρασκευάζειν μελέτην· ἔπειτα ὥσπερ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα δύʼ ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρῶμεν δύο μέρη, τό τε ἄλογον καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, καὶ τὰς ἕξεις τὰς τούτων δύο τὸν ἀριθμόν,
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ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστιν ὄρεξις τὸ δὲ νοῦς, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βούλησις, ἔτι δὲ ἐπιθυμία, καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς παιδίοις, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς προϊοῦσιν ἐγγίγνεσθαι
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πέφυκεν. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι προτέραν ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἔπειτα τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, ἕνεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς.

εἴπερ οὖν ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅπως
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βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα γένηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὄντας χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμιλίαν. δεῖ δʼ ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν πρὸς αὐτούς τε καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον, ἵνα συγκαταβαίνωσι ταῖς ἡλικίαις
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ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ μὴ διαφωνῶσιν αἱ δυνάμεις τοῦ μὲν ἔτι δυναμένου γεννᾶν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης, ἢ ταύτης μὲν τοῦ δʼ ἀνδρὸς μή (ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ στάσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ διαφοράς)· ἔπειτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν τέκνων διαδοχήν, δεῖ γὰρ οὔτε λίαν ὑπολείπεσθαι ταῖς
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ἡλικίαις τὰ τέκνα τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόνητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν πρεσβυτέροις ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ἡ δὲ παρὰ τῶν
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πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις),

οὔτε λίαν πάρεγγυς εἶναι (πολλὴν γὰρ ἔχει δυσχέρειαν· ἥ τε γὰρ αἰδὼς ἧττον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τοιούτοις ὥσπερ ἡλικιώταις καὶ περὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν ἐγκληματικὸν τὸ πάρεγγυς)· ἔτι δʼ, ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι δεῦρο
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μετέβημεν, ὅπως τὰ σώματα τῶν γεννωμένων ὑπάρχῃ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν.

σχεδὸν δὴ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὥρισται τέλος τῆς γεννήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον εἰπεῖν ἀνδράσι μὲν ὁ τῶν ἑβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς ἔσχατος, πεντήκοντα δὲ
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γυναιξί, δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς συζεύξεως κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνειν τούτους. ἔστι δʼ ὁ τῶν νέων συνδυασμὸς φαῦλος πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν· ἐν γὰρ πᾶσι ζῴοις ἀτελῆ τὰ τῶν νέων ἔκγονα, καὶ θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον καὶ μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, ὥστʼ ἀναγκαῖον ταὐτὸ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν
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καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τεκμήριον δέ· ἐν ὅσαις γὰρ τῶν πόλεων ἐπιχωριάζεται τὸ νέους συζευγνύναι καὶ νέας, ἀτελεῖς καὶ μικροὶ τὰ σώματά εἰσιν. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τόκοις αἱ νέαι πονοῦσί τε μᾶλλον καὶ διαφθείρονται πλείους· διὸ καὶ τὸν χρησμὸν γενέσθαι τινές φασι διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν
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τοῖς Τροιζηνίοις, ὡς πολλῶν διαφθειρομένων διὰ τὸ γαμίσκεσθαι τὰς νεωτέρας, ἀλλʼ οὐ πρὸς τὴν τῶν καρπῶν κομιδήν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην συμφέρει τὰς ἐκδόσεις ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέραις· ἀκολαστότεραι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι νέαι χρησάμεναι ταῖς συνουσίαις. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων
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δὲ σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν, ἐὰν ἔτι τοῦ σπέρματος αὐξανομένου ποιῶνται τὴν συνουσίαν· καὶ γὰρ τούτου τις ὡρισμένος χρόνος, ὃν οὐχ ὑπερβαίνει πληθύον ἔτι, ἢ μικρόν· διὸ τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττει περὶ τὴν τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἐτῶν ἡλικίαν συζευγνύναι, τοὺς δʼ ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα ἢ μικρόν πρότερον·
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ἐν τοσούτῳ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσί τε τοῖς σώμασιν ἡ σύζευξις ἔσται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν παῦλαν τῆς τεκνοποιίας συγκαταβήσεται τοῖς χρόνοις εὐκαίρως· ἔτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίγνηται κατὰ λόγον εὐθὺς ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας
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πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἑβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμόν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πότε δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν σύζευξιν εἴρηται, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν ὥραν χρόνοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι οἷς οἱ πολλοὶ χρῶνται, καλῶς καὶ νῦν ὁρίσαντες χειμῶνος τὴν συναυλίαν ποιεῖσθαι ταύτην. δεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἤδη θεωρεῖν πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν τά τε
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παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν φυσικῶν· οἵ τε γὰρ ἰατροὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τῶν σωμάτων ἱκανῶς λέγουσι,

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καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οἱ φυσικοί, τὰ βόρεια τῶν νοτίων ἐπαινοῦντες μᾶλλον. ποίων δέ τινων τῶν σωμάτων ὑπαρχόντων μάλιστʼ ἂν ὄφελος εἴη τοῖς γεννωμένοις, ἐπιστήσασι μὲν μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας,
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τύπῳ δὲ ἱκανὸν εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν χρήσιμος ἕξις πρὸς πολιτικὴν εὐεξίαν οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τεκνοποιίαν, οὔτε ἡ θεραπευτικὴ καὶ κακοπονητικὴ λίαν, ἀλλʼ ἡ μέση τούτων. πεπονημένην μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἕξιν, πεπονημένην δὲ πόνοις μὴ βιαίοις, μηδὲ πρὸς ἕνα
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μόνον, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἕξις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἐλευθερίων πράξεις. ὁμοίως δὲ δεῖ ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν ἀνδράσι καὶ γυναιξίν.

χρὴ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐγκύους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, μὴ ῥᾳθυμούσας μηδʼ ἀραιᾷ τροφῇ χρωμένας. τοῦτο δὲ ῥᾴδιον τῷ νομοθέτῃ ποιῆσαι προστάξαντι καθʼ
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ἡμέραν τινὰ ποιεῖσθαι πορείαν πρὸς θεῶν ἀποθεραπείαν τῶν εἰληχότων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμήν. τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν τοὐναντίον τῶν σωμάτων ῥᾳθυμοτέρως ἁρμόττει διάγειν· ἀπολαύοντα γὰρ φαίνεται τὰ γεννώμενα τῆς ἐχούσης ὥσπερ τὰ φυόμενα τῆς γῆς. περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ
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τροφῆς τῶν γιγνομένων ἔστω νόμος μηδὲν πεπηρωμένον τρέφειν, διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων ἡ τάξις τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύῃ μηθὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· ὁρισθῆναι δὲ δεῖ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλῆθος, ἐὰν δέ τισι γίγνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἴσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζωὴν
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ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλωσιν· τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ διωρισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῆς ἡλικίας ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ διώρισται, πότε ἄρχεσθαι χρὴ τῆς συζεύξεως, καὶ πόσον χρόνον λειτουργεῖν ἁρμόττει πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν ὡρίσθω. τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων
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ἔκγονα, καθάπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων, ἀτελῆ γίγνεται καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις, τὰ δὲ τῶν γεγηρακότων ἀσθενῆ· διὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀκμήν. αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἥνπερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινες εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες ταῖς ἑβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πεντήκοντα
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ἐτῶν. ὥστε τέτταρσιν ἢ πέντε ἔτεσιν ὑπερβάλλοντα τὴν ἡλικίαν ταύτην ἀφεῖσθαι δεῖ τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεννήσεως· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑγιείας χάριν ἤ τινος ἄλλης τοιαύτης αἰτίας φαίνεσθαι δεῖ ποιουμένους τὴν ὁμιλίαν. περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον, ἔστω μὲν ἁπλῶς μὴ καλὸν
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ἁπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς, ὅταν ᾖ καὶ προσαγορευθῇ πόσις·

περὶ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς τεκνοποιίας
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ἐάν τις φαίνηται τοιοῦτόν τι δρῶν, ἀτιμίᾳ ζημιούσθω πρεπούσῃ πρὸς τὴν ἁμαρτίαν.

γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων οἴεσθαι δεῖ μεγάλην εἶναι διαφορὰν πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δύναμιν τὴν τροφήν, ὁποία
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τις ἂν ᾖ. φαίνεται δὲ διά τε τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἐπισκοποῦσι, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν οἷς ἐπιμελές ἐστιν ἄγειν εἰς τὴν πολεμικὴν ἕξιν, ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος πλήθουσα τροφὴ μάλιστʼ οἰκεία τοῖς σώμασιν, ἡ ἀοινοτέρα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα. ἔτι δὲ καὶ κινήσεις ὅσας ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖσθαι τηλικούτων συμφέρει.
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πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι τὰ μέλη διʼ ἁπαλότητα χρῶνται καὶ νῦν ἔνια τῶν ἐθνῶν ὀργάνοις τισὶ μηχανικοῖς, ἃ τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖ τῶν τοιούτων ἀστραβές. συμφέρει δʼ εὐθὺς καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψύχη συνεθίζειν ἐκ μικρῶν παίδων· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς
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πράξεις εὐχρηστότατον. διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἐστι τῶν βαρβάρων ἔθος τοῖς μὲν εἰς ποταμὸν ἀποβάπτειν τὰ γιγνόμενα ψυχρόν, τοῖς δὲ σκέπασμα μικρὸν ἀμπίσχειν, οἷον Κελτοῖς. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα δυνατὸν ἐθίζειν εὐθὺς ἀρχομένων βέλτιον ἐθίζειν μέν, ἐκ προσαγωγῆς δʼ ἐθίζειν·
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εὐφυὴς δʼ ἡ τῶν παίδων ἕξις διὰ θερμότητα πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψυχρῶν ἄσκησιν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρώτην συμφέρει ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τοιαύτην τε καὶ τὴν ταύτῃ παραπλησίαν· τὴν δʼ ἐχομένην ταύτης ἡλικίαν μέχρι πέντε ἐτῶν, ἣν οὔτε πω πρὸς μάθησιν καλῶς ἔχει προσάγειν οὐδεμίαν
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οὔτε πρὸς ἀναγκαίους πόνους, ὅπως μὴ τὴν αὔξησιν ἐμποδίζωσιν, δεῖ τοσαύτης τυγχάνειν κινήσεως ὥστε διαφεύγειν τὴν ἀργίαν τῶν σωμάτων· ἣν χρὴ παρασκευάζειν καὶ διʼ ἄλλων πράξεων καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδιᾶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς εἶναι μήτε ἀνελευθέρους μήτε ἐπιπόνους μήτε ἀνειμένας.
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καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, ποίους τινὰς ἀκούειν δεῖ τοὺς τηλικούτους, ἐπιμελὲς ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσιν οὓς καλοῦσι παιδονόμους. πάντα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα προοδοποιεῖν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον διατριβάς· διὸ τὰς παιδιὰς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς πολλὰς μιμήσεις τῶν ὕστερον σπουδαζομένων. τὰς δὲ διατάσεις
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τῶν παίδων καὶ κλαυθμοὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις· συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὔξησιν· γίγνεται γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ γυμνασία τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις ποιεῖ τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, ὃ συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διατεινομένοις.

ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ
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τοῖς παιδονόμοις τὴν τούτων διαγωγήν, τήν τʼ ἄλλην καὶ ὅπως ὅτι ἥκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται. ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἡλικίαν,

[Bekker 1336b]
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καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον οἴκοι τὴν τροφὴν ἔχειν. εὔλογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων καὶ τῶν ὁραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας. ὅλως μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι, δεῖ
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τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν (ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὁτιοῦν τῶν αἰσχρῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς)· μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων, ὅπως μήτε λέγωσι μήτε ἀκούωσι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον· ἐὰν δέ τις φαίνηταί τι λέγων ἢ πράττων τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων, τὸν μὲν ἐλεύθερον μὲν μήπω δὲ κατακλίσεως
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ἠξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις ἀτιμίαις κολάζειν καὶ πληγαῖς, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτερον τῆς ἡλικίας ταύτης ἀτιμίαις ἀνελευθέροις ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐξορίζομεν, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἢ γραφὰς ἢ λόγους ἀσχήμονας. ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς
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ἄρχουσι μηθέν, μήτε ἄγαλμα μήτε γραφήν, εἶναι τοιούτων πράξεων μίμησιν, εἰ μὴ παρά τισι θεοῖς τοιούτοις οἷς καὶ τὸν τωθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος. πρὸς δὲ τούτους ἀφίησιν ὁ νόμος τοὺς τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντας ἔτι τὴν ἱκνουμένην καὶ ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλφεῖν τοὺς θεούς·
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τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους οὔτʼ ἰάμβων οὔτε κωμῳδίας θεατὰς ἐατέον, πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ἐν ᾗ καὶ κατακλίσεως ὑπάρξει κοινωνεῖν ἤδη καὶ μέθης, καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων γιγνομένης βλάβης ἀπαθεῖς ἡ παιδεία ποιήσει πάντως.

νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδρομῇ τοῦτον πεποιήμεθα τὸν λόγον·
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ὕστερον δʼ ἐπιστήσαντας δεῖ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἴτε μὴ δεῖ πρῶτον εἴτε δεῖ διαπορήσαντας, καὶ πῶς δεῖ· κατὰ δὲ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ κακῶς ἔλεγε τὸ τοιοῦτον Θεόδωρος ὁ τῆς τραγῳδίας ὑποκριτής· οὐθενὶ γὰρ πώποτε παρῆκεν ἑαυτοῦ προεισάγειν, οὐδὲ
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τῶν εὐτελῶν ὑποκριτῶν, ὡς οἰκειουμένων τῶν θεατῶν ταῖς πρώταις ἀκοαῖς· συμβαίνει δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλίας καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων· πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς νέοις πάντα ποιεῖν ξένα τὰ φαῦλα, μάλιστα δʼ αὐτῶν ὅσα
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ἔχει ἢ μοχθηρίαν ἢ δυσμένειαν. διελθόντων δὲ τῶν πέντε ἐτῶν τὰ δύο μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ δεῖ θεωροὺς ἤδη γίγνεσθαι τῶν μαθήσεων ἃς δεήσει μανθάνειν αὐτούς. δύο δʼ εἰσὶν ἡλικίαι πρὸς ἃς ἀναγκαῖον διῃρῆσθαι τὴν παιδείαν, πρὸς τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑπτὰ μέχρι ἥβης καὶ πάλιν μετὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀφʼ
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ἥβης μέχρι τῶν ἑνὸς καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἑβδομάσι διαιροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ
[Bekker 1337a]
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κακῶς,

δεῖ δὲ τῇ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν· πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσλεῖπον βούλεται τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον εἰ ποιητέον τάξιν τινὰ περὶ τοὺς παῖδας, ἔπειτα πότερον συμφέρει κοινῇ
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ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν ἢ κατʼ ἴδιον τρόπον (ὃ γίγνεται καὶ νῦν ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων), τρίτον δὲ ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ ταύτην εἶναι.

### Book VIII, 1337a–1340b

[Bekker 1337a]
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ὅτι μὲν οὖν τῷ νομοθέτῃ μάλιστα πραγματευτέον περὶ τὴν τῶν νέων παιδείαν, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀμφισβητήσειε· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ γιγνόμενον τοῦτο βλάπτει τὰς πολιτείας· δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάστην παιδεύεσθαι, τὸ γὰρ ἦθος
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τῆς πολιτείας ἑκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ φυλάττειν εἴωθε τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον τὸ μὲν δημοκρατικὸν δημοκρατίαν τὸ δʼ ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν· ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ βέλτιον ἦθος βελτίονος αἴτιον πολιτείας. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς πάσας δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ προπαιδεύεσθαι
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καὶ προεθίζεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἑκάστων ἐργασίας, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεις· ἐπεὶ δʼ ἓν τὸ τέλος τῇ πόλει πάσῃ, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων, καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ μὴ κατʼ ἰδίαν, ὃν τρόπον νῦν
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ἕκαστος ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὑτοῦ τέκνων ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ μάθησιν ἰδίαν, ἣν ἂν δόξῃ, διδάσκων. δεῖ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν κοινὴν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν. ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ τινα εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως, μόριον γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως· ἡ δʼ ἐπιμέλεια
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πέφυκεν ἑκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐπαινέσειε δʼ ἄν τις κατὰ τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίους· καὶ γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῦνται σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ κοινῇ ταύτην.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν νομοθετητέον περὶ παιδείας καὶ ταύτην κοινὴν ποιητέον, φανερόν· τίς δʼ ἔσται ἡ παιδεία καὶ πῶς
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χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖται περὶ τῶν ἔργων. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσι δεῖν μανθάνειν τοὺς νέους οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν ἄριστον, οὐδὲ φανερὸν πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος· ἔκ τε τῆς ἐμποδὼν
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παιδείας ταραχώδης ἡ σκέψις καὶ δῆλον οὐδὲν πότερον ἀσκεῖν δεῖ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ τὰ περιττά (πάντα γὰρ εἴληφε ταῦτα κριτάς
[Bekker 1337b]
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τινας)·

περί τε τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐθέν ἐστιν ὁμολογούμενον (καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντες τιμῶσιν, ὥστʼ εὐλόγως διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄσκησιν αὐτῆς). ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεῖ διδάσκεσθαι τῶν χρησίμων,
[Bekker 1337b line 5]
οὐκ ἄδηλον· ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα, διῃρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθερίων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθερίων φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων δεῖ μετέχειν ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ βάναυσον. βάναυσον δʼ ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ
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τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ τάς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι βαναύσους καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας· ἄσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ταπεινήν.
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ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερίων ἐπιστημῶν μέχρι μὲν τινὸς ἐνίων μετέχειν οὐκ ἀνελεύθερον, τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν λίαν πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἔνοχον ταῖς εἰρημέναις βλάβαις. ἔχει δὲ πολλὴν διαφορὰν καὶ τὸ τίνος ἕνεκεν πράττει τις ἢ μανθάνει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὑτοῦ χάριν ἢ φίλων ἢ διʼ ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἀνελεύθερον,
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ὁ δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττων διʼ ἄλλους πολλάκις θητικὸν καὶ δουλικὸν δόξειεν ἂν πράττειν.

αἱ μὲν οὖν καταβεβλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν· ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα σχεδὸν ἃ παιδεύειν εἰώθασι,

γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικὴν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ
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τέταρτον ἔνιοι γραφικήν, τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν ὡς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὔσας καὶ πολυχρήστους, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν ὡς συντείνουσαν πρὸς ἀνδρείαν· τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἤδη διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδονῆς χάριν οἱ πλεῖστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς· οἱ δʼ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔταξαν ἐν παιδείᾳ
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διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται, μὴ μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων μία· καὶ πάλιν εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ δʼ ἄμφω μὲν δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ αἱρετὸν τὸ σχολάζειν τῆς ἀσχολίας καὶ τέλος, ζητητέον
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ὅ τι δεῖ ποιοῦντας σχολάζειν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ παίζοντας· τέλος γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ βίου τὴν παιδιὰν ἡμῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς ἀσχολίαις χρηστέον ταῖς παιδιαῖς (ὁ γὰρ πονῶν δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως, ἡ δὲ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεώς ἐστιν· τὸ δʼ ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει
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μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας), διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ παιδιὰς εἰσάγεσθαι καιροφυλακοῦντας τὴν χρῆσιν, ὡς προσάγοντας φαρμακείας χάριν. ἄνεσις γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς,
[Bekker 1338a]
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καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀνάπαυσις.

τὸ δὲ σχολάζειν ἔχειν αὐτὸ δοκεῖ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως. τοῦτο δʼ οὐ τοῖς ἀσχολοῦσιν ὑπάρχει ἀλλὰ τοῖς σχολάζουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολῶν ἕνεκα τινος ἀσχολεῖ
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τέλους ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχοντος, ἡ δʼ εὐδαιμονία τέλος ἐστίν, ἣν οὐ μετὰ λύπης ἀλλὰ μεθʼ ἡδονῆς οἴονται πάντες εἶναι. ταύτην μέντοι τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν τιθέασιν, ἀλλὰ καθʼ ἑαυτοὺς ἕκαστος καὶ τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὑτῶν, ὁ δʼ ἄριστος τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι
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δεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολὴν μανθάνειν ἄττα καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τὰ παιδεύματα καὶ ταύτας τὰς μαθήσεις ἑαυτῶν εἶναι χάριν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν ὡς ἀναγκαίας καὶ χάριν ἄλλων. διὸ καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν οἱ πρότερον εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν οὐχ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον
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(οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει τοιοῦτον), οὐδʼ ὡς χρήσιμον (ὥσπερ τὰ γράμματα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν καὶ πρὸς οἰκονομίαν καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν καὶ πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις πολλάς, δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ γραφικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν τὰ τῶν τεχνιτῶν ἔργα κάλλιον), οὐδʼ αὖ καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ πρὸς
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ὑγίειαν καὶ ἀλκήν (οὐδέτερον γὰρ τούτων ὁρῶμεν γιγνόμενον ἐκ τῆς μουσικῆς)· λείπεται τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν, εἰς ὅπερ καὶ φαίνονται παράγοντες αὐτήν. ἣν γὰρ οἴονται διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν ταύτῃ τάττουσιν. διόπερ Ὅμηρος οὕτως ἐποίησεν
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ἀλλʼ οἶον μέν ἐστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλείην,
καὶ οὕτω προειπὼν ἑτέρους τινὰς
οἳ καλέουσιν ἀοιδόν
φησίν,
ὅ κεν τέρπῃσιν ἅπαντας.
καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησιν ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ταύτην ἀρίστην εἶναι διαγωγήν, ὅταν εὐφραινομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων
δαιτυμόνες δʼ ἀνὰ δώματʼ ἀκουάζωνται ἀοιδοῦ
ἥμενοι ἑξείης.
(Hom. Od. 9.5)

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ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι παιδεία τις ἣν οὐχ ὡς χρησίμην παιδευτέον τοὺς υἱεῖς οὐδʼ ὡς ἀναγκαίαν ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν, φανερόν ἐστιν· πότερον δὲ μία τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ πλείους, καὶ τίνες αὗται καὶ πῶς, ὕστερον λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν. νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸ
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ὁδοῦ γέγονεν, ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἔχομέν τινα μαρτυρίαν ἐκ τῶν καταβεβλημένων παιδευμάτων· ἡ γὰρ μουσικὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖ δῆλον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὅτι δεῖ τινα παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς παῖδας οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, οἷον τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πολλὰς
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ἐνδέχεσθαι γίγνεσθαι διʼ αὐτῶν μαθήσεις ἑτέρας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν γραφικὴν οὐχ ἵνα ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ὠνίοις μὴ διαμαρτάνωσιν ἀλλʼ ὦσιν ἀνεξαπάτητοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν σκευῶν
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ὠνήν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν,

μᾶλλον δʼ ὅτι ποιεῖ θεωρητικὸν τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους. τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρήσιμον ἥκιστα ἁρμόττει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλευθερίοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν πρότερον τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἢ τῷ λόγῳ
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παιδευτέον εἶναι, καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν, δῆλον ἐκ τούτων ὅτι παραδοτέον τοὺς παῖδας γυμναστικῇ καὶ παιδοτριβικῇ· τούτων γὰρ ἡ μὲν ποιάν τινα ποιεῖ τὴν ἕξιν τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ τὰ ἔργα.

νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι
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τῶν παίδων αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἕξιν ἐμποιοῦσι, λωβώμεναι τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν σωμάτων, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἥμαρτον τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, θηριώδεις δʼ ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρείαν μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι, καθάπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, οὔτε
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πρὸς μίαν οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην βλέποντα ποιητέον τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν· εἰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταύτην, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐξευρίσκουσιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἤθεσιν. πολλὰ
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δʼ ἔστι τῶν ἐθνῶν ἃ πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωποφαγίαν εὐχερῶς ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον Ἀχαιοί τε καὶ Ἡνίοχοι καὶ τῶν ἠπειρωτικῶν ἐθνῶν ἕτερα, τὰ μὲν ὁμοίως τούτοις τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἃ λῃστρικὰ μέν ἐστιν, ἀνδρείας δʼ οὐ μετειλήφασιν. ἔτι δʼ αὐτοὺς τοὺς Λάκωνας
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ἴσμεν, ἕως μὲν αὐτοὶ προσήδρευον ταῖς φιλοπονίαις, ὑπερέχοντας τῶν ἄλλων, νῦν δὲ κἀν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι κἀν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειπομένους ἑτέρων· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοὺς νέους γυμνάζειν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διέφερον, ἀλλὰ μόνον τῷ πρὸς μὴ ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν. ὥστε τὸ καλὸν ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ θηριῶδες
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δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος οὐδʼ οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων τι ἀγωνίσαιτο ἂν οὐθένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, οἱ δὲ λίαν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνέντες τοὺς παῖδας, καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιδαγωγήτους ποιήσαντες, βαναύσους κατεργάζονται κατά γε τὸ ἀληθές, πρὸς ἕν τε μόνον ἔργον
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τῆς πολιτικῆς χρησίμους ποιήσαντες, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο χεῖρον, ὥς φησιν ὁ λόγος, ἑτέρων. δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργων κρίνειν, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν νῦν· ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσι, πρότερον δʼ οὐκ εἶχον.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστέον τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πῶς χρηστέον, ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστιν
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(μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἥβης κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσοιστέον, τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους ἀπείργοντας, ἵνα μηθὲν ἐμπόδιον ᾖ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν·

σημεῖον γὰρ οὐ
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μικρὸν ὅτι δύνανται τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς Ὀλυμπιονίκαις δύο τις ἂν ἢ τρεῖς εὕροι τοὺς αὐτοὺς νενικηκότας ἄνδρας τε καὶ παῖδας, διὰ τὸ νέους ἀσκοῦντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων· ὅταν δʼ ἀφʼ
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ἥβης ἔτη τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασι γένωνται, τότε ἁρμόττει καὶ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγκοφαγίαις καταλαμβάνειν τὴν ἐχομένην ἡλικίαν· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ τε διανοίᾳ καὶ τῷ σώματι διαπονεῖν οὐ δεῖ, τοὐναντίον γὰρ ἑκάτερος ἀπεργάζεσθαι πέφυκε τῶν πόνων, ἐμποδίζων ὁ μὲν τοῦ
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σώματος πόνος τὴν διάνοιαν ὁ δὲ ταύτης τὸ σῶμα).

περὶ δὲ μουσικῆς ἔνια μὲν διηπορήκαμεν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ πρότερον, καλῶς δʼ ἔχει καὶ νῦν ἀναλαβόντας αὐτὰ προαγαγεῖν, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον γένηται τοῖς λόγοις οὓς ἄν τις εἴπειεν ἀποφαινόμενος περὶ αὐτῆς. οὔτε γὰρ τίνα
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ἔχει δύναμιν ῥᾴδιον περὶ αὐτῆς διελεῖν, οὔτε τίνος δεῖ χάριν μετέχειν αὐτῆς, πότερον παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύσεως, καθάπερ ὕπνου καὶ μέθης (ταῦτα γὰρ καθʼ αὑτὰ μὲν οὐδὲ τῶν σπουδαίων, ἀλλʼ ἡδέα, καὶ ἀναπαύει μέριμναν, ὥς φησιν Εὐριπίδης· διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν αὐτὴν καὶ
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χρῶνται πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμοίως, ὕπνῳ καὶ μέθῃ καὶ μουσικῇ· τιθέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄρχησιν ἐν τούτοις), ἢ μᾶλλον οἰητέον πρὸς ἀρετήν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικήν, ὡς δυναμένην, καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ τὸ σῶμα ποιόν τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τὸ ἦθος ποιόν τι ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσαν δύνασθαι χαίρειν
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ὀρθῶς, ἢ πρὸς διαγωγήν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τρίτον θετέον τῶν εἰρημένων). ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τοὺς νέους μὴ παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα παιδεύειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ παίζουσι μανθάνοντες· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ μάθησις)· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγήν γε παισὶν ἁρμόττει
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καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδιδόναι ταῖς τοιαύταις (οὐθενὶ γὰρ ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος). ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἂν δόξειεν ἡ τῶν παίδων σπουδὴ παιδιᾶς εἶναι χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν. ἀλλʼ εἰ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τίνος ἂν ἕνεκα δέοι μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ μή, καθάπερ οἱ τῶν Περσῶν καὶ
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Μήδων βασιλεῖς, διʼ ἄλλων αὐτὸ ποιούντων μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς μαθήσεως; καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον βέλτιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργον καὶ τέχνην τῶν τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἐπιμελουμένων ὅσον πρὸς μάθησιν μόνον. εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα διαπονεῖν αὐτούς, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν
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ὄψων πραγματείαν αὐτοὺς ἂν δέοι παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλʼ ἄτοπον. τὴν δʼ αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ εἰ δύναται τὰ ἤθη βελτίω ποιεῖν· ταῦτα γὰρ τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς,

ἀλλʼ
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οὐχ ἑτέρων ἀκούοντας ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, ὥσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὅμως δύνανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὥς φασι, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν. ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος κἂν εἰ πρὸς εὐημερίαν
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καὶ διαγωγὴν ἐλευθέριον χρηστέον αὐτῇ· τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἑτέρων χρωμένων ἀπολαύειν; σκοπεῖν δʼ ἔξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν· οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἀείδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαναύσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ
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ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παίζοντος.

ἀλλʼ ἴσως περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· ἡ δὲ πρώτη ζήτησίς ἐστι πότερον οὐ θετέον εἰς παιδείαν τὴν μουσικὴν ἢ θετέον, καὶ τί δύναται τῶν διαπορηθέντων τριῶν, πότερον παιδείαν ἢ παιδιὰν ἢ διαγωγήν. εὐλόγως δʼ εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ
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φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἥ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεώς ἐστι, τὴν δʼ ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἡδεῖαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἰατρεία τίς ἐστιν), καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν (τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐστίν)·
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τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναί φαμεν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψιλὴν οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελῳδίας (φησὶ γοῦν καὶ Μουσαῖος εἶναι βροτοῖς ἥδιστον ἀείδειν· διὸ καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγὰς εὐλόγως παραλαμβάνουσιν αὐτὴν ὡς δυναμένην εὐφραίνειν), ὥστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι παιδεύεσθαι
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δεῖν αὐτὴν τοὺς νεωτέρους. ὅσα γὰρ ἀβλαβῆ τῶν ἡδέων, οὐ μόνον ἁρμόττει πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν· ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀλιγάκις γίγνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ ἀναπαύονται καὶ χρῶνται ταῖς παιδιαῖς οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλέον ἀλλὰ καὶ
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διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, χρήσιμον ἂν εἴη διαναπαύειν ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ ταύτης ἡδοναῖς.

συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος· ἔχει γὰρ ἴσως ἡδονήν τινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην λαμβάνουσιν ὡς ταύτην ἐκείνην, διὰ τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν πράξεων
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ἔχειν ὁμοίωμά τι. τό τε γὰρ τέλος οὐθενὸς τῶν ἐσομένων χάριν αἱρετόν, καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἡδονῶν οὐθενός εἰσι τῶν ἐσομένων ἕνεκεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν γεγονότων, οἷον πόνων καὶ λύπης. διʼ ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν γίγνεσθαι διὰ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν, ταύτην εἰκότως ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι
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τὴν αἰτίαν· περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν τῆς μουσικῆς, ὅτι οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὰς ἀναπαύσεις, ὡς ἔοικεν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μή ποτε
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τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε,

τιμιωτέρα δʼ αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρείαν, καὶ δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπʼ αὐτῆς, ἧς ἔχουσι πάντες αἴσθησιν (ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μουσική τινʼ ἡδονὴν φυσικήν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις
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καὶ πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστι προσφιλής), ἀλλʼ ὁρᾶν εἴ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἦθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν. τοῦτο δʼ ἂν εἴη δῆλον, εἰ ποιοί τινες τὰ ἤθη γιγνόμεθα διʼ αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γιγνόμεθα ποιοί τινες, φανερὸν διὰ πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἑτέρων, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν Ὀλύμπου
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μελῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικάς, ὁ δʼ ἐνθουσιασμὸς τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἤθους πάθος ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίγνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν.

ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἡδέων,
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τὴν δʼ ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν, δεῖ δηλονότι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι μηθὲν οὕτως ὡς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· ἔστι δὲ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς
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καὶ πραότητος, ἔτι δʼ ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν (δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων· μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι τοιούτων)· ὁ δʼ ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἐθισμὸς τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ χαίρειν ἐγγύς ἐστι τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν
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τρόπον (οἷον εἴ τις χαίρει τὴν εἰκόνα τινὸς θεώμενος μὴ διʼ ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτήν, ἀναγκαῖον τούτῳ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τὴν θεωρίαν, οὗ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ, ἡδεῖαν εἶναι). συμβέβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ὁμοίωμα τοῖς ἤθεσιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς
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ἁπτοῖς καὶ τοῖς γευστοῖς, ἀλλʼ ἐν τοῖς ὁρατοῖς ἠρέμα (σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ μικρόν, κοὐ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσιν· ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν, ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰ γιγνόμενα σχήματα καὶ χρώματα τῶν ἠθῶν, καὶ ταῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἐπίσημα
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ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ περὶ τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν, δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γραφέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστιν ἠθικός), ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἔστι μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν (καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ φανερόν·
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εὐθὺς γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις, ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἑκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὀδυρτικωτέρως
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καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον,

### Book VIII, 1340b–1342b

οἷον πρὸς τὴν μιξολυδιστὶ καλουμένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἀνειμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μάλιστα πρὸς ἑτέραν, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δωριστὶ μόνη τῶν ἁρμονιῶν, ἐνθουσιαστικοὺς
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δʼ ἡ φρυγιστί. ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες· λαμβάνουσι γὰρ τὰ μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων). τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἦθος ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας
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ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας). ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι δύναται ποιόν τι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἡ μουσικὴ παρασκευάζειν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι προσακτέον καὶ παιδευτέον ἐν αὐτῇ τοὺς νέους. ἔστι δὲ ἁρμόττουσα πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τὴν τηλικαύτην ἡ διδασκαλία
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τῆς μουσικῆς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ νέοι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀνήδυντον οὐθὲν ὑπομένουσιν ἑκόντες, ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν ἡδυσμένων ἐστίν. καί τις ἔοικε συγγένεια ταῖς ἁρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς εἶναι· διὸ πολλοί φασι τῶν σοφῶν οἱ μὲν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, οἱ δʼ ἔχειν ἁρμονίαν.

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πότερον δὲ δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς ᾄδοντάς τε καὶ χειρουργοῦντας ἢ μή, καθάπερ ἠπορήθη πρότερον, νῦν λεκτέον οὐκ ἄδηλον δὴ ὅτι πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ γίγνεσθαι ποιούς τινας, ἐάν τις αὐτὸς κοινωνῇ τῶν ἔργων· ἓν γάρ τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢ χαλεπῶν ἐστι μὴ κοινωνήσαντας
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τῶν ἔργων κριτὰς γενέσθαι σπουδαίους. ἅμα δὲ καὶ δεῖ τοὺς παῖδας ἔχειν τινὰ διατριβήν, καὶ τὴν Ἀρχύτου πλαταγὴν οἴεσθαι γενέσθαι καλῶς, ἣν διδόασι τοῖς παιδίοις, ὅπως χρώμενοι ταύτῃ μηδὲν καταγνύωσι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν· οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχάζειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐστι τοῖς
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νηπίοις ἁρμόττουσα τῶν παιδίων, ἡ δὲ παιδεία πλαταγὴ τοῖς μείζοσι τῶν νέων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν παιδευτέον τὴν μουσικὴν οὕτως ὥστε καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἔργων, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων· τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ μὴ πρέπον ταῖς ἡλικίαις οὐ χαλεπὸν διορίσαι, καὶ λῦσαι πρὸς τοὺς φάσκοντας βάναυσον
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εἶναι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ἐπεὶ τοῦ κρίνειν χάριν μετέχειν δεῖ τῶν ἔργων, διὰ τοῦτο χρὴ νέους μὲν ὄντας χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἔργοις, πρεσβυτέρους δὲ γενομένους τῶν μὲν ἔργων ἀφεῖσθαι, δύνασθαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν καὶ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς διὰ τὴν μάθησιν τὴν γενομένην ἐν τῇ νεότητι·
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περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπιτιμήσεως ἥν τινες ἐπιτιμῶσιν ὡς ποιούσης τῆς μουσικῆς βαναύσους, οὐ χαλεπὸν λῦσαι σκεψαμένους μέχρι τε πόσου τῶν ἔργων κοινωνητέον τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν
[Bekker 1341a]
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παιδευομένοις πολιτικήν,

καὶ ποίων μελῶν καὶ ποίων ῥυθμῶν κοινωνητέον, ἔτι δὲ ἐν ποίοις ὀργάνοις τὴν μάθησιν ποιητέον, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρειν εἰκός. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἡ λύσις ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιτιμήσεως· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τρόπους τινὰς
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τῆς μουσικῆς ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸ λεχθέν. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ τὴν μάθησιν αὐτῆς μήτε ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον πράξεις, μήτε τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν βάναυσον καὶ ἄχρηστον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ἤδη πρὸς δὲ τὰς χρήσεις ὕστερον.

συμβαίνοι δʼ ἂν
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περὶ τὴν μάθησιν, εἰ μήτε τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς τεχνικοὺς συντείνοντα διαπονοῖεν, μήτε τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων, ἃ νῦν ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἀγώνων εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα μέχρι περ ἂν δύνωνται χαίρειν τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσι καὶ ῥυθμοῖς,
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καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔνια ζῴων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πλῆθος ἀνδραπόδων καὶ παιδίων. δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ποίοις ὀργάνοις χρηστέον. οὔτε γὰρ αὐλοὺς εἰς παιδείαν ἀκτέον οὔτʼ ἄλλο τι τεχνικὸν ὄργανον, οἷον κιθάραν κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ
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ὅσα ποιήσει αὐτῶν ἀκροατὰς ἀγαθοὺς ἢ τῆς μουσικῆς παιδείας ἢ τῆς ἄλλης· ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἠθικὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιροὺς χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἢ μάθησιν. προσθῶμεν δὲ ὅτι συμβέβηκεν ἐναντίον αὐτῷ πρὸς
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παιδείαν καὶ τὸ κωλύειν τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι τὴν αὔλησιν. διὸ καλῶς ἀπεδοκίμασαν αὐτοῦ οἱ πρότερον τὴν χρῆσιν ἐκ τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, καίπερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῷ. σχολαστικώτεροι γὰρ γιγνόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπορίας καὶ μεγαλοψυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν, ἔτι τε πρότερον
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καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ φρονηματισθέντες ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, πάσης ἥπτοντο μαθήσεως, οὐδὲν διακρίνοντες ἀλλʼ ἐπιζητοῦντες. διὸ καὶ τὴν αὐλητικὴν ἤγαγον πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν Λακεδαίμονί τις χορηγὸς αὐτὸς ηὔλησε τῷ χορῷ, καὶ περὶ Ἀθήνας οὕτως ἐπεχωρίασεν ὥστε σχεδὸν οἱ
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πολλοὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μετεῖχον αὐτῆς· δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πίνακος ὃν ἀνέθηκε Θράσιππος Ἐκφαντίδῃ χορηγήσας. ὕστερον δʼ ἀπεδοκιμάσθη διὰ τῆς πείρας αὐτῆς, βέλτιον δυναμένων κρίνειν τὸ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν συντεῖνον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ὀργάνων τῶν ἀρχαίων,
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οἷον πηκτίδες καὶ βάρβιτοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συντείνοντα τοῖς ἀκούουσι τῶν χρωμένων, ἑπτάγωνα καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ
[Bekker 1341b]
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σαμβῦκαι,

καὶ πάντα τὰ δεόμενα χειρουργικῆς ἐπιστήμης. εὐλόγως δʼ ἔχει καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων μεμυθολογημένον. φασὶ γὰρ δὴ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν εὑροῦσαν ἀποβαλεῖν τοὺς αὐλούς. οὐ κακῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει φάναι καὶ διὰ
[Bekker 1341b line 5]
τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην τοῦ προσώπου τοῦτο ποιῆσαι δυσχεράνασαν τὴν θεόν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ὅτι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν οὐθέν ἐστιν ἡ παιδεία τῆς αὐλήσεως, τῇ δὲ Ἀθηνᾷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην περιτίθεμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τε ὀργάνων καὶ τῆς ἐργασίας ἀποδοκιμάζομεν τὴν τεχνικὴν παιδείαν
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(τεχνικὴν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ὁ πράττων οὐ τῆς αὑτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης φορτικῆς, διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν, ἀλλὰ θητικωτέραν· καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι· πονηρὸς
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γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος· ὁ γὰρ θεατὴς φορτικὸς ὢν μεταβάλλειν εἴωθε τὴν μουσικήν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας τοὺς πρὸς αὐτὸν μελετῶντας αὐτούς τε ποιούς τινας ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὰς κινήσεις),

σκεπτέον δή τι περί τε τὰς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς,
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καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν πότερον πάσαις χρηστέον ταῖς ἁρμονίαις καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς ἢ διαιρετέον, ἔπειτα τοῖς πρὸς παιδείαν διαπονοῦσι πότερον τὸν αὐτὸν διορισμὸν θήσομεν ἢ τρίτον δεῖ τινα ἕτερον. ἐπεὶ δὴ τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν, τούτων δʼ ἑκάτερον οὐ δεῖ λεληθέναι
[Bekker 1341b line 25]
τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει πρὸς παιδείαν, καὶ πότερον προαιρετέον μᾶλλον τὴν εὐμελῆ μουσικὴν ἢ τὴν εὔρυθμον, νομίσαντες οὖν πολλὰ καλῶς λέγειν περὶ τούτων τῶν τε νῦν μουσικῶν ἐνίους καὶ τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ἐμπείρως ἔχοντες τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας, τὴν μὲν
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καθʼ ἕκαστον ἀκριβολογίαν ἀποδώσομεν ζητεῖν τοῖς βουλομένοις παρʼ ἐκείνων, νῦν δὲ νομικῶς διέλωμεν, τοὺς τύπους μόνον εἰπόντες περὶ αὐτῶν.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδεχόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιροῦσί τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δʼ ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες,
[Bekker 1341b line 35]
καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν τὴν φύσιν τὴν πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων οἰκείαν, ἄλλην πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος, τιθέασι, φαμὲν δʼ οὐ μιᾶς ἕνεκεν ὠφελείας τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι δεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ πλειόνων χάριν (καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἕνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἁπλῶς, πάλιν δʼ ἐν τοῖς περὶ
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ποιητικῆς ἐροῦμεν σαφέστερον—τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν πρὸς ἄνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν),

[Bekker 1342a]
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φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἁρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἠθικωτάταις, πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἑτέρων χειρουργούντων καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. ὃ
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γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχὰς ἰσχυρῶς, τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἧττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον, οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἔτι δʼ ἐνθουσιασμός· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατοκώχιμοί τινές εἰσιν, ἐκ τῶν δʼ ἱερῶν μελῶν ὁρῶμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἐξοργιάζουσι
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τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως· ταὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν καὶ τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὅλως παθητικούς, τοὺς ἄλλους καθʼ ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἑκάστῳ, καὶ πᾶσι γίγνεσθαί τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κουφίζεσθαι
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μεθʼ ἡδονῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ πρακτικὰ παρέχει χαρὰν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἁρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεσιν θετέον τοὺς τὴν θεατρικὴν μουσικὴν μεταχειριζομένους ἀγωνιστάς· ἐπεὶ δʼ ὁ θεατὴς διττός, ὁ μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, ὁ δὲ
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φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγκείμενος, ἀποδοτέον ἀγῶνας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως—οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα,
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ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἑκάστοις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεῖον, διόπερ ἀποδοτέον ἐξουσίαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις πρὸς τὸν θεατὴν τὸν τοιοῦτον τοιούτῳ τινὶ χρῆσθαι τῷ γένει τῆς μουσικῆς. πρὸς δὲ παιδείαν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τοῖς ἠθικοῖς τῶν μελῶν χρηστέον καὶ ταῖς ἁρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις. τοιαύτη
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δʼ ἡ δωριστί, καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον· δέχεσθαι δὲ δεῖ κἄν τινα ἄλλην ἡμῖν δοκιμάζωσιν οἱ κοινωνοὶ τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας. ὁ δʼ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τὴν φρυγιστὶ μόνην καταλείπει μετὰ τῆς δωριστί, καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδοκιμάσας
[Bekker 1342b]
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τῶν ὀργάνων τὸν αὐλόν.

ἔχει γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἡ φρυγιστὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἥνπερ αὐλὸς ἐν τοῖς ὀργάνοις· ἄμφω γὰρ ὀργιαστικὰ καὶ παθητικά· δηλοῖ δʼ ἡ ποίησις. πᾶσα γὰρ βακχεία καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις
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μάλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς αὐλοῖς, τῶν δʼ ἁρμονιῶν ἐν τοῖς φρυγιστὶ μέλεσι λαμβάνει ταῦτα τὸ πρέπον. δηλοῖ δʼ ἡ ποίησις, οἷον ὁ διθύραμβος ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι δοκεῖ Φρύγιον. καὶ τούτου πολλὰ παραδείγματα λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνεσιν ταύτην, ἄλλα τε καὶ ὅτι Φιλόξενος ἐγχειρήσας ἐν
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τῇ δωριστὶ ποιῆσαι διθύραμβον τοὺς Μύσους οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἦν, ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς ἐξέπεσεν εἰς τὴν φρυγιστὶ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἁρμονίαν πάλιν. περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὔσης καὶ μάλιστα ἦθος ἐχούσης ἀνδρεῖον. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον μὲν τῶν ὑπερβολῶν ἐπαινοῦμεν
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καὶ χρῆναι διώκειν φαμέν, ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἁρμονίας, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ Δώρια μέλη πρέπει παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον τοῖς νεωτέροις.

εἰσὶ δὲ δύο σκοποί, τό τε δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον· καὶ γὰρ τὰ δυνατὰ δεῖ μεταχειρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ πρέποντα ἑκάστους.
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ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὡρισμένα ταῖς ἡλικίαις, οἷον τοῖς ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ χρόνον οὐ ῥᾴδιον ᾄδειν τὰς συντόνους ἁρμονίας, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνειμένας ἡ φύσις ὑποβάλλει τοῖς τηλικούτοις. διὸ καλῶς ἐπιτιμῶσι καὶ τοῦτο Σωκράτει τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικήν τινες, ὅτι τὰς ἀνειμένας ἁρμονίας ἀποδοκιμάσειεν
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εἰς τὴν παιδίαν, ὡς μεθυστικὰς λαμβάνων αὐτάς, οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μέθης δύναμιν, βακχευτικὸν γὰρ ἥ γε μέθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον, ἀλλʼ ἀπειρηκυίας. ὥστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐσομένην ἡλικίαν, τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, δεῖ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἁρμονιῶν ἅπτεσθαι καὶ τῶν μελῶν τῶν τοιούτων, ἔτι
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δʼ εἴ τίς ἐστι τοιαύτη τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἣ πρέπει τῇ τῶν παίδων ἡλικίᾳ διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον τʼ ἔχειν ἅμα καὶ παιδείαν, οἷον ἡ λυδιστὶ φαίνεται πεπονθέναι μάλιστα τῶν ἁρμονιῶν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τούτους ὅρους τρεῖς ποιητέον εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, τό τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον.

## Translation — Mouseia

> Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Ancient Greek of all eight books, 182 Bekker pages and 1,609 line marks (the Perseus transcription of W. D. Ross’s Oxford text), for fidelity, argument, imagery and clarity.

### Book I, 1252a–1255b

[Bekker 1252a]
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Since we see that every city is a kind of association, and that every association has been established for the sake of some good—for everyone does everything for the sake of what seems good—it is clear that all associations aim at some good, but above all,
[Bekker 1252a line 5]
at the most authoritative good of all, the association that is most authoritative of all and embraces all the others. This is what is called the city, the political association. Those, then, who think that the statesman, the kingly ruler, the household manager, and the master are the same are mistaken. For they take the number, large or small,
[Bekker 1252a line 10]
to distinguish each of these, not their kind: if he rules a few, he is a master; if more, a household manager; if still more, a statesman or a kingly ruler—as though there were no difference between a large household and a small city. And in distinguishing the statesman from the kingly ruler, they call him a kingly ruler when he himself stands at their head, but when,
[Bekker 1252a line 15]
in accordance with the principles of this science, he rules and is ruled in turn, a statesman. But these claims are not true. What we mean will become clear to those who examine the matter by the method we have indicated. For just as in other matters we must divide what is composite into its uncompounded elements—these are the smallest
[Bekker 1252a line 20]
parts of the whole—so, by examining the parts of which the city is composed, we shall also see more clearly how these differ from one another, and whether we can arrive at any skilled understanding of each of the things mentioned.

If, then, one were to observe these things growing from their beginning,
[Bekker 1252a line 25]
as in other matters, this would be the best way to study them here too. First, those who cannot exist without one another must come together in pairs: female and male for the sake of generation—not from deliberate choice, but because, as in other animals and plants, the desire is natural
[Bekker 1252a line 30]
to leave behind another like oneself—and ruler and ruled by nature, for the sake of preservation. For what can foresee with its mind is by nature a ruler and by nature a master, while what can carry these things out through bodily labor is ruled and is by nature a slave. For this reason, the same thing is to the advantage of master and slave.

By nature, then,
[Bekker 1252b]
[Bekker 1252b line 1]
the female and the slave are distinct. For nature makes nothing in the parsimonious manner in which the bronze workers make the Delphic knife, but one thing for one purpose. Each instrument would thus be made best, with not many tasks but one
[Bekker 1252b line 5]
to serve. Among the barbarians, however, the female and the slave have the same position. The reason is that they have no ruler by nature; instead, their association is that of a female slave and a male slave. This is why the poets say,
“It is fitting that Greeks should rule barbarians,”
(Eur. IA 1400) as though barbarian and slave were the same by nature. From these
[Bekker 1252b line 10]
two associations, then, the household first arises; and Hesiod was right when he wrote,
“First of all a household, a woman, and an ox for plowing.”
(Hes. WD 405) For the ox takes the place of a household servant for the poor. The association established by nature for everyday needs is therefore the household; its members Charondas calls companions of the same bread chest, and Epimenides
[Bekker 1252b line 15]
of Crete, companions of the same table. The first association of several households for needs that are not merely daily is the village. By nature, the village seems above all to be a colony of a household, consisting of those whom some call companions of the same milk: children and children's children. For this reason cities were originally ruled by kings, and so even now are the
[Bekker 1252b line 20]
nations: they came together from households ruled by kings. For every household is ruled as by a king by its eldest member, and so too its colonies, because of their kinship. This is also what Homer means when he says,
“Each lays down the law
for his children and wives.”
(Hom. Od. 9.114) For they are scattered, and this is how people lived in ancient times. For this reason, too, everyone says that the gods
[Bekker 1252b line 25]
are ruled by a king: some people are themselves still ruled by kings, while others were in ancient times. Just as human beings make the gods' forms resemble their own, so too they make the gods' ways of life resemble their own.

The complete association formed from several villages is a city, already reaching, one might say, the limit of full self-sufficiency. It comes into being for the sake of
[Bekker 1252b line 30]
living, but exists for the sake of living well. Therefore every city exists by nature, if indeed the first associations do too. For the city is their end, and nature is an end: what each thing is when its coming into being is complete, we call the nature of that thing—a human being, for example, a horse, or a household. Further, that for the sake of which a thing exists, its end, is best;

[Bekker 1253a]
[Bekker 1253a line 1]
and self-sufficiency is both an end and best. From these considerations, then, it is evident that the city is among the things that exist by nature, and that a human being is by nature a political animal. Anyone who is without a city by nature, and not by chance, is either base or greater than a human being, like
[Bekker 1253a line 5]
the man Homer denounces as
“Without clan, without law, without hearth.”
(Hom. Il. 9.63) For such a person is at once like this by nature and eager for war, being unpaired, like a piece in a board game. It is clear why a human being is a political animal more than any bee or any animal that lives in a herd. For nature, as we say, does nothing in vain; and speech
[Bekker 1253a line 10]
belongs to human beings alone among the animals. Voice is a sign of pain and pleasure, and therefore belongs to the other animals too: their nature has reached this point, that they perceive pain and pleasure and signal them to one another. Speech, however, serves to reveal advantage and
[Bekker 1253a line 15]
harm, and therefore also the just and the unjust. For this is peculiar to human beings in comparison with the other animals: they alone perceive good and bad, the just and the unjust, and the other things of this kind. Sharing in these things makes a household and a city. The city is also prior by nature to the household and to each of us.
[Bekker 1253a line 20]
For the whole must be prior to the part. If the whole is destroyed, there will be neither foot nor hand, except in name, as one might speak of a stone hand—for a hand, once destroyed, will be like that. All things are defined by their function and capacity; hence, when they no longer have these, we should not say that they are the same things, but only that they have the same names.
[Bekker 1253a line 25]
It is clear, then, that the city is also prior by nature to each individual. For if each individual, when separated, is not self-sufficient, he will stand in the same relation to the whole as the other parts do. Anyone who cannot share in an association, or who needs nothing because he is self-sufficient, is no part of a city, and so is either a beast or a god.

By nature, then, there is in
[Bekker 1253a line 30]
everyone an impulse toward such an association; but the first person to establish it was responsible for the greatest goods. For just as a human being, when brought to completion, is the best of animals, so, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all. Injustice is most dangerous when it has weapons. Human beings are born with weapons for practical wisdom and
[Bekker 1253a line 35]
virtue, yet these can be used above all for their opposites. Hence, without virtue, a human being is most impious and savage, and worst in matters of sex and food. Justice is a political matter: for justice is the ordering of the political association, and justice is the judgment of the just.

[Bekker 1253b]
[Bekker 1253b line 1]
Since it is evident what parts the city consists of, we must first speak about household management; for every city is composed of households. The parts of household management correspond in turn to the parts of which a household consists, and a complete household consists of slaves and free people. Since
[Bekker 1253b line 5]
each thing must first be examined in its smallest elements, and the first and smallest parts of a household are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children, we should examine these three relations: what each is and what it ought to be. These are mastery, the marital relation—for between woman and man there is no name for their
[Bekker 1253b line 10]
union—and, third, the relation of producing children—for this too has no name of its own. Let these, then, be the three we have mentioned. There is also a part that some think is household management itself, and others its greatest part; we must study how matters stand. I mean what is called wealth-getting. But first
[Bekker 1253b line 15]
let us speak about master and slave, so that we may both consider what bears on necessary use and see whether we can arrive at a better understanding of them than the views now held. For some think that mastery is a kind of science, and that household management, mastery, statesmanship, and kingly rule are the same,
[Bekker 1253b line 20]
as we said at the outset. Others think that being a master is contrary to nature: one person is a slave and another free by convention, while by nature they differ in no way. For this reason, they say, it is not just, since it rests on force.

Since property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property is a part of household management—for without necessities it is impossible
[Bekker 1253b line 25]
either to live or to live well—and since the particular arts must have their appropriate instruments if their work is to be accomplished, the household manager must have them too. Of instruments, some are lifeless and others living: for a ship's pilot, for example, the rudder is lifeless and the lookout living—for
[Bekker 1253b line 30]
an assistant in the arts is a kind of instrument. So too a piece of property is an instrument for living, property is a collection of instruments, and a slave is a living piece of property; every assistant is, as it were, an instrument that comes before other instruments. For if each instrument could, at a command or by anticipating it, carry out
[Bekker 1253b line 35]
its own work, like the works of Daedalus, as people say, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which the poet says “enter the divine assembly of their own accord”—if shuttles wove by themselves in this way, and plectrums played the lyre—then master craftsmen would have no need of
[Bekker 1254a]
[Bekker 1254a line 1]
assistants, nor masters of slaves.

What we ordinarily call instruments are instruments of production, whereas a piece of property is an instrument of action. For from the shuttle something arises beyond its use, while from clothing and a bed there is only their use.
[Bekker 1254a line 5]
Further, since production and action differ in kind, and both require instruments, their instruments must also have the same distinction. Life is action, not production; therefore the slave too is an assistant in what serves action. A piece of property is spoken of in the same way as a part. For a part is not
[Bekker 1254a line 10]
only a part of something else, but also belongs entirely to something else; and likewise a piece of property. Thus the master is only the slave's master, and does not belong to him; but the slave is not only the master's slave, but also belongs wholly to him.

What the nature and capacity of the slave are is therefore clear from these considerations. For someone who is by nature not his own
[Bekker 1254a line 15]
but another's, though a human being, is a slave by nature. A human being belongs to another if, though human, he is a piece of property; and a piece of property is a separable instrument of action.

Whether anyone is by nature such a person or not, and whether it is better and just for anyone to be a slave, or whether, on the contrary, all slavery is contrary to nature, must next be
[Bekker 1254a line 20]
examined. It is not difficult either to study this through reason or to learn it from what occurs. For ruling and being ruled are not only necessary but also advantageous, and immediately from birth some things are set apart for being ruled and others for ruling. There are many kinds both of rulers and
[Bekker 1254a line 25]
of the ruled; and rule over better subjects is always better, as over a human being rather than a beast, since the work accomplished by better agents is better. Where one rules and another is ruled, there is some work that belongs to them. For in everything composed of several parts and becoming a single common whole, whether its parts are continuous or
[Bekker 1254a line 30]
separate, a ruler and a ruled element appear. This is present in living things as a feature of nature as a whole; for even in things that have no share in life there is a kind of rule, as in a harmony. But perhaps these matters belong to a more external inquiry. A living thing consists in the first place of soul
[Bekker 1254a line 35]
and body, of which the one is by nature the ruler and the other the ruled. We should examine what is natural in things whose condition accords with nature rather than in things that are corrupted. Therefore we must study the human being whose body and soul are in the best condition, in whom this is evident;

for in people who are bad or
[Bekker 1254b]
[Bekker 1254b line 1]
in a bad condition, the body might often seem to rule the soul because their condition is base and contrary to nature.

It is possible, then, as we say, to observe in a living thing, first of all, both the rule of a master and political rule. For the soul, in relation to the body,
[Bekker 1254b line 5]
exercises a master's rule, while the mind rules desire with political or kingly rule. In these cases it is evident that it is by nature and advantageous for the body to be ruled by the soul, and for the part subject to passions to be ruled by the mind and the part that possesses reason; whereas an equal or reversed relation is harmful to all.
[Bekker 1254b line 10]
Again, the same holds between human beings and the other animals. For tame animals are better in nature than wild ones, and for all these it is better to be ruled by human beings, since they are preserved in this way. Further, in the relation of male to female, the one is by nature superior and the other inferior, the one ruling and the other ruled. The
[Bekker 1254b line 15]
same must also hold among all human beings. Those who differ as much from others as soul from body and a human being from a beast—and this is the condition of those whose work consists in using their bodies, and for whom this is the best they can provide—are slaves by nature. For them it is better
[Bekker 1254b line 20]
to be ruled with this sort of rule, if indeed it is so for those already mentioned. For a slave by nature is one who is capable of belonging to another—and therefore does belong to another—and who shares in reason to the extent of apprehending it, but not possessing it. The other animals assist not through apprehension of reason, but through their feelings. Their usefulness differs little:
[Bekker 1254b line 25]
for both slaves and tame animals provide bodily assistance toward the necessities of life. Nature intends, then, to make the bodies of free people and slaves different too: those of slaves strong for necessary service, those of free people upright and useless for
[Bekker 1254b line 30]
such labors, but useful for political life, which is divided into the requirements of war and those of peace. Yet the opposite often happens as well: some have the bodies of free people, others their souls. This much, at least, is evident: if people differed
[Bekker 1254b line 35]
in body alone as much as the images of the gods differ, everyone would say that those who fell short deserved to be their slaves. And if this is true of the body, it is much more just that the distinction should be made in respect of the soul. But it is not equally easy to see
[Bekker 1255a]
[Bekker 1255a line 1]
the beauty of the soul and that of the body.

It is evident, then, that some people are by nature free and others slaves, and that for the latter being a slave is both advantageous and just.

But it is not difficult to see that those who maintain the opposite are also right in a certain way. For being a slave is spoken of in two senses,
[Bekker 1255a line 5]
as is the slave himself. There is also someone who is a slave and serves as a slave by law. For the law is a kind of agreement by which people say that what is conquered in war belongs to the conquerors. Many versed in the laws indict this claim of justice as they would a speaker for an unlawful proposal: it is monstrous, they say, if whoever can use force
[Bekker 1255a line 10]
and is superior in power should have the victim of force as his slave and subject. Some hold one view and others the other, even among the wise. The reason for this dispute, and what makes the arguments overlap, is that virtue, when supplied with resources, is in a sense also most capable of using force, and
[Bekker 1255a line 15]
what prevails always has a superiority in some good. Thus force seems not to be without virtue, and the dispute seems to concern only the just. For this reason some think the just is folly, while others think this very thing is just: that the superior should rule. For once these arguments are set apart,
[Bekker 1255a line 20]
the opposing arguments have neither strength nor persuasiveness in maintaining that what is better in virtue ought not to rule and be master. In general, some people, holding fast, as they think, to a kind of justice—for law is something just—declare slavery resulting from war to be just, yet at the same time deny it. For the origin may not
[Bekker 1255a line 25]
be just in wars, and no one would ever say that someone who does not deserve to be a slave is a slave. Otherwise, it will follow that those considered the best born are slaves and descended from slaves, if they happen to be captured and sold. This is why they do not wish to call themselves slaves, but only barbarians. Yet when they say this,
[Bekker 1255a line 30]
they are seeking nothing other than the slave by nature of whom we spoke at the outset; for they must say that some people are slaves everywhere and others nowhere. It is the same with noble birth: they consider themselves wellborn not only among their own people but everywhere, while barbarians are wellborn only at home,
[Bekker 1255a line 35]
as though some nobility and freedom were unqualified, and others not unqualified. So too Helen in Theodectes says,
“Born of divine roots on either side,
who would presume to call me a servant?”
When they say this, they distinguish by nothing but virtue and vice
[Bekker 1255a line 40]
the slave and the free, the wellborn and the
[Bekker 1255b]
[Bekker 1255b line 1]
lowborn.

### Book I, 1255b–1258b

For they maintain that, just as a human comes from a human and a beast from beasts, so a good person comes from good people. Nature often wishes to bring this about, but cannot always do so.

That the dispute has some reason behind it,
[Bekker 1255b line 5]
and that not all are divided into slaves by nature on the one hand and free people on the other, is clear. Yet in some cases this distinction holds, and for these it is advantageous and just that one should be a slave and the other a master. The one must be ruled and the other must exercise the rule for which he is naturally fitted, and therefore also mastery. But to exercise it badly is disadvantageous to both (for
[Bekker 1255b line 10]
the same thing is advantageous to the part and to the whole, to body and to soul; and the slave is a part of the master, a kind of living but separate part of his body. For this reason there is also a certain common advantage and friendship between slave and master when nature has assigned them these positions; but for those whose relation is not of this kind,
[Bekker 1255b line 15]
but rests on law and compulsion, the opposite holds).

From this it is also evident that mastery and political rule are not the same, nor are all forms of rule identical with one another, as some say. For one is rule over those free by nature, the other over slaves. Household management is a monarchy, since every household is ruled by one,
[Bekker 1255b line 20]
whereas political rule is rule over free and equal people. A master, then, is not so called because of knowledge, but because of the kind of person he is; the same holds for the slave and the free person. Yet there may be knowledge proper to a master and knowledge proper to a slave. Knowledge proper to a slave is of the sort taught by the man in Syracuse: there someone, for a fee,
[Bekker 1255b line 25]
used to teach slave boys their ordinary duties. Instruction of this kind might extend further, to cooking, for example, and the other such branches of service. For some tasks are more honorable than others, and some more necessary; and, as the proverb says,
"Slave surpasses slave, and master surpasses master."
[Bekker 1255b line 30]
All such kinds of knowledge, then, belong to slaves. The knowledge proper to a master is the use of slaves. For being a master consists not in acquiring slaves, but in using them. This knowledge has nothing great or dignified about it: whatever the slave must know how to do, the master must
[Bekker 1255b line 35]
know how to command. For this reason, those who can avoid the trouble themselves appoint a steward to this office, while they themselves take part in public life or pursue philosophy. The art of acquisition is different from both of these; its just form, for example, is a kind of warfare or hunting. Let our distinctions concerning slave and master stand in this
[Bekker 1255b line 40]
form.

[Bekker 1256a]
[Bekker 1256a line 1]
Let us now consider property and wealth-getting as a whole, following the method already indicated, since the slave too was a part of property. First, one might ask whether wealth-getting is the same as household management,
[Bekker 1256a line 5]
or a part of it, or an art that serves it; and, if it serves it, whether it does so as shuttle-making serves weaving or as bronze-working serves statue-making. For these do not serve in the same way: one supplies instruments, the other material. By material I mean the underlying substance from which a work is completed: wool, for example, for the weaver,
[Bekker 1256a line 10]
and bronze for the sculptor. It is clear, then, that household management is not the same as wealth-getting, since the task of one is to procure, and of the other to use. For what art other than household management will use the things in the household? But whether wealth-getting is a part of it or a different kind of art is open to dispute.
[Bekker 1256a line 15]
For if it belongs to the person skilled in wealth-getting to consider where resources and property are to come from, and property and wealth comprise many parts, the first question is whether farming is a part of household management or a different kind of art; and the same question concerns, in general, the care and acquisition of food. Now there are many kinds of food,
[Bekker 1256a line 20]
and hence many ways of life among both animals and human beings. For it is impossible to live without food, so differences in food have made the ways of life of animals different. Among beasts, some live in herds and others live scattered, whichever is advantageous for their food, since some of them
[Bekker 1256a line 25]
eat animals, others fruit, and others everything. Nature has therefore distinguished their ways of life with a view to ease and the choice of these foods. Since the same thing is not naturally pleasant to every animal, but different things to different animals, the ways of life even of the animal-eaters and fruit-eaters differ from one another. So too
[Bekker 1256a line 30]
with human beings: their ways of life differ greatly. The most idle are nomads, for their food comes from tame animals without labor, leaving them at leisure. Since their livestock must move to find pasture, they themselves must follow along, as though with living farmland
[Bekker 1256a line 35]
to cultivate. Others live by hunting, and different people by different kinds of hunting: some by plunder, others by fishing—those who live beside lakes, marshes, rivers, or a suitable sea—and others by hunting birds or wild beasts. But the largest part of humankind lives from the earth and its cultivated fruits.

[Bekker 1256a line 40]
These, then, are roughly the ways of life whose labor draws directly on nature and which do not, through exchange and retail trade,
[Bekker 1256b]
[Bekker 1256b line 1]
procure their food:

the nomadic, the plundering, the fishing, the hunting, and the farming life. Some also live pleasantly by combining these, supplementing the more deficient way of life wherever it falls short of self-sufficiency: some, for example,
[Bekker 1256b line 5]
combine the nomadic and plundering lives, others the farming and hunting lives. The same holds for the others: they live in whatever manner their needs compel them to combine. Property of this kind, then, appears to be given to all by nature herself, both immediately at their first coming into being and when they are fully grown.
[Bekker 1256b line 10]
For at their first coming into being, some animals produce along with their offspring enough food to suffice until the newborn can provide for itself, as do those that produce larvae or lay eggs. Those that bear living young have food within themselves for their offspring for a certain time: what is called milk
[Bekker 1256b line 15]
is this substance. Thus it is likewise clear that we must suppose plants exist for the sake of animals, and the other animals for the sake of human beings, once they have come into being: tame animals both for use and for food; and wild animals, if not all, at least most, for food and other assistance, so that
[Bekker 1256b line 20]
clothing and other instruments may also be made from them. If, then, nature makes nothing incomplete or in vain, nature must have made them all for the sake of human beings. For this reason the art of war too will by nature be in a sense an art of acquisition, since hunting is a part of it. We must use it against wild beasts and
[Bekker 1256b line 25]
against those human beings who are naturally fitted to be ruled but refuse, since this kind of war is just by nature.

One kind of acquisition, then, is by nature a part of household management: either it must be ready to hand, or household management must procure it so that it is ready to hand, providing a store of resources necessary for life and useful
[Bekker 1256b line 30]
for the community of a city or a household. True wealth seems to consist of these. For the amount of property of this sort sufficient for a good life is not unlimited, as Solon says in his verse:
"No limit to wealth stands revealed to men."
(Sol. Fr. 13.71) There is a limit, as there is in the other arts;
[Bekker 1256b line 35]
for no instrument of any art is unlimited either in number or in size, and wealth is a collection of instruments for household management and political rule. That there is, then, a kind of acquisition natural to household managers and statesmen, and for what reason, is clear.

[Bekker 1256b line 40]
There is another kind of acquisition, which people chiefly call wealth-getting, and rightly so; because of it there seems to be no
[Bekker 1257a]
[Bekker 1257a line 1]
limit to wealth and property.

Many consider it one and the same as the kind just discussed, because the two are closely related. Yet it is neither the same as that kind nor far removed from it. One of them exists by nature, the other not by nature, but through experience
[Bekker 1257a line 5]
of a certain kind and art it arises instead. Let us begin our account of it here. Every article of property has two uses. Both are uses of the thing itself, but not in the same way: one is proper to the thing, the other is not. For example, a shoe may be worn or exchanged. Both
[Bekker 1257a line 10]
are uses of a shoe; for the person who exchanges a shoe with someone who needs it, in return for money or food, uses the shoe as a shoe, but not for its proper use, since it did not come into being for the sake of exchange. The same holds for the other articles of property. For
[Bekker 1257a line 15]
all can be exchanged. Exchange arose at first from a natural circumstance: people had more of some things and less of others than was sufficient. This also makes it clear that retail trade is not by nature a part of wealth-getting; for people had to make exchanges only to the extent sufficient for themselves. In the first
[Bekker 1257a line 20]
community, then—that is, the household—it plainly has no function, but it does when the community has grown larger. For the members of the household shared all the same things, whereas those who lived separately shared many different things, which they had to distribute among themselves according to their needs through exchange, as many
[Bekker 1257a line 25]
non-Greek peoples still do. They exchange useful things themselves for one another, and nothing more: giving and receiving wine for grain, for example, and each of the other things of this kind. Such exchange, then, is neither contrary to nature nor any form of wealth-getting
[Bekker 1257a line 30]
—for it served to complete natural self-sufficiency. Yet the other form arose from this, as one would expect. For as assistance came increasingly from abroad, through importing what people lacked and exporting what they had in surplus, the use of money was necessarily devised. For not everything is easy to carry that is naturally
[Bekker 1257a line 35]
necessary. For this reason people agreed among themselves to give and receive in exchange something which was itself a useful thing and could readily be handled for the needs of life: iron, silver, or anything else of this sort. At first it was defined simply by size and weight, but in the end
[Bekker 1257a line 40]
they also stamped it with a mark, to free themselves from having to measure it; for the stamp was set upon it as a sign of its quantity.

[Bekker 1257b]
[Bekker 1257b line 1]
Once money had been devised from necessary exchange, the other form of wealth-getting arose: retail trade. At first it was perhaps practiced simply; then experience made it more skillful, showing where and how exchanges would produce the greatest
[Bekker 1257b line 5]
profit. For this reason wealth-getting seems to concern money above all, and its task seems to be the ability to discern where an abundance of it will come from, since it produces wealth and resources. Indeed, people often regard wealth as an abundance of money, because it is the concern of wealth-getting
[Bekker 1257b line 10]
and retail trade. At other times, however, money seems to be an empty thing, wholly a matter of convention and nothing by nature: if those who use it change their convention, it has no worth and is useful for none of life's necessities. Someone rich in money will often lack necessary food. Yet it is absurd that there should be such
[Bekker 1257b line 15]
wealth that a person with an abundance of it may die of hunger, as the story tells of the famous Midas, whose insatiable prayer made everything set before him turn to gold. For this reason people seek something else as wealth and wealth-getting, and rightly seek it. For there is a different kind of wealth-getting and wealth that is
[Bekker 1257b line 20]
natural. This kind belongs to household management; the other belongs to retail trade and produces wealth, not in every way, but through the exchange of resources. The latter seems to concern money, for money is the starting point and the end of exchange. And this wealth, the wealth arising from this kind of wealth-getting, is indeed unlimited.
[Bekker 1257b line 25]
For just as medicine has no limit in its pursuit of health, and each art has no limit in its pursuit of its end—since each wishes to achieve that end as fully as possible—but is not unlimited in the means to its end, since the end sets a limit for them all, so too this kind of wealth-getting has no limit to its end. Its end is of this kind:
[Bekker 1257b line 30]
wealth and the acquisition of resources. But the wealth-getting of household management has a limit, for this is not the task of household management. Thus, in one respect, a limit to all wealth seems necessary, yet in practice we see the opposite occurring: all who pursue wealth-getting increase their money without limit.
[Bekker 1257b line 35]
The cause is the close relationship between the two forms. For their uses overlap, since each form of wealth-getting uses the same thing. Both use the same property, but not in the same respect: one has a different end, while the other's end is increase. Thus some think this is the task of household management, and persist in the belief that preserving
[Bekker 1257b line 40]
or increasing their stock of money without limit is necessary. The cause of this disposition is a concern with living, but
[Bekker 1258a]
[Bekker 1258a line 1]
not with living well.

Since that desire is unlimited, they also desire unlimited means of satisfying it. Even those who aim at living well seek the means to bodily pleasures; and since this too appears to depend on property,
[Bekker 1258a line 5]
they spend all their time on wealth-getting, and the other form of wealth-getting has arisen for this reason. For since their enjoyment lies in excess, they seek the art that produces an excess of enjoyment. If they cannot provide it through wealth-getting, they try to do so by some other means,
[Bekker 1258a line 10]
using each of their capacities contrary to nature. For the task of courage is not to produce resources but confidence; nor is producing resources the task of generalship or medicine, but victory for the one and health for the other. Yet these people turn them all into arts of wealth-getting, as though that were the end and everything had to serve that end.

Concerning the kind of wealth-getting that is not
[Bekker 1258a line 15]
necessary, what it is, and why we have need of it, we have now spoken, as we have of the necessary kind, which differs from it, belongs by nature to household management, and concerns food. It is not unlimited like the other, but has a boundary.

The question raised at the outset is also clear: whether
[Bekker 1258a line 20]
wealth-getting belongs to the household manager and the statesman, or whether it does not, but must instead be ready to hand. For just as political rule does not make human beings, but receives them from nature and uses them, so nature must supply food, whether from earth, sea, or something else. From these supplies, arranging them as they should be arranged
[Bekker 1258a line 25]
is the household manager's task. For weaving does not make wool, but uses it, and also recognizes what sort is good and suitable, or poor and unsuitable. One might also ask why wealth-getting is a part of household management, while medicine is not; yet people must be healthy
[Bekker 1258a line 30]
within the household, just as they must live or meet any other necessity. But since in one sense it belongs to the household manager and the ruler to attend to health, and in another it does not, but belongs to the doctor, so too in one sense resources are the household manager's concern, and in another they are not, but belong to the art that serves him. Above all, as was said earlier, they must
[Bekker 1258a line 35]
be ready to hand by nature. For it is nature's task to provide food for what is born: in every case, the remainder of that from which it is born is food for it. Thus wealth-getting from fruits and animals is natural for all. Since it is twofold, as we said, one form belonging to retail trade and the other to household management,
[Bekker 1258a line 40]
and since the latter is necessary and praised,

while the
[Bekker 1258b]
[Bekker 1258b line 1]
exchange form is rightly blamed, since it is not according to nature but takes from other people, moneylending is most reasonably hated: its gain comes from money itself, and not from that for which money was devised. For money came into being for the sake of exchange,
[Bekker 1258b line 5]
but interest makes it increase. This is also the source of its name, which means offspring: what is born resembles what gives it birth, and interest is money born of money. Thus, of all forms of wealth-getting, this is the most contrary to nature.

Since we have made sufficient distinctions for understanding, the matters
[Bekker 1258b line 10]
that concern practice must be considered in turn. In all such matters, contemplation is a free pursuit, but practical experience is a necessity. Useful parts of wealth-getting include experience concerning property: what sorts are most profitable, where, and how—for example, what sort of stock of horses, cattle, or sheep, and likewise
[Bekker 1258b line 15]
of the other animals. For one must know by experience which of these are most profitable compared with one another, and which sorts thrive in which places, since different animals flourish in different regions. Next comes knowledge of farming, both of open fields and of planted land, of beekeeping, and of the other animals, aquatic or winged, from
[Bekker 1258b line 20]
which assistance can be obtained. These, then, are the primary parts of the most proper form of wealth-getting. Of the exchange form, the largest part is commerce, which has three parts: shipowning, transport, and offering goods for sale. These differ from one another in that some are safer, while others yield a greater return.
[Bekker 1258b line 25]
The second part is lending at interest, and the third is wage labor, one sort of which belongs to the mechanical arts, the other to those without a craft who are useful only through their bodies. There is a third form of wealth-getting, between this and the first, since it has a share both in the natural form and in the exchange form: everything drawn from the earth
[Bekker 1258b line 30]
and from things arising from the earth which, though they bear no fruit, are useful—for example, woodcutting and every kind of mining. Mining itself comprises many kinds, for there are many sorts of things mined from the earth. Of occupations, those require the most skill in which chance has the smallest part; those are most mechanical in which the
[Bekker 1258b line 35]
body is most damaged; those most slavish in which the body is put to the most uses; and those most ignoble in which virtue is least needed. We have now spoken of each of these in general; examining their particulars precisely would be useful for the occupations themselves, but tiresome to dwell on.

### Book I, 1258b–1260b

Since some have
[Bekker 1258b line 40]
written about these matters,

such as Charetides of Paros and
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[Bekker 1259a line 1]
Apollodorus of Lemnos on farming both open fields and planted land, and likewise others on other subjects, anyone concerned with these matters should study them from those writings. There are also the scattered accounts of the means by which some people have succeeded in wealth-getting,
[Bekker 1259a line 5]
which we must collect. For all these are useful to those who value wealth-getting: the case of Thales of Miletus, for example. This is an insight into wealth-getting, which people attribute to him because of his wisdom, but it happens to be of general application. For when people reproached him for his poverty, claiming the uselessness
[Bekker 1259a line 10]
of philosophy, they say that he foresaw from his study of the stars that there would be a large olive crop. While it was still winter, he obtained a little money and paid deposits on all the olive presses in Miletus and Chios, hiring them cheaply because no one was bidding against him. When the season
[Bekker 1259a line 15]
came and many presses were suddenly sought at once, he hired them out on whatever terms he wished. By collecting a great deal of money, he showed that it is easy for philosophers to become rich if they wish, but that this is not what they care about. Thales, then, is said to have displayed his wisdom in this way. But, as
[Bekker 1259a line 20]
we said, this device in wealth-getting is generally applicable whenever someone can establish a monopoly for himself. For this reason some cities too adopt this source of revenue when they lack resources: they establish a monopoly in goods for sale. In Sicily, someone who had money deposited with him bought up all the iron from
[Bekker 1259a line 25]
the ironworks. Afterward, when the merchants arrived from the trading centers, he was the only seller. He did not raise the price greatly, but nevertheless, on his fifty talents, he gained a hundred. When Dionysius learned of this, he told him to take his money away, but no longer to
[Bekker 1259a line 30]
remain in Syracuse, since he was finding sources of revenue disadvantageous to Dionysius' own affairs. Yet this insight and that of Thales are the same: both contrived to establish a monopoly for themselves. It is useful for statesmen too to know these things. For many cities need wealth-getting and such
[Bekker 1259a line 35]
sources of revenue, just as a household does, and even more; hence some of those who take part in public life concern themselves with these matters alone.

There were three parts of household management—one, mastery, which we discussed earlier; another, paternal rule; and the third, marital rule. For a man rules both wife and children as free people,
[Bekker 1259a line 40]
both of them, but not with the same manner of rule,

rather,
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[Bekker 1259b line 1]
he rules his wife politically and his children as a king. For the male is by nature more fitted to lead than the female, unless their relation is in some way contrary to nature; and the older and fully developed is more fitted to lead than the younger and undeveloped. In political rule, then,
[Bekker 1259b line 5]
in most cases the ruler and the ruled exchange places, since they tend to be equal in nature and to differ in nothing. Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled, they seek a distinction in outward appearance, forms of address, and honors, as Amasis also said in his account of the footbath. But the male always, in relation to
[Bekker 1259b line 10]
the female, stands in this way. Rule over children is kingly, for the parent rules both by affection and by seniority, which is the form of kingly rule. For this reason Homer rightly addressed Zeus as
"Father of men and gods,"
(Hom. Il. 1.544) the king of them all. For by nature
[Bekker 1259b line 15]
a king must differ from his subjects, yet be of the same kind; and this is the relation of the older to the younger and of the parent to the child.

It is evident, then, that household management is more concerned with human beings than with acquiring inanimate things, and
[Bekker 1259b line 20]
with their virtue rather than that of property, which we call wealth; and more with free people than with slaves. First, concerning slaves, one might ask whether a slave has any virtue beyond the virtues of an instrument and a servant, any other virtue more honorable than these, such as moderation, courage, justice, and
[Bekker 1259b line 25]
the other such dispositions; or whether he has none beyond bodily service. Either answer presents a difficulty. For if slaves have these virtues, how will they differ from free people? But if they do not, that is absurd, since they are human beings and share in reason. The question is much the same concerning a woman and a child:
[Bekker 1259b line 30]
do they too have virtues, and must a woman be moderate, courageous, and just, and can a child be either intemperate or moderate, or not? We must therefore examine this generally concerning those who rule and those who are ruled by nature: is their virtue the same or different? For if both must share in nobility and goodness,
[Bekker 1259b line 35]
why should one rule and the other be ruled once and for all? Nor can they differ by having more or less of it: ruling and being ruled differ in kind, whereas more and less do not. But if one must have virtue and the other need not, that is strange. For if the ruler is not moderate and just,
[Bekker 1259b line 40]
how will he rule well? And if the ruled person is not, how will he be ruled
[Bekker 1260a]
[Bekker 1260a line 1]
well?

For if he is intemperate and cowardly, he will do none of what he ought. It is evident, then, that both must share in virtue, but that there must be differences in this virtue, as there are among those ruled by nature. This is already indicated by the facts concerning
[Bekker 1260a line 5]
the soul. For in the soul there is by nature a ruling element and a ruled element, whose virtues we say are different: those of the rational and the irrational elements, for example. It is clear, then, that the same holds in other cases, so that there are by nature several kinds of ruler and ruled. For the free person, in his relation to the slave,
[Bekker 1260a line 10]
rules in one way, the male rules the female in another, and the man the child in another. The parts of the soul are present in all of them, but present differently. For the slave has no deliberative element at all; the female has it, but it lacks authority; the child has it, but it is incomplete.
[Bekker 1260a line 15]
For this reason the ruler must possess intellectual virtue in its complete form, since the task belongs without qualification to the directing craftsman, and reason is the directing craftsman; each of the others must possess as much as falls to his share. We must suppose, then, that the same necessarily holds for the moral virtues: all must share in them, but not in the same
[Bekker 1260a line 20]
way, rather as much as each requires for his own task. Thus it is evident that moral virtue belongs to all those mentioned, and that moderation is not the same in a woman and a man, nor courage and justice, as Socrates thought. Rather, the one's courage is fitted for rule and the other's for service; and the same holds for the other virtues.

This becomes clearer still in the particulars
[Bekker 1260a line 25]
when we examine them. For those who speak in general terms deceive themselves when they say that virtue is the soul's being in good condition, or acting rightly, or something of this sort. Those who enumerate the virtues, as Gorgias does, speak far better than those who define them in this way. Thus we must accept the sort of distinction the poet made concerning a woman, and hold that it applies
[Bekker 1260a line 30]
in every case:
"Silence brings adornment to a woman,"
(Soph. Aj. 293) but this no longer holds for a man. Since the child is incomplete, it is clear that his
[Bekker 1260a line 32]
virtue too is not relative to himself in his present state, but to his end and to the one who guides him; likewise the slave's virtue is relative to his master. We laid it down that the slave is useful for necessary tasks, so it is clear that he needs only a little virtue: enough that neither intemperance nor cowardice makes him fail in his work. One might ask, if what has just been said is true, whether craftsmen too will need virtue, since they often fail in their work through intemperance. Or is there a very great difference here? For the
[Bekker 1260a line 40]
slave shares in his master's life, whereas the craftsman is further removed, and virtue falls to his share only to the extent that slavery does.

For the mechanical craftsman
[Bekker 1260b]
[Bekker 1260b line 1]
has a certain limited slavery; and the slave is among those who are such by nature, but no shoemaker is, nor any of the other craftsmen. It is evident, then, that the master must be the source of this kind of virtue in the slave, but not by possessing the mastery that teaches the
[Bekker 1260b line 5]
work itself. For this reason those who deprive slaves of reasoned speech and say that commands alone should be used are mistaken: slaves need admonition even more than children do.

Let our distinctions on these matters stand in this form. But concerning husband and wife, children and father, and concerning
[Bekker 1260b line 10]
the virtue of each, and their dealings with one another—what is good and what is not, and how the good should be pursued and the bad avoided—we must discuss these in our treatment of constitutions. For every household is a part of a city, and these are parts of a household; and we must consider the part in relation to the whole
[Bekker 1260b line 15]
in respect of virtue. We must therefore educate both children and women with a view to the constitution, if indeed it makes any difference to the city's being good that its children and women should be good. It must make a difference: for women are half the free population, and from children,
[Bekker 1260b line 20]
those who share in the constitution arise. Thus, since these matters have been distinguished and the remaining ones must be discussed elsewhere, let us leave our present arguments as complete, make a new beginning, and first examine those who have pronounced upon the best constitution.

### Book II, 1260b–1264a

[Bekker 1260b]
[Bekker 1260b line 27]
Since we propose to examine the political community, asking which is best of all for those able to live as nearly as possible according to their wishes, we must also investigate the other constitutions,
[Bekker 1260b line 30]
both those employed by cities said to be well governed and any others proposed by particular thinkers and thought to be sound. In this way we may see what is right and useful; and our search for something different from these will not seem merely the work of people eager to display their ingenuity. Rather, because they are not
[Bekker 1260b line 35]
sound as they now exist, we may be seen to have undertaken this inquiry for that reason. We must first begin where this investigation naturally begins. For the citizens must share either everything, or nothing, or some things but not others. That they should share nothing is plainly
[Bekker 1260b line 40]
impossible: the constitution is a kind of community, and they must first share a place. For the territory is one for
[Bekker 1261a]
[Bekker 1261a line 1]
a single city,

the citizens being partners in that one city. But is it better for a city that is to be well ordered to share everything that can be shared, or to share some things but not others? For citizens can have children and women
[Bekker 1261a line 5]
and property in common with one another, as in Plato's Republic. There Socrates says that children, women, and property should be held in common. Which arrangement, then, is better: the present one, or that prescribed by the law written in the Republic?

[Bekker 1261a line 10]
Having women common to everyone presents many other difficulties, and the reason Socrates gives for legislating in this way does not appear to follow from his arguments. Further, the end he says the city should possess is impossible as it is now stated; and how it should be qualified has not been defined.
[Bekker 1261a line 15]
I mean his claim that it is best for the whole city to be as nearly one as possible: this is the assumption Socrates adopts. Yet it is evident that, as it advances and becomes more and more one, it will cease even to be a city. For a city is by nature a plurality, and as it becomes more nearly one, from a city a household, and from a household a person,
[Bekker 1261a line 20]
will arise. We would call a household more nearly one than a city, and an individual more nearly one than a household. Thus, even if someone could bring this about, he should not do it, since he would destroy the city.

A city consists not merely of several human beings, but also of human beings differing in kind. A city does not arise from people who are alike. For there is a difference between an alliance
[Bekker 1261a line 25]
and a city. The former is useful through its numbers, even if its members are of the same kind, since an alliance naturally exists for mutual assistance, just as a heavier weight tips the balance more. But the elements from which a unity is to arise must differ in kind. In this respect a city will also differ from a nation,
[Bekker 1261a line 30]
when its population is not dispersed among villages, but is like the Arcadians. For this reason reciprocal equality preserves cities, as was said earlier in the Ethics. Even among people who are free and equal, this must be so. For all cannot rule at once, but only for a year at a time, or according to some other arrangement or period. This comes about
[Bekker 1261a line 35]
in such a way that all rule, just as if shoemakers and carpenters exchanged occupations, rather than the same people always remaining shoemakers and carpenters. Since it is better for things to be arranged in the latter way in the political community too, it is clear that the same people should always rule, if possible. But where this is impossible because in
[Bekker 1261b]
[Bekker 1261b line 1]
nature all are equal,

and at the same time it is just for all to share in rule, whether ruling is a good or a bad thing, this arrangement at least imitates differences among those out of office: equals yield to one another in turn. For some rule and others are ruled in succession,
[Bekker 1261b line 5]
as though they had become different people. In the same way, different rulers hold different offices. From this it is clear that the city is not by nature one in the way some people say, and that what has been described as the greatest good for cities destroys them. Yet the good of each thing preserves it.
[Bekker 1261b line 10]
It is also clear in another way that seeking to make the city excessively one is not better. A household is more self-sufficient than an individual, and a city than a household; indeed, it seeks to be a city only when the community of its people comes to be self-sufficient. If, then, what is more self-sufficient is more desirable, being less one rather than
[Bekker 1261b line 15]
more one is also more desirable.

But even if this is best—that the community should be as nearly one as possible—not even this appears to be established by the argument that everyone should say "mine" and "not mine" together. For Socrates thinks this a sign that the
[Bekker 1261b line 20]
city is completely one. But "everyone" has two meanings. If it means each individual, this would perhaps be closer to what Socrates wishes to achieve: each will call the same person his own son, and likewise the same woman his own wife, and will speak in the same way about property and each of the things that fall to him. As it is, they will not speak in this way,
[Bekker 1261b line 25]
those who share women and children: all will do so, but not each individually. Likewise with property: all will do so, but not each individually. It is clear, then, that saying "everyone" involves a fallacy. For "all" and "both," and "odd" and "even," through their ambiguity also
[Bekker 1261b line 30]
produce contentious inferences in arguments. Hence everyone's saying the same thing is admirable in one sense, but impossible; in the other, it does nothing to produce concord. Besides, the proposal has another harmful consequence. What is common to the greatest number receives the least care. People care most for what is their own; for what is common,
[Bekker 1261b line 35]
less, or only to the extent that it falls to each of them. For, apart from other considerations, they neglect it more because they think someone else is looking after it, just as in household service many servants sometimes perform their duties worse than fewer do. Each citizen comes to have a thousand sons; these are not sons of each individual, but any one of them, to any citizen,
[Bekker 1262a]
[Bekker 1262a line 1]
is equally a son.

Thus all will neglect them equally.

Further, each says "mine" of whichever citizen is prospering or faring badly, whatever his number may be, saying "mine" or "so-and-so's" in this way of each of the thousand, or however many the
[Bekker 1262a line 5]
city contains; and even this he says doubtfully. For it is unclear to whom a child happened to be born, and whether it survived after birth. Yet is it better for each to say "mine" in this way, when two thousand or ten thousand call the same person "mine," or rather as people in cities now say "mine"? For one, he is his own son; for another, his own brother:
[Bekker 1262a line 10]
they give these names to the same person. Another calls him his cousin, or gives him some other name of kinship, whether by blood or by family connection and marriage, relating him first to himself or to his relatives. Besides these, another calls him a member of his brotherhood or tribe. It is better to be someone's own cousin than a son in this way. Moreover, it is not even possible to prevent some people from
[Bekker 1262a line 15]
supposing that particular people are their own brothers, children, fathers, and mothers. For the resemblances children bear to those who begot them must give grounds for recognizing one another. Some writers on the circuits of the earth say that this actually happens: among certain
[Bekker 1262a line 20]
Libyans of the interior, women are shared, but the children born to them are assigned according to their resemblances. Some women, and females of other animals, such as mares and cows, are naturally very likely to produce offspring resembling their parents, as did the mare in Pharsalus called Dicaea.

[Bekker 1262a line 25]
Further, those who establish this community cannot easily guard against such difficulties as assaults, unintentional and intentional killings, fights, and abusive speech. None of these is holy when committed against fathers, mothers, and close relatives, as it is against those more distantly related.
[Bekker 1262a line 30]
Such things must occur more often when people do not know their relatives than when they do; and when they occur, the customary acts of expiation are possible where the relationship is known, but none is possible where it is not. It is also absurd to make sons common and then forbid lovers only sexual intercourse, without prohibiting love or intimacies
[Bekker 1262a line 35]
of other kinds that are utterly unfitting between father and son or brother and brother, since even love alone is unfitting. It is also absurd to forbid intercourse for no other reason than the excessive intensity of the pleasure, and to think that its occurring between father and son or between brothers
[Bekker 1262a line 40]
makes no difference.

Sharing women and children seems more useful for the farmers
[Bekker 1262b]
[Bekker 1262b line 1]
than for the guardians.

For there will be less friendship when children and women are held in common, and the ruled should be of this sort if they are to obey and not seek revolution. In general, such a law must produce the opposite of what properly
[Bekker 1262b line 5]
established laws should bring about, and of the reason Socrates thinks arrangements for children and women should be made in this way. For we consider friendship the greatest of goods for cities, since it would leave them least prone to faction; and Socrates praises above all the city's being one,
[Bekker 1262b line 10]
which seems, and which he too says, to be the work of friendship. So we know Aristophanes says in the discourses on love that lovers, through their intense affection, desire to grow together and, from being two, both become one. In that case, both would necessarily perish, or one of them;
[Bekker 1262b line 15]
but in the city friendship must become diluted through such a community, and a son will scarcely say "my father," or a father "my son." Just as a little sweetness mixed into much water makes the mixture imperceptible, so too does this happen to the kinship people feel for one another through names
[Bekker 1262b line 20]
of this kind. In such a constitution, a father must care very little for his sons, a son for his father, or brothers for one another. For two things above all make people care and feel affection: that something is their own, and that it is dear to them. Neither can belong to people who take part in public life in this way. Moreover,
[Bekker 1262b line 25]
the transfer of children born to farmers and craftsmen into the guardians, and of children born to guardians into the other groups, raises great confusion as to how it is to be done. Those who give and transfer children must know whom they are giving to whom. Further, the things mentioned earlier, still more often,
[Bekker 1262b line 30]
must occur among these people—assaults, love affairs, killings. For those given to the other citizens will no longer call the guardians brothers, children, fathers, and mothers; nor, conversely, will those among the guardians call the other citizens by these names, so as to avoid committing any such act because of their
[Bekker 1262b line 35]
kinship.

Let this, then, be our determination concerning the sharing of children and women.

The next question is property: how should it be arranged for those who are to take part in public life under the best constitution? Common or not common—
[Bekker 1262b line 40]
which should property be? One might examine this separately from the legislation concerning children and women.

I mean,
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[Bekker 1263a line 1]
concerning property, whether, even if children and women belong to separate families, as they now do everywhere, it is better for property and its use to be common. For example, should the plots of land be separate, but the produce be brought into a common stock and consumed, as some
[Bekker 1263a line 5]
nations do? Or should the reverse hold: the land be common and farmed in common, but the produce divided for private use, as some non-Greek peoples are also said to share it? Or should both the plots and the produce be common? If the farmers are other people, the arrangement would be different and
[Bekker 1263a line 10]
easier; but if the citizens themselves labor on their own property, it would present more difficulties. For when they are not equal but unequal in enjoyment and in work, accusations must arise against those who enjoy or receive much but work little, on the part of those who receive less
[Bekker 1263a line 15]
but work more. In general, living together and sharing all human affairs is difficult, especially affairs of this kind. The associations of fellow travelers show this: most of them fall out, coming into conflict with one another over everyday matters and trifles. Further, among servants, most of all
[Bekker 1263a line 20]
we clash with those we employ most often for ordinary duties.

Common ownership of property, then, presents these and other such difficulties. But the present arrangement, embellished by customs and an order of right laws, would be greatly superior. For it will have the good of both arrangements:
[Bekker 1263a line 25]
by both I mean common and private ownership of property. For property should be common in a certain sense, but in general private. When responsibilities are divided, they will not give rise to accusations against one another, and will lead to greater improvement, since each person attends to what is his own. Through virtue, however, in its use,
[Bekker 1263a line 30]
"Friends' possessions are common," as the proverb says. Even now this arrangement is sketched out in some cities, showing that it is not impossible; and especially in well-ordered cities some of it exists already, while the rest could come about. For each person, while having his own private property, makes some of it available to friends and uses other things
[Bekker 1263a line 35]
in common. In Lacedaemon, for example, they use one another's slaves almost as their own, and also horses and dogs, and, if they need provisions, the produce of farms throughout the country. It is clear, then, that it is better for property to be private, but to make its use common. To make people like this is the lawgiver's
[Bekker 1263a line 40]
special task. Further, the pleasure of regarding something as one's own makes an indescribable difference.

For surely it is not without purpose that toward
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[Bekker 1263b line 1]
himself each person feels affection; this is natural. Selfishness, however, is rightly censured. It is not loving oneself, but loving oneself more than one should, just as with the love of money; for practically everyone loves
[Bekker 1263b line 5]
each of these things. Moreover, it is most pleasant to do favors and give help to friends, guests, or companions, and this is possible when property is private. These things do not occur for those who make the city excessively one; and besides, they plainly abolish the acts of two virtues: temperance in relation to women
[Bekker 1263b line 10]
—for it is a noble act to refrain through temperance from another man's wife—and generosity in relation to property. For no one will be seen to be generous, nor will he perform any generous act, since the work of generosity lies in the use of property.

[Bekker 1263b line 15]
Such legislation, then, has a pleasing appearance and might seem humane. Whoever hears it gladly accepts it, thinking that a marvelous friendship will exist between everyone and everyone else, especially when someone denounces the evils now present in constitutions as arising because
[Bekker 1263b line 20]
property is not common. I mean lawsuits against one another over contracts, trials for false testimony, and flattery of the rich. None of these arises from the absence of common ownership, but from wickedness. Indeed, we see that those who own property in common and share it quarrel much more than those who hold separately
[Bekker 1263b line 25]
their property. But we see few people quarreling over partnerships, compared with the many who own their property privately. Further, it is just to mention not only how many evils they will lose by sharing, but also how many goods. Such a life appears utterly impossible.

The cause
[Bekker 1263b line 30]
of Socrates' error must be taken to be the incorrectness of his assumption. Both the household and the city must be one in a certain sense, but not in every sense. For there is a point at which, if it advances further, it will cease to be a city; and another at which it will still be a city, but a worse one, because it is close to ceasing to be a city. It is as though someone made
[Bekker 1263b line 35]
a harmony into a unison, or a rhythm into a single beat. Rather, since it is a plurality, as was said earlier, it must be made a community and a unity through education. It is absurd that someone intending to introduce education, and thinking it will make the city good, should suppose he can put it right by such measures rather than by
[Bekker 1263b line 40]
customs, philosophy, and laws, as, through the common messes in Lacedaemon and Crete, the
[Bekker 1264a]
[Bekker 1264a line 1]
lawgiver made property common.

### Book II, 1264a–1267a

We must also not overlook this very point: we should heed the long passage of time and the many years during which these arrangements, if they were sound, could not have escaped notice. For almost everything has been discovered, but some things have not been brought together, while others people do not use, though they
[Bekker 1264a line 5]
know them. This would become especially clear if someone saw such a constitution being established in practice. For he will not be able to make the city without dividing and separating its members, some into common messes, others into brotherhoods and tribes. Thus the only distinctive legislation will turn out to be a prohibition on farming
[Bekker 1264a line 10]
for the guardians, which is just what the Lacedaemonians now try to enforce.

Moreover, Socrates has not said what the form of the entire constitution will be for those who share in it, nor is it easy to say. Yet the body of the other citizens makes up almost the whole population of the city. Nothing has been determined about them: whether
[Bekker 1264a line 15]
the farmers too should hold property in common or each should have his own private property, and further, whether their women and children should be private or common. For if everything is common to everyone in the same way, how will these people differ from those guardians? Or what advantage will they gain by submitting to their rule, and on what grounds will they submit
[Bekker 1264a line 20]
to it, unless they devise something like the Cretans' arrangement? For the Cretans allow their slaves everything else on the same terms, prohibiting only physical training and the possession of weapons. But if these matters are arranged among them as they are in other cities, what form will their community take? Within a single city,
[Bekker 1264a line 25]
two cities must exist, and these opposed to one another. For he makes the guardians a kind of garrison, while the farmers, craftsmen, and others are citizens. Accusations, lawsuits, and all the other evils he says exist in cities will exist among these people too. Yet Socrates says
[Bekker 1264a line 30]
that because of their education they will not need many regulations, such as those governing the city, the market, and other such matters, while assigning education only to the guardians. Further, he makes the farmers, who pay a contribution, sovereign over the property. But they are likely to be much more troublesome, with pride
[Bekker 1264a line 35]
in full measure, than the helots, penestae, and slaves found in some places. Whether these arrangements are equally necessary or not, however, nothing has now been determined, nor about the related questions: what their constitution and education will be, and what their laws. These are not easy to discover; nor is it a small matter what sort of people
[Bekker 1264a line 40]
these are, for the preservation of the guardians' community.

But
[Bekker 1264b]
[Bekker 1264b line 1]
if he makes the women common and the property private, who will manage the households as their husbands manage affairs in the fields—and who will do so even if the farmers' property and women are common? It is also absurd to draw the analogy from wild animals,
[Bekker 1264b line 5]
arguing that women should follow the same pursuits as men, since those animals have no part in household management.

The way Socrates appoints the rulers is also precarious. For he always makes the same people rulers; and this causes faction even among people who possess no distinction, still more surely among spirited
[Bekker 1264b line 10]
and warlike men. It is clear that he must make the same people rulers. For the gold bestowed by the god is not mixed into the souls of one group at one time and another at another, but always into the same souls. He says the god mixed gold into some at birth, silver into others, and bronze and iron
[Bekker 1264b line 15]
into those who were to become craftsmen and farmers. Further, although he deprives the guardians of happiness, he says the lawgiver must make the whole city happy. But the whole cannot be happy unless most or all of its parts, or some of them, possess happiness. For happiness does not belong to the same things
[Bekker 1264b line 20]
as being even does. The latter can belong to a whole without belonging to either of its parts, but this is impossible with happiness. Moreover, if the guardians are not happy, who else is? Surely not the craftsmen and the mass of manual workers. The constitution Socrates has described, then, has these
[Bekker 1264b line 25]
difficulties and others no less serious.

The situation is much the same with the Laws, written later; so it is better to examine briefly the constitution presented there as well. For in the Republic Socrates has settled very few matters: concerning women
[Bekker 1264b line 30]
and children, how their sharing should be arranged, property, and the ordering of the constitution. For the population is divided into two parts, one consisting of farmers, the other of those who fight in its defense; and a third part drawn from these deliberates and is sovereign over the city. But as for the farmers and craftsmen,
[Bekker 1264b line 35]
whether they will share in no office or in some, and whether they too should possess weapons and fight alongside the others or not, Socrates has determined nothing. He thinks, however, that women should fight alongside the men and share the same education as the guardians. For the rest, with extraneous matters he has filled
[Bekker 1264b line 40]
his account, and with discussion of education—what sort should be given
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[Bekker 1265a line 1]
to the guardians.

Most of the Laws consists of laws; he has said little about the constitution. Although he wishes to make this one more generally applicable to cities, little by little he brings it back toward the other constitution. For apart from
[Bekker 1265a line 5]
the sharing of women and property, he assigns the same arrangements to both constitutions: the same education, a life free from necessary labor, and likewise the arrangements for common messes. Except that in this constitution he says there should also be common messes for women; and while the former has a thousand
[Bekker 1265a line 10]
men bearing arms, this one has five thousand.

All Socrates' discourses, then, possess an extraordinary quality, refinement, originality, and an inquiring spirit; but it is perhaps difficult to have everything right. For we must not overlook that the population just mentioned will require a territory as large as Babylonia,
[Bekker 1265a line 15]
or some other country of limitless extent, to support five thousand men living without work, and around them a further multitude of women and servants many times as numerous. We should make our assumptions according to our wishes, but assume nothing impossible. It is said that the lawgiver should frame his laws with an eye to two things:
[Bekker 1265a line 20]
the territory and the people. It is also well to add the neighboring territories, first of all if the city is to live a political life. For it must use weapons of war that are useful not only within its own territory, but also outside it, in
[Bekker 1265a line 25]
other regions. Even if someone does not approve of such a life, either for himself or for the city in common, they must nonetheless be formidable to their enemies, not only when these enter their territory, but also when they leave it.

We should also consider the amount of property: might it be better to define it differently, with greater clarity? For enough property
[Bekker 1265a line 30]
he says there must be to live temperately, as though someone had said enough to live well. But this is too general, since it is possible to live temperately yet miserably. A better definition is to live temperately and generously; for taken separately, generosity leads to luxury, temperance to hardship. These alone
[Bekker 1265a line 35]
are desirable dispositions concerning the use of wealth: it is not possible, for example, to use wealth gently or courageously, but it is possible to use it temperately and generously. Hence these dispositions must concern it. It is also absurd to equalize property without making arrangements for the number of citizens, but to leave
[Bekker 1265a line 40]
childbearing unrestricted, on the assumption that childlessness will sufficiently balance it out to the same population, however many children are born,

[Bekker 1265b]
[Bekker 1265b line 1]
because this seems to happen in cities even now. But this cannot work out with the same precision in cities then as it does now. Now no one goes without, because property is divided among any number of people; then, since it is indivisible, those in excess must
[Bekker 1265b line 5]
have nothing, whether they are few or many. One might suppose that childbearing needs to be limited more than property, so that no more than a certain number are born. This number should be set with an eye to the chance that some of those born will die, and to
[Bekker 1265b line 10]
the childlessness of others. Leaving it unrestricted, as in most cities, must cause poverty among the citizens, and poverty produces faction and wrongdoing. Thus Pheidon of Corinth, one of the earliest lawgivers, thought the number of households and the number of citizens should remain the same,
[Bekker 1265b line 15]
even if at the outset all had allotments unequal in size. But in these Laws the opposite holds. We must say later how we think these matters could be better arranged. These Laws also leave out how the rulers will differ from the ruled. For he says
[Bekker 1265b line 20]
that, just as the warp is made from a different wool than the woof, so the rulers should stand in relation to the ruled. Since he allows total wealth to increase up to fivefold, why should this not also hold for land up to a certain limit? We must also examine the division of house plots, to see whether it does not
[Bekker 1265b line 25]
benefit household management. For he allotted two house plots to each person, separating them from one another; but it is difficult to inhabit two households.

The entire arrangement is intended to be neither democracy nor oligarchy, but intermediate between them, what people call a polity; for it consists of those who bear heavy arms. If, then, he establishes this as the most generally applicable
[Bekker 1265b line 30]
to cities among the other constitutions, perhaps he has spoken well. But if he presents it as the best after the first constitution, he has not spoken well. For one might perhaps praise the Lacedaemonians' constitution more, or even some other more aristocratic one. Some people say the best constitution must be a mixture of all constitutions;
[Bekker 1265b line 35]
for this reason they praise the Lacedaemonians' constitution. Some say it consists of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, calling the kingship monarchy and the rule of the elders oligarchy, while the rule of the ephors makes it democratic, because from the people come
[Bekker 1265b line 40]
the ephors. Others say the ephorate is tyranny, and that it is democratic in the common messes and in the rest of
[Bekker 1266a]
[Bekker 1266a line 1]
daily life.

But in these Laws it is said that the best constitution should consist of democracy and tyranny, which one would regard either as no constitutions at all or as the worst of all. Those who mix more forms therefore speak better, since what is composed of
[Bekker 1266a line 5]
more forms is a better constitution. Further, this constitution does not appear to have any monarchical element, but only oligarchic and democratic ones; and it tends to incline more toward oligarchy. This is clear from the appointment of rulers. Choosing by lot from those already elected is common to both forms; but as for the wealthier,
[Bekker 1266a line 10]
requiring them to attend the assembly, elect rulers, or perform some other public duty, while exempting the others, is oligarchic. So too is the attempt to have more rulers drawn from the wealthy, and those holding the greatest offices drawn from the highest property qualifications. He also makes the choice of the council oligarchic. For they elect
[Bekker 1266a line 15]
under compulsion, all of them, but from the first property qualification; then again an equal number from the second; then from the third, except that not all those of the third or fourth classes were compelled to vote. From the fourth, only those of the first and second classes are compelled to elect. Then, from those chosen, equally from each property qualification,
[Bekker 1266a line 20]
a number should be appointed, he says. Those from the highest property qualifications will therefore be more numerous and better, because some of the common people will not elect, since they are not compelled to do so. That such a constitution should not be composed of democracy and monarchy is clear from these considerations and from what will be said later,
[Bekker 1266a line 25]
when the investigation turns to this sort of constitution. Electing rulers from among those already elected also carries a danger. For if certain people wish to combine, even a moderate number of them, the elections will always accord with their wishes. The constitution in the Laws, then, has this
[Bekker 1266a line 30]
character.

There are also other constitutions, some proposed by private individuals, others by philosophers and statesmen. All are closer than these two to the established constitutions under which people now take part in public life. For sharing children and
[Bekker 1266a line 35]
women is an innovation no one else has introduced; nor has anyone else instituted common messes for women. Instead, they begin rather with necessary matters. Some think the most important thing is that property should be well ordered, since, they say, everyone forms factions over it. Phaleas of Chalcedon therefore first introduced this proposal:
[Bekker 1266a line 40]
he says the citizens' property should be equal.

This,
[Bekker 1266b]
[Bekker 1266b line 1]
he thought, would not be difficult to achieve at once in cities being founded. In cities already inhabited it would be harder; nonetheless, equality could be reached most quickly if the rich gave dowries but did not receive them, while the poor did not give them but received them
[Bekker 1266b line 5]
instead. Plato, writing the Laws, thought some freedom should be allowed up to a point, but no citizen should be permitted to acquire more than five times the smallest holding, as was said earlier. Those who legislate in this way must also not overlook what they now overlook: that when regulating property
[Bekker 1266b line 10]
by amount, they should also set the number of children. For if the number of children exceeds the scale of the property, the law must be broken; and apart from its being broken, it is bad for many people to become poor after being rich, since it is difficult to prevent such people from seeking revolution. That there is
[Bekker 1266b line 15]
some influence on the political community in equality of property was evidently recognized by some people long ago. Solon, for example, legislated on it, and among other peoples there is a law preventing anyone from acquiring as much land as he wishes. Likewise, laws prevent the sale of property: in Locri, for instance, a law
[Bekker 1266b line 20]
prohibits selling unless one can show that a manifest misfortune has occurred. There are also laws preserving the original allotments. The abolition of this restriction in Leucas made their constitution excessively democratic, since it no longer happened that people proceeded to office on the basis of the prescribed property qualifications. But equality
[Bekker 1266b line 25]
may exist in property, yet it may be too abundant, leading to luxury, or too scanty, leading to a pinched existence. It is clear, then, that making property equal is not enough for the lawgiver: he must aim at the mean. Further, even if someone fixed a moderate amount of property for everyone, it would be of no use. For desires need to be
[Bekker 1266b line 30]
equalized more than property, and this is impossible unless people are adequately educated by the laws. But perhaps Phaleas would say that this is precisely what he means. For he thinks cities must have equality in these two things, property and education. Yet he must say what the education will be; and its being one
[Bekker 1266b line 35]
and the same is of no use. For it can be one and the same, yet of a kind that will lead people to choose to grasp for more money, or honor, or both together.

Further, people form factions not only because property is unequal, but also because honors are, though in opposite ways in
[Bekker 1266b line 40]
each case. For the many do so because property is unequal,

[Bekker 1267a]
[Bekker 1267a line 1]
while the cultivated do so over honors, if these are equal. Hence the saying:
"The base and the noble alike receive the same honor."
(Hom. Il. 9.319) People do wrong not only for necessities, for which he thinks equality of property is a remedy, so that they need not steal clothing because they are cold or
[Bekker 1267a line 5]
hungry, but also to enjoy themselves and satisfy their desires. For if their desire goes beyond necessities, they will do wrong to remedy it. Nor is this the only reason: they may also desire to enjoy pleasures unaccompanied by pain. What, then, is the remedy for these three things? For the first, a little property
[Bekker 1267a line 10]
and work; for the second, temperance. Third, if some wish to find enjoyment in themselves, they would seek a remedy nowhere but in philosophy, since the other pleasures require other people. For the greatest wrongs are committed through excess, not for necessities: people do not become tyrants to avoid being cold. Thus
[Bekker 1267a line 15]
the honors are great if someone kills not a thief but a tyrant. Hence the arrangement of Phaleas' constitution helps only against minor wrongs. Further, most of his intended arrangements concern how people will conduct their public life well in their dealings with one another; but they must also do so in relation to their neighbors and all outsiders.
[Bekker 1267a line 20]
The constitution must therefore be organized with a view to military strength, about which he has said nothing. The same holds for property. It must be sufficient not only for civic uses but also for dangers from outside. Therefore it should neither be so abundant that
[Bekker 1267a line 25]
stronger neighbors desire it while its possessors cannot repel the invaders, nor so scanty that they cannot sustain a war even against their equals and peers. He has determined nothing about this; but we must not overlook what amount of property is advantageous. Perhaps the best limit, then, is that it should not be profitable
[Bekker 1267a line 30]
for stronger powers to wage war because of its abundance, but that they should stand toward it as they would if it did not possess so much property. For example, when Autophradates was about to besiege Atarneus, Eubulus told him to consider how long he would take to capture the place and calculate the expense for that period. For he was willing to accept less
[Bekker 1267a line 35]
than this and leave Atarneus immediately. By saying this he made Autophradates reflect and abandon the siege.

### Book II, 1267a–1270b

Equality of wealth among the citizens is, then, of some advantage in preventing faction among them, though its importance is, so to speak, slight. For the
[Bekker 1267a line 40]
more cultivated may resent it, thinking themselves worthy of more than an equal share; hence they often appear to launch attacks and stir up faction.

Furthermore,
[Bekker 1267b]
[Bekker 1267b line 1]
human wickedness is insatiable. At first a payment of two obols alone is enough; but once this has become customary, people always want more, until they reach the point of having no limit. For desire is by nature unlimited, and its fulfillment is what most people
[Bekker 1267b line 5]
live for. The principle for dealing with such matters, rather than equalizing wealth, is to form those who are decent by nature so that they do not wish to take more than their share, and the inferior so that they cannot. This will be so if they are weaker and are not treated unjustly. Nor has he properly explained equality of wealth. For
[Bekker 1267b line 10]
he equalizes only landed property, but wealth also consists of slaves, livestock, and money, as well as an abundance of what are called furnishings. We must therefore seek either equality in all these things or some moderate arrangement, or leave them all alone. His legislation also appears to make the city small,
[Bekker 1267b line 15]
if indeed all the artisans are to be public slaves and contribute nothing to the city's citizen population. But if those who perform public work must be public slaves, the arrangement should be like that at Epidamnus, or the one Diophantus once established at Athens. Concerning the constitution of Phaleas,
[Bekker 1267b line 20]
these considerations should enable one to judge, more or less, whether anything he has said is sound or unsound.

Hippodamus of Miletus, the son of Euryphon, invented the division of cities into blocks and laid out the Piraeus. In his other habits too he was unusually extravagant through his love of distinction, to such a degree
[Bekker 1267b line 25]
that some thought his way of life excessively elaborate, with his abundant hair and costly adornment, and also his clothing, cheap but warm, not only in winter but in the summer months as well; and he wished to be learned about nature as a whole. He was the first of those not taking part in public life to attempt to speak about the constitution
[Bekker 1267b line 30]
that is best. He designed a city with a population of ten thousand men, divided into three parts: he made one part artisans, another farmers, and the third those who fought in its defense and possessed arms. He also divided the territory into three parts, sacred, public, and private: the land from which
[Bekker 1267b line 35]
they would provide the customary offerings to the gods was sacred; that from which the defenders would obtain their livelihood was common; and the farmers' land was private. He thought there were only three kinds of laws, since the matters giving rise to lawsuits were three in number: outrage, injury, and death. He also legislated for a single law court with
[Bekker 1267b line 40]
sovereign authority, to which all cases thought to have been wrongly decided must be referred. He constituted it from certain elders
[Bekker 1268a]
[Bekker 1268a line 1]
chosen for the purpose.

He thought judgments in the law courts should not be given by casting votes. Instead, each juror should bring a tablet on which, if he found wholly against the defendant, he would write the penalty; if he acquitted him wholly, he would leave it blank; and if he accepted one part but not another, this would
[Bekker 1268a line 5]
be specified. For he thought the existing law was not well framed, since it compelled jurors to commit perjury by deciding one way or the other. He also made a law that those who discovered something advantageous to the city should receive an honor, and that the children of those who died in war should be maintained at public expense, as though this had not yet been
[Bekker 1268a line 10]
legislated elsewhere. This law now exists both at Athens and in other cities. All rulers were to be chosen by the people, and he made the people consist of the three parts of the city. Those chosen were to attend to public affairs, the affairs of foreigners, and those of orphans.

These, then, are most of the provisions, and
[Bekker 1268a line 15]
the most noteworthy, in Hippodamus's arrangement. One might first question the division of the citizen population. For the artisans, the farmers, and those who possess arms all share in the constitution, though the farmers have no arms, and the artisans neither land nor arms,
[Bekker 1268a line 20]
so that they become almost slaves of those who possess arms. It is therefore impossible for them to share in all the honors, since the generals, the guardians of the citizens, and, so to speak, the most authoritative offices must be drawn from those who possess arms. Yet if they have no share in the constitution, how can they be well disposed
[Bekker 1268a line 25]
toward it? Moreover, those who possess arms must be stronger than both the other parts. This is not easy unless they are numerous; but if they are, why must the others share in the constitution and have authority over the appointment of rulers? Furthermore, what use are the farmers to the city? Artisans
[Bekker 1268a line 30]
are necessary, since every city needs artisans, and they can live by their craft, as in other cities. If the farmers provided those who possess arms with food, they would reasonably be a part of the city; but as things stand, they have private land and will farm it privately.
[Bekker 1268a line 35]
Furthermore, if the defenders themselves farm the common land from which they are to obtain their food, the fighting and farming elements will not be separate, as the legislator wishes. But if those who farm it are different both from those who farm the private land and from the fighters, this will in turn be a fourth part of the city, having no
[Bekker 1268a line 40]
share, but standing outside the constitution. Yet if one makes the farmers of the private and the common land the same people, there will be a difficulty about the quantity of produce that
[Bekker 1268b]
[Bekker 1268b line 1]
each will raise for two households,

and why will they not simply take their own food from the same land and the same allotments and also provide it for the fighters? All these matters, then, involve great confusion. Nor is the law concerning judgment
[Bekker 1268b line 5]
well framed: it requires the juror to make distinctions in his verdict, though the claim is stated without qualification, and turns the juror into an arbitrator. This is possible in arbitration even when there are several arbitrators, since they confer with one another about the judgment. In the law courts, however, it is not possible; indeed, precisely the opposite is what most legislators
[Bekker 1268b line 10]
arrange for: jurors must not confer with one another. Again, how will the judgment not be confused when the juror thinks something is owed, but not as much as the litigant claims? The litigant claims twenty minas, but the juror will award ten minas, or the one more and the other less; another juror will award five,
[Bekker 1268b line 15]
and another four. Plainly, they will divide the amount in this way, while some will award the whole claim and others nothing. What, then, will be the method of counting the votes? Furthermore, nothing compels a juror who acquits or condemns without qualification to commit perjury, provided the charge is stated without qualification and he judges justly. For the juror who acquits does not judge that nothing
[Bekker 1268b line 20]
is owed, but that the twenty minas are not owed. Rather, it is the juror who condemns while not believing the twenty minas are owed who commits perjury.

As for the proposal that those who discover something advantageous to the city should receive an honor, it is unsafe to legislate this: it merely sounds attractive. For it opens the way
[Bekker 1268b line 25]
to malicious accusations and, perhaps, changes of constitution. It also leads into another problem and a further inquiry. Some question whether it is harmful or advantageous to cities to change their ancestral laws when another law is better. Hence it is not easy to agree quickly to the proposal just mentioned, if indeed it is not advantageous
[Bekker 1268b line 30]
to make changes; and some may propose the abolition of laws or of a constitution as a common good. Since we have mentioned the matter, it is better to make a few further distinctions about it. For, as we said, it presents a difficulty, and making changes might seem better. At any rate, this has proved advantageous in the other sciences:
[Bekker 1268b line 35]
medicine, for example, has changed from ancestral practice, as have physical training and, in general, all the arts and capacities. Since political science too must be counted as one of these, it is clear that the same must necessarily hold for it. One might say that the facts themselves provide evidence, since the ancient laws were exceedingly simple
[Bekker 1268b line 40]
and barbarous. For the Greeks used to carry arms and buy their wives from one another, and whatever remains anywhere of the ancient customs is altogether naive,

[Bekker 1269a]
[Bekker 1269a line 1]
such as the law at Cyme concerning homicide: if the person prosecuting a murder produces a certain number of witnesses from among his own relatives, the defendant is guilty of murder. In general, everyone seeks not what is ancestral but what is good. It is likely that the
[Bekker 1269a line 5]
first people, whether they were born from the earth or survived some destruction, were like ordinary, foolish people, as is indeed said of the earthborn; so it is absurd to abide by their decisions. Moreover, it is no better to leave even written laws unchanged. For just as in the other arts,
[Bekker 1269a line 10]
so too in the political order it is impossible for everything to be set down precisely in writing. What is written must be general, but actions concern particulars.

From these considerations, then, it is evident that some laws must sometimes be changed. But viewed in another way, the matter would seem to call for great caution. For when
[Bekker 1269a line 15]
the improvement is slight, while it is bad to accustom people to abolishing laws readily, it is evident that some errors of legislators and rulers should be allowed to stand. For the benefit from making the change will not be as great as the harm from becoming accustomed to disobeying the rulers. The example drawn from the arts is also misleading; for it is not
[Bekker 1269a line 20]
the same to change an art as to change a law. Law has no strength to secure obedience apart from habit, and habit develops only over a long time. Thus, to change readily from existing laws to other, new laws is to weaken the power of law. Furthermore, if
[Bekker 1269a line 25]
laws indeed must be changed, should all of them be changed, and in every constitution, or not? And should anyone at all make changes, or only certain people? These things make a great difference. Let us therefore leave this inquiry for now; it belongs to another occasion.

Concerning the constitution of the Lacedaemonians and that of Crete,
[Bekker 1269a line 30]
and indeed nearly all other constitutions, there are two inquiries: one is whether anything has been legislated well or badly with reference to the best arrangement; the other is whether anything runs counter to the basic aim and character of the constitution they have set before themselves. It is agreed that a city intending to be well governed
[Bekker 1269a line 35]
must have leisure from necessary tasks; but how to secure this is not easy to determine. For the serf class of Thessaly has often attacked the Thessalians, as have the helots the Laconians: they are constantly lying in wait, as it were, for their misfortunes. Among the Cretans,
[Bekker 1269a line 40]
however, nothing of the kind has yet occurred. Perhaps the reason is that the neighboring
[Bekker 1269b]
[Bekker 1269b line 1]
cities,

although they make war on one another, never ally themselves with those who revolt, since this would not be advantageous to cities that themselves possess dependent populations. All the Laconians' neighbors, however, were enemies: the Argives, Messenians, and Arcadians.
[Bekker 1269b line 5]
For in Thessaly too the serfs first revolted because the Thessalians were still at war with their neighbors, the Achaeans, Perrhaebians, and Magnesians. Even if there were no other difficulty, the matter of supervision at least seems troublesome: in what manner should one deal with them? If given freedom, they become insolent and think themselves worthy of equal standing
[Bekker 1269b line 10]
with their masters; if made to live in hardship, they plot against them and hate them. It is clear, then, that those whose system of helotry has these results have not discovered the best method.

Furthermore, the laxity in matters concerning women is harmful both to the constitution's aim and to the city's happiness. For just as
[Bekker 1269b line 15]
man and woman are parts of a household, it is clear that a city too must be regarded as divided roughly in two, into its male and female populations. Thus, in all constitutions where the arrangements concerning women are bad, half the city must be regarded as unregulated by law. This is precisely what has happened there. For the whole
[Bekker 1269b line 20]
city was to be capable of endurance, as the legislator wished; he has plainly achieved this with the men but has neglected the women. They live without restraint, in every kind of indulgence and in luxury. Wealth must therefore be honored in such a constitution, especially if the people happen to be ruled by women,
[Bekker 1269b line 25]
as are most military and warlike peoples, apart from the Celts and any others who have openly honored sexual intercourse with males. For the first teller of the myth seems not without reason to have joined Ares with Aphrodite: all such people evidently fall captive either to intercourse with males
[Bekker 1269b line 30]
or to intercourse with women. Hence this was the case among the Laconians, and many affairs were administered by women during their period of rule. Yet what difference is there between women ruling and rulers being ruled by women? The result is the same. Whatever use
[Bekker 1269b line 35]
boldness has, it is in none of the ordinary pursuits, but, if anywhere, in war; even in this respect, the Laconian women were most harmful. They showed this during the Theban invasion: they were of no use, as in other cities, but caused more uproar than the enemy. From the outset, then,
[Bekker 1269b line 40]
it seems reasonable that among the Laconians the women came to enjoy this
[Bekker 1270a]
[Bekker 1270a line 1]
laxity.

For they spent a long time away from their own land on military campaigns, fighting the war against the Argives and then those against the Arcadians and Messenians. When they had leisure, they presented themselves to the legislator already prepared
[Bekker 1270a line 5]
by military life, for it contains many elements of virtue. As for the women, they say that Lycurgus tried to bring them under the laws, but when they resisted he abandoned the attempt. These, then, are the causes of what came about, and therefore plainly of this error too. But we
[Bekker 1270a line 10]
are not examining whom we should or should not excuse, but what is right and what is not. As was said earlier, the unsatisfactory condition of matters concerning women seems not only to bring a certain impropriety to the constitution in itself, but also to contribute to the love of money.
[Bekker 1270a line 15]
For after what has now been said, one might criticize the inequality of property. Some of them have come to possess far too much wealth, and others extremely little; hence the land has passed into the hands of a few. The laws too have regulated this badly. For buying or
[Bekker 1270a line 20]
selling one's existing property was made dishonorable by the legislator, and rightly so; yet he allowed anyone who wished to give it away or bequeath it. But the same result necessarily follows by either route. Moreover, nearly two-fifths of the whole territory belongs to women, both because many become heiresses
[Bekker 1270a line 25]
and because large dowries are given. Yet it would have been better to prescribe no dowry, or a small or moderate one. As things stand, a man may give his heiress in marriage to anyone he wishes, and if he dies without making arrangements, whoever he leaves as his heir may give her to anyone he wishes. Consequently, though the territory can support a thousand cavalrymen
[Bekker 1270a line 30]
and five hundred more, and thirty thousand hoplites, their total number was not even a thousand. The facts themselves have made it clear that this arrangement was bad for them: the city could not withstand a single blow, but was destroyed because of its lack of men. They say that under the earlier
[Bekker 1270a line 35]
kings they gave others a share in the constitution, so that there was then no shortage of men despite their long wars; and they say that the Spartans once numbered as many as ten thousand. Nevertheless, whether this is true or not, it is better for the city's number of men to grow through an equalization of property. But
[Bekker 1270a line 40]
the law concerning the begetting of children also runs counter to this reform.

[Bekker 1270b]
[Bekker 1270b line 1]
For the legislator, wishing the Spartans to be as numerous as possible, encourages the citizens to have as many children as possible. They have a law exempting the father of three sons from garrison duty, and the father of four from all public obligations. Yet
[Bekker 1270b line 5]
it is evident that if many children are born while the territory is divided in this way, many must become poor.

Moreover, the arrangements concerning the ephorate are bad. This office has sovereign authority over their most important affairs, but the ephors are drawn from the whole people, so that men who are very
[Bekker 1270b line 10]
poor often come into office, and their poverty makes them open to purchase. They have shown this often before, and now in the affair of the Andrians: some of them, corrupted by money, did all they could to destroy the whole city. Because the office is excessively powerful and equal to a tyranny, courting
[Bekker 1270b line 15]
them became necessary even for the kings, so that in this respect too the constitution suffered further harm: it changed from an aristocracy into a democracy. This office does, then, hold the constitution together. For the people remain quiet because they share in the greatest office; thus, whether this has come about through the legislator or by
[Bekker 1270b line 20]
chance, it is advantageous to their affairs. For if a constitution is to be preserved, all parts of the city must wish it to exist and to remain unchanged. The kings have this disposition because of their own honor, the noble and good because of the council of elders, since this office is a prize
[Bekker 1270b line 25]
for virtue, and the people because of the ephorate, since it is drawn from everyone. But although this office should be chosen from everyone, it should not be chosen in the present manner, which is altogether childish. Furthermore, the ephors have authority over important judgments though they are ordinary people; hence, rather than their own discretion,
[Bekker 1270b line 30]
written rules and the laws should guide their judgments. The ephors' way of life is also inconsistent with the city's intention. Their own is excessively lax, while in the case of others it goes too far toward severity, so that they cannot endure it, but secretly evade the law
[Bekker 1270b line 35]
and enjoy bodily pleasures.

### Book II, 1270b–1274b

Their arrangements for the office of the elders are also unsatisfactory. For if the elders were decent men, adequately educated in manly virtue, one might perhaps say that the office benefited the city. Yet even then their lifelong authority over important judgments would be open to dispute
[Bekker 1270b line 40]
(for the mind, like the body, has its old age).

[Bekker 1271a]
[Bekker 1271a line 1]
But when their education is such that even the lawgiver himself distrusts them as men who are not good, the arrangement is unsafe. There is evidence of both bribe-taking and the giving away of many public benefits to please others among those who have shared in this
[Bekker 1271a line 5]
office. For this reason it would be better for them not to be exempt from scrutiny; as things stand, they are. The office of the ephors might seem to subject all the offices to scrutiny. But this gives the ephorate far too great a gift, and this is not the manner in which we say that accounts should be rendered. Moreover, the choice they make of the elders, in its
[Bekker 1271a line 10]
method of judgment, is childish, and it is not right that the man who is to be deemed worthy of the office should himself ask for it. For the man worthy of the office ought to hold it, whether he wishes to or not. As things stand, the lawgiver evidently does here what he does in the rest of the constitution. For he makes the citizens ambitious for honor,
[Bekker 1271a line 15]
and uses this in the choice of the elders: no one would ask to hold office unless he were ambitious for honor. Yet most of the injustices people commit voluntarily arise, one may say, from ambition for honor and love of money.

As for kingship, whether it is better for cities to possess it
[Bekker 1271a line 20]
or not, let that be a separate discussion. Still, it would certainly be better for each king to be judged by his own life, rather than as they are now. It is clear that the lawgiver does not himself think he can make them noble and good. At any rate, he distrusts them as men who are not good enough. For this reason they used to send out as fellow ambassadors
[Bekker 1271a line 25]
the kings' enemies, and thought that faction between the kings ensured the city's safety. Nor did the first founder legislate well concerning the common messes called phiditia. For the contribution should rather have come from public funds, as in Crete. Among the Laconians, however, each man must
[Bekker 1271a line 30]
contribute, although some are extremely poor and cannot meet this expense. Thus the result is the opposite of the lawgiver's intention. For he wishes the institution of the common messes to be democratic, but when legislated in this way it becomes anything but democratic. Participation
[Bekker 1271a line 35]
is not easy for the very poor, and their ancestral condition for participation in the constitution is this: whoever cannot pay this contribution is not to participate in it. Some others have also criticized the law concerning the admirals, and rightly so. For it becomes a cause of faction: alongside the kings,
[Bekker 1271a line 40]
who are permanent generals, the office of admiral has been established as almost a second kingship. One might also criticize the lawgiver's underlying purpose
[Bekker 1271b]
[Bekker 1271b line 1]
in the way that Plato too criticized it in the Laws.

For the whole arrangement of the laws is directed toward one part of virtue, military virtue, since this is useful for gaining mastery. Accordingly, they preserved themselves while waging war, but perished once they had gained rule,
[Bekker 1271b line 5]
because they did not know how to use leisure and had practiced no other discipline of greater importance than warfare. There is a mistake no less serious than this. For they believe that the goods for which people contend are acquired through virtue rather than vice, and in this they are right. But that they suppose these goods superior to virtue
[Bekker 1271b line 10]
is not right. The Spartans' public finances are also in a poor state. There is nothing in the city's treasury, although they are compelled to wage great wars, and their contributions are badly managed. For because most of the land belongs to the Spartans, they do not examine one another's
[Bekker 1271b line 15]
contributions. The lawgiver has achieved the opposite of what is advantageous: he has made the city poor in money and its private citizens lovers of money. Let this suffice, then, concerning the constitution of the Lacedaemonians, for these are the points one might chiefly criticize.

[Bekker 1271b line 20]
The Cretan constitution is close to this one. In a few respects it is no worse, but for the most part it is less finely worked out. For the Laconians' constitution seems, and indeed is said, to have imitated the Cretan constitution in most respects; and most ancient arrangements are less fully articulated than newer ones. They say
[Bekker 1271b line 25]
that when Lycurgus went abroad after giving up his guardianship of King Charilaus, he spent most of his time in Crete because of their kinship. For the Lyctians were colonists of the Laconians, and those who came to found the colony found the system of laws already established
[Bekker 1271b line 30]
among the inhabitants of that time. For this reason the neighboring inhabitants still use them in the same manner, on the understanding that Minos first established the system of laws. The island also seems naturally suited and well situated for rule over the Greeks. For it commands the whole sea, around which nearly all the Greeks
[Bekker 1271b line 35]
are settled. It lies a short distance from the Peloponnese on one side, and from Asia, in the region of Triopium and Rhodes, on the other. For this reason Minos also gained mastery of the sea, subdued some of the islands and settled others, and finally, after attacking Sicily, ended his life
[Bekker 1271b line 40]
there near Camicus.

The Cretan arrangement corresponds to the Laconian. For the helots cultivate the land for the latter,
[Bekker 1272a]
[Bekker 1272a line 1]
and the neighboring inhabitants for the Cretans,

and both have common messes. In ancient times, at least, the Laconians called these not phiditia but andreia, as the Cretans do, which also makes clear that they came from there. There is also the arrangement of the constitution. The
[Bekker 1272a line 5]
ephors have the same power as those called cosmoi in Crete, except that the ephors number five and the cosmoi ten. The elders correspond to the elders whom the Cretans call the council. There was formerly kingship, but the Cretans later abolished it, and the
[Bekker 1272a line 10]
cosmoi hold the command in war. Everyone participates in the assembly, but it has authority over nothing except to approve by vote what the elders and cosmoi have resolved.

The Cretans' arrangements for the common messes, then, are better than the Laconians'. For in Lacedaemon each man contributes the prescribed amount per head,
[Bekker 1272a line 15]
and if he does not, the law prevents him from participating in the constitution, as was also said earlier. In Crete, however, the arrangement is more communal. From all the produce of the public crops and herds, and from the tribute paid by the neighboring inhabitants, a portion is assigned to the gods and public
[Bekker 1272a line 20]
services, and another to the common messes, so that all are fed at public expense—women, children, and men. The lawgiver has devised many measures to encourage moderation in eating as beneficial, and to keep men apart from women so that they may not have many children, making males
[Bekker 1272a line 25]
their partners in intercourse for this purpose. Whether this is bad or not will be considered on another occasion. It is clear, then, that the Cretans' arrangements for the common messes are better than the Laconians'. But the arrangements concerning the cosmoi are worse still than those concerning the ephors. For the evil that belongs to the office of the ephors belongs to these as well
[Bekker 1272a line 30]
(for any chance persons may hold it), while the advantage it offers the constitution there is absent here. There, because the choice is made from everyone, the people share in the greatest office and wish the constitution to endure. Here, however, they choose the cosmoi not from everyone but from certain families, and the elders
[Bekker 1272a line 35]
from those who have served as cosmoi. Concerning these one might make the same arguments as concerning the elders in Lacedaemon. For their exemption from scrutiny and their lifelong tenure are honors greater than their worth, and their ruling not according to written laws but by their own judgment is unsafe. That the people remain quiet without sharing
[Bekker 1272a line 40]
in office is no sign that the arrangement is good. For the cosmoi have no opportunity for gain as the ephors do, being far
[Bekker 1272b]
[Bekker 1272b line 1]
removed, on their island, from those who would corrupt them.

The remedy they employ for this defect is strange, and belongs not to constitutional government but to the domination of a powerful group. For often some of the cosmoi's fellow officeholders or private citizens combine and expel them. The cosmoi are also permitted
[Bekker 1272b line 5]
to resign their office before their term is over. It would be better for all these things to take place according to law rather than according to men's wishes, for this is not a secure standard. Worst of all is the suspension of the cosmoi's office by the powerful, which those among them who do not wish to submit to justice often bring about. This also makes clear that the arrangement has something
[Bekker 1272b line 10]
of a constitution, but is not a constitution; it is rather the domination of a powerful group. They habitually divide the people and their friends into opposing camps, produce anarchy, stir up faction, and fight one another. Yet how does such a situation differ from the city's ceasing for a time to be a city, and the political
[Bekker 1272b line 15]
community's dissolution? A city in this condition is in danger from those who wish and are able to attack it. But, as has been said, it is preserved by its location: its remoteness has brought about the exclusion of foreigners. For this reason too the Cretans' neighboring inhabitants remain subject, whereas the helots frequently revolt. For the Cretans have no share in foreign
[Bekker 1272b line 20]
rule, and recently a war from abroad has crossed over to the island and revealed the weakness of the laws there. Let this suffice, then, for our account of this constitution.

The Carthaginians too seem to take part in public life well, and
[Bekker 1272b line 25]
in many respects better than others, while in some respects above all they resemble the Laconians. For these three constitutions—the Cretan, the Laconian, and, third, the Carthaginian—are in a way close to one another and differ greatly from the others. Many of their institutions are
[Bekker 1272b line 30]
well arranged. A sign of a well-ordered constitution is that the people willingly remain within its constitutional order, and that neither any faction worth mentioning nor any tyrant has arisen. Its resemblances to the Laconian constitution are these: the common messes of the associations correspond to the phiditia, the hundred
[Bekker 1272b line 35]
and four hold an office corresponding to the ephors (with this improvement: the ephors are drawn from any chance persons, whereas they choose this office according to merit), and the kings and the council of elders correspond to the kings and elders there. It is also better that the kings should neither come from one fixed family nor from any chance family,
[Bekker 1272b line 40]
but, if some family is distinguished, that they should be chosen from its members rather than according to age. For since they have authority over important matters, if they are worthless,
[Bekker 1273a]
[Bekker 1273a line 1]
they do great harm,

and have already harmed the city of the Lacedaemonians.

Most of the points that one might criticize as deviations happen to be common to all the constitutions mentioned. Of those that depart from the underlying principle of aristocracy
[Bekker 1273a line 5]
and polity, some incline more toward democracy, others toward oligarchy. For the kings, together with the elders, have authority to bring some matters before the people and not others, if they all agree; otherwise, the people have authority over these matters too. When these rulers introduce a matter, they
[Bekker 1273a line 10]
allow the people not merely to hear the rulers' resolutions, but to have authority to judge them; and anyone who wishes may speak against the proposals, which is not possible in the other constitutions. That the boards of five, which have authority over many important matters, are chosen by their own members, and that the office of the hundred
[Bekker 1273a line 15]
is chosen by these boards—the greatest office—and furthermore these boards hold office longer than the others (for they exercise rule both after leaving office and before entering it), is oligarchic. But their being unpaid and not chosen by lot must be counted aristocratic, as must anything else of this kind, and the fact that all cases are judged by the governing bodies
[Bekker 1273a line 20]
(and not different cases by different bodies, as in Lacedaemon). The Carthaginian arrangement departs from aristocracy chiefly toward oligarchy, following a view that most people share. For they think that rulers should be chosen not only according to merit but also according to wealth, since it is impossible
[Bekker 1273a line 25]
for a man without resources to rule well and have leisure. If, then, choice according to wealth is oligarchic and choice according to virtue aristocratic, this would be a third kind of arrangement, the very one according to which the Carthaginians have also ordered their constitution. For they make their choices with an eye to both these things, especially
[Bekker 1273a line 30]
for the greatest offices, those of the kings and generals.

This deviation from aristocracy must be regarded as a mistake on the lawgiver's part. For one of the most necessary things is to see to this from the outset: that the best men can have leisure and do nothing unseemly, not only while holding office but also
[Bekker 1273a line 35]
while living as private citizens. But if one must also consider affluence for the sake of leisure, it is bad that the greatest offices, kingship and the generalship, should be for sale. For this law makes wealth more honored than virtue, and makes the whole city love money. Whatever the
[Bekker 1273a line 40]
sovereign body considers honorable, the opinion of the other citizens must necessarily follow. And wherever virtue is not honored above all, that
[Bekker 1273b]
[Bekker 1273b line 1]
constitution cannot be securely governed as an aristocracy.

It is reasonable to expect those who buy offices to become accustomed to making a profit from them, when they hold office after spending money. For it would be strange if a poor but decent man wished to make a profit, while an inferior man who had spent money did not.
[Bekker 1273b line 5]
For this reason those who can rule best ought to rule. Even if the lawgiver had neglected the affluence of decent men, it would be better at least to take care that they have leisure while holding office. It would also seem bad for the same man to hold several offices, a practice highly regarded among the Carthaginians. For one
[Bekker 1273b line 10]
work is best accomplished by one person. The lawgiver must see that this happens, and not assign the same man to play the flute and make shoes. Thus, where the city is not small, it accords better with constitutional government, and is more democratic, for more people to share in the offices. For, as we have said, participation is more widely shared, and each task is accomplished better,
[Bekker 1273b line 15]
with the same tasks also accomplished faster. This is clear in military and naval affairs: in both, ruling and being ruled have extended, so to speak, through everyone. Although their constitution is oligarchic, they escape its dangers very well by constantly enriching some portion of the people, sending them out to
[Bekker 1273b line 20]
the cities. For by this means they remedy its defects and make the constitution lasting. But this is the work of chance, whereas they ought to be free of faction through the lawgiver's work. As things stand, if some misfortune occurs and the multitude of the ruled revolts, the laws provide no remedy for restoring peace. Such, then, is the state of the Lacedaemonians'
[Bekker 1273b line 25]
constitution, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian, which are justly held in high regard.

Of those who have expressed views about a constitution, some have never participated in any political actions at all, but have spent their lives as private citizens. If any of their views are worth considering, we have discussed
[Bekker 1273b line 30]
nearly all of them. Others have themselves taken part in public life and become lawgivers, some for their own cities, others also for certain foreign cities. Of these, some became makers of laws alone, others of a constitution as well, as did Lycurgus and Solon; for these men established both laws and constitutions.
[Bekker 1273b line 35]
The Lacedaemonians' constitution has been discussed. Some think that Solon was an excellent lawgiver: that he abolished an excessively unmixed oligarchy, freed the people from slavery, and established the ancestral democracy by blending the constitution well. For the council on the
[Bekker 1273b line 40]
Areopagus was oligarchic, the filling of the offices by choice aristocratic, and the law courts democratic.

But Solon seems
[Bekker 1274a]
[Bekker 1274a line 1]
not to have abolished the institutions already in existence—the council and the choice of officeholders—but to have established the people's power by making the law courts open to everyone. For this reason some also blame him: they say that he destroyed the other institutions by making the law court sovereign
[Bekker 1274a line 5]
over everything, though it was chosen by lot. For when this grew strong, they courted the people as though courting a tyrant, and changed the constitution into the present democracy. Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the council on the Areopagus, and Pericles established pay for service in the law courts. In this way
[Bekker 1274a line 10]
each of the popular leaders advanced it, enlarging it into the present democracy. Yet this seems to have happened not according to Solon's intention, but rather by a concurrence of circumstances (for the people, having brought about naval supremacy during the Persian Wars, became proud and took on bad popular leaders despite opposition
[Bekker 1274a line 15]
from the decent men in public life). Solon at least seems to have given the people the most necessary power, that of choosing officeholders and subjecting them to scrutiny (for if the people did not have authority even over this, they would be slaves and enemies), while he appointed all the offices from the notables and the prosperous, from the five-hundred-measure class
[Bekker 1274a line 20]
and the yoke-men, and from the third class, called the cavalry class. The fourth was the laboring class, who had a share in no office.

Zaleucus became a lawgiver for the Epizephyrian Locrians, and Charondas of Catana for his own citizens and the other Chalcidian cities in Italy
[Bekker 1274a line 25]
and Sicily. Some also attempt to connect them in a succession: Onomacritus was the first skilled in lawgiving, and, being a Locrian living in Crete, received his training there in the art of divination; Thaletas became his companion, Lycurgus and Zaleucus pupils of Thaletas, and Zaleucus's pupil
[Bekker 1274a line 30]
was Charondas. But they make these assertions without sufficient attention to the dates. Philolaus of Corinth also became a lawgiver for the Thebans. Philolaus belonged by birth to the Bacchiads and became the lover of Diocles, the victor at Olympia. When Diocles left the city out of hatred for
[Bekker 1274a line 35]
his mother Alcyone's love, Philolaus departed for Thebes, and both ended their lives there. Even now people point out their tombs, which are easily visible from one another; but in relation to the territory of the Corinthians, one is visible from it and the other is not. For the story is that they arranged their burial in this way:
[Bekker 1274a line 40]
Diocles, because of his loathing for that passion, so that Corinthian territory would not be visible from his burial mound, and Philolaus so that it
[Bekker 1274b]
[Bekker 1274b line 1]
would be visible.

For this reason, then, they lived among the Thebans. Philolaus became their lawgiver on certain other matters and on the bearing of children, in what they call laws of adoption. This is his distinctive legislative provision:
[Bekker 1274b line 5]
that the number of land allotments should be preserved. There is nothing distinctive in Charondas except the actions for false testimony (for he was the first to institute the formal challenge to testimony). But in the precision of his laws he is more accomplished even than present-day lawgivers.

Phaleas's distinctive provision is the equalization of property, and Plato's
[Bekker 1274b line 10]
the community of women, children, and property, and the common messes for women; also the law concerning drunkenness, that sober men should preside over drinking parties, and training in warfare so that men become ambidextrous through practice, on the ground that one hand should not be useful and the other
[Bekker 1274b line 15]
useless. There are laws of Draco, but he laid down his laws for an existing constitution. There is nothing distinctive in his laws worth mentioning, except their harshness owing to the magnitude of the penalties. Pittacus too became a maker of laws, but not of a constitution. His distinctive law is that drunken men, if they
[Bekker 1274b line 20]
commit an offense, should pay a greater penalty than sober men. For because more men act outrageously when drunk than when sober, he looked not to the greater indulgence that should be shown to drunken men, but to advantage. Androdamas of Rhegium also became a lawgiver for the Chalcidians in Thrace. His provisions concern homicide
[Bekker 1274b line 25]
and heiresses; nevertheless, no one could point to anything distinctive in his work. Let this, then, stand as our examination of constitutions, both those in force and those proposed by certain thinkers.

### Book III, 1274b–1278a

[Bekker 1274b]
[Bekker 1274b line 32]
For someone investigating constitutions—what each is and what sort it is—the first inquiry is almost certainly to consider the city: what, precisely, is a city? As things stand, people dispute this, some saying
[Bekker 1274b line 35]
that the city performed an action, others that it was not the city but the oligarchy or the tyrant. We see that the entire concern of the statesman and the lawgiver is with the city, and the constitution is a certain ordering of those who inhabit the city. Since the city is a composite thing, like any other whole
[Bekker 1274b line 40]
made up of many parts, it is clear that we must first inquire into the citizen; for a city is a certain multitude of citizens.

[Bekker 1275a]
[Bekker 1275a line 1]
We must therefore examine whom we should call a citizen and what a citizen is. For the citizen, too, is often disputed: not everyone agrees that the same person is a citizen. Someone who is a citizen in a democracy is often
[Bekker 1275a line 5]
not a citizen in an oligarchy. Let us leave aside those who happen to receive this designation in some other way, such as citizens made so by decree. A citizen is not a citizen by residing somewhere, for resident foreigners and slaves also share in residence. Nor are those citizens who share in legal rights to the extent of being liable to suit and bringing suit
[Bekker 1275a line 10]
(for this belongs also to those who participate under treaties: they too have these rights. Indeed, in many places resident foreigners do not even share fully in these, but must be assigned a patron, so that their participation in this kind of association is incomplete). Rather, just as children who have not yet, because of their age,
[Bekker 1275a line 15]
been enrolled, and old men who have been exempted, must be said to be citizens in a sense, but not altogether without qualification, we must add that the former are incomplete citizens and the latter past their prime, or some other expression of the kind. It makes no difference, for the meaning is clear. We are seeking the citizen without qualification, with no such
[Bekker 1275a line 20]
defect requiring correction; for similar difficulties can also be raised and resolved about the disfranchised and exiles. The citizen without qualification is defined by nothing else so much as by sharing in judgment and office. Some offices are limited in time, so that in some, a second term
[Bekker 1275a line 25]
is never permitted for the same person, or may be held only after certain fixed intervals; others are unlimited, such as those of the juror and the assembly member. Perhaps someone might say that such people are not even officeholders, and do not on this account share in office. Yet it is absurd to deprive those with the greatest authority of office. But let this make no difference: a name
[Bekker 1275a line 30]
is what the argument concerns, for there is no name for what the juror and the assembly member have in common, by which we should call them both. For purposes of definition, then, let it be an unlimited office. We accordingly count as citizens those who share in office in this way.

The citizen who would best fit all those called citizens is, roughly speaking, of this kind. But we must
[Bekker 1275a line 35]
not overlook that, where the underlying things differ in kind and one is first, another second, and another next in order, they either have nothing in common at all, insofar as they are such, or only very little. We see that constitutions differ from one another in kind, and that some are later and others
[Bekker 1275b]
[Bekker 1275b line 1]
earlier;

for defective and deviant constitutions must be later than those without defects. What we mean by deviant constitutions will become clear afterward. Consequently the citizen, too, must differ according to each constitution.
[Bekker 1275b line 5]
For this reason the citizen we have described is above all a citizen in a democracy; in other constitutions he may be, but need not be. For in some there is no people, and they do not customarily hold assemblies, but specially summoned meetings; and they divide the judging of lawsuits among different offices. In Lacedaemon, for example, contract cases are judged by
[Bekker 1275b line 10]
different ephors, the elders judge homicide cases, and perhaps some other office judges other cases. Matters at Carthage are not arranged in the same way: certain offices judge all the lawsuits. But the definition of the citizen admits of correction. In the other constitutions it is not the unlimited officeholder who is assembly member
[Bekker 1275b line 15]
and juror, but the one whose office is defined. For to all or some of these has been assigned the task of deliberating and judging, either on all matters or on certain ones. Who the citizen is, then, is clear from this. Whoever has the right to share in deliberative or judicial office we now call a citizen of this
[Bekker 1275b line 20]
city; and a city, to speak without qualification, is a multitude of such people sufficient for a self-sufficient life.

For practical purposes people define a citizen as one born of two citizens, not of one alone, whether father or mother. Some extend this requirement further, to two or three or more generations of ancestors.
[Bekker 1275b line 25]
When the definition is given in this political and hasty fashion, some ask how that ancestor in the third or fourth generation will be a citizen. Gorgias of Leontini, perhaps partly at a loss and partly being ironic, said that, just as mortars are those things made by mortar-makers, so Larissaeans are those made by their civic officials;
[Bekker 1275b line 30]
for there are some who are Larissaean-makers. But the matter is simple. If they shared in the constitution according to the definition we gave, they were citizens. Indeed, the requirement of being born of a male or female citizen cannot even be applied to the first inhabitants or founders.

But perhaps there is greater difficulty about those who
[Bekker 1275b line 35]
were admitted to citizenship after a change of constitution, as Cleisthenes did at Athens after the expulsion of the tyrants: he enrolled in the tribes many foreigners and slaves who were resident foreigners. The dispute about these concerns not who is a citizen, but whether he is one unjustly or justly. Yet someone might raise this further difficulty:

[Bekker 1276a]
[Bekker 1276a line 1]
if someone is not justly a citizen, is he not a citizen at all, on the assumption that what is unjust and what is false have the same force? But since we see that some hold office unjustly, and we will say that they hold office, though not justly, and the citizen is defined by a certain office—for one who shares in
[Bekker 1276a line 5]
an office of this kind is a citizen, as we said—it is clear that we must call these people citizens too;

but whether they are so justly or unjustly connects with the dispute mentioned earlier. For some are at a loss as to when the city has acted and when it has not: for example, when an oligarchy or tyranny changes into
[Bekker 1276a line 10]
a democracy. At such a time some refuse to discharge contracts, on the ground that it was not the city but the tyrant who received the loan, and likewise refuse many other obligations of this kind, on the ground that some constitutions rest on force and not on the common advantage. If, then, some democracies also govern in this fashion, we must equally
[Bekker 1276a line 15]
call the actions of this constitution actions of this city, just as we must those arising from oligarchy and tyranny. This argument seems related to the difficulty of how we should say that a city is the same, or not the same but another. At its most superficial, this difficulty
[Bekker 1276a line 20]
is investigated with regard to the place and the people: for the place and the people can be divided, and some inhabit one place and others another.

We should therefore regard this difficulty as a milder one, for since the city is spoken of in many senses, there is a certain ease about an inquiry of this kind. Similarly,
[Bekker 1276a line 25]
when people inhabit the same place, when should we consider their city one? Surely not by its walls: one wall could be built around the Peloponnese. Perhaps Babylon is such a city, and every city whose circumference is more that of a nation than of a city. They say that when Babylon was captured, for three
[Bekker 1276a line 30]
days some part of the city did not know it.

But consideration of this difficulty will be useful on another occasion. For the statesman must not overlook the question of a city's size—how large it should be, and whether one nation or several is advantageous. But when the same people inhabit the same place,
[Bekker 1276a line 35]
should we say that the city is the same as long as the inhabitants remain of the same stock, although some are always dying and others being born, just as we customarily speak of the same rivers and the same springs, although water is always coming in and flowing out? Or should we say that the people
[Bekker 1276a line 40]
are the same for this reason, but that the
[Bekker 1276b]
[Bekker 1276b line 1]
city is different?

For if indeed the city is a certain association, and an association of citizens in a constitution, then when the constitution becomes different in kind and changes, it would seem necessary that the city, too, should no longer be the same. So also we say that a chorus
[Bekker 1276b line 5]
is different when it is comic and when it is tragic, although it is often made up of the same people. Likewise every other association and composition is different if the form of its composition is different. For example, we say that a harmony of the same notes is different when it is Dorian and when it is Phrygian. If, then,
[Bekker 1276b line 10]
this is how matters stand, it is clear that in calling a city the same we must look chiefly to its constitution. It may be called by a different name or the same one, whether its inhabitants are the same or entirely different people. But whether it is just to discharge or not discharge obligations when there is a change to another constitution
[Bekker 1276b line 15]
in the city is a different question.

Following what has now been said, we must consider whether we should regard the virtue of a good man and that of a worthy citizen as the same or not the same. Yet if this is to receive investigation, we must first grasp the virtue of the citizen in some outline.
[Bekker 1276b line 20]
Just as a sailor is one member of an association, so, we say, is a citizen. Although sailors differ in their functions—one is a rower, another a helmsman, another a lookout, and another bears some other designation of this kind—it is clear that the most precise account of each one's
[Bekker 1276b line 25]
virtue will be peculiar to him; yet some common account will also fit them all. For the safety of the voyage is the work of them all: this is what every sailor seeks. Likewise, then, for citizens, however different they are, the preservation of their association is their work, and their association is the constitution.
[Bekker 1276b line 30]
The virtue of the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution. If, then, there are several kinds of constitution, it is clear that the worthy citizen cannot have one single, complete virtue. But we call a man good in virtue of one single virtue, the complete one.

That someone may be a worthy citizen without
[Bekker 1276b line 35]
possessing the virtue by which a man is worthy is therefore clear. Yet we can also approach the same argument in another way, by examining difficulties concerning the best constitution. For if it is impossible for a city to consist entirely of worthy people, still each must perform his own work well, and this comes from virtue.
[Bekker 1276b line 40]
Since it is impossible for all the citizens to be alike,

there would not
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[Bekker 1277a line 1]
be one virtue of a citizen and of a good man. For all must possess the virtue of the worthy citizen—this is necessary if the city is to be best—but they cannot all possess the virtue of the good man, unless everyone must be good in
[Bekker 1277a line 5]
the worthy city as a citizen. Again, since the city consists of unlike elements—just as an animal consists immediately of soul and body, and a soul of reason and desire, and a household of husband and wife, and property of master and slave—in the same way a city consists of all these, and in addition of other unlike
[Bekker 1277a line 10]
kinds. The virtue of all citizens must therefore not be one, just as it is not one for the leader of a chorus and the person standing beside him.

Why, then, they are not the same without qualification is clear from this. But will there be someone for whom the virtue of a worthy citizen and a worthy man is the same? We say that the ruler
[Bekker 1277a line 15]
who is worthy is good and possesses practical wisdom, but the citizen need not possess practical wisdom. Some say, indeed, that the education of a ruler is different from the outset: we see that the sons of kings are trained in horsemanship and warfare, and Euripides says,
“Not clever refinements for me … but what the city needs,”
(Eur. Fr. 16)
[Bekker 1277a line 20]
as though there were a particular education for a ruler. If the virtue of a good ruler and of a good man is the same, but the ruled person too is a citizen, then the virtue of citizen and man would not be the same without qualification, though it would be for a certain citizen. For the virtue of ruler and citizen is not the same, and perhaps this is why Jason said he went hungry when he was not a tyrant, as though
[Bekker 1277a line 25]
he did not know how to be a private person.

Yet the ability to rule and to be ruled is praised, and the virtue of the citizen seems to be the ability both to rule well and to be ruled well. If, then, we regard the virtue of the good man as that of ruling, and that of the citizen as both, the two would not be equally praiseworthy. Since, then,
[Bekker 1277a line 30]
both views are sometimes held—that ruler and ruled need not learn the same things, but that the citizen should know both and share in both—we may gain insight from the following. There is rule of a master, and by this we mean rule concerned with necessary tasks. The ruler need not know how to perform these,
[Bekker 1277a line 35]
but rather how to make use of them. The other capacity is indeed slavish. By the other I mean the ability actually to perform the tasks of service. We speak of several kinds of slave, for there are several kinds of work. One part of these is occupied by manual laborers. These, as their name itself indicates, are those who live by
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their hands,

among whom is the mechanical craftsman. For this reason, in some places craftsmen in earlier times did not share in offices, before the most extreme democracy arose. Thus the tasks of those ruled in this fashion are not for the good man, the statesman, or the
[Bekker 1277b line 5]
good citizen to learn, except perhaps for his own personal needs; for then it no longer follows that one is master and another slave.

But there is a kind of rule under which one rules those who are alike in stock and free. This is what we call political rule, which the ruler, through being ruled, must
[Bekker 1277b line 10]
learn, as he learns to command cavalry by serving under a cavalry commander, and to be a general by serving under a general and commanding a regiment and a company. Hence this, too, is well said: no one can rule well without having been ruled. Their virtues are different, but the good citizen must know how and be able both to be ruled and to
[Bekker 1277b line 15]
rule; and this is the virtue of a citizen, to understand the rule of free people from both sides. Both belong also to the good man, even if the moderation and justice of ruling differ in kind. For when a good man is ruled but free, it is clear that his virtue, justice for example, would not be one, but would have forms
[Bekker 1277b line 20]
according to which he will rule and be ruled, just as moderation and courage differ in a man and a woman. A man would seem cowardly if he were only as courageous as a courageous woman, and a woman talkative if she were only as restrained as a good man; since household management, too, differs for man and woman. The man's
[Bekker 1277b line 25]
work is to acquire, the woman's to preserve. Practical wisdom alone is a virtue peculiar to a ruler. The others, it seems, must be common to both ruled and rulers, but practical wisdom is not a virtue of the ruled person; rather, true opinion is. For the ruled person is like a flute-maker, and the ruler
[Bekker 1277b line 30]
like the flute-player who uses the flute. Whether the virtue of a good man and a worthy citizen is the same or different, and how it is the same and how different, is therefore clear from this.

One of the difficulties about the citizen still remains. Is a citizen truly someone permitted to share in
[Bekker 1277b line 35]
office, or should we also count mechanical workers as citizens? If we must count those too who have no share in offices, not every citizen can possess the virtue we have described, for such a person is a citizen. But if none of these is a citizen, in what class should each be placed? He is neither a resident foreigner nor a foreigner. Or shall we say that this argument
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[Bekker 1278a line 1]
produces nothing absurd?

For neither are slaves or freedmen any of the categories mentioned. This is true: we should not count as citizens all those without whom a city could not exist, since even children are not citizens in the same way as men. Rather,
[Bekker 1278a line 5]
the latter are citizens without qualification, the former on a condition: they are citizens, but incomplete ones. In ancient times in some places the mechanical laboring class consisted of slaves or foreigners; for this reason most of them are of this kind even now. The best city will not make a mechanical worker a citizen. But if he too is a citizen, the virtue of a citizen that we described
[Bekker 1278a line 10]
must be said to belong not to everyone, nor merely to everyone free, but to those released from necessary tasks. Of those who perform necessary tasks, those who serve one person in such matters are slaves, while those who serve the public are mechanical workers and hired laborers. How matters stand with them will be clear from a little consideration of this; for when the point just stated comes to light, it makes this
[Bekker 1278a line 15]
clear. Since there are several constitutions, there must also be several kinds of citizen, especially of the citizen who is ruled. Hence in one constitution the mechanical worker and the hired laborer must be citizens, while in some it is impossible: for example, if there is a constitution of the kind they call aristocratic, where according to virtue
[Bekker 1278a line 20]
and worth honors are bestowed. For it is impossible to pursue the activities of virtue while living the life of a mechanical worker or a hired laborer. In oligarchies a hired laborer cannot be a citizen, for participation in offices depends on high property qualifications; but a mechanical worker can, for many
[Bekker 1278a line 25]
craftsmen are wealthy. At Thebes there was a law that someone who had not abstained from trade for ten years could not share in office. In many constitutions the law also draws in some foreigners: in certain democracies a person born of a female citizen is a citizen, and in many places the same holds for the illegitimate. Yet,
[Bekker 1278a line 30]
since they make such people citizens because of a shortage of legitimate citizens—for it is because their population is small that they apply the laws in this way—when they have an abundance of the masses, they gradually remove first those born of a male or female slave, then those descended through women, and finally make citizens only of those born of two citizens.

### Book III, 1278a–1281b

That
[Bekker 1278a line 35]
there are several kinds of citizen is clear from this, and that the citizen is above all someone who shares in honors, as Homer too wrote,
“Like some dishonored migrant”;
(Hom. Il. 9.648) (Hom. Il. 16.59) for someone who does not share in honors is like a resident foreigner. But there are places where this fact is concealed, in order to deceive those who live together
[Bekker 1278a line 40]
there.

Whether we should regard as different or the same the virtue
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[Bekker 1278b line 1]
by which a man is good and a citizen worthy is clear from what has been said: in one city the two are the same, in another different. And even in the former it is not every citizen, but the statesman who is sovereign, or capable of being sovereign, either by himself or with others, in the administration of
[Bekker 1278b line 5]
public affairs.

Now that these matters have been defined, we must next consider whether we should posit one constitution or several; and if several, what they are, how many, and what their differences are. A constitution is an ordering of a city's offices, both the others and especially
[Bekker 1278b line 10]
the office sovereign over all. For everywhere the citizen body is sovereign in the city, and the citizen body is the constitution. I mean, for example, that in democracies the people are sovereign, while in oligarchies, on the contrary, the few are; and we say that the constitutions of these are different. We shall give the same account
[Bekker 1278b line 15]
of the others too. First, then, we must establish for what purpose a city is constituted, and how many kinds of rule there are over human beings and their association in life. In our first discussions, in which we distinguished household management and mastery, it was also said that a human being is by nature a political animal.
[Bekker 1278b line 20]
For this reason, even when they have no need of one another's help, people desire no less to live together. Yet the common advantage also brings them together, insofar as a share of living well falls to each. This, then, is above all the end, both for all in common and for each separately. But they also come together for the sake of life itself and
[Bekker 1278b line 25]
maintain their political association. For perhaps there is some portion of the noble even in mere life itself, provided the hardships of life do not greatly outweigh it. It is clear that most people endure much suffering in their attachment to life, as though it possessed a certain well-being and
[Bekker 1278b line 30]
natural sweetness.

Yet it is also easy to distinguish the modes of rule that we speak of; for we often define them in our external discussions as well. For mastery, although in truth the same thing is advantageous to the slave by nature and to the master by nature, nonetheless exercises rule
[Bekker 1278b line 35]
for the master's advantage, and only incidentally for the slave's; for if the slave perishes, mastery cannot be preserved. Rule over children and wife and the whole household, which we call household management, is either for the sake of the ruled or for something common to both. In
[Bekker 1278b line 40]
itself it is for the ruled, as we see also in the other
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[Bekker 1279a line 1]
arts,

such as medicine and physical training; but incidentally these might be for the practitioners themselves as well. For nothing prevents the trainer himself from sometimes being one of those in training, just as the helmsman is always one of the sailors. The trainer, then,
[Bekker 1279a line 5]
or helmsman looks to the good of the ruled, but when he himself becomes one of them, he shares incidentally in the benefit. For the one is a sailor, and the other, though a trainer, becomes one of those in training. For this reason, too, where political offices are constituted on the basis of the citizens' equality and
[Bekker 1279a line 10]
similarity, they claim the right to rule in turn. Formerly, as is natural, they claimed the right to perform public service in turn, and to have someone look in return to their own good, just as they themselves, while ruling, had looked to his advantage. But now, because of the benefits from public resources and from office, they wish continuously
[Bekker 1279a line 15]
to rule, as though holding office made them always healthy when they were sickly. For in that case too they would perhaps pursue office. It is clear, then, that all constitutions which look to the common advantage are correct according to the just without qualification; while all those which look only to the rulers' own advantage
[Bekker 1279a line 20]
are defective and deviations from the correct constitutions. For they are forms of mastery, whereas the city is an association of free people.

With these matters defined, we must next examine constitutions: how many there are and what they are, and first those that are correct. For the deviations too will become
[Bekker 1279a line 25]
clear when these have been defined. Since constitution and citizen body signify the same thing, and the citizen body is what is sovereign in cities, and the sovereign must be either one person, a few, or the many, whenever the one, the few, or the many rule for the common advantage, such must be correct
[Bekker 1279a line 30]
constitutions; but those directed to the private advantage of the one, the few, or the multitude are deviations. For either we must say that those who participate are not citizens, or they must share in the advantage. Among monarchies we customarily call the one that looks to the common advantage kingship; the rule of the few,
[Bekker 1279a line 35]
but more than one, aristocracy, either because the best rule, or because it looks to what is best for the city and those who share in it. When the multitude takes part in public life for the common advantage, it is called by the name common to all constitutions, polity. (This happens reasonably enough: for one person
[Bekker 1279a line 40]
or a few may excel in virtue, but it is already difficult for a larger number
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[Bekker 1279b line 1]
to attain perfection in every virtue,

but especially in military virtue they can; for this arises in a multitude. Hence under this constitution the fighting element is sovereign, and those who possess arms share in it.) The deviations from the forms mentioned are
[Bekker 1279b line 5]
tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, and democracy from polity. For tyranny is monarchy directed to the advantage of the monarch, oligarchy to that of the wealthy, and democracy to the advantage of the poor. As for what benefits the community,
[Bekker 1279b line 10]
none of them is directed toward it.

We must say at somewhat greater length what each of these constitutions is. For they also present certain difficulties, and someone who investigates each subject philosophically, and not merely with an eye to action, must neither overlook nor
[Bekker 1279b line 15]
leave anything out, but make clear the truth about each. Tyranny, then, is monarchy, as has been said, exercising mastery over the political association; oligarchy is when those who possess property are sovereign over the constitution, while democracy, on the contrary, is when those who do not possess a large amount of property, but are poor, are sovereign.
[Bekker 1279b line 20]
The first difficulty concerns the definition. For if the majority were wealthy and sovereign in the city, and democracy is when the multitude is sovereign—and likewise, conversely, if somewhere the poor happened to be fewer than the wealthy, but stronger and sovereign over the constitution, while where a small
[Bekker 1279b line 25]
number is sovereign people call it oligarchy—then the constitutions would not seem to have been well defined.

Yet even if someone combines fewness with wealth and multitude with poverty, and names the constitutions accordingly—oligarchy that in which the wealthy, being few in number, hold the offices, and democracy
[Bekker 1279b line 30]
that in which the poor, being many in number, do so—there is another difficulty. For what shall we call the constitutions just mentioned, the one in which the wealthy are more numerous and the one in which the poor are fewer, but each group is sovereign over the constitution, if indeed there is no other constitution besides those stated? The
[Bekker 1279b line 35]
argument therefore seems to make clear that the sovereignty of few or many is incidental, the former to oligarchies and the latter to democracies, because everywhere the wealthy are few and the poor many. Hence the characteristics stated do not happen to be the causes of the difference. As for the difference between
[Bekker 1279b line 40]
democracy and oligarchy, poverty and wealth
[Bekker 1280a]
[Bekker 1280a line 1]
are what distinguish them,

and wherever people rule because of wealth, whether they are fewer or more numerous, this must be an oligarchy, and wherever the poor rule, a democracy. But as we said, it happens that the former are few and the latter many. For the wealthy are
[Bekker 1280a line 5]
few, while all share in freedom. On these grounds both lay claim to the constitution.

We must first grasp what limits they assign to oligarchy and democracy, and what the oligarchic and democratic conceptions of the just are. For all touch on something just, but
[Bekker 1280a line 10]
proceed only to a certain point, and do not state the whole of what is just in the authoritative sense. For example, the just seems to be equality, and it is, but not for everyone, only for equals. Inequality also seems to be just, and indeed it is, but not for everyone, only for unequals. They omit this qualification, for whom, and judge badly. The cause is
[Bekker 1280a line 15]
that the judgment concerns themselves, and most people are poor judges of their own affairs. Thus, since the just is just for certain people, and is divided in the same way with regard to the things and the people concerned, as was said earlier in the Ethics, they agree about equality in the thing, but dispute equality in the people concerned. This is chiefly
[Bekker 1280a line 20]
for the reason just given, that they judge badly about themselves; and further, because each side speaks of something just only up to a point, they suppose they are speaking of the just without qualification. For one side thinks that if they are unequal in some respect, such as wealth, they are unequal altogether; the other thinks that if they are equal in some respect, such as freedom, they are altogether
[Bekker 1280a line 25]
equal.

But they do not speak of what is most authoritative. For if they associated and came together for the sake of possessions, they would share in the city in precisely the proportion in which they shared in the property. Thus the argument of the oligarchic party would seem to carry weight: it would not be just for someone who contributed one mina to share equally in the hundred minas with someone who
[Bekker 1280a line 30]
gave all the rest, whether in the original sum or in the gains from it. But they came together not for the sake of life alone, but rather of living well—for there would then be a city of slaves and of other animals too, but as things stand there is not, because they have no share in happiness or in a life of deliberate choice—nor for the sake of an alliance, so that
[Bekker 1280a line 35]
no one might wrong them, nor for exchange and dealings with one another—for then the Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, and all who have treaties with one another, would be citizens of a single city. At any rate, they have agreements about imports, treaties against wrongdoing,
[Bekker 1280a line 40]
and written terms of alliance. But offices for all concerning
[Bekker 1280b]
[Bekker 1280b line 1]
these purposes have not been established in common;

rather, each has its own. Nor does either side concern itself with what sort of people the other ought to be, or with ensuring that none of those under the agreements will be unjust or possess any wickedness, but only with ensuring that they do not wrong
[Bekker 1280b line 5]
one another. Those who care about good government, however, examine political virtue and vice. This also makes it clear that the city which is truly so called, and not merely in name, must concern itself with virtue. Otherwise the association becomes an alliance, differing only in location from the other alliances, those of distant
[Bekker 1280b line 10]
allies. And the law is an agreement and, as Lycophron the sophist said, a guarantor to one another of just claims, but not something capable of making the citizens good and just. That this is how matters stand is clear. For even if someone brought the territories together into one, so that the cities of Megara and
[Bekker 1280b line 15]
Corinth touched at their walls, they would still not be one city; nor would they be if they established intermarriage with one another, although this is one of the forms of association peculiar to cities. Likewise, if some people lived separately, yet not so far apart that they could not associate, but had laws to prevent them from wronging one another in
[Bekker 1280b line 20]
their exchanges—for example, if one were a carpenter, another a farmer, another a shoemaker, another something else of this kind, and they numbered ten thousand, but shared in nothing except such things as exchange and alliance—even then this would not yet be a city.

For what reason, precisely? Surely not because of a lack of proximity in their
[Bekker 1280b line 25]
association. For even if they came together while associating in this fashion, each nevertheless treating his own household as a city, and assisting one another only against those who wronged them, as though they had a defensive alliance, even so it would not seem a city to those who examine the matter precisely, if their dealings when together were the same as when apart. It is clear, then, that
[Bekker 1280b line 30]
the city is not an association in a place, for the purpose of not wronging one another and of exchange. These things must indeed be present if there is to be a city, but even if they are all present there is not yet a city. Rather, it is an association of households and families in living well, for the sake of a complete and self-sufficient life.
[Bekker 1280b line 35]
Yet this will not occur unless they inhabit one and the same place and intermarry. Hence marriage ties, phratries, sacrifices, and pastimes of shared life arose in cities. Such things are the work of friendship, for the choice to live together is friendship. The end of a city, then, is living well,
[Bekker 1280b line 40]
and these things are for the sake of that end. Families and villages form a city through their
[Bekker 1281a]
[Bekker 1281a line 1]
association in a complete and self-sufficient life,

and this, as we say, is to live happily and nobly. We must therefore hold that the political association exists for the sake of noble actions, not of living together. Hence those who contribute most to such an
[Bekker 1281a line 5]
association have a greater share in the city than those who are equal or superior in freedom and birth but inferior in political virtue, or those who surpass them in wealth but are surpassed in virtue. That all who dispute about constitutions have some part of the just
[Bekker 1281a line 10]
in what they say is therefore clear from what has been said.

There is a difficulty about what should be sovereign in the city. It must be either the multitude, the wealthy, the decent, the one person best of all, or a tyrant. But all these possibilities appear to present difficulty. For what if the poor, because they are
[Bekker 1281a line 15]
more numerous, divide the possessions of the wealthy among themselves? Is this not unjust? “No, by Zeus, for the sovereign has justly decreed it.” What, then, should we call the extreme of injustice? And again, when everything has been taken, if the greater number divide the possessions of the smaller, it is clear that they destroy the city. Yet virtue does not destroy
[Bekker 1281a line 20]
what possesses it, nor is the just destructive of a city. Thus it is clear that this law, too, cannot be just. Moreover, all the actions a tyrant has performed must also be just: for he uses force because he is stronger, just as the multitude does against the wealthy. But is it just for the fewer to rule
[Bekker 1281a line 25]
—the wealthy? If, then, they too do these things, plundering and taking away the multitude's possessions, this is just; and so, therefore, is the other case. It is clear, then, that all these things are bad and unjust. But should the decent rule and be sovereign over everything? Then all the others must
[Bekker 1281a line 30]
be without honor, not being honored with political offices. For we call offices honors, and if the same people always hold office, the others must be without honor. But is it better for the one most worthy person to rule? This is still more oligarchic, for those without honor are more numerous. But perhaps someone might say
[Bekker 1281a line 35]
that it is bad for a human being, rather than law, to be sovereign at all, given the passions that arise in his soul. If, then, it is law, but oligarchic or democratic law, what difference will it make to the difficulties raised? For what was said before will happen just the same.

Let there be another discussion of the other matters.
[Bekker 1281a line 40]
But the claim that the multitude should be sovereign rather than the best, who are few, might seem to admit of a solution and to present some difficulty, yet perhaps also some truth. For the many, each of whom is
[Bekker 1281b]
[Bekker 1281b line 1]
not a worthy man,

may nevertheless, when they come together, be better than those others, not individually but collectively, just as dinners to which many contribute are better than those provided at one person's expense. For, being many, each may possess a portion of virtue and practical wisdom,
[Bekker 1281b line 5]
and when they come together the multitude may become like a single human being, with many feet and hands and many senses, and likewise with regard to character and thought. Hence the many also judge works of music and of poets better: different parts are judged by different people, and the whole
[Bekker 1281b line 10]
by all together. But worthy men differ from each of the many in this way, just as, they say, beautiful people differ from those who are not beautiful, and things painted through art from real things: what is dispersed separately is brought together into one. For taken separately, this person's eye may be more beautiful than the one in the painting, and
[Bekker 1281b line 15]
in someone else, another feature.

Whether, then, this difference between the many and the few worthy people can hold of every people and every multitude is unclear. Perhaps, by Zeus, it is clear that for some it is impossible: for the same argument would also fit wild beasts, and indeed how do
[Bekker 1281b line 20]
some people differ, so to speak, from wild beasts? But nothing prevents what was said from being true of a certain multitude. For this reason one could also resolve through these considerations the difficulty stated earlier and the one following it: over what should the free people and the multitude of citizens be sovereign? These are those who neither
[Bekker 1281b line 25]
are wealthy nor enjoy any reputation whatever for virtue. For it is not safe for them to share in the greatest offices: through injustice and lack of wisdom they must act unjustly in some matters and err in others. But to give them no share and let them participate in nothing is frightening: when many are poor and without honor,
[Bekker 1281b line 30]
this city must be full of enemies. It remains, then, for them to share in deliberating and judging. For this reason Solon and some other lawgivers assign them the election of officeholders and the scrutiny of those who have held office, but do not permit them to hold office individually. For all,
[Bekker 1281b line 35]
when they come together, have sufficient perception, and when mixed with the better people they benefit their cities, just as impure food mixed with pure makes the whole more useful than the small amount of pure food. But each separately is incomplete in judgment.

### Book III, 1281b–1285a

This arrangement of the constitution presents a difficulty: first, that
[Bekker 1281b line 40]
judging who has treated a patient correctly would seem to belong to the same person as treating him and making him well from his present illness; and that person is the physician.

The same holds also
[Bekker 1282a]
[Bekker 1282a line 1]
for the other kinds of expertise and the arts. Just as a physician must render his account before physicians, so must the others before their peers. A physician may be a practitioner, a master of the art, or, third, someone educated in the art (for there are
[Bekker 1282a line 5]
such people in practically every art); and we grant those who are educated no less right to judge than those who have expert knowledge. Further, the same would seem to hold for choice. For choosing correctly, too, is the work of those who know: choosing a geometer belongs to those versed in geometry, and
[Bekker 1282a line 10]
a pilot to those versed in navigation. Even if some laymen share in certain tasks and arts, they certainly do not do so more than the experts. Thus, according to this argument, the multitude should not be made sovereign either over the choice of officeholders or over the examination of their accounts. But perhaps not all these statements are correct,
[Bekker 1282a line 15]
both because of our earlier argument, provided that the multitude is not excessively slavish (each person will be a worse judge than the experts, but all together will be better or no worse), and because, in some matters, the maker is neither the only nor the best judge, wherever the work is also understood by those who do not possess the art. For example,
[Bekker 1282a line 20]
knowledge of a house does not belong only to its builder: its user will judge it even better (and its user is the household manager); a pilot judges a rudder better than a carpenter, and the diner, not the cook, judges a feast.

One might perhaps think that this difficulty is adequately resolved in this way; but another follows from it.
[Bekker 1282a line 25]
For it seems absurd that inferior people should be sovereign over greater matters than decent people, and the examination of accounts and the choice of officeholders are matters of the greatest importance. In some constitutions, as has been said, these are assigned to the people; for the assembly is sovereign over all such matters. Yet people take part in the assembly,
[Bekker 1282a line 30]
serve on the council, and sit as jurors with small property qualifications and at any ordinary age, while those who serve as treasurers and generals and hold the greatest offices have large property qualifications. One might resolve this difficulty in the same way. For perhaps these arrangements too are correct. Neither the juror, nor the council member, nor the assembly member
[Bekker 1282a line 35]
is a ruler; rather, it is the law court, the council, and the people; and each of those mentioned is a part of these (by a part I mean the council member, the assembly member, and the juror). Thus the multitude is justly sovereign over greater matters; for the people, the council, and the law court consist of many. And the property qualification
[Bekker 1282a line 40]
of all these together is greater than that of those who, individually or in small groups, hold the great offices. Let these matters, then, be determined
[Bekker 1282b]
[Bekker 1282b line 1]
in this way.

The difficulty first mentioned makes nothing else so clear as this: laws rightly established must be sovereign, while the ruler, whether one or more, must be sovereign in those matters about which the laws cannot
[Bekker 1282b line 5]
speak precisely, because it is not easy to define everything in universal terms. What sort of laws rightly established ought to be is not yet clear at all; the earlier difficulty still remains. For laws must be bad or good, just or unjust, together with and in the same way as constitutions.
[Bekker 1282b line 10]
This, at least, is clear: laws must be established to suit the constitution. If this is so, it is evident that laws conforming to correct constitutions must be just, and those conforming to deviant constitutions unjust.

Since in every science and art
[Bekker 1282b line 15]
the end is a good, and the greatest good, good in the highest degree, is the end of the most authoritative of them all, which is political capacity, and since the political good is the just, and this is the common advantage, everyone thinks the just is a certain equality. Up to a point, at least, they agree with the philosophical arguments in which
[Bekker 1282b line 20]
ethical matters have been defined (for they say that the just is something for certain people, and that it must be equal for equals). But equality and inequality in what must not escape us. For this presents a difficulty and calls for political philosophy. Someone might perhaps say that offices should be distributed unequally according to superiority in any good,
[Bekker 1282b line 25]
if people differ in none of the other respects but are alike. For people who differ have different claims to the just and to what accords with merit. But if this is true, superiority in color, stature, or any good whatever will give those who possess it a larger share of political rights.
[Bekker 1282b line 30]
Or is the falsehood here apparent on the surface? It is clear in the other sciences and capacities. Among flute players equal in their art, those of better birth should not receive a greater share of the flutes (for they will play no better); rather, superiority in the instruments should be granted to the one superior in the work. If
[Bekker 1282b line 35]
what is said is not yet clear, it will become clearer as we carry it further. Suppose someone is superior in flute playing but falls far short in birth or beauty. Even if each of these is a greater good than flute playing (I mean birth and beauty), and even if, in
[Bekker 1282b line 40]
proportion, they surpass flute playing more than he surpasses the others in flute playing, still he must be given the superior
[Bekker 1283a]
[Bekker 1283a line 1]
flutes.

For superiority in wealth and birth would have to contribute to the work, and they contribute nothing.

Further, by this argument every good would be comparable with every other. For if a certain stature counts for more, then
[Bekker 1283a line 5]
stature in general would compete with wealth and freedom. Thus, if this person exceeds that one more in stature than that one exceeds him in virtue, and virtue in general is superior to stature, everything would be comparable. For if so much stature is better than so much virtue, clearly a certain amount is equal to it. But since this is impossible,
[Bekker 1283a line 10]
it is evident that in political matters too people reasonably do not claim offices on the basis of every inequality (for if some are slow and others fast, that is no reason for some to have more and others less; rather, their difference receives its honor in athletic contests). Instead, those things of which a city is composed
[Bekker 1283a line 15]
must be the basis of the claim. This is why the wellborn, the free, and the wealthy reasonably lay claim to honor. For there must be people who are free and who contribute property: a city could not consist entirely of the poor, any more than of slaves. But if these are needed, it is clear that
[Bekker 1283a line 20]
justice and political virtue are needed too, for without these a city cannot be governed. The difference is that without the former a city cannot exist, and without the latter it cannot be governed well.

As regards a city's existence, then, all or at least some of these would seem to make a just claim; as regards the good life, however,
[Bekker 1283a line 25]
education and virtue would make the most just claim, as was said before. Since those who are equal in only one respect ought not to have an equal share in everything, nor those unequal in one respect an unequal share, all constitutions of this kind must be deviations. It was also said earlier
[Bekker 1283a line 30]
that everyone makes a just claim in a certain sense, but not everyone makes a just claim without qualification. The wealthy do so because they have a larger share of the land, and the land is common, and because they are also generally more trustworthy in contracts. The free and the wellborn do so because they are closely related (for fuller citizenship
[Bekker 1283a line 35]
belongs to those of nobler birth than to those of low birth, and noble birth is honored in each people's homeland); further, because those descended from better people are likely to be better, for noble birth is virtue of a family. Likewise, we shall say that virtue too makes a just claim, for we say that justice is a communal virtue, which must be followed by
[Bekker 1283a line 40]
all the other virtues. But the greater number also makes a claim against the lesser, for they are stronger, wealthier, and better, when the greater number is taken collectively against the lesser.

So,
[Bekker 1283b]
[Bekker 1283b line 1]
if all were in one city—I mean, for example, the good, the wealthy, the wellborn, and also some other multitude of citizens—would there be a dispute over who ought to rule, or not? In each of the constitutions mentioned, beyond dispute
[Bekker 1283b line 5]
is the judgment as to who ought to rule (for they differ from one another in who is sovereign: one, for example, has rule through the wealthy, another through good men, and each of the others in the same way). Nevertheless, let us examine how the matter should be determined when all these are present at the same time. If, then,
[Bekker 1283b line 10]
those who possess virtue are very few in number, how ought we to decide? Or must we consider their fewness in relation to the task, asking whether they can govern the city, or whether they are numerous enough to form a city by themselves? There is a difficulty that bears on all those who dispute over political honors. For it would seem
[Bekker 1283b line 15]
that those who claim to rule because of wealth, and likewise those who claim it because of family, have no just argument. For it is clear that if, in turn, one person is wealthier than all the rest, by the same principle of justice this one must rule over all; and likewise the person distinguished in noble birth must rule over those who lay claim
[Bekker 1283b line 20]
on the basis of freedom. Perhaps the same will occur with virtue in aristocracies. For if one man is better than the other good men in the citizen body, by the same principle of justice he must be sovereign. Thus, if the multitude ought to be sovereign because they are stronger than
[Bekker 1283b line 25]
the few, then if one person, or more than one but fewer than the many, is stronger than the others, these should be sovereign rather than the multitude. All these considerations seem to make it clear that none of these standards is correct as a basis on which people claim that they themselves should rule and that the others should be ruled by them,
[Bekker 1283b line 30]
all of them. For even against those who claim to be sovereign over the citizen body on the basis of virtue, and likewise those who claim it on the basis of wealth, the multitudes could advance a certain just argument. Nothing prevents the multitude from sometimes being better than the few and wealthier, not individually but
[Bekker 1283b line 35]
collectively. For this reason, the difficulty that some people investigate and put forward can also be answered in this way. Some ask whether the lawgiver who wishes to establish the most correct laws should legislate for the advantage of the better people or for that of the greater number, when the situation described occurs.
[Bekker 1283b line 40]
What is correct must be understood as equitable; and what is equitably correct looks to the advantage of the whole city and to the common advantage of its citizens. One who shares in ruling and being ruled, in the general sense,
[Bekker 1284a]
[Bekker 1284a line 1]
is a citizen,

but differs according to each constitution; in the best constitution, he is one who is able and chooses to be ruled and to rule with a view to the life of virtue.

But if there is one person so exceptionally superior in virtue, or more than one, though not
[Bekker 1284a line 5]
enough to provide the full complement of a city, that the virtue of all the others and their political capacity cannot be compared with theirs, if there are several, or with his alone, if there is one, these people should no longer be regarded as part of the city. For they will be treated unjustly if deemed worthy of equal shares, when they are so unequal in
[Bekker 1284a line 10]
virtue and political capacity; such a person would naturally be like a god among human beings. Hence it is clear that legislation too must concern those who are equal in birth and capacity; but there is no law for such people, for they themselves are law. It would be ridiculous for anyone to legislate
[Bekker 1284a line 15]
for them. They might perhaps say what Antisthenes said the lions said when the hares were making speeches and demanding that everyone have an equal share. For this reason democratic cities institute ostracism: these cities are thought to pursue equality above all,
[Bekker 1284a line 20]
so that they ostracized those who seemed to be superior in power through wealth, many friends, or some other political strength, and removed them from the city for fixed periods. The story is told that the Argonauts too left Heracles behind for such a reason: the Argo refused to carry him
[Bekker 1284a line 25]
with the other voyagers, because he surpassed them so greatly. Thus those who condemn tyranny and Periander's advice to Thrasybulus should not be thought entirely correct in their criticism. For they say that Periander said nothing to the herald sent to seek his advice, but cut off
[Bekker 1284a line 30]
the ears of grain that rose above the others and leveled the field. The herald did not understand the reason for what was done, but reported what had happened, and Thrasybulus realized that he must eliminate the men who stood above the rest. For this is not advantageous only to tyrants, nor do tyrants alone do it;
[Bekker 1284a line 35]
the same holds for oligarchies and democracies. For ostracism has, in a sense, the same effect as cutting down and exiling those who stand above the rest. Those who control power do the same to cities and peoples: the Athenians, for example, to the Samians,
[Bekker 1284a line 40]
Chians, and Lesbians (for as soon as they had a firm hold on their empire, they humbled them contrary to their agreements),

and the Persian
[Bekker 1284b]
[Bekker 1284b line 1]
king often cut down the Medes, Babylonians, and others whose pride arose from having once held power.

The problem applies generally to all constitutions, including the correct ones. For deviant constitutions
[Bekker 1284b line 5]
do this with a view to their own advantage; yet the same holds for those that look to the common good. This is clear also in the other arts and sciences. A painter would not allow the figure to have a foot that exceeds its proper proportion, even if
[Bekker 1284b line 10]
it were exceptionally beautiful; nor would a shipbuilder allow this in the stern or any other part of the ship, nor would a chorus trainer allow someone whose voice is louder and finer than the whole chorus to sing with it. Thus, on this ground, nothing prevents monarchs from agreeing with cities, provided their own rule is advantageous
[Bekker 1284b line 15]
to the cities when they act in this way. Hence, where the superiorities are acknowledged, the argument concerning ostracism contains an element of political justice. It is better, then, for the lawgiver to construct the constitution from the beginning so that it needs no such remedy; but as a second course, if the situation arises, he should try through some such
[Bekker 1284b line 20]
remedial measure to correct it. This was not what happened in cities: they did not look to the advantage of their own constitution but used ostracisms for factional purposes. In deviant constitutions, then, it is clear that this is advantageous and just for them in particular; and perhaps it is also clear that it is not unconditionally
[Bekker 1284b line 25]
just. But in the best constitution there is a great difficulty—not concerning superiority in other goods, such as strength, wealth, and many friends, but if someone becomes outstanding in virtue: what should be done? Surely no one would say that such a person should be expelled and removed;
[Bekker 1284b line 30]
yet neither should people rule over him. That would be much the same as claiming to rule over Zeus by dividing the offices. What remains, then, and what seems natural, is that everyone should willingly obey such a person, so that such people are kings in their cities for life.

[Bekker 1284b line 35]
Perhaps, after the arguments given, it is appropriate to pass on to examine kingship; for we say that this is one of the correct constitutions. We must examine whether it is advantageous for a city and territory that are to be well governed to be ruled by a king, or not, but rather by some other constitution,
[Bekker 1284b line 40]
or whether it is advantageous for some and not for others. First, then, we must distinguish whether there is one kind of kingship or whether it has several
[Bekker 1285a]
[Bekker 1285a line 1]
varieties.

It is easy to see at least this: that it includes several kinds, and that the manner of rule is not the same in all. For kingship in the Spartan constitution seems to be kingship according to law in the fullest sense, but it is not sovereign over everything;
[Bekker 1285a line 5]
rather, when the king goes beyond the country's borders, he leads in matters of war. Further, matters relating to the gods have been assigned to the kings. This kingship, then, is a kind of generalship with full powers and held for life. For the king has no authority to put anyone to death except in a particular circumstance, as among the ancients on
[Bekker 1285a line 10]
military expeditions, under the law of force. Homer makes this clear: Agamemnon endured abuse in the assemblies, but once they went out he had authority even to put someone to death. At any rate, he says:
“Whomever I find far from battle …
… he will not
be sure of escaping the dogs and birds;
for death is in my hands.”
(Hom. Il. 2.391)

### Book III, 1285a–1288b

One,
[Bekker 1285a line 15]
then, is this form of kingship: generalship for life. Some of these are hereditary, others elective. Beside this there is another form of monarchy, such as the kingships found among certain barbarian peoples. All these have power resembling that of tyrannies, but they are both lawful and ancestral. For
[Bekker 1285a line 20]
because the barbarians are by nature more slavish in character than the Greeks, and those in Asia more so than those in Europe, they endure a master's rule without resentment. Thus these kingships are tyrannical for this reason, but secure because they are ancestral and lawful. Their guard too is kingly,
[Bekker 1285a line 25]
not tyrannical, for the same reason. For citizens guard their kings with arms, whereas tyrants are guarded by a foreign force. Kings rule according to law and over willing subjects, tyrants over unwilling ones; thus the former have a guard supplied by the citizens, the latter a guard against the citizens.

These, then, are two forms
[Bekker 1285a line 30]
of monarchy; another is that which existed among the ancient Greeks, whose rulers are called aisymnetes. This, to speak simply, is an elective tyranny, differing from the barbarian form not in being unlawful, but only in not being ancestral. Some held this office for life, others for certain fixed
[Bekker 1285a line 35]
periods or tasks. For example, the Mytileneans once chose Pittacus to oppose the exiles led by Antimenides and the poet Alcaeus. Alcaeus makes it clear that they chose Pittacus as tyrant in one of his drinking songs: he reproaches them: “Lowborn Pittacus, over the spiritless and
[Bekker 1285b]
[Bekker 1285b line 1]
ill-fated city, they set up as tyrant, all together praising him highly.”

These forms, then, are and were tyrannical because they involve a master's rule, but kingly because they are elective and accepted by willing subjects. A fourth form of kingly monarchy consists of the kingships of the heroic
[Bekker 1285b line 5]
ages, which arose with willing subjects and were ancestral and lawful. For because the first kings became benefactors of the multitude through the arts or war, or by bringing them together or providing land, they became kings over willing subjects, and the kingship was ancestral for their successors. They were sovereign over leadership in war
[Bekker 1285b line 10]
and over sacrifices not belonging to the priesthood, and in addition they judged lawsuits. Some did this without swearing an oath, others under oath; the oath consisted in raising the scepter. The kings of ancient times thus ruled continuously over affairs in the city, in the country, and beyond its borders. Later,
[Bekker 1285b line 15]
as the kings themselves relinquished some powers and the masses took others away, in the other cities only the sacrifices were left to the kings; and wherever there remained what deserved to be called kingship, they retained only leadership in warfare beyond the borders.

[Bekker 1285b line 20]
These, then, are the forms of kingship, four in number. One is that of the heroic ages (this was over willing subjects, but in certain defined matters: the king was a general and a juror, and sovereign over matters relating to the gods). The second is the barbarian form (this is hereditary rule by a master
[Bekker 1285b line 25]
according to law). The third is what they call aisymneteia (this is an elective tyranny). The fourth of these is the Spartan form (this, to speak simply, is hereditary generalship held for life). These, then, differ from one another in this way. There is a fifth form of kingship, when, over everything,
[Bekker 1285b line 30]
one person is sovereign, as each people and each city is over its common affairs, organized on the model of household management. For just as household management is a kind of kingship over a household, so absolute kingship is household management of a city and of one people or several.

There are, broadly speaking, two forms of kingship we must examine: this one
[Bekker 1285b line 35]
and the Spartan. For most of the others lie between these: their kings are sovereign over less than in absolute kingship and over more than in the Spartan form. Thus our examination concerns broadly two questions: one, whether it is advantageous for cities to have a general for life, either hereditary or appointed in turn,

[Bekker 1286a]
[Bekker 1286a line 1]
or whether it is not advantageous; the other, whether it is advantageous for one person to be sovereign over everything or not. Examining this sort of generalship is more a matter of laws than of a constitution (for it can occur under every constitution),
[Bekker 1286a line 5]
so let us set the first question aside. The remaining manner of kingship is a form of constitution, so we must consider it and go through the difficulties it contains. The starting point of the inquiry is this: is it more advantageous to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws?

Those
[Bekker 1286a line 10]
who think it advantageous to be ruled by a king hold that laws speak only in universal terms and do not give commands suited to the circumstances as they arise. Thus, in any art, governing by written rules is foolish (in Egypt too, physicians are allowed to alter the treatment after the fourth day, but if they do so earlier, it is at their own risk). It is clear, then, that
[Bekker 1286a line 15]
for the same reason the constitution based on written rules and laws is not the best. Yet rulers too must possess that universal account. What has no element of passion at all is better than what has it by nature. Law has no such element, but every human soul must
[Bekker 1286a line 20]
have it. Yet someone might perhaps say that, in compensation for this, the king will deliberate better about particulars. It is clear, then, that he must be a lawgiver, and that laws must be established, though they must not be sovereign where they go astray, since in other matters they must be sovereign. But in matters which the law cannot judge either
[Bekker 1286a line 25]
at all or well, should the one best person rule, or everyone? Even now people come together to judge lawsuits, deliberate, and decide, and all these decisions concern particulars. Any one of them, taken individually, may perhaps be inferior; but the city consists of many, and just as a feast to which many contribute
[Bekker 1286a line 30]
is finer than one provided by a single person alone, so for this reason the masses judge many things better than any one person.

Further, a large number is less easily corrupted. Just as a greater quantity of water is less easily spoiled, so the multitude is less easily corrupted than the few. When one person is overcome by anger or some other such passion, his judgment must be corrupted;
[Bekker 1286a line 35]
but in the other case it is difficult for everyone to become angry and go wrong at once. Let the multitude consist of free people who do nothing contrary to law except in matters where the law necessarily falls short. If this is not easy to secure among many, still, if there were several who were good both as men and as citizens, would one person be less easily corrupted as
[Bekker 1286a line 40]
ruler, or rather several good men,
[Bekker 1286b]
[Bekker 1286b line 1]
good without exception?

Is it not clear that the several would be? But they will form factions, whereas the one person is free from faction. To this we should perhaps reply that they are good in soul, just like that one person. If, then, the rule of several men, all good, is to be
[Bekker 1286b line 5]
named aristocracy, and that of one kingship, aristocracy would be preferable to kingship for cities, whether the rule possesses force or lacks it, provided that several similar men can be found. Perhaps this is why they were ruled by kings in earlier times: it was rare to find men greatly distinguished in virtue, especially since they then
[Bekker 1286b line 10]
lived in small cities. Further, they appointed kings because of their benefactions, which are the work of good men. But when it came about that there were many alike in virtue, they no longer endured kingship, but sought something shared and established a constitution. When, becoming worse, they made money from the common funds,
[Bekker 1286b line 15]
it is reasonable to suppose that oligarchies arose from some such beginning; for they made wealth the object of honor. From these they first changed to tyrannies, and from tyrannies to democracy. For by constantly reducing the number of those in power through shameful greed, they made the multitude stronger, so that it attacked them and democracies arose.
[Bekker 1286b line 20]
Since cities have also come to be larger, perhaps it is no longer even easy for any constitution other than democracy to arise.

If someone were to hold that being ruled by a king is best for cities, how will matters stand with the king's children? Must his family too be kings? But if they turn out to be whatever sort of people
[Bekker 1286b line 25]
chance produces, this is harmful. But, it may be said, though sovereign, he will not hand power over to his children. Yet this is no longer easy to believe: it is difficult and requires a virtue greater than human nature allows. There is also a difficulty concerning his force: must the future king have some strength about him with which he can
[Bekker 1286b line 30]
compel those unwilling to obey, or how can he administer his rule? For even if he were sovereign according to law, doing nothing contrary to law at his own wish, he must nevertheless possess a force with which to guard the laws. Perhaps, then, what concerns a king of this sort is not difficult
[Bekker 1286b line 35]
to determine. He must possess strength, but this strength must be such that it exceeds that of each individual and of several together, yet is less than that of the multitude. This was how the ancients granted guards when they appointed someone over the city whom they called an aisymnetes or a tyrant; and when Dionysius requested guards, someone advised
[Bekker 1286b line 40]
the Syracusans to give him that number of guards.

[Bekker 1287a]
[Bekker 1287a line 1]
Our argument has now reached the king who does everything according to his own wish, and we must examine him. For the so-called king according to law is not, as we have said, a form of constitution (for in all constitutions
[Bekker 1287a line 5]
there can be a generalship for life, for example in democracy and aristocracy, and many people make one person sovereign over administration: there is such an office at Epidamnus, and also at Opus, though with somewhat lesser powers). But concerning so-called absolute kingship (this is the form in which the king rules over everything according to
[Bekker 1287a line 10]
his own wish), some think that it is not even by nature for one person to be sovereign over all the citizens where the city is composed of people who are alike. For those alike by nature must by nature have the same claim to the just and the same worth. Thus, if indeed giving unequal people equal food or
[Bekker 1287a line 15]
clothing is harmful to their bodies, the same holds for honors; and likewise, then, for giving unequal shares to equals. Hence it is no more just for anyone to rule than to be ruled, and therefore it is just to do so in turn. But this is already law, for an orderly arrangement is law. It is therefore preferable that law should rule rather than any one of the citizens,
[Bekker 1287a line 20]
and by this same argument, even if it is better for certain people to rule, they should be appointed guardians and servants of the laws. For there must be certain offices, but it is not just, they say, that one person should hold this position, at least when all are alike. Moreover, whatever the law seems unable to determine, a human being
[Bekker 1287a line 25]
would be unable to know either. But the law, having educated the rulers expressly for this purpose, sets them to judge and administer the remaining matters according to the most just judgment. Further, it allows them to correct whatever, through experience, seems better than the existing provisions. Thus one who commands that law should rule seems to command that god and intellect
[Bekker 1287a line 30]
alone should rule; but one who commands that a human being should rule adds a beast as well. For appetite is such a thing, and anger distorts rulers, even the best men. Hence law is intellect without desire. The example drawn from the arts seems false: the claim that treatment according to written rules is bad, and that it is preferable to employ
[Bekker 1287a line 35]
those who possess the arts. For these do nothing contrary to reason because of friendship, but earn their fee by making the sick well; those in political offices, however, are accustomed to do many things out of spite or favor. Indeed, when people suspect physicians of being bribed by their enemies to destroy them
[Bekker 1287a line 40]
for profit, they would then prefer to seek treatment according to written rules.

Moreover, people call in assistance for themselves:
[Bekker 1287b]
[Bekker 1287b line 1]
physicians, when sick, call in other physicians, and physical trainers, when training, call in other trainers, because they cannot judge the truth when judging their own affairs and while under the influence of feeling. Thus it is clear that in seeking the just they seek the impartial; for law is the
[Bekker 1287b line 5]
impartial. Further, laws based on custom are more authoritative, and concern more authoritative matters, than written laws, so that even if a human ruler is more reliable than written laws, he is not more reliable than those based on custom.

Moreover, it is not easy for one person to oversee many things. He will therefore have to appoint several rulers under him,
[Bekker 1287b line 10]
so what difference does it make whether this arrangement exists from the outset or the one person establishes it in this way? Further, as has been said before, if the good man has a just claim to rule because he is better, two good men are better than one. This is the meaning of
“When two go together”
(Hom. Il. 10.224) and of Agamemnon's prayer:
[Bekker 1287b line 15]
“If only I had ten such fellow counselors.”
(Hom. Il. 2.372) Even now, officeholders have authority to judge certain matters, as the juror does, where the law cannot determine them. For in matters where it can, no one disputes that the law would rule and judge best. But since some things can be encompassed by laws and others
[Bekker 1287b line 20]
cannot, these are what cause the difficulty and the inquiry whether it is preferable for the best law to rule or the best man. For it is impossible to legislate about matters on which people deliberate. Thus they do not dispute that a human being must judge such matters, but contend that it should not be
[Bekker 1287b line 25]
one alone, but many.

For each ruler educated by the law judges well; and perhaps it would seem absurd if one person, judging with two eyes and two ears and acting with two feet and hands, should see better than many people with many. Even now monarchs make many eyes
[Bekker 1287b line 30]
and ears and hands and feet for themselves: they make those friendly to their rule and to themselves fellow rulers. If these are not friends, they will not act according to the monarch's choice; but if they are friends to him and his rule, a friend is equal and alike, so that if he thinks these should rule, he thinks that equals and those alike should rule
[Bekker 1287b line 35]
equally. These, then, are broadly the arguments of those who dispute the claims of kingship.

But perhaps these matters stand in this way for some people and not so for others. For some are by nature suited to a master's rule, others to kingly rule, and others to political rule; and different arrangements are just and advantageous for different people. But none is suited to tyranny under
[Bekker 1287b line 40]
nature's order, nor to any of the other constitutions that are deviations; for these arise contrary to nature.

From what has been said,
[Bekker 1288a]
[Bekker 1288a line 1]
at least, it is clear that among those alike and equal it is neither advantageous nor just for one person to be sovereign over all, whether there are no laws and he himself is law, or there are laws; whether he is good and rules over good people, or not good and rules over people who are not good; nor even if in virtue he is
[Bekker 1288a line 5]
better, except in a certain way. We must say what this way is; it has already been mentioned to some extent before.

First, we must define what sort of people is suited to kingship, what to aristocracy, and what to polity. A multitude suited to kingship is one naturally capable of bearing a family superior in virtue for political leadership; a multitude suited to aristocracy
[Bekker 1288a line 10]
is one naturally capable of bearing a body of people able to be ruled with the rule appropriate to free people by those fitted through virtue to lead in political rule; a multitude suited to polity is one in which there naturally arises a body capable of war, able to be ruled and to rule according to a law that distributes, in proportion to merit,
[Bekker 1288a line 15]
offices to the well-off. When, then, either a whole family or one person among the rest happens to become so distinguished in virtue that his virtue surpasses that of all the others, it is then just that this family should be kingly and sovereign over everything, and that this one person should be king. For, as was said before,
[Bekker 1288a line 20]
this holds not only according to the principle of justice usually advanced by those who establish constitutions, whether aristocratic, oligarchic, or democratic (for all make their claims on the basis of superiority, though not the same superiority), but also according to what was said earlier. For killing or
[Bekker 1288a line 25]
exiling or ostracizing such a person is certainly not fitting, nor is requiring him to be ruled in turn. For it is not natural for the part to surpass the whole, yet this is what has happened to the person possessing such exceptional superiority. Thus only one course remains: to obey such a person and let him be sovereign, not in turn but without qualification.
[Bekker 1288a line 30]
Let kingship, then, its varieties, and whether it is disadvantageous or advantageous for cities, and for which cities and in what way, be determined in this manner.

Since we say that there are three correct constitutions, and the best of these must be the one administered by the best people, and such a constitution is one in which it happens
[Bekker 1288a line 35]
that one person surpasses all together, or a whole family or multitude is superior in virtue, with some able to be ruled and others to rule with a view to the most desirable life; and since it was shown in our first arguments that the virtue of a man and that of a citizen of the best city must be the same, it is clear that in the same way
[Bekker 1288a line 40]
and by the same means a man becomes good and someone could establish a city governed by aristocracy or kingship,

so that
[Bekker 1288b]
[Bekker 1288b line 1]
the education and habits that make a good man and those that make a statesman and a king will be practically the same. Having determined these matters, we must now try to speak about the best constitution: in what manner it naturally arises and how it is established.
[Bekker 1288b line 5]
Anyone who is to undertake the appropriate inquiry into it must, then, do so.

### Book IV, 1288b–1291b

[Bekker 1288b]
[Bekker 1288b line 10]
In all arts and sciences that concern not a part of their subject but a whole single kind, it belongs to one science to consider what is fitting for each kind: for example, what sort of bodily exercise benefits what sort of body, and which is best (for the best exercise, in the case of the body best endowed by nature and supplied with resources,
[Bekker 1288b line 15]
must be the one that suits it), and which single exercise suits most bodies alike (for this too is the work of physical training). Further, if someone does not desire the appropriate condition or knowledge for athletic competition, it nonetheless belongs to the trainer and the instructor in physical training to provide him with this lesser capacity as well. We see the same
[Bekker 1288b line 20]
thing happen in medicine, shipbuilding, the making of clothing, and every other art. It is clear, therefore, that it also belongs to the same science to consider what the best constitution is, and what character it would have to fulfill our wishes most completely if nothing external stood in the way, and which constitution suits which people (for many
[Bekker 1288b line 25]
may perhaps find it impossible to attain the best, so that the good lawgiver and the true statesman must know both the constitution that is best without qualification and the best under given conditions); and, third, the constitution assumed as a starting point (for one must also be able to consider a given constitution: how it might arise in the first place, and, once it has arisen,
[Bekker 1288b line 30]
how it might be preserved for the longest time. I mean, for example, if a city happens neither to live under the best constitution, being without even the necessary resources, nor under the constitution possible with the means it has, but under some inferior one). Besides all these, the constitution best suited to all cities
[Bekker 1288b line 35]
must be known. Thus most of those who pronounce on constitutions, even if they speak well in other respects, miss what is useful. For one must consider not only the best constitution but also the possible, and likewise the one that is easier to establish and more generally suited to all. As things stand, the most exalted constitution, requiring abundant
[Bekker 1288b line 40]
resources, is all that some seek; others, though discussing a more common sort, sweep aside existing constitutions; the Spartan constitution
[Bekker 1289a]
[Bekker 1289a line 1]
or some other is what they praise.

But one should propose an order in which, starting from existing conditions, people will readily be persuaded to share and will be able to do so. For correcting a constitution is no less a task than establishing one from the beginning, just as learning anew is no less a task
[Bekker 1289a line 5]
than learning from the beginning. For this reason, in addition to what has been said, the statesman must also be able to assist existing constitutions, as was said before. But this is impossible without knowing how many kinds of constitution there are. Some now suppose that there is one democracy and one oligarchy; but this is not
[Bekker 1289a line 10]
true. Therefore one must be aware of the differences among constitutions, how many there are and in how many ways they are combined. After this, the same practical wisdom must discern both the best laws and those suited to each constitution. For laws must be framed to suit constitutions, and everyone does frame them so, not constitutions
[Bekker 1289a line 15]
to suit laws. A constitution is the order of a city's offices: how they are distributed, what is sovereign in the constitution, and what is the end of each community. Laws, apart from those that define the constitution, are the rules according to which the rulers must rule and watch over those
[Bekker 1289a line 20]
who transgress them. It is clear, therefore, that one must grasp the differences and the definition of each constitution with a view to framing laws as well. For the same laws cannot benefit all oligarchies or all democracies, if indeed several forms, and not just one democracy or one oligarchy alone,
[Bekker 1289a line 25]
exist.

In our first inquiry into constitutions we distinguished three correct constitutions—kingship, aristocracy, and polity—and three deviations from these: tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, and democracy
[Bekker 1289a line 30]
from polity. Aristocracy and kingship have been discussed (for to consider the best constitution is also to speak of the forms bearing these names, since each aims to be founded on virtue supplied with resources). Further, how aristocracy and kingship differ from each other, and when
[Bekker 1289a line 35]
kingship should be adopted, have already been determined. It remains to discuss the constitution designated by the common name, and the other constitutions: oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. It is evident which of these deviations is worst and which comes second. For
[Bekker 1289a line 40]
the deviation from the first and most divine constitution must be the worst. Kingship must either possess the name alone without
[Bekker 1289b]
[Bekker 1289b line 1]
being kingship in fact,

or rest upon the great superiority of the man who reigns. Therefore tyranny, being the worst, must stand furthest from a constitution; oligarchy comes second (for aristocracy is far removed from this constitution), and the most moderate is
[Bekker 1289b line 5]
democracy. One of our predecessors has already pronounced this judgment, though not with the same consideration in view as ours. For he judged that, when all are decent—for example, a good oligarchy and the other forms—democracy is worst, but when they are bad it is best. We, however, maintain that these constitutions are wholly mistaken,
[Bekker 1289b line 10]
and that it is not right to call one oligarchy better than another, but rather less bad. Let this sort of judgment be set aside for now. We must first distinguish how many varieties of constitution there are, if there are indeed several kinds of democracy and oligarchy; next, which is most generally applicable and
[Bekker 1289b line 15]
which most desirable after the best constitution, and, if there happens to be another that is aristocratic and well constituted but unsuited to most cities, what it is. Next, we must also consider which of the other constitutions is desirable for which people (for perhaps democracy is more necessary than oligarchy for some, and oligarchy more necessary than democracy for others).
[Bekker 1289b line 20]
After this, we must consider how someone who wishes to establish these constitutions should do so: I mean each kind of democracy, and likewise each kind of oligarchy. Finally, when we have given all these matters as brief an account as possible, we must try to examine what destroys and what preserves constitutions,
[Bekker 1289b line 25]
both in general and in each separate case, and through what causes these things chiefly tend to occur.

The reason there are several constitutions is that every city has several parts in number. First, we see that all cities are composed of households; next, within this multitude
[Bekker 1289b line 30]
some must be rich, some poor, and some of the middle class. Of both the rich and the poor, some are armed and some unarmed. We also see that some of the people are farmers, some traders, and some artisans. Among the notables too there are differences in wealth and in the size
[Bekker 1289b line 35]
of their estates, for example, in keeping horses (for this is not easy for those who are not wealthy. For this very reason, in ancient times all cities whose strength lay in their horses had oligarchies. They used horses in wars against their neighbors, as did the Eretrians, the Chalcidians, the Magnesians on
[Bekker 1289b line 40]
the Maeander, and many other peoples in Asia). Further, besides differences in wealth there is difference in birth and in
[Bekker 1290a]
[Bekker 1290a line 1]
virtue,

and any other such quality that has been said, in the discussion of aristocracy, to constitute a part of a city. For there we distinguished the necessary parts of which every city consists. Sometimes all these parts share in the constitution, sometimes
[Bekker 1290a line 5]
fewer, and sometimes more. It is evident, then, that there must be several constitutions differing in kind from one another, for these parts themselves also differ in kind. A constitution is the order of offices, and everyone distributes these either according to the power of those who share in them or according to some equality
[Bekker 1290a line 10]
common to them: I mean, for example, an equality among the poor or among the rich, or one common to both. There must therefore be as many constitutions as there are arrangements corresponding to the superiority and the differences of the parts.

But there seem chiefly to be two: just as winds are called northern or southern, and
[Bekker 1290a line 15]
the others deviations from these, so too constitutions are taken to be two, democracy and oligarchy. For people count aristocracy as a kind of oligarchy, since it is a sort of oligarchy, and what is called polity as democracy, just as among winds they count the west wind as northern and the east wind as southern. The same
[Bekker 1290a line 20]
holds of musical modes, as some say: there too they posit two kinds, the Dorian and the Phrygian, and call the other arrangements either Dorian or Phrygian. This is how people are chiefly accustomed to conceive of constitutions. But the distinction we have drawn is truer and better: there are two
[Bekker 1290a line 25]
or one well-constituted forms, and the others are deviations—deviations from the well-blended harmony in the one case, and from the best constitution in the other. The tighter and more masterful constitutions are oligarchic, the relaxed and soft ones democratic.

[Bekker 1290a line 30]
But we should not define democracy, as some now commonly do, simply as a constitution in which the multitude is sovereign (for in oligarchies too, and everywhere, the larger part is sovereign), nor oligarchy as one in which a few are sovereign over the constitution. For if there were thirteen hundred people in all, and a thousand of them were rich,
[Bekker 1290a line 35]
and did not grant a share in office to the three hundred, who were poor but free and like them in other respects, no one would say that these people lived under a democracy. Likewise, if the poor were few but stronger than the rich, who were more numerous, no one would call this an oligarchy either, if the others, though
[Bekker 1290a line 40]
rich, had no share in honors.

Rather, then, we should say that
[Bekker 1290b]
[Bekker 1290b line 1]
there is democracy when the free are sovereign, and oligarchy when the rich are sovereign; it happens, however, that the former are many and the latter few, for the free are many and the rich few. Indeed, if offices were distributed according to height, as
[Bekker 1290b line 5]
some say they are in Ethiopia, or according to beauty, there would be an oligarchy, for both the beautiful and the tall are few in number. Nevertheless, these constitutions are not adequately distinguished by these features alone either. Since both democracy and oligarchy have several parts, we must make the further distinction that, if
[Bekker 1290b line 10]
a few free people rule a greater number who are not free, this is not democracy: for example, in Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf and in Thera (for in each of these cities those distinguished by noble birth, who first occupied the colonies, held the honors, though they were few among many). Nor, if the rich rule because
[Bekker 1290b line 15]
they are more numerous, is this democracy, as in Colophon in ancient times (for there the majority possessed large estates before the war against the Lydians). Rather, there is democracy when the free and poor, being more numerous, are sovereign in rule, and oligarchy when the rich and better-born are
[Bekker 1290b line 20]
few and sovereign.

It has been said, then, that there are several constitutions, and for what reason. Let us now say why there are more than those mentioned, and what they are and why, taking as our starting point what was said before. For we agree that every city has not one part but several.
[Bekker 1290b line 25]
Thus, if we undertook to determine the kinds of animal, we would first distinguish what every animal must have (for example, certain sense organs, the organs for processing and receiving food, such as a mouth and a stomach, and, besides these, the parts by which each animal moves). If there were only so many parts, but these had
[Bekker 1290b line 30]
varieties (I mean, for example, several kinds of mouth, stomach, and sense organs, and also of the parts used for movement), the number of their combinations would necessarily produce several kinds of animal (for the same animal cannot have several different kinds of mouth, nor, similarly, of ears). Thus, when
[Bekker 1290b line 35]
all their possible pairings have been determined, they will produce kinds of animal, and there will be as many kinds of animal as there are combinations of their necessary parts—the same holds for the constitutions we have mentioned. For cities too consist not of one part but of many, as has often been said. One
[Bekker 1290b line 40]
part, then, is the multitude concerned with food, those called farmers;

[Bekker 1291a]
[Bekker 1291a line 1]
a second is that called the artisan class (this consists of those concerned with the arts without which a city cannot be inhabited: some of these arts must exist out of necessity, others for luxury or for living well); a third is the trading class (by the trading class I mean
[Bekker 1291a line 5]
those occupied with selling and buying, foreign trade and retail trade); a fourth is the laboring class; and a fifth kind is the class that will fight in the city's defense. Its existence is no less necessary than that of the others, if they are not to be enslaved by invaders. For surely it is impossible for a community that is a slave by nature to deserve the name of city:
[Bekker 1291a line 10]
a city is self-sufficient, but what is enslaved is not self-sufficient. For this reason the account of this in the Republic is ingenious but inadequate. For Socrates says that a city consists of the four most necessary people, naming a weaver, a farmer, a shoemaker, and a builder. Then he adds more, since these are not self-sufficient:
[Bekker 1291a line 15]
a smith and those concerned with the necessary livestock, and also a merchant and a retailer; all these make up the first city. It is as though every city were constituted for the sake of necessities and not rather for the noble, and needed shoemakers and farmers equally. As for the fighting class,
[Bekker 1291a line 20]
he does not assign it a place until the territory grows and encroaches on that of the neighbors, bringing them into war. Yet even among the four, or among any number whatever of partners, there must be someone who will dispense and judge what is just. If, then, one would count the soul as a part of an animal
[Bekker 1291a line 25]
more than the body, we must also count parts of this sort as parts of cities more than those serving necessary uses: the military part, the part that shares in judicial justice, and, besides these, the deliberative part, which is the work of political understanding. Whether these functions belong separately to different people or to the same people makes no difference
[Bekker 1291a line 30]
to the argument; for the same people often both serve as infantry and farm. Thus, if both these and those are to be counted as parts of a city, it is evident that the infantry class, at least, is a necessary part of the city.

A seventh part is the class that performs public services with its property, whom we call the rich. An eighth is the class that serves the public
[Bekker 1291a line 35]
and performs the services connected with offices, if indeed a city cannot exist without rulers. There must therefore be some who are able to rule and who perform this public service for the city, either continuously or in turn. The remaining parts are those we have just distinguished: the part that deliberates and the part that judges
[Bekker 1291a line 40]
the just in disputes. If, then, these functions must be performed in cities, and performed well and justly,

[Bekker 1291b]
[Bekker 1291b line 1]
there must also be some who share in the virtue of statesmen. Many people think that the other capacities can belong to the same people: for example, that the same people may be defenders, farmers, and artisans, and also those who deliberate
[Bekker 1291b line 5]
and judge. All also lay claim to virtue and think themselves capable of holding most offices. But it is impossible for the same people to be both poor and rich. For this reason these seem above all to be parts of a city: the rich and the poor. Further, because the former are generally few and the latter
[Bekker 1291b line 10]
many, these appear as opposed parts among the city's parts. Therefore people also establish constitutions according to the predominance of these, and there seem to be two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy.

That there are several constitutions, and through what
[Bekker 1291b line 15]
causes, has been said before. Let us now say that there are also several kinds of democracy and oligarchy. This is evident from what has been said as well. For there are several kinds both of the people and of those called the notables. For example, among the kinds of the people, one consists of farmers, another of those engaged in the arts, another of the trading class occupied with
[Bekker 1291b line 20]
buying and selling, another of those concerned with the sea; and of this last, one part is naval, another concerned with wealth-getting, another with ferrying, and another with fishing (for in many places each of these is very numerous: for example, fishermen in Tarentum and Byzantium, the crews of triremes in Athens, merchant seamen in Aegina and Chios, and ferry workers
[Bekker 1291b line 25]
in Tenedos). Besides these there is the class of manual laborers, and those whose property is too small to allow them leisure; further, those who are free but not born of two citizen parents, and any other such kind of multitude. Among the notables, the distinctions are wealth, noble birth, virtue, education, and the qualities spoken of under the same
[Bekker 1291b line 30]
distinction as these.

The first democracy, then, is the one so called chiefly on the basis of equality. For the law of such a democracy defines equality as the poor having no greater predominance than the rich, neither group being sovereign, but both alike. For if freedom is found most fully in democracy,
[Bekker 1291b line 35]
as some suppose, and so is equality, they would be found most fully in this way, when all share as equally as possible in the constitution. Since the people are more numerous, and what the majority decides is sovereign, this must be a democracy. This, then, is one kind of democracy: for offices, a property qualification
[Bekker 1291b line 40]
is required, though it is small. Anyone acquiring the qualification must be permitted to share, and anyone losing it must not share.

### Book IV, 1292a–1295a

[Bekker 1292a]
[Bekker 1292a line 1]
Another kind of democracy is that in which all citizens whose status is beyond challenge share, but the law rules; another is that in which everyone shares in offices, provided only that he is a citizen, but the law rules. Another kind of democracy is that in which the other features
[Bekker 1292a line 5]
are the same, but the multitude is sovereign and not the law. This occurs when decrees are authoritative rather than the law, and it comes about through demagogues. For in cities governed democratically under law a demagogue does not arise, but the best citizens occupy the leading position;
[Bekker 1292a line 10]
where the laws are not authoritative, however, demagogues arise. For the people become a monarch, one composite ruler made up of many: the many are sovereign not as individuals but collectively. Which sort of rule by many Homer means when he says it is not good—this sort or the sort in which there are several rulers acting as individuals—
[Bekker 1292a line 15]
is unclear. Such a people, then, being a monarch, seeks to exercise monarchical rule because it is not ruled by law, and becomes masterful, so that flatterers are honored. Such a people corresponds, among monarchies, to tyranny. For its character is the same: both rule as masters over the better people, and decrees
[Bekker 1292a line 20]
are like the commands issued there; the demagogue and the flatterer are the same and correspond to one another. Each has the greatest influence with his respective ruler: flatterers with tyrants, and demagogues with peoples of this sort. They are responsible for decrees being authoritative rather than the laws,
[Bekker 1292a line 25]
because they refer everything to the people. For they themselves become great because the people are sovereign over everything, while they are sovereign over the people's opinion: the multitude obeys them. Further, those who bring charges against the officeholders say that the people must judge, and the people gladly accept the invitation. Thus dissolved are
[Bekker 1292a line 30]
all offices. Someone who says that such a democracy is not a constitution would seem to make a reasonable criticism. For where laws do not rule there is no constitution. The law must rule over all, and the offices over particular cases, and we must judge this to be a constitution. Therefore, if democracy is
[Bekker 1292a line 35]
one of the constitutions, it is evident that such an arrangement, in which everything is administered by decrees, is not even democracy in the proper sense; for no decree can be universal. Let the kinds of democracy, then, be distinguished in this way.

Of the kinds of oligarchy, one rests on property qualifications:
[Bekker 1292a line 40]
these determine offices and are so high that the poor, though more numerous, do not share, but anyone who acquires the qualification is permitted to share in the constitution;

another
[Bekker 1292b]
[Bekker 1292b line 1]
is that in which offices depend on large property qualifications, and the officeholders themselves choose those who fill vacancies (if they do this from all those qualified, it seems rather aristocratic, but if from a certain defined group, oligarchic). Another kind of oligarchy
[Bekker 1292b line 5]
is that in which a son enters in place of his father; a fourth is that in which the condition just mentioned exists and not the law but the rulers rule. This has its counterpart in tyranny among monarchies and in the democracy we discussed last among democracies. They call
[Bekker 1292b line 10]
such an oligarchy rule by a powerful group.

There are, then, this many kinds of oligarchy and democracy. But we must not overlook that in many places the constitution as laid down in the laws happens not to be democratic, yet through custom and upbringing people take part in public life democratically. Likewise,
[Bekker 1292b line 15]
among others the constitution as laid down in the laws is more democratic, but in upbringing and customs they are governed more oligarchically. This happens especially after changes in constitutions. For they do not change over at once, but at first are content to gain small advantages from one another,
[Bekker 1292b line 20]
so that the previously existing laws remain, while those who changed the constitution hold power.

That there are this many kinds of democracy and oligarchy is evident from what has been said itself. For either all the parts of the people that have been mentioned must share in the constitution,
[Bekker 1292b line 25]
or some must share and others not. When the farming class and those who possess moderate property are sovereign over the constitution, they conduct public life under laws (for they earn their living by working and cannot have leisure, so they set the law over them and attend only the necessary meetings of the assembly). Others are permitted to share when
[Bekker 1292b line 30]
they acquire the property qualification defined by the laws. Therefore all who acquire it are permitted to share. For, in general, it is oligarchic not to permit everyone to share; but it is impossible to have leisure without revenues. This, then, is one kind of democracy, for these reasons. Another kind arises from the
[Bekker 1292b line 35]
next distinction: it is possible to permit everyone whose birth is beyond challenge to share, though only those able to have leisure actually do so. For this reason the laws rule in such a democracy, because there is no revenue. A third kind permits all who are free to share in the constitution, though they do not
[Bekker 1292b line 40]
actually share, for the reason mentioned before, so that in this form too the law must rule.

A fourth kind of democracy
[Bekker 1293a]
[Bekker 1293a line 1]
is the one that has arisen latest in time in the cities. For because the cities have become much larger than they originally were, and abundant revenues are available, everyone shares in the constitution owing to the predominance of the multitude. They also share in its activities and
[Bekker 1293a line 5]
take part in public life because even the poor can have leisure, receiving pay. Indeed, such a multitude has the most leisure, for attention to their own affairs does not hinder them at all, whereas it hinders the rich, so that these often do not take part in the assembly or in judging. Therefore the multitude of the poor becomes
[Bekker 1293a line 10]
sovereign over the constitution, rather than the laws.

The kinds of democracy, then, are this many and of this character because of these necessities; those of oligarchy are the following. When a larger number possess property, but in smaller amounts and not very much, this is the first kind of oligarchy. For they permit a share
[Bekker 1293a line 15]
to anyone who acquires it, and because those who share in the citizen body are numerous, not the people but the law must be sovereign (for the further they stand from monarchy, possessing neither so much property that they can have leisure while neglecting it nor so little that they must be supported by the city,
[Bekker 1293a line 20]
the more they must require the law to rule for them, rather than rule themselves). But if those who possess property are fewer than those in the preceding case, yet have more of it, the second kind of oligarchy arises. For being stronger, they claim a greater share; therefore they themselves choose from among the others those who enter the citizen body,
[Bekker 1293a line 25]
but because they are not yet strong enough to rule without law, they establish a law of this kind. If they intensify this by being fewer and possessing larger estates, the third stage of oligarchy arises: they retain the offices among themselves, but according to a law ordering that those who die be succeeded by their
[Bekker 1293a line 30]
sons. When they greatly increase their preponderance in property and in their many connections, such rule by a powerful group is close to monarchy, and the individual rulers become sovereign rather than the law. This is the fourth kind of oligarchy, the counterpart of the last kind of democracy.

[Bekker 1293a line 35]
There are also two constitutions besides democracy and oligarchy. One of these is recognized by everyone and has been described as one of the four kinds of constitution (they speak of four: monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and, fourth, what is called aristocracy). The fifth is the one designated
[Bekker 1293a line 40]
by the name common to all (for they call it polity); but because it does not occur often, it escapes those who try to enumerate the kinds of constitution, and they use only the four
[Bekker 1293b]
[Bekker 1293b line 1]
(as Plato does) in their accounts of constitutions.

It is right, then, to call aristocracy the constitution we discussed in our first arguments (for only the constitution composed of those best in virtue without qualification, and not of men good in relation to some assumption, deserves
[Bekker 1293b line 5]
the name aristocracy. In it alone the same man is both a good man without qualification and a good citizen; those in the other constitutions are good in relation to their own constitution). Nevertheless, there are some constitutions that differ both from oligarchic constitutions and from what is called polity, and are called aristocracies.
[Bekker 1293b line 10]
For where offices are chosen not only on the basis of wealth but also on the basis of merit, this constitution differs from both and is called aristocratic. For even in cities that do not make virtue a common concern, there are nonetheless some who enjoy a good reputation and seem to be decent. Where, then, the constitution looks to
[Bekker 1293b line 15]
wealth, virtue, and the people, as in Carthage, it is aristocratic; and so are those that look only to two, as does that of the Lacedaemonians, to virtue and the people, and are a mixture of these two, democracy and virtue. These, then, are two kinds of aristocracy besides the first and best constitution,
[Bekker 1293b line 20]
and a third comprises those forms of what is called polity that incline more toward oligarchy.

It remains for us to speak of what is called polity and of tyranny. We have placed them in this order, although neither polity nor the aristocracies just mentioned are deviations, because
[Bekker 1293b line 25]
in truth all fall short of the most correct constitution; and, further, they are counted along with these, and the constitutions we mentioned at the beginning are deviations from them. It is reasonable to mention tyranny last, because it is least of all a constitution, while our
[Bekker 1293b line 30]
inquiry concerns constitutions. The reason for this order has now been stated. We must now give our account of polity. For its character is clearer now that the matters concerning oligarchy and democracy have been distinguished. Polity is, to put it simply, a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. People are accustomed
[Bekker 1293b line 35]
to call those that incline toward democracy polities, and those that incline more toward oligarchy aristocracies, because education and noble birth belong more often to the richer people. Further, the rich are thought to possess those things for the sake of which wrongdoers do wrong; hence “noble and good” and “notables”
[Bekker 1293b line 40]
are also names given to them. Since, then, aristocracy aims to assign predominance to the best citizens, people also say that oligarchies are composed rather of the noble and good.

[Bekker 1294a]
[Bekker 1294a line 1]
It seems impossible that a city should be well governed by laws if it is ruled not by the best but by the wicked; and likewise that it should be ruled by the best if it is not well governed by laws. Yet good government by laws does not consist in the laws being well framed but not obeyed. Therefore one aspect of good government by laws
[Bekker 1294a line 5]
must be understood as obedience to the established laws, and another as the laws that people abide by being well framed (for it is possible to obey badly framed laws too). This latter is possible in two ways: the laws may be either the best possible for them or the best without qualification.

Aristocracy seems chiefly to consist in
[Bekker 1294a line 10]
honors being distributed according to virtue (for virtue is the defining feature of aristocracy, wealth of oligarchy, and freedom of democracy). But the authority of what the majority decides exists in all: in oligarchy, aristocracy, and democracies alike, whatever the greater part of those sharing in the constitution decides is authoritative.
[Bekker 1294a line 15]
In most cities, then, this is called a kind of polity; for the mixture aims only at the rich and the poor, wealth and freedom (for among most people the rich seem to occupy the place of the noble and good). Since there are three things that lay claim to equality
[Bekker 1294a line 20]
in the constitution—freedom, wealth, and virtue (the fourth, which they call noble birth, follows upon two of these, for noble birth is ancient wealth and virtue)—it is evident that the mixture of the two, the rich and the poor, should be called polity, and the mixture of the three aristocracy, more than any of the others apart from the
[Bekker 1294a line 25]
true and first aristocracy. It has been said, then, that there are also other kinds of constitution besides monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy; what these are; and how the aristocracies differ from one another, and polities from aristocracy. It is also evident that these are not far removed from one another.

[Bekker 1294a line 30]
Let us next discuss how what is called polity arises alongside democracy and oligarchy, and how it should be established. At the same time, the features by which democracy and oligarchy are defined will also become clear. For we must grasp their distinction, and then, taking from each
[Bekker 1294a line 35]
as though a token of recognition, combine them. There are three ways of combining and mixing them. Either we must take both provisions that the two enact, as in the matter of judging (for in oligarchies they impose a fine on the rich if they do not serve as jurors, but give the poor no pay; in democracies,
[Bekker 1294a line 40]
they give the poor pay, but impose no fine on the rich. Both these provisions together form a common and intermediate arrangement, and for this reason it is also
[Bekker 1294b]
[Bekker 1294b line 1]
characteristic of polity, since it is mixed from both).

This, then, is one way of combining them. Another is to take the middle between what each prescribes: for example, some require no property qualification, or an entirely small one, for attendance at the assembly, while others require a large qualification. The common arrangement,
[Bekker 1294b line 5]
however, is neither, but a qualification midway between the two. A third is to take, from the two arrangements, some provisions from the oligarchic law and others from the democratic. I mean, for example, that it is thought democratic for offices to be assigned by lot and oligarchic for them to be assigned by choice; and democratic for them not to depend on
[Bekker 1294b line 10]
a property qualification, oligarchic for them to depend on one. It is therefore aristocratic and characteristic of polity to take one feature from each: from oligarchy, to make offices a matter of choice, and from democracy, to make them independent of a property qualification.

This, then, is the way to mix them. For democracy and oligarchy to be well mixed,
[Bekker 1294b line 15]
the criterion is that the same constitution can be called both democracy and oligarchy. For it is evident that those who describe it in this way do so because it is well mixed. This also holds of the middle, for each extreme shows itself in it. This is what happens with the constitution of the Lacedaemonians. For many
[Bekker 1294b line 20]
try to describe it as a democracy because its order has many democratic features: first, for example, the rearing of children (for the children of the rich are reared in the same way as those of the poor, and educated in a manner that the children of the poor could also receive); likewise at the next
[Bekker 1294b line 25]
stage of life, and when they become men, it is the same (for in this respect the rich man is in no way distinguished from the poor). Food is the same for everyone in the common messes, and the rich wear clothing of the sort that any poor man could also provide. Further, of the two greatest offices, one
[Bekker 1294b line 30]
is chosen by the people and the other is shared by them (for they choose the elders and share in the office of ephor). Others call it an oligarchy because it has many oligarchic features: for example, all offices are assigned by choice and none by lot, a few have authority over death and exile, and there are many other such features. But in
[Bekker 1294b line 35]
a well-mixed constitution, both forms should seem to be present and neither; and it should be preserved through itself, not from outside. It should be preserved through itself not because those who want it are more numerous outside it (for this could also hold of a bad constitution), but because no part of the city would want any other constitution
[Bekker 1294b line 40]
at all. How polity should be established, and likewise what are called aristocracies, has now been said.

[Bekker 1295a]
[Bekker 1295a line 1]
It remained for us to speak of tyranny, not because there is much to say about it, but so that it may receive its share of the inquiry, since we count it too as a kind of constitution. We distinguished kingship in our first arguments,
[Bekker 1295a line 5]
in which we examined kingship in the fullest sense: whether it is disadvantageous or advantageous to cities, what sort of king should be established and from what source, and how. We distinguished two kinds of tyranny in our examination of kingship, because their character overlaps in a certain way
[Bekker 1295a line 10]
with kingship also, since both these forms of rule are according to law (for among some non-Greek peoples they choose monarchs with absolute power, and in ancient times among the early Greeks certain monarchs arose in this way, whom they called aisymnetes). These forms have certain
[Bekker 1295a line 15]
differences from one another, but were kingly because they were according to law and because the monarch ruled over willing subjects, and tyrannical because they ruled as masters and according to their own judgment. A third kind of tyranny, which seems to be tyranny in the fullest sense, is the counterpart of absolute kingship. Such tyranny must be a monarchy
[Bekker 1295a line 20]
that rules without accountability over all who are its equals or betters, to its own advantage rather than that of the ruled. For this reason it is against their will: no free person willingly submits to such rule. These, then, are the kinds of tyranny, this many in number, for the reasons that have been stated.

### Book IV, 1295a–1299a

[Bekker 1295a line 25]
What constitution is best, and what life is best, for most cities and most human beings, if we judge neither by a virtue beyond that of ordinary people, nor by an education that requires natural gifts and a fortunate provision of resources, nor by a constitution that fulfills our wishes, but by a life that
[Bekker 1295a line 30]
most can share and a constitution in which most cities can participate? For even the constitutions called aristocracies, which we have just discussed, either lie beyond the reach of most cities or border on what is called polity (and therefore we must speak of both as one). The judgment concerning
[Bekker 1295a line 35]
all these matters rests on the same principles. For if the Ethics rightly says that the happy life is a life according to virtue, free from impediments, and that virtue is a mean, then the middle life must be best: the life at the mean that each can attain. These same criteria must apply
[Bekker 1295a line 40]
to a city's virtue and vice and to its constitution; for a constitution
[Bekker 1295b]
[Bekker 1295b line 1]
is a certain way of life for a city.

In every city there are three parts of the city: the very wealthy, the very poor, and, third, those between them. Since, then, it is agreed that what is moderate and intermediate is best, it is evident that, among
[Bekker 1295b line 5]
the gifts of fortune too, a moderate possession is best of all. For it is most readily obedient to reason. But for someone exceptionally beautiful, strong, wellborn, or rich, or, on the contrary, exceptionally destitute, weak, or lacking in honor, it is difficult to follow reason. The former tend to become insolent and wicked on a grand scale,
[Bekker 1295b line 10]
the latter malefactors and excessively petty in their wickedness; and unjust acts arise either from insolence or from malice. Moreover, those in the middle are least inclined either to shun office or to pursue it eagerly, and both these tendencies harm cities. Besides this, those who possess an excess of fortune's gifts—strength, wealth, friends,
[Bekker 1295b line 15]
and other such things—neither wish nor know how to be ruled (and this begins at home when they are children: because of their luxury they are not accustomed to being ruled even at school). Those who are excessively deprived of these things are altogether abject. Thus the latter do not know how to rule, but only how to submit to
[Bekker 1295b line 20]
the rule imposed on slaves, while the former know how to submit to no rule, but only how to exercise a master's rule. The city therefore becomes a city of slaves and masters, not of free people, with one group envious and the other contemptuous. Nothing is farther from friendship and political community than this; for community involves friendship. Even on a journey, people do not wish
[Bekker 1295b line 25]
to share company with their enemies. Yet a city wishes to consist, as far as possible, of people who are equal and alike, and this is true above all of the middle class. Necessarily, then, the city consisting of those whom we say form a city by nature has the best constitution. These citizens are also the safest in cities. For neither
[Bekker 1295b line 30]
do they themselves desire others' possessions, as the poor do, nor do others desire theirs, as the poor desire those of the rich. Because they neither suffer nor devise plots, they live without danger. For this reason Phocylides prayed well:
“Many things are best for those in the middle; I wish to be in the middle in the city.”

It is clear,
[Bekker 1295b line 35]
then, that the political community formed through the middle class is best, and that cities can be well governed where the middle class is numerous and stronger, preferably than both the other parts together, but otherwise than either one. For when it joins either side, it tips the balance and prevents the opposing extremes from arising. Hence it is good fortune
[Bekker 1295b line 40]
of the highest kind for those who take part in public life to possess moderate and sufficient property,

[Bekker 1296a]
[Bekker 1296a line 1]
since where some possess an enormous amount and others nothing, either an extreme democracy arises or an unmixed oligarchy, or tyranny arises through both extremes. For tyranny arises both from the most headstrong democracy and from oligarchy, but
[Bekker 1296a line 5]
from the middle constitutions and those near them much less often. We shall state the reason later, in our discussion of changes in constitutions. That the middle constitution is best is evident: it alone is free from faction. For where the middle element is numerous, faction and divisions among the citizens are least likely to occur. Large cities too are less subject to faction
[Bekker 1296a line 10]
for the same reason, because the middle element is numerous. In small cities it is easy to divide everyone into two groups, leaving nothing in the middle, and nearly everyone is either poor or wealthy. Democracies too are more secure and longer-lasting than oligarchies because of the middle class (for they are more numerous
[Bekker 1296a line 15]
and have a greater share in honors in democracies than in oligarchies). For when the poor, without this class, become overwhelmingly numerous, things go badly and the constitutions swiftly perish. We must also regard as evidence the fact that the best legislators belong to the middle class of citizens. Solon was one of them
[Bekker 1296a line 20]
(as his poetry shows), as were Lycurgus (for he was not a king), Charondas, and nearly all the others.

From this it is also evident why most constitutions are either democratic or oligarchic. Because the middle element in them is often small, whichever group gains the upper hand,
[Bekker 1296a line 25]
whether the property owners or the people, oversteps the middle and draws the constitution toward itself, so that either democracy or oligarchy arises. Besides this, because faction and conflict arise between the people and the wealthy, whichever side happens to prevail over its opponents does not establish
[Bekker 1296a line 30]
a common or equal constitution, but takes supremacy in the constitution as the prize of victory, one side establishing a democracy and the other an oligarchy. Moreover, those who attained leadership in Greece each looked to their own constitution: democracies in the cities were what one side
[Bekker 1296a line 35]
established, and oligarchies the other, considering not the cities' advantage but their own. For these reasons the middle constitution either never arises or does so rarely and in few places. For only one man among those who formerly held leadership was persuaded that this
[Bekker 1296a line 40]
arrangement should be conferred. By now, among those in the cities, a custom
[Bekker 1296b]
[Bekker 1296b line 1]
has arisen: not even to desire equality,

but to seek either to rule or to endure being dominated. What constitution is best, and for what reason, is therefore evident from this. As for the other constitutions, since we say that several democracies and several oligarchies
[Bekker 1296b line 5]
exist, it is not difficult, once the best has been defined, to see which should be ranked first and second, and in this way next in order, according as one is better and another worse. For the constitution nearest to this must always be better, and the one farther removed from the middle worse, unless one judges in relation to a particular assumption. I mean
[Bekker 1296b line 10]
by judging in relation to an assumption that often, though one constitution is more desirable, nothing prevents a different constitution from being more advantageous for certain people.

Next after what has been said, we must examine which constitution is advantageous for whom, and what kind for what kind of people. First we must grasp
[Bekker 1296b line 15]
the same universal principle concerning all of them: the part of the city that wishes the constitution to remain must be stronger than the part that does not. Every city consists of both quality and quantity. By quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, and noble birth; by quantity, superiority in numbers. Quality may
[Bekker 1296b line 20]
belong to one of the parts of which the city consists, and quantity to another. For example, those without noble birth may outnumber the wellborn, or the poor the rich, yet not be as superior in quantity as they are inferior in quality. Therefore these must be compared with one another. Where,
[Bekker 1296b line 25]
then, the multitude of the poor exceeds the proportion just stated, democracy naturally exists, and each form of democracy corresponds to the superiority of each kind of people. For example, if the multitude of farmers predominates, the first democracy arises; if the multitude of artisans and wage earners,
[Bekker 1296b line 30]
the last; and similarly for the others between these. But where the wealthy and the notables are more superior in quality than they are inferior in quantity, oligarchy naturally exists, and likewise each form of oligarchy corresponds to the superiority of the oligarchic multitude.

It is necessary
[Bekker 1296b line 35]
for the legislator always to bring the middle class into the constitution. For whether he lays down oligarchic laws, he must aim at the middle class, or democratic laws, he must attach these citizens to the laws. Where the multitude of the middle class exceeds either both extremes together or even just one of them, there it is possible
[Bekker 1296b line 40]
for a constitution to endure.

For there is no fear that
[Bekker 1297a]
[Bekker 1297a line 1]
the rich will ever agree with the poor against them. Neither side will ever wish to be enslaved to the other, and if they seek a constitution more common to both, they will find none other than this. For they would not endure ruling in turn because of their distrust
[Bekker 1297a line 5]
of one another. Everywhere the arbitrator is the most trusted, and the person in the middle is an arbitrator. The better a constitution is mixed, the more lasting it is. Many, even among those who wish to make aristocratic constitutions, err not only in assigning more to the wealthy, but also in
[Bekker 1297a line 10]
deceiving the people. For in time a real evil must arise from counterfeit goods. The grasping of the rich destroys the constitution more than that of the people.

The devices contrived in constitutions under a pretext
[Bekker 1297a line 15]
to deal with the people are five in number, concerning the assembly, offices, law courts, the possession of arms, and physical training. Concerning the assembly, everyone is permitted to attend, but a fine for failing to attend is imposed on the wealthy, either on them alone or a much heavier one. Concerning offices,
[Bekker 1297a line 20]
those who meet the property qualification are not permitted to excuse themselves by oath, while the poor are permitted to do so. Concerning law courts, the wealthy are fined if they do not serve as jurors, while the poor are exempt, or the wealthy receive a large fine and the poor a small one, as in the laws of Charondas. In some places everyone who registers is permitted
[Bekker 1297a line 25]
to attend the assembly and serve as a juror, but if, after registering, they neither attend nor serve, heavy fines are imposed on them. The intention is that the fine should make them avoid registering, and their failure to register should prevent them from serving as jurors or attending the assembly. The same manner concerning the possession of arms
[Bekker 1297a line 30]
and physical training is followed in legislation. The poor are permitted not to possess arms, but the wealthy are fined for not possessing them. If they do not train, there is no fine for the poor, but a fine for the wealthy, so that the latter participate because of the fine, while the former, having nothing to fear, do not participate. These,
[Bekker 1297a line 35]
then, are oligarchic devices in legislation; in democracies they devise corresponding measures against these. For they provide pay for the poor who attend the assembly and serve as jurors, but impose no fine on the wealthy. Thus it is evident that, if anyone wishes to make a just mixture, he must combine the arrangements of both
[Bekker 1297a line 40]
and provide pay for the one group and a fine for the other. For in this way everyone would participate, whereas in the other way the constitution belongs
[Bekker 1297b]
[Bekker 1297b line 1]
to only one of the two groups.

The constitution must consist only of those who possess arms. But as for the amount of the property qualification, we cannot define it unconditionally and say that so much is required. Rather, we must consider the highest level that can be set so that
[Bekker 1297b line 5]
those who participate in the constitution outnumber those who do not, and establish this. For the poor are willing to remain quiet even without a share in honors, provided no one insults them or takes any of their property away. But this is not easy; one cannot always count on decency among those who belong
[Bekker 1297b line 10]
to the citizen body. In wartime, too, the poor are usually reluctant if they receive no provisions and lack resources; but if someone provides them with provisions, they are willing to fight.

Among some peoples the constitution consists not only of those currently serving as heavy infantry but also of those who have served. Among the Malians the constitution
[Bekker 1297b line 15]
consisted of these, but they chose officeholders from those on active service. The first constitution among the Greeks after kingship also consisted of the fighting men, initially of the cavalry (for the strength and superiority in war lay with the cavalry: without formation, nothing useful can be achieved
[Bekker 1297b line 20]
with heavy infantry, and in ancient times experience and arrangements in these matters did not exist, so that the strength lay with the cavalry). But as cities grew and those bearing arms became stronger, more people participated in the constitution. Hence what we now call polities, people formerly called
[Bekker 1297b line 25]
democracies. The ancient constitutions were oligarchic and kingly, as might be expected. For because of their small populations they did not have a numerous middle class, so that, being both few in number and poorly organized, they endured being ruled. Why there are several constitutions, and why
[Bekker 1297b line 30]
there are others besides those named (for democracy is not one in number, and the same holds for the others); moreover, what their differences are and why these occur; and, besides this, which constitution is best, generally speaking, and which of the other constitutions suits which people: all this has therefore been stated.

[Bekker 1297b line 35]
Let us again discuss what follows, both in general and separately for each constitution, taking the appropriate starting point. There are three parts of all constitutions, concerning which the serious legislator must consider what is advantageous for each. When these are well arranged, the constitution must be well arranged, and
[Bekker 1297b line 40]
constitutions differ from one another as each of these differs. Of these three, one is the element that deliberates
[Bekker 1298a]
[Bekker 1298a line 1]
about common affairs;

the second concerns offices, namely what offices there must be, over what they must have authority, and how the choice of their holders must be made; the third is the element that judges. The deliberative element has authority over war and peace, alliances
[Bekker 1298a line 5]
and their dissolution, laws, death, exile, and confiscation, and the choice of officeholders and the scrutiny of their accounts. All these decisions must be assigned either to all the citizens, or all to some of them (for example, to one office or several, or different decisions to different offices), or some to all and others to some.

For
[Bekker 1298a line 10]
all to decide about everything is democratic; for the people seek this kind of equality. There are several ways in which all may participate. One is by turns, rather than all together (as in the constitution of Telecles of Miletus; in other constitutions too, the boards of officeholders meet to deliberate,
[Bekker 1298a line 15]
and everyone enters office by turns from the tribes and the very smallest divisions until it has passed through them all), while they assemble only to enact laws, to consider matters concerning the constitution, and to hear what the rulers announce. Another way is for
[Bekker 1298a line 20]
all to assemble together, but only to choose officeholders, to legislate, to consider war and peace, and to scrutinize accounts, while the offices appointed for each matter, filled by choice or lot from everyone, deliberate about the rest. Another way is for
[Bekker 1298a line 25]
the citizens to meet concerning offices and the scrutiny of accounts, and to deliberate about war and alliances, while the offices administer the rest, being filled by choice wherever possible; such are the offices which necessarily require knowledgeable rulers. A fourth way is for everyone to assemble and deliberate about everything,
[Bekker 1298a line 30]
while the offices decide nothing but merely conduct a preliminary examination. This is the way in which the last form of democracy is now administered, which we say corresponds to oligarchy ruled by a dominant group and to tyrannical monarchy. All these ways, then, are democratic; but for some to deliberate about everything is oligarchic.
[Bekker 1298a line 35]
This too has several varieties. When they are chosen on the basis of more moderate property qualifications and are more numerous because of the moderation of the qualification, and when they do not alter what the law forbids but follow it, and anyone who acquires the qualification is permitted to participate, such a constitution is oligarchic but constitutional
[Bekker 1298a line 40]
because of its moderation. When in deliberation not everyone
[Bekker 1298b]
[Bekker 1298b line 1]
participates, but only those selected beforehand,

and they rule according to law, as before, it is oligarchic. But when those with authority to deliberate also choose themselves, and when a son enters in place of his father and they are sovereign over the laws, this arrangement must be
[Bekker 1298b line 5]
oligarchic. When some decide certain matters—for example, everyone decides about war, peace, and the scrutiny of accounts, but rulers decide the rest, and these are chosen, not appointed by lot—the constitution is an aristocracy. If some are chosen and others appointed by lot, and the latter either without restriction or from those selected beforehand, or if those chosen
[Bekker 1298b line 10]
and those appointed by lot act together, some of these arrangements belong to an aristocratic constitution, others to polity itself.

The deliberative element has therefore been distinguished in relation to constitutions in this way, and each constitution administers it according to the distinction stated. For the democracy now thought to be democracy most of all (I mean
[Bekker 1298b line 15]
one in which the people are sovereign even over the laws), it is advantageous, in order to deliberate better, to do the same as is done with the law courts in oligarchies (for they impose a fine on those whom they wish to serve as jurors, so that they will serve, while democrats provide pay for the poor): to do this, then, with assemblies too
[Bekker 1298b line 20]
(for all will deliberate better when they deliberate together, the people with the notables and these with the multitude). It is also advantageous for those who deliberate to be chosen, or appointed by lot in equal numbers from the different parts. And if the democrats greatly outnumber those who favor a constitutional government, it is advantageous either not to
[Bekker 1298b line 25]
give pay to everyone, but only to a number proportionate to the multitude of notables, or to exclude the excess by lot. In oligarchies it is advantageous either to choose some additional members from the multitude or, after establishing an office like those in certain constitutions called preliminary councilors and guardians of the laws, to conduct business on matters
[Bekker 1298b line 30]
which these have considered beforehand (for in this way the people will participate in deliberation and will be unable to undo anything in the constitution); moreover, either for the people to vote for the same measures or at least for nothing contrary to those introduced, or for all to share in giving counsel while the rulers deliberate. They must also do the opposite
[Bekker 1298b line 35]
of what occurs in polities. For the multitude must have authority when it votes to reject, but not when it votes to approve; rather, the matter must be referred back to the rulers. In polities they do the reverse: the few have authority when they vote to reject, but when they vote to approve,
[Bekker 1298b line 40]
they do not have authority; instead, the matter is referred to the greater number
[Bekker 1299a]
[Bekker 1299a line 1]
always.

### Book IV, 1299a–1301a

Let the deliberative element, which must also be sovereign in the constitution, be defined in this way.

Next comes the distinction concerning offices. For this part of the constitution too has many differences:
[Bekker 1299a line 5]
how many offices there are, over what they have authority, and, concerning time, how long each office lasts (some make offices last six months, others less, others a year, and others longer); whether offices must be perpetual or long-lasting or neither, but the same people hold them several times, or
[Bekker 1299a line 10]
the same person not twice but only once; and moreover, concerning the establishment of offices, from whom their holders must be appointed, by whom, and how. For in all these matters we must be able to distinguish how many ways are possible, and then determine which ways are advantageous for which constitutions. Nor is it
[Bekker 1299a line 15]
easy to define which positions we should call offices. For the political community needs many supervisors, and therefore we must not regard all those chosen or appointed by lot as rulers: first, for example, the priests (for this must be considered something different from political offices). Moreover, sponsors of choruses, heralds, and ambassadors are also chosen.
[Bekker 1299a line 20]
Some responsibilities are political, concerning either all citizens in a particular activity, as a general supervises those on military service, or a part of them, as the supervisor of women or the supervisor of children does. Others concern household management (for they often choose distributors of grain); others are subordinate services, to which they assign slaves if they have the means.
[Bekker 1299a line 25]
Generally speaking, those positions should most properly be called offices to which the power has been assigned to deliberate about certain matters, to judge, and to command, especially this last; for commanding is more characteristic of rule. But these distinctions make virtually no difference in practice (for no legal decision has yet arisen from a dispute about
[Bekker 1299a line 30]
the name), though they afford a further subject for intellectual inquiry.

Which offices, and how many, are necessary if a city is to exist, and which, though not necessary, are useful for a good constitution: these are questions one might find more perplexing, concerning every constitution and particularly small cities. For in
[Bekker 1299a line 35]
large cities it is both possible and necessary to assign one office to one task (for many can enter offices because the citizens are numerous, so that some offices are held again only after a long interval and others only once, and each task receives better attention when the attention is devoted to one thing
[Bekker 1299b]
[Bekker 1299b line 1]
rather than many).

In small cities, however, many offices must be brought together in a few hands (for because the population is small it is not easy to have many people in office: who, then, will be left to succeed them?). Yet sometimes small cities need
[Bekker 1299b line 5]
the same offices and laws as large ones. But the latter often need the same services, while in the former the need arises only after long intervals. Therefore nothing prevents several responsibilities from being assigned at once (for they will not obstruct one another), and because of the small population offices must be made like
[Bekker 1299b line 10]
combined spits and lamp stands. If, then, we can say how many offices every city must have, and how many, though not necessary, it ought to have, knowledge of this would make it easier to see which offices it is fitting to combine into one. It is also fitting not to overlook which matters require
[Bekker 1299b line 15]
many offices to supervise them in different places and which require a single office with authority everywhere: for example, whether good order requires a market supervisor in the marketplace and someone else in another place, or the same person everywhere. And should the division follow the matter at hand or the people concerned? I mean, for example, should one person supervise good order, or one supervise children
[Bekker 1299b line 20]
and another women? And regarding constitutions, does the kind of office also differ in each, or not at all? For example, in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy, do the same offices have authority, though their holders are not drawn from equal or similar people, but from different people in different constitutions: for example, in
[Bekker 1299b line 25]
aristocracies from the educated, in oligarchies from the rich, and in democracies from the free? Or do some constitutions differ in the offices themselves, with the same offices advantageous in some places and different ones in others (for in one place it is fitting that the same offices should have great
[Bekker 1299b line 30]
powers, and in another small ones)?

Yet some offices are peculiar to particular constitutions, such as that of the preliminary councilors; for this is not democratic. A council, however, is democratic. There must be some such body responsible for considering matters beforehand for the people, so that the people will be occupied; but if its members are few in number, this is oligarchic. The
[Bekker 1299b line 35]
preliminary councilors must be few in number, so this is oligarchic. But where both these offices exist, the preliminary councilors are set over the councilors; for the councilor is democratic, the preliminary councilor oligarchic. The council's power is also dissolved in those democracies in
[Bekker 1300a]
[Bekker 1300a line 1]
which the people themselves assemble and transact all business.

This commonly happens when there are ample means to pay those attending the assembly. For, having leisure, they assemble often and decide everything themselves. A supervisor of children and a supervisor of women,
[Bekker 1300a line 5]
and any other ruler with authority over such responsibilities, is aristocratic, not democratic (for how is it possible to prevent the wives of the poor from going out?), nor oligarchic (for the wives of those who hold power in oligarchies live in luxury).

Let this be enough for now concerning these matters. As for the appointment of officeholders,
[Bekker 1300a line 10]
we must attempt to examine it from the beginning. The differences lie in three terms, by combining which all the ways must be included. Of these three, one is who appoints the officeholders, the second from whom, and the remaining one in what manner. For each of these three, three differences
[Bekker 1300a line 15]
exist. For either all the citizens appoint or some; and either from all or from certain people defined by a qualification (for example, property, birth, virtue, or some other such thing, as at Megara from those who returned together and fought together against the people). And they do this either by choice or by lot (with these, again, combined:
[Bekker 1300a line 20]
I mean that some offices are filled by some citizens and others by all, some from all and others from some, and some by choice and others by lot).

Each of these differences will have four ways. For either all appoint from all by choice, or all from all by lot—and either from everyone, or by turns,
[Bekker 1300a line 25]
for example, according to tribes, demes, and phratries, until it has passed through all the citizens, or always from everyone—or some offices in one way and others in the other. Again, if some appoint, they do so either from all by choice or from all by lot, or from some by choice or from some by lot, or some offices in one way and others in the other. I mean
[Bekker 1300a line 30]
some from all by choice and others by lot, and some from some by choice and others by lot. Thus there are twelve ways apart from the two combinations. Of these, three modes of appointment are democratic: for all to appoint from all by choice, by lot, or by both, some offices by lot and others by choice. But for not all to appoint at the same time,
[Bekker 1300a line 35]
yet to appoint from all or from some, by lot or by choice or by both, or some offices from all and others from some by both (by both I mean some by lot and others by choice), belongs to polity; and for some to appoint from all either by choice or by lot or by both (some by lot and others by choice)
[Bekker 1300a line 40]
is oligarchic. Appointment from both groups is still more oligarchic. But appointing to some offices from all and to others from some belongs to polity with an aristocratic tendency,

[Bekker 1300b]
[Bekker 1300b line 1]
or appointing to some by choice and to others by lot. For some to appoint from some by choice is oligarchic, as is for some to appoint from some by lot (though this does not occur, it is so nonetheless), and for some to appoint from some by both. But for some to appoint from all, and for all to appoint from some by choice,
[Bekker 1300b line 5]
is aristocratic. These, then, are the number of ways concerning offices, and they are distinguished according to constitutions in this manner. Which are advantageous for whom, and how appointments should be made, will become evident together with the powers of the offices and what the offices are. By the power of an office I mean, for example, authority
[Bekker 1300b line 10]
over revenues or authority over the guard. For the power of a generalship is of a different kind from that of the office with authority over contracts in the marketplace.

Of the three parts, it remains to discuss the judicial element. Its ways too must be considered on the same basis. The
[Bekker 1300b line 15]
law courts differ in three terms: from whom they are constituted, what matters they concern, and how. By “from whom” I mean whether from all or from some; by “what matters,” how many kinds of law court there are; by “how,” whether by lot or by choice. First, then, let us distinguish how many kinds of law court there are. They are eight in number: one for scrutinizing accounts,
[Bekker 1300b line 20]
another for offenses against common interests, another for matters affecting the constitution, a fourth for disputes concerning penalties, involving both rulers and private individuals, a fifth for substantial private transactions, and besides these the courts for homicide and for foreigners (the kinds of homicide court, whether
[Bekker 1300b line 25]
judged by the same jurors or by different ones, concern intentional killings, unintentional killings, and killings that are admitted but whose justice is disputed; a fourth concerns charges brought against those exiled for homicide regarding their return, as the court at Phreatto in Athens is said to do. Such cases occur
[Bekker 1300b line 30]
rarely over the whole course of time, even in large cities. Of the courts for foreigners, one concerns foreigners against foreigners and another foreigners against citizens). Besides all these there is a court for small transactions, involving one drachma, five drachmas, or a little more. For these too require a decision, but do not
[Bekker 1300b line 35]
fall to a large body of jurors.

But let us leave aside these courts and those for homicide and foreigners, and speak of the political courts: when these are not well arranged, divisions and upheavals in constitutions arise. Either all must judge all the matters distinguished, being appointed by choice
[Bekker 1300b line 40]
or by lot, or all must judge all matters, some appointed by lot and others by choice, or, concerning certain of the same matters, some must be appointed by lot and others
[Bekker 1301a]
[Bekker 1301a line 1]
by choice.

These ways, then, are four in number; and there are as many other ways involving only a part. For, again, those who judge all matters may be appointed from some by choice, or from some for all matters by lot, or some by lot and others by choice, or certain courts
[Bekker 1301a line 5]
for the same matters may consist of those appointed by lot and those chosen. These, then, as stated, are the ways corresponding to those already described. Moreover, the same arrangements may be combined: I mean, for example, some courts from all, others from some, and others from both (for example, if some members of the same court were drawn from all and others from some), and either
[Bekker 1301a line 10]
by lot or by choice or by both. We have therefore stated how many ways law courts can be constituted. Of these, the first are democratic,
[Bekker 1301a line 12]
those drawn from all to judge all matters; the second are oligarchic, those drawn from some to judge all matters; and the third are aristocratic and belong to polity, those drawn partly from all and partly
[Bekker 1301a line 15]
from some.

### Book V, 1301a–1304b

[Bekker 1301a]
[Bekker 1301a line 19]
As for the other matters we proposed to discuss, nearly
[Bekker 1301a line 20]
all have now been spoken of. What causes constitutions to change, how many such causes there are and of what kinds; what destroys each constitution, and from which forms they chiefly pass into which others; further, what preserves them, both in general and each separately, and by what means each constitution might best be preserved—all these must be examined
[Bekker 1301a line 25]
next, following what has been said.

We must first take as our starting point that many constitutions have arisen because, though everyone acknowledges the just and proportional equality, people miss their meaning, as we have said before. Democracy arose from the belief that those who are equal in any respect are equal without qualification
[Bekker 1301a line 30]
(for because everyone is equally free, they think they are equal without qualification); oligarchy, from the assumption that those who are unequal in one respect are unequal altogether (for because they are unequal in property, they assume they are unequal without qualification). Then the first group, on the ground that they are equal, claim an equal share in everything; the others, on the ground that they are unequal,
[Bekker 1301a line 35]
seek a greater share, for a greater share is unequal. All these constitutions therefore contain something just, but without qualification they are mistaken. For this reason, when either group does not share in the constitution according to the conception it happens to hold, it forms factions. Some would have the most just grounds of all for faction,
[Bekker 1301a line 40]
yet are least inclined to engage in it: those who surpass others in virtue;

[Bekker 1301b]
[Bekker 1301b line 1]
for these alone have the strongest reasonable claim to be unequal without qualification. There are also some who, because they excel in birth, do not consider themselves entitled to equal shares on account of this inequality; for those whose ancestors possessed virtue and wealth are thought to be wellborn.

Beginnings
[Bekker 1301b line 5]
and sources of factions, so to speak, are these, from which people engage in faction. Hence changes also occur in two ways. Sometimes they are directed against the constitution, to replace the established one with another—for example, democracy with oligarchy, or oligarchy with democracy, or these with polity and aristocracy,
[Bekker 1301b line 10]
or those with these. Sometimes they are not directed against the established constitution: people choose to retain the same arrangement, but want it in their own hands, whether oligarchy or monarchy. Again, change may concern a greater or lesser degree: for example, making an existing oligarchy more oligarchical
[Bekker 1301b line 15]
or less so, or an existing democracy more democratic or less so, and likewise with the other constitutions, either intensifying or relaxing them. Again, it may be directed at changing some part of the constitution, such as establishing or abolishing a particular office. Thus some say that at Lacedaemon Lysander
[Bekker 1301b line 20]
attempted to abolish kingship, and King Pausanias the office of the ephors. At Epidamnus too the constitution changed in one part (for they instituted a council in place of the tribal rulers, but the officeholders among the citizen body are still required to attend the popular court whenever
[Bekker 1301b line 25]
an office is put to the vote, and the single ruler was also an oligarchical feature in this constitution). For everywhere faction arises because of inequality, unless unequal people receive proportionate shares (for perpetual kingship is unequal if it exists among equals). In general, people form factions in pursuit of equality. Equality is of two kinds: one is
[Bekker 1301b line 30]
numerical, the other according to worth. By numerical equality I mean sameness and equality in number or size; by equality according to worth, equality in ratio. Thus three exceeds two numerically by the same amount as two exceeds one, whereas four exceeds two in the same ratio as two exceeds one; for two is the same fraction of four as
[Bekker 1301b line 35]
one is of two: both are halves. Although people agree that what accords with worth is just without qualification, they differ, as was said before, because some think that if they are equal in any respect, they are equal altogether, while others, if they are unequal in any respect, claim unequal shares in everything. Hence chiefly two arise:
[Bekker 1301b line 40]
the constitutions of democracy and oligarchy; for good birth and virtue
[Bekker 1302a]
[Bekker 1302a line 1]
belong to few,

but these other qualities to more. For nowhere are there a hundred wellborn and good men, whereas in many places there are a hundred wealthy ones. Yet to arrange everything without qualification according to either kind of equality is bad. This is evident from what happens: none
[Bekker 1302a line 5]
of such constitutions is lasting. The reason is that, when the first principle and starting point are mistaken, it is impossible not to encounter some evil in the end. Therefore numerical equality must be used in some matters, and equality according to worth in others.

Nevertheless, democracy is more secure and less subject to faction than oligarchy. For in
[Bekker 1302a line 10]
oligarchies two kinds of faction arise, that of the few against one another and that against the people; in democracies only the faction against the oligarchy arises, while no faction worth mentioning arises within the people against themselves. Further, the constitution based on the middle class is closer to democracy than to the constitution of the few;
[Bekker 1302a line 15]
and it is the most secure of such constitutions.

Since we are examining the causes from which factions arise and constitutions change, we must first grasp their beginnings and causes generally. Broadly speaking, they are three in number, and each must be distinguished by itself in outline
[Bekker 1302a line 20]
first. For we must grasp the disposition in which people engage in faction, the ends for which they do so, and third, the beginnings of political disturbances and factions against one another. As the general cause of their disposition toward change, we should chiefly posit what we have already spoken of. Those who
[Bekker 1302a line 25]
seek equality form factions if they think they have less, though they are equal to those who have more; those who seek inequality and superiority do so if they suppose that, though unequal, they have not more but an equal or smaller share (these desires may be just, but they may also be unjust). For those who are inferior
[Bekker 1302a line 30]
form factions to become equal, and those who are equal to become superior. We have therefore stated the disposition in which people engage in faction. The objects over which they do so are profit and honor and their opposites. For people also form factions in cities to escape dishonor and loss, either for themselves or for their friends. The causes and beginnings
[Bekker 1302a line 35]
of disturbances, from which people acquire the disposition described and become concerned with the objects mentioned, are in one sense seven in number, and in another more. Two of them are the same as those already mentioned, but not in the same way. For people are also incited against one another by profit and honor, not to acquire them
[Bekker 1302a line 40]
for themselves, as was said before,

but because others
[Bekker 1302b]
[Bekker 1302b line 1]
are seen taking a greater share of them, some justly, others unjustly. Further causes are insolence, fear, superiority, contempt, and disproportionate growth; and, in another way, electioneering, neglect, small changes,
[Bekker 1302b line 5]
and dissimilarity. The power of insolence and profit among these causes, and how they operate as causes, is fairly evident. For when those in office behave insolently and take more than their share, people form factions both against one another and against the constitutions that give them their power. This grasping for more is sometimes at the expense of
[Bekker 1302b line 10]
private property, sometimes of public property.—Honor too is evident, both in its power and in how it causes faction. For people form factions both when they themselves are dishonored and when they see others honored. These things happen unjustly when people are honored or dishonored contrary to their worth, and justly when according to their worth.
[Bekker 1302b line 15]
—Superiority causes faction when someone, whether one person or more, is greater in power than accords with the city and the strength of its citizen body; for monarchy or the rule of a powerful group commonly arises from such conditions. Hence in some places they customarily ostracize people, as at Argos and Athens. Yet it is better to see from the beginning that there will be no people
[Bekker 1302b line 20]
so greatly superior than to let them arise and seek a remedy afterward.—Through fear, both those who have done wrong, fearing punishment, and those about to suffer wrong, wishing to act before they suffer it, engage in faction. Thus at Rhodes the notables banded together against the people because of the lawsuits being brought against them.
[Bekker 1302b line 25]
—Through contempt people both form factions and attack: in oligarchies, for example, when those without a share in the constitution are more numerous (for they think themselves stronger); and in democracies, when the wealthy despise the disorder and lack of rule. Thus at Thebes, after the battle at Oenophyta,
[Bekker 1302b line 30]
poor government destroyed the democracy; and the democracy of the Megarians was destroyed when they were defeated through disorder and lack of rule. The same happened at Syracuse before Gelon's tyranny, and to the people at Rhodes before the uprising.

Changes in constitutions also arise through disproportionate growth. For just as
[Bekker 1302b line 35]
a body is composed of parts, which must grow proportionately if its symmetry is to remain, and otherwise it is ruined, when the foot is four cubits long and the rest of the body two spans; and sometimes it might even change into the shape of another animal, if not only in quantity but also in quality
[Bekker 1302b line 40]
it grew disproportionately, so a city too is composed
[Bekker 1303a]
[Bekker 1303a line 1]
of parts,

one of which often grows unnoticed, as does the multitude of the poor in democracies and polities. Sometimes this also happens through accidents: at Tarentum, for example, when many notables were defeated and killed by the
[Bekker 1303a line 5]
Iapygians shortly after the Persian Wars, democracy arose from polity. At Argos, when those of the seventh were killed by Cleomenes the Spartan, they were forced to admit some of the surrounding inhabitants. At Athens, when they suffered defeats on land, the notables became fewer because they were on the citizen list
[Bekker 1303a line 10]
for military service during the Spartan War. This also happens in democracies, though less often: as the wealthy become more numerous or their properties increase, they change into oligarchies and the rule of powerful groups.—Constitutions also change without faction, through electioneering, as
[Bekker 1303a line 15]
at Heraea (for they changed the offices from elective to allotted because people were choosing those who canvassed); and through neglect, when they let men unfriendly to the constitution enter the sovereign offices. Thus at Oreus the oligarchy was overthrown when Heracleodorus became one of the rulers: from an oligarchy he
[Bekker 1303a line 20]
constructed a polity and democracy.—Again, through small changes. By small changes I mean that a great alteration in the laws often develops unnoticed when people overlook a small one. Thus at Ambracia the property qualification was small, and in the end people held office without any qualification, on the ground that a small amount is close to nothing or no different
[Bekker 1303a line 25]
from nothing.

Difference of stock also fosters faction until people come to share a common spirit. For just as a city does not arise from any chance multitude, neither does it arise in any chance interval of time. Hence most of those who have admitted fellow settlers or later settlers have fallen into faction. For example, Achaeans settled Sybaris together with Troezenians; then the more numerous group,
[Bekker 1303a line 30]
the Achaeans, expelled the Troezenians, and from this came the curse upon the Sybarites. At Thurii the Sybarites quarreled with their fellow settlers (for, claiming a greater share because the land was theirs, they were expelled). At Byzantium the later settlers were caught plotting against the Byzantines and were driven out by fighting. As for the people of Antissa, those from Chios
[Bekker 1303a line 35]
whom they admitted as exiles they expelled by fighting; the people of Zancle admitted Samians and were themselves expelled. The people of Apollonia on the Euxine Sea brought in later settlers and fell into faction;

and the Syracusans, after the tyrannies, the foreigners
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[Bekker 1303b line 1]
and mercenaries they made citizens, then fell into faction and came to battle. The people of Amphipolis admitted settlers from Chalcis, and most of them were expelled by these newcomers. In oligarchies the many engage in faction because they believe they are wronged, since
[Bekker 1303b line 5]
they do not receive equal shares, as was said before, though they are equal; in democracies the notables do so because they receive equal shares though they are not equal. Cities sometimes also fall into faction because of their locations, when the territory is not naturally suited to being one city. Thus at Clazomenae those at Chytrum oppose those
[Bekker 1303b line 10]
on the island, and the Colophonians oppose the people of Notium. At Athens too the inhabitants are not alike: those who live in the Piraeus are more democratic than those in the city proper. For just as in wars the crossings of ditches, even very small ones, break up the battle lines, so every difference seems to produce division.
[Bekker 1303b line 15]
Perhaps the greatest division is between virtue and wickedness; next comes that between wealth and poverty, and then others, some greater than others, one of which is the difference just mentioned.

Factions, then, arise not over small matters but from small matters, and people engage in faction over great ones. Small differences are particularly powerful when among those in authority
[Bekker 1303b line 20]
they arise, as happened at Syracuse in ancient times. For the constitution changed because two young men holding office quarreled over a love affair. While one was away, the other won over his beloved; in return, the first, angered by this, the other's wife
[Bekker 1303b line 25]
he persuaded to come to him. From this, by drawing in members of the citizen body, they divided everyone into factions. Therefore such things must be guarded against at their beginnings, and factions among leaders and powerful men must be dissolved. For the error occurs at the beginning, and the beginning is said to be half of everything,
[Bekker 1303b line 30]
so that even a small error there is proportionate to errors in the other parts. In general, factions among the notables make the whole city share in their consequences. Thus at Hestiaea after the Persian Wars two brothers disputed over the division of their father's estate. The poorer brother,
[Bekker 1303b line 35]
claiming that the other had not disclosed the property or the treasure their father had found, enlisted the democrats; the other, who had much property, enlisted the wealthy. At Delphi too a disagreement arising from a marriage connection became the beginning of all the factions
[Bekker 1304a]
[Bekker 1304a line 1]
that followed;

for when the bridegroom came for his bride, he took some occurrence as an omen and went away without taking her. The others, considering themselves insulted, planted some of the sacred money on him while he was sacrificing and then killed him as a temple robber. At Mytilene too, over heiresses
[Bekker 1304a line 5]
a faction arose and became the beginning of many evils and of the war against the Athenians, in which Paches captured their city. For Timophanes, a wealthy man, left two daughters; Dexander, who was rebuffed and failed to obtain them for his sons, began the faction and incited the Athenians,
[Bekker 1304a line 10]
whose city's representative he was. Among the Phocians too, a faction over an heiress between Mnaseas, Mnason's father, and Euthycrates, Onomarchus's father, became the beginning of the Sacred War for the Phocians. At Epidamnus also the constitution changed because of a marriage dispute. A man had betrothed
[Bekker 1304a line 15]
his daughter to another; when the father of the man to whom she was betrothed became a ruler and fined him, the other, believing himself mistreated, brought in those outside the constitution.

Constitutions also change into oligarchy, democracy, and polity because an office or a part of the city gains prestige or grows stronger.
[Bekker 1304a line 20]
For example, the council on the Areopagus, having won prestige in the Persian Wars, was thought to have tightened the constitution; and, on the other hand, the naval masses, having brought about the victory at Salamis and thereby the city's leadership through its sea power, made the democracy stronger.
[Bekker 1304a line 25]
At Argos the notables, having won prestige in the battle at Mantinea against the Lacedaemonians, attempted to overthrow the people. At Syracuse the people, having brought about victory in the war against the Athenians, changed the polity into democracy. At Chalcis, Phoxus
[Bekker 1304a line 30]
the tyrant was killed by the people together with the notables, and the people immediately took control of the constitution. At Ambracia too, in the same way, the people helped those who attacked Periander the tyrant to drive him out and transferred the constitution to themselves. In general, we must not overlook this: those who have brought about an increase in power,
[Bekker 1304a line 35]
whether private individuals, offices, tribes, or any part or multitude whatever, stir up faction. For either those who envy them their honors begin the faction, or these people, because of their superiority, are unwilling to remain on equal terms. Constitutions are also disturbed when the parts of the city thought to be opposed become equal
[Bekker 1304b]
[Bekker 1304b line 1]
to one another,

such as the rich and the people, and there is no middle class or only a very small one. For if either part is greatly superior, the other is unwilling to risk itself against a plainly stronger opponent. Hence those who excel in virtue do not engage in faction,
[Bekker 1304b line 5]
so to speak; for they are few against many. In general, then, the beginnings and causes of factions and changes in all constitutions are of this kind. People change constitutions sometimes through force and sometimes through deception; by force, either compelling people immediately from the beginning or doing so afterward.
[Bekker 1304b line 10]
For deception too is of two kinds. Sometimes they first deceive people into consenting to a change in the constitution, and afterward hold it by force against their will. Thus under the Four Hundred they deceived the people by saying that the King would provide money for the war against the Lacedaemonians; having lied,
[Bekker 1304b line 15]
they tried to retain the constitution. Sometimes, having persuaded people from the outset, they continue afterward to rule them with their willing consent. Generally, then, changes in all constitutions arise from the causes that have been stated.

### Book V, 1304b–1308a

Distinguishing the effects of these causes for each kind of constitution,
[Bekker 1304b line 20]
we must examine the consequences. Democracies chiefly change through the outrageous conduct of demagogues. For by bringing malicious charges against property owners individually, they draw them together (a common fear unites even the bitterest enemies), while publicly they stir up the multitude against them. As for this,
[Bekker 1304b line 25]
one can see it happening in many cases. At Cos, for example, the democracy changed when wicked demagogues arose (for the notables banded together); and at Rhodes too. For the demagogues procured pay for public service and prevented the repayment of what was owed to the trierarchs; the latter, because of the impending
[Bekker 1304b line 30]
lawsuits against them, were forced to band together and overthrow the people. At Heraclea too the people were overthrown soon after the colony was founded, because of the demagogues. For the notables, wronged by them, were driven into exile; then the exiles gathered together, returned, and overthrew the people. In much the same way
[Bekker 1304b line 35]
the democracy at Megara was also overthrown. For the demagogues, to have property to confiscate, expelled many of the notables, until they had made the exiles numerous. The exiles returned, defeated the people in battle, and established the oligarchy.

The same thing happened at
[Bekker 1305a]
[Bekker 1305a line 1]
Cyme in the democracy that Thrasymachus overthrew. In nearly all the other cases too, one would find on examination that the changes followed this pattern. For sometimes, to win favor, demagogues wrong the notables and so unite them: either their property
[Bekker 1305a line 5]
is redistributed or their revenues are consumed through public services; sometimes they slander them, so that they can confiscate the possessions of the rich.

In ancient times, when the same man became both demagogue and general, democracies changed into tyranny. For nearly all the ancient tyrants arose from demagogues.
[Bekker 1305a line 10]
The reason this happened then but does not happen now is that the demagogues then came from among the generals (for people were not yet skilled in speaking), whereas now, with the growth of rhetoric, those able to speak act as demagogues, but their inexperience in military matters keeps them from attempting tyranny, except where there has been some small development
[Bekker 1305a line 15]
of this kind. Tyrannies also arose more often in earlier times than now because important offices were entrusted to individuals, as at Miletus the tyranny arose from the presidency (for the president was sovereign over many important matters). Further, because cities then were not large, but in the countryside lived the
[Bekker 1305a line 20]
people, busy with their work, the leaders of the people, when they became capable soldiers, attempted tyranny. All did this after gaining the people's trust, and the ground of that trust was hostility toward the rich. Thus at Athens Pisistratus engaged in faction against the men of the plain; and at Megara Theagenes
[Bekker 1305a line 25]
slaughtered the livestock of the wealthy, seizing it as they pastured it beside the river. Dionysius, by accusing Daphnaeus and the rich, was judged worthy of tyranny, since his hostility won him trust as a friend of the people. Democracies also change from the ancestral form to the newest one. For where election is used
[Bekker 1305a line 30]
for offices without property qualifications, and the people make the choice, those eager for office act as demagogues and bring things to the point where the people are sovereign even over the laws. A remedy that prevents this or makes it less frequent is for the tribes to elect the rulers, rather than the people as a whole. As for democracies,
[Bekker 1305a line 35]
nearly all their changes, then, occur through these causes.

Oligarchies change chiefly in two especially evident ways. One is when they wrong the multitude, for anyone becomes a sufficient leader against them, especially when
[Bekker 1305a line 40]
the leader happens to come from the oligarchy itself, as did Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterward also became tyrant of the
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[Bekker 1305b line 1]
Naxians.

The beginning of faction from outside also takes different forms. Sometimes the overthrow comes from the wealthy themselves, though not those in office, when those holding honors are exceedingly few, as happened at Massalia,
[Bekker 1305b line 5]
Istrus, Heraclea, and other cities. For those without a share in the offices stirred up change until first the elder brothers gained a share, and later the younger brothers in turn. In some places a father and son do not hold office together; in others one elder and one younger
[Bekker 1305b line 10]
brother cannot hold office together. At Massalia the oligarchy became more constitutional, at Istrus it ended in democracy, and at Heraclea it expanded from fewer members to six hundred. At Cnidos too the oligarchy changed when the notables themselves fell into faction with one another because few had a share and, as has been said, if a father held office,
[Bekker 1305b line 15]
his son could not share in it, nor, if there were several brothers, could anyone but the eldest. For the people seized their opportunity while they were divided, took a leader from among the notables, attacked, and prevailed; for what is divided by faction is weak. At Erythrae too, under the oligarchy of the Basilidae in ancient times, although
[Bekker 1305b line 20]
those within the constitution administered it well, the people nevertheless resented being ruled by a few and changed the constitution.

Oligarchies are also disturbed from within by the rivalry of those who act as demagogues (demagoguery is of two kinds: one occurs among the few themselves—for a demagogue arises
[Bekker 1305b line 25]
even when they are very few; thus among the Thirty at Athens, Charicles and his associates gained power by playing the demagogue to the Thirty, and among the Four Hundred Phrynichus and his associates did the same—the other occurs when those within the oligarchy play the demagogue to the masses. Thus at Larissa the citizen guardians, because they were chosen by
[Bekker 1305b line 30]
the masses, acted as demagogues; and the same happens in all oligarchies where officeholders are not chosen by those from whom they are drawn, but the offices are filled from those with high property qualifications or from political clubs, while the heavy-armed soldiers or the people choose them, as happened at Abydos; and where the law courts are not drawn from the citizen body—for by playing the demagogue
[Bekker 1305b line 35]
in court proceedings they change the constitution, as happened at Heraclea on the Pontus. Again, it happens when some pull the oligarchy into fewer hands, for those seeking equality are forced to call in the people as an ally). Changes in oligarchy also arise when
[Bekker 1305b line 40]
men squander their private property by living extravagantly. For such men seek innovations: either they attempt tyranny themselves or
[Bekker 1306a]
[Bekker 1306a line 1]
set up someone else

(as Hipparinus did Dionysius at Syracuse; and at Amphipolis a man named Cleotimus brought in settlers from Chalcis, and when they arrived he set them at odds with the wealthy; and at Aegina the man who carried on the dealings
[Bekker 1306a line 5]
with Chares attempted to change the constitution for such a reason). Sometimes, then, they attempt to stir up some change; sometimes they steal public funds, from which faction against one another arises, either among these men themselves or from those who fight against their theft, as happened at Apollonia on the Pontus. But an oligarchy united in concord
[Bekker 1306a line 10]
is not easily destroyed from within. Evidence is the constitution at Pharsalus: though few, they are sovereign over many because they treat one another well.

Oligarchies are also overthrown when they create another oligarchy within the oligarchy. This happens when, although the whole citizen body is small,
[Bekker 1306a line 15]
not all the few share in the highest offices, as once happened at Elis. For although the constitution was in the hands of a few, exceedingly few of them became elders, because the elders held office for life and numbered ninety, and their choice was controlled by a powerful group, resembling the choice of the elders at Lacedaemon. Change also occurs
[Bekker 1306a line 20]
in oligarchies both in war and in peace: in war because distrust of the people forces them to employ mercenaries (for the man to whom they entrust them often becomes tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth; if they entrust them to several, these secure the rule of a powerful group for themselves;
[Bekker 1306a line 25]
sometimes, fearing these outcomes, they give the multitude a share in the constitution because they are forced to use the people). In peace, through distrust of one another, they entrust their defense to mercenaries and a neutral ruler, who sometimes becomes sovereign over both sides, as happened at Larissa
[Bekker 1306a line 30]
under the rule of the Aleuadae led by Simus, and at Abydos under the political clubs, one of which was that of Iphiades.

Factions also arise because some members of the oligarchy are thrust aside by others and driven into faction over marriages or lawsuits. Examples arising from marriage disputes are those mentioned
[Bekker 1306a line 35]
before (and Diagoras also overthrew the oligarchy of the knights at Eretria after being wronged over a marriage). A verdict in a law court gave rise to the faction at Heraclea and that at Thebes, when punishment on a charge of adultery was inflicted justly but in a factious manner: at Heraclea upon Eurytion,
[Bekker 1306b]
[Bekker 1306b line 1]
and at Thebes upon Archias

(for their enemies pressed the matter so that they were bound in the pillory in the marketplace). Many oligarchies have also been overthrown because they were excessively despotic, causing some of those within the constitution to grow discontented,
[Bekker 1306b line 5]
as with the oligarchies at Cnidos and Chios. Changes also arise by accident both in the so-called polity and in those oligarchies where people serve on the council, sit as jurors, and hold the other offices on the basis of a property qualification. For often the property qualification originally fixed to suit
[Bekker 1306b line 10]
the circumstances of the time, so that in the oligarchy few might share in office and in the polity the middle class might do so, is overtaken by prosperity arising from peace or some other good fortune: the same possessions become worth many times the qualification, so that everyone shares in everything. Sometimes by stages
[Bekker 1306b line 15]
the change occurs, little by little and unnoticed, and sometimes more quickly. Oligarchies, then, undergo change and faction through causes of this kind (and in general both democracies and oligarchies sometimes change not into the opposite constitutions, but into those of the same kind: for example,
[Bekker 1306b line 20]
from law-governed democracies and oligarchies into those that are themselves sovereign, and from these into the former).

In aristocracies some factions arise because few share in the honors, which, as has been said, also disturbs oligarchies, since the description of aristocracy too as oligarchy
[Bekker 1306b line 25]
is true in a way (for in both the rulers are few, though they are few for different reasons). Indeed, for these reasons aristocracy is also thought to be oligarchy. This is especially bound to happen when there is a multitude of people who have a proud sense that they are alike in virtue, as at Lacedaemon the so-called Partheniae
[Bekker 1306b line 30]
(for they were descended from the peers), whom the Lacedaemonians, after discovering their plot, sent out to found Tarentum; or when certain men of greatness, inferior to none in virtue, are dishonored by others enjoying higher honors, as Lysander was by the kings; or when a courageous man has no share in honors, as Cinadon,
[Bekker 1306b line 35]
who organized the attack upon the Spartans in the time of Agesilaus. Again, faction arises when some are exceedingly poor and others wealthy (this happens especially in wars, and it happened at Lacedaemon during the Messenian War; this is also evident from Tyrtaeus's poem called
[Bekker 1307a]
[Bekker 1307a line 1]
Eunomia;

for some, hard pressed by the war, demanded that the land be redistributed). Again, it arises if someone is great and capable of becoming still greater, so that he may rule alone, as is thought to have been the aim at Lacedaemon of Pausanias, who commanded during the Persian
[Bekker 1307a line 5]
War, and at Carthage of Hanno.

Polities and aristocracies are chiefly dissolved through a deviation from the just within the constitution itself. For the beginning lies in the failure to mix democracy and oligarchy well in a polity, and these together with virtue in an aristocracy,
[Bekker 1307a line 10]
particularly the first two—by the two I mean democracy and oligarchy. For polities and most of the so-called aristocracies attempt to mix these. Aristocracies differ from the so-called polities in this respect, and because of it some of them are less lasting and others more so.
[Bekker 1307a line 15]
For those that lean more toward oligarchy are called aristocracies, and those that lean toward the multitude, polities. Hence the latter are more secure than the former: the larger number is stronger, and people are more content when they have an equal share, whereas the wealthy, if the constitution gives them superiority,
[Bekker 1307a line 20]
seek to act insolently and take more. In general, whichever way the constitution inclines, it shifts in that direction, as each side increases its own power: for example, polity shifts into democracy, and aristocracy into oligarchy. Or they shift into their opposites: aristocracy, for example, into democracy (for, on the ground of being wronged, it is pulled toward
[Bekker 1307a line 25]
the opposite by the poorer people), and polities into oligarchy (for only equality according to worth and the possession of what is one's own are lasting). What has been described happened at Thurii. Because office depended upon a high property qualification, they shifted to a lower one and a greater number of offices; and because all the land
[Bekker 1307a line 30]
had been acquired by the notables contrary to the law (for the constitution was rather oligarchical, so they could take more than their share), the people, trained in war, became stronger than the guards, until those who held too much land relinquished it.

Further, the oligarchical character of all aristocratic constitutions
[Bekker 1307a line 35]
means that the notables take more than their share. Thus at Lacedaemon property passes into few hands; and the notables have greater freedom to do whatever they wish and to form marriage connections with whomever they wish. Hence the city of the Locrians was ruined by its marriage connection with Dionysius, which would not have happened in a democracy, nor
[Bekker 1307a line 40]
in a well-mixed aristocracy.

Especially unnoticed are
[Bekker 1307b]
[Bekker 1307b line 1]
aristocracies as they change, because they are dissolved little by little. As was said earlier about all constitutions generally, even a small thing is a cause of change. For when people abandon some matter concerning the constitution, afterward
[Bekker 1307b line 5]
they alter another, slightly greater one more readily, until they have altered the entire order. This happened to the constitution of Thurii. For although there was a law that one could serve as general only at intervals of five years, some younger men became skilled in war and gained prestige among the mass of the guards; despising those in
[Bekker 1307b line 10]
charge of affairs and thinking they would easily gain control, they first attempted to abolish this law, so that the same men could serve continuously as generals, seeing that the people would eagerly vote for them. The rulers appointed to deal with this, called councilors, at first moved to oppose them,
[Bekker 1307b line 15]
but were persuaded to join them, supposing that after altering this law they would leave the rest of the constitution alone. Later, when other things were being altered and they wished to prevent it, they could no longer accomplish anything: the entire order of the constitution changed into the rule of the powerful men who had attempted the innovations.

All constitutions
[Bekker 1307b line 20]
are dissolved sometimes from within, sometimes from outside, when an opposite constitution is either nearby or far away but powerful. This happened in the time of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians: for the Athenians everywhere overthrew oligarchies, and the Spartans democracies. The sources from which changes
[Bekker 1307b line 25]
in constitutions and factions arise have now been stated for the most part.

Next we must speak about preservation, both generally and for each constitution separately. First, then, it is clear that if we possess the means through which constitutions are destroyed, we also possess those through which they are preserved; for opposite causes produce opposite effects, and destruction is
[Bekker 1307b line 30]
the opposite of preservation. In well-blended constitutions, then, if anything must be watched, it is that no breach of law occurs, and above all the small breach must be guarded against. For lawlessness slips in unnoticed, just as a small expense, often repeated, destroys a fortune. The expense goes unnoticed
[Bekker 1307b line 35]
because it does not occur all at once; the mind is led astray by these expenses, as by the sophistical argument that if each is small, all are small. This is true in one sense, but in another it is not: for the whole and the total are not small, but are composed of small things.

This, then, is one safeguard, at the outset,
[Bekker 1307b line 40]
that must be taken. Next, we must not trust sophistical tricks
[Bekker 1308a]
[Bekker 1308a line 1]
devised against the multitude,

for they are exposed by events (what we mean by constitutional sophistries has been stated before). Further, we must observe that some aristocracies and even oligarchies endure, not because security
[Bekker 1308a line 5]
belongs to their constitutions, but because those who hold office treat both those outside the constitution and those within the citizen body well. They treat those without a share well by not wronging them, by bringing their leading men into the constitution, by not wronging the ambitious through dishonor or the many
[Bekker 1308a line 10]
in their gain; and they treat themselves and those who share in the constitution well by dealing democratically with one another. For the equality that democrats seek for the multitude is not only just but also advantageous among peers. Hence, if there are many within the citizen body, many democratic laws are advantageous,
[Bekker 1308a line 15]
such as making offices last six months, so that all the peers may share in them; for the peers are already like a people (hence demagogues often arise among them too, as was said before). Further, oligarchies and aristocracies fall less often into the rule of powerful groups (for it is not equally easy to do wrong
[Bekker 1308a line 20]
when holding office for a short time and for a long one; indeed, for this reason tyrannies arise in oligarchies and democracies. For either the most powerful in each attempt tyranny—demagogues in the one, powerful men in the other—or those holding the highest offices, when they hold them for a long time).

### Book V, 1308a–1311b

Constitutions are preserved
[Bekker 1308a line 25]
not only because the things that destroy them are far away, but sometimes also because they are near. Fear makes people keep a firmer hold on their constitution. Those who care for the constitution must therefore create occasions for fear, so that people guard it and do not abandon, as they would a night watch,
[Bekker 1308a line 30]
their watch over the constitution, and must bring what is distant near. Moreover, they must try, by means of the laws as well, to guard against the rivalries and factions of the notables, and to protect those outside the rivalry before they too are drawn into it. For recognizing an evil as it begins is not the work of just anyone, but requires political
[Bekker 1308a line 35]
judgment. As for the change from oligarchy and polity that arises through property qualifications, when this happens because the same qualifications remain in place while money becomes more plentiful, it is advantageous to examine the total assessed value of the community against its previous value: in those
[Bekker 1308a line 40]
cities where assessments are made annually, at that interval,

[Bekker 1308b]
[Bekker 1308b line 1]
and in larger cities every three or five years. If it is a multiple or a fraction of the earlier value, at which the constitution's assessments were established, there should be a law to raise or lower the property qualifications: if the value has increased, raising them
[Bekker 1308b line 5]
in proportion to the increase; if it has declined, lowering them and making the assessment smaller. For in oligarchies and polities, if they do not do this, in the one case an oligarchy arises in some places and the rule of a powerful clique in others, while in the other case a polity changes into a democracy, and an oligarchy
[Bekker 1308b line 10]
into a polity or democracy.

A measure common to democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, and every constitution is not to enlarge anyone's power excessively, beyond due proportion, but rather to try to grant small honors over a long period than great ones quickly. For people are corrupted, and not every man can bear
[Bekker 1308b line 15]
good fortune. If this is not done, at least do not take back all at once honors that were given all at once, but withdraw them gradually. Above all, try to regulate matters by the laws so that no one arises with a great preponderance of power through either friends or money; failing that, arrange for such people to spend their time abroad.
[Bekker 1308b line 20]
Since people also seek revolution because of their private lives, an office should be established to oversee those whose lives are at odds with the constitution: in a democracy, with democracy; in an oligarchy, with oligarchy; and similarly in each of the other constitutions. As for prosperity within the city,
[Bekker 1308b line 25]
one must guard against it in any particular section for the same reasons. The remedy is always to entrust business and offices to the opposing parts—I mean that the respectable oppose the multitude, and the poor the wealthy—and to try either to blend together the multitude of the poor and, on the other side,
[Bekker 1308b line 30]
that of the wealthy, or to enlarge the middle class. For this dissolves factions arising from inequality. The most important thing in every constitution is for the laws and the rest of its administration to be so arranged that offices offer no opportunity for profit.

This must be watched especially in oligarchic constitutions. For the many are not so indignant at being excluded
[Bekker 1308b line 35]
from rule; indeed, they are pleased if they are left free to attend to their private affairs. But if they think the rulers are stealing public funds, then both things distress them: their exclusion from honors and from profits. There is only one way in which democracy and aristocracy can exist together,
[Bekker 1308b line 40]
and that is if someone establishes this arrangement.

For it would be possible for both the
[Bekker 1309a]
[Bekker 1309a line 1]
notables and the multitude to have what they want. For everyone to be permitted to rule is democratic, while for the notables to hold office is aristocratic. This will happen when offices offer no opportunity for profit. For the poor
[Bekker 1309a line 5]
will not wish to rule if they gain nothing, but will prefer to attend to their private affairs, while the wealthy will be able to do so because they need nothing from public funds. Thus the poor will become wealthy by spending their time at their work, and the notables will not be ruled by just anyone.
[Bekker 1309a line 10]
To prevent public funds from being stolen, let the transfer of money take place in the presence of all the citizens, and let copies of the accounts be deposited with the phratries, companies, and tribes. To encourage service in office without profit, honors for those who earn distinction must be established by law. In democracies, the
[Bekker 1309a line 15]
wealthy must be spared: not only must their property not be redistributed, but neither must its produce—a practice that passes unnoticed in some constitutions. It is better also to prevent them, even when they are willing, from undertaking costly but useless public services, such as sponsoring choruses, organizing torch races, and all other services of this kind.
[Bekker 1309a line 20]
In an oligarchy, much care should be taken for the poor, and offices that provide income should be assigned to them. If one of the wealthy outrages them, the penalties should be greater than if he outraged someone of his own class. Inheritances should pass by descent rather than by gift, and no more than one inheritance
[Bekker 1309a line 25]
should pass to the same person. For in this way properties would be more equal, and more of the poor would attain prosperity. In both democracy and oligarchy it is advantageous to allot either equality or precedence in other matters to those who have less share in the constitution: in a democracy to the wealthy, and in an oligarchy
[Bekker 1309a line 30]
to the poor. The exception is offices sovereign over the constitution: these should be entrusted only, or for the most part, to those who belong to the constitution.

Those who are to hold the sovereign offices must possess three things: first, friendship toward what is established:
[Bekker 1309a line 35]
the constitution; next, the greatest capacity for the work of the office; and third, in each constitution, the virtue and justice appropriate to that constitution. For if the just is not the same under all constitutions, there must also be differences in justice. But a difficulty arises when these qualities do not
[Bekker 1309a line 40]
all coincide in the same person: how should the choice be made?

[Bekker 1309b]
[Bekker 1309b line 1]
For example, if one man is skilled in generalship but vicious and no friend of the constitution, while another is just and friendly toward it, how should the choice be made? It seems that we must look to two things: which quality everyone shares more widely, and which less widely. Thus in choosing a general,
[Bekker 1309b line 5]
we should look more to experience than to virtue, since fewer people share the skills of generalship, and more share decency; but in choosing a guardian or treasurer, the reverse, since this requires more virtue than most people possess, while the knowledge is common to all.

Someone might ask: if capacity and friendship toward the constitution are present,
[Bekker 1309b line 10]
what need is there of virtue? For the two together will achieve what is advantageous. Is it because people who possess both may lack self-control? Just as they do not serve their own interests, although they know and love themselves, so nothing prevents some of them from being similarly disposed toward the community. In general, all the things in the laws that we say are advantageous
[Bekker 1309b line 15]
to constitutions preserve those constitutions; and the greatest element is what has often been stated: ensuring that the multitude who want the constitution is stronger than those who do not. Besides all this, we must not overlook what the deviant constitutions now overlook: the mean.
[Bekker 1309b line 20]
For many things thought democratic destroy democracies, and many thought oligarchic destroy oligarchies. Those who think this is the sole virtue draw it toward excess, not knowing that a nose may depart from the straightness that is most beautiful toward being hooked or snub,
[Bekker 1309b line 25]
yet still be beautiful and pleasing to the eye. But if someone presses it still further toward excess, it will first lose the proper proportion of the part, and finally he will make it appear not even to be a nose, because of the excess and deficiency of the opposing features. The same holds for
[Bekker 1309b line 30]
the other parts, and this also happens with the other constitutions. For an oligarchy or a democracy can be in a satisfactory condition, although it has departed from the best arrangement. But if someone pushes either of them further, he will first make the constitution worse, and finally make it no constitution at all.
[Bekker 1309b line 35]
Therefore the legislator and statesman must not be ignorant of which democratic measures preserve democracy and which destroy it, or which oligarchic measures preserve or destroy oligarchy. For neither can exist and endure without both the wealthy and the multitude; but when equality
[Bekker 1309b line 40]
of property arises, this constitution must necessarily become another one.

[Bekker 1310a]
[Bekker 1310a line 1]
Thus by destroying these elements through laws carried to excess, they destroy the constitutions.

Mistakes are also made in democracies and oligarchies. In democracies, the demagogues err where the multitude is sovereign over the laws: for two opposing sides
[Bekker 1310a line 5]
they always create within the city by fighting the wealthy, whereas they should, on the contrary, always appear to speak on behalf of the wealthy. In oligarchies, the oligarchs should speak on behalf of the people, and swear oaths opposite to those they swear now. For now in some oligarchies they swear, “I will be ill-disposed toward the people, and will devise
[Bekker 1310a line 10]
whatever harm I can.” But they should adopt and profess the opposite attitude, declaring in their oaths, “I will not wrong the people.”

The greatest of all the things mentioned for making constitutions endure, which everyone now neglects, is education suited to the constitutions. For there is no benefit in
[Bekker 1310a line 15]
even the most beneficial laws, approved by all who take part in public life, unless people are habituated and educated in the constitution: democratically if the laws are democratic, and oligarchically if they are oligarchic. For if a single person can lack self-control, so can a city. Being educated
[Bekker 1310a line 20]
to suit the constitution does not mean doing what pleases the oligarchs or those who want democracy, but what will enable the former to rule oligarchically and the latter to live under democracy. As things stand, in oligarchies the sons of the rulers live in luxury, while those of the poor become trained and hardened by toil,
[Bekker 1310a line 25]
so that they are both more willing and more able to bring about revolution. In democracies thought to be especially democratic, the opposite of what is advantageous has become established. The cause is that they define freedom badly. For democracy seems to be defined by two things: the majority's being sovereign, and
[Bekker 1310a line 30]
freedom. For the just is thought to be equal; and equality means that whatever the multitude decides is sovereign; while freedom and equality mean doing whatever one wishes. Thus in such democracies everyone lives as he wishes, and “toward whatever he desires,” as Euripides says. But this is bad. For we must not
[Bekker 1310a line 35]
think that living in accordance with the constitution is slavery, but preservation. These, then, broadly speaking, are the causes through which constitutions change and are destroyed, and the means through which they are preserved and endure.

It remains to examine monarchy as well: the causes through which
[Bekker 1310a line 40]
it is destroyed and the means through which it naturally preserves itself.

Nearly the same
[Bekker 1310b]
[Bekker 1310b line 1]
as what has been said about constitutions are the events concerning kingships and tyrannies. For kingship corresponds to aristocracy, while tyranny is composed of the most extreme oligarchy and democracy.
[Bekker 1310b line 5]
For this reason it is also the most harmful to the ruled, since it is composed of two evils and possesses the deviations and errors of both constitutions. The two forms of monarchy have opposite origins from the outset. For help against the people
[Bekker 1310b line 10]
came through kingship to the respectable, and a king is appointed from among the respectable because of his preeminence in virtue, or in actions springing from virtue, or through the preeminence of a family of this kind. But the tyrant comes from the people and the multitude to oppose the notables, so that the people may suffer no injustice at their hands. The events make this clear. For nearly
[Bekker 1310b line 15]
all tyrants, one might say, have arisen from demagogues, winning trust by slandering the notables. Some tyrannies were established in this way after the cities had grown; those before them arose from kings who departed from ancestral ways, a more masterful form of rule
[Bekker 1310b line 20]
being what they sought; others from those elected to the sovereign offices—for in ancient times the peoples made civic magistracies and sacred missions long-lasting—and others from oligarchies that chose one man as sovereign over the greatest offices. For all these ways offered the possibility of accomplishing this easily,
[Bekker 1310b line 25]
if only they wished, because power was already available to them: to some through royal rule, to others through the honor of office. Thus Pheidon at Argos and others became tyrants when a kingship already existed; those in Ionia and Phalaris rose from offices; Panaetius at Leontini, Cypselus at Corinth,
[Bekker 1310b line 30]
Pisistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and others rose in the same way from leadership of the people. As we said, then, kingship is ranked with aristocracy. For it rests on merit, whether personal virtue, family, benefactions, or these together with power. All
[Bekker 1310b line 35]
who received this honor had benefited, or were capable of benefiting, cities or peoples: some by preventing their enslavement in war, like Codrus; others by freeing them, like Cyrus; or by founding settlements or acquiring territory, like the kings of Lacedaemon, Macedonia, and
[Bekker 1310b line 40]
the Molossians. The king wishes to be a guardian,

so that
[Bekker 1311a]
[Bekker 1311a line 1]
those who possess property suffer no injustice, and the people suffer no outrage. Tyranny, as has often been said, looks to no common interest, except for the sake of its own benefit. The tyrant's aim is pleasure,
[Bekker 1311a line 5]
and the king's is the noble. Therefore, among the objects they seek in excess, money is more characteristic of a tyrant, and honor of a king; and a king's guard consists of citizens, while a tyrant's consists of foreigners.

It is clear that tyranny possesses the evils of both democracy and oligarchy. From oligarchy it takes
[Bekker 1311a line 10]
wealth as its end, for only in this way can the guard and its luxury be maintained, and complete distrust of the multitude, which is why tyrants confiscate their arms. Ill-treatment of the masses, driving them out of the urban center, and dispersing them among settlements are common to both
[Bekker 1311a line 15]
oligarchy and tyranny. From democracy it takes warfare against the notables, destroying them secretly and openly and exiling them as rivals and obstacles to its rule. For plots arise from these men: some wish to rule themselves, while others wish not
[Bekker 1311a line 20]
to be slaves. This is the source of Periander's advice to Thrasybulus, the cutting down of the outstanding ears of grain, meaning that the outstanding citizens must always be removed. As was more or less said, then, we must suppose that the beginnings of changes are the same for constitutions and for monarchies.
[Bekker 1311a line 25]
For many of the ruled attack monarchies because of injustice, fear, or contempt; and among forms of injustice, especially because of outrage, though sometimes also because they are deprived of their private property.

The ends sought in tyrannies and kingships are also the same as in those constitutions.
[Bekker 1311a line 30]
For monarchs possess great wealth and honor, which everyone desires. Some attacks are directed against the rulers' persons, others against their rule. Those arising from outrage are directed against their persons. Since outrage takes many forms, each becomes a cause of anger; and of those who are angry,
[Bekker 1311a line 35]
most attack for the sake of revenge, not preeminence. For example, the attack on the Pisistratids arose because they insulted Harmodius's sister and affronted Harmodius: Harmodius acted on account of his sister, and Aristogeiton on account of Harmodius. A plot was also made against Periander,
[Bekker 1311a line 40]
the tyrant at Ambracia, because, while drinking with
[Bekker 1311b]
[Bekker 1311b line 1]
his beloved, he asked the young man whether he was already pregnant by him.

Philip was attacked by Pausanias because he allowed Pausanias to be outraged by Attalus and his companions; Amyntas the Little by Derdas because he boasted of having enjoyed Derdas's youth; and
[Bekker 1311b line 5]
Evagoras of Cyprus by the eunuch, who killed him because his son had taken away the eunuch's wife and he felt outraged. Many attacks have also occurred because certain monarchs inflicted sexual dishonor. Such was Crataeus's attack on Archelaus. For he always resented their intercourse, so that sufficient
[Bekker 1311b line 10]
would have been even a lesser pretext—or because Archelaus, despite his promise, gave him neither of his daughters, but, pressed by war against Sirrhas and Arrhabaeus, gave the elder to the king of Elimeia, and the younger to his son Amyntas, thinking that in this way Amyntas would be least likely to quarrel
[Bekker 1311b line 15]
with his son by Cleopatra. But the beginning of the estrangement was his resentment at the sexual service. Hellanocrates of Larissa joined the attack for the same reason. For since Archelaus enjoyed his youth but did not restore him to his homeland as promised, outrage rather than erotic desire
[Bekker 1311b line 20]
was, he thought, the reason for their intercourse. Python and Heraclides of Aenus destroyed Cotys to avenge their father; and Adamas revolted against Cotys because Cotys had castrated him as a boy, and he felt outraged.

### Book V, 1311b–1315a

Many, too, have been angered by bodily mistreatment through blows: some have killed,
[Bekker 1311b line 25]
others have attempted to kill, because they felt outraged, even men holding offices and royal power. For example, at Mytilene, Megacles and his friends attacked and killed the Penthilids, who went about striking people with clubs. Later Smerdis, after being beaten,
[Bekker 1311b line 30]
was dragged away from his wife and killed Penthilus. Decamnichus also became a leader in the attack on Archelaus, being the first to incite the attackers. The cause of his anger was that Archelaus had handed him over to Euripides the poet to be whipped. Euripides was angry because Decamnichus had said something about his bad breath. Many others, too,
[Bekker 1311b line 35]
have been killed or plotted against for such reasons. The same holds for fear: this was one of the causes, in monarchies as in constitutions. For example, Artapanes attacked Xerxes, fearing an accusation over Darius, whom he had hanged without Xerxes' orders, but thinking
[Bekker 1311b line 40]
that Xerxes would pardon him, having forgotten the matter because he was dining. Other attacks arise from
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contempt,

as when someone saw Sardanapalus carding wool with the women—if those who tell the story speak the truth; and if not of him, it could certainly be true of someone else. Dion also attacked Dionysius the Younger because he
[Bekker 1312a line 5]
despised him, seeing the citizens similarly disposed and Dionysius himself continually drunk. Some friends also attack out of contempt: because they are trusted, they despise the ruler, thinking they will escape notice. Those who think they can seize power also attack, in a sense, out of contempt.
[Bekker 1312a line 10]
For, believing themselves capable and despising the danger because of their power, they readily make the attempt, as do those who serve as generals under monarchs: Cyrus, for example, attacked Astyages, despising both his way of life and his power, because the power had fallen idle while Astyages lived in luxury; and Seuthes the Thracian attacked Amadocus, whose general he was.
[Bekker 1312a line 15]
Others attack for several of these reasons, for example both out of contempt and for profit, as Mithridates attacked Ariobarzanes. Those who are bold by nature and hold military honors under monarchs attempt it especially for this reason. For courage joined to power is audacity; and because of these
[Bekker 1312a line 20]
two things they make their attacks, thinking they will prevail easily.

For those who attack from love of honor, the cause takes a different form from those mentioned earlier. Some attempt to overthrow tyrants because they see great profits and great honors awaiting them; but this is not why each of those who attack from love of honor
[Bekker 1312a line 25]
chooses to run the risk. The former act for the reason stated, while the latter, just as they would undertake some other extraordinary deed through which they become renowned and known to others, make an attempt against monarchs, wishing to acquire not
[Bekker 1312a line 30]
monarchy but glory. Yet those who set out for this reason are very few in number. For they must presuppose that they care nothing for survival if they are not going to accomplish the deed. They must adopt Dion's conviction, though it is not easy for many to acquire it.
[Bekker 1312a line 35]
For he marched against Dionysius with a few men, saying that his attitude was this: however far he could advance, it would be enough for him to have taken that much part in the enterprise. For example, if he happened to die immediately after setting foot on a small stretch of land, such a death would be acceptable to him.

Tyranny is destroyed, in one case,
[Bekker 1312a line 40]
in this way, like each of the other constitutions, from outside,

[Bekker 1312b]
[Bekker 1312b line 1]
if an opposing constitution is stronger. For plainly the wish to destroy it will be present because their purposes are opposed, and everyone does what he wishes when he has the power. Constitutions opposed to tyranny are democracy, in Hesiod's sense,
[Bekker 1312b line 5]
as potter opposes potter—for the most extreme democracy is also a tyranny—and kingship and aristocracy, because their constitutions are opposed to it. Hence the Lacedaemonians overthrew the greatest number of tyrannies, as did the Syracusans in the period when their public life was well ordered. Another way is from within, when those who share in the tyranny
[Bekker 1312b line 10]
form factions, as happened with Gelon's tyranny, and now with that of Dionysius. Gelon's was destroyed when Thrasybulus, Hieron's brother, courted Gelon's son and urged him toward pleasures so that he himself might rule. The family organized to overthrow Thrasybulus, but not the tyranny as a whole; those
[Bekker 1312b line 15]
who joined their cause, however, seized the opportunity and expelled them all. Dion, who was related by marriage to Dionysius, marched against him and enlisted the people; after expelling him, Dion was himself killed. Of the two chief causes for which people attack tyrannies, hatred and contempt, one is always present
[Bekker 1312b line 20]
for tyrants: hatred. But contempt brings about many overthrows. The evidence is this: most of those who acquired power also kept it, while almost all who inherited it lose it immediately, one might say. For by living for enjoyment they become easy to despise and
[Bekker 1312b line 25]
provide many opportunities for their attackers. Anger too should be counted as a kind of hatred, for in a sense it causes the same actions. Often it is even more effective than hatred: people attack more vehemently because this passion does not employ calculation. It happens especially
[Bekker 1312b line 30]
that people follow their anger because of outrage; this was the cause of the overthrow of the Pisistratids' tyranny and many others. But hatred is more effective overall. For anger is accompanied by pain, so that calculation is not easy, whereas enmity is without pain.

To put it in summary, all the causes we have stated
[Bekker 1312b line 35]
for the destruction of unmixed and extreme oligarchy, and of the most extreme democracy, must also be assigned to tyranny. For these too are tyrannies divided among many. Kingship is least likely to be destroyed from outside, which is why it is long-lasting; most of its destructions from within
[Bekker 1312b line 40]
arise. It is destroyed in two ways:

one is when
[Bekker 1313a]
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those who share in the kingship form factions; the other is when kings try to govern more tyrannically, claiming sovereignty over more things, even contrary to law. Kingships no longer arise now; if monarchies do arise, they are tyrannies
[Bekker 1313a line 5]
rather than kingships, because kingship is rule over willing subjects, but sovereign over greater matters, while there are many equals and no one so superior as to measure up to the extent and dignity of the office. For this reason they do not willingly submit. But if someone gains rule through deceit or force,
[Bekker 1313a line 10]
this is already thought to be tyranny. In hereditary kingships we must add to the stated causes of destruction the fact that many kings become easy to despise, and that they commit outrages although they possess not tyrannical power but royal honor. For overthrow becomes easy: when people no longer wish it,
[Bekker 1313a line 15]
the king at once ceases to be king, whereas a tyrant remains even against their will. Monarchies, then, are destroyed through these causes and others like them.

It is clear that, generally speaking, they are preserved through the opposite causes; more particularly, kingships are preserved by bringing them
[Bekker 1313a line 20]
toward greater moderation. For the fewer things kings are sovereign over, the longer the whole of their rule must last. They themselves become less masterful and more equal to others in character, and they are less envied by the ruled. For this reason the kingship among the Molossians also lasted a long time,
[Bekker 1313a line 25]
as did that of the Lacedaemonians, because its rule was divided into two parts from the beginning, and again because Theopompus moderated it in other respects and established the office of the ephors alongside it. For by diminishing its power he enlarged the kingship in duration, so that in a sense he made it not smaller but
[Bekker 1313a line 30]
greater. This is also what they say he replied to his wife when she asked whether he was not ashamed to hand down to his sons a kingship smaller than the one he had received from his father: “Certainly not,” he said, “for I am handing down one that will last longer.”

Tyrannies are preserved in two entirely opposite ways.
[Bekker 1313a line 35]
One is the traditional way, by which most tyrants administer their rule. Most of these practices are said to have been established by Periander of Corinth, and many similar ones may also be taken from Persian rule. They include the measures mentioned long ago for preserving, as far as possible,
[Bekker 1313a line 40]
tyranny: cutting down those who stand out, killing the high-spirited, and allowing neither common messes, associations, education, nor anything else of the kind,

but everything
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[Bekker 1313b line 1]
from which two things usually arise, high spirit and mutual trust, must be guarded against. They must allow neither schools nor other gatherings for leisurely study, and must do everything possible to make
[Bekker 1313b line 5]
all people strangers to one another, for acquaintance creates greater trust between them. Those staying in the city must always be visible and spend their time at the palace doors, for in this way what they do would be least likely to escape notice, and constant servitude would accustom them to think little of themselves. There are all the other such practices of Persian origin
[Bekker 1313b line 10]
and the barbarian practices characteristic of tyranny, for they all have the same effect. Tyrants must also try to ensure that nothing any of the ruled happens to say or do escapes notice, but employ spies, such as the women called “informers” at Syracuse, and the “listeners” whom Hieron sent out wherever there was a gathering or meeting.
[Bekker 1313b line 15]
For people speak less freely in fear of such spies, and if they do speak freely, they are less likely to escape notice. Another practice is to slander people to one another and set them at odds: friends against friends, the people against the notables, and the rich against one another. Making the ruled poor is also characteristic of tyranny, so that no guard
[Bekker 1313b line 20]
can be maintained, and they are too busy with their daily needs to plot. Examples are the pyramids in Egypt, the votive offerings of the Cypselids, the building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Pisistratids, and the works of Polycrates on Samos. For all these
[Bekker 1313b line 25]
have the same effect: keeping the ruled occupied and poor. So does the imposition of taxes, as at Syracuse, where under Dionysius people paid in the whole value of their property in five years. The tyrant is also a maker of war, to keep people occupied and in continual need of a leader. While
[Bekker 1313b line 30]
kingship is preserved through friends, it is characteristic of tyranny to distrust friends most of all, on the assumption that everyone wishes to overthrow it, but these especially have the power.

Everything that occurs in the most extreme democracy is also characteristic of tyranny: women's dominance in households, so that they may report against their
[Bekker 1313b line 35]
husbands, and license for slaves, for the same reason. For slaves and women do not plot against tyrants, and when they prosper they must be well-disposed toward both tyrannies and democracies. For the people too wish to be a monarch. Hence the flatterer is honored by both: among
[Bekker 1313b line 40]
the peoples, the demagogue—for the demagogue is the people's flatterer—and among tyrants, those who associate with them in a servile manner,
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[Bekker 1314a line 1]
which is the work of flattery.

For this reason, too, tyranny loves the vicious: tyrants enjoy being flattered, but no one with a free spirit would do this. Decent people show affection, or at least do not flatter. The vicious are also useful for vicious deeds:
[Bekker 1314a line 5]
“one nail drives out another,” as the proverb says. Disliking anyone dignified or free is also characteristic of tyranny. For the tyrant claims to be the only person of this kind, while anyone who matches his dignity and acts freely takes away the tyranny's preeminence and mastery. Tyrants therefore hate such people as if they were overthrowing their
[Bekker 1314a line 10]
rule. It is also characteristic of tyranny to take foreigners rather than citizens as table companions and daily associates, on the assumption that citizens are enemies while foreigners make no rival claim. These and similar practices are characteristic of tyranny and preserve its rule, but lack nothing in wickedness. All of them, one might say, are comprised
[Bekker 1314a line 15]
in three kinds. For tyranny aims at three things: first, that the ruled should think little of themselves, for no small-spirited person would plot against anyone; second, that they should distrust one another, for a tyranny is not overthrown until some people trust one another. Hence tyrants also make war on the decent as harmful
[Bekker 1314a line 20]
to their rule, not only because they refuse to be ruled by a master, but also because they are trustworthy toward one another and toward others, and do not inform against one another or anyone else. Third is incapacity for action, for no one attempts the impossible, and therefore no one attempts to overthrow a tyranny without
[Bekker 1314a line 25]
the power to do so. These, then, are the three ends to which the tyrants' counsels are directed. For all tyrannical measures can be referred to these aims: some to prevent mutual trust, others to prevent power to act, and others to make people think little of themselves.

This
[Bekker 1314a line 30]
then, is one way in which tyrannies are preserved. The other follows a course of management almost opposite to what has been said. It can be understood from the destruction of kingships. For just as one way of destroying a kingship is to make its rule more tyrannical, so for tyranny
[Bekker 1314a line 35]
preservation consists in making it more kingly, while safeguarding just one thing: the power to rule not only willing but also unwilling subjects. For if the tyrant lets this go, he also lets go of being a tyrant. This must remain as a foundation; in other matters he must do some things and appear to do others,
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playing the kingly role well. First, he must appear
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[Bekker 1314b line 1]
to care for public funds,

not spending on gifts of the kind that anger the multitudes, when rulers take money from people who labor and toil for a meager living, but give it lavishly to courtesans, foreigners, and artists, and, as for an account,
[Bekker 1314b line 5]
he should render one of receipts and expenses, as some tyrants have already done. For someone who administers affairs in this way would appear to be a household manager rather than a tyrant. He need not fear ever running short of money, since he is sovereign over the city. Indeed, for tyrants who go away from their own territory,
[Bekker 1314b line 10]
this is more advantageous than leaving behind accumulated funds, since the guards would be less likely to attack their government. For when tyrants are abroad, the guards are more to be feared than the citizens: the guards go abroad with them, while the citizens remain. Next, the taxes and public services
[Bekker 1314b line 15]
he collects must appear to be for the sake of administration and for use in emergencies of war, should the need arise. In general he must present himself as a guardian and treasurer of funds that are public, not private. He must appear not harsh but dignified, and such that those who encounter him do not fear him
[Bekker 1314b line 20]
but rather respect him. Yet this is not easy to achieve if he is contemptible. Thus, even if he takes no care for the other virtues, he must care for military virtue and create this reputation for himself. Moreover, not only must he himself appear to outrage none of the ruled, neither young man nor
[Bekker 1314b line 25]
young woman, but neither must anyone around him. His own women must likewise conduct themselves toward other women, since many tyrannies have also perished through outrages committed by women. In bodily pleasures he must do the opposite of what some tyrants now do: not only do they indulge in these from the very
[Bekker 1314b line 30]
break of day and continuously for many days, but they also wish others to see them doing so, in order to be admired as happy and blessed. Rather, he should above all be moderate in such things; failing that, he should at least escape being seen by others. For the one easy to attack or despise
[Bekker 1314b line 35]
is not the sober man but the drunk, and not the wakeful man but the sleeper. He must also do the opposite of almost everything mentioned earlier, for he must equip and adorn the city as though he were its steward, not its tyrant. Moreover, he must always appear exceptionally earnest in matters concerning the gods. For people are less
[Bekker 1314b line 40]
afraid of suffering anything unlawful from such rulers,

[Bekker 1315a]
[Bekker 1315a line 1]
if they think the ruler fears the gods and cares for them; and they plot against him less, believing that he has the gods too as allies. Yet he must appear so without foolishness. He must honor those who become good at anything in such a way
[Bekker 1315a line 5]
that they would not think they could ever be more honored by citizens living under their own laws; and he should confer such honors himself, but inflict punishments through other rulers and law courts. A safeguard common to every monarchy is to make no single person great, but, if any, several, for they will watch one another.
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If someone must be made great, at least he must not be bold in character, for such a character is most inclined to attack in every undertaking. If the tyrant decides to diminish someone's power, he should do this gradually, and not strip away all his authority at once. Moreover, he should refrain from every outrage,
[Bekker 1315a line 15]
but above all from two: bodily punishment and sexual outrage against the young. He must exercise this caution especially toward those who love honor. For lovers of money deeply resent disregard for their money, while lovers of honor resent dishonor, as do the decent among
[Bekker 1315a line 20]
men. Therefore he should either not employ such treatment, or appear to inflict punishments in a fatherly way, not out of contempt, and to enter into sexual relations with the young from erotic motives, not because of his power. In general he should redeem apparent dishonors with greater honors. Of those who attempt
[Bekker 1315a line 25]
to kill him, the most dangerous, and those requiring the greatest vigilance, are those who do not choose to preserve their own lives after killing him. Therefore he must be especially wary of those who think that they themselves or those they care for have been outraged. For those who attack in anger have no regard for themselves,
[Bekker 1315a line 30]
as Heraclitus also said, declaring that it is hard to fight anger, because it purchases its desires at the price of life.

### Book V, 1315a–1316b

Since cities consist of two parts, people without means and people with means, above all both must believe that their safety depends on the ruler, and that neither group is
[Bekker 1315a line 35]
subjected to any injustice by the other. Whichever group is stronger, he should make especially attached to his rule. For if this condition is secured, the tyrant need neither free slaves nor confiscate arms: either part, added to his own power, is enough to make him stronger than
[Bekker 1315a line 40]
those who attack him. But to discuss each such measure is needless elaboration; the aim is clear:

he must appear to the ruled not as a tyrant
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but as a household manager and a king, not as a usurper but as a trustee; he must pursue moderation in his way of life, not excess, and further, associate with the notables and court the people. For from
[Bekker 1315b line 5]
these things it necessarily follows not only that his rule is nobler and more enviable, because he rules better people, not people who have been abased, and does not remain an object of hatred and fear, but also that his rule lasts longer. Further, his own character will be either well disposed toward virtue or half decent,
[Bekker 1315b line 10]
not wicked but half wicked.

Yet of all constitutions, oligarchy and tyranny are the shortest-lived. The longest-lasting tyranny was that at Sicyon, belonging to Orthagoras himself and his descendants: it endured for a hundred years. The reason for this was
[Bekker 1315b line 15]
that they treated the ruled moderately and in many matters were subject to the laws; Cleisthenes, moreover, being a capable soldier, was not easily despised, and for the most part they courted the people by attending to their needs. Cleisthenes, at any rate, is said to have crowned the man who judged against his victory; some say that
[Bekker 1315b line 20]
the seated statue in the marketplace is an image of the man who gave this judgment. They also say that Pisistratus once submitted to a summons for trial before the Areopagus. Second was the tyranny of the Cypselids at Corinth: this too lasted seventy-three years and six months. Cypselus was tyrant for
[Bekker 1315b line 25]
thirty years, Periander for forty-four, and Psammetichus son of Gordius for three years. The reasons in this case were the same: Cypselus courted the people and throughout his rule had no bodyguard; Periander was tyrannical, but a capable soldier. Third came
[Bekker 1315b line 30]
the tyranny of the Pisistratids at Athens. It was not continuous, for Pisistratus went into exile twice during his tyranny. Thus, of thirty-three years, he was tyrant for seventeen, and his sons for eighteen, making thirty-five years in all. Among the rest was the tyranny of Hieron and Gelon at
[Bekker 1315b line 35]
Syracuse. This too endured for no great number of years, but eighteen in all: Gelon, after seven years as tyrant, died in the eighth; Hieron ruled for ten, and Thrasybulus was expelled in his eleventh month. Most tyrannies have all been very short-lived indeed.

[Bekker 1315b line 40]
As for constitutions and monarchies, then, the causes of their destruction and, in turn, of their preservation have nearly
[Bekker 1316a]
[Bekker 1316a line 1]
all been discussed.

In the Republic, Socrates does discuss revolutions, but not well. For he does not explain the revolution of the best and first constitution in terms peculiar to it. He says that the cause is that
[Bekker 1316a line 5]
nothing remains, but everything changes in a certain cycle; and the beginning of these changes is when the "base in the ratio of four to three, coupled with five, yields two harmonies," meaning when the number of this figure becomes a cube, as though nature sometimes produced inferior people whom education cannot overcome. In saying this very thing,
[Bekker 1316a line 10]
perhaps he is not wrong (for there may be people who cannot be educated and become worthy men). But why should this revolution be peculiar to what he calls the best constitution, rather than to all the others and to everything that comes into being? And because of the time through which, he says,
[Bekker 1316a line 15]
everything changes, do things that did not begin to exist together also change together? For instance, if something came into being on the day before the turning point, does it therefore change at the same time? Besides, for what reason does this constitution change into the Laconian one? All constitutions change more often into their opposite than into
[Bekker 1316a line 20]
the constitution nearest them. The same argument applies to the other revolutions too. For from the Laconian constitution, he says, it changes into oligarchy, from this into democracy, and from democracy into tyranny. Yet they also change in the reverse direction, for example from popular rule into oligarchy, and more often than into monarchy.

[Bekker 1316a line 25]
Further, he does not say whether tyranny will undergo a revolution or not, or, if it will, for what reason and into what constitution. The reason is that he could not easily say: it is undetermined, since on his account it must change into the first and best constitution; for in this way there would be continuity and a cycle. But a tyranny also changes
[Bekker 1316a line 30]
into a tyranny, as at Sicyon, from Myron's into Cleisthenes'; and into oligarchy, as Antileon's at Chalcis; and into democracy, as Gelon's at Syracuse; and into aristocracy, as Charilaus' at Lacedaemon, and at Carthage. And a change into tyranny
[Bekker 1316a line 35]
also occurs from oligarchy, as happened with almost all the ancient oligarchies in Sicily: at Leontini into the tyranny of Panaetius, at Gela into that of Cleander, at Rhegium into that of Anaxilaus, and likewise in many other cities. It is also absurd to think that the change into oligarchy is due to
[Bekker 1316a line 40]
the fact that those who are lovers of money and devote themselves to wealth-getting are the people
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[Bekker 1316b line 1]
in office,

rather than because those who far surpass others in property think it unjust that those who own nothing should have an equal share in the city with those who own property. In many oligarchies, moreover, wealth-getting is not permitted, but laws
[Bekker 1316b line 5]
forbid it; whereas at Carthage, under democratic rule, they pursue wealth-getting and have not yet undergone a revolution.

It is also absurd to say that the oligarchic city is two cities, one of rich people and one of poor. For why should this be truer of it than of the Laconian city, or any other where not everyone owns equal property or not everyone is equally
[Bekker 1316b line 10]
good? Even when no one has become poorer than before, they nonetheless change from oligarchy to popular rule if those without means become more numerous, and from popular rule to oligarchy if the wealthy part is stronger than the multitude and the one group is inattentive while the other is alert. Though there are many causes through
[Bekker 1316b line 15]
which revolutions occur, he names only one: that people become poor through extravagant living and the burden of interest, as though all or most were rich at the outset. But this is false. Rather, when some of the leaders lose their property, they seek innovations; when others do, nothing alarming
[Bekker 1316b line 20]
happens, and even then the change is no more likely to be into popular rule than into another constitution. Further, people form factions and change constitutions if they have no share in honors, or are wronged or treated with arrogance, even if they have not squandered their property, because they are free to do whatever they wish; and excessive freedom
[Bekker 1316b line 25]
is its cause, he says. Though there are several oligarchies and democracies, Socrates speaks of their revolutions as though there were only one of each.

### Book VI, 1316b–1320b

[Bekker 1316b]
[Bekker 1316b line 31]
The number and kinds of the deliberative element sovereign in the constitution, of the arrangement of offices, and of law courts; which arrangement belongs with which constitution; and further, the destruction and preservation of constitutions,
[Bekker 1316b line 35]
from what conditions they arise and through what causes—all these have been discussed before. Since there happen to be several forms of democracy, and likewise of the other constitutions, it would be well to examine at the same time anything still left to discuss about them, and to set out the arrangement appropriate and advantageous to each. Further,
[Bekker 1316b line 40]
we must examine the combinations of all the previously mentioned
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[Bekker 1317a line 1]
arrangements themselves.

For when these are combined, they make constitutions overlap, so that aristocracies are oligarchic and polities more democratic. I mean the combinations that ought to be examined but have not yet been examined: for example, if
[Bekker 1317a line 5]
the deliberative element and the choice of offices are arranged oligarchically, but the law courts aristocratically; or if these and the deliberative element are arranged oligarchically, but the choice of offices aristocratically; or if in some other way not all the elements of the constitution are combined
[Bekker 1317a line 10]
appropriately.

Which democracy suits which city, and likewise which oligarchy suits which multitude, and which of the remaining constitutions is advantageous to which people, has been stated before. Nevertheless, since we must make clear not only which of these constitutions is best for cities, but also
[Bekker 1317a line 15]
how these and the others should be established, let us go through the matter briefly. First let us speak of democracy; for at the same time the opposite constitution will become clear, the one some call oligarchy. For this inquiry we must take up all democratic features and all those thought
[Bekker 1317a line 20]
to accompany democracies. For the forms of democracy result from combining these, and so there are several democracies, not one, and they differ. There are two causes for democracies being several: first, the one mentioned earlier, that peoples differ (for
[Bekker 1317a line 25]
one multitude is agricultural, another consists of artisans and hired laborers; when the first is added to the second, and again the third to both, the difference is not merely that the democracy becomes better or worse, but also that it is not the same democracy); second, the cause we are now discussing. For the features that
[Bekker 1317a line 30]
accompany democracies and are thought appropriate to this constitution make democracies different when combined. One will have fewer of them, another more, and another all of them. It is useful to know each, both for establishing whichever of these democracies one happens to wish for,
[Bekker 1317a line 35]
and for making corrections. For those who establish constitutions seek to bring together all the features appropriate to their underlying principle, but in doing this they go wrong, as was said earlier in the discussion of the destruction and preservation of constitutions. Now let us state their claims, their characters, and their aims.

[Bekker 1317a line 40]
The underlying principle of a democratic constitution, then, is freedom (for this is what people usually say, claiming that only in this constitution
[Bekker 1317b]
[Bekker 1317b line 1]
do they share in freedom;

for they say that every democracy aims at this). One feature of freedom is being ruled and ruling in turn. For democratic justice consists in having equality according to number, not according to worth; and if this
[Bekker 1317b line 5]
is the just, the multitude must be sovereign, and whatever the majority decides must be final and must be the just. For they say that each citizen ought to have an equal share. Thus in democracies those without means are more sovereign than those with means: they are more numerous, and what
[Bekker 1317b line 10]
the majority decides is authoritative. This, then, is one sign of freedom, which all supporters of democracy set down as a defining feature of the constitution. Another is living as one wishes. For they say that this is the function of freedom, if indeed living not as one wishes is the condition of a slave. This, then, is the second defining feature of democracy. From it has arisen
[Bekker 1317b line 15]
the wish not to be ruled, preferably by no one, but otherwise only in turn; and in this way it contributes to freedom based on equality.

With these assumptions and this starting point, the following features are democratic: that everyone should choose the offices from among everyone; that everyone should rule
[Bekker 1317b line 20]
each person, and each person in turn everyone; that offices should be assigned by lot, either all or those that do not require experience and skill; that offices should depend on no property qualification, or the smallest possible; that the same person should hold no office twice, or only rarely, or only a few offices, apart from military offices; that terms should be short for
[Bekker 1317b line 25]
all offices, or as many as possible; that everyone, drawn from everyone, should sit in judgment on all matters, or on most and on the greatest and most authoritative, such as the scrutiny of officials, the constitution, and private transactions; that the assembly should be sovereign over all matters or the greatest, and no office
[Bekker 1317b line 30]
over any, or over as few as possible, or that a council should be sovereign over the greatest matters (of offices, a council is the most democratic where there is no abundance of pay for everyone; for where there is, they deprive even this office of its power: the people brings all decisions before itself when it has abundant pay, as was said earlier in the inquiry preceding
[Bekker 1317b line 35]
this one); next, that preferably everyone should receive pay, the assembly, the law courts, and the offices, but otherwise the offices, the law courts, the council, and the principal assemblies, or those offices whose holders must eat together. Further, since oligarchy is defined by birth, wealth, and education,
[Bekker 1317b line 40]
the democratic features are thought to be their opposites: low birth, poverty, and manual work. Further, no office should be perpetual;

[Bekker 1318a]
[Bekker 1318a line 1]
and if any is left over from an ancient revolution, its power should at least be taken away, and its holders appointed by lot instead of chosen. These, then, are the features common to democracies. From what is agreed to be democratic justice
[Bekker 1318a line 5]
(that everyone should have equality according to number) arises what is thought most truly to be democracy and popular rule. For equality means that those without means should rule no more than those with means, nor be alone sovereign, but that everyone should share equally according to number. For in this way they would think the constitution possessed equality
[Bekker 1318a line 10]
and freedom.

The next difficulty is how they will have equality. Should the property assessments of the five hundred be divided among a thousand, and should the thousand have equal power with the five hundred? Or should equality in this respect be established not in this way, but by dividing
[Bekker 1318a line 15]
them in this way and then taking equal numbers from the five hundred and from the thousand, and making these sovereign over choices and law courts? Which, then, is the most just constitution according to democratic justice: this one, or rather the one based on numbers? For supporters of democracy say that the just is whatever the majority decides,
[Bekker 1318a line 20]
while supporters of oligarchy say it is whatever the greater property decides; for they say that judgment should follow the amount of property. But both contain inequality and injustice. For if whatever the few decide prevails, there is tyranny (indeed, if one person owns more than the other wealthy people, according to oligarchic justice it is just for him alone to rule); but if
[Bekker 1318a line 25]
whatever the numerical majority decides prevails, they will commit injustice by confiscating the property of the rich, who are fewer, as was said before.

What equality both groups would agree to must therefore be examined from the conceptions of the just by which both define their positions. For they say that whatever the majority of citizens decides must be authoritative.
[Bekker 1318a line 30]
Let this stand, then, but not without qualification. Since there happen to be two parts of which the city consists, rich and poor, let what both decide, or the majority in both, be authoritative; but if they decide opposite things, let it be what is decided by the greater number whose property assessment is greater. For example, if one group numbers ten and the other twenty, and of the rich
[Bekker 1318a line 35]
six resolve one way, and of the poorer fifteen resolve the opposite; four of the rich have joined the poor and five of the poor have joined the rich. Whichever side's property assessment is greater, when both groups on each side are counted together, let its decision be authoritative. If they turn out equal, this must be regarded as a difficulty common to both systems, just as
[Bekker 1318a line 40]
now, if the assembly or the law court is divided in two;

for either
[Bekker 1318b]
[Bekker 1318b line 1]
the matter must be decided by lot or something else of the kind must be done. But concerning equality and the just, even if it is very difficult to find the truth about them, it is still easier to attain it than to persuade those who can take more than their share. For equality and the
[Bekker 1318b line 5]
just are always sought by the weaker; those who prevail pay no attention to them.

Of the four democracies, the first in order is the best, as was said in the earlier discussions; and this is also the oldest of all. By first I mean according to the way one might divide the peoples. For the agricultural people
[Bekker 1318b line 10]
is the best, so that democracy can also be established where the multitude lives from agriculture or pasture. Because it has little property, it has no leisure, and so does not often attend the assembly; and because they have the necessities, they spend their time at their work and do not desire what belongs to others. Rather, they find
[Bekker 1318b line 15]
working more pleasant than taking part in public life and holding office, where offices do not yield large profits. For most people desire gain more than honor. Here is evidence: they endured the ancient tyrannies and endure oligarchies, if no one prevents them from working or
[Bekker 1318b line 20]
takes anything away from them. For some of them quickly become rich, and the others are not destitute. Further, being sovereign over choice and scrutiny makes up for what they lack, if they have any ambition for honor. For among some peoples, even if they have no share in the choice of offices, but some persons are chosen in turn from everyone,
[Bekker 1318b line 25]
as at Mantinea, yet they are sovereign over deliberation, the many are satisfied; and this too must be regarded as a form of democracy, such as once existed at Mantinea. Therefore it is both advantageous to the democracy mentioned earlier, and usual in it, for everyone to choose the offices, scrutinize their holders, and
[Bekker 1318b line 30]
sit in judgment, but for the greatest offices to be held by people chosen subject to property qualifications, the greater offices requiring greater qualifications; or for no office to depend on property qualifications, but for capable people to hold them. Those who take part in public life in this way necessarily do so well (for the offices will always be in the hands of the best, with the people's consent and without envy of the
[Bekker 1318b line 35]
decent). This arrangement must also satisfy the decent and the notables: they will not be ruled by others worse than themselves, and they will rule justly because others are sovereign over their scrutiny. For having a restraint hanging over one, and not being free to do everything one pleases, is advantageous. The freedom
[Bekker 1318b line 40]
to do whatever one wishes cannot restrain the baseness in
[Bekker 1319a]
[Bekker 1319a line 1]
each human being.

Thus what is most beneficial in constitutions must follow: the decent rule without going wrong, while the multitude suffers no disadvantage.

That this is the best of the democracies, then, is clear,
[Bekker 1319a line 5]
and so is the reason: because the people is of a certain character. To make the people agricultural, some of the laws established long ago among many peoples are entirely useful: either forbidding anyone to own more land than a certain measure altogether, or within a certain distance of the town
[Bekker 1319a line 10]
and the city (long ago many cities had a law forbidding even the sale of the original allotments; and the law said to be Oxylus' has something of this effect, forbidding loans secured on a certain part of each person's land). At present, corrections should also be made through the law of the Aphytaeans,
[Bekker 1319a line 15]
for it is useful for what we are describing. Though they are many and own little land, they all nonetheless farm: they assess not whole properties, but divide them into portions small enough that even the poor can exceed the required assessments.

After the agricultural multitude,
[Bekker 1319a line 20]
the best people is one composed of herdsmen who live from livestock. For this has many features similar to agriculture, and for military actions these people are especially well trained in their habits, useful in their bodies, and able to camp in the open. Almost all the other multitudes, from
[Bekker 1319a line 25]
which the remaining democracies are constituted, are far inferior to these. For their life is inferior, and none of the work undertaken by the multitude of artisans, marketplace people, and hired laborers involves virtue. Further, because virtually all this class frequents the marketplace and the town,
[Bekker 1319a line 30]
it readily attends the assembly; whereas farmers, because they are scattered over the countryside, neither meet together nor have the same need for this gathering. Where the territory also happens to be so situated that the countryside lies far from the city, it is easy to establish a good democracy
[Bekker 1319a line 35]
and constitution; for the multitude is compelled to make its settlements in the fields. Thus, even if there is a marketplace mob, assemblies in democracies must not be held without the multitude from the countryside. How the best and first democracy should be established, then, has been stated; it is clear
[Bekker 1319a line 40]
how the others should be established too. For one must deviate in sequence
[Bekker 1319b]
[Bekker 1319b line 1]
and single out a worse multitude at each stage.

The last democracy, because everyone shares in it, is neither something every city can bear nor something that can easily endure unless well constituted in its laws and customs (nearly all the things that bring destruction upon both this
[Bekker 1319b line 5]
and the other constitutions have been stated before). To establish this democracy and make the people strong, its leaders usually admit as many as possible, and make citizens not only of those of legitimate birth, but also of those of illegitimate birth and those with either
[Bekker 1319b line 10]
parent a citizen—I mean, for example, a father or a mother. For all this is more appropriate to such a people. This, then, is how demagogues usually establish it; but they should admit people only until the multitude exceeds the notables and the middle class, and not go beyond this. For by exceeding it
[Bekker 1319b line 15]
they make the constitution more disorderly and further provoke the notables to resent enduring democracy. This proved to be the cause of faction at Cyrene. For a small evil is overlooked, but as it grows large it is more conspicuous. Further,
[Bekker 1319b line 20]
measures of the following kind are useful for such a democracy, like those Cleisthenes employed at Athens when he wished to enlarge the democracy, and those employed by the founders of popular rule at Cyrene. New and more numerous tribes and brotherhoods should be created, and private religious rites should be brought together into a few
[Bekker 1319b line 25]
common ones; and every device should be used to mix everyone with everyone else as much as possible, and to break up their former associations. Further, all tyrannical measures also seem democratic: I mean, for example, the lack of control over slaves (this might be advantageous up to a point), over women, and over
[Bekker 1319b line 30]
children, and overlooking people's living as they please. For there will be much support for such a constitution: most people find living without order more pleasant than living with self-restraint.

For the legislator and those wishing to establish some such constitution, the greatest task is not its establishment,
[Bekker 1319b line 35]
nor is this the only task; rather, it is to ensure its preservation. For it is not difficult to remain under any sort of constitution for one or two or three days. Therefore, from the matters examined earlier concerning the preservation and destruction of constitutions, they must try to establish security, guarding against the things that destroy them,
[Bekker 1319b line 40]
and laying down laws, both unwritten and written,

[Bekker 1320a]
[Bekker 1320a line 1]
that will most fully embrace the things that preserve constitutions. They must not regard as democratic or oligarchic whatever will make the city as thoroughly democratic or oligarchic as possible, but whatever will make it so for the longest time. Yet present-day demagogues,
[Bekker 1320a line 5]
to please the peoples, confiscate much property through the law courts. Therefore those who care for the constitution must oppose these practices by legislating that none of the property forfeited by judgment should become public and pass into the common treasury, but should be sacred. For wrongdoers will be no less cautious
[Bekker 1320a line 10]
(for they will suffer the same penalty), but the masses will be less inclined to condemn defendants, since they will receive nothing. Further, public prosecutions should always be kept as few as possible, by restraining those who bring charges recklessly with heavy penalties. For it is not supporters of democracy but the notables whom they usually bring to trial; yet
[Bekker 1320a line 15]
in this constitution too, all citizens should preferably be well disposed toward it, or otherwise at least not regard its sovereign members as enemies.

Since the last democracies have large populations and it is difficult to get people to attend the assembly without pay, and where there are no revenues this is hostile to the notables
[Bekker 1320a line 20]
(for it must come from a levy, confiscation, and corrupt law courts, things that have already overturned many democracies), where there are no revenues few assemblies should be held, and law courts should have many members but sit for few days (for this contributes both to keeping
[Bekker 1320a line 25]
the rich from fearing the expenses, even if the wealthy receive no juror's pay but the poor do, and to having cases judged far better: the wealthy are unwilling to be absent from their own affairs for many days, but are willing for a short time). Where there are revenues, one must not do what
[Bekker 1320a line 30]
the demagogues do now (for they distribute the surplus; people receive it and at once need the same again: such help to those without means is a jar full of holes). Rather, someone truly devoted to democracy must see to it that the multitude is not excessively poor; for this is what makes democracy defective.
[Bekker 1320a line 35]
Means must therefore be devised to bring about lasting prosperity. Since this is advantageous to the wealthy too, the proceeds from revenues should be accumulated and distributed to those without means in substantial sums, preferably, if one can collect enough, for the acquisition of a small plot of land; otherwise, as capital for trade and
[Bekker 1320b]
[Bekker 1320b line 1]
agriculture,

### Book VI, 1320b–1323a

and, if this is not possible for everyone, distribute it by tribes or some other division in turn. Meanwhile, for the necessary meetings, the prosperous should contribute the pay, being released from useless public services. In something like this fashion, the Carthaginians
[Bekker 1320b line 5]
conduct their public life and have secured the friendship of the people; for by continually sending some of the people out to the neighboring settlements, they make them prosperous. It also belongs to generous and intelligent notables to divide the poor among themselves and, by giving them a start, turn them toward productive work. It is also good to imitate the practices of the people of Tarentum.
[Bekker 1320b line 10]
For by making their property available for the poor to use in common, they secure the goodwill of the multitude. Moreover, they have made all their offices twofold, some elective and others allotted: the allotted offices so that the people may share in them, the elective so that they may conduct public life better. This can also be done by
[Bekker 1320b line 15]
dividing the same office, making some of its holders allotted and others elective. How democracies should be established has therefore been stated.

From these considerations it is also fairly clear how oligarchies should be established. For each oligarchy must be assembled from the opposite elements,
[Bekker 1320b line 20]
with reference to the corresponding democracy. The best-blended and first kind of oligarchy is the one close to what is called polity. In it the property qualifications must be divided, making some lower and others higher: the lower for participation in the necessary offices,
[Bekker 1320b line 25]
the higher for the more authoritative ones. Anyone who acquires the property qualification must be allowed to share in the constitution, and enough of the people must be admitted through the qualification to make the participants stronger than those who do not participate. The partners must always be drawn from the better part of the people. Similarly, the next
[Bekker 1320b line 30]
kind of oligarchy must be established by tightening the requirements a little. But the oligarchy opposed to the last kind of democracy, the most cliquish and tyrannical of oligarchies, needs all the more safeguarding the worse it is. For just as bodies in good condition for health, and ships well equipped for sailing
[Bekker 1320b line 35]
with their crews, admit of more errors without being destroyed by them, whereas sickly bodies and unsound ships with poor crews cannot bear even small errors, so too the worst constitutions need the greatest
[Bekker 1321a]
[Bekker 1321a line 1]
safeguarding.

Democracies, then, are generally preserved by a large population (for this stands opposed to the just according to merit). But oligarchy must clearly, on the contrary, find its preservation in good order.

[Bekker 1321a line 5]
Since there are chiefly four parts of the multitude—the farmers, the artisans, the traders, and the laborers—and four forces useful for war—cavalry, heavy infantry, light infantry, and a navy—where the territory happens to be suited to horses, there are naturally favorable conditions for establishing a strong oligarchy
[Bekker 1321a line 10]
(for the inhabitants' preservation depends on this force, and keeping horses belongs to those who possess large estates). Where the territory is suited to heavy infantry, the next kind of oligarchy is appropriate (for heavy infantry belongs more to the prosperous than to the poor), whereas the light-armed force and the navy are wholly democratic. As things are now,
[Bekker 1321a line 15]
where there is a large multitude of this kind, the oligarchs often fare worse in battle when faction breaks out. The remedy for this must be taken from generals experienced in war, who combine with the cavalry and heavy infantry the appropriate force of light infantry. This is how the people prevail in factions
[Bekker 1321a line 20]
over the prosperous: being lightly armed, they fight easily against cavalry and heavy infantry.

To form this force out of these people, then, is to form it against themselves. Instead, since ages are divided and some are older and others young, they must have their own sons, while still young, taught
[Bekker 1321a line 25]
the duties of light and lightly armed troops; and once they have been selected out of boyhood, they must be practiced contestants in these duties. A share in the citizen body should be given to the multitude either, as stated before, to those who acquire the property qualification; or, as at Thebes, to those who have abstained for a certain time from artisans' work; or, as
[Bekker 1321a line 30]
at Massalia, by judging the merits of those within the citizen body and those outside it. Moreover, the most authoritative offices, which those within the constitution must hold, must carry public services, so that the people will willingly refrain from sharing in them and will excuse the rulers as paying a high price for their
[Bekker 1321a line 35]
office. It is fitting that on entering office they should offer magnificent sacrifices and construct some public work, so that the people, sharing in the feasts and seeing the city adorned with votive offerings in one place and buildings in another, will gladly see the constitution endure. The notables will also have
[Bekker 1321a line 40]
memorials of their expenditure. But those concerned with oligarchies now do not do this; they do the opposite. For they seek profits no less than honor. For this reason it is apt to say
[Bekker 1321b]
[Bekker 1321b line 1]
that these are small democracies.

Let this, then, be our account of how democracies and oligarchies should be established.

Following upon what has been said, we must properly distinguish
[Bekker 1321b line 5]
the matters concerning offices: how many there are, what they are, and what they concern, as was also said before. For without the necessary offices a city cannot exist, and without those directed toward good order and adornment it cannot be well administered. Moreover, it is necessary that in small cities there should be fewer offices and in large ones
[Bekker 1321b line 10]
more, as has already been stated. We must therefore be clear about which it is fitting to combine and which to separate. The first of the necessary responsibilities is that concerning the marketplace. There must be an office to oversee contracts and good order there; for it is virtually necessary
[Bekker 1321b line 15]
for all cities to buy some things and sell others to meet one another's necessary needs. This is the most immediate means to self-sufficiency, for the sake of which they seem to have come together into a single constitution. Another responsibility, following and closely related to this, concerns public and private property in the town: ensuring
[Bekker 1321b line 20]
good order, preserving and repairing dilapidated buildings and roads, keeping boundaries between properties free from dispute, and whatever other responsibilities are of a similar kind. Most people call this office town supervision. It has several parts, for
[Bekker 1321b line 25]
which they appoint different people in the more populous cities: for example, wall-builders, overseers of fountains, and guardians of harbors. Another office is necessary and similar to this one; for it concerns the same matters, but in the countryside and the areas outside the town. These rulers are called
[Bekker 1321b line 30]
by some field-supervisors, by others forest-wardens. These, then, are three responsibilities for these matters. Another office is that to which public revenues are brought; its holders keep them and distribute them to each branch of administration. They call these officials receivers and treasurers. Another office is that with which private contracts must be registered,
[Bekker 1321b line 35]
along with judgments from the law courts. These same officials must also receive the written charges in lawsuits and bring the cases to court. In some places they divide this office too among several officials, while elsewhere one has authority over all these matters. They are called sacred recorders, overseers, recorders, and other
[Bekker 1321b line 40]
similar names.

Following this comes what is virtually the most necessary and most difficult of the offices: that concerned with enforcing judgments against those convicted, collecting the fines posted
[Bekker 1322a]
[Bekker 1322a line 1]
in the registers, and keeping people in custody.

It is difficult because it arouses great hatred, so that where there is no great profit to be made, people neither consent to hold it nor, if they do consent, are willing to act according to the laws.
[Bekker 1322a line 5]
But it is necessary, because it is of no use to hold trials concerning the just if the judgments are not carried out. Hence, if it is impossible to live together without trials, it is also impossible without enforcement. For this reason it is better that this should not be a single office, but that different officials should enforce the judgments of different courts. As for the posted notices
[Bekker 1322a line 10]
in the registers, we should likewise try to divide this responsibility. Moreover, some judgments should be enforced by other offices, those of the previous year preferably by the new officials, and those of the current officials by an office other than the one that passed the judgment: for example, the town-supervisors should enforce those of the market-supervisors, and others those of the town-supervisors.
[Bekker 1322a line 15]
For the less hatred the enforcing officials arouse, the more readily the judgments will be carried out. When those who pass judgment and those who enforce it are the same, they incur a double hatred; and when the same people do this in every matter, it makes them enemies of everyone. In many places the office that keeps prisoners is indeed distinct from that which
[Bekker 1322a line 20]
enforces judgments, as is the office of the so-called Eleven at Athens. It is therefore better to separate this office too, and to seek an ingenious arrangement for it as well. For it is no less necessary than the one mentioned; but decent people tend especially to shun this office, while it is unsafe to give authority to the wicked. They themselves
[Bekker 1322a line 25]
need to be guarded more than they are able to guard others. Hence there must not be a single office assigned to them, nor the same one continually. Instead, where there is an organized body of youths or guards, different members of it, and of the offices, must take responsibility in turn.

These
[Bekker 1322a line 30]
offices, then, must be placed first as the most necessary. After them come those no less necessary but ranked in higher dignity; for they require much experience and trustworthiness. Such would be the offices concerned with guarding the city and all those assigned to the needs of war. There must be,
[Bekker 1322a line 35]
in peace and war alike, overseers of the guarding of gates and walls, and of the inspection and organization of the citizens. In some places there are several offices for all these matters, in others fewer; in small cities, for example, one concerns itself with all of them. The names generals and war-commanders are given to
[Bekker 1322b]
[Bekker 1322b line 1]
such officials.

Moreover, if there are cavalry, light infantry, archers, or a navy, sometimes an office is established over each of these as well. These are called naval commands, cavalry commands, and infantry commands; their subdivisions are commands of triremes, companies,
[Bekker 1322b line 5]
and tribal contingents, and whatever parts these have. The whole is one kind of responsibility: the oversight of military affairs.

So much, then, for this office. Since some offices, if not all, handle considerable public funds, there must be another to receive the accounts and examine them,
[Bekker 1322b line 10]
itself handling nothing else. Some call these officials auditors, others accountants, others examiners, and others public advocates. Besides all these offices there is the one with the highest authority over everything. For the same office often has authority over the final decision and the introduction of business, or presides over the multitude where sovereignty lies with the
[Bekker 1322b line 15]
people; for the body that convenes the sovereign body must have authority within the constitution. In some places they are called preliminary councilors because they deliberate beforehand; where there is a multitude, it is more commonly called a council. Such, roughly, are the political offices. Another kind of responsibility concerns the gods: for example, priests and overseers of
[Bekker 1322b line 20]
sacred places, charged with preserving what exists and restoring dilapidated buildings and other things dedicated to the gods. In some places this responsibility falls to a single office, as in small cities; in others to many, distinct from the priesthood, such as officials who conduct sacrifices,
[Bekker 1322b line 25]
temple-guardians, and treasurers of sacred funds. Following this is the office set apart for all the common sacrifices that the law does not assign to the priests, whose holders instead receive their honor from the common hearth. Some call these officials rulers, others kings, and others presidents.

The
[Bekker 1322b line 30]
necessary responsibilities, then, concern the following matters, to state them in summary: divine affairs, military affairs, revenues and expenditure, the marketplace, the town, harbors, and the countryside; further, the law courts, the registration of agreements,
[Bekker 1322b line 35]
enforcement of judgments, custody, accounts, examinations, and audits of rulers; and finally the offices concerned with deliberation about public affairs. Peculiar to cities with more leisure and greater prosperity, which also take care for good order, are the supervision of women, guardianship of laws, supervision of children,
[Bekker 1323a]
[Bekker 1323a line 1]
and supervision of gymnasia,

and, besides these, oversight of athletic and Dionysian contests and any other such public spectacles that happen to be held. Some of these offices are clearly not democratic, such as the supervision of women and of children;
[Bekker 1323a line 5]
for the poor are compelled to use their wives and children as attendants because they have no slaves. There are three offices through which some select the authoritative offices: guardians of laws, preliminary councilors, and a council. Guardians of laws are aristocratic, preliminary councilors oligarchic, and a council democratic. Concerning the
[Bekker 1323a line 10]
offices, then, we have now spoken in outline of virtually all of them.

### Book VII, 1323a–1326a

[Bekker 1323a]
[Bekker 1323a line 14]
Concerning the best constitution, anyone intending to undertake the
[Bekker 1323a line 15]
appropriate inquiry must first determine which life is most worthy of choice. For if this is unclear, the best constitution must also be unclear; those who take part in public life under the best arrangements their circumstances allow should fare best, unless something contrary to reasonable expectation occurs. Therefore we must first
[Bekker 1323a line 20]
agree on which life is most worthy of choice for virtually everyone, and after this whether it is the same or different for a community and for an individual. Since we consider that much has been said adequately about the best life in the external discourses, we must use those discussions now as well. For in truth, at least as regards one division, no one would dispute
[Bekker 1323a line 25]
that, since there are three classes of goods—external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul—the blessed must possess all of these. For no one would call blessed a person with no share in courage, moderation, justice, or practical wisdom, but who fears the passing
[Bekker 1323a line 30]
flies, who abstains from none of the most extreme acts if he desires food or drink, who ruins his dearest friends for a quarter-obol, and whose mind is likewise as senseless and mistaken as that of a child or a madman. Everyone would agree to these statements, as it seems;
[Bekker 1323a line 35]
but they differ about the amount and the relative superiority of the goods. For they think any amount of virtue sufficient, however small, but seek an unlimited excess of wealth, money, power, reputation, and everything of that kind. We shall tell them that it is easy to gain conviction about these matters even from the
[Bekker 1323a line 40]
facts, by observing that people acquire and preserve not the virtues through external goods, but external goods through the virtues,

[Bekker 1323b]
[Bekker 1323b line 1]
and that living happily, whether for human beings it lies in enjoyment, in virtue, or in both, belongs more to those whose character and mind are adorned to the highest degree, but who are moderate in the acquisition of external goods, than to those
[Bekker 1323b line 5]
who possess more of those goods than is useful, but fall short in these qualities. Nevertheless, the matter is also easy to grasp when examined by reasoning. For external goods have a limit, like an instrument (and everything useful is useful for something); an excess of them must either harm or be of no benefit to their
[Bekker 1323b line 10]
possessors. But each of the soul's goods is more useful the more abundant it is, if we ought to apply to these not only the term noble but also useful. In general, it is clear that we shall say the best conditions of things stand in relation to one another according to the superiority
[Bekker 1323b line 15]
of the things whose conditions we say they are. So if the soul is more honorable than property and the body, both without qualification and for us, the best condition of each of these must stand in the same proportion. Moreover, these things are by nature worthy of choice for the soul's sake, and all must
[Bekker 1323b line 20]
choose them for its sake if they think sensibly, not the soul for theirs.

Let us therefore agree that each person has as much happiness as he has virtue and practical wisdom, and activity in accordance with them. We call the god as witness, who is happy and blessed not through any
[Bekker 1323b line 25]
external goods, but through himself and the character of his nature. For these reasons good fortune must also be different from happiness (for chance and fortune cause the goods external to the soul, but no one is just or moderate by chance or through fortune). It follows,
[Bekker 1323b line 30]
and requires the same arguments, that the best city is also happy and acts well. But those who do not perform noble actions cannot act well; and no noble deed of either a man or a city exists without virtue and practical wisdom. A city's courage, justice, and practical wisdom
[Bekker 1323b line 35]
have the same power and form as those through participation in which each human being is called just, practically wise, and moderate. Let this suffice as a preface to the argument; for it is neither possible to leave these matters untouched nor to pursue all the arguments appropriate to them, since another inquiry concerns
[Bekker 1323b line 40]
these matters. For now let this much be assumed: the best life, both for each individual separately and for cities in common,

is the life with virtue sufficiently supported
[Bekker 1324a]
[Bekker 1324a line 1]
to allow participation in actions according to virtue. As for those who dispute this, we must leave them aside in the present inquiry and examine their objections later, if anyone happens not to be persuaded by what has been said.

[Bekker 1324a line 5]
It remains to say whether we must declare the happiness of each individual human being and of a city to be the same or not the same. This too is evident; for everyone would agree that it is the same. Those who place living well in wealth for an individual also regard the whole city, if it is rich,
[Bekker 1324a line 10]
as blessed; those who most esteem the tyrannical life would also declare the city that rules over the most people the happiest; and if someone approves of an individual because of his virtue, he will also say that the more excellent city is happier. But there are now two matters requiring examination. One is which is more worthy of choice:
[Bekker 1324a line 15]
the life of taking part in public life together and sharing in a city, or rather the life of an outsider, released from the political community. The other is which constitution and which arrangement of a city must be held best, whether sharing in a city is worthy of choice for everyone, or not for some but for most. Since political
[Bekker 1324a line 20]
thought and study are concerned with this, not with what is worthy of choice for each individual, and since this is the inquiry we have now chosen, the former question would be incidental, while the latter is the task of this investigation. The best constitution must be that arrangement under which anyone whatever would act best and live
[Bekker 1324a line 25]
a blessed life: this, then, is clear. But even those who agree that the life with virtue is most worthy of choice dispute whether the political and active life is worthy of choice, or rather the life released from all external affairs, a contemplative life of some kind, which some say is the only philosophical life. For these are roughly the
[Bekker 1324a line 30]
two lives that those most ambitious for virtue appear to choose, both in former times and now: I mean the political and the philosophical. Which view holds the truth makes no small difference; for a sensible person must direct himself toward the better aim, and so must each
[Bekker 1324a line 35]
individual and the constitution in common. Some think that ruling one's neighbors as a master involves an injustice of the greatest kind, while ruling them politically involves no injustice but does impede one's own well-being. Others hold what is virtually the opposite opinion: only
[Bekker 1324a line 40]
the active and political life, they say, is worthy of a man, for in the exercise of each virtue private individuals have no more scope for action
[Bekker 1324b]
[Bekker 1324b line 1]
than those who conduct public affairs and take part in public life.

Some, then, suppose this; others say that only the masterful and tyrannical manner of constitution is happy. Among some peoples this is also the aim of their constitution and laws: to exercise mastery
[Bekker 1324b line 5]
over their neighbors. Therefore, although among most peoples most laws are laid down in a haphazard fashion, so to speak, still, wherever the laws look toward a single object, they all aim at conquest. At Lacedaemon and in Crete, for instance, education and the mass of laws are organized almost entirely for wars. Moreover, among
[Bekker 1324b line 10]
all nations capable of gaining ascendancy, such power is honored: for example, among the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Celts. In some there are even laws that spur people toward this virtue. At Carthage, for example, they say that a person receives an ornament of rings corresponding to the number of
[Bekker 1324b line 15]
campaigns in which he has served. There was once a law in Macedonia that a man who had killed no enemy must wear a halter around his waist. Among the Scythians, a man who had killed no enemy was not allowed to drink from the cup passed around at a certain feast. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, a matching number of stakes
[Bekker 1324b line 20]
is planted around a man's tomb for the enemies he has slain. Among other peoples there are many other such practices, some embodied in laws, others in customs.

Yet perhaps it would seem altogether strange to those willing to examine the matter if this were the task of the political expert: to be able to consider how to rule
[Bekker 1324b line 25]
and exercise mastery over one's neighbors, whether they are willing or unwilling. For how could this belong to political expertise or legislation, when it is not even lawful? It is not lawful to rule unjustly as well as justly, but conquest can also be unjust. Nor indeed do we see this in the other sciences; for neither
[Bekker 1324b line 30]
a doctor's nor a pilot's task is to persuade or compel, in the one case his patients, in the other his passengers. But most people seem to think the art of mastery is political expertise, and what each of them says is neither just nor advantageous for himself, they are not ashamed to practice upon others.
[Bekker 1324b line 35]
For among themselves they seek just rule, but toward others they have no concern for the just. Yet it would be strange if there were no natural distinction between what is fit for mastery and what is not. Therefore, if this is how things stand, we must not try to exercise mastery over everyone, but over those fit for it, just as we must not hunt for a feast or sacrifice
[Bekker 1324b line 40]
human beings, but what is fit to be hunted for that purpose; and what is fit to be hunted is a wild animal suitable for eating. Moreover, there could even be
[Bekker 1325a]
[Bekker 1325a line 1]
a happy city on its own,

provided, of course, that it conducts its public life well, if it is possible for a city to be established somewhere on its own, using excellent laws. The organization of its constitution will not be directed toward war or toward conquering enemies;
[Bekker 1325a line 5]
for let us suppose that nothing of that kind exists. It is clear, then, that all preparations for war must be held noble, but not as the highest end of all; rather, they are for the sake of that end. It is the excellent legislator's task to consider, for a city, a race of human beings, or any other community, how a good life
[Bekker 1325a line 10]
and the happiness possible for them can be enjoyed. Some of the laws laid down will, however, differ; and it belongs to legislation to see, if there are neighbors, which practices should be adopted toward which peoples, or how to apply to each the measures appropriate to them. But this question may later receive its proper
[Bekker 1325a line 15]
examination: toward what end the best constitution must be directed.

As for those who agree that the life with virtue is most worthy of choice, but differ about how it is to be lived, we must address both groups (for some reject political offices, thinking that for a free person
[Bekker 1325a line 20]
the life is different from the political life and is the most worthy of choice of all, while others hold the latter to be best, since it is impossible for one who does nothing to act well, and acting well and happiness are the same). Both are right in some things they say and wrong in others. The former are right that a free person's life is better than a master's.
[Bekker 1325a line 25]
For this is true: there is nothing dignified about using a slave as a slave, since giving orders about necessities has no share in the noble. Yet it is not right to think that every kind of rule is mastery; for rule over free people differs from rule over slaves no less than what is free by nature itself differs from what is
[Bekker 1325a line 30]
a slave by nature. These matters have been adequately distinguished in our opening discussions. But it is not true that doing nothing should be praised more than acting. For happiness is activity, and the actions of just and moderate people achieve many noble ends.

Yet perhaps someone might suppose, now that these distinctions have been made,
[Bekker 1325a line 35]
that being sovereign over everything is best; for in this way he would have authority over the most numerous and noblest actions. Hence someone capable of ruling should not yield to his neighbor but rather take rule away from him; neither a father should take account of his children, nor children of their father, nor, in general, any friend of a friend, nor
[Bekker 1325a line 40]
pay any heed to them in this regard. For the best is most worthy of choice, and acting well is best. Perhaps, then, what they say is true,

if indeed
[Bekker 1325b]
[Bekker 1325b line 1]
those who rob others and use force will possess what is most worthy of choice among things that exist. But perhaps it cannot belong to them, and their assumption is false. For the actions of a person cannot any longer be noble unless he is as far superior as a man is to a woman, or a father
[Bekker 1325b line 5]
to his children, or a master to slaves. Hence the transgressor could not subsequently achieve any success so great as his existing departure from virtue. For among those who are alike, the noble and the just lie in taking turns, since this is equal and alike. But inequality among equals and unlikeness among those alike are contrary to nature, and nothing
[Bekker 1325b line 10]
contrary to nature is noble. Therefore, if someone else is superior to the best in virtue and in the power to act, it is noble to follow him and just to obey him. He must possess not virtue alone but also the power by which he will be able to act. But if these things are rightly stated, and happiness
[Bekker 1325b line 15]
must be held to be acting well, the active life would be best both for every city in common and for each individual. Yet the active life need not be directed toward others, as some think; nor are only those thoughts active that arise for the sake of the results of action. Much more so are
[Bekker 1325b line 20]
the contemplations and thoughts complete in themselves and undertaken for their own sake; for acting well is an end, and therefore also a kind of activity. Even in external actions, we say that those who direct them through thought are most properly acting. Nor indeed must cities established on their own, which have
[Bekker 1325b line 25]
chosen to live in this way, be inactive; for activity can occur among their parts, since the parts of a city have many associations with one another. The same holds for any individual human being. For the god and the whole universe could hardly be in a good condition if this were not so, since they have no external actions
[Bekker 1325b line 30]
beyond those proper to themselves. It is therefore clear that the same life must be best for each individual human being and for cities and human beings in common.

Since what we have now said about these matters has served as a preface, and we have previously examined the other constitutions,
[Bekker 1325b line 35]
the starting point for what remains is to state first what assumptions must be made about the city that is to be constituted as we would wish. For the best constitution cannot come into being without suitable resources. We must therefore assume many conditions beforehand, as though expressing wishes, yet none of them must be impossible. I mean,
[Bekker 1325b line 40]
for example, the number of citizens and the territory. For just as other craftsmen, such as a weaver or a shipbuilder,

must have
[Bekker 1326a]
[Bekker 1326a line 1]
material suited to their work (for the better this happens to have been prepared, the finer the product of their craft must also be), so the political expert and the legislator must have their proper material
[Bekker 1326a line 5]
in a suitable condition.

The first resource for political expertise is the multitude of human beings: how many there must be and of what natural character; and likewise with the territory, how large it must be and of what kind. Most people think a happy city ought to be large; but if this is
[Bekker 1326a line 10]
true, they do not know what makes a city large or small. For they judge its largeness by the number of inhabitants, whereas we should look not so much to numbers as to capacity. A city too has a certain task; hence the city most capable of accomplishing it must be thought the greatest. For example,
[Bekker 1326a line 15]
one might say that Hippocrates is greater, not as a man but as a doctor, than someone superior in bodily size. Nevertheless, even if we must judge by looking to numbers, we must not do so by looking at just any multitude (for cities must perhaps contain large numbers of slaves,
[Bekker 1326a line 20]
resident foreigners, and strangers), but at those who are parts of the city and constitute it as its proper members. A great number of these is a sign of a large city; but a city from which many artisans go out and few heavy infantry cannot be large. For a large
[Bekker 1326a line 25]
city and a populous one are not the same.

Moreover, experience makes this too evident: it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, for an excessively populous city to be well governed by laws. At any rate, we see that none of the cities thought to conduct public life well is unrestricted in its population. This is also clear from the evidence of reasoning. For
[Bekker 1326a line 30]
law is a kind of order, and good government by laws must be good order, but an excessively great number cannot share in order. For that is surely the work of divine power, which also holds together this universe. Therefore a city that combines magnitude with the limit just mentioned must be the finest;
[Bekker 1326a line 35]
for beauty ordinarily arises in number and magnitude. But there is also a certain measure for a city's size, just as for everything else—animals, plants, instruments. Each of these, when excessively small or excessively large, will not possess its proper capacity, but will sometimes be wholly deprived of its nature, sometimes
[Bekker 1326a line 40]
be in a poor condition. A ship a span long, for example, will not be a ship at all, nor will one two stades long.

### Book VII, 1326a–1329b

But when it reaches a certain size, it will sometimes
[Bekker 1326b]
[Bekker 1326b line 1]
make sailing poor through being too small, and sometimes through being excessive. Likewise, a city with too few inhabitants is not self-sufficient (and a city is something self-sufficient), while one with far too many is self-sufficient in necessities, like a nation, but
[Bekker 1326b line 5]
not a city; for it is not easy for it to have a constitution. Who will be general of a vastly excessive multitude, or who its herald, unless he has the voice of Stentor? Therefore the first city must consist of a multitude large enough to be, for the first time, self-sufficient for living well in a political community. A city that
[Bekker 1326b line 10]
exceeds this in numbers may also be a larger city, but this increase is not unlimited, as we have said. It is easy to see from the city's functions what the limit of the excess is. For the city's actions are those of rulers on the one hand and of the ruled on the other, and the ruler's function is command and judgment. To judge
[Bekker 1326b line 15]
questions of justice and to distribute offices according to merit, the citizens must know one another's character. Where this does not happen, the distribution of offices and judgments must be poor. For in neither case is it just to proceed haphazardly, as happens
[Bekker 1326b line 20]
plainly when the population is far too large. Moreover, foreigners and resident aliens can easily share in the constitution; for it is not difficult to escape notice when numbers are excessive. Clearly, then, the best limit for a city is the largest multitude sufficient for a self-sufficient life that can readily be surveyed. Let
[Bekker 1326b line 25]
this, then, be our determination of the city's size.

The territory stands in much the same relation. As for its character, clearly everyone would praise the territory most self-sufficient (and such a territory must produce everything; for having everything and needing nothing
[Bekker 1326b line 30]
is self-sufficiency). In extent and size it should be such that the inhabitants can live at leisure, in a manner both generous and temperate. Whether we are right or wrong in stating this limit must be examined more precisely later, when property and abundance of possessions are generally
[Bekker 1326b line 35]
discussed: how they should stand, and in what manner, with regard to their use. For there are many disputes about this inquiry because some draw life toward one extreme and some toward the other, some toward stinginess and others toward luxury. It is not difficult to say what the shape of the territory should be (though on some matters
[Bekker 1326b line 40]
we must also follow those experienced in generalship): it should be difficult for enemies to enter but easy for its own people to leave.

[Bekker 1327a]
[Bekker 1327a line 1]
Furthermore, just as we said that the number of inhabitants should be readily surveyed, so should the territory. By readily surveyed I mean that the territory can easily be defended. If the city's position is to be as we would wish, then in relation to the sea
[Bekker 1327a line 5]
it should be well situated, and in relation to the territory as well. One requirement, then, is that already stated (for it should be accessible from every part of the territory for sending assistance); the remaining requirement concerns the conveyance of the crops produced, and also of timber, and of any other product that the territory happens to yield which is
[Bekker 1327a line 10]
easily transported.

As for access to the sea, whether it is advantageous or harmful to well-governed cities, there is much dispute. For people say that the residence of strangers brought up under other laws is detrimental to
[Bekker 1327a line 15]
good government, and so is a large population. For using the sea to send and receive goods brings a multitude of merchants, and this, they say, is opposed to taking part well in public life. It is clear, then, that if these consequences do not follow, it is better, both for security and for an abundant supply of necessities, for
[Bekker 1327a line 20]
the city and its territory to have access to the sea. For to endure wars more easily, those who are to be preserved must be able to receive assistance in both ways, by land and by sea. And to inflict harm on attackers, if that is not possible in both ways, it will at least be
[Bekker 1327a line 25]
more possible in one of them if they have access to both. It is also necessary to import whatever they do not happen to possess themselves, and to export the surplus of what they produce. For the city should engage in trade for itself, not for others. Those who make themselves a marketplace for everyone have revenue
[Bekker 1327a line 30]
as their motive; but a city that should have no share in this kind of acquisitiveness should not possess such a trading port either. Since even now we see many territories and cities with naval stations and harbors conveniently situated in relation to the city, so that they neither occupy the same urban area nor lie too far away,
[Bekker 1327a line 35]
but are controlled by walls and other such defenses, it is evident that if any good results from contact with them, the city will possess that good, while if anything harmful results, it is easy to guard against it by laws specifying and defining who should not and who should associate
[Bekker 1327a line 40]
with one another.

As for naval power, it is clear that it is best to possess it up to a certain strength

(for not
[Bekker 1327b]
[Bekker 1327b line 1]
only for their own sake but also for that of some of their neighbors they must be formidable and able to give assistance by sea as by land). But the number and size of this force must be considered in relation to the city's way of life. For if
[Bekker 1327b line 5]
it is to lead a life of leadership and public activity, this force too must be proportionate to its actions. The large population associated with the naval masses need not belong to the cities; for these men need not be any part of the city. The marines
[Bekker 1327b line 10]
are free men and belong to the infantry; they have authority over and control the fleet. If there is a large population of outlying inhabitants and people farming the territory, there must also be an abundant supply of sailors. We see this even now in some places, for example in the city of the Heracleots: they man many
[Bekker 1327b line 15]
triremes, although their city is more moderate in size than others.

Let this, then, be our determination concerning the territory and harbors of cities, the sea, and naval power. As for the number of citizens, we have already said what limit it should have; as for what sort of people
[Bekker 1327b line 20]
they should be by nature, let us now speak.

One might understand this, at least in broad outline, by looking both at the Greek cities held in high esteem and at the whole inhabited world, as it is divided among nations. The nations in cold regions and those of Europe are full of spirit; in intelligence
[Bekker 1327b line 25]
and skill, however, they are deficient. Therefore they remain freer, but without organized constitutions and unable to rule their neighbors. Those of Asia are intelligent and skillful in soul, but lack spirit; therefore they continue to be ruled and enslaved. The Greek race, just as it lies midway
[Bekker 1327b line 30]
in geographical position, shares in both qualities. For it is both spirited and intelligent; therefore it remains free, has the best constitutions, and is capable of ruling all peoples if it obtains a single constitution. The Greek nations also have this same difference among themselves: some have
[Bekker 1327b line 35]
a one-sided nature, while others are well blended with respect to both these capacities. Clearly, then, those whom the legislator is to lead readily toward virtue must be both intelligent and spirited by nature. For as to what some say the guardians should possess, namely that they should be affectionate
[Bekker 1327b line 40]
toward those they know but fierce toward strangers, it is spirit that produces affection; for this is the soul's
[Bekker 1328a]
[Bekker 1328a line 1]
capacity by which we love.

Here is a sign of this: spirit rises more against acquaintances and friends than against strangers when it believes it has been slighted. Therefore Archilochus, in reproaching his friends, fittingly addresses his spirit:
[Bekker 1328a line 5]
“For you are choked by friends.”

Rule and freedom, too, belong to everyone through this capacity; for spirit is commanding and unconquerable. But it is not right to say that they should be harsh toward strangers; for they should be so toward no one, nor are the magnanimous
[Bekker 1328a line 10]
fierce by nature, except toward wrongdoers. They feel this still more strongly toward acquaintances, as was said before, if they believe they are being wronged. And this happens reasonably: for from those whom they suppose to owe them kindness, they suffer not only harm but also the loss of that kindness,
[Bekker 1328a line 15]
they believe. Hence the saying,
“For wars between brothers are bitter,”
(Eur. Fr. 965) and
“Those who have loved beyond measure also beyond measure
hate.”
(Anon. fr. 78 (Nauck))

We have now determined in broad outline how many people should take part in public life and what sort they should be by nature, and also how large the territory should be and of what kind (for we must not seek the
[Bekker 1328a line 20]
same precision in arguments as in things that become known through perception).

Since, as with other things constituted by nature, those things without which the whole could not exist are not all parts of its entire constitution, it is clear that we should not count as parts of a city everything that cities must possess,
[Bekker 1328a line 25]
nor should we count all necessities as parts of any other community that forms a single kind (for there must be something one, common, and the same for the members, whether they share in it equally or unequally), whether this is food, an extent of territory, or something else of this sort. But when one thing is for the sake of another, and the other is that for whose sake it exists, they have nothing
[Bekker 1328a line 30]
in common in these relations except that one produces and the other receives. I mean, for example, the relation of every tool and of craftsmen to the work produced. For a house and a builder have nothing that comes to be common to them; rather, the builders' art exists for the sake of the house. Therefore cities need property, but property is no part of the
[Bekker 1328a line 35]
city. Yet many parts of property are living things. The city is a community of similar people, for the sake of the best life possible. Since happiness is the best thing, and this is an activity and a complete exercise of virtue, and since it so happens that some can share in it, while others share little or
[Bekker 1328a line 40]
not at all, it is clear that this is the cause of the different forms of city and of the plurality of constitutions.

For in different ways and through
[Bekker 1328b]
[Bekker 1328b line 1]
different means, each group pursues this and makes its ways of life and its constitutions different. We must also examine how many things there are without which a city could not exist. For among these will be the things we call parts of the city, and therefore they must exist. We must therefore establish
[Bekker 1328b line 5]
the number of its functions, for from these the matter will be clear. First, then, there must be food; next, crafts (for life needs many tools); third, arms (for the members of the community must also possess arms among themselves, both to maintain rule over the disobedient and against wrongdoing by outsiders
[Bekker 1328b line 10]
who attempt it); further, a certain abundance of wealth, so that they have resources both for their own needs and for those of war; fifth, and first in importance, care for the divine, which they call priestly service; and sixth in number, and most necessary of all, judgment about matters of advantage and about justice in their
[Bekker 1328b line 15]
relations with one another. These, then, are the functions that virtually every city requires (for a city is not just any multitude, but one self-sufficient for life, as we say; if any of these things happens to be lacking, this community cannot be altogether self-sufficient). Therefore, in accordance with the activities
[Bekker 1328b line 20]
just mentioned, the city must be constituted. There must therefore be a multitude of farmers who will provide food, craftsmen, the military element, the wealthy element, priests, and judges of matters of necessity and advantage.

With these things determined, it remains to consider whether everyone
[Bekker 1328b line 25]
should share in all these functions (for it is possible for the same people all to be farmers, craftsmen, deliberators, and judges), or whether different people should be assigned to each of the functions mentioned, or whether some of them must be separate and others shared. It is not the same in every constitution. For, as we have said,
[Bekker 1328b line 30]
it is possible both for everyone to share in everything and for not everyone to share in everything, but some in some things. These differences also make the constitutions different: in democracies everyone shares in everything, while in oligarchies the opposite holds. Since we are investigating the best constitution, and this
[Bekker 1328b line 35]
is the one under which the city would be happiest, and since it has already been said that happiness cannot exist apart from virtue, it is evident from this that in the city with the finest constitution, which possesses men just without qualification and not merely relative to a given assumption, neither the life of a mechanic nor that of a trader should be lived
[Bekker 1328b line 40]
by the citizens (for such a life is ignoble and opposed to virtue); nor should anyone be a farmer who is going to
[Bekker 1329a]
[Bekker 1329a line 1]
be a citizen

(for leisure is needed both for the development of virtue and for political actions).

Since the military element and the element that deliberates about matters of advantage and judges questions of justice are also present, and seem to be parts of the
[Bekker 1329a line 5]
city above all, should these too be assigned to different people, or should both be given to the same people? This too is clear: in one sense to the same people, and in another to different people. Insofar as each function belongs to a different prime of life, and one needs practical wisdom while the other needs strength, they should belong to different people. But insofar as it is impossible
[Bekker 1329a line 10]
for those capable of using force and preventing coercion to submit to being ruled forever, they should belong to the same people. For those who have authority over arms also have authority over whether the constitution endures or not. It remains, then, to assign both functions of this constitution to the same people, but not at the same time. Just as by nature
[Bekker 1329a line 15]
strength is found in younger men and practical wisdom in older men, so it seems advantageous that both functions should be distributed accordingly; and this is just, for the division accords with merit. Moreover, property too must belong to these men. For the citizens must have ample resources, and these are the citizens. The
[Bekker 1329a line 20]
mechanical element has no share in the city, nor does any other class that does not produce virtue. This is clear from our assumption: happiness must exist together with virtue, and we should call a city happy not by looking at some part of it, but at all its citizens. It is
[Bekker 1329a line 25]
also evident that property must belong to these men, if the farmers must be slaves or barbarian inhabitants of the outlying districts. Of the classes enumerated, the priestly class remains. Their place too is evident. Neither a farmer nor a mechanic should be appointed priest (for it is fitting that the citizens
[Bekker 1329a line 30]
honor the gods). Since the citizen body has been divided into two parts, namely the armed element and the deliberative element, and since it is fitting both to offer service to the gods and for those exhausted by age to find rest in their service, the priesthoods concerned with the gods should be assigned to these men.

As for the things without which
[Bekker 1329a line 35]
a city is not constituted and how many parts a city has, these have now been stated (for farmers, craftsmen, and the entire laboring element must be present in cities, but the city's parts are the armed and the deliberative elements), and each of these has been separated, some permanently and others in turn.

[Bekker 1329a line 40]
It seems that those who philosophize about constitutions have recognized, not only now or recently, that separate classes should be distinguished
[Bekker 1329b]
[Bekker 1329b line 1]
within the city, and that the military class and the farming class should be different.

For this arrangement still holds even now in Egypt, and also in Crete: in Egypt, they say, Sesostris legislated in this way, and Minos did so in
[Bekker 1329b line 5]
Crete. The institution of common messes also seems ancient: those in Crete originated in the reign of Minos, while those in Italy are much older than these. For the learned among the inhabitants there say that a certain Italus became king of Oenotria, from whom their name
[Bekker 1329b line 10]
was changed, and they were called Italians instead of Oenotrians; and this coast of Europe received the name Italy, the part that lies within the Scylletic and Lametic gulfs. These are half a day's journey apart. They say that this Italus made the nomadic
[Bekker 1329b line 15]
Oenotrians into farmers, established other laws for them, and first instituted common messes. Hence even now some of his descendants still use common messes and some of his laws. The country toward Tyrrhenia was inhabited by the Opicans, called both formerly and now
[Bekker 1329b line 20]
Ausonians; that toward Iapygia and the Ionian Sea, the region called the Syrtis, by the Chonians. The Chonians too were Oenotrians by race. The institution of common messes, then, first arose here, but the division of the citizen population into classes came from Egypt; for the reign that far precedes in time
[Bekker 1329b line 25]
Minos' is that of Sesostris. We should suppose that most other things, too, have been discovered many times in the long course of time, or rather infinitely many times. For need itself is likely to teach what is necessary; and once these things are present, it is reasonable that things contributing to refinement and abundance should develop.
[Bekker 1329b line 30]
Therefore we must suppose that matters concerning constitutions follow the same course. That all these things are ancient is indicated by Egypt: its people seem to be the most ancient, yet they have always possessed laws and political organization. Therefore we must make adequate use of what has been discovered and, as for what has been left out,
[Bekker 1329b line 35]
try to seek it.

### Book VII, 1329b–1333a

We have already said that the territory should belong to those who possess arms and share in the constitution, that those who farm it must be different from them, and how large and of what kind the territory should be. As for its
[Bekker 1329b line 40]
distribution and the farmers, who they should be and of what kind, we must speak first, since we say neither that there should be common
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property, as some have said,

but that it should be common in use through friendship, nor that any citizen should lack food. As for common messes, everyone agrees that their presence is useful in well-organized cities; why this seems useful
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to us too, we shall say later. All the citizens must share in them, but it is not easy for the poor both to contribute the prescribed amount from their own resources and to manage the rest of their household. Furthermore, expenses relating to the gods are common to the whole city. Into two parts, therefore,
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the territory must be divided, one common and the other belonging to private individuals, and each of these must in turn be divided in two: one part of the common land for services to the gods, the other for the expense of the common messes; and of the privately owned land, one part toward the frontier,
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the other toward the city, so that with two allotments assigned to each person, everyone has a share in both locations. For this arrangement provides both equality and justice, and greater concord in wars against neighboring cities. Where the arrangement is otherwise, some, where their border neighbors are concerned, are indifferent to
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hostility, while others care too much, even beyond what is noble. Hence in some places there is a law that those whose land adjoins the border must not share in deliberation about wars against their neighbors, on the ground that their private interest would prevent them from deliberating well. The territory, then, must be divided in this way for the already stated
[Bekker 1330a line 25]
reasons. As for those who are to farm it, the best arrangement, if things are to be as we wish, is that they should be slaves, neither all of the same race nor spirited (for in this way they would both be useful for work and safe from attempts at revolution); the second best is that they should be barbarian inhabitants of the outlying districts, similar in nature to those just described.
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Of these, those on private estates should be the private property of the owners of those estates, while those on the common land should be common property. How slaves should be treated, and why it is better for freedom to be held out as a prize to all slaves, we shall say later.

That the city should be accessible from the mainland
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and equally, as far as possible, from the sea and the whole territory, has been said already. We should wish its own position to lie on a slope, with four considerations in view. First, as a necessity, health (for cities inclined toward the east and toward the winds
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blowing from the sunrise are healthier; next come those facing north, for these have milder winters).

Of the remaining considerations,
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the position should be favorable for political and military actions. For military actions, it should be easy for the inhabitants to leave, but difficult for opponents to approach or surround. As for waters and springs, there should preferably be an abundant supply
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of their own; failing this, a remedy has been found by constructing plentiful large cisterns for rainwater, so that the supply never fails when war cuts them off from the territory. Since the inhabitants' health must be considered, and this depends on the site's being well situated both in such a place and toward
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such a quarter, and secondly on using healthy water, this matter too must be attended to with more than passing care. For what we use for the body in the greatest quantities and most frequently contributes most to health; and the influence of water and air is of this nature. Therefore in
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prudent cities, if not all the water is alike and there is no abundant supply of such springs, water for nourishment must be kept separate from water for other uses.

As for defensible positions, the advantage is not the same for all constitutions. For example, an acropolis suits oligarchy and monarchy,
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a level site suits democracy, and neither suits aristocracy, but rather several strong positions. The arrangement of private dwellings is thought more pleasant and more useful for other activities if it is laid out in straight streets, in the newer manner of Hippodamus; but for military
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security, the opposite is preferable, as things were arranged in ancient times. For that arrangement is difficult for foreign troops to enter and for attackers to find their way through. Therefore the city should share in both arrangements (for this is possible if one lays it out in the way farmers arrange what some call clumps of vines), and should not
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make the whole city regularly laid out, but only particular sections and places. For in this way it will be well arranged both for security and for beauty.

As for walls, those who say that cities laying claim to virtue should not have them hold an altogether antiquated view, even though they see that cities that prided themselves in this way have been refuted by events.
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Against equals and those not greatly superior in numbers, it is not noble to try to preserve oneself through the strength of walls. But since it is possible for the superiority of the attackers to exceed the human virtue of a small number, if the city is to be preserved
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and not suffer harm or outrage, we must regard the greatest possible strength of walls as the most effective means for war,

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especially now that missiles and siege engines have been brought to precision for besieging cities. To demand that cities not be surrounded by walls is like seeking to make the territory easy to invade and to remove its
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mountainous places, or likewise not to enclose private dwellings with walls, on the ground that their inhabitants will become cowardly. Moreover, we must not overlook this: those who have put walls around their city can use their city in both ways, both as a city with walls and as one without
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them, while those who have none cannot. If this is so, not only must walls be built around the city, but care must also be taken that they suit the city both as an adornment and for military needs, both the other needs and those newly discovered. For just as attackers
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take care to discover the means of gaining an advantage, so defenders too have discovered some means and must search out and investigate others. For people do not even attempt to attack those who are well prepared.

Since the multitude of citizens must, among common messes,
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be divided, and the walls must be divided by guard posts and towers at suitable points, it is clear that these considerations invite us to establish some of the common messes in these guard posts. These things, then, might be arranged in this way. The buildings assigned to the gods,
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and the most authoritative of the officials' common messes, should occupy the same suitable site, except for those shrines which the law or some other pronouncement of the Pythian oracle sets apart. Such a site would be one sufficiently prominent to display the excellence of its position, and more strongly defended in relation to the adjoining
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parts of the city. Below this site it is fitting to establish a marketplace of the kind customary in Thessaly, which they call the free marketplace. This must be clear of all merchandise, and neither a mechanic nor a farmer nor anyone else of this sort should enter
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unless summoned by the rulers. The place would be agreeable if the gymnasia of the older men were also situated here; for this arrangement too should be divided according to age, and some rulers should spend their time with the younger men, while the older men should be with
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the rulers. For being present in the rulers' sight is especially effective in instilling true respect and, in free men,
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fear.

The marketplace for merchandise must be different from this one and separate, in a place convenient for bringing together everything sent from the sea and from the territory.

Since the city's leadership is divided into priests
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and rulers, the priests' common messes too should be situated near the sacred buildings. Those official establishments concerned with contracts, the filing of lawsuits, summonses, and other administration of this sort, and also with the supervision of the marketplace and what is called
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the supervision of the city, should be established near a marketplace and a common meeting place. The place around the marketplace for necessities is of this kind: we assign the upper marketplace to leisure, but this one to necessary activities. The arrangements in the territory should imitate those just described. For there too the
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rulers whom some call forest wardens and others country wardens must have guard posts and common messes for their duties of protection. Shrines must also be distributed through the territory, some for gods and others for heroes. But to spend time now discussing these things in detail is idle. Such things are not
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difficult to conceive, but rather to put into practice; for describing them is the work of wishing, while their realization is the work of chance. Therefore, for the present, let us leave further discussion of such things aside.

As for the constitution itself, we must say from what elements, and of what kind,
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the city that is to be blessed and to take part well in public life must be constituted. Since doing well in any matter depends on two things, one of which is setting the aim and the end of our actions correctly, and the other finding the actions that lead to the end (for it is possible
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for these to be at variance with one another or in harmony: sometimes the aim is rightly set, but in acting people fail to attain it; sometimes they succeed in all the means to the end, but have set themselves a bad end; and sometimes they fail in both, as in medicine, for sometimes they neither
[Bekker 1331b line 35]
judge correctly what a healthy body should be like nor attain the means that produce the standard they have set themselves; but in the arts and sciences both must be mastered, the end and the actions toward the end), living well and happiness are desired
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by everyone, as is evident, but some have the opportunity and others do not, owing to some chance or natural condition

(for living nobly also needs a supply of resources
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of some kind, less for those better constituted and more for those worse). Others, though they have the opportunity, seek happiness wrongly from the outset. Since our task is to discern the best constitution, and this
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is the one under which a city would conduct its public life best, and it would conduct its public life best under the constitution that allows the city to be happiest, it is clear that we must not be ignorant of what happiness is.

We say (and have determined in the Ethics, if those arguments are of any use) that it is an activity and a complete exercise of virtue, and that this
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is not conditional but unqualified. By conditional I mean what is necessary, and by unqualified what is noble. For example, in matters of just actions, just acts of retribution and punishment spring from virtue, but are necessary, and possess nobility through necessity (for it is preferable that neither a man nor a city should need any such
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things); but actions directed toward honors and abundant resources are noblest without qualification. For the former kind is the removal of some evil, while actions of the latter kind are the opposite: they establish and bring forth good things. A good man would make noble use even of poverty, illness, and
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other bad turns of fortune; but blessedness lies in their opposites (for this too has been determined in our ethical arguments: the good man is one for whom, through virtue, the things that are good without qualification are good; and it is evident that his uses of these things too must be good and noble
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without qualification). Hence people also think that external goods are the causes of happiness, as if they attributed brilliant and beautiful lyre-playing to the lyre rather than to the art.

Therefore, from what has been said, some things must already be present, while others the legislator must provide. Hence we pray to obtain
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in the city's formation those things over which chance is sovereign (for we assume that it is sovereign over them); but for the city to be good is no longer the work of chance, but of knowledge and deliberate choice. Yet a city is good through the goodness of the citizens who share in its constitution; and in our city all the citizens
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share in the constitution. We must therefore examine how a man becomes good. For even if it is possible for all the citizens collectively to be good without each citizen being so, the latter is preferable; for the goodness of all follows from that of each. Now people become good and virtuous through three things. These three
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are nature, habit, and reason. For first one must be born, for example, a human being and not some other animal; and then with a certain character of body and soul. But with some qualities it is of no use
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to be born with them;

for habits cause change. Some qualities are by nature capable of going either way, and are turned by habits toward worse or better. The other animals live chiefly by nature, though some are also influenced to a small extent by habits; but a human being lives
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also by reason, for he alone has reason. Therefore these things must be in harmony with one another. For people do many things contrary to their habits and their nature because of reason, if they are persuaded that some other course is better. We have already determined what sort of nature those whom the legislator is to handle readily must have;
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the remaining task now belongs to education. For people learn some things by becoming habituated and others by hearing.

Since every political community is constituted of rulers and the ruled, we must consider whether the rulers and the ruled should be different people or the same people throughout
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life. For it is clear that education too must follow this division. If, then, one group differed from the others as much as we believe gods and heroes differ from human beings, possessing from the outset great superiority first in body and then in
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soul, so that the superiority of the rulers was unquestionable and evident to the ruled, clearly it would be better for the same people always to rule and the others to be ruled, once and for all. But since this is not easy to find, and the kings do not differ so greatly as Scylax says they do among the Indians
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from the ruled, it is evident that, for many reasons, everyone must share equally in ruling and being ruled in turn. For equality consists in the same treatment of similar people, and it is difficult for a constitution established contrary to justice to endure. For standing with the ruled in revolution are
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all those throughout the territory who wish for it, and for the citizen body to be so numerous as to be stronger than all these is one of the impossibilities. Yet it is beyond dispute that the rulers must differ from the ruled. How this is to come about and how they are to share must be considered by
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the legislator. We have spoken of this before. For nature has provided the division by making what is the same in kind partly younger and partly older; of these, it is fitting for the former to be ruled and the latter to rule. No one resents being ruled on account of his age, or thinks himself superior, especially
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when he is going to receive this contribution in return once he reaches the appropriate age.

In one sense, therefore, we must say that the same people rule and are ruled, and in another sense different people.

Consequently their
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education too must in one sense be the same and in another different. For they say that anyone who is going to rule well must first have been ruled. (As we said in our first discussions, one kind of rule is for the sake of the ruler and another for the sake of the ruled.
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Of these, we say that one is a master's rule and the other the rule of free people. Some of the tasks commanded differ not in the work itself, but in the person for whose sake it is done. Therefore it is noble for the young among free people to perform many of the tasks that seem to be menial; for with regard to being noble or not noble, actions differ not so much
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in themselves as in their end and that for whose sake they are done.) Since we say that the virtue of the citizen and ruler is the same as that of the best man, and that the same person must first become one of the ruled and later a ruler, the legislator's concern should be how good men
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come to be, through what practices, and what the end of the best life is.

The soul is divided into two parts, one of which has reason in itself, while the other does not have reason in itself but can obey reason. We say that their virtues are those by which a man is called good in some sense. In which of these
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the end chiefly lies is not obscure for those who divide them as we say. For the worse always exists for the sake of the better, and this is equally evident in things made by art and in things constituted by nature; and the part that has reason is better. It is itself divided in two, in the way we customarily divide it:
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one kind of reason is practical, the other contemplative. Clearly, then, this part too must be divided accordingly. We shall also say that the actions stand in a corresponding relation, and that the actions of the part better by nature should be preferable for those capable of attaining either all of them or both kinds; for what is always most desirable for each person is
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the highest thing he can attain. The whole of life is also divided into work and leisure, war and peace, and actions into those directed toward what is necessary and useful and those directed toward what is noble. In these matters the same choice must be made as with the parts of the soul and the actions
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of those parts: war for the sake of peace, work for the sake of leisure, and things necessary and useful for the sake of things noble. Therefore the statesman must legislate with all these things in view, both the parts of the soul and their actions, but more especially the better things and the ends. In the
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same way he must consider ways of life and choices of activities; for one must be able to work and to wage war,

### Book VII, 1333b–1337a

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but rather live in peace and enjoy leisure; and they must do what is necessary and useful, but still more what is noble. Therefore toward these ends we must educate both those who are still children and people of every other age that needs
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education.

Yet those Greeks who now seem to have the best constitutions, and the legislators who established these constitutions, appear neither to have ordered their constitutional arrangements toward the best end nor to have directed their laws and education toward all the virtues. Instead, they have crudely inclined
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toward the virtues that seem useful and better suited to gaining an advantage. In much the same way, some later writers have also declared this same opinion. For in praising the constitution of the Lacedaemonians, they admire the legislator's purpose, because he framed all his laws with a view to conquest and war. These claims
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are easily refuted by argument, and have now been refuted by events. Just as most people covet mastery over many, because it brings an abundant supply of the goods of fortune, so Thibron too evidently admired the legislator of the Laconians, as did each of the other
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writers on their constitution, because their training to face dangers enabled them to rule over many. Yet it is clear that, since the Laconians no longer possess their empire, they are not happy, nor is their legislator good. And this is absurd, if, while they abide by his laws and nothing prevents
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their use of them, they have lost the ability to live nobly. Nor do they understand correctly the kind of rule that a legislator ought evidently to honor. For rule over free people is nobler than rule as a master, and more in keeping with virtue. Moreover, we must not on this account consider a city happy
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and praise its legislator, because he trained it to conquer so as to rule its neighbors. Such things bring great harm. For clearly any citizen capable of this must also try to pursue it, so that he may rule his own city. This is precisely the charge the Laconians bring against King Pausanias, although
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he held so great an honor.

None of these arguments or laws, then, is suited to a city, or beneficial, or true. For the same things are best both for individuals and for the community, and the legislator must implant them in people's souls. Nor should they practice training in warfare for the purpose of enslaving
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those who do not deserve it, but first so that they themselves may not be enslaved to others, and next so that they may seek leadership for the
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benefit of the ruled,

and not mastery over everyone; and third, to exercise mastery over those who deserve to be slaves. That the legislator should take greater care to arrange his laws concerning warfare, as well as his other legislation, with leisure
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and peace as their purpose is an argument to which events bear witness. For most cities of this kind survive while they are at war, but perish when they have gained an empire. They lose their temper, like iron, when they live in peace. The legislator is responsible, because he did not educate them to be capable of leisure.

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Since the end appears to be the same for people collectively and individually, and the same standard must apply to the best man and the best constitution, it is evident that the virtues directed toward leisure must be present. For the end,
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as has often been said, is peace for war, and leisure for occupation. Among the virtues useful for leisure and the conduct of life are both those whose activity belongs to leisure and those whose activity belongs to occupation. For many necessities must be available if leisure is to be possible. Therefore the city ought to be temperate,
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courageous, and enduring. For, as the proverb says, there is no leisure for slaves, and those unable to face danger courageously are slaves to their attackers. Courage and endurance, then, are needed for occupation, philosophy for leisure, and temperance and justice at both times,
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but more especially when people live in peace and enjoy leisure. For war compels them to be just and temperate, whereas the enjoyment of good fortune and leisure in peace make them more insolent. Much justice and much temperance, then, are needed by those who seem to fare best
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and who enjoy everything accounted blessed—as would any who dwell, as the poets say, in the Isles of the Blessed. For these people will most need philosophy, temperance, and justice, the more they enjoy leisure amid an abundance of such goods. It is therefore evident why a city that is to be happy
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and good must share in these virtues. For if it is shameful to be unable to use good things, it is still more shameful to be unable to use them in leisure: to appear good when occupied and at war, but slavish when living in peace and at leisure.
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Therefore virtue must not be cultivated as the city of the Lacedaemonians cultivates it.

For they differ from others not in this respect,
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that they do not regard the same things as the greatest goods, but in the fact that these are attained more through a certain virtue. But since these are greater goods, and the enjoyment of them greater than that of the virtues […]. […] and that it is for its own sake, is evident
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from these considerations. How, and by what means, it will be attained is what we must now examine.

We have already distinguished the need for nature, habit, and reason. Of these, what sort of people they must be by nature has been determined earlier; it remains to examine whether they should first be educated through reason or through habits. For these must
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accord with one another in the best possible harmony. Reason may miss the best starting point, and habits may likewise have led one astray. First, then, this much is evident, as in other matters: coming to be proceeds from a starting point, and the end proceeds from a starting point that is itself another end.
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Reason and intellect are the end of our nature, so our coming to be and the cultivation of our habits must be prepared with a view to them. Next, just as soul and body are two, so we see two parts in the soul, the irrational and the part possessing reason; and their dispositions are two in number,
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one being desire and the other intellect. Just as the body is prior to the soul in coming to be, so the irrational part is prior to the part possessing reason. This too is evident. For spirit and wish, and also appetite, are present in children from birth, whereas reasoning and intellect, as they advance
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in age, naturally develop. Therefore care for the body must necessarily come before care for the soul, and care for desire must come next; yet care for desire must be for the sake of intellect, and care for the body for the sake of the soul.

If, then, the legislator must see from the beginning that
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the bodies of those brought up become as good as possible, he must first attend to their union: when, and in what condition, they should enter into marital intercourse with one another. He must legislate for this partnership with an eye both to the partners themselves and to their span of life, so that they reach the decline of their years
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at the same time, and their capacities do not fall out of harmony, with the man still able to beget children but the woman unable, or the woman able but the man unable. For this causes both faction and differences between them. Next he must consider the succession of children. For children must neither be too far behind in
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age compared with their fathers, since the benefit from the children is then of no use to the elderly, nor, from the
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fathers, assistance to the children,

nor be too close to them in age. For this brings many difficulties: such children have less reverence, as though they were of the same age, and closeness in age leads to complaints concerning household management. Further, there is the matter from which we began and came
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to this discussion: how the bodies of those born may conform to the legislator's intention.

Almost all these things are secured by attention to one point. For since the limit of procreation is fixed, generally speaking, at seventy years at the latest for men, and fifty
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for women, the beginning of their union, in respect of age, must be timed to reach these limits together. The mating of the young is poor for the production of children. For in all animals the offspring of the young are imperfect, more often female, and small in form; hence the same must necessarily occur
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among human beings. Here is evidence: in all cities where it is customary to pair young men and young women, their offspring are imperfect and small in body. Moreover, young women suffer more in childbirth, and more of them die. For this reason, some say that the oracle was given on such an account
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to the Troezenians, because many women were dying through marrying too young, and not with reference to the gathering of the harvest. It is also advantageous for temperance to give women in marriage when they are older, since those who have sexual intercourse when young are thought to be more intemperate. The bodies of males too
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seem to be injured in their growth if they have intercourse while their seed is still increasing. For this too has a definite period, beyond which its increase does not continue, or only a little. Therefore it is fitting to unite women in marriage at about eighteen years of age, and men at thirty-seven or a little earlier.
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For at these ages their union will take place while their bodies are in their prime, and will arrive at the cessation of childbearing at a suitable time for both. Moreover, the children's succession will come as they begin their prime, if birth follows at once as may reasonably be expected, while the parents' age will already have declined
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toward the number of seventy years.

We have spoken, then, about when their union should take place. As for the season of the year, they should follow the times most people use: even now they rightly determine to begin this life together in winter. The partners themselves should also attend, with a view to producing children, both to
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what physicians say and to what students of nature say. For physicians give sufficient advice about the right bodily conditions,

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and students of nature about the winds, favoring northerly over southerly winds. What bodily conditions in the parents would most benefit their offspring must be discussed more carefully in our treatment of the supervision of children;
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but it is enough even now to give an outline. For neither the condition of athletes is useful for civic fitness, or for health and the production of children, nor a pampered condition or one excessively worn by toil, but the condition between these. Their condition, then, must be trained, but trained by exertions that are not violent, nor directed toward only one
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activity, as is the condition of athletes, but toward the activities of free people. These things must hold alike for men and women.

Pregnant women must also care for their bodies, neither remaining inactive nor taking insufficient food. The legislator can readily bring this about by prescribing each
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day a walk to worship the gods who have been allotted the honor of presiding over birth. But their minds, unlike their bodies, should pass the time more gently. For offspring evidently draw upon the woman carrying them, just as plants draw upon the earth. As for the exposure and
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rearing of offspring, let there be a law that no deformed child is to be reared; but if the established customs forbid the exposure of any offspring because of their number, a limit must be set to the number of children. If some couples conceive beyond this limit, before sensation and life arise,
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an abortion must be procured. For sensation and life will determine what is holy and what is not. Since the initial age has been determined for a man and a woman, at which they should begin their union, let the length of time for which they should perform this service of producing children also be determined. For older parents'
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offspring, like those of younger parents, are imperfect in both body and mind, while those of the aged are weak. Therefore the limit should accord with the prime of the mind. In most people this occurs at the age mentioned by some of the poets who measure age in periods of seven years, around fifty
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years. Thus, when a man exceeds this age by four or five years, he should be released from producing children for the community; for the rest of his life, intercourse should evidently be for health or some other such reason. As for intercourse with another woman or another man, let it simply be regarded as ignoble
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for anyone to be found engaging in it in any way whatever, when he is and is called a husband.

During the period of producing children,
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if anyone is found doing such a thing, let him be punished by a loss of honor appropriate to the offense.

Once children are born, we must consider that nourishment makes a great difference to the strength of their bodies, depending on what kind
[Bekker 1336a line 5]
it may be. An examination both of other animals and of peoples who take care to develop a warlike condition shows that nourishment rich in milk is most suited to their bodies, and that it should contain less wine because of diseases. Moreover, as much movement as is possible at this age is beneficial.
[Bekker 1336a line 10]
To prevent their limbs from becoming distorted through their softness, some peoples even now use certain mechanical devices that keep the bodies of such children straight. It is also beneficial to accustom them to cold from early childhood. For both health and military
[Bekker 1336a line 15]
activities, this is most useful. Hence among many non-Greek peoples there is a custom: some immerse newborn children in a cold river, while others clothe them in little covering, as the Celts do. For in everything to which they can be accustomed, it is better to accustom them from the beginning, but to do so gradually.
[Bekker 1336a line 20]
Children's bodily condition, through its warmth, is naturally well suited to training in enduring cold.

For their earliest age, then, it is beneficial to provide care of this kind and similar care. In the age following this, up to five years, when it is not yet fitting to introduce any learning
[Bekker 1336a line 25]
or compulsory exertions, lest they hinder growth, children must receive enough movement to avoid bodily inactivity. This should be provided both through other activities and through play. Their games must be neither unworthy of free people, nor exhausting, nor lax.
[Bekker 1336a line 30]
The rulers called supervisors of children should also attend to the kinds of stories and tales that children of this age ought to hear. For all such things must prepare the way for their later pursuits. Hence most games should be imitations of the things they will later do in earnest. As for the straining
[Bekker 1336a line 35]
of children and their crying, those who forbid them in their laws are wrong to prohibit them, for they contribute to growth. In a way they exercise the body: holding the breath produces strength in those exerting themselves, and this also happens in children when they strain.

Inspection is required:
[Bekker 1336a line 40]
the supervisors of children must examine how they pass their time, in other respects and also to ensure that they spend as little time as possible with slaves. For at this age,

[Bekker 1336b]
[Bekker 1336b line 1]
and up to seven years, they must be brought up at home. It is therefore reasonable to expect that, even at this age, they will acquire what is unworthy of free people from what they hear and see. In general, then, foul speech from the city, as much as anything else, must be
[Bekker 1336b line 5]
banished by the legislator, for speaking readily of anything shameful brings doing it close at hand. Above all, it must be kept from the young, so that they neither say nor hear anything of the kind. If anyone is found saying or doing any of the forbidden things, a free person who is not yet deemed worthy to recline
[Bekker 1336b line 10]
at the common messes should be punished by dishonor and blows; but one older than this age should be punished with forms of dishonor suited to slaves, for his slavish conduct. Since we banish speaking of such things, it is clear that we also banish viewing indecent pictures or hearing indecent stories. Care should therefore be taken by the
[Bekker 1336b line 15]
rulers that no statue or picture represents such acts, except in the precincts of certain gods to whom the law also assigns ribaldry. To these the law permits people whose age is sufficiently advanced to honor the gods on behalf of themselves, their children, and their wives.
[Bekker 1336b line 20]
But younger people should not be allowed to attend performances of iambic verse or comedy before they reach the age at which they may also take part in reclining at meals and in intoxication, and their education will make them altogether immune to the harm arising from such things.

For now we have treated this subject in passing.
[Bekker 1336b line 25]
Later we must consider it carefully and determine it more fully, first examining whether these things should be permitted or not, and how they should be permitted. For the present we have mentioned it as necessary. Perhaps Theodorus, the tragic actor, spoke well on this point. For he never allowed anyone to appear before him, not even
[Bekker 1336b line 30]
one of the lesser actors, on the ground that audiences grow attached to what they first hear. The same thing happens in our relations both with people and with things: we always cherish the first more. Hence we must make everything base unfamiliar to the young, especially whatever
[Bekker 1336b line 35]
contains depravity or ill will. Once the five years have passed, during the two years up to seven they should already observe the studies they will have to learn themselves. There are two ages into which education must necessarily be divided: the period from seven to puberty, and then the period from
[Bekker 1336b line 40]
puberty to twenty-one years. For those who divide ages into periods of seven years speak, for the most part, not
[Bekker 1337a]
[Bekker 1337a line 1]
without reason,

but we must follow nature's divisions. For every art and education seeks to fill out what nature leaves lacking. First, then, we must examine whether some system should be established for children; next, whether a common arrangement is advantageous
[Bekker 1337a line 5]
for their care, or an individual one, as happens now in most cities; and third, what this care ought to be.

### Book VIII, 1337a–1340b

[Bekker 1337a]
[Bekker 1337a line 11]
No one would dispute, then, that the legislator must concern himself above all with the education of the young. For where this does not happen in cities, it harms their constitutions. People must be educated to suit each constitution, since the character
[Bekker 1337a line 15]
proper to each constitution both habitually preserves it and establishes it in the first place: democratic character a democracy, for example, and oligarchic character an oligarchy. A better character is always the cause of a better constitution. Moreover, for all capacities and arts there are things that must be learned beforehand
[Bekker 1337a line 20]
and habits that must be formed beforehand for the work of each; so clearly this also holds for the activities of virtue. Since the whole city has one end, it is evident that education must also be one and the same for all, and that care for it must be common, not private, as it is now,
[Bekker 1337a line 25]
when each person cares privately for his own children and teaches them whatever private course of study he thinks fit. Training in common concerns must also be common. At the same time, we should not think that any citizen belongs to himself, but that all belong to the city, for each is a part of the city. Care
[Bekker 1337a line 30]
for each part naturally looks to care for the whole. In this respect one might praise the Lacedaemonians: they devote the greatest attention to children, and do so in common.

It is evident, then, that laws must be laid down concerning education, and that it must be made common. But what education is to be, and how
[Bekker 1337a line 35]
people should be educated, must not escape our attention. For at present the tasks are disputed. Not everyone supposes that the young should learn the same things, either for virtue or for the best life; nor is it evident whether education should be directed more toward the intellect or toward the soul's character. From the current
[Bekker 1337a line 40]
education the inquiry grows confused, and it is not at all clear whether we should cultivate what is useful for life, what tends toward virtue, or the more refined accomplishments. For all these have found advocates
[Bekker 1337b]
[Bekker 1337b line 1]
of one sort or another.

Nor is there any agreement about what leads to virtue. For not everyone honors the same virtue to begin with, so it is reasonable that they also differ about its cultivation. That the necessary among useful things should be taught
[Bekker 1337b line 5]
is not unclear; but that not all should be taught is evident from the distinction between activities worthy of free people and those unworthy of them. It is also evident that we should share in those useful things that will not make the participant vulgar. We must consider vulgar any work, art, or study that, for the exercise and
[Bekker 1337b line 10]
activities of virtue, renders the body, soul, or intellect of free people useless. Hence we call vulgar both those arts that cause the body to be in a worse condition and those occupations performed for wages, for they leave the intellect without leisure and debase it.
[Bekker 1337b line 15]
Even among the liberal sciences, it is not unworthy of a free person to engage in some up to a point; but excessive application to precision is liable to the harms just mentioned. The purpose for which one acts or learns also makes a great difference. For doing something for oneself, for friends, or for virtue is not unworthy of a free person,
[Bekker 1337b line 20]
whereas doing this same thing for others might often be thought the work of a hired laborer or a slave.

The studies now established, as was said earlier, are of an ambiguous character. There are roughly four things that people customarily teach:

letters, physical training, music, and,
[Bekker 1337b line 25]
as a fourth, in some cases, drawing. Letters and drawing are taught as useful for life and having many uses, and physical training as contributing to courage. But about music one might already raise a difficulty. At present most people engage in it for pleasure; but those who first included it in education
[Bekker 1337b line 30]
did so because nature itself seeks, as has often been said, not only to be rightly occupied, but also to be capable of enjoying leisure nobly. This is the one principle of everything; let us speak of it again. If both are needed, but leisure is more worthy of choice than occupation and is its end, we must inquire
[Bekker 1337b line 35]
what we should do when enjoying leisure. Surely we should not play, for then play would necessarily be the end of our life. But if this is impossible, and play should rather be used amid our occupations—for the person who toils needs rest, and play is for the sake of rest, while occupation involves
[Bekker 1337b line 40]
toil and strain—we must therefore introduce play, watching for the right time to use it, as though administering a remedy. For such movement of the soul is a release,
[Bekker 1338a]
[Bekker 1338a line 1]
and, through its pleasure, a rest.

Leisure itself seems to contain pleasure, happiness, and blessed living. This belongs not to those who are occupied but to those who enjoy leisure. For the occupied person is occupied for the sake of some
[Bekker 1338a line 5]
end that he does not yet possess; but happiness is an end, and everyone thinks it involves not pain but pleasure. Yet they no longer take this pleasure to be the same: each determines it according to himself and his own disposition, while the best person takes it to be the best pleasure, arising from the noblest things. It is therefore evident that
[Bekker 1338a line 10]
some things must also be learned, and education given, for the leisure in which we conduct our lives. These branches of education and study must be for their own sake, whereas those directed toward occupation are necessary and for the sake of other things. Hence our predecessors included music in education not as something necessary
[Bekker 1338a line 15]
—for it has nothing of this kind—nor as something useful, as letters are for earning money, household management, learning, and many activities of public life, while drawing also seems useful for judging the work of craftsmen better. Nor, again, is it like physical training, which contributes to
[Bekker 1338a line 20]
health and strength, for we see neither of these resulting from music. It remains, then, that music serves the conduct of life in leisure, and this is evidently the purpose for which they introduce it. For they assign it a place in what they consider the way of life of free people. Hence Homer wrote as follows:
[Bekker 1338a line 25]
"But he alone should be called to the abundant feast,"
and, after speaking beforehand of certain others,
"who call the singer,"
he says,
"who may delight them all."
Elsewhere, too, Odysseus says that this is the best way to pass the time, when people are rejoicing and
"the diners throughout the hall listen to the singer,
sitting in order."
(Hom. Od. 9.5)

[Bekker 1338a line 30]
It is evident, then, that there is a kind of education in which sons must be educated not as useful or necessary, but as worthy of free people and noble. Whether it is one in number or several, and what these kinds are and how they are taught, must be discussed later. For now we have made this much
[Bekker 1338a line 35]
progress: we have some testimony from the ancients too, in the established subjects of education, for music makes this clear. Moreover, children must also be educated in some useful things not only because they are useful—for example, the study of letters—but also because many
[Bekker 1338a line 40]
other studies can arise through them. Likewise, drawing is to be learned not so that they may avoid mistakes in their own purchases and remain undeceived in the
[Bekker 1338b]
[Bekker 1338b line 1]
buying and selling of furnishings,

but rather because it makes them observant of bodily beauty. To seek the useful everywhere is least fitting for the great-souled and for free people. Since it is evident that through habits before reason
[Bekker 1338b line 5]
we must be educated, and in the body before the intellect, it is clear from this that children must be entrusted to physical training and bodily instruction. For the former gives the body a certain condition, and the latter teaches its activities.

At present, among the cities thought most attentive
[Bekker 1338b line 10]
to children, some produce an athletic condition, damaging the form and growth of their bodies; while the Laconians have not made this mistake, but make their children beastlike through exertions, supposing that this contributes most to courage. Yet, as has often been said, neither
[Bekker 1338b line 15]
one virtue alone nor chiefly this virtue should be the aim in providing care. Even if it were directed toward this, they do not achieve it. For neither among other animals nor among peoples do we see courage accompanying the most savage, but rather the gentler and lionlike characters. There are many
[Bekker 1338b line 20]
peoples readily inclined to killing and cannibalism, such as the Achaeans and Heniochi around the Black Sea, and other peoples inland, some resembling these and others surpassing them, who are predatory but have no share in courage. Moreover, we know that the Laconians themselves,
[Bekker 1338b line 25]
so long as they alone devoted themselves to arduous training, surpassed the rest, but now fall behind others both in athletic contests and in warfare. For they differed not by training their young in this way, but only by training in competition with people who did not train. Therefore the noble, not the beastlike,
[Bekker 1338b line 30]
must take the leading role. For neither a wolf nor any other beast would face any noble danger, but rather a good man would. Those who turn children too far toward these things, and leave them uneducated even in necessities, in truth make them vulgar, rendering them useful for only one task
[Bekker 1338b line 35]
of civic life, and even at this task worse than others, as the argument shows. We must judge not from their earlier achievements but from their present ones. For now they have rivals in education, whereas formerly they did not.

It is agreed, then, that physical training should be used, and how it should be used
[Bekker 1338b line 40]
—for up to puberty lighter exercises should be applied, excluding the forced diet and compulsory exertions, so that there may be no hindrance to growth.

For it is no
[Bekker 1339a]
[Bekker 1339a line 1]
small indication that these can have this effect that among Olympic victors one would find only two or three who have won both as men and as boys. For those who train when young are robbed of their strength by compulsory exercises. But when, after
[Bekker 1339a line 5]
puberty, they have spent three years on the other studies, it is then fitting to devote the following age both to exertions and to forced feeding. For we must not make both intellect and body labor intensely at the same time. Each kind of labor naturally produces a contrary effect: labor of the
[Bekker 1339a line 10]
body hinders the intellect, and labor of the intellect hinders the body.

We have already raised some difficulties about music in our discussion, but it is well now to take them up again and carry them further, so that they may serve as a prelude to the arguments one might offer in declaring a judgment about it. For it is not easy to distinguish what
[Bekker 1339a line 15]
power it has, nor for what purpose we should engage in it. Is it for play and rest, like sleep and intoxication? For these are not in themselves among serious things, but are pleasant and, as Euripides says, give rest from care. Hence people also place music in this class and
[Bekker 1339a line 20]
use all these alike—sleep, intoxication, and music—and they also include dancing among them. Or should we rather think that music tends in some degree toward virtue, since, just as physical training gives the body a certain condition, music can give character a certain quality, habituating people to be capable of taking pleasure
[Bekker 1339a line 25]
rightly? Or does it contribute something to the conduct of life and to practical wisdom? For this must be counted as the third of the possibilities mentioned. That the young should not be educated for the sake of play is not unclear, for they are not playing when they learn: learning involves pain. Nor, indeed, is it fitting to assign the conduct of life to children
[Bekker 1339a line 30]
and people of such ages, for an end belongs to nothing incomplete. But perhaps children's serious study might be thought to be for the sake of play when they have become men and reached maturity. Yet if this is so, why should they learn themselves, rather than, like the kings of the Persians and
[Bekker 1339a line 35]
Medes, share in the pleasure and the learning through others who perform it? For those who have made this their work and art must perform better than those who devote to it only the time needed for learning. If they must labor at such things themselves, then they would also have to prepare
[Bekker 1339a line 40]
the dishes for their meals themselves; but that is absurd. The same difficulty arises if music can improve character. For why should they learn these things themselves,

rather than,
[Bekker 1339b]
[Bekker 1339b line 1]
by listening to others, take pleasure rightly and be able to judge, like the Laconians? For although they do not learn, they can nevertheless judge correctly, as they say, which melodies are good and which are not. The same argument also holds if music should be used for enjoyment
[Bekker 1339b line 5]
and a way of life worthy of free people. Why should they learn themselves, rather than enjoy it when others perform? We may also consider the belief we hold about the gods. For in the poets Zeus himself does not sing and play the lyre. Indeed, we call such performers vulgar, and consider performing unworthy
[Bekker 1339b line 10]
of a man unless he is drunk or playing.

But perhaps these matters should be examined later. Our first inquiry is whether music should or should not be included in education, and which of the three things whose difficulties we have discussed it can provide: education, play, or the conduct of life. It is reasonably assigned to all, and
[Bekker 1339b line 15]
evidently shares in them. For play is for the sake of rest, and rest must be pleasant, since it is a kind of remedy for the pain caused by toil. And it is agreed that the conduct of life must contain not only the noble but also pleasure, for happiness consists of both these.
[Bekker 1339b line 20]
We all say that music is among the most pleasant things, both instrumental music alone and music with song. Indeed, Musaeus says that singing is the sweetest thing for mortals; hence people reasonably introduce music into their gatherings and pastimes as something capable of giving delight. Thus on this ground too one might suppose education
[Bekker 1339b line 25]
in it to be necessary for the young. For harmless pleasures are fitting not only for the end but also for rest. Since people attain the end only seldom, but often rest and make use of play, not only for the sake of further activity but also
[Bekker 1339b line 30]
for pleasure, it would be useful to take their rest in the pleasures music provides.

Yet people have come to make play their end. For perhaps the end too contains some pleasure, though not a chance pleasure; and in seeking this they accept the one as the other, because, in relation to the end of their activities,
[Bekker 1339b line 35]
it bears a certain resemblance. For the end is worthy of choice not for the sake of anything to come, and pleasures of this kind are likewise not for the sake of anything to come, but of what has already occurred, such as toil and pain. As for the reason why they seek to attain happiness through these pleasures, one might reasonably suppose this to be
[Bekker 1339b line 40]
the cause. As for engaging in music, it seems that they do so not only for this reason, but also because it is useful for rest. Nevertheless, we must investigate whether perhaps
[Bekker 1340a]
[Bekker 1340a line 1]
this is incidental,

and its nature is more honorable than the use just mentioned. We should not merely share in the common pleasure it provides, which everyone perceives—for music has a certain natural pleasure, and therefore people of every age
[Bekker 1340a line 5]
and every character love its use—but see whether it also contributes in some way to character and the soul. This would be evident if we acquire certain qualities of character through it. But that we do acquire certain qualities is clear from many other instances, and not least from Olympus's
[Bekker 1340a line 10]
melodies. For these admittedly fill souls with inspired excitement, and such excitement is an affection of the soul's character. Moreover, when listening to imitations, everyone comes to share in their emotions, even apart from the rhythms and melodies themselves.

Since music is one of the pleasant things,
[Bekker 1340a line 15]
and virtue concerns taking pleasure, loving, and hating rightly, clearly nothing must be learned and made habitual so much as judging rightly and taking pleasure in good characters and noble actions. In rhythms and melodies there are likenesses, very close to their true natures, of anger
[Bekker 1340a line 20]
and gentleness, and also of courage and temperance and all their opposites, and of the other qualities of character. This is evident from experience, for our souls change when we listen to such things. Habituation to feeling pain and pleasure in likenesses comes close to having toward the truth the same
[Bekker 1340a line 25]
disposition. For example, if someone delights in looking at a person's image for no other reason than the form itself, then looking at the person himself whose image he sees must also be pleasant to him. Among objects of sense, the others contain no likeness of characters—for example, objects of
[Bekker 1340a line 30]
touch and taste—but visible objects contain a little. For there are shapes of this kind, though only to a small degree, and not everyone shares in such perception. Moreover, these are not likenesses of characters, but the shapes and colors that arise are rather signs of characters, and these are manifest
[Bekker 1340a line 35]
in the emotions. Nevertheless, to the extent that looking at these things too makes a difference, the young should look not at the works of Pauson but at those of Polygnotus, and of any other painter or sculptor who portrays character. But in melodies themselves there are imitations of characters (and this is evident.
[Bekker 1340a line 40]
For the nature of the musical modes differs from the outset, so that listeners are affected differently and do not have the same disposition toward each: toward some they become more mournful
[Bekker 1340b]
[Bekker 1340b line 1]
and more subdued,

### Book VIII, 1340b–1342b

as with the so-called Mixolydian mode; at others their minds are softened, as with the relaxed modes; at another they are most of all brought into a moderate and settled state, as the Dorian alone among the modes seems to do; into an inspired state,
[Bekker 1340b line 5]
the Phrygian brings them. For those who have studied this education philosophically speak well on these matters: they draw the evidence for their arguments from the facts themselves.) The same holds also for rhythms. (Some have a more settled character, others a stirring one; and among the latter some have more vulgar
[Bekker 1340b line 10]
movements, others more liberal ones.) From these considerations, then, it is evident that music can impart a certain quality to the character of the soul; and if it can do this, it is clear that the young must be introduced to it and educated in it. Suited to the nature of this age is instruction
[Bekker 1340b line 15]
in music. For the young, because of their age, willingly endure nothing without sweetness, and music is by nature among the things that have sweetness. There also seems to be a certain kinship with modes and rhythms. Hence many of the wise say, some that the soul is a harmony, others that it possesses harmony.

[Bekker 1340b line 20]
Whether they should learn by singing and playing themselves or not, as was questioned earlier, must now be discussed. It is certainly not unclear that taking part in the activities oneself makes a great difference to the sort of person one becomes. For it is among the impossible or difficult things for those who have not taken part
[Bekker 1340b line 25]
in the activities to become sound judges. At the same time, children must have some occupation, and Archytas's rattle must be thought a good invention: people give it to little children so that, occupied with it, they will break none of the things in the house; for the young cannot keep still. This, then, is suitable for
[Bekker 1340b line 30]
infant children, while education is a rattle for older young people. That music must be taught in such a way that the learners also take part in its activities is evident from considerations of this kind. It is not difficult to distinguish what is appropriate and what inappropriate at each age, or to answer those who say that the pursuit
[Bekker 1340b line 35]
is vulgar. For, first, since they must take part in the activities for the sake of judging, they should therefore engage in them while young, but when older leave the activities aside and be able to judge what is noble and enjoy it rightly because of the learning they acquired in youth.
[Bekker 1340b line 40]
As for the reproach some make, that music makes people vulgar, it is not difficult to answer it by considering how far participation in the activities should go for those whose virtue
[Bekker 1341a]
[Bekker 1341a line 1]
is being developed for civic life,

and what kinds of melodies and rhythms they should take part in, and further, on what instruments they should learn; for this too is likely to make a difference. The answer to the reproach lies in these matters: nothing prevents certain forms
[Bekker 1341a line 5]
of music from producing the result mentioned. It is evident, then, that learning it must neither hinder their later activities nor make the body vulgar and useless for military and civic exercises, for some uses now and for others later.

This would be achieved
[Bekker 1341a line 10]
in their learning if they labored neither at what is directed toward professional contests nor at the astonishing and elaborate feats that have now entered the contests and, from the contests, education; rather, they should practice even the less elaborate things only until they can enjoy noble melodies and rhythms,
[Bekker 1341a line 15]
and not merely what is common to music, as do some other animals, and also the mass of slaves and children. From this it is clear, too, what instruments should be used. Neither flutes nor any other professional instrument, such as the cithara or any other of that kind, should be introduced into education, but
[Bekker 1341a line 20]
only those that will make them good listeners, whether to musical education or to education of another kind. Further, the flute does not express character, but rather excites religious frenzy, so it should be used on occasions when listening can bring about purification rather than learning. Let us add that flute-playing has another feature contrary to
[Bekker 1341a line 25]
education: it prevents the use of speech. Hence earlier generations rightly rejected its use by the young and by free people, although they had used it at first. For, as they gained more leisure through prosperity and became more high-minded in their pursuit of virtue, and both earlier
[Bekker 1341a line 30]
and after the Persian Wars were filled with pride by their achievements, they took up every kind of learning, making no distinctions but seeking it out. Hence they also introduced flute-playing among the subjects of learning. Indeed, in Lacedaemon a certain sponsor of a chorus himself played the flute for it, and in Athens it became so customary that roughly the
[Bekker 1341a line 35]
majority of free people took part in it. This is evident from the tablet Thrasippus dedicated when he sponsored a chorus for Ecphantides. Later it was rejected through experience of the practice itself, when people could better judge what contributed to virtue and what did not. The same happened with many of the ancient instruments,
[Bekker 1341a line 40]
such as pectides and barbitoi, and those directed toward giving pleasure to listeners through their players: seven-sided and triangular instruments and
[Bekker 1341b]
[Bekker 1341b line 1]
sambucae,

and all that require skilled manual knowledge. The story told by the ancients about flutes is also reasonable. For they say that Athena invented flutes and then threw them away. It is not unreasonable to say that the goddess did this also because
[Bekker 1341b line 5]
she was displeased by the disfigurement of her face. Nevertheless, it is more likely that she did so because instruction in flute-playing contributes nothing to the mind, while we attribute knowledge and art to Athena. Since we reject professional education both in instruments and in performance
[Bekker 1341b line 10]
(by professional we mean education directed toward contests, for in these the performer practices not for the sake of his own virtue but for the pleasure of the listeners, and a vulgar pleasure at that; hence we judge the activity to be not for free people but more suited to hired labor, and indeed the performers become vulgar, for it is a bad
[Bekker 1341b line 15]
aim that they make their end: the spectator, being vulgar, habitually alters the music, so that he gives a certain character both to the professionals themselves who practice for him and to their bodies, through their movements),

we must now consider the modes and rhythms,
[Bekker 1341b line 20]
and whether all modes and all rhythms should be used for education, or distinctions should be made; then, whether we shall lay down the same distinction for those who labor at music for education, or whether some other, third distinction is needed. Since we see that music consists of melody-making and rhythms, we must not fail to understand, in the case of each,
[Bekker 1341b line 25]
what power it has for education, and whether music with good melody should be preferred to music with good rhythm. Believing, then, that both some present-day musicians and those philosophers who have experience of musical education say many sound things on these matters, we shall leave
[Bekker 1341b line 30]
precise examination of each detail to those who wish to seek it from them; for now let us make distinctions in the manner of a lawgiver, stating only the outlines of these matters.

Since we accept the division of melodies made by some philosophers, who distinguish those that express character, those that prompt action, and those that inspire ecstasy,
[Bekker 1341b line 35]
and assign to each of these the kind of mode naturally suited to it, a different one to each division; and since we say that music should be used not for one benefit alone but for several (for education and for purification—what we mean by purification we state simply for now, but in our discussion of
[Bekker 1341b line 40]
poetry we shall speak of it again more clearly—and third, for the occupation of leisure, for relaxation and for rest from exertion),

[Bekker 1342a]
[Bekker 1342a line 1]
it is evident that all modes should be used, but not all in the same way: for education those that most express character, but for listening to others perform, those that prompt action and those that inspire ecstasy as well. For the
[Bekker 1342a line 5]
feeling that affects certain souls strongly is present in all, though it differs in being weaker or stronger: pity and fear, for example, and also ecstasy. Indeed, some people are possessed by this disturbance; yet we see from sacred melodies that, when they use the frenzied
[Bekker 1342a line 10]
melodies that excite the soul, they become settled, as though they had received healing and purification. This same experience must also come to those prone to pity and fear, and to the emotional in general, and to others insofar as each has a share in such feelings; all must undergo a certain purification and be relieved
[Bekker 1342a line 15]
with pleasure. Likewise, melodies that prompt action also afford people harmless joy. Hence competitors who practice theatrical music should be allowed to use such modes and such melodies. Since spectators are of two kinds, one free and educated, the other
[Bekker 1342a line 20]
vulgar, consisting of artisans, hired laborers, and others of that sort, contests and spectacles must also be provided for these people for their rest. Just as their souls are distorted from their natural condition, so there are deviations among the modes, and among melodies those that are strained and overcolored.
[Bekker 1342a line 25]
What is naturally congenial gives pleasure to each; hence performers competing before this sort of spectator must be allowed to use some such kind of music. For education, however, as has been said, we should use melodies that express character and modes of that kind. Such
[Bekker 1342a line 30]
is the Dorian, as we said earlier; but we must also accept any other that those who share in philosophical study and musical education approve for us. Socrates in the Republic is wrong to retain the Phrygian alone along with the Dorian, especially when he has rejected
[Bekker 1342b]
[Bekker 1342b line 1]
the flute among the instruments.

For the Phrygian has the same power among modes as the flute among instruments: both excite religious frenzy and emotion. Poetry makes this clear. For every form of Bacchic frenzy and every such disturbance
[Bekker 1342b line 5]
is expressed most of all, among instruments, by flutes; and among modes, these find their appropriate expression in Phrygian melodies. Poetry makes this clear: the dithyramb, for instance, is generally agreed to be Phrygian. Those versed in this subject give many examples of it, including the fact that Philoxenus tried, in
[Bekker 1342b line 10]
the Dorian mode, to compose his dithyramb, the Mysians, but could not: the nature of the composition itself drove him back into the Phrygian, the appropriate mode. About the Dorian all agree that it is the most settled and has above all a courageous character. Further, since we praise the mean between extremes
[Bekker 1342b line 15]
and say that it should be pursued, and the Dorian has this nature in relation to the other modes, it is evident that Dorian melodies are more appropriate for the education of the young.

There are two aims: what is possible and what is appropriate. For each group should practice especially what is possible and what is appropriate for them.
[Bekker 1342b line 20]
These too are determined by age. For example, those worn out by time cannot easily sing the strained modes; rather, nature suggests the relaxed modes to people of that age. Hence some musicians rightly reproach Socrates on this point too, because he rejected the relaxed modes
[Bekker 1342b line 25]
for amusement, taking them to be intoxicating—not in the sense of the power of intoxication, for intoxication produces rather a Bacchic frenzy, but in the sense of being enfeebled. Therefore, with a view also to the age that will come, that of older people, one must engage with modes and melodies of this kind; and further,
[Bekker 1342b line 30]
with any mode that is appropriate to the age of children because it can possess both orderliness and educational value, as the Lydian seems to do most of all among the modes. It is clear, then, that these three limits must be set for education: the mean, the possible, and the appropriate.

## Translation — Mouseia

> Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same Greek, covering all eight books and every Bekker page and line mark.

### Book I, 1252a–1255b

[Bekker 1252a]
[Bekker 1252a line 1]
Every city, as we can see, is some kind of community. Every community is formed for some good, since everyone does everything for what they think is good. Clearly, then, all communities aim at some good. But most of all,
[Bekker 1252a line 5]
the most authoritative community, which includes all the others, aims at the most authoritative good of all. This is what we call the city, or the political community. People who think that a statesman, a king, a household manager, and a master are the same are wrong. They take the number of people ruled
[Bekker 1252a line 10]
to distinguish these roles, not their kind. Someone who rules a few is a master; someone who rules more is a household manager; someone who rules still more is a statesman or a king. On this view, a large household and a small city are no different. They also distinguish a statesman from a king this way: when someone rules on his own, he is a king. But when
[Bekker 1252a line 15]
he takes turns ruling and being ruled, following the principles of this kind of knowledge, he is a statesman. These claims aren't true. This will become clear if we look into the matter using the method we have laid out. In other subjects, we have to break a composite thing down until we reach its simplest parts. These are the smallest
[Bekker 1252a line 20]
parts of the whole. In the same way, looking at the parts that make up a city will help us understand these matters better. We will see how they differ from each other. We will also see whether we can gain any systematic knowledge about each role just mentioned.

If we look at how things develop from the beginning,
[Bekker 1252a line 25]
we will get the clearest view of these matters, just as we do in other subjects. First, those who can't exist without each other must form pairs. For example, female and male must pair up to reproduce. This isn't a matter of choice. As with other animals and plants, there is a natural desire
[Bekker 1252a line 30]
to leave behind another being like oneself. The ruler and the ruled by nature must also pair up, for their survival. Someone who can use thought to plan ahead is a ruler and a master by nature. Someone who can carry out these plans with the body is ruled and is a slave by nature. So the same thing brings advantage to master and slave.

By nature, then,
[Bekker 1252b]
[Bekker 1252b line 1]
the female and the slave are distinct. Nature doesn't make anything on the cheap, like the metalworkers' Delphic knife. Instead, it makes one thing for one task. Each tool would do its job best in this way, with not many tasks but one
[Bekker 1252b line 5]
to serve. Among non-Greek peoples, though, the female and the slave have the same rank. The reason is that they have no ruler by nature. Instead, their community consists of a female slave and a male slave. That is why the poets say,
"It is fitting for Greeks to rule non-Greeks,"
(Eur. IA 1400) as though a non-Greek and a slave were the same by nature. From these
[Bekker 1252b line 10]
two communities, then, the household first emerges. Hesiod was right when he wrote,
"First of all, a household, a wife, and an ox for plowing."
(Hes. WD 405) For poor people, the ox takes the place of a household servant. So the community formed by nature to meet everyday needs is the household. Charondas calls its members people who share a bread bin; Epimenides
[Bekker 1252b line 15]
of Crete calls them people who share a food trough. The first community formed from several households to meet needs beyond the everyday is a village. By nature, the village seems most of all to be an offshoot of a household. Its members are what some call people nourished on the same milk: children and their children's children. This is why cities were first ruled by kings, and even today
[Bekker 1252b line 20]
nations are too. They came together out of groups ruled by kings. Every household is ruled by its oldest member, so its offshoots are too, because they are related. This is also what Homer means when he says,
"Each gives laws
for his children and wives."
(Hom. Od. 9.114) They lived scattered apart, as people did in early times. This is also why everyone says the gods
[Bekker 1252b line 25]
are ruled by a king. Some people still live under kings themselves; others did in early times. Just as people make the gods' appearance like their own, they also make the gods' lives like their own.

The complete community formed from several villages is a city. It has reached, so to speak, full self-sufficiency. It comes into being for the sake of
[Bekker 1252b line 30]
living, but it exists for the sake of living well. So every city exists by nature, if the first communities do too. The city is their end, and nature is an end. What each thing is when its development is complete is what we call its nature, whether it is a human, a horse, or a household. Also, the purpose and the end are what is best.

[Bekker 1253a]
[Bekker 1253a line 1]
Self-sufficiency is both an end and what is best. From this it is clear that the city is one of the things that exist by nature, and that a human is a political animal by nature. Someone who has no city by nature, not by chance, is either a bad person or more than human. He is like
[Bekker 1253a line 5]
the person Homer condemns:
"Without clan, without law, without a home."
(Hom. Il. 9.63) Someone who is like this by nature also wants war. He stands alone, like an isolated piece in a board game. It is clear why a human is a political animal more than any bee or any animal that lives in a herd. Nature, as we say, does nothing without a purpose. Speech,
[Bekker 1253a line 10]
however, belongs to humans alone among animals. Voice is a sign of pain and pleasure, so other animals have it too. Their nature has developed far enough for them to feel pain and pleasure and to signal these to each other. But speech serves to show what brings advantage and
[Bekker 1253a line 15]
what causes harm, and therefore the just and the unjust as well. This is what sets humans apart from other animals: they alone have a sense of good and bad, of the just and the unjust, and of the other things of this kind. Sharing these makes a household and a city. The city also comes before the household and each of us by nature.
[Bekker 1253a line 20]
The whole must come before the part. If the whole is destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in name, as when we speak of a stone hand. A dead hand will be like that. Everything is defined by its work and its ability. When it no longer has these, we shouldn't call it the same thing, but only something with the same name.
[Bekker 1253a line 25]
So it is clear that the city also comes before each individual by nature. For if an individual is not self-sufficient when separated, he will stand in the same relation to the whole as the other parts do. Someone who can't share in a community, or who needs nothing because he is self-sufficient, is no part of a city. He must be either a beast or a god.

By nature, then, there is a drive in
[Bekker 1253a line 30]
everyone toward this kind of community. But the person who first set it up was responsible for the greatest goods. A human, when fully developed, is the best of animals. In the same way, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all. Injustice is most dangerous when it has weapons. A human is born with weapons for practical wisdom and
[Bekker 1253a line 35]
virtue, but can use them especially for the opposite ends. Without virtue, then, he is the most unholy and savage of beings, and the worst when it comes to sex and food. Justice belongs to the city. For justice gives order to the political community, and justice is the judgment of the just.

[Bekker 1253b]
[Bekker 1253b line 1]
Now that it is clear what parts make up a city, we must first discuss household management. Every city is made up of households. The parts of household management are, in turn, the parts that make up a household. A complete household consists of slaves and free people. For
[Bekker 1253b line 5]
we must first study each thing in its smallest parts. The first and smallest parts of a household are master and slave, husband and wife, and father and children. We should examine each of these three relationships: what it is and what it should be like. These are mastery, the marital relationship—a woman and a man have no special name for their
[Bekker 1253b line 10]
union as a couple—and, third, producing children, which also has no special name of its own. Let these be the three we have mentioned. There is also a part that some people think is household management itself, while others think it is its most important part. We must examine how this stands. I mean what is called money-making. But first,
[Bekker 1253b line 15]
let's discuss master and slave. We want to see what concerns their necessary use, and whether we can gain a better understanding of them than the views now held. Some people think mastery is a kind of knowledge, and that household management, mastery, statesmanship, and kingship are the same,
[Bekker 1253b line 20]
as we said at the start. Others think being a master is against nature. On their view, one person is a slave and another free by convention, but they are no different by nature. So mastery isn't just either, because it rests on force.

Property is part of the household, and getting property is part of household management. Without necessities, it is impossible
[Bekker 1253b line 25]
either to live or to live well. Just as each particular craft must have its own tools if its work is to be done, so must the household manager. Some tools are lifeless and others living. For a ship's pilot, for example, the rudder is lifeless, but the lookout at the bow is living. An
[Bekker 1253b line 30]
assistant is a kind of tool in the crafts. In the same way, a possession is a tool for living, property is a collection of tools, and a slave is a living possession. Every assistant is like a tool that comes before other tools. Suppose each tool could, when ordered or when it anticipated the order, carry out
[Bekker 1253b line 35]
its own work. This is what people say of Daedalus's creations and Hephaestus's tripods, which the poet says enter the gathering of the gods on their own. If weaving shuttles wove on their own like this, and picks played the lyre, master craftsmen wouldn't need
[Bekker 1254a]
[Bekker 1254a line 1]
assistants, and masters wouldn't need slaves.

What we usually call tools, then, are tools for making things, while a possession is a tool for acting. Using a shuttle produces something beyond its use. Using clothing or a bed gives only the use itself.
[Bekker 1254a line 5]
Also, making and acting differ in kind, and both need tools. Their tools must therefore differ in the same way. Life is action, not production. So a slave is an assistant in matters of action. A possession is spoken of in the same way as a part. A part is not
[Bekker 1254a line 10]
just a part of something else; it also belongs entirely to something else. The same is true of a possession. So a master is only the slave's master; he doesn't belong to the slave. But a slave is not just the master's slave; he also belongs entirely to him.

This makes clear the slave's nature and function. Someone who by nature belongs not to himself
[Bekker 1254a line 15]
but to someone else, while being human, is a slave by nature. A human belongs to someone else if, while being human, he is a possession. A possession is a tool for action that is separate from its owner.

Is anyone like this by nature or not? Is it better and just for anyone to be a slave, or not? Or is all slavery against nature? These are the questions we must next
[Bekker 1254a line 20]
examine. It isn't hard to see the answer through reasoning and to learn it from what happens. Ruling and being ruled are not only necessary but also bring advantage. Right from birth, some things are set apart to be ruled and others to rule. There are also many kinds of rulers and
[Bekker 1254a line 25]
ruled. Rule is always better when those being ruled are better: rule over a human, for example, is better than rule over a beast. Work done by better beings is better work. Where one rules and another is ruled, there is some work they do. Whenever several parts make up one common whole, whether the parts are connected or
[Bekker 1254a line 30]
separate, a ruling element and a ruled element appear in all such cases. This is present in living things as a feature of nature as a whole. Even in things that have no share in life, there is a kind of rule, as in a musical harmony. But these matters may belong to a discussion outside our subject. An animal is made up first of soul
[Bekker 1254a line 35]
and body. Of these, one rules by nature and the other is ruled. We should look for what is natural in things that are in their natural condition, rather than in damaged things. So we must look at the human who is in the best condition in both body and soul. In him this is clear.

In people who are bad or
[Bekker 1254b]
[Bekker 1254b line 1]
in a bad condition, the body may often seem to rule the soul, because their condition is poor and against nature.

As we say, then, we can first see both a master's rule and political rule in an animal. The soul, in relation to the body,
[Bekker 1254b line 5]
rules as a master, while the mind rules desire with political rule or a king's rule. In these cases, the body is naturally ruled by the soul, and this brings advantage. The same holds for the part that feels emotions. It is ruled by the mind and the part that has reason. Equal rule, or the reverse arrangement, harms them all.
[Bekker 1254b line 10]
The same applies to humans and other animals. Tame animals have a better nature than wild ones. It is better for all tame animals to be ruled by humans, since this keeps them alive. Also, the male is superior to the female by nature, and the female inferior. One rules and the other is ruled. The
[Bekker 1254b line 15]
same pattern must apply among all humans too. People who are as different from others as soul is from body and a human from a beast are slaves by nature. This is the condition of people whose work is the use of their bodies and for whom this is the best they can offer. It is better for them
[Bekker 1254b line 20]
to be ruled in this way, if it is also better for the things already mentioned. A slave by nature is someone who can belong to someone else, and therefore does belong to someone else. He shares in reason enough to recognize it, but not to have it himself. Other animals serve not by recognizing reason but by their feelings. Their use also differs little:
[Bekker 1254b line 25]
both slaves and tame animals give bodily help with life's necessities. Nature also intends to make the bodies of free people and slaves different. Slaves' bodies are strong for necessary work; free people's bodies stand upright and are unsuited to
[Bekker 1254b line 30]
work of this kind, but suited to political life. Political life itself is divided between activities in war and in peace. But the opposite often happens too: some have free people's bodies, others their souls. At least this is clear: if people differed
[Bekker 1254b line 35]
in body alone as much as statues of the gods do, everyone would say that those who fell short deserved to be their slaves. If this is true of the body, it is much more just to make this distinction in the case of the soul. But it isn't equally easy to see
[Bekker 1255a]
[Bekker 1255a line 1]
the beauty of the soul and the beauty of the body.

Clearly, then, some people are free by nature and others are slaves. For the latter, being slaves both brings advantage and is just.

It isn't hard to see that those who make the opposite claims are also right in a way. Being a slave has two meanings,
[Bekker 1255a line 5]
and so does the word "slave". Someone can also be a slave and serve as a slave under law. This law is a kind of agreement under which people say that what is captured in war belongs to the victors. Many people versed in law challenge this claim to justice, just as they bring an indictment against a speaker for an illegal proposal. They think it is terrible if someone who can use force
[Bekker 1255a line 10]
and is stronger in power will have the person he overpowers as his slave and subject. Some think one way and some the other, even among the wise. The cause of this disagreement, and what makes the arguments overlap, is that virtue, when supplied with resources, is in a way especially able to use force. Also,
[Bekker 1255a line 15]
the victor always has a greater share of some good. So force seems not to be without virtue, and the disagreement seems to concern only the just. For this reason, some think the just is nonsense; others think that this very thing is just: that the stronger should rule. Once these arguments are separated,
[Bekker 1255a line 20]
the opposing arguments have nothing strong or convincing in them, when they claim that whoever is better in virtue shouldn't rule and be master. In general, some people hold to what they think is a kind of justice—for law is something just—and say that slavery arising from war is just. But at the same time they deny it. For the cause of a war need not
[Bekker 1255a line 25]
be just, and no one would ever say that someone who doesn't deserve to be a slave is a slave. Otherwise, people thought to be of the noblest birth would turn out to be slaves and descended from slaves, if they happened to be captured and sold. So these people aren't willing to call them slaves, but only non-Greeks. Yet when they say this,
[Bekker 1255a line 30]
they are looking for nothing other than the slave by nature we spoke of at the start. They must say that some people are slaves everywhere and others nowhere. They take the same approach to noble birth. They think they themselves are noble not only in their own country but everywhere, while non-Greeks are noble only at home.
[Bekker 1255a line 35]
This assumes that one kind of noble birth and freedom is unqualified, while another is not. Helen in Theodectes's play says the same:
"Born from divine roots on both sides,
who would think it right to call me a servant?"
But when they say this, they use nothing but virtue and vice to distinguish
[Bekker 1255a line 40]
slave from free, and people of noble birth from those
[Bekker 1255b]
[Bekker 1255b line 1]
of low birth.

### Book I, 1255b–1258b

They expect a good person to come from good people, just as a human comes from a human and an animal from animals. Nature often wants to do this, but can't.

That the dispute has some basis,
[Bekker 1255b line 5]
and that some people are not slaves or free by nature, is clear. It's also clear that in some cases this distinction does exist. For these people, being a slave benefits one and being a master benefits the other, and this is just. One must be ruled and the other must exercise the kind of rule he is naturally suited to exercise, including mastery. Exercising it badly harms both. (For
[Bekker 1255b line 10]
the same thing benefits the part and the whole, and the body and the soul. The slave is a part of the master, something like a living but separate part of his body. So there is a common advantage and friendship between slave and master when nature has assigned them these positions. But when their positions are not of this kind,
[Bekker 1255b line 15]
but come from law and force, the opposite is true.)

This also makes it clear that mastery and political rule aren't the same, and that not all kinds of rule are the same as one another, as some people say. Political rule is over people who are free by nature; mastery is over slaves. Household management is a monarchy, since every household is ruled by one person,
[Bekker 1255b line 20]
while political rule is rule over free and equal people. A person is called a master, then, not because of his knowledge but because of what he is. The same goes for a slave and a free person. Still, there could be knowledge belonging to masters and knowledge belonging to slaves. Knowledge for slaves would be the sort a man in Syracuse taught. There someone took a fee
[Bekker 1255b line 25]
for teaching slave boys their routine duties. Learning of this kind could also be extended, for example to cooking and other kinds of service like that. Some jobs carry more honor than others, and some are more necessary. As the proverb says,
"One slave is better than another; one master is better than another."
[Bekker 1255b line 30]
All such kinds of knowledge belong to slaves. A master's knowledge consists in using slaves. What makes him a master isn't acquiring slaves but using them. There's nothing great or impressive about this knowledge. Whatever a slave must know how to do, the master must
[Bekker 1255b line 35]
know how to order. So people who can avoid the trouble themselves assign this office to a steward, and they take part in public life or study philosophy. The art of acquiring slaves is different from both these kinds of knowledge. Its just form, for example, is a kind of warfare or hunting. Let this settle the distinction between slave and master in this
[Bekker 1255b line 40]
way.

[Bekker 1256a]
[Bekker 1256a line 1]
Let's now look at property and money-making as a whole, following the method we have set out, since a slave was also a part of property. The first question is whether money-making is the same as household management,
[Bekker 1256a line 5]
a part of it, or something that serves it. If it serves it, does it do so as shuttle-making serves weaving, or as bronze-working serves statue-making? These don't serve in the same way: one supplies tools, the other material. By material I mean the underlying stuff from which a finished product is made, such as wool for a weaver
[Bekker 1256a line 10]
and bronze for a statue-maker. Clearly, household management isn't the same as money-making. One acquires things, the other uses them. What art other than household management will use the things in a household? But whether money-making is a part of it or a different kind of activity is open to dispute.
[Bekker 1256a line 15]
Suppose the money-maker's job is to consider where wealth and property will come from. Property and wealth have many parts. So the first question is whether farming belongs to household management or is a different kind of activity. The same question applies generally to looking after and acquiring food. There are many kinds of food,
[Bekker 1256a line 20]
and so there are many ways of life for both animals and humans. Life is impossible without food, so differences in food have made animals' ways of life different. Some wild animals live in groups and others live scattered apart, according to which way helps them get food. This is because some
[Bekker 1256a line 25]
eat other animals, some eat plants, and some eat everything. Nature has therefore made their ways of life different to make it easy for them to get the food they choose. Since the same things aren't naturally pleasant to every animal, but different things to different animals, even the ways of life of meat-eaters and of plant-eaters differ from one another. The same is true
[Bekker 1256a line 30]
of humans. Their ways of life differ a great deal. The least active are nomads. Food from domesticated animals comes to them without work, leaving them at leisure. Since their livestock have to move to find pasture, they too have to follow along, as though they had living farmland
[Bekker 1256a line 35]
to farm. Others live by hunting, with different people hunting different things. Some live by robbery, others by fishing—those who live beside lakes, marshes, rivers, or a suitable sea. Others live by hunting birds or wild animals. But most people live from the land and cultivated crops.

[Bekker 1256a line 40]
These, then, are roughly all the ways of life whose work draws directly on nature, rather than using exchange and retail trade
[Bekker 1256b]
[Bekker 1256b line 1]
to get food:

herding, robbery, fishing, hunting, and farming. Some combine these and live comfortably. They supplement the less adequate way of life at the point where it falls short of being self-sufficient. For example, some combine
[Bekker 1256b line 5]
herding with robbery, others farming with hunting. The same applies to the others: they live in whatever way their needs force them to adopt. This kind of property seems to be given to all living things by nature itself, both at their very first coming into being and when they are fully grown.
[Bekker 1256b line 10]
At their first coming into being, some animals bring forth enough food along with their young to last until the offspring can get its own. This is true of those that produce larvae or eggs. Those that give birth to live young have food inside themselves for their offspring for a certain time. What is called milk
[Bekker 1256b line 15]
is that substance. So it's similarly clear that we must think that, once they have come into being, plants exist for animals and the other animals for humans. Domesticated animals serve both for use and for food. Of wild animals, if not all, at least most serve for food and other help, so that
[Bekker 1256b line 20]
clothing and other tools can be made from them. If nature makes nothing incomplete or pointless, nature must have made them all for humans. For this reason, warfare too will be a kind of acquiring property by nature, since hunting is part of it. We should use it against wild animals and
[Bekker 1256b line 25]
against those humans who are naturally suited to be ruled but refuse. This kind of war is just by nature.

One kind of acquiring property, then, is by nature a part of household management. It concerns things that must either be available or be acquired by household management so that they are available: a store of goods needed for life and useful
[Bekker 1256b line 30]
to the community of a city or household. True wealth seems to consist of these. The amount of such property that is enough for a good life isn't unlimited, as Solon says in his poem:
"No stated limit of wealth is set for humans."
(Sol. Fr. 13.71) There is a limit, just as there is in the other arts.
[Bekker 1256b line 35]
No art has a tool that is unlimited in either number or size. Wealth is a collection of tools for household management and political activity. So it's clear that there is a way of acquiring property by nature for household managers and political rulers, and why there is.

[Bekker 1256b line 40]
But there is another kind of acquiring property, which people especially call money-making, and rightly so. Because of it, there seems to be no
[Bekker 1257a]
[Bekker 1257a line 1]
limit to wealth and property.

Many think it is one and the same as the kind we have discussed, because the two are closely related. But it is neither the same as that kind nor far removed from it. One is by nature, while the other is not by nature but through experience
[Bekker 1257a line 5]
of a certain kind and skill it comes about instead. Let's take this as our starting point for discussing it. You can use each possession in two ways. In both cases you use the thing itself, but differently. One use belongs to it properly; the other doesn't. For example, a shoe can be worn or exchanged. Both
[Bekker 1257a line 10]
are uses of a shoe. Someone who exchanges a shoe for money or food with someone who needs a shoe uses it as a shoe, but not for its proper use. It wasn't made for exchange. The same holds for other pieces of property. There is a way
[Bekker 1257a line 15]
of exchanging all of them. This first began from a natural situation: people had more than enough of some things and less than enough of others. This also shows that retail trade isn't a kind of money-making by nature. People had to make exchanges only to get enough for themselves. In the first
[Bekker 1257a line 20]
community, which is the household, exchange clearly has no function. It has one only when the community is larger. The members of the household shared all the same things. But people living separately shared many different things. They had to share these with one another according to their needs through exchange, as many
[Bekker 1257a line 25]
non-Greek peoples still do. They exchange useful things directly for one another, and nothing more. For example, they give and receive wine for grain, and exchange each of the other things of this kind. Such exchange is neither against nature nor any kind of money-making,
[Bekker 1257a line 30]
since it served to complete natural self-sufficiency. But the other kind arose from this one, as we would expect. When help came more from abroad, through importing things they lacked and exporting things they had in excess, the use of money was necessarily devised. We can't easily carry everything we naturally
[Bekker 1257a line 35]
need. So for exchanges people agreed with one another to give and receive something that was itself useful and easy to handle for the needs of life, such as iron, silver, or anything else of that kind. At first it was defined simply by size and weight. Finally
[Bekker 1257a line 40]
they also put a stamp on it, to save themselves the trouble of measuring. The stamp was put there as a sign of the amount.

[Bekker 1257b]
[Bekker 1257b line 1]
Once money had been devised from necessary exchange, the other kind of money-making arose: retail trade. At first it was perhaps done simply, but then experience made it more skillful, showing where and how to exchange things to make the greatest
[Bekker 1257b line 5]
profit. So money-making seems to concern money above all, and its task is to be able to see where a large amount will come from, since it produces wealth and money. In fact, people often define wealth as a large amount of money, because it is the concern of money-making
[Bekker 1257b line 10]
and retail trade. At other times, though, money seems to be nonsense and entirely a matter of convention, with nothing natural about it. If the people who use it change their agreement, it's worth nothing and is useless for any of life's necessities. Someone rich in money will often lack necessary food. Yet it's strange that something should
[Bekker 1257b line 15]
be wealth when a person with plenty of it could starve to death. This is what the story says happened to Midas: because of his greedy wish, everything served to him turned to gold. That's why people look for something different as wealth and money-making, and they're right to look. There is another kind of money-making, and wealth that is
[Bekker 1257b line 20]
by nature. This kind belongs to household management. The other is retail trade, which produces wealth not in every way but through the exchange of goods. This kind seems to concern money, since money is the starting point and endpoint of exchange. The wealth that comes from this kind of money-making has no limit.
[Bekker 1257b line 25]
Medicine sets no limit on health, and every art sets no limit on its goal, since it wants to achieve that goal as fully as possible. But the means to the goal aren't unlimited, since the goal is a limit for all of them. In the same way, this kind of money-making has no limit on its goal. That goal is this kind of
[Bekker 1257b line 30]
wealth and the acquisition of money. But the money-making that belongs to household management has a limit, since this isn't the task of household management. So in one sense there seems to have to be a limit to all wealth. Yet in practice we see the opposite happening: all money-makers increase their money without limit.
[Bekker 1257b line 35]
The cause is the close connection between the two kinds. Their uses overlap because both kinds of money-making use the same thing. They use the same property, but not in the same way. One has a different goal; the other's goal is increase. So some people think this is the task of household management, and they keep on thinking that keeping
[Bekker 1257b line 40]
their supply of money or increasing it without limit is necessary. The cause of this attitude is their concern with living, but
[Bekker 1258a]
[Bekker 1258a line 1]
not with living well.

Since this desire has no limit, they also desire unlimited means of fulfilling it. Even those who aim to live well look for the means to enjoy bodily pleasures. Since this too seems to depend on property,
[Bekker 1258a line 5]
they spend all their time on money-making, and this is why the other kind of money-making has arisen. Since their enjoyment goes to excess, they look for the art that produces an excess of enjoyment. If they can't supply it through money-making, they try to do it through some other means,
[Bekker 1258a line 10]
using each of their abilities in a way that's not by nature. Courage's job is not to produce money but confidence. Nor is money the job of generalship or medicine: one produces victory, the other health. But these people turn all abilities into ways of making money, as though this were the goal and everything had to contribute to the goal.

As for the kind of money-making that isn't
[Bekker 1258a line 15]
necessary, we have now discussed what it is and why we need it. We have also discussed the necessary kind. It differs from the other and is by nature a part of household management, concerned with food. It isn't unlimited like the other kind, but has a boundary.

The question we raised at the start is also now clear: whether
[Bekker 1258a line 20]
money-making belongs to the household manager and political ruler or not, or whether the resources must instead be available beforehand. Political activity doesn't make humans, but takes them from nature and uses them. In the same way, nature must supply food, whether from land, sea, or something else. From these supplies, arranging them as needed
[Bekker 1258a line 25]
is the household manager's responsibility. Weaving doesn't produce wool but uses it, and also knows which wool is good and suitable and which is bad and unsuitable. Someone might also ask why money-making is a part of household management but medicine isn't. Yet people must be healthy
[Bekker 1258a line 30]
within the household, just as they must be alive or meet any other necessary condition. In one sense looking after health is the household manager's and ruler's job, but in another it isn't: it's the doctor's. Likewise, in one sense looking after money is the household manager's job, but in another it isn't: it belongs to a supporting art. Above all, as we said earlier, this supply must
[Bekker 1258a line 35]
be available by nature. Nature's job is to provide food for what it brings into being. For every living thing, the food is what is left over from that out of which it comes into being. So money-making from crops and animals is by nature for everyone. As we said, it has two kinds: retail trade and the kind belonging to household management.
[Bekker 1258a line 40]
The latter is necessary and praised,

while the
[Bekker 1258b]
[Bekker 1258b line 1]
kind based on exchange is rightly criticized, since it isn't by nature but takes from other people. Lending at interest is hated with the best reason, because the property it acquires comes from money itself, rather than from what money was devised for. Money came into being for exchange,
[Bekker 1258b line 5]
but interest makes the money itself increase. This is also where its name, meaning offspring, comes from: offspring resemble those that produce them, and interest is money produced from money. So of all kinds of money-making, this is the one most against nature.

We have made enough distinctions for understanding. What
[Bekker 1258b line 10]
is needed for practical use must now be covered. With all such subjects, studying them is a free person's activity, but practicing them is a matter of necessity. Useful parts of money-making include experience with property: knowing which kinds are most profitable, where, and how. For example, what kind of horses, cattle, or sheep to own, and likewise
[Bekker 1258b line 15]
other animals. We need experience of which are most profitable compared with one another, and which kinds do best in which places, since different kinds thrive in different regions. Next comes knowledge of farming, both on open fields and on planted land, of beekeeping, and of the other animals, swimming or flying, from
[Bekker 1258b line 20]
which some benefit can be gained. These are the first parts of the most proper kind of money-making. The largest part of the exchange kind is commerce. It has three parts: shipowning, transporting goods, and offering them for sale. They differ because some are safer and others bring a greater return.
[Bekker 1258b line 25]
The second part is lending at interest, and the third is working for wages. Wage work includes skilled manual trades and the work of unskilled people whose bodies alone are useful. A third kind of money-making lies between this kind and the first. It includes a part of both the natural kind and the exchange kind: everything obtained from the earth
[Bekker 1258b line 30]
and from things that grow from the earth that don't bear fruit but are useful, such as logging and all mining. Mining includes many kinds, since there are many kinds of things extracted from the earth. The occupations needing the most skill are those with the least room for chance. The most degrading manual jobs are those in which
[Bekker 1258b line 35]
bodies are most damaged. The most slave-like are those that use the body most, and the least noble are those needing the least virtue. We have now spoken about each of these in general terms. Going into detail with precision is useful for practicing them, but spending time on it is tedious.

### Book I, 1258b–1260b

Since some people have
[Bekker 1258b line 40]
written about these subjects,

for example Charetides of Paros and
[Bekker 1259a]
[Bekker 1259a line 1]
Apollodorus of Lemnos on farming both open fields and planted land, and others on other subjects, anyone interested should study these matters in their writings. The scattered accounts of how some people have succeeded in making money,
[Bekker 1259a line 5]
we should also collect. For all these are useful to people who value money-making. One example is the story of Thales of Miletus. It involves an insight into money-making. People credit it to him because of his wisdom, but it is actually something of general application. People criticized him for his poverty, saying this showed the uselessness
[Bekker 1259a line 10]
of philosophy. The story goes that he realized from his study of the stars that there would be a large olive crop. While it was still winter, he got together a little money and put down deposits on all the olive presses in Miletus and Chios. He rented them cheaply, since no one was bidding against him. When the season
[Bekker 1259a line 15]
came, many presses were needed all at once and suddenly. He rented them out on whatever terms he wanted and collected a lot of money. He showed that philosophers can easily get rich if they want to, but that this isn't what they care about. Thales is said to have demonstrated his wisdom in this way. But, as
[Bekker 1259a line 20]
we said, this is a generally applicable way of making money, if someone can set up a monopoly for himself. This is why some cities also use this means of raising money when they are short of it: they set up a monopoly on goods for sale. In Sicily, someone used money deposited with him to buy up all the iron from
[Bekker 1259a line 25]
the ironworks. Later, when the merchants arrived from the trading centers, he was the only seller. He didn't raise the price very much, but still made a hundred talents on top of his fifty. When Dionysius heard about this, he told the man to take his money away, but no longer to
[Bekker 1259a line 30]
stay in Syracuse. The man was finding ways of making money that harmed Dionysius's own interests. Still, this insight and Thales's were the same: both managed to create a monopoly for themselves. Knowing these things is also useful for political rulers. Many cities need money-making and such
[Bekker 1259a line 35]
sources of income, just as a household does, and even more. This is why some people in public life concern themselves only with these matters.

Household management had three parts. One was mastery, which we discussed earlier. Another was a father's rule, and the third was a husband's rule. A man rules both his wife and his children as free people,
[Bekker 1259a line 40]
but he doesn't rule both in the same way.

Instead,
[Bekker 1259b]
[Bekker 1259b line 1]
he rules his wife as a political ruler and his children as a king. The male is by nature more fit to lead than the female, unless the situation has somehow developed against nature. And the older and fully developed is more fit to lead than the younger and not fully developed. As for political systems of rule,
[Bekker 1259b line 5]
in most of them the ruler and the ruled change places, since they aim to be equal in nature and not different at all. Even so, when one rules and another is ruled, they look for a difference in outward appearance, forms of address, and honors. This is like the story Amasis told about the footbath. But the male always, in relation to
[Bekker 1259b line 10]
the female, stands in this way. Rule over children is kingly. The parent rules both through affection and through seniority, which is the form of kingly rule. So Homer rightly addressed Zeus by saying,
"Father of humans and gods,"
(Hom. Il. 1.544) since he is king of them all. By nature,
[Bekker 1259b line 15]
a king must be different from those he rules, but of the same kind. This is the relation of the older to the younger and of the parent to the child.

Clearly, then, household management is more concerned with people than with owning lifeless things, and
[Bekker 1259b line 20]
with people's virtue than with the excellence of property, which we call wealth. It is also more concerned with free people than with slaves. First, someone might ask about slaves: does a slave have any virtue beyond the abilities needed as a tool and a servant, something more honorable than these, such as self-control, courage, justice, or
[Bekker 1259b line 25]
other qualities of that kind? Or is there nothing beyond bodily services? Either answer presents a problem. If slaves have these virtues, how will they differ from free people? If they don't, that is strange, since they are human and share in reason. Almost the same question arises about a woman and a child:
[Bekker 1259b line 30]
do they too have virtues? Must a woman be self-controlled, courageous, and just? Can a child be undisciplined or self-controlled, or not? We need to consider this question generally about those who rule and those who are ruled by nature: is their virtue the same or different? If both must share in goodness and nobility,
[Bekker 1259b line 35]
why should one rule and the other be ruled once and for all? They can't differ just by having more or less. Ruling and being ruled differ in kind, while more and less don't. But if one must have virtue and the other needn't, that's surprising. If the ruler isn't self-controlled and just,
[Bekker 1259b line 40]
how will he rule well? If the ruled person isn't, how will he be ruled
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[Bekker 1260a line 1]
well?

If he is undisciplined and cowardly, he won't do anything he should. Clearly, then, both must share in virtue, but there must be differences in that virtue, just as there are among those ruled by nature. What we have said already points to this in
[Bekker 1260a line 5]
the soul. In it, one part naturally rules and another is ruled. We say they have different virtues, as with the part that has reason and the part without reason. Clearly, the same holds in other cases too, so there are several kinds of rulers and ruled by nature. A free person, in relation to a slave,
[Bekker 1260a line 10]
rules in one way, a male rules a female in another, and a man rules a child in another. All have the parts of the soul, but they have them differently. A slave has no ability to deliberate at all. A female has it, but it has no authority. A child has it, but it isn't fully developed.
[Bekker 1260a line 15]
So the ruler must have complete intellectual virtue, since the work belongs without qualification to the person directing it, and reason directs it. Each of the others must have as much as falls to them. We must assume that the same necessarily holds for moral virtues: everyone must share in them, but not in the same
[Bekker 1260a line 20]
way. Each must have as much as is needed for their own work. So clearly all those we have mentioned have moral virtue. But a woman's self-control isn't the same as a man's, nor are their courage and justice the same, as Socrates thought. One kind of courage is for ruling, the other for serving. The same holds for the other virtues.

This is even clearer in the details
[Bekker 1260a line 25]
when we look at them. People who speak in general terms fool themselves when they say that virtue is a good state of the soul, or acting rightly, or something of that sort. Those who list the virtues, as Gorgias does, speak much better than those who define them in that way. So we should take what the poet said about a woman as the model for thinking
[Bekker 1260a line 30]
about all these cases:
"Silence gives a woman grace."
(Soph. Aj. 293) But this no longer applies to a man. Since a child isn't fully developed, clearly the child's
[Bekker 1260a line 32]
virtue isn't measured in relation to the child alone, but in relation to the goal and to the person leading the child. The same goes for a slave in relation to a master. We said that a slave is useful for life's necessities. So clearly a slave needs only a little virtue, just enough not to fall short in his work through lack of self-control or cowardice. If what we just said is true, someone might ask whether craftsmen also need virtue, since they often fall short in their work through lack of self-control. Or is there a very great difference here? The
[Bekker 1260a line 40]
slave shares in the master's life, while the craftsman is more distant. He has a share of virtue just to the extent that he shares in slavery.

For the manual craftsman
[Bekker 1260b]
[Bekker 1260b line 1]
has a kind of limited slavery. A slave is one of those who are slaves by nature, but no shoemaker is, nor is any other craftsman. Clearly, then, the master must be responsible for giving the slave this kind of virtue, but not through the master's skill in teaching
[Bekker 1260b line 5]
the work. So people are wrong when they deny slaves reasoned discussion and say we should only give them orders. Slaves need advice more than children do.

Let these matters be settled in this way. As for husband and wife, children and father, and concerning
[Bekker 1260b line 10]
each person's virtue and their dealings with one another, we must discuss these in our account of constitutions. What is good and what isn't? How should they pursue the good and avoid the bad? Every household is a part of a city, and these people are parts of a household. We must consider the part's virtue in relation to the whole's
[Bekker 1260b line 15]
virtue. So we must educate both children and women with a view to the constitution, if having good children and good women makes any difference to having a good city. It must make a difference. Women make up half of the free people, and from children,
[Bekker 1260b line 20]
participants in the constitution develop. So, since we have settled these matters and must discuss the rest elsewhere, let's leave this discussion as finished and make another start. First, let's examine those who have made statements about the best constitution.

### Book II, 1260b–1264a

[Bekker 1260b]
[Bekker 1260b line 27]
We have chosen to study the political community and ask which kind is best of all for people who can live as nearly as possible as they wish. So we must also examine other constitutions,
[Bekker 1260b line 30]
both those used by cities said to have good laws and any others proposed by people and thought to be sound. This will let us see what is right and useful in them. It will also show that our search for something different isn't simply an attempt to be clever. Rather, because they aren't
[Bekker 1260b line 35]
sound as they now exist, we seem to have undertaken this inquiry. We should first start at the natural starting point for this investigation. The citizens must share either everything, nothing, or some things but not others. Sharing nothing is clearly
[Bekker 1260b line 40]
impossible. A constitution is a kind of community, and people must first share a place. There is one territory for
[Bekker 1261a]
[Bekker 1261a line 1]
a single city,

and its citizens share that single city. But should a city that is to be well run share everything that can be shared? Or is it better to share some things but not others? Citizens can have children and wives
[Bekker 1261a line 5]
and property in common with one another, as in Plato's Republic. There Socrates says that children, wives, and property should be held in common. Is it better, then, to have things as they are now, or according to the law set out in the Republic?

[Bekker 1261a line 10]
Having wives shared by everyone presents many other difficulties. And the reason Socrates gives for making this law doesn't seem to follow from his arguments. Also, the goal he says the city should have is impossible as he now states it. He hasn't explained at all how we should qualify it.
[Bekker 1261a line 15]
I mean the claim that it is best for the whole city to be as completely one as possible. Socrates takes this as his starting assumption. Yet clearly, as a city goes on becoming more and more one, it will no longer even be a city. A city is by nature a collection of people. As it becomes more one, a household from a city, and a person from a household,
[Bekker 1261a line 20]
will emerge. We would say that a household is more of a unit than a city, and a single person more than a household. So even if someone could do this, they shouldn't. They would destroy the city.

A city is made up not just of several people but of people different in kind. People who are all alike don't form a city. An alliance is different
[Bekker 1261a line 25]
from a city. An alliance is useful because of its numbers, even if its members are all the same kind. Its natural purpose is mutual help, just as a greater weight would pull down more. But the people who are to form a single whole must differ in kind. In this respect a city also differs from a nation,
[Bekker 1261a line 30]
when its people aren't scattered in villages but live like the Arcadians. This is why equality through give-and-take preserves cities, as we said earlier in the Ethics. Even among free and equal people this is necessary. They can't all rule at once, but must take turns yearly or by some other arrangement or period of time. This happens
[Bekker 1261a line 35]
in such a way that everyone gets to rule. It is as if shoemakers and carpenters changed places instead of the same people always being shoemakers and carpenters. Since it is better for things to stay that way, the same applies to the political community: clearly, it is better for the same people always to rule, if possible. But where this isn't possible because in
[Bekker 1261b]
[Bekker 1261b line 1]
nature everyone is equal,

it is also just for everyone to share in rule, whether ruling is good or bad. Equals taking turns and giving way imitates the situation where people are unlike outside office. Some rule and others are ruled in turn,
[Bekker 1261b line 5]
as though they had become different people. In the same way, different rulers hold different offices. These points make it clear that a city isn't by nature one in the way some people say. What is described as the greatest good for cities destroys them. Yet what is good for each thing preserves it.
[Bekker 1261b line 10]
There is another way to see that trying to make the city too much of a unit isn't better. A household is more self-sufficient than one person, and a city more than a household. A city only really comes into being when the community of many people becomes self-sufficient. So if greater self-sufficiency is more desirable, being less of a unit rather than
[Bekker 1261b line 15]
more of one is also more desirable.

But even if it is best for a community to be as completely one as possible, the argument doesn't seem to prove this by having everyone say "mine" and "not mine" at the same time. Socrates thinks this is a sign that the
[Bekker 1261b line 20]
city is completely one. But "everyone" has two meanings. If it means each person individually, that might come closer to what Socrates wants to achieve. Each person will call the same boy his son and the same woman his wife. The same goes for property and for each thing that happens. But they won't speak this way,
[Bekker 1261b line 25]
the people who share wives and children. All of them will, but not each individually. Likewise, all will call the property theirs, but not each individually. So clearly, saying "everyone" involves a false inference. Because they have two meanings, "all" and "both," as well as "odd" and "even,"
[Bekker 1261b line 30]
produce misleading arguments even in discussions. So having everyone say the same thing is good but impossible in one sense, and does nothing to produce agreement in the other. Besides, the proposal has another disadvantage. What is shared by the most people gets the least care. People care most about their own things. About common things they care
[Bekker 1261b line 35]
less, or only as much as falls to their share. Among other reasons, they neglect them more because they think someone else is looking after them. In household service, too, many servants sometimes do a worse job than fewer. Each citizen will have a thousand sons. These won't be his individually. Instead, any one of them, to any citizen,
[Bekker 1262a]
[Bekker 1262a line 1]
will equally be a son.

So everyone will neglect them equally.

Also, each person will call a citizen who is doing well or badly "mine" in this way, whatever number he happens to be: "mine" or "so-and-so's." He will speak this way about each of the thousand, or however many people the
[Bekker 1262a line 5]
city has, and even then with doubt. For it is unclear who happened to have a child and whose child survived after birth. Is it really better for each person to say "mine" in this way, with two thousand or ten thousand calling the same person "mine"? Or is it better to use "mine" as people now do in cities? For one, he is a son; for another, a brother:
[Bekker 1262a line 10]
they give these names to the same person. Another calls him a cousin, or uses some other relationship by blood or by connection and marriage, either his own or that of his relatives. Besides these, someone else calls him a member of his brotherhood or tribe. It is better to be someone's own cousin than a son in this way. Still, it isn't even possible to prevent some people from
[Bekker 1262a line 15]
suspecting that others are their brothers, children, fathers, or mothers. The resemblances children have to those who gave birth to them will necessarily give people grounds for believing they are related. Some people who write descriptions of the earth say that this actually happens. Among some
[Bekker 1262a line 20]
peoples of inland Libya, they say, wives are shared, but the children born are assigned by their resemblances. There are also some women, and females of other animals, such as horses and cattle, who naturally produce offspring very like their parents. One example is the mare at Pharsalus called Dicaea.

[Bekker 1262a line 25]
Also, people setting up this kind of community can't easily guard against problems such as assaults, accidental and deliberate killings, fights, and insults. None of these is religiously permissible when directed against fathers, mothers, and close relatives in the way it is against people more distantly related.
[Bekker 1262a line 30]
These things will necessarily happen more often among people who don't know their relatives than among those who do. When they happen among those who do know, the customary acts of atonement are possible. Among those who don't, none is possible. It is also strange to make sons common and ban only sexual intercourse between lovers, without banning love or forms of intimacy
[Bekker 1262a line 35]
of other kinds that are most inappropriate of all between father and son or brother and brother. Even love alone is inappropriate. It is strange, too, to ban intercourse for no other reason than the excessive strength of the pleasure it produces, while thinking that one person being a father or son, or the two being brothers,
[Bekker 1262a line 40]
makes no difference.

Sharing wives and children seems more useful for the farmers
[Bekker 1262b]
[Bekker 1262b line 1]
than for the guardians.

There will be less friendship when children and wives are shared. The ruled need to be like this if they are to obey and not start revolutions. Overall, a law of this kind must produce the opposite of what
[Bekker 1262b line 5]
well-made laws should produce, and the opposite of the reason Socrates thinks children and wives should be organized this way. We think friendship is the greatest good for cities, since it would leave them least likely to fall into faction. Socrates especially praises the city's being one,
[Bekker 1262b line 10]
which seems to be the work of friendship, as he himself says. We know that Aristophanes says in the speeches about love that lovers, because they love so strongly, want to grow together and become one instead of two. In that case, both or one of them must be destroyed.
[Bekker 1262b line 15]
But in the city, friendship must become watered down through this kind of sharing. A son will be least likely to call someone "my father," or a father "my son." A little sweetness mixed into a great deal of water makes its taste impossible to notice. The same happens to the family connection people have with one another through names
[Bekker 1262b line 20]
of this kind. In this sort of constitution a father must care least for people as his sons, or a son for someone as his father, or brothers for one another. Two things above all make people care and love: something's being their own and something's being dear to them. Neither can belong to people living under such a constitution. Furthermore,
[Bekker 1262b line 25]
there is great difficulty over how to transfer the children born—some from the farmers and craftsmen to the guardians, and others from the guardians to them. Those who give up and transfer the children must know which children they are giving to whom. Also, the things mentioned earlier, even more often,
[Bekker 1262b line 30]
are bound to happen among these people: assaults, love affairs, and killings. Those given to the other citizens will no longer call the guardians brothers, children, fathers, or mothers. Likewise, those among the guardians won't call the other citizens these names, and so won't guard against doing such things because of their
[Bekker 1262b line 35]
relationship.

Let this, then, settle our discussion of sharing children and wives.

The next thing to examine is property. How should it be arranged for people who are to live under the best constitution? Common or not common—
[Bekker 1262b line 40]
which should property be? We could study this separately from the laws about children and wives.

I mean,
[Bekker 1263a]
[Bekker 1263a line 1]
should property and its use be shared, even if wives and children are separate, as they now are everywhere? For example, the plots of land might be separate, but their produce brought into a common stock for consumption. Some
[Bekker 1263a line 5]
nations do this. Or the reverse: the land might be common and farmed jointly, but the produce divided up for private use. Some non-Greek peoples are said to share in this way too. Or both the plots and their produce might be common. If others do the farming, the arrangement would be different and
[Bekker 1263a line 10]
easier. But if the citizens work for themselves, the property arrangements would cause more difficulties. If their shares in both the benefits and the work aren't equal but unequal, those who enjoy or receive much but work little will inevitably face complaints from those who receive less
[Bekker 1263a line 15]
and work more. In general, living together and sharing all human affairs is difficult, especially affairs of this kind. Groups traveling together show this. Most of them fall out over everyday matters and annoy one another over little things. Also, among servants, most of all
[Bekker 1263a line 20]
we clash with those we use most for routine services.

So common property has these and other similar difficulties. The present arrangement, improved by good habits and a system of sound laws, would be far better. It would have the good of both arrangements:
[Bekker 1263a line 25]
I mean the good of common property and the good of private property. Property should be common in one sense, but private overall. When responsibilities are divided, they won't cause complaints against one another. Things will improve more, because each person attends to what is their own. But virtue will make its use
[Bekker 1263a line 30]
common, as the saying goes, "Friends' things are shared." This arrangement is already sketched out in some cities, showing that it isn't impossible. Especially in well-run cities, some of it already exists and some could come about. Each person has private property, but makes some of it available to friends and uses other things
[Bekker 1263a line 35]
in common. In Lacedaemon, for example, they use one another's slaves as practically their own, as well as horses and dogs. If they need provisions, they also use those in the fields throughout the country. Clearly, then, it is better for property to be private but made common in use. Making people like this is the lawgiver's
[Bekker 1263a line 40]
particular job. Also, the pleasure of thinking that something is your own makes an indescribably great difference.

Surely it isn't pointless to direct toward
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oneself the love each person feels. This is natural. Selfishness is rightly criticized. But this isn't loving yourself. It is loving yourself more than you should, just as with loving money. Practically everyone loves
[Bekker 1263b line 5]
each of these things. Also, doing favors and helping friends, guests, or companions is very pleasant. This becomes possible when property is private. People who make the city too much of a unit miss out on these things. Besides, they plainly do away with the acts of two virtues. One is self-control in relation to women:
[Bekker 1263b line 10]
it is a noble act to hold back from another man's wife through self-control. The other is generosity in relation to property. No one will be seen to be generous or do any generous act. Generosity's work lies in the use of property.

[Bekker 1263b line 15]
This kind of legislation looks attractive and might seem humane. A listener welcomes it gladly, thinking it will bring about an extraordinary friendship of everyone toward everyone. This is especially so when someone blames the evils now found in constitutions on property not being
[Bekker 1263b line 20]
shared. I mean lawsuits against one another over contracts, trials for false testimony, and flattery of the rich. None of these comes from a lack of sharing. They come from wickedness. We see people who own and share property in common disagreeing far more than those who hold separately
[Bekker 1263b line 25]
their property. But we notice only a few people quarreling over shared property, comparing them with the many who own private property. Also, it is only fair to mention not just the evils people will lose by sharing, but the good things too. This life seems quite impossible.

The cause
[Bekker 1263b line 30]
of Socrates' error must be seen as his mistaken assumption. Both a household and a city must be one in some way, but not completely. As it goes on becoming one, in one sense it will cease to be a city. In another it will still be a city, but a worse one because it is close to no longer being a city. It would be like turning a
[Bekker 1263b line 35]
harmony into a single note, or a rhythm into a single beat. Instead, as we said earlier, a city is a collection of people and must be made into a shared unit through education. It is strange that someone who plans to introduce education, and thinks it will make the city good, should think these measures will put it right, rather than
[Bekker 1263b line 40]
habits, philosophy, and laws. In Lacedaemon and Crete, for example, property, through common meals,
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was made common by the lawgiver.

### Book II, 1264a–1267a

We shouldn't overlook this point either: we must pay attention to the long stretch of time and the many years in which these arrangements, if they were good, couldn't have gone unnoticed. Nearly everything has already been discovered, but some things haven't been brought together, and others aren't used even though people
[Bekker 1264a line 5]
know about them. This would become especially clear if someone saw such a constitution being set up in practice. They couldn't create the city without dividing and separating its people, some into common meals, others into brotherhoods and tribes. So the only new law will be a ban on farming
[Bekker 1264a line 10]
for the guardians. This is what the Lacedaemonians already try to do.

Still, Socrates hasn't said what form the whole constitution will take for those who share in it, and it isn't easy to say. Yet the great majority of the city consists of the other citizens. Nothing has been settled about them: whether
[Bekker 1264a line 15]
the farmers too should have common property, or each have their own, and whether their wives and children should be their own or shared. If everything is shared by everyone in the same way, how will they differ from the guardians? What more will they gain by submitting to the guardians' rule? What will make them submit
[Bekker 1264a line 20]
to it, unless the guardians devise some trick like the Cretans? They give slaves the same rights in other matters, and only forbid physical training and owning weapons. But if these things are to be arranged as in other cities, what form will the community take? Within one city,
[Bekker 1264a line 25]
two cities must exist, and these opposed to each other. He makes the guardians a kind of garrison, and the farmers, craftsmen, and others the citizens. Complaints, lawsuits, and all the other evils he says cities have will be found among these people too. Yet Socrates says
[Bekker 1264a line 30]
that their education will mean they don't need many regulations, such as rules for managing the city, the market, and similar things. But he gives education only to the guardians. Also, he makes the farmers authoritative owners of the property, paying a contribution from it. Yet they are likely to be much more troublesome, with pride
[Bekker 1264a line 35]
in full measure, than the enslaved helots and penestae and the other slaves found in some places. But whether these arrangements are equally necessary or not, nothing has yet been settled, nor have the related questions: what these people's constitution and education will be, and what laws they will have. This isn't easy to work out. It matters a great deal what sort of people
[Bekker 1264a line 40]
they are, when it comes to preserving the guardians' community.

Furthermore,
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[Bekker 1264b line 1]
if he makes wives common but property private, who will manage the household as their husbands manage affairs in the fields? And what if both the farmers' property and their wives are common? It is also strange to use wild animals as a comparison
[Bekker 1264b line 5]
to argue that women should have the same occupations as men. Animals have no part in household management.

The way Socrates appoints the rulers is also unsafe. He makes the same people rule all the time. This causes faction even among people without standing, and all the more among spirited
[Bekker 1264b line 10]
and warlike men. Clearly, he has to make the same people rule. The gold from the god isn't mixed into different people's souls at different times, but always into the same people's. He says that at their birth the god mixed gold into some, silver into others, and bronze and iron
[Bekker 1264b line 15]
into those who were to become craftsmen and farmers. Also, though he takes happiness away from the guardians, he says the lawgiver should make the whole city happy. But the whole can't be happy unless most, all, or some of its parts have happiness. Being happy isn't like being
[Bekker 1264b line 20]
even in number. A whole can be even without either part being even, but this is impossible with happiness. And if the guardians aren't happy, who else is? Surely not the craftsmen and the mass of manual workers. So the constitution Socrates has described has these
[Bekker 1264b line 25]
difficulties, and others no less serious.

The situation is much the same with the Laws, written later. So it is better to examine the constitution in that work briefly too. In the Republic, Socrates has settled very few matters at all: concerning wives
[Bekker 1264b line 30]
and children, how their sharing should work, the arrangements for property, and the structure of the constitution. The population is divided into two parts: the farmers and the fighting force. From these comes a third, the part that deliberates and is sovereign in the city. As for the farmers and craftsmen,
[Bekker 1264b line 35]
Socrates hasn't settled whether they will share in no office or in some office, or whether they too should own weapons and join in fighting. But he thinks women should join in fighting and have the same education as the guardians. He has filled, with matters outside the subject,
[Bekker 1264b line 40]
the rest of his discussion, and with education—what kind should be given
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to the guardians.

Most of the Laws consists of laws. He has said little about the constitution. Though he wants to make it more widely applicable to cities, he gradually brings it back toward the other constitution. Apart from
[Bekker 1265a line 5]
the sharing of wives and property, he assigns the same things to both constitutions: the same education, a life free from necessary work, and the same arrangements for common meals. But in this one he says women should have common meals too. The first has a thousand
[Bekker 1265a line 10]
men who own weapons; this one has five thousand.

All Socrates' discussions show originality, cleverness, innovation, and a searching mind. But perhaps it is hard to get everything right. We shouldn't overlook the fact that the population just mentioned will need a territory as large as Babylonia
[Bekker 1265a line 15]
or some other country of unlimited size. It must feed five thousand people who don't work, and around them another crowd of women and servants many times as large. We should assume conditions that meet our wishes, but nothing impossible. It is said that the lawgiver should make laws with two things in view:
[Bekker 1265a line 20]
the territory and its people. It is also good to add the neighboring regions, especially if the city is to live a political life. It must have weapons for war useful not just in its own territory but also outside it, in
[Bekker 1265a line 25]
other regions. But even if someone rejects this kind of life, either for themselves or for the city as a whole, they must still be formidable to their enemies, not just when enemies enter their territory but also after they leave.

We should also consider the amount of property. Might it be better to define it differently, and more clearly? Enough property
[Bekker 1265a line 30]
must be available, he says, to live with self-control. That is like saying enough to live well. It is too general, since someone can live with self-control but in hardship. A better limit is enough to live with self-control and generosity. Taken separately, generosity will lead to luxury, and self-control to hardship. These alone
[Bekker 1265a line 35]
are desirable habits concerning the use of property. For example, you can't use property gently or courageously, but you can use it with self-control and generosity. So these must also be the habits concerned with it. Making property equal without arranging the number of citizens is strange too. Yet he leaves
[Bekker 1265a line 40]
childbearing unrestricted. He assumes that, however many children are born, childlessness will sufficiently balance things out to the same population,

[Bekker 1265b]
[Bekker 1265b line 1]
because this seems to happen in cities now. But the results in those cities and in cities now can't be exactly alike. Now no one is left without property, since estates are divided among any number of people. Then, since estates are indivisible, the extra children must
[Bekker 1265b line 5]
have nothing, whether there are fewer or more of them. One might think that childbearing needs limits more than property does, so that people don't have more than a certain number of children. This number should be set with an eye to the chances of some children dying after birth and to
[Bekker 1265b line 10]
other people's childlessness. Leaving it unrestricted, as in most cities, must cause poverty among the citizens. Poverty produces faction and crime. Pheidon of Corinth, one of the earliest lawgivers, thought the number of households and citizens should stay the same,
[Bekker 1265b line 15]
even if everyone originally had land allotments unequal in size. In these Laws, the reverse is true. We must say later what we think would be better in these matters. These Laws also leave out how the rulers will differ from the ruled. He says
[Bekker 1265b line 20]
that just as the lengthwise threads are made from different wool than the crosswise threads, the rulers should differ from the ruled. Since he allows total property to grow to as much as five times its original amount, why shouldn't this apply to land up to some limit too? We should also examine the division of house plots, in case it doesn't
[Bekker 1265b line 25]
help household management. He has assigned each person two separate house plots, and it is hard to live in two houses.

The whole system is meant to be neither democracy nor oligarchy, but something between them, which people call polity. It consists of those who serve as heavy-armed soldiers. If he sets up this constitution as the most widely applicable
[Bekker 1265b line 30]
to cities of all constitutions, perhaps he is right. But if he presents it as the best after the first constitution, he isn't right. Someone might prefer the Lacedaemonian constitution, or another more aristocratic one. Some people say that the best constitution should be a mixture of all constitutions.
[Bekker 1265b line 35]
That is why they praise the Lacedaemonian one. Some say it combines oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy. They call the kingship monarchy, the rule of the elders oligarchy, and the rule of the overseers called ephors democratic because the people supply
[Bekker 1265b line 40]
the ephors. Others say the office of ephor is a tyranny, but the constitution is democratic in its common meals and the rest of its
[Bekker 1266a]
[Bekker 1266a line 1]
everyday life.

But in these Laws it is said that the best constitution should combine democracy and tyranny. Someone might not count these as constitutions at all, or might count them as the worst of all. So those who mix more forms are more correct. One made up of
[Bekker 1266a line 5]
more forms is a better constitution. Besides, this constitution doesn't seem to contain anything monarchical, only oligarchic and democratic elements. It tends more toward oligarchy. This is clear from the way rulers are appointed. Selection by lot from elected candidates is common to both forms. But as for wealthier people,
[Bekker 1266a line 10]
requiring them to attend the assembly, choose rulers, or carry out some other public duty while exempting the others is oligarchic. So is trying to have more rulers from the well-off and to fill the greatest offices from the highest property qualifications. He also makes the choice of the council oligarchic. They choose
[Bekker 1266a line 15]
and everyone must do so. The candidates, though, come from the first property class. Then they choose an equal number from the second. Next they choose from the third, but not everyone in the third or fourth classes was required to do so. Only the first and second classes must choose from the fourth. Then from these candidates, equally from each property class,
[Bekker 1266a line 20]
a number must be appointed, he says. Those from the highest property classes will therefore be more numerous and better, because some of the common people won't choose, since they aren't required to. So this constitution shouldn't be put together from democracy and monarchy. That is clear from these points and those to be made later,
[Bekker 1266a line 25]
when our investigation turns to this sort of constitution. Also, choosing rulers by electing from elected candidates is dangerous. If some people choose to combine, even a moderate number, the choice will always follow their wishes. The constitution in the Laws, then, has this
[Bekker 1266a line 30]
form.

There are also some other constitutions, some proposed by private individuals, others by philosophers and statesmen. They are all closer than either of these two to established constitutions under which people now take part in public life. Sharing children and
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wives is something new that no one else has introduced. Nor has anyone else introduced common meals for women. Instead, they start more with necessities. Some think the most important thing is to arrange property well. They say everyone starts factions over this. So Phaleas of Chalcedon was the first to introduce this proposal:
[Bekker 1266a line 40]
he says citizens' property should be equal.

This,
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[Bekker 1266b line 1]
he thought, wouldn't be hard to do at once in cities being founded. It would be harder in those already settled. Still, equality could be reached fastest if the rich gave dowries but didn't receive them, while the poor didn't give them but received them
[Bekker 1266b line 5]
instead. Plato, in writing the Laws, thought property should be allowed to increase up to a point, but no citizen should be allowed to acquire more than five times the smallest holding, as we said earlier. People making laws this way shouldn't overlook something they now do overlook: when regulating property
[Bekker 1266b line 10]
by amount, they should also fix the number of children. If the number of children exceeds what the property can support, the law must break down. Apart from that breakdown, it is bad for many people to become poor after being rich. It is hard to keep such people from starting revolutions. There is
[Bekker 1266b line 15]
some influence on the political community from equal property. Some people long ago clearly recognized this. Solon, for example, made a law about it. Among other peoples too there is a law that prevents someone from acquiring as much land as they want. Laws also prevent selling property. In Locri, for example, a law
[Bekker 1266b line 20]
prohibits selling unless someone can show that a clear misfortune has happened to them. Laws also preserve the old land allotments. The abolition of this rule in Leucas made their constitution too democratic, since people no longer entered offices on the basis of the fixed property qualifications. But equality
[Bekker 1266b line 25]
can exist in property, yet it can be too plentiful, leading to luxury, or too scanty, leading to a meager life. Clearly, then, it isn't enough for the lawgiver to make property equal. The middle amount must be the goal. Even if someone set a moderate amount of property for everyone, it would do no good. Desires need to be
[Bekker 1266b line 30]
made equal more than property does. This can't happen unless people are properly educated by the laws. But perhaps Phaleas would say that this is exactly what he means. He thinks cities need equality in these two things: property and education. But he must say what the education will be. Having one
[Bekker 1266b line 35]
and the same education does no good. It can be one and the same but of a kind that makes people choose to get more than their share of money, honor, or both.

Also, people form factions not just because of inequality in property but because of inequality in honors. Things work oppositely
[Bekker 1266b line 40]
in each case: the many do so because property is unequal,

[Bekker 1267a]
[Bekker 1267a line 1]
but the people of distinction do so if honors are equal. Hence the line,
"The bad and the good have the same honor."
(Hom. Il. 9.319) People don't act unjustly only because they lack necessities. He thinks equality of property is a cure for this, so that people won't steal clothing because they are cold or
[Bekker 1267a line 5]
hungry. But people also do wrong to enjoy themselves and stop feeling desire. If their desire goes beyond necessities, they will do wrong to remedy it. And not only for this reason: they may also desire to enjoy pleasures that involve no pain. What, then, is the cure for these three cases? For the first, a little property
[Bekker 1267a line 10]
and work; for the second, self-control. For the third, if people want to find enjoyment through themselves, they should look for the cure only in philosophy. The other pleasures need other people. People commit the greatest injustices for excess, not for necessities. They don't become tyrants to avoid being cold, for example. This is why
[Bekker 1267a line 15]
the honors are great for killing a tyrant, not a thief. So Phaleas' kind of constitution only helps against small injustices. Also, he mostly wants to arrange things so that people will take part in public life well among themselves. But they must do so in relation to their neighbors and all outsiders too.
[Bekker 1267a line 20]
So the constitution must be organized with military strength in mind, and he has said nothing about this. The same goes for property. There must be enough not just for the city's uses, but also to meet dangers from outside. For this reason, there shouldn't be so much that
[Bekker 1267a line 25]
stronger neighbors covet it while the owners can't repel the invaders. Nor should there be so little that they can't sustain a war even against equals and people like themselves. He has settled nothing about this. But we mustn't overlook what amount of property is advantageous. Perhaps the best limit is one that makes it unprofitable
[Bekker 1267a line 30]
for stronger neighbors to wage war because of the excess wealth, so that the city is in the same position as if it had less property. For example, when Autophradates was about to besiege Atarneus, Eubulus told him to consider how long it would take to capture the place and calculate the expense over that time. He was willing to take less
[Bekker 1267a line 35]
than this amount and leave Atarneus at once. By saying this, he made Autophradates think it over and abandon the siege.

### Book II, 1267a–1270b

So equal wealth among citizens does help keep them from forming factions against each other. But its help isn't very great, you might say. For people
[Bekker 1267a line 40]
of refinement might resent it, thinking they deserve more than equal shares. That's why we often see them attacking the government and forming factions.

What's more,
[Bekker 1267b]
[Bekker 1267b line 1]
human wickedness is never satisfied. At first, just a payment of two small coins called obols is enough. But once that has become the established practice, people always want more, until they go on without limit. Desire has no limit by nature, and satisfying it is what most people
[Bekker 1267b line 5]
live for. So the starting point in these matters isn't so much to equalize wealth. It's to shape people who are decent by nature so they don't want more than their share, and bad people so they can't get it. This happens if they are weaker and aren't treated unjustly. His account of equal wealth isn't right either. For
[Bekker 1267b line 10]
he makes only landed property equal. But wealth also consists of slaves, livestock, money, and large stocks of what are called household goods. So we must either seek equality in all these things, or some moderate arrangement, or leave them all alone. His legislation also seems to make the city small,
[Bekker 1267b line 15]
if all the craftsmen are to be publicly owned and aren't to form part of the city's population. But if those who do public work must be publicly owned, the arrangement must be like the one in Epidamnus, or the one Diophantus once set up in Athens. So, concerning Phaleas's constitution,
[Bekker 1267b line 20]
these points should be enough to let us judge whether anything he has said is right or wrong.

Hippodamus of Miletus, the son of Euryphon, invented the division of cities into districts and laid out Piraeus. In other parts of his life too, his wish to stand out made him so unconventional
[Bekker 1267b line 25]
that some people thought he was overdoing things, with his mass of hair and expensive ornaments. He also wore cheap but warm clothing, not just in winter but in summer too. He wanted to be knowledgeable about nature as a whole. He was the first person who didn't take part in public life to attempt an account of the constitution
[Bekker 1267b line 30]
that is best. He designed a city with a population of ten thousand men, divided into three groups. One group consisted of craftsmen, one of farmers, and the third of those who fought in its defense and had arms. He also divided the land into three parts: sacred, public, and private. The land that provided
[Bekker 1267b line 35]
for the customary worship of the gods was sacred. The land that supported those who fought in the city's defense was common land, and the farmers' land was private. He also thought there were only three kinds of law. There were, he said, only three things that lawsuits concerned: violent abuse, damage, and killing. He also established a single law court as the
[Bekker 1267b line 40]
authoritative one. All cases thought to have been wrongly decided were to be referred to it. He made this court consist of certain elderly men
[Bekker 1268a]
[Bekker 1268a line 1]
chosen for the task.

He thought decisions in law courts shouldn't be made by casting votes. Instead, each juror should bring a tablet. If he found fully against the defendant, he should write the penalty on it. If he acquitted him fully, he should leave it blank. If he found against him on some points but not others, that distinction
[Bekker 1268a line 5]
should be specified. He thought the current law was unsatisfactory, because it forced jurors to break their oath by deciding one way or the other. He also made a law that people who discovered something useful to the city should receive an honor. The children of those who died in war were to be supported at public expense, as if this hadn't yet been
[Bekker 1268a line 10]
made law anywhere else. But this law now exists in Athens and in other cities too. All the rulers were to be chosen by the people. He made the people consist of the city's three groups. Those chosen were to oversee public affairs, affairs concerning foreigners, and affairs concerning orphans.

These, then, are most of the proposals, and
[Bekker 1268a line 15]
the most important ones, in Hippodamus's arrangement. The first difficulty someone might raise concerns his division of the citizens. The craftsmen, the farmers, and those who have arms all share in the constitution. Yet the farmers have no arms, and the craftsmen have neither land nor arms,
[Bekker 1268a line 20]
so they become practically slaves of those who own arms. They can't, then, share in all the public honors. The generals, the guardians of the citizens, and practically all the most authoritative offices must be appointed from those who have arms. But if the others don't share in the constitution, how can they be friendly
[Bekker 1268a line 25]
toward it? Those who own arms must also be stronger than both the other groups. That isn't easy unless there are many of them. But if that is the case, why should the others share in the constitution and have authority over the appointment of rulers? Also, what use are the farmers to the city? Craftsmen
[Bekker 1268a line 30]
are necessary, since every city needs them. And they can live by their craft, as they do in other cities. If the farmers supplied food to those who own arms, it would make sense for them to be part of the city. As things stand, though, they have private land and will farm it for themselves.
[Bekker 1268a line 35]
And what about the common land that is to provide food for those who fight in the city's defense? If they farm it themselves, the fighting group and the farming group won't be separate, as the lawgiver wants them to be. If the farmers of this land are different both from those who farm their private land and from the fighters, they will form a fourth part of the city. They will have no
[Bekker 1268a line 40]
share in anything, but will stand outside the constitution. On the other hand, if someone makes the same people farm both the private land and the common land, there will be a problem with the amount of produce that
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[Bekker 1268b line 1]
each farmer must grow for two households.

And why won't they simply get their own food and supply the fighters from the same land and the same plots? All these arrangements are very confused. The law about decisions in court
[Bekker 1268b line 5]
isn't right either. It asks for a divided judgment when the claim has been stated without division, and makes the juror into an arbitrator. This is possible in arbitration, even with several arbitrators, because they discuss the decision with one another. But it isn't possible in law courts. In fact, the opposite is what most lawgivers
[Bekker 1268b line 10]
arrange: they keep jurors from discussing the case with one another. Besides, how can the decision avoid confusion when a juror thinks something is owed, but not as much as the claimant asks? The claimant asks for twenty money-units called minas, but the juror will award ten minas, or one will award more and another less. Another awards five,
[Bekker 1268b line 15]
and another four. Clearly, they will divide the award in this way. Some will award the whole amount, and others nothing. How, then, will the votes be counted? Also, nothing forces a person who simply rejects or accepts the claim to break his oath, if the claim has been stated without division and he judges justly. The person who rejects it doesn't judge that nothing
[Bekker 1268b line 20]
is owed, but that the twenty minas aren't owed. It is the person who accepts the claim, without thinking the twenty minas are owed, who breaks his oath.

As for giving an honor to people who discover something useful to the city, it isn't safe to make this a law. It merely sounds attractive. For it brings
[Bekker 1268b line 25]
malicious accusations and perhaps changes in the constitution. It also leads into another problem and another inquiry. Some people ask whether changing ancestral laws, when another law is better, harms cities or helps them. So it isn't easy to agree quickly with the proposal just mentioned, if it isn't an advantage
[Bekker 1268b line 30]
to change laws. Some people may propose abolishing laws or a constitution as a public good. Since we've mentioned the issue, it's better to set out a few further distinctions about it. As we said, it presents a difficulty, and change might seem better. In the other branches of knowledge, at least, change has been beneficial.
[Bekker 1268b line 35]
Medicine, for example, has changed from ancestral practices, as have physical training and, in general, all the crafts and skills. So, since political science must be counted as one of these, clearly the same must be true of it too. Someone might say that the facts themselves provide evidence: the ancient laws were far too simple
[Bekker 1268b line 40]
and barbaric. The Greeks used to carry weapons and buy wives from one another. And any ancient customs that still survive anywhere are completely foolish.

[Bekker 1269a]
[Bekker 1269a line 1]
For example, in Cyme there is a law about killing: if the person prosecuting the killing produces a certain number of witnesses from among his own relatives, the defendant is guilty of the killing. People generally look for what is good, not for what comes from their ancestors. Probably the
[Bekker 1269a line 5]
first humans were ordinary and foolish, whether born from the earth or survivors of some disaster, as the earthborn are in fact said to have been. So it's absurd to stick to their decisions. Besides, it isn't better to leave even written laws unchanged. Just as in the other crafts,
[Bekker 1269a line 10]
so in the political arrangement, it's impossible to set everything down precisely in writing. What is written must be general, but actions concern particular cases.

These points make it clear that some laws should sometimes be changed. But if we look at it another way, it would seem to call for great caution. When
[Bekker 1269a line 15]
the improvement is small, but getting people used to easily doing away with laws is bad, clearly we must leave some mistakes made by lawgivers and rulers alone. A person won't gain as much from making the change as he'll lose by getting used to disobeying the rulers. The comparison with the crafts is also false. For
[Bekker 1269a line 20]
changing a craft isn't like changing a law. Law has no power to secure obedience except through habit, and habit develops only over a long time. So easily switching from existing laws to other, new laws weakens the power of law. Also, even if
[Bekker 1269a line 25]
laws should be changed, should all of them be changed, and in every constitution, or not? And should anyone at all make the changes, or only certain people? These distinctions matter a great deal. So let's leave this inquiry aside for now. It belongs to another occasion.

Concerning the constitution of Lacedaemon and that of Crete,
[Bekker 1269a line 30]
and practically all other constitutions too, there are two questions. One is whether any law has been made well or badly in relation to the best arrangement. The other is whether anything conflicts with the basic aim and character of the constitution they have set before themselves. It is agreed that a city that is to conduct its public life well
[Bekker 1269a line 35]
must have leisure from necessary work. But it's not easy to work out how it can have this. The serfs in Thessaly have often attacked the Thessalians, and the helots, Sparta's serfs, have done the same to the Spartans. They are always, so to speak, waiting to seize on their masters' misfortunes. But among the Cretans
[Bekker 1269a line 40]
nothing like this has happened yet. Perhaps the reason is that the neighboring
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cities,

even though they fight one another, never ally themselves with the rebels. Doing so wouldn't be an advantage to them, since they too have dependent populations. But all the Spartans' neighbors were their enemies: the Argives, Messenians, and Arcadians.
[Bekker 1269b line 5]
The Thessalians' subjects also rebelled at first because the Thessalians were still at war with their neighbors, the Achaeans, Perrhaebians, and Magnesians. Even if there were no other difficulty, managing these people seems hard: how should one deal with them? If they are given a free hand, they become abusive and claim equality
[Bekker 1269b line 10]
with their masters. If they live in hardship, they plot against them and hate them. Clearly, then, those whose helots behave this way haven't found the best way to manage them.

Also, the lack of restraint on women harms both the constitution's aim and the city's happiness. Just as
[Bekker 1269b line 15]
a man and a woman are parts of a household, clearly we should think of a city too as divided nearly in half, into its male and female populations. So in any constitution where arrangements for women are bad, we should think of half the city as having no laws. This is what has happened there. The whole
[Bekker 1269b line 20]
city was to be capable of endurance, as the lawgiver wanted. He has clearly achieved this with the men, but has neglected the women. They live without restraint, indulging in every kind of excess and in luxury. So wealth must be highly valued in a constitution like this, especially if the men happen to be ruled by women.
[Bekker 1269b line 25]
Most military and warlike peoples are ruled by women, except the Celts and any others who have openly honored sexual relations between males. The first person to tell the story seems to have had good reason to pair Ares with Aphrodite. All men of this kind seem to be gripped by a desire for relations with males
[Bekker 1269b line 30]
or with women. So this was the case among the Spartans, and many things were managed by women during the time of their rule. Yet what difference is there between women ruling and rulers being ruled by women? The result is the same. Though useful
[Bekker 1269b line 35]
in no everyday activity, boldness has a use, if anywhere, in war. Yet even here the Spartan women did the greatest harm. They showed this during the Theban invasion. They were no use, as in other cities, and they caused more confusion than the enemy. From the start,
[Bekker 1269b line 40]
then, it seems there was an understandable reason for the Spartan women's
[Bekker 1270a]
[Bekker 1270a line 1]
lack of restraint.

The men were away from their own country for long periods on military campaigns. They fought the war against the Argives, and then the war against the Arcadians and Messenians. When they had leisure, they placed themselves in the lawgiver's hands, already prepared
[Bekker 1270a line 5]
by military life, which contains many elements of virtue. But they say Lycurgus tried to bring the women under the laws and then gave up when they resisted. These, then, are the causes of what happened, and clearly of this mistake too. But we
[Bekker 1270a line 10]
aren't asking who should or shouldn't be forgiven. We're asking what is right and what is wrong. As we said earlier, bad arrangements for women seem not only to make the constitution itself somewhat improper, but also to contribute to the love of money.
[Bekker 1270a line 15]
After the points just made, one might criticize the unequal distribution of property. Some of them have come to own far too much wealth, and others very little. That's why the land has passed into so few hands. This has also been badly arranged by the laws. Buying or
[Bekker 1270a line 20]
selling one's existing property was made dishonorable by the lawgiver. He was right to do so. But he allowed anyone who wished to give it away or leave it by will. Yet the result must be the same either way. Also, women own nearly two-fifths of all the land, because there are many heiresses
[Bekker 1270a line 25]
and because large dowries are given. It would have been better to set no dowry, or a small or moderate one. As things stand, a man may give an heiress in marriage to anyone he wants. If he dies without making a will, the heir he leaves behind gives her to anyone he wants. So, although the country can support a thousand cavalrymen
[Bekker 1270a line 30]
and five hundred more, and thirty thousand heavy infantrymen, their numbers were fewer than a thousand. The facts themselves have made it clear that this arrangement was bad for them. The city couldn't withstand a single blow, but was ruined because it had too few men. They say that under the earlier
[Bekker 1270a line 35]
kings they gave others a share in the constitution. So there wasn't a shortage of men then, despite the long wars. They say there were once as many as ten thousand Spartans. Whether this is true or not, it's better to increase the city's number of men by equalizing property. But in conflict
[Bekker 1270a line 40]
with this reform is the law about having children.

[Bekker 1270b]
[Bekker 1270b line 1]
The lawgiver wants there to be as many Spartans as possible, so he encourages citizens to have as many children as possible. They have a law that a man who has fathered three sons is exempt from guard duty, and one who has fathered four is exempt from all public duties. Yet
[Bekker 1270b line 5]
it's clear that, if many children are born while the land is divided in this way, many must become poor.

The arrangements for the supervising officials called ephors are bad too. This office has authority over their most important affairs, but its members come from the whole people. So men who are very
[Bekker 1270b line 10]
poor often get into office, and their poverty made them open to bribery. They have shown this many times before, and recently in the affairs of Andros. Some were corrupted by money and, as far as it lay in their power, ruined the whole city. And because the office is far too powerful and equal to a tyranny, courting
[Bekker 1270b line 15]
them was necessary even for the kings. This further damaged the constitution in this respect too, since an aristocracy turned into a democracy. Still, this office holds the constitution together. The people stay quiet because they share in the highest office. So whether this came about through the lawgiver or by
[Bekker 1270b line 20]
chance, it helps the situation. For a constitution to survive, all parts of the city must want it to exist and remain unchanged. The kings feel this way because of their own honor. The noble and good men feel this way because of the council of elders. This office is a reward
[Bekker 1270b line 25]
for virtue. The people feel this way because of the ephors' office. Its members are appointed from everyone. But this office should have been filled by choice from everyone, not in the way it is now, which is far too childish. Also, quite ordinary people have authority over important court decisions. So rather than their own judgment,
[Bekker 1270b line 30]
the basis of their decisions should be written rules and the laws. The ephors' way of life also conflicts with the city's aim. Their own life is far too relaxed, while the life imposed on the others goes too far in severity. As a result, they can't endure it, but secretly escape the law
[Bekker 1270b line 35]
and enjoy bodily pleasures.

### Book II, 1270b–1274b

Their arrangements for the office of the elders aren't good either. If the elders are decent men and have had enough education to make them good, someone might say that this office benefits the city. Still, it's questionable whether they should have lifelong authority over important decisions
[Bekker 1270b line 40]
(for the mind grows old, just as the body does).

[Bekker 1271a]
[Bekker 1271a line 1]
But when their education is such that even the lawgiver himself distrusts them as men who aren't good, it isn't safe. Bribes have clearly been taken, and many public benefits given away to please others, by people who have held this
[Bekker 1271a line 5]
office. So it would be better if they had to account for their actions. As things stand, they don't. The office of the supervising officials called ephors might seem to hold all the offices to account. But this gives the ephors far too much power, and this isn't how we say officials should give an account. Also, the choice of elders, in its
[Bekker 1271a line 10]
method of judging candidates, is childish. Nor is it right that someone considered worthy of the office should have to apply for it himself. A person worthy of the office should hold it whether he wants to or not. Here the lawgiver clearly does what he does in the rest of the constitution. He makes the citizens eager for honor,
[Bekker 1271a line 15]
and uses this in the choice of elders. Nobody would apply for office unless he wanted honor. Yet, by and large, most of the deliberate wrongs people commit come from the love of honor and the love of money.

As for kingship, whether it's better for cities to have it
[Bekker 1271a line 20]
or not is a question for another discussion. But it certainly would be better to judge each king by his own life, rather than follow the present practice. It's clear that even the lawgiver himself doesn't think he can make them noble and good. At any rate, he distrusts them as men who aren't good enough. That's why people sent along as fellow ambassadors
[Bekker 1271a line 25]
the kings' enemies, and thought that faction between the kings kept the city safe. The person who first established the shared meals called phiditia didn't make good laws about them either. The gathering should have been paid for from public funds instead, as it is in Crete. But among the Spartans everyone must
[Bekker 1271a line 30]
contribute, even though some are very poor and can't afford this expense. So the result is the opposite of what the lawgiver intended. He wants the shared meals to be a democratic institution, but with these laws they turn out to be anything but democratic. Taking part
[Bekker 1271a line 35]
isn't easy for the very poor. Yet their traditional condition for taking part in the constitution is that anyone who can't pay this contribution is excluded from it. Some others have criticized the law about naval commanders, and they've been right to criticize it. It causes faction. Alongside the kings,
[Bekker 1271a line 40]
who are generals for life, the naval command has become almost a second kingship. Someone could also criticize the lawgiver's basic aim
[Bekker 1271b]
[Bekker 1271b line 1]
in the same way that Plato has criticized it in the Laws.

The whole system of laws is directed at just one part of virtue, military virtue. This is useful for gaining control. So they stayed safe while fighting wars, but began to fall apart once they ruled,
[Bekker 1271b line 5]
because they didn't know how to use leisure and hadn't practiced any activity more important than warfare. Another mistake is no smaller than this. They think that the good things people fight over are gained through virtue rather than vice, and they're right about that. But they suppose that these things are better than virtue,
[Bekker 1271b line 10]
and that's wrong. The Spartans' public finances are badly arranged too. There's nothing in the city's public treasury, even though they're forced to fight major wars, and they pay their contributions badly. Because most of the land belongs to the Spartans, they don't check each other's
[Bekker 1271b line 15]
contributions. The lawgiver has achieved the opposite of what's advantageous. He has made the city penniless and its private citizens greedy for money. Let that be enough about the constitution of the Lacedaemonians. These are the things someone would criticize most.

[Bekker 1271b line 20]
The Cretan constitution is close to this one. A few of its features are no worse, but most are less carefully worked out. The Spartan constitution seems to have copied the Cretan constitution in most respects, and people say it did. Most older arrangements are less well organized than newer ones. They say
[Bekker 1271b line 25]
that when Lycurgus left his guardianship of King Charilaus and went abroad, he spent most of his time in Crete because of their kinship. The people of Lyctus were settlers from Sparta. Those who came to establish the settlement found that this system of laws already existed
[Bekker 1271b line 30]
among the people living there then. That's why even now the surrounding inhabitants follow these laws in the same way, on the grounds that Minos first established the system of laws. The island also seems naturally suited and well placed to rule the Greeks. It commands the whole sea, and almost all the Greeks
[Bekker 1271b line 35]
are settled around the sea. On one side it's only a short distance from the Peloponnese, and on the other from the part of Asia around Triopium and from Rhodes. That's why Minos gained control of the sea. He conquered some of the islands and settled others. Finally he attacked Sicily and died
[Bekker 1271b line 40]
there near Camicus.

The Cretan system corresponds to the Spartan one. The helots farm for the Spartans,
[Bekker 1272a]
[Bekker 1272a line 1]
and the surrounding inhabitants for the Cretans,

and both have shared meals. In earlier times the Spartans called them not phiditia but andreia, just as the Cretans do. This also makes it clear that they came from Crete. The arrangement of the constitution corresponds too. The
[Bekker 1272a line 5]
ephors have the same power as the officials in Crete called cosmoi, except that there are five ephors and ten cosmoi. The elders correspond to the elders whom the Cretans call the council. There used to be kingship, but the Cretans abolished it, and the
[Bekker 1272a line 10]
cosmoi lead in war. Everyone takes part in the assembly, but it has no authority except to vote its approval of decisions made by the elders and the cosmoi.

The Cretans' shared meals are better arranged than the Spartans'. In Lacedaemon, each person pays the fixed contribution individually.
[Bekker 1272a line 15]
If he doesn't, the law prevents him from taking part in the constitution, as we said before. But in Crete the arrangement is more communal. A share of all the produce from public crops and livestock, and of the taxes paid by the surrounding inhabitants, is set aside, partly for the gods and public
[Bekker 1272a line 20]
services, and partly for the shared meals. So everyone—women, children, and men—is fed at public expense. The lawgiver has given much thought to keeping food intake low, believing this to be beneficial. He has also arranged for separation from women, so that people won't have too many children, by making males
[Bekker 1272a line 25]
their partners in sexual relations. Whether this is bad or not will be a question to examine another time. It's clear, then, that the shared meals are better arranged among the Cretans than among the Spartans. But the arrangements for the cosmoi are even worse than those for the ephors. The bad feature of the ephors' office exists here too
[Bekker 1272a line 30]
(for anyone at all can hold it). But what benefits the constitution there doesn't exist here. There, because the choice is made from everyone, the people have a share in the most important office and want the constitution to last. Here they choose the cosmoi not from everyone but from certain families, and the elders
[Bekker 1272a line 35]
from those who have been cosmoi. We could make the same points about them as about those appointed in Lacedaemon. Freedom from having to account for their actions and lifelong tenure are greater honors than they deserve. And it's dangerous for them to rule by their own judgment rather than by written laws. The fact that the people stay quiet without taking part
[Bekker 1272a line 40]
is no sign that the arrangements are good. Unlike the ephors, the cosmoi have no opportunity for profit, since they live far away
[Bekker 1272b]
[Bekker 1272b line 1]
on an island, away from those who might corrupt them.

The remedy they use for this fault is strange. It's not constitutional but a matter of personal domination. Often some of the cosmoi's fellow officials or private citizens band together and throw them out. The cosmoi can also
[Bekker 1272b line 5]
give up their office before their term is over. All these things would be better done by law than at people's will. That isn't a safe standard. Worst of all is the suspension of the cosmoi's office, which powerful men often bring about when they don't want to face justice. This makes it clear that the system has something
[Bekker 1272b line 10]
of a constitution, but isn't a constitution: it's more a system of personal domination. They regularly split the people and their friends into groups, bring about a state without rulers, create factions, and fight one another. Yet how is this different from such a community temporarily ceasing to be a city, with its political
[Bekker 1272b line 15]
community broken up? A city in this condition is in danger from anyone willing and able to attack it. But, as we've said, its location keeps it safe. Its distance has had the effect of excluding foreigners. That's also why the Cretans' surrounding inhabitants remain in their position, while the helots often revolt. The Cretans have no share in foreign
[Bekker 1272b line 20]
rule, and only recently has a foreign war crossed over to the island. It has made the weakness of their laws clear. Let that be enough of our discussion of this constitution.

The Carthaginians also seem to take part in public life well, and
[Bekker 1272b line 25]
to be outstanding in many respects compared with others. Some of their arrangements are especially close to those of the Spartans. These three constitutions—the Cretan, the Spartan, and, third, the Carthaginian—are somewhat close to one another and differ greatly from the rest. Many of their arrangements
[Bekker 1272b line 30]
are good. A sign of a well-organized constitution is that the people willingly stay within its constitutional order, and that no faction worth mentioning has occurred, nor any tyrant arisen. Some things correspond to the Spartan constitution. Their associations' shared meals correspond to the phiditia. The hundred
[Bekker 1272b line 35]
and four hold an office like that of the ephors. There is a difference that's no worse. The ephors come from anyone at all, but this office is filled by choosing the best. Their kings and council of elders correspond to the kings and elders there. It's also better that the kings don't come from one fixed family, nor from just any family,
[Bekker 1272b line 40]
but, if some family stands out, are chosen from its members rather than appointed by age. They have authority over important matters, and if they're worthless,
[Bekker 1273a]
[Bekker 1273a line 1]
they do great harm,

and they have already harmed the city of the Lacedaemonians.

Most of the things one might criticize as deviations turn out to be common to all the constitutions we've discussed. Among the departures from the basic principle of aristocracy
[Bekker 1273a line 5]
and constitutional government, some lean more toward the people and others toward oligarchy. If the kings and elders all agree, they have the authority to bring some matters before the people and not others. If they don't agree, the people have authority over these matters too. When these officials bring something forward, they don't
[Bekker 1273a line 10]
just let the people hear what the rulers have decided. The people have the authority to decide, and anyone who wants to can speak against the proposals. This doesn't happen in the other constitutions. The boards of five have authority over many important matters and choose their own members. The office of the hundred
[Bekker 1273a line 15]
is also filled by their choice. It is the most important office. And they hold power longer than the others, since they exercise it both after leaving office and before entering it. These are oligarchic features. But unpaid offices not assigned by lot should count as aristocratic. The same holds for any other feature of this kind. So should having all lawsuits judged by the officials
[Bekker 1273a line 20]
rather than different cases by different officials, as in Lacedaemon. The Carthaginian system departs from aristocracy toward oligarchy chiefly because of a certain idea that most people share. They think rulers should be chosen not just for being the best but also for their wealth. It's impossible,
[Bekker 1273a line 25]
they say, for a poor person to rule well and have leisure. So if choosing by wealth is oligarchic and choosing by virtue aristocratic, this would be a third kind of arrangement, the very one the Carthaginians use in their constitution. They choose with both these things in mind, especially
[Bekker 1273a line 30]
for the most important offices, the kings and the generals.

We should consider this departure from aristocracy a mistake by the lawgiver. One of the most necessary things is to see to it from the start that the best people can have leisure and don't have to do anything shameful, not only while holding office but also
[Bekker 1273a line 35]
as private citizens. Even if we must consider resources as a means to leisure, it's bad for the most important offices, kingship and generalship, to be for sale. This law makes wealth more honored than virtue and makes the whole city love money. Whatever is regarded as valuable by the
[Bekker 1273a line 40]
sovereign body must also be valued by the other citizens. Where virtue isn't honored above all, the
[Bekker 1273b]
[Bekker 1273b line 1]
constitution can't be firmly aristocratic.

It's reasonable to expect people who buy their offices to get used to making a profit from them, when they take office after spending money. It would be strange if a poor but decent man wanted to make a profit, while a worse man who had spent money didn't.
[Bekker 1273b line 5]
So the people who can rule best should hold office. Even if the lawgiver neglected to provide decent people with resources, it would be better at least to ensure their leisure while they hold office. It also seems bad for the same person to hold several offices, though the Carthaginians think highly of this. One
[Bekker 1273b line 10]
job is done best by one person. The lawgiver must see to it that this happens, and not tell the same person to play the flute and make shoes. So, where the city isn't small, having more people share in the offices is more constitutional and more democratic. As we've said, it's more widely shared, and each task gets done better,
[Bekker 1273b line 15]
with the same tasks done faster too. This is clear in military and naval affairs. In both, ruling and being ruled extend through practically everyone. Although their constitution is oligarchic, they do very well at avoiding the dangers by continually enriching a section of the people, sending them out to
[Bekker 1273b line 20]
their cities. This is how they remedy the problem and keep the constitution stable. But this is the work of luck. They should be free of faction because of the lawgiver. As things stand, if some misfortune happens and the majority of the ruled revolt, the laws offer no remedy to restore peace. So this is how things stand with the Lacedaemonian
[Bekker 1273b line 25]
constitution, the Cretan one, and the Carthaginian one, which rightly have good reputations.

Some of those who have put forward views on constitutions never took part in any political activity at all, but spent their whole lives as private citizens. If anything about them is worth mentioning, we've discussed
[Bekker 1273b line 30]
practically all of it. Others have become lawgivers, some for their own cities and some for foreign cities as well, and have themselves taken part in public life. Some of these made only laws, while others also made constitutions, as Lycurgus and Solon did. They established both laws and constitutions.
[Bekker 1273b line 35]
We've already discussed the Lacedaemonian constitution. Some people think Solon was an excellent lawgiver. They say he abolished a system of rule far too purely oligarchic, freed the people from slavery, and established the traditional democracy by mixing the constitution well. The council on the Areopagus,
[Bekker 1273b line 40]
they say, was oligarchic, the choice of officeholders aristocratic, and the law courts democratic.

But Solon seems
[Bekker 1274a]
[Bekker 1274a line 1]
not to have abolished the earlier institutions, the council and the choice of officeholders. Rather, he established the people's power by making the law courts open to everyone. This is why some criticize him. They say he broke up the other institutions by giving the law court authority
[Bekker 1274a line 5]
over everything, even though its members were assigned by lot. Once it became strong, they courted the people as if they were a tyrant and changed the constitution into the democracy of today. Ephialtes and Pericles cut back the council on the Areopagus, and Pericles introduced pay for service in the law courts. In this way
[Bekker 1274a line 10]
each of the popular leaders carried it further, expanding it into today's democracy. But this seems to have happened not by Solon's intention but more as a result of circumstances. The people grew proud after securing naval supremacy in the Persian Wars. They took on bad popular leaders despite opposition
[Bekker 1274a line 15]
from the decent citizens. Solon seems to have given the people only the most necessary power: to choose officials and hold them to account (without authority even over this, the people would be slaves and enemies). But he assigned all the offices to the notables and the wealthy, from the class whose property yields five hundred measures of produce,
[Bekker 1274a line 20]
the ox-team class, and the third class, called the cavalry class. The fourth was the laboring class, whose members had no share in any office.

The Epizephyrian Locrians had Zaleucus as their lawgiver. Charondas of Catana made laws for his fellow citizens and the other Chalcidian cities of Italy
[Bekker 1274a line 25]
and Sicily. Some people also try to link them together. They say Onomacritus was the first expert in lawgiving, and that he trained in Crete in the art of divination, being a Locrian who was staying there. Thaletas, they say, was his associate; Lycurgus and Zaleucus were pupils of Thaletas, and Zaleucus's pupil
[Bekker 1274a line 30]
was Charondas. But they say this without examining the dates carefully enough. Philolaus of Corinth also became a lawgiver for the Thebans. Philolaus came from the Bacchiad family and was the lover of Diocles, who won at Olympia. When Diocles left the city because he hated the
[Bekker 1274a line 35]
passion of his mother Alcyone, Philolaus went to Thebes. Both ended their lives there. Even now people point out their tombs. Each can easily be seen from the other, but one has a view toward Corinthian territory and the other doesn't. The story is that they arranged their burial this way:
[Bekker 1274a line 40]
Diocles, because of his hatred of that passion, wanted Corinthian territory not to be visible from his burial mound, while Philolaus wanted it
[Bekker 1274b]
[Bekker 1274b line 1]
to be visible.

That, then, was why they lived among the Thebans. Philolaus became their lawgiver on several matters, including the bearing of children. They call these laws the adoption laws. This was his particular contribution to their laws,
[Bekker 1274b line 5]
to preserve the number of land allotments. Charondas has nothing distinctive except the lawsuits for false testimony (he was the first to introduce a formal challenge to testimony). But the precision of his laws is more carefully worked out than even that of today's lawgivers.

Phaleas' distinctive feature is the equalization of property. Plato's are
[Bekker 1274b line 10]
the sharing of women, children, and property, and the women's shared meals. He also had a law about drunkenness: sober people should supervise drinking parties. His military training taught people to use both hands equally well through practice. One hand shouldn't be useful and the other
[Bekker 1274b line 15]
useless. There are laws by Draco, but he made them for an existing constitution. There's nothing distinctive in them worth mentioning except their harshness, due to the size of the penalties. Pittacus also made laws but not a constitution. His distinctive law is that drunken people, if they
[Bekker 1274b line 20]
commit an offense, should pay a heavier penalty than sober people. More people behave violently when drunk than when sober. So he looked not to forgiveness, on the grounds that drunken people should be more readily forgiven, but to advantage. Androdamas of Rhegium also became a lawgiver for the Chalcidians in Thrace. His laws concern homicide
[Bekker 1274b line 25]
and heiresses. But nobody could point to anything distinctive about him. Let this, then, be our examination of constitutions, both those in force and those proposed by particular people.

### Book III, 1274b–1278a

[Bekker 1274b]
[Bekker 1274b line 32]
For someone studying constitutions—what each is and what it's like—the first question is almost always about the city: what exactly is a city? People now disagree about this. Some say
[Bekker 1274b line 35]
the city carried out an action. Others say it wasn't the city but the oligarchy or the tyrant. We see that all the work of the statesman and the lawgiver concerns the city. A constitution is a certain arrangement of the people living in a city. The city is a composite thing, like any other whole
[Bekker 1274b line 40]
made up of many parts. So clearly we must first examine the citizen. A city is a collection of citizens.

[Bekker 1275a]
[Bekker 1275a line 1]
We must therefore consider whom we should call a citizen, and what a citizen is. People often disagree about the citizen too. They don't all agree that the same person is a citizen. Someone who is a citizen in a democracy is often
[Bekker 1275a line 5]
not a citizen in an oligarchy. We can set aside people who receive this title in some other way, such as people made citizens by a special grant. A citizen isn't a citizen just because he lives somewhere. Resident foreigners and slaves also share a place to live. Nor do legal rights make someone a citizen, even rights to be sued and to bring a suit.
[Bekker 1275a line 10]
People covered by agreements between cities have these rights too. In many places resident foreigners don't even have a full share in these rights. They must appoint a patron, so their share in this kind of community is incomplete. Likewise, children who are still too young
[Bekker 1275a line 15]
to be enrolled, and old people who have been released from service, must be called citizens in a sense, but not without qualification. We must add that the first are not fully qualified and the second are past their prime, or use some other similar description. The wording doesn't matter; the meaning is clear. We're looking for the citizen without qualification, whose status has no
[Bekker 1275a line 20]
such objection that needs correcting. The same sorts of difficulties can be raised and settled about people deprived of civic rights and exiles. A citizen without qualification is best defined by taking part in judgment and office. Some offices have fixed terms, so that in some offices, a second term
[Bekker 1275a line 25]
cannot be held by the same person at all. In others, he can do so only after a set interval. Other offices have no fixed term, such as those of the juror and the assembly member. Someone might say that these people aren't even officeholders, and so don't take part in office. Yet it's absurd to deny office to those with the most authority. But this needn't matter. A name
[Bekker 1275a line 30]
is what the question is about. There is no common name for a juror and an assembly member, no term for what we should call both. So, to define it, let's call it an office without a fixed term. We count those who take part in this way as citizens.

This, then, is roughly the definition of a citizen that would fit best all those called citizens. But we must
[Bekker 1275a line 35]
remember this: when the things concerned differ in kind, with one first, another second, and another following, they have nothing in common as such, or very little. We see that constitutions differ from one another in kind, and that some come later and others
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earlier.

Faulty constitutions that depart from the right ones must come later than those without faults. What we mean by constitutions that depart from the right ones will become clear later. So the citizen must also differ with each constitution.
[Bekker 1275b line 5]
That's why the citizen just described is a citizen above all in a democracy. He may be one in other constitutions, but he needn't be. Some have no people acting as a body and no regular assembly, only specially called meetings. Different offices judge different lawsuits. In Lacedaemon, for example, contract cases are judged by
[Bekker 1275b line 10]
different supervising officials called ephors. The elders judge homicide cases, and perhaps some other office judges other cases. Things aren't the same at Carthage either. There certain offices judge all lawsuits. But the definition of the citizen can be corrected. In other constitutions, it isn't the official without a fixed term who acts as assembly member
[Bekker 1275b line 15]
and juror. Instead, it is the official whose office is defined. All or some of these officeholders are assigned the work of deliberating and judging, either on every issue or on certain issues. This makes clear what a citizen is. We call someone who has the right to share in office involving public debate or court judgments a citizen of that
[Bekker 1275b line 20]
city. In simple terms, a city is a collection of such people large enough for a self-sufficient life.

For practical purposes, people define a citizen as someone whose parents are both citizens, not just one, such as the father or the mother. Some take this requirement further, going back two, three, or more generations.
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When people define citizenship this way, for political purposes and without much thought, some ask how that ancestor in the third or fourth generation can have been a citizen. Gorgias of Leontini, perhaps partly puzzled and partly joking, said that just as mortars are things made by mortar-makers, Larissaeans are people made by their civic officials.
[Bekker 1275b line 30]
There are, he said, Larissaean-makers. But the answer is simple. If they took part in the constitution according to the definition given, they were citizens. Besides, the requirement of having a citizen father or mother can't possibly apply to the first settlers or founders.

But perhaps a greater difficulty concerns those who
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became citizens after a change of constitution. Cleisthenes did this at Athens after the tyrants were expelled. He enrolled in the tribes many foreigners and slaves who were resident foreigners. The dispute about these people isn't over who is a citizen, but whether they are citizens justly or unjustly. Yet someone might raise this further question:

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if someone isn't justly a citizen, is he not a citizen at all, as though being unjust and being false meant the same thing? But we see people holding office unjustly, and we say that they hold office, though not justly. A citizen is defined by a certain kind of office. Someone who shares in
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this kind of office is a citizen, as we said. So clearly we must say that these people too are citizens.

Whether they are citizens justly or unjustly connects with the dispute mentioned earlier. Some people ask when an action is the city's and when it isn't. For example, when an oligarchy or tyranny becomes
[Bekker 1276a line 10]
a democracy, some people refuse to settle debts. They say it wasn't the city that borrowed, but the tyrant. They also refuse many other such obligations, on the grounds that some constitutions rest on force rather than the common advantage. If some democracies are governed in this way too, then the actions
[Bekker 1276a line 15]
of this constitution must be called the city's actions just as much as those of the oligarchy and tyranny. This argument seems connected with the problem of when we should say a city is the same city, and when it is not the same but a different one. At its most superficial, this problem
[Bekker 1276a line 20]
is examined in terms of the place and the people. The place and the people can be divided, with some living in one place and others in another.

We should treat this as an easier problem. Since “city” has several meanings, a question of this sort is fairly easy to deal with. Similarly,
[Bekker 1276a line 25]
when people live in the same place, when should we consider them one city? Certainly not because of their walls. One wall could be built around the Peloponnese. Perhaps Babylon is like this, and any place whose boundaries enclose more of a nation than a city. They say that after Babylon was captured, it was the third
[Bekker 1276a line 30]
day before part of the city learned of it.

But it will be useful to examine this problem on another occasion. A statesman must understand a city's size—how large it should be, and whether one nation or several is better. But when the same people live in the same place,
[Bekker 1276a line 35]
should we call it the same city as long as its inhabitants remain of the same stock, even though some are always dying and others being born? We habitually call rivers and springs the same, although fresh water is always coming in and old water flowing out. Or should we say that the people
[Bekker 1276a line 40]
are the same for this reason, but the
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[Bekker 1276b line 1]
city is different?

If a city is a community, and a community of citizens under a constitution, then when the constitution becomes different in kind, the city too would seem necessarily no longer the same. We say that a chorus
[Bekker 1276b line 5]
is different when it performs comedy and when it performs tragedy, even though it often consists of the same people. Likewise, any other community or combination is different if the form of the combination differs. For example, the same notes make a different harmony when arranged in the Dorian way and in the Phrygian way. If this
[Bekker 1276b line 10]
is so, clearly we should look above all to the constitution in deciding whether a city is the same. It can be given a different name or the same name whether its inhabitants are the same people or completely different people. Whether it is just to settle obligations or not when there is a change to another constitution
[Bekker 1276b line 15]
in the city is a separate question.

The next question after what we've said is whether we should count the virtue of a good man and that of a good citizen as the same or not. If we are to investigate this, we must first get a rough idea of a citizen's virtue.
[Bekker 1276b line 20]
A sailor is one member of a community, and we say the same of a citizen. Sailors differ in their abilities: one is a rower, another a helmsman, another a lookout at the bow, and another has some other such title. Clearly, the most exact description of each one's
[Bekker 1276b line 25]
virtue will be specific to him. But a common description will also fit them all. Keeping the voyage safe is the task of all of them. Each sailor aims at this. Similarly, citizens differ, but keeping the community safe is their task. Their community is the constitution.
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So a citizen's virtue must relate to the constitution. If there are several kinds of constitution, clearly there can't be one virtue, the complete virtue, of a good citizen. But we say that a man is good because of one virtue, the complete virtue.

Clearly, then, someone can be a good citizen without
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having the virtue that makes a good man. But we can also approach the same argument another way, by raising questions about the best constitution. If a city can't be made up entirely of good people, each must still do his own task well, and that requires virtue.
[Bekker 1276b line 40]
Since all the citizens can't be alike,

there cannot
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[Bekker 1277a line 1]
be one and the same virtue of a citizen and a good man. Everyone must have the virtue of a good citizen. That is necessary for the city to be the best. But they can't all have the good man's virtue, unless everyone must be good in
[Bekker 1277a line 5]
a good city as a citizen. Further, a city is made up of unlike parts. An animal, for a start, consists of soul and body, the soul of reason and desire, a household of man and woman, and property of master and slave. In the same way, a city consists of all these, and also other unlike
[Bekker 1277a line 10]
kinds of people. So all its citizens can't have the same virtue, just as a chorus leader and the person standing beside him don't have the same virtue.

This makes clear why the two virtues aren't simply the same. But will someone have the same virtue as a good citizen and a good man? We say that a ruler
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who rules well is good and has good judgment in practical matters. A citizen needn't have practical judgment. Some say that a ruler's education is different from the start. We do see kings' sons educated in riding and warfare. And Euripides says,
“Not clever things for me … but what the city needs,”
(Eur. Fr. 16)
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as though there were a special education for a ruler. If the virtue of a good ruler and a good man is the same, but someone who is ruled is also a citizen, the virtue of a citizen and a man won't simply be the same. It will, however, be the same for a certain citizen. A ruler's virtue and a citizen's aren't the same. Perhaps this is why Jason said he went hungry when he wasn't a tyrant, because
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he didn't know how to live as a private person.

Still, the ability to rule and be ruled is praised. A citizen's virtue seems to be the ability both to rule well and to be ruled well. If we say that the good man's virtue is the ability to rule, and the citizen's is both, the two abilities won't be equally praiseworthy. Since, then,
[Bekker 1277a line 30]
both views sometimes seem right, and the ruler and the ruled needn't learn the same things, while the citizen must know both and share in both, we can see the answer from the following. There is rule exercised by a master. We mean rule concerned with necessary tasks. The ruler needn't know how to do these,
[Bekker 1277a line 35]
but rather how to use their results. Doing them is actually slavish. By doing them I mean being able to serve by carrying out these menial tasks. We speak of several kinds of slave, since there are several kinds of work. One part of this work belongs to manual laborers. As their name indicates, these are people who live by
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their hands.

The craftsman who works with his hands is one of these. That's why in some places craftsmen didn't share in office in earlier times, before the most extreme democracy arose. The tasks of people ruled in this way aren't for a good man or a statesman or a
[Bekker 1277b line 5]
good citizen to learn, except when he needs to do something for himself. When he serves himself, there is no longer one person who is master and another who is slave.

But there is a kind of rule over people who are alike in stock and free. We call this political rule. The ruler, by being ruled, must
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learn it. For example, he learns to command cavalry by serving under a cavalry commander, and to be a general by serving under a general and commanding a regiment and a company. That's why it's rightly said that someone who hasn't been ruled can't rule well. The virtues involved are different, but a good citizen must know how and be able both to be ruled and to
[Bekker 1277b line 15]
rule. This is a citizen's virtue: knowing the rule of free people from both sides. A good man too must have both, even if self-control and justice in a ruler are different in kind. Clearly, the virtue of a good man who is ruled but free, such as his justice, won't have just one form. It will have forms
[Bekker 1277b line 20]
according to whether he rules or is ruled, just as self-control and courage differ for a man and a woman. A man would seem cowardly if he had only the courage of a courageous woman. A woman would seem talkative if she were as restrained as a good man. Their household management differs too. The man's
[Bekker 1277b line 25]
task is to acquire, the woman's to preserve. Practical wisdom is the only virtue specific to a ruler. All the others seem necessarily shared by the ruled and the rulers. The virtue of someone ruled isn't practical judgment, but true opinion. The person ruled is like a flute-maker, and the ruler
[Bekker 1277b line 30]
like the flute-player who uses it. This makes clear whether the virtue of a good man and a good citizen is the same or different, and how it is the same and how it differs.

One problem about the citizen still remains. Is a citizen really someone entitled to share in
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office, or should we count craft workers as citizens too? If we must include these people, who have no share in office, then not every citizen can have the virtue described, since this person too is a citizen. But if no such person is a citizen, in what category should each be placed? He isn't a resident foreigner or a foreigner. Or should we say that this argument
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leads to nothing absurd?

Slaves and freed slaves don't belong to any of the categories mentioned either. It's true that we shouldn't count everyone without whom a city couldn't exist as a citizen. Even children aren't citizens in the same way as grown men. Rather,
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the latter are citizens without qualification and the former with a qualification: they are citizens, but not fully qualified. In ancient times, in some places, craft workers were slaves or foreigners. That's why most are still like this today. The best city won't make a craft worker a citizen. But if such a person is a citizen, the citizen's virtue we described
[Bekker 1278a line 10]
can't be said to belong to everyone, or even everyone who is free. It belongs to those released from necessary tasks. People who perform such necessary services for one person are slaves; those who perform them for the public are craft workers and hired laborers. A little examination makes their position clear. Once the point itself is understood, it makes what we've said
[Bekker 1278a line 15]
clear. Since there are several constitutions, there must be several kinds of citizen, especially of the citizen who is ruled. So in one constitution craft workers and hired laborers must be citizens, while in some others this is impossible. An example is any constitution called aristocratic, where according to virtue
[Bekker 1278a line 20]
and worth honors are given. Someone who lives as a craft worker or hired laborer can't practice the activities of virtue. In oligarchies a hired laborer can't be a citizen, since sharing in office requires high property qualifications. But a craft worker can be one. Many
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craftsmen are rich. At Thebes there was a law that anyone who hadn't stayed out of trade for ten years couldn't share in office. In many constitutions the law also draws in some foreigners. In some democracies a person with a citizen mother is a citizen. Many places take the same approach to children born outside marriage. However,
[Bekker 1278a line 30]
they make such people citizens because of a shortage of citizens born to citizen parents. They apply their laws this way because their population is small. Once they have plenty of people, they gradually remove these rights, first from those with a slave father or mother, then from those with only citizen mothers. Finally they make only those with two citizen parents citizens.

### Book III, 1278a–1281b

That
[Bekker 1278a line 35]
there are several kinds of citizen is clear from this. It is also clear that a citizen is above all someone who shares in public honors, as Homer wrote:
“As if I were some dishonored newcomer.”
(Hom. Il. 9.648) (Hom. Il. 16.59) Someone with no share in public honors is like a resident foreigner. But in some places this fact is kept hidden in order to deceive the people living together
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in the city.

Whether we should count as different or the same the virtue
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[Bekker 1278b line 1]
that makes a man good and a citizen good is clear from what we've said. In some cities the good man and the good citizen are the same; in others they differ. Even where they are the same, not every citizen is such a man. Only the person active in politics who is, or can be, in charge, alone or with others, of managing
[Bekker 1278b line 5]
public affairs is such a man.

Now that we've defined these things, we must consider the next question. Should we say that there is one constitution or several? If there are several, what are they, how many are there, and how do they differ? A constitution is a city's arrangement of its offices, especially
[Bekker 1278b line 10]
the office sovereign over all. Everywhere the city's citizen body is sovereign, and the citizen body is the constitution. I mean, for example, that in democracies the people are sovereign, while in oligarchies, by contrast, the few are. We say that these also have different constitutions. We will use the same argument
[Bekker 1278b line 15]
for the others. First we must establish why a city is formed, and how many kinds of rule there are over human beings and their shared life. In our first discussions, where we defined household management and mastery, we also said that a human being is by nature a political animal.
[Bekker 1278b line 20]
So even when people don't need one another's help, they still want to live together just as much. Still, the common advantage also brings them together, insofar as each gets a share in living well. This is above all their goal, both for all together and for each separately. But they also come together for life itself and
[Bekker 1278b line 25]
maintain the political community for its sake. Perhaps there is some element of the noble even in simply being alive, as long as life's hardships aren't too overwhelming. Clearly, most people endure great suffering because they cling to life, as though it contained a certain well-being and
[Bekker 1278b line 30]
a natural sweetness.

It's also easy to distinguish the kinds of rule we speak of. We often define them in our discussions for a wider audience too. In mastery, although the slave by nature and the master by nature really have the same advantage, the master still rules
[Bekker 1278b line 35]
for his own advantage, and only incidentally for the slave's. Mastery can't survive if the slave dies. Rule over children, a wife, and the whole household, which we call household management, is either for the advantage of the ruled or for an advantage shared by both. In
[Bekker 1278b line 40]
itself it serves the ruled, as we see with other
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[Bekker 1279a line 1]
skills,

such as medicine and physical training. Incidentally, it may also serve the practitioners themselves. Nothing prevents a trainer from sometimes being one of the people exercising himself, just as the helmsman is always one of the sailors. The trainer
[Bekker 1279a line 5]
or helmsman aims at the good of the people he directs. When he becomes one of them himself, he shares in the benefit incidentally. The one is a sailor, and the other, though a trainer, becomes one of the people exercising. That's why, when a constitution rests on citizens' equality and
[Bekker 1279a line 10]
similarity, they claim the right to hold political office in turn. Originally, as is natural, they expected to serve in turn, and then to have someone else look after their good, just as they themselves had looked after his advantage when in office. But now, because of the benefits from public funds and from office, they want all the time
[Bekker 1279a line 15]
to hold office, as if being in office kept them continually healthy when they were sickly. In that case too they would probably chase after offices. Clearly, then, all constitutions that aim at the common advantage are correct according to the just without qualification. Those that aim only at the rulers' own advantage
[Bekker 1279a line 20]
are all faulty and departures from the correct constitutions. They exercise a master's rule, while the city is a community of free people.

Now that we've defined these things, the next step is to examine the constitutions: how many there are and what they are. We should first examine the correct ones. Their departures will also become
[Bekker 1279a line 25]
clear once these are defined. Constitution and citizen body mean the same thing, and the citizen body is what is sovereign in cities. The sovereign must be one person, a few, or the many. When the one, the few, or the many rule for the common advantage, these must be correct
[Bekker 1279a line 30]
constitutions. Those that serve the private advantage of the one, the few, or the multitude are departures. Either we must say that those who share in the community aren't citizens, or they must share in its advantage. We usually call a monarchy that looks to the common advantage kingship. Rule by a few,
[Bekker 1279a line 35]
but more than one, we call aristocracy, either because the best people rule or because it serves what is best for the city and its members. When the multitude takes part in public life for the common advantage, it is called polity, using the common name for all constitutions. (This is reasonable. One person can stand out
[Bekker 1279a line 40]
in virtue, or a few can. But it's hard for a larger number
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to reach perfection in every virtue,

though they can above all reach it in military virtue. This does arise in a multitude. That's why in this constitution the fighting force is sovereign, and those who possess weapons share in it.) The departures from the forms mentioned
[Bekker 1279b line 5]
are tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, and democracy from polity. Tyranny is monarchy for the advantage of the monarch. Oligarchy serves the advantage of the wealthy, and democracy the advantage of the poor. As for what benefits the community,
[Bekker 1279b line 10]
none of them serves it.

We must say a little more about what each of these constitutions is. There are some problems here. For someone who examines each field philosophically, rather than looking only to practical action, it is appropriate not to overlook or
[Bekker 1279b line 15]
leave anything out, but to make clear the truth about each point. Tyranny, as we said, is monarchy that exercises a master's rule over the political community. Oligarchy is when those who own property are sovereign over the constitution. Democracy is the opposite: those who possess no great amount of property, but are poor, are sovereign.
[Bekker 1279b line 20]
The first problem concerns the definition. Suppose the majority were wealthy and sovereign over the city, and democracy is when the multitude is sovereign. Or suppose somewhere the poor were fewer than the wealthy, but stronger and sovereign over the constitution, while, when a small
[Bekker 1279b line 25]
number is sovereign, people call it oligarchy. Then the definitions of the constitutions wouldn't seem sound.

But even if someone combines wealth with fewness and poverty with large numbers, and names the constitutions accordingly—oligarchy where the wealthy hold office and are few, democracy
[Bekker 1279b line 30]
where the poor hold office and are many—there is another problem. What are we to call the constitutions just mentioned, where the wealthy are more numerous or the poor less numerous, but each group is sovereign over its constitution? This is a problem if there is no constitution apart from the ones mentioned. So the
[Bekker 1279b line 35]
argument seems to make clear that having few or many sovereign is incidental, the first to oligarchies and the second to democracies. That's because the wealthy are few and the poor many everywhere. So the factors just mentioned don't account for the difference. As for the difference between
[Bekker 1279b line 40]
democracy and oligarchy, poverty and wealth
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are what distinguish them.

Wherever people rule because of wealth, whether they are fewer or more numerous, that constitution must be an oligarchy. Where the poor rule, it must be a democracy. But, as we said, one group happens to be few and the other many. Wealth is possessed
[Bekker 1280a line 5]
by few people, but all share in freedom. These are the grounds on which both groups dispute control of the constitution.

We must first grasp the limits people set for oligarchy and democracy, and what the just is in oligarchic and democratic terms. Everyone touches on something just, but
[Bekker 1280a line 10]
they go only so far and don't state the whole of what is just in the full sense. For example, the just is thought to be equality, and it is—but not for everyone, only for equals. Inequality too is thought to be just, and it is—but not for everyone, only for unequals. People leave out this qualification, “for whom,” and judge badly. The reason
[Bekker 1280a line 15]
is that they are judging their own case. Most people are poor judges of their own affairs. The just is for certain people, and it is divided in the same way between the things distributed and the people receiving them, as we said earlier in the Ethics. They agree about equality in the things, but disagree about equality in the people. This is mainly
[Bekker 1280a line 20]
for the reason just given: they judge their own affairs badly. It is also because both groups state something just up to a point, and think they are stating the just without qualification. One group thinks that if they are unequal in some respect, such as wealth, they are unequal in every respect. The other thinks that if they are equal in some respect, such as freedom, in every respect they are
[Bekker 1280a line 25]
equal.

But they don't state the most important point. If people formed a community and came together for the sake of possessions, their share in the city would match their share in the property. The oligarchic argument would then seem valid. (It wouldn't be just for someone who contributed one mina to have an equal share of the hundred minas with someone who
[Bekker 1280a line 30]
provided all the rest, either of the original sum or of what it earned.) But people didn't come together merely to live, but rather to live well. Otherwise there could be a city of slaves or other animals. In fact there isn't, because they don't share in happiness or in a life guided by choice. Nor did people come together for an alliance, so that
[Bekker 1280a line 35]
no one would wrong them, or for exchanges and dealings with one another. Otherwise the Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, and all people who have agreements with one another, would be citizens of a single city. They certainly have treaties about imports, agreements not to wrong one another,
[Bekker 1280a line 40]
and written terms of alliance. But offices for all concerning
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[Bekker 1280b line 1]
these purposes haven't been established in common.

Each has separate offices. Neither group is concerned about what sort of people the other should be, or that no one covered by the treaties should be unjust or have any wickedness. They care only that they don't wrong
[Bekker 1280b line 5]
one another. But those who care about good government examine political virtue and vice. This makes clear that a city truly deserving the name, and not just called a city for argument's sake, must concern itself with virtue. Otherwise the community becomes an alliance, differing only in location from other alliances of faraway
[Bekker 1280b line 10]
allies. The law becomes an agreement and, as Lycophron the professional teacher said, a guarantee of the just to one another, but not something able to make citizens good and just. It's clear that this is so. Even if someone brought the territories together so that the cities of Megara and
[Bekker 1280b line 15]
Corinth touched at their walls, they still wouldn't be one city. Not even if they gave their people the right to marry one another, though this is one of the forms of association specific to cities. Likewise, suppose some people lived separately, but not too far apart to associate, and had laws preventing them from wronging one another in
[Bekker 1280b line 20]
their exchanges. One might be a carpenter, another a farmer, another a shoemaker, and another something similar. Suppose they numbered ten thousand, but shared nothing except things like exchange and alliance. Even then they wouldn't yet be a city.

Why exactly is this? It certainly isn't because of a lack of closeness in their
[Bekker 1280b line 25]
association. Suppose they came together while sharing in this way, but each treated his own household as a city. They helped one another only against wrongdoers, as though they had a defensive alliance. Even so, they wouldn't seem a city to someone looking closely if their dealings were the same together as apart. Clearly, then,
[Bekker 1280b line 30]
a city isn't a community of place, formed to keep its members from wronging one another and to allow exchange. These things must be present for a city to exist. But even when all are present, that doesn't yet make a city. A city is a community of households and families in living well, for the sake of a complete and self-sufficient life.
[Bekker 1280b line 35]
Still, this won't happen unless they live in one and the same place and marry one another. That's why cities developed ties by marriage, brotherhoods, sacrifices, and shared pastimes. These are the work of friendship. The choice to live together is friendship. So the goal of a city is living well,
[Bekker 1280b line 40]
and these things serve that goal. Families and villages make a city through a
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[Bekker 1281a line 1]
community of complete and self-sufficient life.

This, we say, is living happily and nobly. So we must hold that the political community exists for noble actions, not just for living together. That's why those who contribute most to
[Bekker 1281a line 5]
such a community have a greater share in the city. Their share exceeds that of people equal or superior in freedom and ancestry but inferior in political virtue. It also exceeds that of people who surpass them in wealth but fall below them in virtue. That all those who dispute about constitutions have some part of the just
[Bekker 1281a line 10]
in what they say is clear from what we've said.

But there is a problem about what should be sovereign in the city. Should it be the multitude, the rich, the decent people, the single best person of all, or a tyrant? All these seem to involve difficulties. What if the poor, because they
[Bekker 1281a line 15]
are more numerous, divide up the property of the rich? Isn't that unjust? “After all, by Zeus, the sovereign body approved it as just.” Then what should we call the extreme of injustice? Again, after everything has been taken, if the majority divide up what belongs to the minority, clearly they destroy the city. But virtue doesn't destroy what
[Bekker 1281a line 20]
has it, nor does the just destroy a city. So clearly this law too can't be just. Further, all the tyrant's actions would have to be just. He uses force because he is stronger, just as the multitude does against the rich. But is it just for the fewer to rule
[Bekker 1281a line 25]
—the rich? Then if they do the same things, plundering and taking away the multitude's property, this is just—and so the other case is just too. Clearly, then, all these things are bad and not just. But should the decent people rule and be sovereign over everything? Then all the others must
[Bekker 1281a line 30]
be without honor, since they aren't honored with political offices. We call offices honors, and if the same people always hold office, the others must be without honor. But is it better for the single best person to rule? This is still more oligarchic, since more people are without honor. Perhaps someone might
[Bekker 1281a line 35]
say that it's bad for a human being, rather than law, to be sovereign at all, because his soul is subject to passions. But if it is law, and the law is oligarchic or democratic, what difference will that make to the problems raised? The results mentioned earlier will follow just the same.

We can leave the other questions for another discussion.
[Bekker 1281a line 40]
But the claim that the multitude should be sovereign rather than the few best people might seem to offer a solution. It also presents a problem, but perhaps contains some truth. The many, each of whom is
[Bekker 1281b]
[Bekker 1281b line 1]
not a good man,

may nevertheless be better than those few when they come together—not individually but as a whole. It's like dinners to which everyone contributes being better than those paid for by one person. Since there are many, each can have a share of virtue and good judgment in practical matters.
[Bekker 1281b line 5]
When they come together, the multitude can become like a single person with many feet, many hands, and many senses, and likewise with character and understanding. That's also why the many judge works of music and poetry better. Different parts are judged by different people. The whole
[Bekker 1281b line 10]
is judged by everyone together. But good men differ from each individual among the many in this way. Beautiful people are said to differ from those who aren't beautiful in the same way. So do figures painted with skill from real people. Features scattered separately are brought together into one. Taken separately, this person's eye may be finer than the painted eye, and
[Bekker 1281b line 15]
someone else's other feature finer than its painted counterpart.

Whether this difference between the many and the few good people is possible for every people and every multitude is unclear. Perhaps, by Zeus, it's clear that for some it is impossible. The same argument would apply to wild animals; and indeed, how do
[Bekker 1281b line 20]
some people differ from wild animals, so to speak? But nothing prevents what we've said from being true of some multitude. So these points could resolve the problem raised earlier, and the next one: over what should free people and the multitude of citizens be sovereign? By these we mean people who are neither
[Bekker 1281b line 25]
rich nor credited with any virtue. It's unsafe for them to share in the highest offices. Because of their injustice and lack of judgment, they must do wrong in some cases and make mistakes in others. But giving them no share or participation is dangerous. When there are many poor people without honor,
[Bekker 1281b line 30]
the city must be full of enemies. What remains is for them to share in deliberating and judging. That's why Solon and some other lawgivers assign them the election of officeholders and the review of their conduct, but don't allow them to hold office individually. For all of them,
[Bekker 1281b line 35]
when brought together, have adequate perception, and when mixed with better people they benefit cities. In the same way, impure food mixed with pure makes the whole more useful than the small amount of pure food alone. But each person separately is incomplete in his ability to judge.

### Book III, 1281b–1285a

This arrangement of the constitution raises a difficulty. The first is that
[Bekker 1281b line 40]
the person qualified to judge who has treated a patient correctly would seem to be the same person qualified to give treatment and cure the patient of the illness he has. That person is the doctor.

The same applies
[Bekker 1282a]
[Bekker 1282a line 1]
to other kinds of practical knowledge and skill. So, just as a doctor must answer for his work before doctors, other skilled workers must answer before people like themselves. There is the doctor who practices, the doctor who directs the work, and, third, the person educated about the skill. There are
[Bekker 1282a line 5]
people of this third kind in practically every skill. We allow educated people to judge no less than experts. Then choice would seem to work in the same way. Making the right choice is also the job of people who know: choosing a surveyor is the job of people who know surveying, and
[Bekker 1282a line 10]
choosing a ship's pilot is the job of people who know navigation. In some kinds of work and skill, some nonspecialists do have a share in the knowledge, but certainly no greater share than the experts. So, on this argument, the multitude should not be made sovereign over either the choice of officials or the examination of their accounts. But perhaps these points are not all correct.
[Bekker 1282a line 15]
The earlier argument counts against them, if the multitude is not too slavish. Each person will be a worse judge than the experts. But all together will be better or no worse. In some cases, too, the maker is neither the only judge nor the best. This holds wherever people without the skill also understand its products. For example,
[Bekker 1282a line 20]
a house is not understood only by its builder. The person who uses it will judge it better, and the person who uses it is the household manager. A pilot judges a rudder better than a carpenter does, and a dinner is judged by the diner, not the cook.

Someone might think this solves the difficulty well enough. But another difficulty follows from it.
[Bekker 1282a line 25]
It seems strange for inferior people to be sovereign over more important matters than decent people. Examining officials' accounts and choosing officials are matters of the greatest importance. In some constitutions, as we have said, these are assigned to the people. The assembly is sovereign over all such matters. Yet people take part in the assembly,
[Bekker 1282a line 30]
serve on the council, and act as jurors with small property qualifications and at any age, while treasurers, generals, and holders of the highest offices have large property qualifications. This difficulty too could be solved in the same way. Perhaps these arrangements are also right. For neither an individual juror, nor a council member, nor an assembly member
[Bekker 1282a line 35]
is a ruler. The law court, the council, and the people are. Each of the people just named is a part of these bodies. By a part I mean the council member, assembly member, and juror. So the multitude is rightly sovereign over more important matters. The people, the council, and the law court consist of many people. And the property qualification
[Bekker 1282a line 40]
of all of them together is greater than that of the people who hold high offices individually or in small groups. Let these points be settled
[Bekker 1282b]
[Bekker 1282b line 1]
in this way.

The difficulty mentioned first makes one thing clearer than anything else: correctly established laws should be sovereign. The ruler, whether one person or several, should be sovereign over the matters on which the laws cannot
[Bekker 1282b line 5]
speak precisely, because it is not easy to lay down general rules about everything. But what correctly established laws should be like is not yet clear. The earlier difficulty still remains. Laws must be bad or good, and just or unjust, at the same time and in the same way as the constitutions.
[Bekker 1282b line 10]
At least this is clear: laws must be established to fit the constitution. If that is so, laws that fit correct constitutions must be just, and laws that fit deviant constitutions must be unjust.

In every science and skill,
[Bekker 1282b line 15]
the goal is a good. The greatest good, in the fullest sense, is the goal of the most authoritative of them all, which is political expertise. The political good is the just, and that is the common advantage. Now everyone thinks the just is a kind of equality. Up to a point, people agree with the philosophical arguments in which
[Bekker 1282b line 20]
ethical questions have been settled. They say that the just is something assigned to certain people, and that equals should have equal shares. But we must not overlook what equality and inequality apply to. This raises a difficulty and calls for political philosophy. Someone might say that offices should be distributed unequally according to superiority in any good quality,
[Bekker 1282b line 25]
if people do not differ in any other way but are alike in everything else. People who differ, he might say, have different claims to what is just and what fits their worth. But if this is true, people who are superior in complexion, height, or any other good quality will have a larger share of political rights.
[Bekker 1282b line 30]
Or is the mistake here obvious? It is clear in the other sciences and abilities. Among flute players with equal skill, those of better birth should not get a larger share of the flutes. They will not play any better. The better instruments should go to the person who is better at the job. If
[Bekker 1282b line 35]
what we mean is not yet clear, it will become clear as we take it further. Suppose someone is better at flute playing but much worse in birth or beauty. Each of those may be a greater good than flute playing. I mean good birth and beauty. Even if,
[Bekker 1282b line 40]
proportionately, their superiority over flute playing is greater than his superiority as a flute player, he should still be given the better
[Bekker 1283a]
[Bekker 1283a line 1]
flutes.

For being richer or better born would have to improve the performance. Neither does.

Also, on this argument, every good would be comparable with every other good. For if a certain amount of size counts for more, then
[Bekker 1283a line 5]
size in general could compete with wealth and freedom too. So if one person stands out more in size than another does in virtue, and virtue in general is far superior to size, everything would be comparable. For if this much size is better than that much virtue, clearly some amount is equal to it. But this is impossible.
[Bekker 1283a line 10]
So it is reasonable that, in political matters too, people do not claim offices on the basis of every inequality. If some are slow and others fast, that is no reason for some to have more and others less. The difference between them gets its reward in athletic contests. Instead, the things from which a city is made
[Bekker 1283a line 15]
must be the basis of the claims. That is why people of good birth, free people, and rich people reasonably claim honor. The citizens must be free and must contribute property. A city could not consist entirely of people without resources, any more than it could consist of slaves. But if these qualities are needed, clearly
[Bekker 1283a line 20]
justice and political virtue are needed too. A city cannot be run without these either. The difference is that without the first qualities a city cannot exist, while without the latter it cannot be run well.

So, as far as the city's existence goes, all or at least some of these qualities would seem to support valid claims. But for a good life,
[Bekker 1283a line 25]
education and virtue would have the strongest claim, as we said earlier. People equal in only one respect should not have equal shares in everything, and people unequal in one respect should not have unequal shares in everything. So all constitutions of these kinds must be deviations. We have already said
[Bekker 1283a line 30]
that everyone has some justice on their side in these disputes, but not everyone is right without qualification. The rich make their claim because they have a larger share of the land, and the land is common property. Also, they are generally more trustworthy in contracts. Free people and people of good birth make their claim as closely related groups. Fuller citizenship
[Bekker 1283a line 35]
belongs to people of better birth than to people of low birth, and good birth is honored in each people's own country. Also, people from better families are likely to be better, since good birth is the virtue of a family. In the same way, we will say that virtue too has a just claim. We say that justice is a virtue of social life, and it must be followed by
[Bekker 1283a line 40]
all the other virtues. But the greater number also has a claim against the smaller number. They are stronger, richer, and better, if the larger group is taken together and compared with the smaller.

So,
[Bekker 1283b]
[Bekker 1283b line 1]
if all these groups were in one city—I mean, for example, good people, rich people, people of good birth, and also some other body of citizens—would there be a dispute about who should rule, or not? In each of the constitutions we have mentioned, there is no dispute
[Bekker 1283b line 5]
about the decision on who should rule. They differ from one another in who is sovereign: one is governed by rich people, another by good men, and each of the others differs in the same way. Still, let us consider how to decide when these groups all exist at the same time. If the
[Bekker 1283b line 10]
people with virtue are very few in number, how should we draw the distinction? Should we judge how few they are in relation to their task—whether they can manage the city—or ask whether there are enough of them to make a city by themselves? There is a difficulty for everyone who disputes political honors. For it might seem
[Bekker 1283b line 15]
that those who claim the right to rule because of wealth have no just argument. The same goes for those who claim it because of birth. For if, in turn, one person is richer than everyone else, then clearly, on the same principle of justice, that one person must rule them all. The same goes for someone whose birth is superior to that of those claiming the right to rule
[Bekker 1283b line 20]
because they are free. Perhaps the same result will follow in aristocracies on the basis of virtue. If one man is better than the other good men in the citizen body, he must be sovereign on the same principle of justice. Suppose the multitude should be sovereign because it is stronger than
[Bekker 1283b line 25]
the few. Then if one person, or several who are fewer than the multitude, are stronger than the rest, they should be sovereign instead. All this seems to show that none of these standards is correct as a basis for claiming that they should rule and the others should be ruled by them,
[Bekker 1283b line 30]
every one of them. For the multitudes could make a fairly just argument against those who claim to be sovereign over the citizen body on the basis of virtue, and equally against those who claim it on the basis of wealth. Nothing prevents the multitude from sometimes being better and richer than the few, not individually but
[Bekker 1283b line 35]
all together. So this also gives a way to answer the difficulty that some people investigate and raise. Some ask whether a lawgiver who wants to establish the most correct laws should legislate for the advantage of the better people or of the greater number, when the situation just described occurs.
[Bekker 1283b line 40]
What is right must be understood as equal treatment. Equal treatment is right when it serves the advantage of the whole city and the common advantage of the citizens. Someone who shares in ruling and being ruled
[Bekker 1284a]
[Bekker 1284a line 1]
is a citizen in general,

but the citizen differs with each constitution. Under the best constitution, a citizen is someone able and willing to be ruled and to rule for a life in accordance with virtue.

Suppose one person has far superior virtue, or several people do, though not
[Bekker 1284a line 5]
enough to make up a city. Suppose all the others' virtue and political ability cannot be compared with theirs, if there are several. If there is only one, the comparison is with that one person's virtue and ability. Such people should no longer be treated as part of the city. They will be wronged if they are judged worthy of equal shares, when they are so unequal in
[Bekker 1284a line 10]
virtue and political ability. Such a person would naturally be like a god among human beings. So it is clear that legislation must concern people equal in birth and ability. There is no law for people like these: they are themselves a law. It would be ridiculous for anyone to legislate
[Bekker 1284a line 15]
for them. They might say what Antisthenes said the lions said when the hares made speeches and demanded that everyone have an equal share. This is also why democratic cities establish ostracism, or temporary banishment. They seem to pursue equality more than anything else,
[Bekker 1284a line 20]
so they ostracized people thought to have superior power because of wealth, many friends, or some other political strength, and removed them from the city for set periods. The story says that the Argonauts left Heracles behind for a similar reason. The Argo would not carry him
[Bekker 1284a line 25]
with the other sailors because he far surpassed them. So we should not think that people who criticize tyranny and Periander's advice to Thrasybulus are simply right in their criticism. They say Periander said nothing to the messenger sent to ask his advice, but cut off the
[Bekker 1284a line 30]
ears of grain that stood out and made the field level. The messenger did not understand why he did this, but reported what happened. Thrasybulus then understood that he must eliminate the men who stood out. This does not benefit only tyrants, and tyrants are not the only ones who do it.
[Bekker 1284a line 35]
The same applies to oligarchies and democracies. In a way, ostracism has the same effect as cutting down those who stand out and sending them into exile. Those who hold power also do the same to cities and nations. The Athenians, for example, did it to the people of Samos,
[Bekker 1284a line 40]
Chios, and Lesbos. As soon as they had firm control of their empire, they humbled them, contrary to the treaties.

The Persian
[Bekker 1284b]
[Bekker 1284b line 1]
king often cut down the Medes, Babylonians, and others who were proud because they had once held power.

The problem applies generally to all constitutions, including the correct ones. Deviant constitutions
[Bekker 1284b line 5]
do this with an eye to their own advantage, but the same applies to those that look to the common good. This is clear in other skills and sciences too. A painter would not let a figure have a foot out of proportion, even if
[Bekker 1284b line 10]
it were exceptionally beautiful. Nor would a shipbuilder allow an oversized stern or any other part of a ship. Nor would a chorus trainer let someone sing with the chorus whose voice was louder and more beautiful than the whole chorus. So, for this reason, nothing prevents monarchs from agreeing with cities, provided their own rule is beneficial
[Bekker 1284b line 15]
to the cities when they act in this way. So the argument for ostracism has some political justice on its side when it concerns acknowledged kinds of superiority. It is better, then, for the lawgiver to organize the constitution from the start so that it does not need this kind of treatment. The next-best course, if the situation arises, is to try with some such
[Bekker 1284b line 20]
remedy to put things right. But that is not what happened in the cities. They did not look to the advantage of their own constitution. Instead, they used ostracism for factional purposes. In deviant constitutions it is clear that ostracism serves their particular advantage and is just in that particular sense. Perhaps it is also clear that it is not in every sense
[Bekker 1284b line 25]
just. But in the best constitution it raises a serious difficulty. This does not concern superiority in other goods, like strength, wealth, or having many friends. Rather, if someone is exceptionally virtuous, what should be done? Surely people would not say that such a person should be expelled and removed.
[Bekker 1284b line 30]
But neither should they rule over him. That would be much like claiming to rule over Zeus by dividing up the offices. So the only course left, which seems natural, is for everyone to obey such a person willingly. People like this should therefore be kings in their cities for life.

[Bekker 1284b line 35]
After these arguments, it may be a good idea to move on and examine kingship. We say it is one of the correct constitutions. We must examine whether rule by a king benefits a city and territory that are to be run well. Would some other constitution be better,
[Bekker 1284b line 40]
or would kingship benefit some cities but not others? First we must distinguish whether there is just one kind of it or several
[Bekker 1285a]
[Bekker 1285a line 1]
different kinds.

It is easy to see that it includes several kinds, and that the way rule is exercised is not the same in all of them. Kingship in the Spartan constitution seems the clearest example of kingship under law. But it is not sovereign over everything.
[Bekker 1285a line 5]
When the king leaves the country, he leads in matters of war. Matters concerning the gods are also assigned to the kings. So this kingship is like a permanent generalship with full command. The king has no authority to put someone to death, except in certain circumstances, as among the ancients on
[Bekker 1285a line 10]
military expeditions, under the law of force. Homer makes this clear. Agamemnon put up with insults in the assemblies, but once they had marched out he had authority even to kill. At any rate, he says,
"Whoever I find away from battle …
… he will not
be safe from the dogs and birds;
for death is in my hands."
(Hom. Il. 2.391)

### Book III, 1285a–1288b

So this is one
[Bekker 1285a line 15]
kind of kingship: generalship for life. Some offices of this kind are hereditary, and others are filled by choice. Alongside this is another kind of monarchy, found in the kingships of some non-Greek peoples. All these have power much like tyrannies, but they are lawful and hereditary. Because
[Bekker 1285a line 20]
non-Greek peoples are by nature more slavish in character than Greeks, and the peoples of Asia more so than those of Europe, they accept a master's rule without resentment. So these kingships are like tyrannies in this respect, but secure because they are hereditary and lawful. Their guard is also a king's guard,
[Bekker 1285a line 25]
not a tyrant's, for the same reason. Citizens guard kings with their weapons, while foreign troops guard tyrants. Kings rule by law over willing subjects, while tyrants rule over unwilling subjects. So the first have a guard supplied by the citizens, and the second have a guard against the citizens.

These, then, are two kinds
[Bekker 1285a line 30]
of monarchy. Another is the kind that existed among the ancient Greeks, whose rulers they call aisymnetes. Put simply, this is an elective tyranny. It differs from the non-Greek kind not in being unlawful, but only in not being hereditary. Some held this office for life, others for set
[Bekker 1285a line 35]
periods or tasks. For example, the people of Mytilene once chose Pittacus to deal with the exiles led by Antimenides and the poet Alcaeus. Alcaeus makes it clear in one of his drinking songs that they chose Pittacus as tyrant. He criticizes them: "Lowborn Pittacus, over their spiritless,
[Bekker 1285b]
[Bekker 1285b line 1]
ill-fated city, they made tyrant, all together loudly praising him."

These forms of rule are and were like tyrannies because they involve mastery, but like kingships because the rulers are chosen and the subjects willing. A fourth kind of kingly monarchy is found in the heroic
[Bekker 1285b line 5]
period. These kingships were willingly accepted, hereditary, and lawful. The first kings became benefactors of the multitude through skills or war, or by bringing people together or providing land. So they became kings over willing subjects, and those who succeeded them inherited the office. They had authority to lead in war
[Bekker 1285b line 10]
and to conduct sacrifices that did not belong to priests. They also judged lawsuits. Some did this without swearing an oath, others under oath. The oath consisted in raising the scepter. So in ancient times they ruled continuously over affairs in the city, within the country, and beyond its borders. Later,
[Bekker 1285b line 15]
the kings gave up some powers, and the masses took others away. In the other cities, only the sacrifices were left to the kings. Where there was still something worth calling kingship, they had only the command of military operations beyond the borders.

[Bekker 1285b line 20]
These, then, are the kinds of kingship, four in number. One is that of the heroic period. It was accepted willingly, but concerned certain set matters. The king was both general and judge, and had authority over matters concerning the gods. The second is the non-Greek kind. This is hereditary rule involving mastery,
[Bekker 1285b line 25]
under law. The third is what they call rule by an aisymnetes. This is elective tyranny. The fourth is the Spartan kind. Put simply, this is permanent hereditary generalship. These kinds differ from one another in this way. A fifth kind of kingship exists when, over everything,
[Bekker 1285b line 30]
one person is sovereign, as each nation and each city is over its common affairs. It is organized along the lines of household management. Just as household management is a kind of kingship over a household, absolute kingship is household management of a city and of one or more nations.

So there are, roughly speaking, two kinds of kingship for us to examine: this one
[Bekker 1285b line 35]
and the Spartan one. Most of the others lie between them. They have authority over fewer things than absolute kingship, but more than Spartan kingship. So the inquiry is roughly about two questions. One is whether it benefits cities to have a permanent general, either by heredity or by taking turns,

[Bekker 1286a]
[Bekker 1286a line 1]
or whether it does not. The other is whether it benefits them for one person to be sovereign over everything, or whether it does not. Examining generalship of this kind is more a matter of laws than of a constitution, since it can exist in every constitution.
[Bekker 1286a line 5]
So let us leave the first question aside. The remaining kind of kingship is a form of constitution, so we must study it and go through the difficulties it involves. The starting point of the inquiry is this: is it better to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws?

People who
[Bekker 1286a line 10]
think it is better to be ruled by a king believe that laws speak only in general terms, and do not give directions for particular situations as they arise. So in any skill, following written rules is foolish. In Egypt, doctors are allowed to change the treatment after four days. If they do so earlier, it is at their own risk. Clearly, then,
[Bekker 1286a line 15]
a constitution based on written rules and laws is not the best, for the same reason. Still, rulers too must have that general principle to guide them. What has no emotional element at all is better than what has it by nature. Law does not have it, but every human mind must
[Bekker 1286a line 20]
have it. Yet someone might say that, to make up for this, the ruler will deliberate better about individual cases. So it is clear that he must be a lawgiver, and that there must be established laws. But they must not be authoritative where they miss the mark, though they must be authoritative in other matters. Where law cannot judge either
[Bekker 1286a line 25]
at all or well, should the one best person rule, or should everyone? Even now people meet to hear lawsuits, deliberate, and make decisions, and all these decisions concern individual cases. Any one of them, considered alone, may be worse. But the city consists of many people. Just as a meal to which everyone contributes
[Bekker 1286a line 30]
is better than a single meal supplied by one person, so the masses judge many matters better than any one person.

Also, a large quantity is less easily corrupted. Just as a greater amount of water is harder to spoil, so the multitude is harder to corrupt than the few. When one person is overcome by anger or some other emotion of that kind, his judgment must be spoiled.
[Bekker 1286a line 35]
But in the other case it is difficult for everyone to become angry and go wrong at once. Let the multitude be free people who do nothing against the law except in matters where the law must fall short. If this is not easy to achieve in a large group, still, suppose there are several good men who are also good citizens. Is one person harder to corrupt as
[Bekker 1286a line 40]
ruler, or are several good people,
[Bekker 1286b]
[Bekker 1286b line 1]
all of them good?

Surely it is clear that the larger number is. But they will form factions, while the one person will not. The answer to this may be that they are good in character, just like that one person. If rule by several men, all good, should be
[Bekker 1286b line 5]
called aristocracy, and rule by one kingship, cities should prefer aristocracy to kingship. This holds whether the ruling body has an armed force or not, provided several similar people can be found. Perhaps this is also why people were ruled by kings in earlier times: it was rare to find men far superior in virtue, especially when they were then
[Bekker 1286b line 10]
living in small cities. Also, they made men kings because of benefits they had provided, and providing benefits is the work of good men. But when there came to be many people alike in virtue, they no longer put up with kingship. They sought something shared and established a constitution. When they became worse and made money from public resources,
[Bekker 1286b line 15]
it is reasonable to suppose that oligarchies arose from something like this. For they made wealth the basis of honor. From these they first changed to tyrannies, and from tyrannies to democracy. By constantly concentrating power in fewer hands because of shameful greed, they made the multitude stronger, until it attacked and democracies arose.
[Bekker 1286b line 20]
Since the cities have also grown larger, perhaps it is no longer even easy for any constitution other than democracy to arise.

Suppose someone holds that kingship is best for cities. What will happen with the king's children? Should his family also rule as kings? But if they turn out to be just any sort of people,
[Bekker 1286b line 25]
that is harmful. Yet, it may be said, although he has the authority, he will not hand it over to his children. But it is not easy to believe that. It is difficult and demands greater virtue than human nature allows. There is also a difficulty about his armed force. Should the person who is to be king have a force around him with which he can
[Bekker 1286b line 30]
compel those unwilling to obey? Otherwise, how can he manage his rule? Even if his authority is under law, and he does nothing against the law merely because he wants to, he must still have a force with which to protect the laws. Perhaps it is not difficult
[Bekker 1286b line 35]
to settle the question for a king of this kind. He should have a force, but it should be strong enough to overcome any single person or several together, yet weaker than the multitude. This is how the ancients supplied guards when they appointed someone over the city whom they called an aisymnetes or a tyrant. And when Dionysius asked for guards, someone advised
[Bekker 1286b line 40]
the people of Syracuse to give him that number of guards.

[Bekker 1287a]
[Bekker 1287a line 1]
The argument has now reached the king who does everything as he wants, and we must examine him. For the so-called king under law is not, as we said, a form of constitution. In every constitution there can be
[Bekker 1287a line 5]
a generalship for life, for example in democracy and aristocracy. Many people make one person sovereign over the administration. An office of this kind exists at Epidamnus, and at Opus too, though with somewhat less power. As for what is called absolute kingship, the king rules everything as
[Bekker 1287a line 10]
he wishes. Some people think that one person's sovereignty over all the citizens goes against nature where the city consists of similar people. People who are alike by nature must have the same claim to what is just and the same worth by nature. So if unequal people have equal food or
[Bekker 1287a line 15]
clothing, and this harms their bodies, the same holds for honors. Likewise, it is harmful for equals to have unequal shares. That is why it is no more just for anyone to rule than to be ruled, and the same goes for taking turns. But this is already law, since an orderly arrangement is law. So it is more desirable for law to rule than for any one of the citizens
[Bekker 1287a line 20]
to do so. By the same argument, even if it is better for certain people to rule, they should be appointed guardians of the laws and servants of the laws. There must be some offices, but these people say it is not just for this to mean one person, when everyone is alike. Moreover, whatever the law seems unable to determine, a human being
[Bekker 1287a line 25]
would also be unable to know. But the law gives rulers the training they need, then leaves the remaining matters to them to judge and manage with the fairest judgment. It also allows them to correct anything that experience shows to be better than the established rules. So someone who calls for law to rule seems to call for god and reason
[Bekker 1287a line 30]
alone to rule. Someone who calls for a human being to rule adds a wild animal too. Desire is like that, and anger twists rulers, even the best men. That is why law is reason without appetite. The example drawn from skills seems false: that treatment by written rules is bad, and that it is better to use
[Bekker 1287a line 35]
people who have the skills. They do not act against reason out of friendship. Instead, they earn their pay by curing the sick. But people in political offices often act out of spite or favoritism. In fact, when people suspect doctors of having been won over by their enemies to destroy them
[Bekker 1287a line 40]
for profit, they would then prefer treatment according to written rules.

Moreover, people call in help for themselves:
[Bekker 1287b]
[Bekker 1287b line 1]
doctors, when ill, call in other doctors, and athletic trainers, when training, bring in other trainers. They cannot judge truly because they are judging their own affairs and are under the influence of emotion. So it is clear that people who seek the just seek what is impartial. For law is what is
[Bekker 1287b line 5]
impartial. Also, laws based on customs are more authoritative, and concern more authoritative matters, than written laws. So even if a human ruler is more reliable than written laws, he is not more reliable than laws based on custom.

Besides, it is not easy for one person to oversee many things. So he will need to appoint several rulers under him.
[Bekker 1287b line 10]
What difference does it make whether this arrangement exists right from the start or the one person sets it up in this way? We made this point earlier too. If a man's goodness gives him a right to rule because he is better, two good men are better still than one. That is what is meant by
"Two going together"
(Hom. Il. 10.224) and by Agamemnon's prayer,
[Bekker 1287b line 15]
"If only I had ten such advisers."
(Hom. Il. 2.372) Even now officials, like the juror, have authority to judge certain matters that the law cannot determine. Where the law can determine them, no one disputes that it would rule and judge best. But some matters can be covered by laws, while
[Bekker 1287b line 20]
others cannot. These are what make people raise difficulties and ask whether it is better for the best law to rule or for the best man. Matters that people deliberate about cannot be legislated for. So they do not dispute that a human being must judge such matters. They dispute that it should be only
[Bekker 1287b line 25]
one person rather than many.

For each ruler, trained by the law, judges well. It might seem strange if one person could see better, judging with two eyes and two ears and acting with two feet and hands, than many people with many. Even now monarchs provide many eyes
[Bekker 1287b line 30]
for themselves, and ears, hands, and feet. They make people friendly to their rule and to themselves their fellow rulers. If these people are not friends, they will not act according to the monarch's wishes. But if they are friends of both him and his rule, a friend is an equal and a similar person. So if he thinks these people should rule, he thinks equals and similar people should rule
[Bekker 1287b line 35]
equally. These, roughly, are the arguments made by those who challenge kingship.

But perhaps these arguments apply in this way to some people, and not to others. Some people are by nature suited to mastery, others to kingship, and others to political rule. Different arrangements are just and beneficial for different people. But no one is suited to tyranny under
[Bekker 1287b line 40]
nature's order, or to any of the other constitutions that are deviations. These come about contrary to nature.

From what we have said,
[Bekker 1288a]
[Bekker 1288a line 1]
it is clear that among similar and equal people it is neither beneficial nor just for one person to be sovereign over everyone. This holds whether there are no laws and he acts as law himself, or there are laws. It holds whether he is good and rules good people, or is not good and rules people who are not good. It holds even if in virtue he is
[Bekker 1288a line 5]
better, except in a certain way. We must say what that way is. We have already said something about it earlier.

First we must define what makes a people suited to kingship, aristocracy, or polity, lawful government by the many. A people suited to kingship is one that naturally produces a family superior in virtue for political leadership. A people suited to aristocracy
[Bekker 1288a line 10]
is one that naturally produces a body able to be ruled as free people by those whose virtue equips them to lead in political rule. A people suited to polity is one in which a body capable of war naturally develops, able to be ruled and to rule under a law that assigns, according to worth,
[Bekker 1288a line 15]
offices to the well-off. Suppose a whole family, or even one individual among the others, becomes outstanding in virtue. Their virtue surpasses that of all the others. Then it is just for that family to be royal and sovereign over everything, or for that individual to be king. As we said earlier,
[Bekker 1288a line 20]
this follows not only from the principle of justice usually put forward by those who establish constitutions, whether aristocratic, oligarchic, or democratic. All base their claims on superiority, but not on the same superiority. It also follows from what was said before. Killing or
[Bekker 1288a line 25]
exiling such a person or voting to banish him is not fitting. Nor is expecting him to be ruled in turn. A part is not naturally superior to the whole, but that is what has happened with someone whose superiority is so great. So the only course left is to obey such a person and let him be sovereign, not in turn but without qualification.
[Bekker 1288a line 30]
Let this settle our account of kingship: what different kinds it has, whether it benefits cities or not, which cities it benefits, and how.

We say that there are three correct constitutions. Of these, the best must be the one managed by the best people. This is a constitution in which
[Bekker 1288a line 35]
either one individual, a whole family, or a body of people surpasses everyone in virtue, some able to be ruled and others to rule for the most desirable life. In our first arguments, we showed that the virtue of a man and that of a citizen of the best city must be the same. So it is clear that in the same way
[Bekker 1288a line 40]
and by the same means a man becomes good and someone could organize a city ruled by an aristocracy or a king.

So
[Bekker 1288b]
[Bekker 1288b line 1]
the education and habits that make a good man will be roughly the same as those that make a person fit for political rule and kingship. Now that these things have been settled, we must try to discuss the best constitution: how it naturally comes about and how it can be established.
[Bekker 1288b line 5]
So anyone who intends to carry out a suitable inquiry into it must do so.

### Book IV, 1288b–1291b

[Bekker 1288b]
[Bekker 1288b line 10]
In every art and science that doesn't deal with just one part of a subject but covers a whole field, a single science studies what suits each kind of thing. Physical training, for example, studies which exercise benefits which body, and which exercise is best (for a body with the best natural condition and resources, the best exercise
[Bekker 1288b line 15]
must be the right one). It also studies which single exercise suits most people alike (this too is the work of physical training). And if someone doesn't want the condition or knowledge needed for athletic competition, the trainer and the expert in physical training still have the job of preparing him for that lesser ability. We see the same thing
[Bekker 1288b line 20]
in medicine, shipbuilding, clothing, and every other art. So clearly the same science must study the best constitution: what it is, and what form would best meet our wishes if no outside obstacle stood in the way. It must also study which constitution suits which people (for many
[Bekker 1288b line 25]
may find it impossible to achieve the best. So a good lawgiver and a genuine statesman must know both the best constitution without qualification and the best under given conditions). Third, it must study a constitution based on an assumption (for it must be able to study a given constitution: how it could first come into being, and, once established,
[Bekker 1288b line 30]
how it could last the longest. I mean, for example, a city that happens to have neither the best constitution, because it lacks even the necessary resources, nor the best one possible with what it has, but some worse one). Besides all these, the constitution best suited to all cities
[Bekker 1288b line 35]
must be known. Most people who pronounce on constitutions, even if they speak well on other matters, miss what is useful. We must study not just the best constitution but also the possible one, and likewise the one that is easier to achieve and more widely suited to all cities. As things stand, the most perfect constitution, which needs abundant
[Bekker 1288b line 40]
resources, is the only kind some seek. Others propose something more generally applicable, but reject existing constitutions. The Spartan constitution
[Bekker 1289a]
[Bekker 1289a line 1]
or some other one is what they praise.

We should propose an arrangement that people can easily be persuaded to accept and can share in, starting from their present conditions. For correcting a constitution is no smaller task than building one from the start, just as relearning
[Bekker 1289a line 5]
is no smaller task than learning from the start. So, besides the things mentioned, a statesman must also be able to help existing constitutions, as we said earlier. This is impossible if he doesn't know how many kinds of constitution there are. Some now think there is just one democracy and one oligarchy. But that isn't
[Bekker 1289a line 10]
true. So we must know the differences among constitutions, how many there are, and how many ways they can be combined. After this, the same practical wisdom must also identify the best laws and those that suit each constitution. Laws must be made to fit constitutions, and everyone does make them that way, not constitutions
[Bekker 1289a line 15]
to fit laws. A constitution is a city's arrangement of its offices: how they are distributed, what is sovereign in the constitution, and what the aim of each community is. Laws are distinct from the provisions that define the constitution. They are the rules by which rulers must rule and guard against those who
[Bekker 1289a line 20]
break them. So clearly, even for making laws, we must understand the differences between constitutions and the definition of each. The same laws can't benefit all oligarchies or all democracies, if several kinds, not just one democracy and one oligarchy alone,
[Bekker 1289a line 25]
really exist.

In our first investigation of constitutions, we distinguished three correct constitutions: kingship, aristocracy, and polity, lawful government by the many. We also distinguished three deviations from these: tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, and democracy
[Bekker 1289a line 30]
from polity. We have already discussed aristocracy and kingship (for studying the best constitution is the same as discussing the forms bearing these names. Each aims to be established on the basis of virtue, with the necessary resources). Also, how aristocracy and kingship differ from each other, and when
[Bekker 1289a line 35]
kingship should be accepted, were explained earlier. What remains is to discuss polity, the form called by the name shared by all constitutions, and the other constitutions: oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. We can also see which wrong form is worst and which ranks second. Necessarily,
[Bekker 1289a line 40]
the worst departure is from the constitution that ranks first and is most divine. Kingship must either have the name alone without actually
[Bekker 1289b]
[Bekker 1289b line 1]
being kingship,

or rest on the great superiority of the man who is king. So tyranny, being worst, must be farthest from a constitution. Oligarchy comes second (for aristocracy is very far removed from this constitution), and the most moderate is
[Bekker 1289b line 5]
democracy. One of the earlier thinkers has already given this verdict, but not with the same point in view as us. He judged that, when all the constitutions are decent—for example, a good oligarchy and the others—democracy is worst, but when they are bad, it is best. We say that these constitutions are altogether mistaken,
[Bekker 1289b line 10]
and that it isn't right to call one oligarchy better than another, but rather less bad. Still, let's leave that sort of judgment aside for now. First we must distinguish how many varieties of constitution there are, if democracy and oligarchy each have several kinds. Next, which is the most widely applicable and
[Bekker 1289b line 15]
which is the most desirable after the best constitution? And if there happens to be another constitution that is aristocratic and well organized but doesn't suit most cities, what is it? Then, among the other constitutions, which is desirable for which people? (Perhaps democracy is more necessary than oligarchy for some, and oligarchy more than democracy for others.)
[Bekker 1289b line 20]
After that, we must ask how someone who wants these constitutions should establish them. I mean each kind of democracy and, in turn, each kind of oligarchy. Finally, once we have discussed all these as briefly as we can, we must try to examine what destroys and what preserves constitutions,
[Bekker 1289b line 25]
both in general and for each one separately, and what causes most naturally bring these things about.

There are several constitutions because every city has several parts. First, we see that all cities are made up of households. Next, among this
[Bekker 1289b line 30]
population, some must be well-off, some poor, and some in the middle. Among both the well-off and the poor, some have heavy arms and some are unarmed. We see that some of the people are farmers, some work in trade, and some are manual workers. The notables also differ in wealth and in the size
[Bekker 1289b line 35]
of their property: for example, in their ability to keep horses (for this isn't easy without wealth. That is why, in ancient times, cities whose strength lay in cavalry had oligarchies. In wars with neighboring cities they fought on horseback. The Eretrians and Chalcidians did this, as did the Magnesians settled beside
[Bekker 1289b line 40]
the Maeander, and many other Asian peoples). Besides differences in wealth, there are differences in birth and
[Bekker 1290a]
[Bekker 1290a line 1]
virtue,

and any other such distinction mentioned as a part of a city in our discussion of aristocracy. For there we distinguished how many necessary parts every city has. Sometimes all these parts share in the constitution, sometimes
[Bekker 1290a line 5]
fewer, and sometimes more. So clearly there must be several constitutions differing in kind from one another, since these parts themselves differ in kind. A constitution is the arrangement of offices. Everyone distributes these either according to the power of those taking part or according to some equality they
[Bekker 1290a line 10]
share. I mean, for example, an equality among the poor, among the well-off, or common to both. So there must be as many constitutions as there are arrangements based on the superior position and the differences of the city's parts.

People generally think there are two constitutions. Just as winds are said to be either north or south winds, and
[Bekker 1290a line 15]
the others deviations from these, so there are said to be two constitutions: democracy and oligarchy. They class aristocracy as a kind of oligarchy, since it is a sort of rule by a few, and the constitution called polity as democracy. This is like classing the west wind with the north wind, and the east wind with the south wind. It is the same
[Bekker 1290a line 20]
with patterns of musical notes, called modes, according to some people. There too they set out two kinds, Dorian and Phrygian, and call the other arrangements either Dorian or Phrygian. This, then, is the usual way people understand constitutions. But the division we made is truer and better: there are two
[Bekker 1290a line 25]
or one that are well organized, and the others are deviations—some from the well-balanced musical mode, others from the best constitution. The tighter and more master-like constitutions are oligarchic, while the looser and softer ones are democratic.

[Bekker 1290a line 30]
We shouldn't define democracy simply as a constitution where the majority is sovereign, as some people now tend to do (for in oligarchies too, and everywhere, the larger part is sovereign). Nor should we define oligarchy as a constitution where a few are sovereign. Suppose there were thirteen hundred people in all, and a thousand of them were rich,
[Bekker 1290a line 35]
and didn't let the three hundred share in office, though they were poor free people and like them in other respects. No one would say that these people lived under a democracy. Likewise, if a few poor people were stronger than the larger number of well-off people, no one would call this an oligarchy either, if the others, who were
[Bekker 1290a line 40]
rich, had no share in public honors.

So it is better to say that
[Bekker 1290b]
[Bekker 1290b line 1]
there is democracy when the free are sovereign, and oligarchy when the rich are. But it happens that the former are many and the latter few, since many people are free and few are rich. If offices were distributed by height, as
[Bekker 1290b line 5]
some say happens in Ethiopia, or by beauty, there would still be an oligarchy. For the number of beautiful people and tall people alike is small. Yet these features alone aren't enough to define these constitutions. Since both the people and the oligarchy have several parts, we must make a further distinction. If
[Bekker 1290b line 10]
a few free people rule a larger number who aren't free, that isn't democracy. This happens in Apollonia on the Ionian Sea and in Thera. In each city the men of outstanding noble birth who first settled the colonies held public honors. They were few among many. Nor is it democracy if the rich rule because they
[Bekker 1290b line 15]
outnumber the others, as in Colophon long ago (for there most people owned large properties before the war against the Lydians). Rather, there is democracy when the free and poor, who are the majority, are sovereign in government, and oligarchy when the rich and better-born,
[Bekker 1290b line 20]
who are few, are sovereign.

We have now said that there are several constitutions, and why. Let's say why there are more than those we have mentioned, what they are, and why they exist, starting from the point we made earlier. For we agree that every city has not one part but several.
[Bekker 1290b line 25]
Suppose we wanted to identify the kinds of animal. First we would set out the parts every animal must have (for example, some sense organs, parts for processing and receiving food, such as the mouth and stomach, and also the parts each animal uses to move). Suppose these were the only parts, but there were
[Bekker 1290b line 30]
differences among them. I mean, for example, several kinds of mouth, stomach, sense organs, and parts used for movement. The number of combinations would necessarily produce several kinds of animal. For the same animal can't have several different types of mouth, or of ears either. So when
[Bekker 1290b line 35]
all the possible combinations of these are identified, they will produce kinds of animal. There will be as many kinds of animal as there are combinations of the necessary parts. The same applies to the constitutions we have mentioned. For cities too consist of many parts, not one, as we have often said. One
[Bekker 1290b line 40]
is the group concerned with food, those called farmers,

[Bekker 1291a]
[Bekker 1291a line 1]
and a second is the group called manual workers (these work in the crafts without which a city can't be inhabited. Some of these crafts must exist out of necessity, others for luxury or living well). A third is the trading group (by the trading group I mean
[Bekker 1291a line 5]
those who spend their time selling and buying, in wholesale and retail trade). A fourth is the hired laborers, and a fifth the group that fights to defend the city. This is as necessary as any of the others if people are not to become slaves to attackers. For surely it is impossible for a community that is by nature enslaved to deserve the name of city.
[Bekker 1291a line 10]
A city is self-sufficient, and what is enslaved isn't self-sufficient. That is why the account of this in the Republic is clever but inadequate. Socrates says that a city consists of four groups that are most necessary: a weaver, a farmer, a shoemaker, and a builder. Then he adds more, because these aren't self-sufficient:
[Bekker 1291a line 15]
a smith, people who look after the necessary livestock, and also a wholesale and a retail trader. All these make up the first city, as though every city were established for necessities rather than for the noble, and needed shoemakers as much as farmers. As for the fighting force,
[Bekker 1291a line 20]
he doesn't give it a place until the territory expands, encroaches on that of its neighbors, and brings them to war. Yet even among the four partners, or however many there are, someone must distribute and decide what is just. So suppose we count the soul as part of an animal
[Bekker 1291a line 25]
more truly than the body. Likewise, we should count these groups as parts of cities more truly than those serving necessary uses. They are the military group, those administering justice in the law courts, and those who deliberate. Deliberation calls for political understanding. Whether these functions belong to separate people or to the same people makes no difference
[Bekker 1291a line 30]
to the argument. For the same people often serve as heavily armed soldiers and work as farmers. So if both these groups and those others are to be considered parts of the city, clearly the heavily armed soldiers are a necessary part of it.

A seventh part is the group that serves the city with its property, whom we call the well-off. An eighth is the group that performs public services
[Bekker 1291a line 35]
and serves in offices, if a city can't exist without rulers. So there must be people able to rule and to provide this service for the city either continually or in turn. The remaining groups are those we happened to define just now: the group that deliberates and the one that judges
[Bekker 1291a line 40]
what is just between people in dispute. If cities must have these functions, and have them carried out well and justly,

[Bekker 1291b]
[Bekker 1291b line 1]
there must also be some people who share in the virtue of statesmen. Many people think the same individuals can have the other abilities: for example, that the same people can defend the city, farm, practice crafts, and also deliberate
[Bekker 1291b line 5]
and judge. Everyone also claims to have virtue, and thinks they can hold most offices. But the same people can't be poor and rich. That is why these seem to be the city's main parts: the well-off and the poor. Also, because the former are usually few and the latter
[Bekker 1291b line 10]
many, these seem to be opposing parts among the city's groups. So constitutions are established according to which of these has the upper hand, and there seem to be two constitutions: democracy and oligarchy.

That there are several constitutions, and what
[Bekker 1291b line 15]
causes this, have already been explained. Let's now explain that democracy and oligarchy also have several kinds. This is clear from what we have said as well. For there are several kinds both of the people and of those called the notables, the prominent citizens. For example, one kind of the people is farmers, another is those working in crafts, another is the trading group concerned with
[Bekker 1291b line 20]
buying and selling, and another is the group connected with the sea. Of this last group, some serve in the navy, some engage in money-making, some carry passengers, and some fish. In many places each group is large. Examples are fishermen in Tarentum and Byzantium, warship crews in Athens, traders in Aegina and Chios, and passenger carriers
[Bekker 1291b line 25]
in Tenedos. Besides these are manual laborers, those with so little property that they can't have leisure, those who are free but don't have two citizen parents, and any other such kind of population. The notables are distinguished by wealth, noble birth, virtue, education, and the things spoken of under the same
[Bekker 1291b line 30]
kinds of distinction.

The first democracy is the one most clearly based on equality. The law of this kind of democracy defines equality as neither the poor nor the well-off having any advantage, and neither being sovereign over the other, but both being alike. For if freedom is found most of all in democracy,
[Bekker 1291b line 35]
as some people suppose, and equality too, this would be most true when everyone shares in the constitution as equally as possible. Since the people are the majority, and what the majority decides is authoritative, this must be a democracy. So this is one kind of democracy: for offices, a property qualification
[Bekker 1291b line 40]
is required, but it is low. Anyone who acquires the required property must be allowed to take part, and anyone who loses it must not take part.

### Book IV, 1292a–1295a

[Bekker 1292a]
[Bekker 1292a line 1]
Another kind of democracy lets all citizens whose status is beyond challenge take part, but the law rules. Another kind lets everyone share in office, provided only that he is a citizen, but the law rules. In another kind of democracy the other features
[Bekker 1292a line 5]
are the same, but the majority is sovereign, not the law. This happens when decrees are authoritative rather than the law. Popular leaders who win the people's favor bring this about. For in democracies governed by law, no such popular leader arises. Instead, the best citizens take the leading positions.
[Bekker 1292a line 10]
But where the laws aren't authoritative, such popular leaders arise. For the people become a monarch, a single ruler made up of many. The many are sovereign not as individuals but all together. When Homer says that rule by many is not good, which kind he means—this kind, or the kind where several rulers each rule individually—
[Bekker 1292a line 15]
is unclear. In any case, people of this sort, being a monarch, seek to rule as one because they aren't ruled by law. They become master-like, so flatterers are held in honor. Such a people corresponds to tyranny among monarchies. For their character is the same. Both act as masters over the better people, and decrees
[Bekker 1292a line 20]
are like a tyrant's commands. The popular leader and the flatterer are the same and play corresponding roles. Each has the greatest influence with his own side: flatterers with tyrants and popular leaders with peoples of this sort. These men cause decrees, rather than laws, to be authoritative
[Bekker 1292a line 25]
by bringing everything before the people. They become powerful because the people are sovereign over everything, while they control the people's opinion, since the majority listens to them. Also, those who bring charges against officeholders say the people must judge. The people gladly accept the invitation. So they undermine
[Bekker 1292a line 30]
all offices. It would seem reasonable for someone to criticize this sort of democracy as not being a constitution. For where laws don't rule, there is no constitution. The law must rule over everything, and the offices must rule in particular cases. This is what we must consider a constitution. So if democracy is
[Bekker 1292a line 35]
one of the constitutions, clearly an arrangement of this sort, where everything is managed by decrees, isn't even a democracy in the proper sense. For no decree can be a universal rule. Let this, then, be our distinction between the kinds of democracy.

One kind of oligarchy rests on property qualifications:
[Bekker 1292a line 40]
these determine officeholding and are high enough to exclude the poor, who are the majority. But anyone who acquires the required property can share in the constitution.

Another
[Bekker 1292b]
[Bekker 1292b line 1]
is when offices depend on high property qualifications and the officeholders themselves choose people to fill vacancies (if they choose from everyone who meets these qualifications, this seems more aristocratic; if from certain designated people, oligarchic). Another kind of oligarchy is
[Bekker 1292b line 5]
when a son takes his father's place. A fourth is when this feature is present and the rulers, not the law, rule. Among oligarchies this corresponds to tyranny among monarchies, and to the last democracy we described among democracies. They call
[Bekker 1292b line 10]
this kind of oligarchy the rule of powerful families.

These, then, are the kinds of oligarchy and democracy. We must not overlook the fact that in many places the constitution laid down by law isn't democratic, but custom and people's way of life make public life democratic. Likewise,
[Bekker 1292b line 15]
in other places the constitution laid down by law is more democratic, but people's way of life and customs make government more oligarchic. This happens especially after changes in constitutions. People don't change everything at once, but at first are satisfied to gain small advantages from one another.
[Bekker 1292b line 20]
So the earlier laws remain, but those who changed the constitution are in control.

The things we have said themselves make it clear that there are this many kinds of democracy and oligarchy. For either all the parts of the people we mentioned must share in the constitution,
[Bekker 1292b line 25]
or some must and others must not. When the farmers and those with moderate property are sovereign in the constitution, they conduct public life according to laws (for they can make a living by working, but can't have leisure. So they put the law in charge and attend only the necessary assemblies). The others are allowed to take part when
[Bekker 1292b line 30]
they acquire the property qualification set by the laws. So everyone who acquires it is allowed to take part. For, in general, not allowing everyone to take part is oligarchic, but having leisure is impossible without income. These reasons explain this one kind of democracy. Another kind results from the
[Bekker 1292b line 35]
next distinction. Everyone whose birth is beyond challenge can be allowed to take part, but in fact only those able to have leisure do so. That is why the laws rule in this kind of democracy: there is no income. A third kind allows all who are free to share in the constitution, but they don't actually
[Bekker 1292b line 40]
take part for the reason just mentioned. So the law must rule in this kind too.

A fourth kind of democracy is
[Bekker 1293a]
[Bekker 1293a line 1]
the latest to have arisen in cities. Because cities have become much larger than they were at first, and plentiful revenue is available, everyone shares in the constitution because the majority is stronger. They also share and
[Bekker 1293a line 5]
take part in public life because even the poor can have leisure, since they receive pay. This sort of population has the most leisure. For attending to their private affairs doesn't hold them back at all, but it does hold back the rich. So the rich often don't attend the assembly or serve as jurors. That is why the mass of the poor
[Bekker 1293a line 10]
is sovereign in the constitution, not the laws.

The kinds of democracy, then, are this many and of this sort for these necessary reasons. The kinds of oligarchy are as follows. When a larger number of people have property, but in smaller amounts and not very much, this is the first kind of oligarchy. They allow participation
[Bekker 1293a line 15]
to anyone who acquires the required property. Since many belong to the citizen body, the law must be sovereign, not the people themselves. They are farther from monarchy. They have neither enough property to neglect it and have leisure, nor so little that they need support from the city.
[Bekker 1293a line 20]
So they must want the law to rule for them, rather than rule themselves. But if the property owners are fewer than in the previous case and have more property, the second kind of oligarchy arises. Since they are stronger, they claim a greater advantage. That is why they themselves choose, from the others, those who enter the citizen body.
[Bekker 1293a line 25]
But because they aren't yet strong enough to rule without law, they make a law of this sort. If their position grows stronger because they are fewer and have larger properties, the third stage of oligarchy arises. They keep offices in their own hands, under a law that directs that those who die be succeeded by their
[Bekker 1293a line 30]
sons. When they become far stronger in property and in their many personal connections, this kind of rule by powerful families is close to monarchy. The individual rulers themselves become sovereign, not the law. This is the fourth kind of oligarchy, corresponding to the last kind of democracy.

[Bekker 1293a line 35]
Besides democracy and oligarchy there are two more constitutions. Everyone recognizes one of them, and it has been described as one of the four kinds of constitution (they list four: monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and, as the fourth, what is called aristocracy). The fifth is the one called by
[Bekker 1293a line 40]
the name common to them all (for they call it polity, a mixture of rule by the few and rule by the people). But because it doesn't occur often, those who try to count the kinds of constitution overlook it, and use only the four
[Bekker 1293b]
[Bekker 1293b line 1]
(as Plato does) in their accounts of constitutions.

It is right to call the constitution we discussed in our earlier arguments aristocracy. Only a constitution made up of those best in virtue without qualification, not men good only under some assumption, is rightly entitled
[Bekker 1293b line 5]
to the name aristocracy. Only in it is the same person both a good man and a good citizen without qualification. Those in the other constitutions are good relative to their own constitution. Still, there are some constitutions called aristocracies that differ both from oligarchies and from what is called polity.
[Bekker 1293b line 10]
For where people choose officeholders not just by wealth but also by merit, that constitution differs from both and is called aristocratic. Even in cities that don't make virtue a public concern, there are still some people who have a good reputation and are thought to be decent. So where a constitution takes account of
[Bekker 1293b line 15]
wealth, virtue, and the people, as in Carthage, it is aristocratic. So are constitutions that take account of just two, like the Spartan constitution, which takes account of virtue and the people. It is a mixture of these two: democracy and virtue. So, besides the first aristocracy, the best constitution, these are two kinds of aristocracy,
[Bekker 1293b line 20]
and a third consists of those forms of what is called polity that lean more toward oligarchy.

It remains for us to discuss what is called polity and also tyranny. We have put them in this order, even though neither polity nor the aristocracies just mentioned are deviations, because
[Bekker 1293b line 25]
in truth all have missed the most correct constitution. Also, they are counted alongside these, and the deviations from them are those we mentioned at the start. It is reasonable to discuss tyranny last, because it is least of all a constitution, while our
[Bekker 1293b line 30]
investigation concerns constitutions. We have now said why they are arranged this way. We must now explain polity. Its character is clearer since we have defined what concerns oligarchy and democracy. For, to put it simply, polity is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. People usually
[Bekker 1293b line 35]
call those that lean toward democracy polities, and those that lean more toward oligarchy aristocracies, because education and noble birth are more often found among the better-off. The well-off also seem to possess the things for which wrongdoers do wrong. That is why “noble and good” and “notables”
[Bekker 1293b line 40]
are what people call them. Since aristocracy aims to give the advantage to the best citizens, people also say that oligarchies are made up more of the noble and good.

[Bekker 1294a]
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It seems impossible for a city to have good law and order if it is ruled not by the best but by the bad. Likewise, it seems impossible for a city to be ruled by the best if it doesn't have good law and order. But having well-made laws that aren't obeyed isn't good law and order. So one aspect of good law and order
[Bekker 1294a line 5]
must be understood as obeying the laws in force. The other is having well-made laws that people keep (for people can also obey badly made laws). This second aspect is possible in two ways: they may obey the best laws possible for them, or the best without qualification.

Aristocracy seems above all to consist in
[Bekker 1294a line 10]
public honors being distributed according to virtue (for virtue is the defining feature of aristocracy, wealth of oligarchy, and freedom of democracy). But the authority of whatever the majority decides is found in all of them. In oligarchy, aristocracy, and democracies alike, whatever the larger part of those sharing in the constitution decides is authoritative.
[Bekker 1294a line 15]
In most cities, then, the name polity is given to this kind of constitution. For the mixture aims only at combining the well-off and the poor, wealth and freedom (for among most people the well-off seem to occupy the place of the noble and good). Three things claim equal standing
[Bekker 1294a line 20]
in the constitution: freedom, wealth, and virtue. The fourth, called noble birth, comes from two of these. Noble birth is long-established wealth and virtue. Clearly, then, we should call the mixture of the two groups, the well-off and the poor, polity. The mixture of the three is, more than any of the others, an aristocracy, apart from the
[Bekker 1294a line 25]
true and first aristocracy. We have now said that there are other kinds of constitution besides monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy, and what they are. We have also said how the aristocracies differ from one another and how polities differ from aristocracy. It is clear that these aren't far apart.

[Bekker 1294a line 30]
Following what we have said, let's explain how the constitution called polity arises alongside democracy and oligarchy, and how it should be established. At the same time, this will make clear the features that define democracy and oligarchy. We must grasp the distinction between them, then take something from each
[Bekker 1294a line 35]
as though joining matching pieces, and combine them. There are three ways to make this combination and mixture. One is to take both of the things that each side makes law, for example concerning jury service (for in oligarchies they fine the well-off if they don't serve as jurors, but give the poor no pay. In democracies,
[Bekker 1294a line 40]
they give the poor pay but don't fine the well-off. Combining both these arrangements makes something shared and intermediate. That is also why it is
[Bekker 1294b]
[Bekker 1294b line 1]
a feature of polity: it is a mixture of both).

This, then, is one way to combine them. Another is to take the middle between what each side lays down. For example, one side allows attendance at the assembly with no property qualification or an extremely small one, while the other requires a high property qualification. What they share
[Bekker 1294b line 5]
is neither of these, but a property qualification midway between the two. A third way takes some provisions from the oligarchic law and others from the democratic law. I mean, for example, that choosing officeholders by lot is thought democratic, and choosing them by election oligarchic. It is also democratic to require no
[Bekker 1294b line 10]
property qualification, and oligarchic to require one. So it is aristocratic and characteristic of polity to take one feature from each: from oligarchy, choosing officeholders by election, and from democracy, having no property qualification.

This, then, is the way to make the mixture. For democracy and oligarchy to be well mixed,
[Bekker 1294b line 15]
the test is whether the same constitution can be called both democracy and oligarchy. For clearly people describe it this way because it is well mixed. This is also true of what lies in the middle, since each extreme appears in it. This is what happens with the Spartan constitution. Many people
[Bekker 1294b line 20]
try to describe it as a democracy because its arrangement has many democratic features. First, for example, is the way children are brought up (for the children of the rich are brought up like those of the poor, and educated in a way that the children of the poor could also afford). The same applies in the next
[Bekker 1294b line 25]
stage of life, and in the same way when they become men (for in this respect there is no visible difference between rich and poor). Everyone has the same food at shared meals, and the rich wear clothes that any poor person could also provide. Also, there are two highest offices. One
[Bekker 1294b line 30]
is elected by the people, and the other is open to them. They elect the elders and can serve as ephors, the officials who oversee the city. Other people see it as rule by a few, since many of its features fit oligarchy. Every office is filled by election, never by lot. Only a few can sentence people to death or exile. Many other features are like this too. In
[Bekker 1294b line 35]
a well-mixed constitution it should seem to be both forms and neither. It should be preserved through itself, not from outside. Preserving itself doesn't mean that more people outside it want it preserved. Even a bad constitution could have that support. It means that no part of the city would want any other constitution
[Bekker 1294b line 40]
at all. We have now said how polity should be established, and likewise the constitutions called aristocracies.

[Bekker 1295a]
[Bekker 1295a line 1]
We still need to discuss tyranny. There isn't much to say about it. But we count it as a kind of constitution, so it must have a place in our study. We defined kingship in our earlier arguments,
[Bekker 1295a line 5]
where we examined kingship in the fullest sense: whether it is harmful or beneficial to cities, what sort of king should be appointed, from what source, and how. While examining kingship, we distinguished two kinds of tyranny because their powers overlap somewhat
[Bekker 1295a line 10]
with kingship. Both forms of rule are based on law. Some non-Greek peoples choose monarchs with absolute authority. In ancient times some monarchs of this sort arose among the Greeks too. They called them aisymnetes, elected rulers with absolute power. These two forms have some
[Bekker 1295a line 15]
differences from each other. They were kingly because they were based on law and because one man ruled over willing subjects, but tyrannical because he ruled as a master and according to his own judgment. A third kind of tyranny is the one that most clearly seems to be tyranny, corresponding to absolute kingship. A monarchy must be this kind of tyranny
[Bekker 1295a line 20]
when it rules without accountability over all those who are its ruler's equals or better, for its own advantage rather than that of the ruled. That is why it is against their will: no free person willingly puts up with such rule. These, then, are the kinds of tyranny, and this is their number, for the reasons stated.

### Book IV, 1295a–1299a

[Bekker 1295a line 25]
What is the best constitution and the best life for most cities and most people? We must judge neither by virtue beyond what ordinary people have, nor by an education that needs natural gifts and resources supplied by good luck, nor by a constitution that meets our highest wishes. Instead, we must look for a life that
[Bekker 1295a line 30]
most people can share and a constitution that most cities can adopt. The so-called aristocracies we have just discussed are either beyond the reach of most cities or close to what is called polity, a mixture of rule by the few and rule by the people. (So we must discuss both as one.) Our judgment about
[Bekker 1295a line 35]
all these matters comes from the same basic principles. Suppose the Ethics rightly says that a happy life is a life of virtue without obstacles, and that virtue is a middle point between extremes. Then the best life must be the middle life, at the middle point that each person can reach. These same standards must apply
[Bekker 1295a line 40]
to a city's virtue and vice and to its constitution. For a constitution
[Bekker 1295b]
[Bekker 1295b line 1]
is a city's way of life.

Every city has three parts: the very rich, the very poor, and, third, those in the middle between them. Since everyone agrees that moderation and the middle point are best, it is clear that, among
[Bekker 1295b line 5]
the good things fortune brings, a moderate amount of property is best of all. It makes following reason easiest. Someone who is exceptionally handsome, strong, wellborn, or rich finds it hard to follow reason. So does someone at the opposite extreme: exceptionally poor, weak, or dishonored. The first group tends to become arrogant and wicked on a large scale,
[Bekker 1295b line 10]
the second, criminals and petty wrongdoers in the extreme. Some injustices come from arrogance, others from criminal wrongdoing. Also, people in the middle are least likely to avoid office or chase after it. Both these things harm cities. In addition, those who have far more than others of fortune's gifts—strength, wealth, friends,
[Bekker 1295b line 15]
and other things of that kind—neither want to be ruled nor know how. This starts at home when they are children. Their luxurious upbringing means that even at school they are not used to being ruled. Those who lack these things to an extreme degree are far too submissive. So the latter do not know how to rule, but only how to be ruled
[Bekker 1295b line 20]
as slaves. The former do not know how to be ruled at all, but only how to rule as masters. The result is a city of slaves and masters, not of free people, with one group full of envy and the other full of contempt. Nothing is further from friendship and political community. Community rests on friendship. Even on a journey they do not want
[Bekker 1295b line 25]
their enemies as companions. A city aims to consist, as far as possible, of people who are equal and alike. This is most true of the middle class. So a city made up of the people who, we say, naturally form a city must have the best constitution. These citizens are also the safest in cities. They do not
[Bekker 1295b line 30]
desire other people's property, as the poor do. Nor do others desire theirs, as the poor desire the property of the rich. Since they neither plot against others nor face plots themselves, they live without danger. That is why Phocylides expressed his wish well:
"Many things are best for those in the middle; I want to be in the middle in my city."

It is clear,
[Bekker 1295b line 35]
then, that the best political community is the one based on the middle class. Cities can be well governed when their middle class is large and stronger, ideally, than both other groups combined, or, failing that, than either one. When it joins one side, it tips the balance and prevents the opposite extremes from developing. So it is good fortune
[Bekker 1295b line 40]
of the highest kind for those in public life to have moderate and sufficient property.

[Bekker 1296a]
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Where some own an enormous amount and others nothing, either extreme democracy or unmixed oligarchy develops, or tyranny comes from either extreme. Tyranny does arise from the most headstrong democracy and from oligarchy, but
[Bekker 1296a line 5]
much less often from middle constitutions and those close to them. We will explain the reason later, in the discussion of constitutional changes. It is clear that the middle constitution is best. It alone is free from faction. Where the middle class is large, faction and division among citizens are least common. Large cities are also less prone to faction
[Bekker 1296a line 10]
for the same reason: their middle class is large. In small cities it is easy to divide everyone into two groups, leaving no one in the middle, and almost everyone is either poor or rich. Democracies are also safer and last longer than oligarchies because of the middle class. (Its members are more numerous
[Bekker 1296a line 15]
and have a greater share in offices in democracies than in oligarchies.) When the poor greatly outnumber the others without this middle group, things go badly and the constitutions soon collapse. We should also take as evidence the fact that the best lawmakers were middle-class citizens. Solon was one of these,
[Bekker 1296a line 20]
as his poetry shows, and so were Lycurgus, who was not a king, Charondas, and almost all the others.

These points also make it clear why most constitutions are either democratic or oligarchic. The middle class in them is often small. So whichever side gets the upper hand,
[Bekker 1296a line 25]
whether the property owners or the people, moves away from the middle and draws the constitution toward itself. The result is either democracy or oligarchy. Furthermore, the people and the rich form factions and fight one another. Whichever side manages to defeat its opponents does not establish
[Bekker 1296a line 30]
a shared or equal constitution. Instead, it takes control of the constitution as the prize of victory. One side sets up a democracy, the other an oligarchy. Also, the powers that gained leadership of Greece each looked to their own constitution. Democracies in the cities were what one side
[Bekker 1296a line 35]
established; the other set up oligarchies. They considered their own advantage, not that of the cities. For these reasons, a middle constitution either never comes about or does so rarely and in few places. Only one man among those who formerly held leadership was persuaded that this
[Bekker 1296a line 40]
arrangement should be introduced. By now, among people in the cities, a habit
[Bekker 1296b]
[Bekker 1296b line 1]
has arisen: they do not even want equality,

but they seek either to rule or to put up with being dominated. These points make clear which constitution is best and why. As for the other constitutions, we say that several democracies and several oligarchies
[Bekker 1296b line 5]
exist. Once the best has been defined, it is not hard to see which should rank first, which second, and so on in order from better to worse. The one closest to the best must always be better, and the one further from the middle worse, unless we judge by particular circumstances. What I mean
[Bekker 1296b line 10]
by particular circumstances is this: often, even though one constitution is more desirable, nothing prevents a different constitution from being more advantageous for some people.

After what we have said, the next step is to examine which constitution benefits which people, and what kind suits what kind of people. First we must establish
[Bekker 1296b line 15]
one general principle for them all. The part of the city that wants the constitution to stay must be stronger than the part that does not. Every city consists of both quality and quantity. By quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, and good birth; by quantity, superiority in numbers. Quality may
[Bekker 1296b line 20]
belong to one of the parts that make up the city, and quantity to another. For example, people without good birth may outnumber the wellborn, or the poor may outnumber the rich. But their numerical superiority may not match their inferiority in quality. So these things must be compared with each other. Where,
[Bekker 1296b line 25]
then, the number of the poor exceeds the proportion just described, democracy naturally exists. Each type of democracy depends on which part of the people is strongest. For example, if the farmers are the most numerous, it is the first type of democracy; if artisans and wage earners are,
[Bekker 1296b line 30]
it is the last. The same applies to the other types between these. Where the rich and the notables, the prominent citizens, have a greater superiority in quality than their inferiority in numbers, oligarchy naturally exists. Similarly, each type of oligarchy depends on the superiority of the oligarchic group.

It is necessary
[Bekker 1296b line 35]
for the lawmaker always to include the middle class in the constitution. If he makes oligarchic laws, he must aim at the middle class; if democratic laws, he must use the laws to bring them in. Where the middle class outnumbers either both extremes together or even just one of them, there can be
[Bekker 1296b line 40]
a lasting constitution.

There is no fear that
[Bekker 1297a]
[Bekker 1297a line 1]
the rich will ever join with the poor against the middle class. Neither side will ever want to be slaves to the other. If they seek a constitution that is more widely shared, they will find none other than this. They would not agree to rule in turn, because of their distrust
[Bekker 1297a line 5]
of each other. Everywhere, the arbitrator is the person most trusted, and the person in the middle is an arbitrator. The better mixed a constitution is, the longer it lasts. Many who want to make aristocratic constitutions go wrong, not only by giving more to the rich, but also by
[Bekker 1297a line 10]
deceiving the people. In time, real evil must come from false good. The greed of the rich destroys the constitution more than the greed of the people does.

The tricks used in constitutions to give a plausible pretext
[Bekker 1297a line 15]
are aimed against the people and are five in number. They concern the assembly, offices, law courts, weapons, and physical training. In the case of the assembly, everyone is allowed to attend, but the rich are fined if they do not. Either they alone are fined, or their fine is much larger. In the case of offices,
[Bekker 1297a line 20]
those who meet the property qualification are not allowed to swear an oath declining office, but the poor are. In the law courts, the rich are fined if they do not serve as jurors, while the poor are exempt. Or the rich have a large fine and the poor a small one, as in Charondas's laws. In some places, everyone who registers is allowed
[Bekker 1297a line 25]
to attend the assembly and serve as a juror. But if they register and then neither attend nor serve, they face large fines. The aim is to make them avoid registering because of the fine, and then, because they are not registered, neither serve as jurors nor attend the assembly. The same approach to owning weapons
[Bekker 1297a line 30]
and taking physical training is used in making laws. The poor are allowed not to own weapons, but the rich are fined if they do not. If the poor do not train, there is no fine, but the rich are fined. The aim is that one group participates because of the fine, while the other does not because it has nothing to fear. These,
[Bekker 1297a line 35]
then, are oligarchic tricks in lawmaking. Democracies use countertricks against them. They provide pay for the poor who attend the assembly and serve as jurors, but impose no fine on the rich. So clearly, anyone who wants to mix the two fairly must combine their practices,
[Bekker 1297a line 40]
providing pay for one group and a fine for the other. In this way everyone would share, while otherwise the constitution belongs
[Bekker 1297b]
[Bekker 1297b line 1]
to just one of the two groups.

The constitution must include only those who own weapons. We cannot set an absolute figure for the property qualification and say that it must be this much. Instead, we must consider the highest figure that still allows
[Bekker 1297b line 5]
those who share in the constitution to outnumber those who do not, and set that figure. The poor are willing to stay quiet even without a share in offices, provided no one mistreats them or takes any of their property. But this is not easy. The people who share
[Bekker 1297b line 10]
in the citizen body are not always considerate. Also, in wartime the poor are usually reluctant to fight if they receive no support and have no resources. But if someone supplies support, they are willing to fight.

In some places the constitution includes not only those currently serving as heavy-armed foot soldiers but also those who have served. Among the Malians the constitution
[Bekker 1297b line 15]
was made up of these, but they chose officeholders from those on active service. The first constitution among the Greeks after the kingships also consisted of those who fought. At first it consisted of cavalry. (For military strength and superiority lay in the cavalry. Without organized formations, nothing useful can be done
[Bekker 1297b line 20]
with heavy-armed foot soldiers, and the people of early times had no experience or formations of this kind. So strength lay in the cavalry.) As cities grew and their armed infantry became stronger, more people shared in the constitution. That is why the constitutions we now call polities used to be called
[Bekker 1297b line 25]
democracies. The early constitutions were, understandably, oligarchic and kingly. Because the population was small, the middle class was not large. Since they were few in number and poorly organized, they put up with being ruled. Why there are several constitutions, and why
[Bekker 1297b line 30]
there are others besides those usually named, have now been explained. (Democracy is not one single type, and the same is true of the others.) We have also explained what their differences are and why these occur. In addition, we have said which constitution is best, generally speaking, and which of the other constitutions suits which people.

[Bekker 1297b line 35]
Let us now discuss the next points, both generally and separately for each constitution, taking the appropriate starting point. All constitutions have three parts. A good lawmaker must consider what is advantageous for each constitution in each of these parts. If they are well arranged, the constitution must be well arranged. Constitutions
[Bekker 1297b line 40]
differ from one another because each of these parts differs. Of these three, one is the body that deliberates
[Bekker 1298a]
[Bekker 1298a line 1]
on common affairs,

the second concerns offices: which there must be, what they must control, and how the choice of their holders should take place. The third is the body that judges. The deliberative body is sovereign in matters of war and peace, alliances
[Bekker 1298a line 5]
and their ending, laws, death, exile, confiscation, and the choice of officeholders and the review of their conduct. Either all these decisions must be assigned to all citizens, or all to some of them—for example, to one office or several, or different decisions to different offices—or some to everyone and some to a limited group.

For
[Bekker 1298a line 10]
everyone to decide everything is democratic. The people seek this kind of equality. But there are several ways for everyone to participate. One is for them to do so in turns, not all together, as in the constitution of Telecles of Miletus. (In other constitutions too, boards of officeholders meet to deliberate.
[Bekker 1298a line 15]
Everyone holds office in turn, drawn from the tribes and the very smallest divisions. The cycle continues until it has gone through everyone.) They meet together only to make laws, to discuss the constitution, and to hear announcements from the rulers. Another way is for
[Bekker 1298a line 20]
everyone to meet together, but only to choose officeholders, make laws, consider war and peace, and review officials' conduct. The other matters are deliberated on by the offices assigned to each, whose holders are chosen from everyone by choice or lot. Another way is for
[Bekker 1298a line 25]
the citizens to meet for the choice of officeholders and the review of their conduct, and to deliberate on war and alliances. The offices manage the other matters, with their holders chosen by choice wherever possible. Such offices are those that must be held by people with expert knowledge. A fourth way is for everyone to meet and deliberate on everything,
[Bekker 1298a line 30]
while the offices decide nothing but only examine matters beforehand. This is how the last type of democracy is now managed, the one we say corresponds to oligarchy controlled by a ruling clique and to tyrannical monarchy. All these ways are democratic. For only some people to decide everything is oligarchic.
[Bekker 1298a line 35]
This too has several variations. Suppose officeholders are chosen on moderate property qualifications, so that their number is fairly large because the qualification is moderate. They do not change matters where the law forbids it, but follow the law. Anyone who acquires the required property can participate. Such an oligarchy has the character of a polity
[Bekker 1298a line 40]
because of its moderation. When in deliberation not everyone
[Bekker 1298b]
[Bekker 1298b line 1]
shares, but only a selected group,

and they rule according to law as in the previous case, the arrangement is oligarchic. When those who control deliberation also choose themselves, when a son takes his father's place, and when they have authority over the laws, this arrangement must
[Bekker 1298b line 5]
be oligarchic. When particular people decide particular matters—for example, everyone decides war, peace, and reviews of officials, while rulers decide the rest, and these rulers are chosen by choice, not lot—the constitution is an aristocracy. Some may be chosen by election and others by lot. The lot may be drawn from everyone or from a selected group. Or those chosen by election
[Bekker 1298b line 10]
and those chosen by lot may act together. Some of these arrangements belong to an aristocratic constitution, others to polity itself.

This is how the deliberative body is divided according to the constitutions, and each constitution manages it in line with the division described. For the democracy now regarded as the fullest democracy—I mean
[Bekker 1298b line 15]
the one in which the people are sovereign even over the laws—it is advantageous, for better deliberation, to do what oligarchies do with law courts. (They impose a fine on those they want to serve as jurors, to make them serve, while democracies pay the poor.) The same should be done with assemblies.
[Bekker 1298b line 20]
(Everyone will deliberate better if they deliberate together: the people with the notables, and the notables with the masses.) It is also advantageous for those who deliberate to be chosen by choice or by lot in equal numbers from the different groups. If supporters of democracy greatly outnumber supporters of polity, it is also advantageous either not to
[Bekker 1298b line 25]
give pay to everyone, but only to a number proportionate to the notables, or to exclude the excess by lot. In oligarchies it helps to add some members from the masses. Another option is to establish officials like the preliminary councilors and guardians of the laws found in some constitutions. They should conduct business
[Bekker 1298b line 30]
on matters these officials have considered beforehand. (In this way the people will share in deliberation without being able to overturn any part of the constitution.) Further, the people should either vote for the same measures or for nothing contrary to those put forward. Or everyone should have a share in giving advice, while the rulers make the decisions. They should also do the opposite
[Bekker 1298b line 35]
of what happens in polities. The masses must have authority when they vote to reject a measure, but not when they vote to approve it. Instead, it must go back to the rulers. A polity reverses this arrangement. Rejection by the few settles the matter, but their approval
[Bekker 1298b line 40]
doesn't. Instead, the matter goes back to the larger body
[Bekker 1299a]
[Bekker 1299a line 1]
every time.

### Book IV, 1299a–1301a

Let this, then, be our account of the deliberative body, which is sovereign in the constitution.

The next subject to divide up is offices. This part of the constitution also has many differences:
[Bekker 1299a line 5]
how many offices there are, what they control, and how long each lasts. Some make offices last six months, others less, others a year, and others longer. We must also ask whether offices should be permanent or long-lasting, or neither, with the same people holding them repeatedly, or
[Bekker 1299a line 10]
whether the same person should hold office not twice but only once. Then there is the appointment of officeholders: from whom they should be drawn, by whom, and how. In all these matters, we must be able to distinguish how many arrangements are possible, and then match the suitable ones to the constitutions they benefit. It is not
[Bekker 1299a line 15]
easy even to define which positions should be called offices. The political community needs many supervisors. So we must not count everyone chosen by choice or lot as a ruler. Take priests first: their role should be counted as something different from political offices. Also, sponsors of choruses, heralds, and ambassadors are chosen by choice.
[Bekker 1299a line 20]
Some supervisory duties are political. They concern either all citizens in some activity, as a general supervises those on military service, or a particular group, as a supervisor of women or children does. Others concern household management: grain measurers, for example, are often chosen by choice. Others are duties of service, for which cities with enough resources appoint slaves.
[Bekker 1299a line 25]
Generally speaking, we should call offices above all those positions assigned the power to deliberate on certain matters, judge, and issue orders, especially this last. Giving orders is most characteristic of rule. But these distinctions make practically no difference in use. (No legal decision has yet arisen from disputes about
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the name.) They do, however, offer a separate subject for theoretical study.

Which offices, and how many, are necessary for a city to exist? Which are not necessary but are useful for a good constitution? These are questions we might find more difficult, both for every constitution and especially for small cities. In
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large cities, one office can and should be assigned to one task. (Many people can enter the offices because the citizens are numerous. So they can hold some offices again after a long interval and others only once. Each task also gets better attention when the person responsible handles one matter
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rather than many.)

In small cities, many offices must be combined in the hands of a few people. The small population makes it hard for many people to hold office: who will succeed them in turn? Yet small cities sometimes need
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the same offices and laws as large ones. The difference is that large cities need the same services often, while small ones need them only at long intervals. So nothing prevents several duties from being assigned together, since they will not interfere with each other. Because of the small population, the offices must be made like
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combined spit-and-lamp stands. If, then, we can say how many offices every city must have, and how many are not necessary but should exist, someone who knows this can more easily see which offices it makes sense to combine into one. We should also be clear about which matters need
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several local offices and which need one office with authority everywhere. For example, should good order be the responsibility of a market supervisor in the marketplace, and of different officials elsewhere, or of the same one everywhere? Should duties be divided by subject or by the people concerned? I mean, for example, should one official supervise good order, or should there be one for children
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and another for women? We must also ask whether the kinds of offices differ in each constitution, or not at all. For example, in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy, do the same offices have authority, but with their holders drawn not from equal or similar people, but from different groups in different constitutions? In
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aristocracies, educated people might hold them. In oligarchies the holders might be rich, and in democracies free. Or are the offices themselves different in some constitutions? The same offices may help some cities, while others need different ones. (In some places an office should have extensive
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powers; elsewhere those powers should be limited.)

Still, some offices are distinctive, such as that of preliminary councilors. This is not democratic, while a council is democratic. There must be some body responsible for considering matters beforehand for the people, so that the people can attend to their work. But if this body has few members, it is oligarchic. The
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preliminary councilors must be few in number, so this is oligarchic. Where both these offices exist, the preliminary councilors are set over the council members. A council member is democratic, a preliminary councilor oligarchic. The council's power is also abolished in democracies of the kind in
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which the people themselves meet and conduct all business.

This usually happens when there is enough money to pay those who attend the assembly. Because they have leisure, they gather often and decide everything themselves. A supervisor of children and a supervisor of women,
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and any other ruler responsible for supervision of this kind, is aristocratic, not democratic. (How could anyone stop the wives of the poor from going out?) Nor is it oligarchic. (The wives of oligarchic rulers live in luxury.)

Let that be enough on these matters for now. As for the appointment of officeholders,
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we must try to examine it from the beginning. The differences come under three headings. Combining these must give us all the possible arrangements. The first of the three is who appoints the officeholders; the second, from whom; the last, in what way. For each of these three headings, three variations
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exist. Either all citizens make the appointments or only some; and the appointees are drawn either from everyone or from a defined group. (For example, the group may be defined by property qualification, family, virtue, or something else of that kind. In Megara it consists of those who returned together from exile and fought together against the people.) Appointments are made either by choice or by lot. These can also be combined,
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meaning that some appointments are made by a few and others by everyone, some from everyone and others from a few, and some by choice and others by lot.

Each of these distinctions will have four arrangements. Everyone may appoint from everyone by election, or everyone may appoint from everyone by lot. The candidates may come from everyone, or from groups in rotation,
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such as tribes, districts, and brotherhoods, until the cycle covers all citizens. Or the candidates may always come from everyone. Or some appointments may follow one method and others the other method. Again, if only some people make the appointments, they appoint either from everyone by choice, from everyone by lot, from a limited group by choice, or from a limited group by lot. Or some appointments are made one way and others another, meaning
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some from everyone by choice and others by lot, and some from a limited group by choice and others by lot. So there are twelve arrangements, apart from the two combined forms. Three of these forms of appointment are democratic: everyone appointing from everyone by choice, by lot, or by both, with some offices filled by lot and others by choice. Not everyone may make appointments at the same time,
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but appointees may come from everyone or from a limited group, by lot, election, or both. Or some may come from everyone and others from a limited group, using both methods. By both I mean some by lot and others by election. This belongs to polity, a mixture of rule by the few and rule by the people. When a limited group appoints from everyone by choice, lot, or both, with some offices filled by lot and others by choice,
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it is oligarchic. Drawing from both groups is more oligarchic still. Drawing some from everyone and others from a limited group belongs to polity in an aristocratic form,

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or filling some offices by choice and others by lot. It is oligarchic when a limited group appoints from a limited group by election. The same holds for appointments by lot, though this does not happen, and for appointments using both methods. Some people appointing from everyone, and everyone appointing from a limited group by choice, are
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aristocratic. These, then, are the number of arrangements concerning offices, and this is how they are divided among the constitutions. Which arrangements benefit which people, and how appointments should be made, will become clear along with the powers of offices and what those offices are. By the power of an office I mean, for example, authority
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over revenue or over defense. A general's power, for example, is a different kind from the power of an official who controls contracts in the marketplace.

Of the three parts, the judicial one remains to be discussed. We must also consider its arrangements on the same basis. The
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law courts differ under three headings: who serves in them, what they deal with, and how their members are appointed. By who serves, I mean whether members come from everyone or from a limited group. By what they deal with, I mean how many kinds of law courts there are. By how, I mean whether appointment is by lot or choice. First, then, let us distinguish how many kinds of law courts there are. There are eight. One reviews officials' conduct;
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another deals with anyone who wrongs the community; another with matters affecting the constitution. A fourth deals with disputes about penalties involving both rulers and private people. A fifth deals with substantial private transactions. Besides these there are the homicide court and the court for foreigners. (The kinds of homicide court, whether
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they have the same jurors or different ones, deal with deliberate killings, unintentional killings, and killings that are admitted but whose justice is disputed. A fourth deals with charges brought against people exiled for homicide, concerning their return. One example is the court said to exist at Phreatto in Athens. Such cases occur
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only rarely throughout all time, even in large cities. Of the courts for foreigners, one deals with foreigners against foreigners, the other with foreigners against local citizens.) Besides all these, there is a court for small transactions involving one drachma, five drachmas, or a little more. These too need a decision, but they do not
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fall to a large body of jurors.

Let us leave aside these courts, as well as the homicide courts and the courts for foreigners. Let us discuss the political courts. If these are not well organized, divisions and constitutional upheavals arise. One option is for everyone to judge all the cases we have distinguished, with jurors appointed by election
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or lot. Another is for everyone to judge all cases, some courts appointed by lot and others by election. Or courts dealing with the same matters may have some jurors appointed by lot and others
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by election.

These arrangements number four. There are just as many others drawn from a limited group. Again, jurors judging all matters may come from a limited group by election. Or they may come from a limited group for all matters by lot. Or some courts may be appointed by lot and others by election. Or certain courts
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dealing with the same matters may include jurors appointed both by lot and by election. These arrangements, as stated, correspond to those already described. There are also combinations of the same arrangements. I mean, for example, that some courts are drawn from everyone, others from a limited group, and others from both. (For example, some jurors in the same court may be drawn from everyone and others from a limited group.) They may be appointed
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by lot, choice, or both. We have now said how many arrangements law courts can have. Of these, the first are democratic:
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those drawn from everyone to judge everything. The second are oligarchic: those drawn from a limited group to judge everything. The third are aristocratic and belong to polity: those in which some courts are drawn from everyone and others
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from a limited group.

### Book V, 1301a–1304b

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As for the other subjects we set out to cover, almost
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all have now been discussed. We must examine the causes of constitutional changes: how many there are and what kinds, what destroys each constitution, and which constitutions most often change into which others. We must also examine what preserves constitutions, both in general and individually, and what means are most likely to preserve each one,
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as the next step after what we have already said.

We must first take as our starting point that many constitutions have developed because everyone agrees about the just and about proportional equality, but gets them wrong, as we said earlier. Democracy arose from the belief that people who are equal in any one respect are equal in every respect
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(because everyone is equally free, they think they are equal in every respect). Oligarchy arose from the assumption that people who are unequal in one respect are completely unequal (because they are unequal in wealth, they assume they are unequal in every respect). Then those who consider themselves equal claim an equal share in everything. Those who consider themselves unequal
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try to get a larger share, since a larger share is unequal. So all these constitutions contain something just, but taken as a whole they are mistaken. For this reason, when either group doesn't share in the constitution as its own assumptions lead it to expect, it starts a faction. Some people would have the strongest justification of all for starting a faction,
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but they do this least of all: those who stand out in virtue.

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Only they can most reasonably be considered unequal in every respect. Some people who are superior in birth also think this inequality entitles them to more than equal shares. People whose ancestors had virtue and wealth are considered wellborn.

Starting points
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and sources of factions are roughly these. They are the grounds on which people form them. Changes therefore happen in two ways. Sometimes they attack the constitution to replace the existing one with another. For example, they turn democracy into oligarchy or oligarchy into democracy, or turn these into polity, a mixed constitution, or aristocracy,
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or the latter into the former. Sometimes they don't attack the existing constitution. They choose to keep the same arrangement but want to run it themselves, whether it is an oligarchy or a monarchy. There are also changes of degree. An oligarchy may be made more oligarchic
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or less so, and a democracy more democratic or less so. The same applies to the other constitutions: they may be tightened or relaxed. People may also try to change some part of a constitution, such as creating or abolishing an office. For example, some say that at Lacedaemon Lysander
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tried to abolish kingship, and King Pausanias tried to abolish the office of the ephors, the Spartan overseers. At Epidamnus, too, the constitution changed in one part. They created a council to replace the tribal chiefs. But the rulers who belong to the citizen body must still go to the popular assembly whenever
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an office is put to a vote; the single ruler was also an oligarchic feature of this constitution. Everywhere inequality causes faction, unless unequal people receive proportionate shares (permanent kingship is unequal if it exists among equals). In general, people start factions because they seek equality. There are two kinds of equality. One is
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numerical, the other is based on worth. By numerical equality I mean sameness and equality in number or size; by equality based on worth I mean equality of proportion. For example, three exceeds two, and two exceeds one, by the same number. But four exceeds two, and two exceeds one, in the same proportion. Two is the same fraction of four as
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one is of two: both are halves. People agree that what is based on worth is just without qualification, but they disagree, as we said earlier. One group thinks that if people are equal in one respect, they are equal in all respects. The other thinks that if they are unequal in one respect, they deserve unequal shares in everything. This is also why two main forms arise:
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the constitutions of democracy and oligarchy. Good birth and virtue
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are found in few people,

but these other qualities are found in more. Nowhere are there a hundred people who are wellborn and good, but in many places there are a hundred wealthy people. It is a mistake to organize everything entirely by either kind of equality. The results make this clear: none
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of these constitutions lasts. The reason is that a mistake at the very first starting point must lead to some bad result in the end. So numerical equality must be used in some matters, and equality based on worth in others.

Still, democracy is more secure and less open to faction than oligarchy. In
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oligarchies two kinds of faction arise: one among the oligarchs themselves, and another against the people. In democracies there is only faction against the oligarchy. No faction worth mentioning arises within the people against themselves. Also, a constitution based on the middle class is closer to democracy than to rule by the few.
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It is the most secure of constitutions of this kind.

Since we are examining what causes factions and constitutional changes, we must first grasp their starting points and causes in general. There are, roughly speaking, three, and we must distinguish each of them on its own in outline
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first. We must identify the state of mind in which people form factions, what they form them for, and, third, what starts political disturbances and factions between people. The main general cause of the state of mind that leads people toward change must be taken to be the one we have already described. Those
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seeking equality form factions when they believe their share is smaller than that of others who are their equals. Others want unequal shares and superiority. They form factions when they believe they are unequal yet receive no larger share, but an equal or smaller one. These aims can be just or unjust. People who have less
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start factions to become equal, and those who are equal do so to become greater. We have now described the state of mind in which people start factions. The things they fight over are gain and honor, and their opposites. People also start factions in cities to avoid dishonor and loss, either for themselves or for their friends. The causes and starting points
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of these movements, which put people into the state of mind we described and turn them toward these aims, are in one way seven in number, but in another way more. Two are the same as those already mentioned, but work differently. Gain and honor also turn people against one another, not because they want to get them
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for themselves, as we said before,

but because other people
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are seen getting a larger share of them, some justly, others unjustly. Other causes are abusive behavior, fear, superiority, contempt, and growth out of proportion. There are also causes of another kind: election scheming, carelessness, small changes,
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and differences between people. The force of abusive behavior and gain, and how they act as causes, is fairly clear. When people in office behave abusively and take more than their share, people start factions both against one another and against the constitutions that give them this power. They take extra shares sometimes from
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private property, sometimes from public property.—Honor is also clear, both in its force and in how it causes faction. People start factions because they themselves are dishonored and because they see others honored. This happens unjustly when people are honored or dishonored against their worth, and justly when it matches their worth.
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—Superiority causes faction when someone, whether one person or several, has more power than suits the city and the power of its citizen body. Such situations usually produce monarchy or the rule of a powerful group. This is why some places practice ostracism, for example Argos and Athens. Yet it is better to make sure from the start that there won't be people
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with such great superiority than to let them arise and find a cure later.—Fear leads both people who have done wrong and people who are about to suffer wrong to start factions. The first fear punishment; the second want to act before they are wronged. For example, the notables at Rhodes banded together against the people because of the lawsuits being brought against them.
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—Contempt also makes people start factions and launch attacks. In oligarchies this happens when those excluded from the constitution are more numerous (they think they are stronger). In democracies the wealthy come to despise the disorder and lack of government. For example, at Thebes, after the battle at Oenophyta,
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bad government destroyed the democracy. The democracy at Megara was also destroyed when disorder and lack of government led to defeat. The same happened at Syracuse before Gelon's tyranny, and to the people's rule at Rhodes before the uprising.

Constitutions also change because of growth out of proportion. Compare a body:
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it consists of parts. They must grow in proportion to keep their proper balance. Otherwise the body is ruined, as when its foot is four cubits long and the rest of its body two spans. Sometimes it might even take the form of another animal. This could happen if, not only in size but also in kind,
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it grew out of proportion. In the same way, a city consists
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of parts.

One of them often grows unnoticed, such as the number of poor people in democracies and polities. Sometimes this also happens by chance. At Tarentum, for example, many notables were defeated and killed by the
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Iapygians shortly after the Persian Wars, and the polity became a democracy. At Argos, after those on the seventh were killed by Cleomenes the Spartan, they were forced to admit some of the surrounding inhabitants. At Athens, military disasters on land reduced the number of notables, because they were on the citizen roll
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for military service during the Spartan War. This also happens in democracies, but less often. When wealthy people become more numerous or their fortunes grow, democracies change into oligarchies and the rule of powerful groups.—Constitutions also change without faction through election scheming, as
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at Heraea (they replaced elected offices with offices assigned by lot because people were electing those who schemed for votes). They also change through carelessness, when people allow those unfriendly to the constitution to enter the offices with sovereign power. At Oreus, for example, the oligarchy was overthrown when Heracleodorus became one of the rulers. From an oligarchy he
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created a polity and a democracy.—Another cause is small changes. By this I mean that a great change in the laws often goes unnoticed when people overlook a small one. At Ambracia, for example, the property qualification was small, and in the end people held office with none, on the grounds that a small amount was close to, or no different from,
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nothing.

Differences in origin also cause faction until people come to think alike. A city cannot be formed from just any crowd, nor can it be formed in just any amount of time. This is why most cities that have admitted fellow settlers or later settlers have experienced faction. For example, Achaeans settled Sybaris together with Troezenians. Then the more numerous group,
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the Achaeans, expelled the Troezenians. This brought the curse upon the people of Sybaris. At Thurii the Sybarites fought with those who settled with them (they claimed a larger share because the land was theirs, and were expelled). At Byzantium the later settlers were discovered plotting and were driven out after a fight. As for the people of Antissa, those from Chios
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whom they admitted as exiles they then drove out after a fight. The people of Zancle admitted Samians but were themselves driven out. The people of Apollonia on the Black Sea brought in later settlers and experienced faction.

At Syracuse, too, after the tyrannies, the foreigners
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and mercenaries were made citizens. This led to factions and fighting. The people of Amphipolis admitted settlers from Chalcis, and most of the original inhabitants were driven out by them. In oligarchies the many form factions because they think they are wronged because
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they don't receive equal shares, though they are equal, as we said earlier. In democracies the notables do so because they receive equal shares though they are not equal. Sometimes cities also experience faction because of their geography, when the land isn't naturally suited to being a single city. For example, at Clazomenae the people at Chytrum were opposed to those
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on the island, and the people of Colophon to those of Notium. At Athens, too, people are not alike: those who live in Piraeus are more democratic than those in the town. In war, crossings over ditches, even very small ones, break up battle formations. In the same way, every difference seems to create division.
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The greatest division is perhaps between virtue and badness, then between wealth and poverty. After that one difference is greater than another, and the one we mentioned is among them.

Factions arise not over small things but from small things. People fight over great things. Even small differences have the greatest force when among those with sovereign power
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they arise, as happened at Syracuse in early times. The constitution changed because two young men who held office quarreled over a love affair. While one was away, the other won over his boyfriend. In return, the first man was angry. The other's wife
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he persuaded to come to him. They then brought the members of the citizen body onto their sides and split them all into factions. So we must guard against such things when they begin, and settle the factions of leaders and powerful people. The mistake happens at the beginning, and the beginning is said to be half of everything,
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so even a small mistake there corresponds in scale to mistakes in the other parts. In general, factions among the notables draw the whole city into their consequences. This happened at Hestiaea after the Persian Wars, when two brothers disagreed over the division of their father's property. The poorer one,
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claiming that the other hadn't disclosed the property or the treasure their father had found, brought the democrats onto his side. The other, who had a large fortune, brought in the wealthy. At Delphi a dispute arising from a marriage became the starting point for all the factions that came
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later.

When the groom came for the bride, he took some incident as a bad omen and went away without her. Her family felt insulted, planted some of the sacred property on him while he was sacrificing, and then killed him as a temple robber. At Mytilene, too, over heiresses
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a faction arose and started many troubles, including the war against Athens in which Paches captured their city. Timophanes, a wealthy man, left two daughters. Dexander was rejected and failed to obtain them for his sons. He started the faction and stirred up the Athenians,
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whose city's representative he was. Among the Phocians, too, a faction over an heiress involving Mnaseas, Mnason's father, and Euthycrates, Onomarchus's father, became the starting point of the Sacred War for the Phocians. At Epidamnus the constitution also changed because of marriage matters. Someone had arranged a betrothal
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for his daughter. The young man's father became a ruler and fined him. Feeling mistreated, he brought in those outside the constitution.

Constitutions also change into oligarchy, democracy, or polity because some office or part of the city gains a good reputation or grows in power.
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For example, the council on the Areopagus gained a good reputation during the Persian Wars and was thought to have tightened the constitution. On the other hand, the naval masses, who brought about the victory at Salamis and, through it, leadership based on naval power, made the democracy stronger.
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At Argos the notables won a good reputation in the battle against the Lacedaemonians at Mantinea and tried to overthrow the people's rule. At Syracuse the people brought about victory in the war against the Athenians and changed the polity into a democracy. At Chalcis, Phoxus
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the tyrant was killed by the people together with the notables. The people immediately took control of the constitution. At Ambracia, similarly, the people joined those who attacked Periander the tyrant in driving him out, and transferred the constitution to themselves. In general, we mustn't overlook this: those who have helped create power,
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whether private individuals, officials, tribes, or any part or group whatever, stir up faction. Either people who envy the honors they receive start the faction, or they themselves refuse to remain on equal terms because of their superiority. Constitutions also become unstable when the parts of the city thought to be opposed are equal
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to each other,

such as the rich and the people, and there is no middle class or only a very small one. If either side is far stronger, the other won't risk a fight with an obviously stronger opponent. This is also why people who stand out in virtue do not start a faction,
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so to speak. They are few against many. In general, then, these are the starting points and causes of factions and changes in all constitutions. People change constitutions sometimes by force, sometimes by deception. They use force either right from the start or by imposing it later.
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Deception is also of two kinds. Sometimes they deceive people at first and change the constitution with their consent, but later hold it by force against their will. Under the Four Hundred, for example, they deceived the people by claiming that the king would provide money for the war against the Lacedaemonians. After this lie,
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they tried to keep control of the constitution. At other times they persuade people at the start and later persuade them again, and rule over them with their consent. Generally, then, changes in all constitutions arise from the causes we have described.

### Book V, 1304b–1308a

Taking each kind of constitution separately and sorting the effects of these causes,
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we must examine the results. Democracies mainly change because of the unrestrained behavior of popular leaders, the demagogues. Sometimes they bring false charges against property owners individually and so make them unite (a shared fear brings together even the bitterest enemies). Sometimes they turn the crowd against them as a group. This happens
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in many cases, as we can see. At Cos, for example, the democracy changed when bad demagogues appeared (the notables banded together). The same happened at Rhodes. The demagogues arranged public pay and prevented repayment of the money owed to the commanders who outfitted warships. Because of the impending
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lawsuits against them, those commanders were forced to band together and overthrow the people's rule. At Heraclea, too, the people's rule was overthrown soon after the colony was founded because of the demagogues. The notables were wronged by them and driven into exile. Then the exiles gathered, returned, and overthrew the people's rule. Similarly,
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the democracy at Megara was overthrown. The demagogues expelled many of the notables to get money by confiscation, until they had created a large number of exiles. These returned, defeated the people in battle, and established the oligarchy.

The same also happened at
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Cyme, under the democracy that Thrasymachus overthrew. If we look at the other cases, too, we can see that changes usually follow this pattern. Sometimes demagogues wrong the notables to win favor, and so make them unite: either their property
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is redistributed or their income is used up through public services. At other times they slander them so that they can confiscate the possessions of the rich.

In early times, when the same person was both a demagogue and a general, democracies changed into tyrannies. Almost all the early tyrants came from the demagogues.
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This happened then but not now because the demagogues then came from those who served as generals (people weren't yet skilled at speaking). The art of public speaking has now developed. Capable speakers become demagogues. But they lack military experience, so they don't try to establish tyranny, except for a few minor cases
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of this kind. Tyrannies also arose more often before than now because some people were entrusted with powerful offices. At Miletus, for example, tyranny arose from the presidency (the president had authority over many important matters). Also, cities were not large then. The countryside was home to the
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people, busy with their work. So when the people's leaders had military abilities, they tried to establish tyranny. They all did this after winning the people's trust. What won that trust was their hostility toward the rich. For example, at Athens Pisistratus formed a faction against the men of the plain. At Megara Theagenes
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slaughtered the livestock of the wealthy when he found them grazing by the river. Dionysius accused Daphnaeus and the rich and was thought fit for tyranny. His hostility won him trust as a supporter of the people. Democracies also change from their traditional form into the newest one. Where appointments are made by election
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to offices without property qualifications and the people make the choice, ambitious office-seekers act as popular leaders. They give the people supreme authority even over the laws. To prevent this, or make it less common, let the tribes choose the rulers instead of the whole people. As for democracies,
[Bekker 1305a line 35]
nearly all their changes happen for these reasons.

Oligarchies mainly change in two very clear ways. One is when they wrong the crowd. Anyone can become an effective leader against them, especially when
[Bekker 1305a line 40]
the leader happens to come from the oligarchy itself, as Lygdamis did at Naxos. He later became tyrant of the
[Bekker 1305b]
[Bekker 1305b line 1]
Naxians.

Factions that start with outsiders also take different forms. Sometimes the wealthy themselves, but not those holding office, overthrow the constitution, when very few people hold the positions of honor. This happened at Massalia,
[Bekker 1305b line 5]
Istrus, Heraclea, and other cities. Those excluded from office stirred up unrest until first the older brothers were admitted, and later the younger ones too. In some places a father and son cannot hold office together; in others one older and one younger
[Bekker 1305b line 10]
brother cannot hold office together. At Massalia the oligarchy became more like a polity, a mixed constitution. At Istrus it ended in democracy. At Heraclea it expanded from a smaller number to six hundred. At Cnidos, too, the oligarchy changed when the notables themselves formed factions against one another. Few could participate, and, as we said, if a father participated,
[Bekker 1305b line 15]
his son couldn't; if there were several brothers, only the oldest could. The people seized the opportunity while they were divided. They took a leader from the notables, attacked, and won, since a divided group is weak. At Erythrae, too, in early times under the oligarchy of the Basilidae, although
[Bekker 1305b line 20]
those in the constitution managed affairs well, the people resented being ruled by a few and changed the constitution.

Oligarchies are also disturbed from within when people compete with one another by acting as demagogues. This happens in two ways. One is among the few themselves—a demagogue can arise
[Bekker 1305b line 25]
even when they are very few. At Athens, for example, among the Thirty, Charicles and his group gained power by acting as demagogues toward the Thirty, and Phrynichus and his group did the same among the Four Hundred. The other is when members of the oligarchy act as demagogues toward the masses. At Larissa, for example, the guardians of the citizens, because they were elected by
[Bekker 1305b line 30]
the masses, acted as demagogues toward them. This also happens in oligarchies where the offices aren't filled by the same people from whom the rulers are drawn. Instead, offices go to people with high property qualifications or members of clubs, but the heavily armed soldiers or the people elect them. This happened at Abydos. It also happens where the law courts aren't drawn from the citizen body. By acting as demagogues
[Bekker 1305b line 35]
over court decisions, they change the constitution, as happened at Heraclea on the Black Sea. Another case is when some people try to restrict the oligarchy to fewer people. Those who want equality are forced to bring in the people as allies. Oligarchies also change when their members
[Bekker 1305b line 40]
spend their own fortunes on unrestrained living. Such people, too, look for a revolution. They either try to establish tyranny themselves or
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[Bekker 1306a line 1]
set someone else up as tyrant

(as Hipparinus did with Dionysius at Syracuse. At Amphipolis a man named Cleotimus brought in settlers from Chalcis, and after they arrived he set them in faction against the wealthy. At Aegina the man who carried out the dealings
[Bekker 1306a line 5]
with Chares tried to change the constitution for a reason of this kind). Sometimes, then, they try to bring about a change; at other times they steal public funds. This leads to faction against one another, involving either these people or those who fight against their theft, as happened at Apollonia on the Black Sea. But an oligarchy that agrees within itself
[Bekker 1306a line 10]
isn't easily destroyed from within. The constitution at Pharsalus is evidence of this. There a few people rule over many because they treat one another well.

Oligarchies are also overthrown when they create another oligarchy inside the existing one. This happens when the whole citizen body is small,
[Bekker 1306a line 15]
and not all the few share in the highest offices. It happened once at Elis. The constitution was controlled by a few, but only a very small number became elders. There were ninety, their offices were for life, and their selection favored a powerful group, like the selection of elders at Lacedaemon. Changes
[Bekker 1306a line 20]
in oligarchies happen in both war and peace. In war, distrust of the people forces them to use hired soldiers (the man they entrust with command often becomes a tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth. If there are several commanders, they secure rule by a powerful group for themselves.
[Bekker 1306a line 25]
Sometimes fear of this leads the oligarchs to give the crowd a share in the constitution, because they are forced to use the people). In peace, distrust of one another leads them to entrust their protection to soldiers and a ruler who stands between the two sides. He sometimes becomes sovereign over both. This happened at Larissa
[Bekker 1306a line 30]
under the rule of the Aleuadae led by Simus, and at Abydos under the clubs, one of which was Iphiades' club.

Factions also arise when members of the oligarchy push one another aside and form factions over marriages or lawsuits. Examples arising from marriage are the ones mentioned
[Bekker 1306a line 35]
earlier (Diagoras also overthrew the oligarchy of the cavalry at Eretria after being wronged over a marriage). Factions at Heraclea and Thebes arose from a court decision. The punishment for adultery was just. But it was imposed in a way that caused faction: at Heraclea it was imposed on Eurytion,
[Bekker 1306b]
[Bekker 1306b line 1]
and at Thebes on Archias.

(Their enemies insisted that they be fastened in a punishment frame in the marketplace). Many oligarchies have also been overthrown because they behaved too much like masters, and some of those within the constitution became dissatisfied,
[Bekker 1306b line 5]
as happened to the oligarchies at Cnidos and Chios. Accidents also cause changes in the constitution called polity. They cause changes in oligarchies too, where people need a property qualification to sit on the council, serve on juries, or hold the other offices. Often the property qualification originally set to suit
[Bekker 1306b line 10]
the circumstances was meant to let only a few participate in oligarchy, and the middle class in polity. But peace or some other good fortune brings prosperity. The same property comes to be worth many times the qualification, so that everyone shares in everything. Sometimes by stages
[Bekker 1306b line 15]
the change develops little by little and goes unnoticed, but sometimes it happens more quickly. These, then, are the kinds of causes that lead oligarchies to change and form factions. In general, democracies and oligarchies sometimes change into others of the same kind, not their opposites. For example, they can change
[Bekker 1306b line 20]
from democracies and oligarchies governed by law into ones with sovereign power, and from these into the former.

In aristocracies some factions arise because few people share in positions of honor. As we said, this also disturbs oligarchies, since the description of aristocracy too as oligarchy
[Bekker 1306b line 25]
is true in a way. In both, the rulers are few, though not for the same reason. Indeed, this is why aristocracy is also thought to be oligarchy. This is most bound to happen when there is a group who proudly believe they are equals in virtue. At Lacedaemon, for example, there were the so-called Partheniae
[Bekker 1306b line 30]
(they came from the equals). When their plot was discovered, they were sent out to found Tarentum. It also happens when important people, inferior to no one in virtue, are dishonored by people in higher positions of honor, as Lysander was by the kings. Or a courageous man may have no share in positions of honor, like Cinadon,
[Bekker 1306b line 35]
who organized the attack against the Spartans under Agesilaus. Another cause is when some are very poor and others wealthy (this happens especially in wars. It also happened at Lacedaemon during the Messenian War. This is clear from Tyrtaeus's poem called
[Bekker 1307a]
[Bekker 1307a line 1]
Good Order:

some people, hard pressed by the war, demanded that the land be redistributed). Another cause is when someone is powerful and able to become still more powerful, and wants to rule alone. This seems to have been the case at Lacedaemon with Pausanias, who commanded during the Persian
[Bekker 1307a line 5]
War, and at Carthage with Hanno.

Polities and aristocracies are mainly destroyed by a departure from the just within the constitution itself. The starting point is a bad mixture: in a polity, of democracy and oligarchy; in an aristocracy, of these and virtue,
[Bekker 1307a line 10]
but especially of the two. By the two I mean democracy and oligarchy. Polities and most so-called aristocracies try to mix these. Aristocracies differ from the constitutions called polities in this respect, and this is why some of them are less lasting and others more so.
[Bekker 1307a line 15]
People call those that lean more toward oligarchy aristocracies, and those that lean toward the crowd polities. This is why the latter are more secure than the former. The greater number is stronger, and people are more content when they have equal shares. But the wealthy, if the constitution gives them a superior position,
[Bekker 1307a line 20]
try to behave abusively and get more than their share. In general, whichever way the constitution leans, it changes in that direction as each side expands its own power. For example, a polity changes into democracy and an aristocracy into oligarchy. Or they change in the opposite directions. An aristocracy changes into democracy because people feel wronged and pull it toward
[Bekker 1307a line 25]
the opposite. These are the poorer people. Polities change into oligarchy. Only equality based on worth, and having what belongs to oneself, are lasting. What we have described happened at Thurii. Since offices required a higher property qualification, it changed to a lower one and to more offices. But all the land
[Bekker 1307a line 30]
was acquired by the notables against the law (the constitution leaned more toward oligarchy, so they could take more than their share). The people, trained in the war, became stronger than the garrison troops, until those who held too much land gave it up.

Also, the oligarchic character of all aristocratic constitutions
[Bekker 1307a line 35]
means that the notables take more than their share. At Lacedaemon, for example, property ends up in the hands of a few. The notables have more freedom to do whatever they want and to form marriage ties with whomever they want. This is why the city of the Locrians was destroyed by the marriage connection with Dionysius. This would not have happened in a democracy, or
[Bekker 1307a line 40]
in a well-mixed aristocracy.

Especially likely to go unnoticed are
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[Bekker 1307b line 1]
aristocracies as they change. They break down little by little. We said earlier, about all constitutions in general, that small things also cause changes. Once people let something connected with the constitution slip, they then
[Bekker 1307b line 5]
change another, slightly bigger thing more easily, until they have changed the whole arrangement. This also happened in the constitution of Thurii. A law required five years between terms as general. Some younger men became skilled in war and gained a good reputation with the mass of garrison troops. They despised those in
[Bekker 1307b line 10]
charge and thought they could easily take control. They first tried to abolish this law, so that the same men could serve as generals continuously, seeing that the people would eagerly vote for them. The officials responsible for this, called the councilors, initially set out to oppose it,
[Bekker 1307b line 15]
but were persuaded to agree. They assumed that after changing this law the men would leave the rest of the constitution alone. Later, when other things were changed, they wanted to prevent it, but could no longer do anything. The whole structure of the constitution changed into rule by the powerful men who had attempted the revolution.

All constitutions
[Bekker 1307b line 20]
are sometimes destroyed from within, sometimes from outside, when an opposite constitution is either nearby or far away but powerful. This happened with the Athenians and Lacedaemonians. The Athenians overthrew oligarchies everywhere, and the Spartans overthrew democracies. As for the sources of changes
[Bekker 1307b line 25]
in constitutions and factions, we have now said nearly all we need to.

Next we must discuss how constitutions are preserved, both in general and individually. First, it is clear that if we know what destroys constitutions, we also know what preserves them. Opposite things produce opposite results, and destruction is
[Bekker 1307b line 30]
the opposite of preservation. In well-mixed constitutions, then, we must make sure above all that people don't break the law, and be especially watchful over small things. Lawbreaking slips in unnoticed, just as small expenses repeated often consume a fortune. The spending goes unnoticed
[Bekker 1307b line 35]
because it doesn't happen all at once. The mind is misled by these expenses, as by the deceptive argument that if each thing is small, all of them are small too. This is true in one sense but not in another. The whole, the total, isn't small; it is made up of small things.

This, then, is one precaution that, to begin with,
[Bekker 1307b line 40]
we must take. Next, we mustn't trust deceptive tricks
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[Bekker 1308a line 1]
devised against the crowd,

because the facts expose them (we explained earlier what we mean by constitutional tricks). We must also notice that some aristocracies and even oligarchies survive not because security
[Bekker 1308a line 5]
belongs to their constitutions, but because those who hold office treat both those outside the constitution and those in the citizen body well. They don't wrong those excluded. They admit their leading men into the constitution. They don't wrong those who seek honor by dishonoring them, or the many
[Bekker 1308a line 10]
by depriving them of gain. Within their own group, among those who participate, they treat one another democratically. The equality that democrats seek for the crowd is not only just among equals but also an advantage. So if the citizen body is fairly large, many democratic laws are useful,
[Bekker 1308a line 15]
such as six-month terms of office, so that all the equals can share in them. The equals already form something like a people (this is why demagogues often arise among them too, as we said earlier). Also, oligarchies and aristocracies are then less likely to fall under the rule of powerful groups. It isn't as easy to do harm
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when holding office for a short time as for a long one. This is why tyrannies arise in oligarchies and democracies. Either the most powerful men try to establish tyranny: the demagogues in one, the powerful oligarchs in the other. Or those holding the highest offices try to do so when their terms are long.

### Book V, 1308a–1311b

Constitutions survive
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not only because the things that destroy them are far away, but sometimes because they're close. Fear makes people keep a firmer grip on their constitution. So those who care for the constitution should create fears. This will make people guard it and not abandon, as they would a night watch,
[Bekker 1308a line 30]
their watch over the constitution. They must also make distant dangers seem close. They must also try to use the laws to keep the rivalries and factions of the notables in check. They must protect those outside the rivalry before they're drawn into it too. Recognizing an evil as it begins isn't the work of just anyone, but requires political
[Bekker 1308a line 35]
judgment. There is also the change from oligarchy and polity, a mixed constitution, caused by property qualifications. This happens when the qualifications stay the same but money becomes more plentiful. To deal with it, it helps to compare the total assessed value of wealth with its earlier amount. In some
[Bekker 1308a line 40]
cities assessments are made every year. The comparison should be done each year;

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[Bekker 1308b line 1]
in larger cities, every three or five years. If the total is a multiple or a fraction of what it was when the constitution's assessments were set, a law should require the property qualifications to be raised or lowered. If the total has grown, the qualifications should rise
[Bekker 1308b line 5]
in the same proportion. If it has fallen, they should be lowered and the assessment made smaller. If this isn't done in oligarchies and polities, one kind of shift produces an oligarchy in some cases and a ruling clique in others. The opposite shift turns a polity into a democracy, and an oligarchy into
[Bekker 1308b line 10]
a polity or popular government.

One rule applies to popular government, oligarchy, monarchy, and every constitution: don't increase anyone's power too far beyond its proper proportion. Instead, try to give small honors over a long period rather than great ones quickly. (People become corrupted, and not everyone can bear
[Bekker 1308b line 15]
good fortune.) Failing that, at least don't take away all at once honors that were given all at once. Take them away gradually. Above all, try to regulate things through the laws so that no one becomes far more powerful than others through friends or money. Failing that, arrange for these people to spend their time abroad.
[Bekker 1308b line 20]
People's private lives also lead them to seek revolution. So there should be an office to watch ways of life that don't fit the constitution. In a democracy, watch those who don't fit democracy; in an oligarchy, those who don't fit oligarchy. The same applies in each other constitution. Prosperity within the city
[Bekker 1308b line 25]
should be watched in any particular section for the same reasons. The remedy is always to give public business and offices to opposing sections. (By opposing sections I mean the decent people and the multitude, and the poor and the wealthy.) Try either to mix the poor with those who are
[Bekker 1308b line 30]
wealthy, or to enlarge the middle class. (This ends factions caused by inequality.) The most important thing in every constitution is to arrange the laws and the rest of the administration so that offices can't be used for profit.

This needs special attention in oligarchic constitutions. The many aren't so angry at being kept out
[Bekker 1308b line 35]
of office. In fact, they're happy if they're allowed time for their own affairs. But if they think the rulers are stealing public funds, then both things upset them: having no share in the honors and having no share in the profits. There is just one way for democracy and aristocracy to exist together:
[Bekker 1308b line 40]
by setting things up like this.

For then both the
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[Bekker 1309a line 1]
notables and the multitude could have what they want. Allowing everyone to hold office is democratic. Having the notables in office is aristocratic. This will happen when offices offer no profit. The poor
[Bekker 1309a line 5]
won't want office if they make nothing from it. They'll prefer to attend to their own affairs. The wealthy will be able to hold office because they don't need anything from public funds. So the poor will become wealthy by spending their time at work, while the notables won't be ruled by just anyone.
[Bekker 1309a line 10]
To keep public funds from being stolen, the money should be handed over with all the citizens present. Copies of the accounts should be deposited with the brotherhoods, companies, and tribes. To encourage service without profit, honors should be set by law for those who earn a good name. In democracies, the
[Bekker 1309a line 15]
wealthy should be spared. Not only should their property not be redistributed, but neither should its produce. In some constitutions this happens without people noticing. It's also better to stop them, even when they want to, from performing costly but useless public services, such as funding choruses, torch races, and other things of that kind.
[Bekker 1309a line 20]
In an oligarchy, take great care of the poor. Give them the offices that provide income. If a wealthy person treats them abusively, the penalties should be greater than if he did the same to someone of his own class. Inheritances should pass by family connection, not by gift, and no more than one inheritance
[Bekker 1309a line 25]
should pass to the same person. This would make properties more equal and bring more of the poor into wealth. In both democracy and oligarchy, it also helps to give those with less of a share in the constitution equality or precedence in other matters: the wealthy in popular government and, in oligarchy,
[Bekker 1309a line 30]
the poor. The exception is offices that control the constitution. These should be entrusted only, or mainly, to members of the governing body.

Those who are going to hold the sovereign offices need three things. First, they must be loyal to what is established:
[Bekker 1309a line 35]
the constitution. Next, they must have the greatest possible ability to do the office's work. Third, they need the virtue and justice that fit the constitution in each case. (If the just isn't the same under all constitutions, there must also be differences in justice.) But there's a difficulty when these qualities aren't
[Bekker 1309a line 40]
all found in the same person: how should the choice be made?

[Bekker 1309b]
[Bekker 1309b line 1]
Suppose one person is skilled as a general but bad and not loyal to the constitution, while another is just and loyal. How should we make the choice? It seems we must look at two things: which quality people generally have more of, and which they have less of. So in choosing a general,
[Bekker 1309b line 5]
look more to experience than to virtue. (People have less of a general's skill and more decency.) In choosing a guardian or treasurer, do the opposite. (These posts need more virtue than most people have, while the knowledge is common to everyone.)

Someone might ask: if a person has ability and loyalty to the constitution,
[Bekker 1309b line 10]
why is virtue needed? The other two will bring about what is to our advantage. Isn't it because people with those two qualities can lack self-control? They can fail to act in their own interests, even though they know and love themselves. So nothing prevents some from behaving the same way toward the public. In short, all the things we describe in the laws as being to the advantage
[Bekker 1309b line 15]
of constitutions preserve them. And the greatest element is the one often mentioned: take care that the body of people who want the constitution is stronger than the body who don't. Besides all this, we mustn't overlook something that deviant constitutions now overlook: the middle course.
[Bekker 1309b line 20]
Many apparently democratic measures destroy democracies, and many apparently oligarchic ones destroy oligarchies. People who think this is the only virtue pull things to an extreme. They don't realize that a nose can depart from the most beautiful straight shape toward a hooked or snub shape and
[Bekker 1309b line 25]
still be beautiful and pleasant to look at. But if someone pushes it still further to an extreme, it will first lose the proper proportion of that part. In the end, excess and deficiency in these opposite features will make it no longer even look like a nose. The same holds for
[Bekker 1309b line 30]
the other parts of the body. This also happens with the other constitutions. An oligarchy or a democracy can work well enough even though it has departed from the best arrangement. But if someone pushes either further, he will first make the constitution worse and finally leave no constitution at all.
[Bekker 1309b line 35]
So the lawgiver and the statesman must know which democratic measures preserve democracy and which destroy it, and likewise which oligarchic measures preserve or destroy oligarchy. Neither can exist or last without both the wealthy and the multitude. But when
[Bekker 1309b line 40]
property becomes equal, this must be a different constitution.

[Bekker 1310a]
[Bekker 1310a line 1]
So when they destroy these groups through extreme laws, they destroy their constitutions.

Mistakes are made both in democracies and in oligarchies. In democracies, the popular leaders make them where the multitude is sovereign over the laws. Two opposing sides
[Bekker 1310a line 5]
they constantly create within the city by fighting the wealthy. Instead, they should always appear to speak for the wealthy. In oligarchies, the oligarchs should speak for the people. And oligarchs should swear the opposite oaths to those they swear now. In some places they now swear: "I will be hostile to the people and plan
[Bekker 1310a line 10]
whatever harm I can." They should think and publicly profess the opposite, declaring in their oaths: "I won't wrong the people."

Of all the things mentioned, the most important for keeping constitutions in place is education suited to the constitution. Everyone neglects it now. There is no benefit in
[Bekker 1310a line 15]
even the most helpful laws, approved by all who take part in public life, if people aren't trained and educated in the constitution: democratically if the laws are democratic, oligarchically if they're oligarchic. For if an individual can lack self-control, a city can too. Education
[Bekker 1310a line 20]
suited to the constitution doesn't mean doing what pleases the oligarchs or those who want democracy. It means doing what will let the former govern as oligarchs and the latter live under democratic government. As things stand in oligarchies, the rulers' sons live in luxury, while the sons of the poor are trained and used to hard work,
[Bekker 1310a line 25]
so they have both more desire and more ability to make revolutionary changes. In the democracies thought to be most democratic, the arrangement is the opposite of what is to their advantage. This is because they define freedom badly. Two things are thought to define democracy: the majority being sovereign and
[Bekker 1310a line 30]
freedom. The just is thought to mean equality, and equality means that whatever the multitude decides is sovereign. Freedom and equality mean doing whatever you want. So in democracies of this kind everyone lives as he wants, "for whatever he longs for," as Euripides says. This is bad. We shouldn't
[Bekker 1310a line 35]
think of living in line with the constitution as slavery, but as safety. These, then, are broadly the causes through which constitutions change and are destroyed, and the means through which they're preserved and endure.

It remains to discuss monarchy too: what causes
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its destruction and what naturally preserves it.

Almost the same
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[Bekker 1310b line 1]
as what we described for constitutions is what happens to kingships and tyrannies. Kingship follows the pattern of aristocracy. Tyranny combines the most extreme oligarchy with democracy.
[Bekker 1310b line 5]
This is why it is also the most harmful to the ruled. It combines two bad forms and has the deviations and faults of both constitutions. From the very beginning, the two kinds of monarchy arise from opposite sources. Help against the people
[Bekker 1310b line 10]
came through kingship to the decent people. A king is appointed from among the decent people for outstanding virtue, deeds arising from virtue, or outstanding family background of that kind. A tyrant comes from the people and the multitude to oppose the notables, so that the people aren't wronged by them. Events make this clear. Nearly
[Bekker 1310b line 15]
all tyrants, we might say, have come from popular leaders who won trust by attacking the notables. Some tyrannies were set up in this way after the cities had already grown. Earlier ones arose from kings who departed from ancestral customs. Rule more like that of a master
[Bekker 1310b line 20]
was what they wanted. Others arose from men elected to the sovereign offices. (In early times, the people appointed civic officials and sacred envoys for long terms.) Others arose from oligarchies that chose one person to control the greatest offices. In all these ways it was easy to achieve tyranny,
[Bekker 1310b line 25]
if they only wanted to, because they already had power: some from royal rule, others from the honor of office. For example, Pheidon at Argos and others became tyrants from existing kingships. Those in Ionia and Phalaris did so from offices. Panaetius at Leontini, Cypselus at Corinth,
[Bekker 1310b line 30]
Pisistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and others likewise did so from popular leadership. As we said, kingship follows the pattern of aristocracy. It rests on merit: personal virtue, family background, services rendered, or these together with power. All
[Bekker 1310b line 35]
who had benefited cities or peoples, or had the ability to do so, received this honor. Some kept them from being enslaved in war, like Codrus. Others freed them, like Cyrus. Others founded a settlement or acquired territory, like the kings of Lacedaemon, Macedonia, and
[Bekker 1310b line 40]
the Molossians. The king wants to be a guardian,

so that
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property owners suffer no injustice and the people suffer no abuse. Tyranny, as we've said many times, has no concern for anything public except for the sake of its own benefit. The tyrant's aim is pleasure,
[Bekker 1311a line 5]
the king's is the noble. So among the advantages they seek, money is more characteristic of tyranny, and honor of kingship. A king's guard consists of citizens; a tyrant's, of foreigners.

It's clear that tyranny has the evils of both democracy and oligarchy. From oligarchy it takes
[Bekker 1311a line 10]
wealth as its goal. (This is the only way its guard and its luxury can be maintained.) It also takes complete distrust of the multitude. (That's why tyrants take away their weapons.) Mistreating the masses, driving them out of the urban center, and scattering them into separate settlements are common to both
[Bekker 1311a line 15]
oligarchy and tyranny. From democracy it takes hostility to the notables: secretly or openly destroying them and sending them into exile as rivals and obstacles to rule. Plots arise from these people, since some want to rule themselves and others don't want
[Bekker 1311a line 20]
to be slaves. This explains Periander's advice to Thrasybulus: cutting off the ears of grain that stood above the rest, meaning that the outstanding citizens should always be killed. So, as we have more or less said, we must take the starting points of changes in constitutions and monarchies to be the same.
[Bekker 1311a line 25]
Many of the ruled attack monarchies because of injustice, fear, or contempt. Among forms of injustice, abusive treatment is the main cause, though sometimes it is the loss of their own property.

The aims are also the same in tyrannies and kingships as in the other constitutions.
[Bekker 1311a line 30]
Monarchs possess great wealth and honor, which everyone desires. Some attacks target the rulers' persons, others their rule. Those caused by abusive treatment target the person. Abuse has many forms, and each causes anger. Among those who are angry,
[Bekker 1311a line 35]
most attack for revenge, not for a position of superiority. For example, the attack on the sons of Pisistratus came from the public insult to Harmodius's sister and the affront to Harmodius. (Harmodius acted because of his sister, and Aristogeiton because of Harmodius.) There was also a plot against Periander,
[Bekker 1311a line 40]
the tyrant at Ambracia, because, while drinking with
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his young lover, he asked him whether he was pregnant by him yet.

Pausanias's attack on Philip came because Philip allowed Attalus and his associates to abuse him. Derdas's attack on Amyntas the Small came because Amyntas boasted about his youthful favors. There was also the
[Bekker 1311b line 5]
eunuch's attack on Evagoras of Cyprus. He killed Evagoras because Evagoras's son had taken his wife from him. He considered this an outrage. Many attacks have also happened because some monarchs sexually disgraced people. Crataeus's attack on Archelaus was one. He always resented their sexual relationship, so enough
[Bekker 1311b line 10]
would have been even a smaller pretext—or because Archelaus gave him neither daughter, though he had promised one to him. Instead, when pressed by war with Sirrhas and Arrhabaeus, he gave the older daughter to the king of Elimeia, and the younger to his son Amyntas. He thought this would make Amyntas least likely to quarrel
[Bekker 1311b line 15]
with his son by Cleopatra. But the starting point of Crataeus's alienation was his resentment at providing sexual favors. Hellanocrates of Larissa joined in the attack for the same reason. Archelaus enjoyed his youthful favors but didn't restore him to his home as promised. An intent to humiliate, not sexual desire,
[Bekker 1311b line 20]
was, he thought, the reason for their relationship. Python and Heraclides of Aenus killed Cotys to avenge their father. Adamas rebelled against Cotys because Cotys had castrated him as a boy, which he considered an outrage.

### Book V, 1311b–1315a

Many people have also been angered by the physical abuse of being beaten. Some have killed,
[Bekker 1311b line 25]
and others have attempted to kill, even officeholders and members of royal ruling families, because they felt outraged. At Mytilene, for example, the Penthilids went around beating people with clubs. Megacles attacked them with his friends and killed them. Later, Smerdis, after being beaten,
[Bekker 1311b line 30]
was dragged away from his wife and killed Penthilus. Decamnichus also became the leader of the attack on Archelaus. He was the first to stir up the attackers. The cause of his anger was that Archelaus handed him over to the poet Euripides to be whipped. Euripides was angry because Decamnichus had said something about his bad breath. Many others too
[Bekker 1311b line 35]
have been killed or plotted against for reasons like these. Fear likewise causes attacks. This was one of the causes in constitutions, and it is also one in monarchies. For example, Artapanes attacked Xerxes because he feared being accused over Darius. He had hanged Darius without Xerxes's orders, but thought
[Bekker 1311b line 40]
Xerxes would forgive him, being forgetful because he was dining. Other attacks come from
[Bekker 1312a]
[Bekker 1312a line 1]
contempt,

as when someone saw Sardanapalus carding wool with the women. (If the storytellers tell the truth about this; and if it wasn't true of him, it could still be true of someone else.) Dion also attacked the younger Dionysius because he
[Bekker 1312a line 5]
despised him. He saw that the citizens felt the same way and that Dionysius was always drunk. Some friends also attack out of contempt. Being trusted makes them think they can escape notice. Those who think they can seize power also attack, in a sense, out of contempt.
[Bekker 1312a line 10]
Because they believe they are capable and their power makes them dismiss the danger, they readily attempt it. This happens with generals serving monarchs. For example, Cyrus attacked Astyages, despising both his way of life and his power, because his forces had become inactive and he himself lived in luxury. Seuthes the Thracian likewise attacked Amadocus while serving as his general.
[Bekker 1312a line 15]
Some attack for more than one of these reasons: from both contempt and a desire for gain, for example, as Mithridates attacked Ariobarzanes. Those most likely to attempt it for this reason are bold by nature and hold military rank under monarchs. Courage backed by power is boldness. Because of
[Bekker 1312a line 20]
both, they make their attacks expecting to win easily.

For those who attack from ambition, the cause is of a different kind from those mentioned before. Some attack tyrants because they see the great profits and honors available to them. But this isn't how each person who attacks from ambition
[Bekker 1312a line 25]
chooses to run the risk. The first group acts for the reason just mentioned. The second attacks monarchs as they would undertake any extraordinary action that would make them famous and known to others. They don't want to acquire
[Bekker 1312a line 30]
monarchy, but a reputation. However, very few are moved by this cause. They must be prepared to care nothing for survival if they can't bring their undertaking to completion. They must follow Dion's thinking, but few can easily develop it.
[Bekker 1312a line 35]
He marched against Dionysius with a few men, saying that his attitude was this: however far he could advance, taking that much part in the undertaking would be enough for him. For example, if he happened to die as soon as he had set foot even a little way into the country, that death would satisfy him.

A tyranny is destroyed, in one case,
[Bekker 1312a line 40]
in this way: like each other constitution, from outside,

[Bekker 1312b]
[Bekker 1312b line 1]
if an opposing constitution is stronger. (It will clearly want to destroy it because their aims are opposed. And everyone does what they want when they can.) These are the opposing constitutions: popular government is opposed to tyranny in Hesiod's sense,
[Bekker 1312b line 5]
"as potter to potter." (For the most extreme democracy is also a tyranny.) Kingship and aristocracy are opposed because their constitutions are opposite to tyranny. (That's why the Lacedaemonians destroyed the most tyrannies, and the Syracusans did so during the period when their public life was well ordered.) Another way is from within, when those who share
[Bekker 1312b line 10]
in it form factions. This happened with the tyranny of Gelon and his associates, and now with that of Dionysius and his associates. In Gelon's case, Thrasybulus, Hieron's brother, played the popular leader with Gelon's son and urged him toward pleasures so that he himself could rule. The family united to stop the overthrow of the whole tyranny and get rid of Thrasybulus instead. But those
[Bekker 1312b line 15]
who joined them, seeing their opportunity, drove all of them out. In Dionysius's case, Dion, his relative by marriage, marched against him and won the people to his side. He drove Dionysius out but was himself killed. Hatred and contempt are the two main causes of attacks on tyrannies. One of these is always present
[Bekker 1312b line 20]
for tyrants: hatred. But contempt causes many of their overthrows. Here is evidence: most who acquired power also kept it, while almost all who inherited it lose it at once, so to speak. Living for enjoyment makes them easy to despise, and
[Bekker 1312b line 25]
gives attackers many opportunities. Anger should also be treated as a part of hatred. In a sense it causes the same actions. It is often even more effective than hatred. People attack with greater force because the emotion doesn't use reasoning. (People are especially likely
[Bekker 1312b line 30]
to follow their anger after abusive treatment. This was the cause of the overthrow of the tyranny of Pisistratus's sons and many others.) But hatred is more effective overall. Anger comes with pain, so reasoning isn't easy, while hostility is free from pain.

To state the main points, all the causes we have mentioned
[Bekker 1312b line 35]
for the unmixed and most extreme oligarchy and the most extreme democracy must also be taken as causes for tyranny. For these too are tyrannies divided among several people. Kingship is least likely to be destroyed from outside, and so it lasts a long time. Most of its destruction from within
[Bekker 1312b line 40]
comes about. Two causes destroy it:

the first is
[Bekker 1313a]
[Bekker 1313a line 1]
faction among those who hold royal power. The second is an attempt to rule more like tyrants. Kings claim authority over more things, even against the law. Kingships no longer arise today. Any monarchies that do arise are tyrannies
[Bekker 1313a line 5]
rather than kingships, because kingship is rule over willing subjects but has authority over greater matters. There are many people who are alike, and no one stands out enough to match the scale and dignity of the office. For this reason people don't willingly submit. If someone rules through deception or force,
[Bekker 1313a line 10]
this is considered tyranny from the start. In hereditary kingships, besides the causes already mentioned, we must include the fact that many kings become easy to despise. Another cause is that they behave abusively despite possessing not a tyrant's power but a king's honor. Overthrow then becomes easy. If the people no longer want him,
[Bekker 1313a line 15]
he will cease to be king at once, whereas a tyrant remains even if they don't want him. Monarchies, then, are destroyed for these and other similar reasons.

Clearly, in general terms, they are preserved by the opposite causes. To be specific, kingships are preserved by making them
[Bekker 1313a line 20]
more moderate. The fewer things kings have authority over, the longer the whole rule must last. They become less like masters and more like equals in their character, and the ruled resent them less. This is why kingship among the Molossians lasted a long time.
[Bekker 1313a line 25]
Kingship among the Lacedaemonians lasted because the rule was divided in two from the start. Theopompus also moderated it in other ways and established the office of the ephors alongside it. By taking away some of its power, he lengthened the kingship's duration. So in a sense he made it not smaller but
[Bekker 1313a line 30]
greater. They say this was also his reply to his wife. She asked whether he wasn't ashamed to hand down a smaller kingship to his sons than he had received from his father. He said, "Certainly not. I'm handing down one that will last longer."

Tyrannies are preserved in two completely opposite ways.
[Bekker 1313a line 35]
One is the traditional way, by which most tyrants manage their rule. They say Periander of Corinth established most of these practices. Many similar ones can also be drawn from Persian rule. They include the measures discussed long ago for preserving, as far as possible,
[Bekker 1313a line 40]
a tyranny: cut down those who stand out and kill those with proud spirits. Allow no shared meals, clubs, education, or anything else of that kind.

Instead, everything
[Bekker 1313b]
[Bekker 1313b line 1]
that usually produces two things, self-confidence and trust, must be guarded against. Allow no places for leisure or other gatherings for spending leisure together. Do everything possible to make
[Bekker 1313b line 5]
everyone strangers to one another. (Getting to know one another creates more mutual trust.) Residents must always be visible and spend their time at the palace gates. (Then what they're doing is least likely to escape notice, and their constant slavery will train them to think little of themselves.) There are also all the other practices of Persian origin
[Bekker 1313b line 10]
and the foreign practices of this tyrannical kind. (They all have the same effect.) The tyrant must try to keep anything any of the ruled says or does from escaping notice. There should be spies, like the women called "informers" at Syracuse, and the "listeners" Hieron sent out wherever there was a meeting or gathering.
[Bekker 1313b line 15]
(People speak less freely because they fear such people, and if they do speak freely, they're less likely to escape notice.) People should be slandered to one another and set against one another: friends against friends, the people against the notables, and the rich against one another. Making the ruled poor is also a tyrannical practice. Then no guard
[Bekker 1313b line 20]
can be maintained, and people are busy earning their daily living and have no time to plot. Examples are the pyramids in Egypt, the offerings of the Cypselids, the construction of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the sons of Pisistratus, and the works of Polycrates on Samos. (All these
[Bekker 1313b line 25]
have the same effect: keeping the ruled busy and poor.) There is also the imposition of taxes, as at Syracuse. (Under Dionysius, people ended up paying in their whole property over five years.) A tyrant also makes war, to keep people busy and make them constantly need a leader. And
[Bekker 1313b line 30]
while kingship is preserved through friends, it is characteristic of tyranny to distrust friends most of all. Everyone wants to attack, but friends are especially able to do so.

Everything that happens in the most extreme democracy is also characteristic of tyranny: women's power in the homes, so that they can report on
[Bekker 1313b line 35]
their husbands, and freedom from restraint for slaves, for the same reason. Neither slaves nor women plot against tyrants. When they prosper, they must be well disposed toward both tyrannies and democracies. For the people too want to be a monarch. That's also why flatterers are honored by both. Among
[Bekker 1313b line 40]
the people, it's the popular leader. (The popular leader is the people's flatterer.) Among tyrants, it's those who deal with them submissively,
[Bekker 1314a]
[Bekker 1314a line 1]
which is the work of flattery.

For this reason too, tyranny likes bad people. Tyrants enjoy being flattered, and no one with a free spirit would do that. Decent people offer affection or at least don't flatter. Bad people are also useful for bad tasks:
[Bekker 1314a line 5]
"one nail drives out another," as the proverb says. It's also characteristic of tyranny to dislike anyone dignified or free. (The tyrant claims that he alone should be like that. Anyone who shows dignity in return and behaves freely takes away the superiority and mastery of tyranny. So tyrants hate them as people who would overthrow their
[Bekker 1314a line 10]
rule.) It's also characteristic of tyranny to prefer foreigners to citizens as companions at meals and during the day. Citizens are seen as enemies, while foreigners make no claim on power—these and similar practices are tyrannical and preserve the rule, but they lack nothing in wickedness. All these things can, broadly speaking, be grouped under
[Bekker 1314a line 15]
three headings. Tyranny aims at three things. First, it makes the ruled think little of themselves. (Someone who thinks little of himself wouldn't plot against anyone.) Second, it makes them distrust one another. (A tyranny isn't overthrown until some people trust one another. That's why tyrants fight decent people as harmful
[Bekker 1314a line 20]
to their rule. Decent people don't think they should be ruled like slaves. They are also trustworthy to one another and to others. They don't inform against one another or others.) Third, it makes them unable to act. (No one attempts the impossible, so no one attempts to overthrow a tyranny without
[Bekker 1314a line 25]
the power to do so.) These, then, are the three goals to which tyrants' plans lead. All tyrannical measures can be traced back to these principles: some prevent people from trusting one another, others keep them powerless, and others make them think little of themselves.

This
[Bekker 1314a line 30]
then, is one way tyrannies are preserved. The other approach is almost the opposite of what we have described. We can learn it from the way kingships are destroyed. One way to destroy kingship is to make its rule more tyrannical. For tyranny, the way
[Bekker 1314a line 35]
to preserve it is to make it more like kingship. Only one thing must be kept: the power to rule not only over willing subjects but over unwilling ones too. Giving this up means giving up being a tyrant. This must remain as the basic condition. For the rest, the tyrant should do some things and appear to do others,
[Bekker 1314a line 40]
playing the king's part well. First, he should appear to
[Bekker 1314b]
[Bekker 1314b line 1]
care for public affairs,

not spending on gifts that anger the multitude. They get angry when tyrants take money from people who work and struggle to scrape by, then give lavishly to courtesans, foreigners, and performers. As for an account,
[Bekker 1314b line 5]
he should also give one of what he receives and spends, as some tyrants have already done. (By managing things in this way, he would seem to be a household manager rather than a tyrant. He needn't fear that he will ever run short of money, since he controls the city. In fact, for tyrants who travel away from their own country,
[Bekker 1314b line 10]
this is more to their advantage than leaving behind a pile of money. The guards would be less likely to attack the government. For tyrants abroad, the guards are more dangerous than the citizens. The guards go abroad with them, while the citizens stay behind.) Next, the levies and public services
[Bekker 1314b line 15]
should appear to be collected for the sake of administration and to meet needs that may arise in times of war. In general, he should act as guardian and treasurer of public funds, not of his own. He should appear dignified rather than harsh, and be the sort of person whose visitors feel no fear
[Bekker 1314b line 20]
but respect instead. But this isn't easy to achieve if he's easy to despise. So even if he doesn't attend to the other virtues, he must attend to military virtue and create that reputation for himself. Moreover, not only must he appear to abuse none of the ruled, neither young men nor
[Bekker 1314b line 25]
young women, but neither must anyone around him. The women of his household must likewise treat other women this way. Many tyrannies have been lost through women's abusive behavior too. As for bodily pleasures, he should do the opposite of what some tyrants now do. (They don't just indulge from
[Bekker 1314b line 30]
early morning and continuously for many days. They also want others to see them doing it, so people will admire them as happy and blessed.) Ideally, he should be moderate in such things. Failing that, he should at least avoid being seen by others. (The one easy to attack or despise
[Bekker 1314b line 35]
is not the sober man but the drunk; not the wakeful man but the sleeping one.) He should do the opposite of almost everything mentioned earlier. (He should equip and beautify the city as its steward, not as its tyrant.) He should also always appear especially serious about his duties to the gods. (People are less
[Bekker 1314b line 40]
afraid of being treated unlawfully by such rulers

[Bekker 1315a]
[Bekker 1315a line 1]
if they think the ruler is religious and cares about the gods. They also plot less against him, thinking he has the gods as allies.) But he should show this without foolishness. He should honor people who are good at something in such a way
[Bekker 1315a line 5]
that they don't think they could ever be honored more by citizens governing themselves. He should award these honors himself, but impose punishments through other rulers and law courts. A safeguard common to every monarchy is not to make any one person great, but, if necessary, several. (They will watch one another.)
[Bekker 1315a line 10]
If it is necessary to make someone great, at least don't choose someone bold in character. (That sort of character is most ready to attack in every undertaking.) If he decides to reduce someone's power, he should do this gradually, not take away all his authority at once. He should also keep away from every kind of abuse,
[Bekker 1315a line 15]
and especially two: bodily punishment and sexual abuse of the young. He must be particularly careful of this with those who love honor. Those who love money resent disrespect for their money. Those who love honor resent dishonor, as do decent
[Bekker 1315a line 20]
people. So he should either not do such things, or make punishments appear fatherly and not contemptuous, and sexual relationships with the young appear based on desire, not on power. In general, he should make up for apparent dishonors with greater honors. Among those who attempt
[Bekker 1315a line 25]
to kill him, the most dangerous and those who need the most guarding against are those who don't choose to preserve their own lives after the killing. So he must be especially wary of people who think they themselves or those they care about have been abused. People who attack out of anger have no concern for themselves,
[Bekker 1315a line 30]
as Heraclitus also said: "It's hard to fight anger, because it buys at the price of life."

### Book V, 1315a–1316b

Since cities are made up of two groups, poor people and wealthy people, the main thing is to make both believe that his rule keeps them safe, and that neither group is
[Bekker 1315a line 35]
wronged by the other. Whichever group is stronger, he should make it especially loyal to his rule. If he achieves this, the tyrant won't need to free slaves or take away weapons. Adding either group to his own forces is enough to make him stronger than
[Bekker 1315a line 40]
those who attack him. There is no need to discuss each of these measures separately. The aim is clear:

he must seem to the ruled not like a tyrant,
[Bekker 1315b]
[Bekker 1315b line 1]
but like a household manager and a king; not someone who takes what belongs to others, but someone who looks after it. He must aim for moderation in his way of life, not excess. He must also be friendly with the notables and win over the people. As a result,
[Bekker 1315b line 5]
these measures must make his rule nobler and more desirable. He rules better people, not people who have been humiliated. He does not remain hated and feared. His rule must also last longer. Besides, his own character will either be well disposed toward virtue or at least halfway good,
[Bekker 1315b line 10]
and not bad, but only halfway bad.

Yet oligarchy and tyranny are the shortest-lived of all constitutions. The longest-lasting tyranny was the one at Sicyon, that of Orthagoras and his descendants. It lasted a hundred years. The reason was
[Bekker 1315b line 15]
that they treated the ruled with moderation and obeyed the laws in many matters. Cleisthenes was also a capable soldier, so he was not easily despised. For the most part, they won over the people by looking after them. Cleisthenes, for instance, is said to have crowned the judge who denied him victory. Some say that
[Bekker 1315b line 20]
the seated statue in the marketplace is a likeness of the man who made this judgment. They also say that Pisistratus once submitted to trial when summoned before the Areopagus. Second came the tyranny of the Cypselids at Corinth. This lasted seventy-three years and six months. Cypselus was tyrant for
[Bekker 1315b line 25]
thirty years, Periander for forty-four, and Psammetichus, the son of Gordius, for three. The reasons for its survival were the same. Cypselus won over the people and went without a bodyguard throughout his rule. Periander was tyrannical, but a capable soldier. Third came
[Bekker 1315b line 30]
the tyranny of the Pisistratids at Athens. It was not continuous, since Pisistratus went into exile twice during his tyranny. So out of thirty-three years he was tyrant for seventeen. His sons ruled for eighteen, making thirty-five years in all. Among the remaining tyrannies was that of Hieron and Gelon at
[Bekker 1315b line 35]
Syracuse. This too lasted only a few years: eighteen in all. Gelon was tyrant for seven years and died in the eighth. Hieron ruled for ten, and Thrasybulus was driven out in the eleventh month. All of the many other tyrannies have been very short-lived.

[Bekker 1315b line 40]
As for constitutions and monarchies, and what destroys them or preserves them, almost
[Bekker 1316a]
[Bekker 1316a line 1]
everything has now been discussed.

In the Republic, Socrates discusses changes of constitution, but his account is not good. He does not explain the particular change that affects the best and first constitution. He says the cause is that
[Bekker 1316a line 5]
nothing stays as it is, but changes within a certain cycle. These changes begin when the base ratio of four to three, joined with five, produces two harmonies. He means when the number of this geometrical figure becomes a cube, on the supposition that nature sometimes produces inferior people who are beyond the reach of education. On this point
[Bekker 1316a line 10]
he may not be wrong. There may be some people who cannot be educated and become good men. But why would this change be peculiar to what he calls the best constitution, rather than to all the others and everything that comes into being? And through the action of time, which he says
[Bekker 1316a line 15]
changes everything, do things that did not begin together also change together? For example, if something came into being the day before the turning point, does it change at the same time? Besides, why does this constitution change into the Spartan one? All constitutions change into their opposites more often than into
[Bekker 1316a line 20]
a closely related form. The same objection applies to the other changes. He says the Spartan constitution changes into oligarchy, oligarchy into democracy, and democracy into tyranny. Yet they also change in the reverse direction: for example, from democracy into oligarchy, and more often than into monarchy.

[Bekker 1316a line 25]
Besides, he does not say whether tyranny will change or not, or, if it does, why and into what constitution. The reason is that he could not easily say. It is undetermined, though on his account it ought to change into the first and best constitution. That would make the sequence continuous and circular. But tyranny also changes
[Bekker 1316a line 30]
into tyranny, as at Sicyon, from Myron's tyranny into that of Cleisthenes. It also changes into oligarchy, as Antileon's did at Chalcis; into democracy, as that of Gelon's family did at Syracuse; and into aristocracy, as Charilaus's did at Lacedaemon, and as happened at Carthage. A change into tyranny
[Bekker 1316a line 35]
also takes place from oligarchy. This happened to almost all the old oligarchies in Sicily. At Leontini the change was into the tyranny of Panaetius. At Gela it was into that of Cleander, and at Rhegium into that of Anaxilaus. The same happened in many other cities. It is also strange to think that a change into oligarchy is due to
[Bekker 1316a line 40]
the love of money and money-making among those
[Bekker 1316b]
[Bekker 1316b line 1]
in office.

Instead, people with much greater wealth think it unjust for those who own nothing to have an equal share in the city with property owners. In many oligarchies, money-making is not allowed. There are laws
[Bekker 1316b line 5]
against it. But in democratic Carthage they make money and have not yet changed their constitution.

It is also strange to say that an oligarchic city is two cities, one of the rich and one of the poor. Why is this more true of it than of Sparta or any other city? In those cities too, not everyone owns the same amount or is equally
[Bekker 1316b line 10]
good. Even without anyone becoming poorer than before, an oligarchy still changes into democracy if the poor become more numerous. A democracy changes into oligarchy if the wealthy group is stronger than the masses, and the latter are careless while the former pay attention. There are many causes
[Bekker 1316b line 15]
of changes, but he names only one: people become poor by wasting their money and being ruined by interest payments. This assumes that all or most of them were rich to begin with. That is false. When some of the leaders lose their wealth, they bring about change. When others do, nothing serious
[Bekker 1316b line 20]
happens. Even then, they are no more likely to change into democracy than into another constitution. Besides, if they are denied honors, wronged, or insulted, they form factions and change constitutions, even if they have not used up their wealth, because they are allowed to do whatever they want. Excessive freedom
[Bekker 1316b line 25]
is the cause of this, he says. There are several forms of oligarchy and democracy, but Socrates discusses their changes as though there were only one of each.

### Book VI, 1316b–1320b

[Bekker 1316b]
[Bekker 1316b line 31]
Deliberative bodies with supreme authority within a constitution, offices, and law courts: their kinds and number, their fit with each constitution; also, constitutional destruction and preservation,
[Bekker 1316b line 35]
how they happen and why—all this was discussed before. Since there are several kinds of democracy, and likewise of the other constitutions, we should also examine anything left to discuss about them. We should set out the appropriate and advantageous way of organizing each. We should also
[Bekker 1316b line 40]
examine combinations of all the previously mentioned
[Bekker 1317a]
[Bekker 1317a line 1]
arrangements;

combining these makes constitutions overlap, so that some aristocracies are oligarchic and some polities, constitutions combining democracy and oligarchy, more democratic. I mean combinations that need examining but have not yet been examined. For example,
[Bekker 1317a line 5]
the deliberative body and the choice of officeholders might be organized on oligarchic lines, but the law courts on aristocratic lines. Or the courts and the deliberative body might be oligarchic, but the choice of officeholders aristocratic. Or in some other way not all the parts of the constitution might be put together
[Bekker 1317a line 10]
in a way appropriate to it.

We have already said which democracy suits which city, which oligarchy suits which population, and which of the other constitutions is advantageous for which people. Still, we need to make clear not only which of these constitutions is best for cities, but also
[Bekker 1317a line 15]
how to set up these and the others. Let's go through this briefly. First let's discuss democracy. This will also make clear the opposite constitution, which some call oligarchy. For this inquiry we must take all the democratic features and all the features thought
[Bekker 1317a line 20]
to go with democracies. The kinds of democracy result from combinations of these. That is why there is more than one democracy, and why they differ. There are two reasons why democracies take several forms. The first, mentioned earlier, is that the people differ. Some populations are
[Bekker 1317a line 25]
farmers, others craftspeople and hired workers. When the first group is added to the second, and the third in turn to both, the difference is not just that democracy becomes better or worse. It is also no longer the same democracy. The second reason is the one we are now discussing. The features that
[Bekker 1317a line 30]
go with democracies and are thought appropriate to this constitution produce different democracies when combined. One will have fewer of these features, another more, and another all of them. Knowing each feature is useful both for setting up whichever democracy someone happens to want
[Bekker 1317a line 35]
and for correcting it. People who establish constitutions try to gather all the features appropriate to their basic principle. But they make a mistake by doing this, as we said earlier in discussing the destruction and preservation of constitutions. Now let's discuss their principles, their habits, and their aims.

[Bekker 1317a line 40]
The basic principle of a democratic constitution is freedom. This is what people usually say, claiming that only in this constitution
[Bekker 1317b]
[Bekker 1317b line 1]
do people have a share in freedom;

they say that every democracy aims at this. One part of freedom is to be ruled and to rule in turn. For democratic justice means equality based on number, not on worth. If this
[Bekker 1317b line 5]
is the just, the masses must be sovereign. Whatever the majority decides must be final and must be the just. They say that each citizen should have an equal share. As a result, in democracies the poor have more authority than the wealthy. There are more of them, and what
[Bekker 1317b line 10]
the majority decides is authoritative. This is one sign of freedom, which all supporters of democracy set up as a defining feature of the constitution. Another is to live as one wants. They say this is the effect of freedom, since the slave's condition is to live not as he wants. This is democracy's second defining feature. From it comes
[Bekker 1317b line 15]
the desire not to be ruled, preferably by anyone, or, failing that, only in turn. In this way it contributes to freedom based on equality.

With these assumptions and this basic principle, the following arrangements are democratic. Everyone chooses officeholders from everyone. Everyone rules
[Bekker 1317b line 20]
each person, and each person in turn rules everyone. Offices are filled by lot, either all of them or those that do not need experience and skill. Offices require no property qualification, or the smallest possible one. No one holds the same office twice, or only rarely, or in only a few offices apart from military ones. Terms are short for
[Bekker 1317b line 25]
all offices, or as many as possible. Everyone serves as a juror, drawn from everyone, and judges all matters, or most of them and the greatest and most important ones. These include reviews of officeholders' conduct, constitutional matters, and private dealings. The assembly is sovereign in everything or in the most important matters. No office
[Bekker 1317b line 30]
is sovereign in anything, or only in as few matters as possible; or the council is sovereign in the most important matters. Of the offices, the council is the most democratic where there is not enough money to pay everyone. Where there is, they take away the power of this office too. When the people have enough pay, they bring all decisions before themselves, as was said earlier in the inquiry preceding
[Bekker 1317b line 35]
this one. Next, preferably everyone should be paid: the assembly, the law courts, and the officeholders. If that is not possible, the officeholders, the law courts, the council, and the sovereign meetings of the assembly should be paid, or those officeholders who must eat together. Also, since oligarchy is defined by birth, wealth, and education,
[Bekker 1317b line 40]
their opposites are thought democratic: low birth, poverty, and manual work. Another feature is that no office is held for life.

[Bekker 1318a]
[Bekker 1318a line 1]
If an office of this kind survives from an earlier change, at least its power should be taken away, and its holders should be selected by lot instead of by choice. These, then, are the features common to democracies. From what people agree is democratic justice
[Bekker 1318a line 5]
(everyone having an equal share based on number) comes the form thought most fully democratic: rule by the people. Equality means that the poor should have no more rule than the wealthy, and should not be the only sovereign group. Everyone should have an equal share based on number. In this way, people would think that the constitution had both equality
[Bekker 1318a line 10]
and freedom.

The next question is how they will have an equal share. Should the property qualifications of the five hundred be divided among a thousand, so that the thousand have the same power as the five hundred? Or should equality in this respect be arranged differently: divide them
[Bekker 1318a line 15]
in this way, then take equal numbers from the five hundred and the thousand and make these people sovereign over the choice of officeholders and the law courts? Is this constitution the most just by democratic standards of justice, or is the one based on numbers more just? Supporters of democracy say that whatever the majority decides is just.
[Bekker 1318a line 20]
Supporters of oligarchy say the same about the decision of the greater wealth, since they say that the amount of wealth should decide. Both involve inequality and injustice. If what the few decide is authoritative, that is tyranny. For if one person has more than the other wealthy people, oligarchic justice makes it just for him alone to rule. If,
[Bekker 1318a line 25]
on the other hand, the numerical majority decides, they will act unjustly by confiscating the property of the rich, who are fewer, as we said earlier.

So we must examine what equality both groups will accept, starting from the definitions of the just that both use. They say that whatever the majority of citizens decides must be authoritative.
[Bekker 1318a line 30]
Let this stand, but not without qualification. Since the city consists of two groups, the rich and the poor, let whatever both groups, or their majorities, decide be authoritative. If they make opposite decisions, let the decision follow the majority whose total property qualification is greater. For example, suppose one group has ten members and the other twenty. Suppose one decision is favored, among the rich, by
[Bekker 1318a line 35]
six people, while the opposite is favored by fifteen of the poorer people. Four of the rich have joined the poor, and five of the poor have joined the rich. Whichever side has the greater total property qualification, counting both groups on each side together, should be authoritative. If they turn out equal, this is a problem shared by all constitutions, just as
[Bekker 1318a line 40]
now when the assembly or law court is evenly divided.

Either
[Bekker 1318b]
[Bekker 1318b line 1]
we must decide by lot or do something else of that kind. But however hard it may be to discover the truth about equality and the just, it is still easier to find it than to persuade people who can take more than their share. Equality and
[Bekker 1318b line 5]
what is just are always sought by the weaker. Those who have the upper hand do not care at all.

There are four democracies, and the first in order is the best, as we said in the earlier discussions. It is also the oldest of them all. I call it the first according to the way we might divide the people into groups. The farming people
[Bekker 1318b line 10]
are the best. So it is possible to make a democracy where the masses live by farming or raising livestock. Because they have little property, they have no leisure and cannot often attend the assembly. Since they have the necessities of life, they spend their time at work and do not want what belongs to others. They find it more pleasant
[Bekker 1318b line 15]
to work than to take part in public life and hold office, where offices do not offer large profits. Most people want profit more than honor. There is evidence for this: they put up with the old tyrannies and still put up with oligarchies, provided no one stops them from working or
[Bekker 1318b line 20]
takes anything from them. Some of them soon get rich, and the others are not in need. Besides, being sovereign over the choice of officeholders and the review of their conduct makes up for what they lack, if they have any desire for honor. In some democracies, even if the people have no part in the choice of officeholders, but certain people chosen from everyone take turns doing this,
[Bekker 1318b line 25]
as at Mantinea, the masses are satisfied if they are sovereign over deliberation. We should regard this too as a form of democracy, like the one that once existed at Mantinea. So in the democracy described earlier, it is useful and usual for everyone to choose officeholders, review their conduct, and
[Bekker 1318b line 30]
serve as jurors. The greatest offices are held by people chosen on the basis of property qualifications. Greater offices require greater qualifications. Alternatively, no office need have a property qualification, but capable people should hold office. People who take part in public life in this way must do so well. The offices will always be in the hands of the best people, with the people's consent and without their resenting
[Bekker 1318b line 35]
the decent people. This arrangement must also satisfy the decent people and the notables. They will not be ruled by others who are worse than themselves, and they will rule justly because others are sovereign over the review of their conduct. It is advantageous to have a check hanging over them, and not to be free to do anything they decide. Freedom
[Bekker 1318b line 40]
to do whatever one wants cannot keep in check the bad that is in
[Bekker 1319a]
[Bekker 1319a line 1]
every human being.

So the result must be what is most beneficial in constitutions: decent people rule without making mistakes, while the masses lose nothing.

It is clear, then, that this is the best democracy,
[Bekker 1319a line 5]
and why: because the people are of a certain kind. To make the people farmers, some laws established long ago in many places are certainly useful. One forbids anyone to own more land than a certain amount, either anywhere or within a certain distance of the town
[Bekker 1319a line 10]
and city. In many cities there was an old law that even forbade selling the original allotments. The law said to be that of Oxylus has a similar effect: it forbids lending against a certain part of each person's land. Today we should also make corrections by using the law of the people of Aphytis,
[Bekker 1319a line 15]
since it is useful for what we are discussing. Although there are many of them and they own little land, they all farm. They do not assess whole properties, but divide them into portions small enough that even the poor can exceed the required property qualifications.

After the farming population,
[Bekker 1319a line 20]
the best people are those who herd animals and live from livestock. This has many similarities to farming. These people are especially well trained in the habits needed for military action. Their bodies are fit for it, and they can live outdoors. Almost all the other populations
[Bekker 1319a line 25]
that make up the remaining democracies are much worse than these. Their way of life is bad. None of the work done by the population of craftspeople, marketplace workers, and hired laborers involves virtue. Besides, since practically all people of this kind spend their time around the marketplace and the town,
[Bekker 1319a line 30]
they can easily attend the assembly. Farmers, on the other hand, are scattered across the countryside. They neither come together nor feel the same need for this gathering. Where the territory is laid out so that the countryside is far from the city, it is also easy to make a good democracy
[Bekker 1319a line 35]
and constitution. The masses have to settle in the fields. So even if there are masses of marketplace workers, democracies should not hold assemblies without the country population. We have now said how to set up the best and first democracy. It is also clear
[Bekker 1319a line 40]
how to set up the others. We must depart from this in successive steps,
[Bekker 1319b]
[Bekker 1319b line 1]
singling out a worse population at each step.

The last form, because everyone shares in it, is not one that every city can bear. Nor can it easily last unless its laws and habits are well organized. As for nearly all the things that destroy this
[Bekker 1319b line 5]
and the other constitutions, we have already discussed them. To establish this democracy and make the people strong, its leaders usually bring in as many people as possible. They make citizens not only of legitimate children, but also of illegitimate children and of anyone with either
[Bekker 1319b line 10]
parent a citizen, whether the father or the mother. All this is more suited to a people of this kind. This is how popular leaders usually set it up. But they should add people only until the masses outnumber the notables and the middle class, and go no further. If they go too far,
[Bekker 1319b line 15]
they make the constitution more disorderly and provoke the notables to find democracy still harder to put up with. This was the cause of faction at Cyrene. People overlook a little evil, but when it grows large, it is more noticeable. Also,
[Bekker 1319b line 20]
measures like those Cleisthenes used at Athens when he wanted to expand democracy, and those used by the founders of democracy at Cyrene, are useful for this kind of democracy. They should create more tribes and kinship groups, different from the old ones. They should combine the rites of private shrines into a few
[Bekker 1319b line 25]
common ones. They should devise every means of mixing everyone together as much as possible and breaking up their old associations. All the measures used by tyrants also seem democratic. I mean, for example, the lack of control over slaves, which can be advantageous up to a point, and over women and
[Bekker 1319b line 30]
children, and overlooking people's living however they want. There will be much support for a constitution of this kind. Most people find it more pleasant to live without discipline than with self-control.

The greatest task of the lawgiver and those who want to organize a constitution of this kind is not to establish it,
[Bekker 1319b line 35]
nor is that their only task. Rather, they must ensure that it survives. It is not hard for people to live under any sort of constitution for one, two, or three days. So they should use our earlier examination of what preserves and destroys constitutions to try to secure it. They should guard against what destroys it
[Bekker 1319b line 40]
and establish laws, both unwritten and written,

[Bekker 1320a]
[Bekker 1320a line 1]
that include as fully as possible what preserves constitutions. They should not think democratic or oligarchic measures are those that make the city as democratic or oligarchic as possible. They are the ones that make it remain so for the longest time. Today's popular leaders,
[Bekker 1320a line 5]
to please the people, confiscate a great deal of property through the law courts. So those who care about the constitution should oppose this. They should make a law that none of the property taken by court judgment becomes public property or goes into the public treasury, but that it belongs to the gods. Wrongdoers will be just as careful,
[Bekker 1320a line 10]
since they will face the same penalties. But the masses will be less likely to convict defendants when they stand to gain nothing. Also, public prosecutions should always be kept as few as possible. Heavy penalties should deter people from bringing charges without grounds. They usually prosecute the notables, not supporters of democracy. Yet
[Bekker 1320a line 15]
in this constitution too, all citizens should preferably be well disposed toward it. If not, at least they should not regard those who are sovereign as enemies.

The most extreme democracies have large populations, and it is hard to get people to attend the assembly without pay. Where there is no revenue, this is hostile to the notables,
[Bekker 1320a line 20]
since the pay must come from a special tax, confiscation, and corrupt law courts. These things have already overthrown many democracies. So where there is no revenue, there should be few meetings of the assembly. Law courts should have many jurors but sit on few days. This helps keep
[Bekker 1320a line 25]
the rich from fearing the expense, even if the wealthy receive no juror's pay and the poor do. It also makes trials much better. The wealthy are unwilling to be away from their own affairs for many days, but they are willing for a short time. Where there is revenue, they should not do what
[Bekker 1320a line 30]
the popular leaders do now. They distribute the surplus, but as soon as people receive it, they need the same help again. Helping the poor this way is like a jar with holes in it. Someone who truly supports democracy must see to it that the masses are not too poor. This is what makes democracy bad.
[Bekker 1320a line 35]
So they must find a way to make prosperity last. Since this is also advantageous for the wealthy, they should collect the income from public revenues and distribute it to the poor in lump sums. Ideally, if possible, they should collect enough for each to buy a small plot of land. Otherwise, it should be enough to provide starting funds for trade and
[Bekker 1320b]
[Bekker 1320b line 1]
farming,

### Book VI, 1320b–1323a

and if this can't be done for everyone, distribute it to the tribes or some other group in turn. Meanwhile, the rich should pay for attendance at the necessary meetings, and be excused from useless public services. In something like this way, the Carthaginians
[Bekker 1320b line 5]
conduct their public life and have won the people's friendship. They are always sending some of the people out to the neighboring communities and making them well-off. Decent and sensible notables should also divide the poor among themselves, give them resources, and turn them toward work. It is also good to copy the practices of the Tarentines.
[Bekker 1320b line 10]
They make their property available for the poor to use, and so win the goodwill of the population. They have also divided all their offices into two kinds, some filled by choice and others by lot. Those filled by lot let the people have a share in them. Those filled by choice make public life better. This can also be done by
[Bekker 1320b line 15]
dividing the same office, so that some holders are appointed by lot and others by choice. We have now explained how democracies should be set up.

From this it is also fairly clear how oligarchies should be set up. Each oligarchy must be put together from the opposite elements,
[Bekker 1320b line 20]
matching it to the opposite democracy. Start with the best-balanced and first kind of oligarchy. This is the one close to what is called polity, a constitution combining democracy and oligarchy. In it the property qualifications must be divided, with some lower and some higher. The lower ones should give access to the necessary offices,
[Bekker 1320b line 25]
and the higher ones to the more authoritative offices. Anyone who acquires the required property should be allowed a share in the constitution. The property qualification should admit enough of the people to make those who take part stronger than those who don't. New members must always be drawn from the better part of the people. In the same way, the next
[Bekker 1320b line 30]
kind of oligarchy should be set up by tightening these requirements a little. But the oligarchy opposite the last kind of democracy, the one most dominated by powerful families and most like a tyranny, needs more protection the worse it is. Healthy bodies and ships that are in good sailing condition
[Bekker 1320b line 35]
can stand more mistakes by their sailors without being destroyed by them. But sick bodies, and ships that are coming apart and have poor sailors, can't stand even small mistakes. In the same way, the worst constitutions need the most
[Bekker 1321a]
[Bekker 1321a line 1]
protection.

In general, democracies are kept safe by their large population, since this counterbalances justice based on merit. Clearly, an oligarchy must get its safety from the opposite source, good order.

[Bekker 1321a line 5]
There are four main parts of the population: farmers, craftsmen, traders, and laborers. There are also four kinds of forces useful in war: cavalry, or mounted soldiers; heavy infantry, or heavily armed foot soldiers; light infantry, or lightly armed foot soldiers; and the navy. Where the land is suitable for horses, conditions naturally favor setting up a strong oligarchy.
[Bekker 1321a line 10]
The inhabitants' safety depends on this force, and keeping horses is something people with large fortunes can do. Where the land suits heavy infantry, conditions favor the next kind of oligarchy, since heavy infantry belongs more to the well-off than to the poor. Light infantry and naval forces, however, are entirely democratic. As things are now,
[Bekker 1321a line 15]
where there are large numbers of these people, the oligarchs often fight at a disadvantage when the two sides split. The remedy must be taken from generals experienced in war. They combine cavalry and heavy infantry with a suitable force of light infantry. This is how, in civil conflicts, the people defeat
[Bekker 1321a line 20]
the well-off. As light infantry, they can easily fight cavalry and heavy infantry.

To build up this force from the common people, then, is to build it up against themselves. Instead, the age groups should be divided into older and younger men. While their own sons are still young, they must have them taught
[Bekker 1321a line 25]
light and unarmored military exercises. Once they have passed beyond childhood, they should be trained competitors in these activities. The population should enter the citizen body as we said before, by acquiring the required property. Or they should enter as at Thebes, after keeping away from manual trades for a certain time. Another way is the one used
[Bekker 1321a line 30]
at Massalia: judging who deserves membership, both among those in the citizen body and those outside it. Also, the most authoritative offices, which those who share in the constitution must hold, should carry costly public duties. Then the people will willingly stay out of them and accept the rulers, seeing that they pay a high price for
[Bekker 1321a line 35]
office. On taking office, they should make splendid sacrifices and build some public work. The people will share in the feasts and see the city decorated with offerings and buildings. This will make them glad to see the constitution stay in place. The notables, too, will have
[Bekker 1321a line 40]
memorials of their spending. But those who run oligarchies now don't do this. They do the opposite. They look for profits no less than honor. So it is fair to say
[Bekker 1321b]
[Bekker 1321b line 1]
that these are small democracies.

Let this, then, settle how democracies and oligarchies should be established.

The next step after what we have said is to make clear distinctions
[Bekker 1321b line 5]
about offices: how many there should be, what they should be, and what they should deal with, as we said earlier too. Without the necessary offices a city can't exist. Without the offices that provide good order and proper arrangements, it can't be run well. Also, smaller cities must have fewer offices, and larger ones
[Bekker 1321b line 10]
more, as we said before. We must therefore understand which offices it makes sense to combine and which to keep separate. The first necessary responsibility is the marketplace. There must be an office to supervise its contracts and good order. It is virtually necessary
[Bekker 1321b line 15]
for every city to buy some things and sell others to meet one another's necessary needs. This is the most direct way to achieve self-sufficiency, for which people seem to have joined together under one constitution. The next responsibility, closely connected with this one, concerns public and private property in the town. Its job is to ensure
[Bekker 1321b line 20]
good order, preserve and repair buildings that are falling down and roads, keep boundaries between properties free of disputes, and handle other similar matters. Most people call this office town supervision. It has several branches, and
[Bekker 1321b line 25]
in more populated cities different people are appointed to different tasks, such as building walls, looking after fountains, and guarding harbors. Another necessary office is similar to this. It deals with the same things, but in the countryside and the districts outside the town. Its rulers are called
[Bekker 1321b line 30]
rural supervisors by some, and forest wardens by others. These, then, are three responsibilities for these matters. Another office receives the public revenues, keeps them safe, and allocates them to each department. These officials are called receivers and treasurers. Another office must keep a record of private contracts
[Bekker 1321b line 35]
and judgments from the law courts. The same officials must also receive written claims and bring cases before the courts. In some places this office too is divided among several officials. Elsewhere one office is responsible for all these things. They are called sacred recorders, supervisors, recorders, and other
[Bekker 1321b line 40]
similar names.

Next comes an office that is about the most necessary and difficult of all. It deals with enforcing penalties against those convicted, collecting the sums posted
[Bekker 1322a]
[Bekker 1322a line 1]
in the public records, and keeping prisoners in custody.

It is difficult because it causes so much hostility. Where there is no large profit to be made, people won't accept the office, or, if they do, won't carry out their duties according to the laws.
[Bekker 1322a line 5]
But it is necessary. There is no use in having trials about what is just if the judgments aren't carried out. If people can't live together without judgments, neither can they live together without enforcing them. So it is better not to have a single office for this, but different officials for different law courts. As for posted debts
[Bekker 1322a line 10]
in public records, their collection should likewise be divided if possible. Also, other offices should enforce some penalties. Newly appointed officials should enforce those imposed by the officials of the previous year. For current officials, one office should impose the penalty and another enforce it. For example, town supervisors should enforce penalties imposed by market supervisors, and others those imposed by town supervisors.
[Bekker 1322a line 15]
The less hostility there is toward those enforcing penalties, the more likely enforcement is to succeed. When the same people both impose and enforce penalties, they face double the hostility. If the same people handle everything, they become everyone's enemies. In many places the office that keeps prisoners is separate from the one that
[Bekker 1322a line 20]
enforces penalties, as with the officials called the Eleven at Athens. So it is better to separate this office too, and to look for a clever arrangement for it as well. It is no less necessary than the office we mentioned. But decent people especially avoid it, and it isn't safe to put bad people in charge. They themselves
[Bekker 1322a line 25]
need guarding more than they can guard others. So there shouldn't be one office assigned to the prisoners, or the same office doing the job continuously. Instead, where young men are organized into cadet groups or guards, these and the offices should take turns, with different people providing supervision.

These
[Bekker 1322a line 30]
offices, then, should be put first as the most necessary. Next come those that are no less necessary but have higher standing, since they need great experience and trustworthiness. These include the offices concerned with protecting the city and those assigned to military needs. There must be,
[Bekker 1322a line 35]
in peace and war alike, people responsible for guarding the gates and walls and for inspecting and organizing the citizens. Some places have several offices for all these tasks, and others fewer. In small cities, for example, one office handles them all. They use the titles general and war commander for
[Bekker 1322b]
[Bekker 1322b line 1]
these officials.

Also, if there are cavalry, light infantry, archers, or a navy, an office is sometimes set up for each of these. These are called naval commands, cavalry commands, and infantry commands. Under them are more specialized commands of warships with three banks of oars, companies,
[Bekker 1322b line 5]
and tribal units, and whatever subdivisions these have. All of this is one kind of responsibility: military affairs.

This is how matters stand with that office. Since some offices, if not all, handle large amounts of public money, there must be another office to take and audit their accounts,
[Bekker 1322b line 10]
without handling anything else itself. Some call these officials examiners of accounts, others accountants, others inspectors, and others public advocates. Besides all these offices there is the one with the greatest authority over everything. It often has both the final decision and the introduction of proposals, or presides over the population where power lies with the
[Bekker 1322b line 15]
people. The office that brings together the sovereign body must have authority over the constitution. In some places its members are called preliminary councilors, because they deliberate in advance. Where there is a large population, it is more often called a council. These are roughly the political offices. Another kind of responsibility concerns the gods. Priests and those who look after
[Bekker 1322b line 20]
the temples have this responsibility. They preserve existing buildings, restore those that are falling down, and care for the other things set apart for the gods. In some places, such as small cities, this is a single responsibility. Elsewhere it is divided among many offices separate from the priesthood, such as officials who conduct sacrifices,
[Bekker 1322b line 25]
temple wardens, and treasurers of sacred funds. Next to this is the office assigned to all the common sacrifices that the law doesn't give to the priests. These officials have their honor from the common hearth. Some call them rulers, others kings, and others presidents.

The
[Bekker 1322b line 30]
necessary responsibilities, then, to put them briefly together, concern religion, military affairs, revenues and spending, the marketplace, the town, harbors, and the countryside. They also concern the law courts, records of transactions,
[Bekker 1322b line 35]
enforcing penalties, custody, taking accounts, inspecting and auditing rulers, and finally deliberating about public affairs. Cities with more leisure and greater prosperity that also care about good order have special offices for supervising women, guarding the laws, supervising children,
[Bekker 1323a]
[Bekker 1323a line 1]
and managing gymnasiums.

Besides these, they have offices for overseeing athletic contests, contests in honor of Dionysus, and any other public spectacles of this sort that take place. Some of these offices are clearly not democratic, such as those that supervise women and children.
[Bekker 1323a line 5]
The poor have to use their wives and children like attendants because they have no slaves. There are three offices by means of which some people select the authoritative offices: guardians of the laws, preliminary councilors, and a council. Guardians of the laws are aristocratic, preliminary councilors oligarchic, and a council democratic. As for the
[Bekker 1323a line 10]
offices, this is a rough account of pretty much all of them.

### Book VII, 1323a–1326a

[Bekker 1323a]
[Bekker 1323a line 14]
Anyone planning a study of the best constitution in the
[Bekker 1323a line 15]
proper way must first settle which life is most worth choosing. If this is unclear, the best constitution must also be unclear. Those who take part in public life in the best way their circumstances allow should do best, unless something unexpected happens. So we must first
[Bekker 1323a line 20]
agree on which life is most worth choosing for practically everyone. After that, we must ask whether it is the same life for a community and for an individual, or a different one. Much has been said about the best life in our discussions for a general audience, and we can treat that as sufficient and use it here too. In fact, no one would dispute one division:
[Bekker 1323a line 25]
there are three kinds of goods, those outside us, those of the body, and those of the soul, and people who are blessed must have all of these. No one would call someone blessed who had no trace of courage, self-control, justice, or practical wisdom. Nor would anyone call him blessed if he feared passing
[Bekker 1323a line 30]
flies. Nor would he count as blessed if he held back from none of the worst excesses when he wanted to eat or drink, or ruined his dearest friends for a quarter of an obol, a small coin. Nor would anyone call him blessed if his thinking was as foolish and mistaken as a child's or a madman's. Almost everyone would agree with these statements.
[Bekker 1323a line 35]
But they disagree about how much of each good is needed and which should count for more. They think any amount of virtue, however small, is enough. But they seek unlimited amounts of wealth, money, power, reputation, and all such things. We will tell them that it is easy to find proof of this in
[Bekker 1323a line 40]
facts. We can see that people don't acquire and preserve the virtues through external goods, but external goods through the virtues.

[Bekker 1323b]
[Bekker 1323b line 1]
Human happiness may consist in enjoyment, virtue, or both. We can also see who is happier: people whose character and thinking are highly developed but who have a moderate amount of external goods, rather than people
[Bekker 1323b line 5]
with more external goods than they can use but poor character and thinking. The same point is also easy to see by reasoning. External goods have a limit, like a tool, since everything useful is useful for something. Too much of them must either cause harm or do no good to
[Bekker 1323b line 10]
their owners. But the more someone has of each good of the soul, the more useful it must be—if we should call these goods useful as well as noble. In general, we will clearly say that the best conditions of different things have relative importance
[Bekker 1323b line 15]
matching that of the things whose conditions they are. So if the soul is more valuable than property and the body, both in itself and for us, the best condition of each must stand in the same proportion. Also, property and the body are naturally worth choosing for the soul's sake. Everyone must
[Bekker 1323b line 20]
choose them for that reason if they think sensibly, not choose the soul for their sake.

Let us agree, then, that each person's share of happiness is as great as his share of virtue and practical wisdom and of action guided by them. We can use the god as a witness. He is happy and blessed, not because of any
[Bekker 1323b line 25]
external goods, but because of himself and the nature he has. For the same reasons, good fortune must be different from happiness. Chance and fortune cause the goods outside the soul, but no one is just or self-controlled by chance or because of chance. The next
[Bekker 1323b line 30]
point follows from this and needs the same arguments: the best city is also happy and does well. People who don't do noble things can't do well. No noble deed, whether by a person or a city, is possible without virtue and practical wisdom. A city's courage, justice, and practical wisdom
[Bekker 1323b line 35]
have the same force and form as the qualities that make each person who shares in them just, wise in practice, and self-controlled. Let this be enough of an introduction to our discussion. We can't avoid touching on these subjects, but we can't go through every relevant argument either. Another course of study deals with
[Bekker 1323b line 40]
these matters. For now, let us assume this much: the best life, both for each individual and for cities as communities,

is a life of virtue with enough resources
[Bekker 1324a]
[Bekker 1324a line 1]
to take part in virtuous actions. If anyone disputes this and isn't persuaded by what we have said, we must examine those objections later and leave them aside in our present inquiry.

[Bekker 1324a line 5]
It remains to say whether happiness is the same for each individual person and for a city, or not the same. This too is clear. Everyone would agree that it is the same. Those who think an individual's good life consists in wealth also consider the whole city, if it is rich,
[Bekker 1324a line 10]
blessed. Those who value the life of a tyrant most would also call the city that rules the most people the happiest. And anyone who approves of an individual because of virtue will say that the better city is happier. But there are now two questions that need examining. One is which is more worth choosing:
[Bekker 1324a line 15]
a life of taking part in public life and sharing in a city, or a life apart from it, free of the political community. The other is which constitution and arrangement of a city we should call best, whether sharing in a city is worth choosing for everyone or for most people but not for some. Since political
[Bekker 1324a line 20]
thought and study deal with this second question, not with what each individual should choose, and since this is the inquiry we have now chosen, the first question is a side issue. The second is the task of this inquiry. The best constitution must be the arrangement under which anyone could do best and live
[Bekker 1324a line 25]
a blessed life: this is clear. But even those who agree that a life of virtue is most worth choosing disagree. Should we choose political activity, or rather a life free of all outside involvement? The latter is a life of reflective thinking, which some say is the only philosophical life. These are roughly the
[Bekker 1324a line 30]
two lives that people most ambitious for virtue seem to choose, both in earlier times and now. I mean the political life and the philosophical life. It matters a great deal which view is true. Anyone who thinks sensibly must arrange his life around the better goal, and this holds for
[Bekker 1324a line 35]
each individual and for the constitution as a whole. Some think that ruling others as a master involves one of the greatest kinds of injustice. Ruling them politically, they think, isn't unjust, but hinders one's own well-being. Others hold the opposite view. They think only
[Bekker 1324a line 40]
an active, political life is fit for a man. For each virtue, private individuals have no more scope for action
[Bekker 1324b]
[Bekker 1324b line 1]
than those who handle public affairs and take part in public life.

That is what some people think. Others say that only a constitution based on mastery and tyranny is happy. For some peoples, the goal of both the constitution and the laws is to exercise mastery
[Bekker 1324b line 5]
over their neighbors. So although most legal arrangements among most peoples are, broadly speaking, put together at random, wherever the laws look toward one goal, they all aim at domination. At Lacedaemon and Crete, for example, both education and most of the laws are directed toward war. Also, among
[Bekker 1324b line 10]
all peoples able to get the upper hand, this kind of power is honored—for example, among the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Celts. Some even have laws that encourage this virtue. At Carthage, for example, they say a man gets a decoration of rings corresponding to the number of
[Bekker 1324b line 15]
campaigns he has served in. Macedonia once required a man to wear a horse's halter around his waist if he had never killed an enemy. A Scythian who had never killed an enemy could not drink from the cup passed around at a certain festival. Among the Iberians, a warlike people, the number of stakes
[Bekker 1324b line 20]
planted around a man's grave matches the number of enemies he has killed. Many other peoples have other customs like these, some laid down in laws and others in established practice.

Still, anyone willing to examine the matter might find it very strange if a statesman's job is to work out how to rule
[Bekker 1324b line 25]
and exercise mastery over his neighbors, whether they want it or not. How could something that isn't even lawful belong to statesmanship or lawmaking? Ruling not only justly but also unjustly isn't lawful, and it is possible to dominate others unjustly. We don't see this in the other fields of knowledge either. It isn't
[Bekker 1324b line 30]
a doctor's job to persuade or force his patients, or a ship captain's to persuade or force his sailors. But most people seem to think mastery is statesmanship. They aren't ashamed to do to others what they each say is neither just nor to their own advantage.
[Bekker 1324b line 35]
For themselves, among their own people, they seek just rule. But where others are concerned, they don't care about justice. Yet it would be strange if some were not by nature fit for mastery and others not fit for it. So if this is how things stand, we shouldn't try to exercise mastery over everyone, but only over those fit for it. Likewise, we shouldn't hunt for a feast or sacrifice
[Bekker 1324b line 40]
human beings, but animals fit to be hunted for this purpose. What is fit to be hunted is a wild animal that can be eaten. Moreover, there could also be
[Bekker 1325a]
[Bekker 1325a line 1]
a happy city on its own,

provided, of course, that it takes part in public life well. A city could exist somewhere on its own and use good laws. Its constitution wouldn't be organized for war or for defeating enemies.
[Bekker 1325a line 5]
Let us suppose it has none of these things. Clearly, then, we should regard all preparations for war as noble, but not as the highest goal of all. Instead, they serve that goal. A good lawmaker must consider a city, a race of human beings, and every other community. How can a good life
[Bekker 1325a line 10]
and the happiness possible for them be enjoyed? Some of the laws laid down will, however, differ. If there are neighbors, it is also the lawmaker's job to see which practices to use toward which neighbors, or how to adopt the measures appropriate to each. But later we can give proper
[Bekker 1325a line 15]
consideration to the question of the goal toward which the best constitution should aim.

We must now answer both groups who agree that the life of virtue is most worth choosing but disagree about how to live it. Some reject political offices, thinking that a free person's
[Bekker 1325a line 20]
life is different from a political life and is the most worth choosing of all. Others think the political life is best. A person who does nothing, they say, can't do well, and doing well and happiness are the same. We must tell them that both groups are right in some things and wrong in others. The first group is right that a free person's life is better than a master's.
[Bekker 1325a line 25]
This is true. There is nothing dignified about using a slave as a slave. Giving orders about necessary tasks has no share in the noble. But it is wrong to think that all rule is mastery. Rule over free people differs from rule over slaves no less than someone free by nature differs from someone
[Bekker 1325a line 30]
a slave by nature. We made adequate distinctions about these matters in our opening discussions. But it isn't true that inactivity deserves more praise than activity. Happiness is an activity, and the actions of just and self-controlled people achieve many noble results.

Now that we have made these distinctions, someone might suppose
[Bekker 1325a line 35]
that being sovereign over everyone is best. This would put him in charge of the most numerous and noblest actions. So anyone able to rule shouldn't give way to his neighbor but should instead take rule away from him. A father should take no account of his children, nor children of their father, nor, in general, a friend of any friend. Nor should they
[Bekker 1325a line 40]
worry about these things. What is best is most worth choosing, and doing well is best. Perhaps they speak truly,

if
[Bekker 1325b]
[Bekker 1325b line 1]
the most desirable thing there is will belong to those who rob others and use force. But perhaps it can't belong to them, and their assumption is false. A person's actions can no longer be noble unless he is as superior to others as a man is to a woman, a father to
[Bekker 1325b line 5]
his children, or a master to slaves. So someone who breaks this rule could never later achieve anything so great as the loss of virtue he has already suffered. For people who are alike, the noble and the just consist in taking turns. That is equal and alike treatment. Unequal treatment of equals and unlike treatment of those who are alike go against nature. Nothing
[Bekker 1325b line 10]
that goes against nature is noble. So if someone is superior to the best people in virtue and in the ability to act, it is noble to follow him and just to obey him. But he must have not only virtue but also the power that will let him act. If these points are right and happiness
[Bekker 1325b line 15]
should be understood as doing well, then the active life would be best both for every city as a community and for each individual. But an active life doesn't have to involve other people, as some think. Nor are practical thoughts limited to those aimed at the results of action. Much more practical are
[Bekker 1325b line 20]
the forms of contemplation and thinking that are complete in themselves and pursued for their own sake. Doing well is a goal, so it too is a kind of action. Even with external actions, we say that those who direct them through their thinking are most truly acting. Nor must cities established on their own, which have
[Bekker 1325b line 25]
chosen to live this way, be inactive. Activity can take place among their parts. The parts of a city have many dealings with one another. The same holds for any individual person. Otherwise the god and the whole universe would hardly be in a good condition, since they have no external activities
[Bekker 1325b line 30]
beyond their own proper activities. Clearly, then, the best life must be the same for each individual person and for cities and human beings as communities.

These points have introduced the subject, and we have already studied the other constitutions.
[Bekker 1325b line 35]
So we must begin the rest by stating the conditions we assume for the city we want to establish according to our wishes. The best constitution can't come into being without suitable resources. So we must assume many things in advance, as if we were expressing wishes. But none of them should be impossible. I mean,
[Bekker 1325b line 40]
for example, the number of citizens and the territory. Other craftsmen, such as a weaver or a shipbuilder,

need
[Bekker 1326a]
[Bekker 1326a line 1]
materials suited to their work. The better these are prepared, the finer the product of their skill must be. In the same way, a statesman and a lawmaker must have their own materials
[Bekker 1326a line 5]
in a suitable condition.

The first resources for political work concern the population: how many people there should be and what their natural character should be. The same applies to the territory: how large it should be and what it should be like. Most people think a happy city should be great. Even if this is
[Bekker 1326a line 10]
true, they don't understand what makes a city great or small. They judge greatness by the number of inhabitants. But we should look at its capacity rather than its population. A city too has a task, so we should consider the city most able to carry it out the greatest. For example,
[Bekker 1326a line 15]
someone might say Hippocrates is greater, not as a human being but as a doctor, than a person who stands out for his bodily size. But even if we should judge by population, we shouldn't do so by just any population. Cities may necessarily contain large numbers of slaves,
[Bekker 1326a line 20]
resident foreigners, and visitors. We should count those who are parts of the city, the proper parts that make it up. A large number of these is a sign of a great city. But a city that sends out large numbers of craftsmen and few heavily armed foot soldiers can't be great. For a great
[Bekker 1326a line 25]
city is not the same thing as a highly populated city.

The facts also make this clear: it is difficult, perhaps impossible, for an excessively populated city to be well governed by laws. At any rate, none of the cities thought to conduct public life well has an unrestricted population. Reasoning also makes this clear. For
[Bekker 1326a line 30]
law is a kind of order, and good government by law must be good order. But an excessively large number can't share in order. That would require the divine power that also holds this whole universe together. So the finest city must be one that combines greatness with the defining limit just described.
[Bekker 1326a line 35]
The noble usually involves number and size. But a city's size also has a measure, as everything else does—animals, plants, and tools. None of these will have its proper capacity if it is too small or excessively large. In one case it will lose its nature altogether, and in another
[Bekker 1326a line 40]
it will be in a poor condition. For example, a boat a handspan long won't be a boat at all, nor will one two stades, or racecourse lengths, long.

### Book VII, 1326a–1329b

But once it reaches a certain size, it will sometimes
[Bekker 1326b]
[Bekker 1326b line 1]
sail badly because it is too small, and sometimes because it is too large. The same applies to a city. One with far too few people is not self-sufficient, while a city must be self-sufficient. One with far too many people is self-sufficient in necessities, like a nation, but
[Bekker 1326b line 5]
not a city. It is not easy for it to have a constitution. Who could be general of such an enormous population? Who could be its herald without Stentor's voice? So the smallest possible city must have enough people to make it self-sufficient for living well as a political community. A city
[Bekker 1326b line 10]
with a larger population than this can be larger, but, as we said, its size cannot be unlimited. It is easy to see what the upper limit is by looking at its tasks. A city's activities involve both rulers and the ruled. A ruler's job is to give orders and make judgments. To judge
[Bekker 1326b line 15]
what is just and to assign offices according to worth, the citizens must know one another's character. Where this does not happen, the assignment of offices and the administration of justice are bound to go badly. Guesswork is not just in either case, and it occurs
[Bekker 1326b line 20]
clearly when the population is far too large. Also, foreigners and resident aliens can easily gain a share in the constitution. With so many people, it is not hard to escape notice. So the best limit for a city is clearly this: the largest population that is self-sufficient for life and can still be readily surveyed. Let us
[Bekker 1326b line 25]
settle the question of a city's size in this way.

Much the same applies to its territory. As for its character, clearly everyone would praise the territory that is most self-sufficient. Such territory must produce everything: having everything and needing nothing
[Bekker 1326b line 30]
is self-sufficiency. Its extent and size should allow its residents to live with leisure, generously and with moderation. We must examine later, in more detail, whether this limit is right or wrong. That will be when property and the plentiful supply of material resources are generally
[Bekker 1326b line 35]
discussed, along with how we should approach their use. There are many disputes about this question. Some people pull life toward one extreme, others toward the other: some toward stinginess, others toward luxury. It is not hard to say what the shape of the territory should be. On some points we must
[Bekker 1326b line 40]
also listen to people with military experience. It should be hard for enemies to enter and easy for its own people to leave.

[Bekker 1327a]
[Bekker 1327a line 1]
Also, just as we said the population should be easy to survey, so should the territory. Here, being easy to survey means that help can easily reach any part of it. If we can choose the city's location as we wish, then in relation to the sea
[Bekker 1327a line 5]
it should be well situated, and in relation to the territory too. One requirement is the one already mentioned: it must be a common base for sending help to every part of the territory. The other concerns the transport of harvested crops, timber, and any other products the territory happens to have. Its position should make these
[Bekker 1327a line 10]
easy to transport.

There is much dispute about access to the sea, and whether it helps or harms cities with good laws. Some say that receiving visitors brought up under other laws harms
[Bekker 1327a line 15]
good government, and so does a large population. Using the sea to send and receive goods, they say, brings in crowds of merchants, and this works against taking part in public life well. Clearly, if these problems do not arise, it is better for both security and the supply of necessities for
[Bekker 1327a line 20]
the city and its territory to have access to the sea. To bear wars more easily, people who are to survive must be able to receive help by both routes, by land and by sea. To harm their attackers, too, if they cannot do so by both routes, by one route they will have
[Bekker 1327a line 25]
a better chance if they have access to both. They also need to import things they do not have at home and export their surplus products. A city should trade for its own needs, not those of others. Cities that make themselves a marketplace for everyone have revenue
[Bekker 1327a line 30]
as their motive. But a city that should not share in this kind of greed should not have this kind of trading center either. Even now, we see many territories and cities with ports and harbors conveniently placed in relation to the city. They are neither part of the same urban area nor too far away,
[Bekker 1327a line 35]
but are kept under control by walls and other defenses of that kind. Clearly, then, if contact with them brings any benefit, the city will have that benefit. If it brings any harm, it is easy to guard against it through laws that state and specify who should not, and who should, mix
[Bekker 1327a line 40]
with one another.

As for naval power, clearly it is best to have it up to a certain size.

(A city must not
[Bekker 1327b]
[Bekker 1327b line 1]
only be formidable and able to help itself, but also some of its neighbors, by sea as well as by land). But we must judge the number and size of these forces by the city's way of life. If
[Bekker 1327b line 5]
it is to lead other cities and take an active part in their affairs, it must have naval power proportionate to these activities. Cities need not have the large population that comes with a mass of naval workers. These people need not be any part of the city. The marines
[Bekker 1327b line 10]
are free men drawn from the infantry. They have authority and control the ship's operations. If there are plenty of people living in the surrounding area and farming the land, there must also be plenty of sailors. Even now we see this in some places, such as the city of the Heracleots. They fill many
[Bekker 1327b line 15]
warships with three banks of oars, although their city is more moderate in size than others.

Let this settle the questions of cities' territory, harbors, access to the sea, and naval power. We have already said what limit there should be on the citizen population. As for what kind of people
[Bekker 1327b line 20]
they should be by nature, let us now speak.

We can get a fairly good idea of this by looking at the Greek cities with good reputations and at the whole inhabited world, as it is divided among nations. The nations in cold regions, and those around Europe, are full of spirit. In intelligence
[Bekker 1327b line 25]
and skill they are lacking. So they generally remain free, but lack political organization and cannot rule their neighbors. Those around Asia are intelligent and skillful, but lack spirit. So they remain ruled by others and enslaved. The Greek people, just as they occupy a middle position
[Bekker 1327b line 30]
geographically, share in both qualities. They have both spirit and intelligence. So they remain free, have the best political organization, and could rule everyone if they had a single constitution. The same differences exist among the Greek nations themselves. Some have
[Bekker 1327b line 35]
a one-sided nature, while others have a good mixture of these two abilities. Clearly, then, those whom the lawgiver can readily guide toward virtue must be both intelligent and spirited by nature. Some say that guardians should love
[Bekker 1327b line 40]
the people they know and be fierce toward strangers. But spirit is what makes us love: it is the soul's
[Bekker 1328a]
[Bekker 1328a line 1]
capacity for loving.

Here is evidence. When it thinks it has been treated with contempt, spirit rises more strongly against familiar people and friends than against strangers. So Archilochus, when accusing his friends, fittingly addresses his spirit:
[Bekker 1328a line 5]
"It is your friends who are choking you."

Everyone's capacity to rule and to be free also comes from this power. Spirit seeks to rule and will not be defeated. But it is wrong to say that people should be harsh toward strangers. They should not be like that toward anyone. People with greatness of soul are not
[Bekker 1328a line 10]
naturally fierce, except toward people who do wrong. They feel this even more strongly toward familiar people, as we said before, if they think they have been wronged. And this makes sense. When they think someone owes them a kindness, they suffer both harm and the loss of that kindness,
[Bekker 1328a line 15]
they believe. That is why it has been said,
"Brothers' wars are bitter,"
(Eur. Fr. 965) and
"Those who have loved beyond measure also beyond measure
hate."
(Anon. fr. 78 (Nauck))

We have now roughly determined how many people should take part in public life and what their natural character should be, and also how large the territory should be and what its character should be. For
[Bekker 1328a line 20]
we must not seek the same precision in arguments as in things we observe through our senses.

In other things formed by nature, not everything without which the whole could not exist is a part of the whole structure. So clearly we should not count everything a city needs as a part of the city,
[Bekker 1328a line 25]
or of any other community that forms a single kind. The partners must have one thing that is common and the same for them all, whether they share it equally or unequally. It might be food, an area of land, or something else of that kind. But when one thing exists for the sake of another, and the other is its purpose, they have nothing
[Bekker 1328a line 30]
in common except that one produces and the other receives. I mean, for example, the relation of any tool or craft worker to the work produced. A house has nothing in common with its builder. The builder's craft exists for the sake of the house. So cities need property, but property is not a part of the
[Bekker 1328a line 35]
city. Many parts of property are living things. A city is a community of people who are alike, formed for the best life possible. Happiness is the best thing, and it is an activity and a complete use of virtue. But some people can share in it, while others can share only a little or
[Bekker 1328a line 40]
not at all. Clearly, this causes the different kinds of city and the variety of constitutions.

By different ways and through
[Bekker 1328b]
[Bekker 1328b line 1]
different means, each group pursues this and so makes its ways of life and constitutions different. We must also examine how many things there are without which a city could not exist. What we call parts of a city would be among these too, since they must be present. So we must list
[Bekker 1328b line 5]
the tasks. They will make the matter clear. First, there must be food. Next, there must be crafts, since life needs many tools. Third, there must be arms. The members of the community must have arms themselves to maintain rule over those who disobey. They also need arms against wrongdoing by outsiders
[Bekker 1328b line 10]
who attempt it. There must also be a supply of money to meet their own needs and the needs of war. Fifth, and first in importance, there must be care for the gods, which is called priestly service. Sixth in number, and most necessary of all, there must be judgment about matters of advantage and about what is just in people's
[Bekker 1328b line 15]
relations with one another. These, then, are the tasks that practically every city needs. A city is not just any collection of people. As we say, it is one that is self-sufficient for life. If any of these things is missing, this community cannot be fully self-sufficient. So, around the kinds of work
[Bekker 1328b line 20]
just mentioned, a city must be organized. There must therefore be a body of farmers to provide food, craft workers, a fighting force, wealthy people, priests, and judges of what is necessary and advantageous.

With these points settled, we still need to ask whether everyone
[Bekker 1328b line 25]
should share in all these tasks. It is possible for all the same people to be farmers, craft workers, deliberators, and judges. Or should we assign different people to each of the tasks mentioned? Or must some be separate and others shared? The answer is not the same in every constitution. As we said,
[Bekker 1328b line 30]
everyone can share in everything, or not everyone in everything, but certain people in certain things. These differences also make constitutions different. In democracies everyone shares in everything; in oligarchies the opposite is true. We are examining the best constitution, and this
[Bekker 1328b line 35]
is the one under which a city would be happiest. We said earlier that happiness cannot exist without virtue. This makes clear what follows for the city with the best constitution. Its men are just without qualification, not merely under a certain assumption. Neither manual work nor trading should be a way of life
[Bekker 1328b line 40]
for its citizens. That kind of life is low and works against virtue. Nor should farmers be among those who are going to
[Bekker 1329a]
[Bekker 1329a line 1]
be citizens

(for leisure is needed both to develop virtue and to carry out political activities).

The fighting force and the body that deliberates about matters of advantage and judges what is just are present in the city and seem to be its parts
[Bekker 1329a line 5]
most of all. Should these too be separate, or should both tasks be assigned to the same people? This too is clear: in one way to the same people, and in another to different people. Each task calls for a different prime of life, and one needs practical wisdom while the other needs strength. In that respect they belong to different people. But it is impossible
[Bekker 1329a line 10]
for people with the power to use force and stop others to put up with being ruled forever. In that respect they belong to the same people. Those who control the arms also control whether the constitution survives or not. The only course left, then, is to assign participation in this constitution to the same people in both roles, but not at the same time. By nature,
[Bekker 1329a line 15]
strength belongs to younger people and practical wisdom to older people. So it seems both advantageous and just to assign the two roles this way, since this division follows worth. Property must also belong to these people. Citizens must be well supplied with resources, and these are the citizens. The
[Bekker 1329a line 20]
manual workers have no share in the city, nor does any other group that does not produce virtue. This is clear from our starting point. Happiness must go together with virtue. We should call a city happy by looking not at some part of it, but at all its citizens. Clearly,
[Bekker 1329a line 25]
then, property must belong to these people, if the farmers must be slaves or non-Greek residents of the surrounding area. Of the groups we listed, the priests remain. Their place is clear too. Neither a farmer nor a manual worker should be made a priest, since it is fitting for the citizens
[Bekker 1329a line 30]
to honor the gods. The citizen body has been divided into two parts, the armed force and the deliberative body. It is fitting for those worn out by age to give service to the gods and find rest in serving them. So the priestly offices should be assigned to these people.

As for the things without which
[Bekker 1329a line 35]
a city cannot be formed, and what its parts are, we have now stated them. Cities must have farmers, craft workers, and the whole body of hired laborers. But the parts of the city are the armed force and the deliberative body. Each of these groups is kept separate, some permanently and others in turn.

[Bekker 1329a line 40]
Students of constitutions seem to have known this long ago, not just now or recently: there should be separate groups
[Bekker 1329b]
[Bekker 1329b line 1]
within the city, with the fighting group distinct from the farming group.

This is still the arrangement in Egypt and Crete even now. In Egypt, they say, Sesostris made laws establishing it, and Minos did so
[Bekker 1329b line 5]
in Crete. The system of common messes, meals eaten together, also seems to be ancient. In Crete it began in the reign of Minos, and in Italy much earlier. The learned people who live there say that a certain Italus became king of Oenotria. From him their name
[Bekker 1329b line 10]
was changed from Oenotrians to Italians. This stretch of the European coast also took the name Italy: the part lying between the Scylletic and Lametic gulfs. These gulfs are half a day's journey apart. They say this Italus turned the nomadic
[Bekker 1329b line 15]
Oenotrians into farmers, gave them other laws, and first established common messes. That is why some of his descendants still use common messes and some of his laws even now. The side toward Tyrrhenia was inhabited by the Opicans, called both formerly and now
[Bekker 1329b line 20]
Ausonians. The side toward Iapygia and the Ionian Sea, in the area called Syrtis, was inhabited by the Chonians. The Chonians too were Oenotrians by descent. The system of common messes first came from here. The division of the citizen population into separate groups came from Egypt. This was because the reign that was much earlier than
[Bekker 1329b line 25]
Minos's was that of Sesostris. We should suppose that most other things too have been discovered many times over the long course of time, or rather infinitely many times. Need itself is likely to teach people what is necessary. Once these things exist, it is reasonable that things contributing to refinement and plenty should develop.
[Bekker 1329b line 30]
So we should think the same applies to constitutions. Egypt is evidence that all these things are ancient. The Egyptians are considered the oldest people, and they have always had laws and a political order. So we should make proper use of what has been discovered, and, for what has been overlooked,
[Bekker 1329b line 35]
try to look for it.

### Book VII, 1329b–1333a

We said earlier that the territory should belong to those who have arms and share in the constitution, that the farmers should be different people, and how large the territory should be and what its character should be. First we must discuss its
[Bekker 1329b line 40]
division and the farmers: who they should be and what kind of people they should be. For we say that there should not be common
[Bekker 1330a]
[Bekker 1330a line 1]
property, as some have said,

but it should be shared in use through friendship. Nor should any citizen lack food. Everyone agrees that common messes, or shared meals, are useful in well-organized cities. Why they seem useful
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to us too, we will explain later. All the citizens must share in them. But it is not easy for poor people both to contribute the required amount from their own resources and to manage the rest of their household. Also, expenses for worship are shared by the whole city. So into two parts
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the territory must be divided: one held in common and the other owned by individuals. Each of these should be divided into two again. Of the common land, one part should support the service of the gods, and the other the cost of the common messes. Of the privately owned land, one part should be near the borders,
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and the other near the city. Each person should be assigned two plots, so that everyone shares in both areas. This is both equal and just, and brings more agreement about wars with neighboring cities. Where this is not the arrangement, where neighboring people are concerned, some care little about
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hostility. Others care too much, even at the expense of the noble. So in some places the law bars those who live near the borders from taking part in deliberation about wars with these neighbors. Their private interests, it is thought, would prevent them from deliberating well. The territory must therefore be divided this way for the already stated
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reasons. As for those who will farm it, the best choice, if we can have what we wish, is slaves who are neither all of the same people nor spirited. That way they would be useful for the work and could safely be trusted not to attempt a revolution. The second choice is non-Greek residents of the surrounding area with a similar nature.
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Those working on private estates should belong privately to the estate owners, while those on common land should belong to the community. We will explain later how slaves should be treated, and why it is better to offer freedom as a reward to all slaves.

The city should be accessible from the mainland
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and equally, as far as possible, from the sea and all its territory. We said this earlier. In choosing the city's own site, we should hope for a sloping location and keep four considerations in view. The first, and necessary one, is health. Cities that slope toward the east and toward the winds
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that blow from the east are healthier. Those facing north come second, since their winters are milder.

Of the remaining considerations,
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the site should be well suited to political and military activities. For military purposes, it should be easy for its own people to leave, but hard for enemies to approach or surround. Ideally it should have plenty of water and springs
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of its own. Otherwise, a solution has been found: build many large reservoirs for rainwater, so that the supply never runs out when war cuts people off from the territory. We must care for the residents' health. This depends on the site's being well placed in such a setting and facing
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in such a direction, and secondly on using healthy water. This too needs serious attention. The things we use most and most often for our bodies make the greatest contribution to health. Water and air have this kind of influence. So
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well-run cities must separate water used for food and drink from water used for other purposes, unless all the water is alike or there are plenty of healthy springs.

As for fortified sites, what is advantageous is not the same for every constitution. A fortified high point, for example, suits rule by a few or by one ruler.
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Level ground suits democracy. Neither suits rule by the best, which is better served by several strong positions. The arrangement of private houses is thought more pleasant and more convenient for other activities if it has straight streets, following the newer plan of Hippodamus. But for military
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security the opposite is better: the old arrangement. That is hard for foreign troops to enter and for attackers to find their way through. So the city should combine both plans. This is possible if the layout follows what some farmers call clusters of vines. The
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whole city should not have straight streets, but only certain sections and districts. That way it will be well suited to both security and good order.

As for walls, those who say that cities claiming virtue should not have them are thinking in a very outdated way. They do so even though they see cities that took pride in this being proved wrong in practice.
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Against opponents who are similar and not much more numerous, it is not noble to try to stay safe behind strong walls. But attackers may have an advantage too great for the human virtue of a small group to overcome. If the city is to survive,
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and not suffer harm or degrading treatment, the strongest protection walls can give must be regarded as the best military defense,

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especially now that projectiles and siege machines have been developed to such precision. Demanding that cities have no surrounding walls is like wanting their territory to be easy to invade and removing the
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mountainous areas. It is also like refusing to put walls around private houses, on the grounds that their residents would become cowards. Nor should we overlook this: people who have put walls around their city can use it either way, as a city with walls or as one without
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them. People who have no walls cannot do this. If that is so, we must not only put walls around a city but also take care that they give it a fitting appearance and serve military needs, both the others and those recently discovered. Just as attackers
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take care to find ways of gaining an advantage, so defenders have discovered some means already and must search for and study others. Attackers do not even begin an attack against those who are well prepared.

The body of citizens must, for the common messes,
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be divided into groups, and the walls must have guard posts and towers at suitable intervals. Clearly this suggests placing some of the common messes in these guard posts. These things could be arranged in this way. But the buildings set aside for the gods
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and the principal common messes of the ruling offices should share a suitable site. This excludes temples that the law sets apart, or that some other oracle, coming from the Pythian god, sets apart. Such a site should be prominent enough to display the excellence of its position, and, in relation to the neighboring
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parts of the city, be more strongly defended. Below it there should be a public square of the kind customary in Thessaly, which they call the free square. This must be kept clear of all goods for sale. No manual worker, farmer, or anyone else of that kind should enter
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unless summoned by the rulers. The place would be attractive if the older men's exercise grounds were also located there. This arrangement too should be divided by age. Some rulers should spend time with the younger men, while the older men should spend time with
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the rulers. Being in the rulers' sight is the strongest way to inspire real respect and, in free people,
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fear.

The market for goods must be different from this square and separate from it. Its site should be convenient for bringing together all the goods sent from the sea and from the territory.

Since the city's leaders are divided into priests
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and rulers, the priests' common messes should also be located near the sacred buildings. Some offices handle contracts, the filing of lawsuits, summonses, and other administration of this kind. They also handle market regulation and what is called
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city management. These offices should be established near a market and a public meeting place. The area around the market for necessities is such a place. We assign the upper square to leisure, and this one to necessary activities. The arrangement in the countryside should follow the one described too. There, the
[Bekker 1331b line 15]
rulers whom some call forest wardens and others countryside wardens must also have guard posts and common messes for their work of protection. Temples should also be spread throughout the territory, some for gods and some for heroes. But spending time now on precise descriptions of these matters is pointless. Such things aren't
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hard to imagine. Doing them is harder. Describing them is a matter of wishing; making them happen is a matter of luck. So let us set aside further discussion of such things for now.

As for the constitution itself, we must say what people, and what kinds of people,
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should make up a city that is to be happy and well governed. Doing well depends on two things for everyone. One is to set the right aim and end for our actions. The other is to find the actions that lead to that end. These two can
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conflict or agree. Sometimes the aim is well chosen, but people fail to reach it through their actions. Sometimes they succeed in all the steps toward the end, but have chosen a bad end. Sometimes they fail in both respects. Medicine is an example. Sometimes people neither
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judge correctly what a healthy body should be like nor find the means of producing the condition they have set as their goal. In crafts and sciences, we must master both of these: the end and the actions that lead to it. Living well and happiness are sought
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by everyone. That is clear. But some have the opportunity and others do not, because of some circumstance of luck or nature

(for living well needs some provision
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of resources, less for those in a better condition and more for those in a worse one). Others have the opportunity but look for happiness in the wrong way from the start. Our task is to see what the best constitution is. This
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is the one under which a city would be governed best. It would be governed best under the constitution that gives it the greatest chance of happiness. So clearly we must know what happiness is.

We say that it is an activity and a complete use of virtue. We have defined it this way in the Ethics, if those arguments are of any value. This use
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is not merely under certain conditions, but without qualification. By conditional I mean necessary acts; by unqualified I mean acting well. Take just actions, for example. Just acts of revenge and punishment come from virtue, but they are necessary, and are noble only as necessary acts. It would be preferable for no such things to be needed by
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either a person or a city. But actions directed toward honors and prosperity are the noblest without qualification. The former remove some evil; actions of the latter kind do the opposite. They establish and produce good things. A good man would also make noble use of poverty, illness, and
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other bad turns of luck. But happiness lies in their opposites. In our arguments on ethics we have also defined the good man as someone for whom things that are good without qualification are good because of his virtue. Clearly, his uses of these things must also be good and noble
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without qualification. That is why people think external goods cause happiness. It is as if they credited the lyre rather than skill for brilliant and beautiful lyre playing.

From what has been said, then, some things must be there already, and the lawgiver must provide others. So we hope
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that the city's formation will turn out well in matters controlled by luck. We assume luck does control them. But making the city good is not a matter of luck. It is a matter of knowledge and deliberate choice. A city is good because the citizens who share in its constitution are good. In our city, all the citizens
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share in the constitution. So we must examine how a man becomes good. Even if all the citizens could be good as a group without each one being good individually, making each one good is preferable. When each is good, all are good as well. People become good and virtuous through three things. These three
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are nature, habit, and reason. First, a person must be born, for example, a human being and not some other animal. Then the body and soul must also have a certain character. But with some qualities it is no use to
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be born;

because habits change them. Some qualities can go either way by nature, and habits turn them toward the worse or the better. Other animals live mainly by nature, though some are guided a little by habits too. Human beings
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also live by reason, since they alone have reason. So these things must agree with one another. People often act against their habits and nature because of reason, if they are persuaded that some other course is better. We have already determined what the natural character of those whom the lawgiver can readily guide should be.
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The remaining work belongs to education. People learn some things by becoming used to them and others by hearing them.

Every political community is made up of rulers and the ruled. So we must examine whether the rulers and the ruled should be different people or the same people throughout
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life. Clearly education will also have to follow this division. Suppose one group differed from the other as much as we think gods and heroes differ from human beings. They would first have a great advantage in body, then in
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soul. The rulers' superiority would be beyond dispute and obvious to the ruled. Then clearly it would be better for the same people always to rule and the same people always to be ruled. But this is not easy to find. Kings do not differ, as Scylax says they do among the Indians, so greatly
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from the ruled. So clearly, for many reasons, everyone must share equally in ruling and being ruled in turn. Equality means the same treatment for people who are alike. And it is hard for a constitution to last when it is established against the just. For the ruled have allies in revolution:
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all those throughout the territory who want it. And it is impossible for the citizen body to be numerous enough to overpower all of them. Still, there is no question that the rulers must differ from the ruled. How this will happen and how they will share in rule must be considered by
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the lawgiver. We have spoken about this earlier. Nature has provided the division by making some members of the same kind younger and others older. It is fitting for the younger to be ruled and the older to rule. No one resents being ruled because of age or thinks himself better than his rulers, especially
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when he will receive this contribution in return once he reaches the proper age.

So in one sense we should say that the same people rule and are ruled, and in another that they are different people.

So their
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education must also be the same in one sense, but different in another. People say that anyone who is to rule well must first be ruled. (As we said in our earlier arguments, one kind of rule is for the ruler's benefit, and another for the benefit of the ruled.
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We say that the first is a master's rule and the second is rule over free people. Some commanded tasks involve the same work but differ in the person for whose sake it is done. That is why many tasks that seem to be servants' work are noble for young free people to perform too. What is noble or not noble depends less on
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the actions themselves than on their end and for whose sake they are done.) We say that a citizen's and a ruler's virtue is the same as that of the best man. The same person must be ruled first and rule later. So the lawgiver should work on how good men
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are developed, through what practices, and what the end of the best life is.

The soul is divided into two parts. One has reason in itself. The other does not have reason in itself, but can listen to reason. We say that their virtues are what make a man good in some sense. In which of these
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the end lies more fully is easy to say for those who divide the soul as we do. The worse always exists for the sake of the better. This is equally clear in things made by craft and things produced by nature. The part with reason is better. It too is divided in two, in the way we usually divide it:
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one kind of reason concerns action, and the other contemplation. Clearly, then, this part must be divided in the same way. We shall say that its activities have a corresponding relation. The activities of the part that is better by nature must be preferable for people able to carry out all the activities, or those of both parts. For each person, what is most preferable is always
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the highest thing he can achieve. The whole of life is also divided into work and leisure, and war and peace. Some actions aim at necessary and useful things, others at noble things. Our choice between these must follow the same pattern as our choice between the parts of the soul and the activities
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of those parts. War is for the sake of peace. Work is for the sake of leisure. Necessary and useful things are for the sake of noble things. So the statesman must make laws with all these in view, both the parts of the soul and their activities, but more especially the better ones and the ends. The
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same applies to ways of life and choices of action. People must be able to work and to wage war,

### Book VII, 1333b–1337a

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but more importantly to live in peace and have leisure. They must also do what is necessary and useful, but still more what is noble. So education must aim at these goals, both for children and for people of other ages who need
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education.

The Greeks who are now thought to have the best constitutions, and the lawmakers who established those constitutions, clearly haven't organized their constitutions around the best goal. Nor have they directed their laws and education toward all the virtues. Instead, they have crudely leaned
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toward the virtues that seem useful and more likely to bring gains. Some later writers have expressed the same view. In praising the constitution of Lacedaemon, they admire the lawmaker's aim: he made all his laws for conquest and war. These views
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are easy to refute by argument, and events have now refuted them too. Most people envy mastery over many others because it brings a large supply of the goods of fortune. In the same way, Thibron clearly admires the Laconians' lawmaker, as does every other
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writer on their constitution, because their training for danger enabled them to rule many people. Yet it's clear that, now the Laconians no longer rule, they aren't happy, and their lawmaker wasn't good. It's ridiculous if they have kept his laws, with nothing preventing them
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from using those laws, but have lost the ability to live well. They also misunderstand the kind of rule a lawmaker should be seen to honor. Rule over free people is nobler and involves more virtue than ruling as a master. Nor should we consider a city happy
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and praise its lawmaker because he trained it to conquer and rule its neighbors. This does great harm. Clearly, any citizen who can do this must also try to pursue it, so that he can rule his own city. This is just what the Laconians accuse King Pausanias of doing, despite
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the great honor he held.

None of these arguments or laws is fit for a city, useful, or true. The same things are best for individuals and for the community, and the lawmaker must instill them in people's souls. Training for war shouldn't aim at enslaving
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those who don't deserve slavery. Its first aim should be to keep people from being enslaved by others. Its next aim should be to seek leadership for the
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benefit of the ruled,

not mastery over everyone. Its third aim should be mastery over those who deserve slavery. The lawmaker should above all take care to arrange both military laws and the rest of his laws for leisure
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and peace. Events confirm this argument. Most cities of this kind survive while at war, but perish once they have won an empire. In peace they lose their temper, like iron. The lawmaker is to blame because he hasn't educated them to be able to use leisure.

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People clearly have the same goal as a community and as individuals. The same standard must apply to the best man and the best constitution. So clearly they must have the virtues needed for leisure. For the goal,
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as we've often said, is this: peace is the goal of war, and leisure is the goal of work. The virtues useful for leisure and the way we spend it include both those exercised in leisure and those exercised at work. Many necessities must be available for leisure to be possible. So a city must be self-controlled,
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brave, and able to endure hardship. As the proverb says, slaves have no leisure. Those who can't face danger bravely are slaves to their attackers. So courage and endurance are needed for work, philosophy for leisure, and self-control and justice for both,
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especially when people are at peace and have leisure. War forces people to be just and self-controlled. But enjoying good fortune and leisure in peace is more likely to make them arrogant. So people who seem to be doing best need a great deal of justice and self-control,
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if they enjoy everything that people call a blessing. This would apply to anyone living in the Islands of the Blessed, if there are such people, as the poets say. They will need philosophy, self-control, and justice most of all, the more leisure they have amid an abundance of these goods. Clearly, then, a city that is to be happy
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and good must share in these virtues. It's shameful not to be able to use good things. It's even more shameful not to be able to use them in leisure, but to seem good while working and fighting, and slavish while at peace and at leisure.
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So we must not practice virtue as the city of Lacedaemon does.

They differ from others not
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by judging different things to be the greatest goods, but by obtaining those goods more through a particular virtue. Since these goods and the enjoyment of them are greater than those of the virtues […]. […] And that it is for its own sake is clear
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from this. We must now consider how it will come about, and through what means.

We have already distinguished the need for nature, habit, and reason. We have already defined what people's nature should be like. It remains to consider whether education should start with reason or with habits. These must
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be in the best possible agreement. Reason can miss the best starting point, and habits can lead people astray in the same way. First, this much is clear: as in other cases, development starts from a beginning, and an end starts from a beginning that is itself another end.
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For us, reason and understanding are nature's goal. So we must arrange both development and training in habits with these in view. Next, just as soul and body are two, we see two parts in the soul: the part without reason and the part with reason. Their states are also two in number,
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desire and understanding. Just as the body develops before the soul, the part without reason develops before the part with reason. This too is clear. Spirit, wish, and appetite are present in children as soon as they're born. Reasoning and understanding, as they grow
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older, develop naturally. So care of the body must come before care of the soul, and care of desire must come next. But care of desire must be for the sake of understanding, and care of the body for the sake of the soul.

If the lawmaker must take care from the beginning that
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those brought up have the best possible bodies, he must first attend to marriage: when, and in what condition, people should enter married life together. His laws for this partnership must consider the couple themselves and their life spans. They should reach the end of their reproductive years
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at the same time. Their powers shouldn't be out of step, with the man still able to have children and the woman unable, or the woman able and the man unable. This causes conflict and disagreement between them. Next, he must consider the children's succession. Children must not be too far behind in
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age compared with their fathers. Otherwise the children's gratitude is no use to their elderly parents, nor, from the
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fathers, is help any use to their children.

Nor should they be too close in age. This brings many difficulties. Children in that position have less respect for their parents, as if they were the same age, and closeness in age leads to complaints about household management. Also, to return to the point that brought us
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here, the bodies of the children born must be what the lawmaker wants.

Almost all these results follow from taking care of one thing. The limit of childbearing is, generally speaking, seventy years at the latest for men and fifty
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for women. So the age at which marriage begins must allow it to end at these times. Marriage between young people is bad for having children. In all animals, the offspring of the young are underdeveloped, more often female, and small in size. The same thing must therefore happen
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with human beings. Here's the evidence: in cities where young men and young women commonly marry, the children are underdeveloped and small in body. Also, young women suffer more in childbirth, and more of them die. Some say this was the reason for the oracle given
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to the people of Troezen: many women were dying because they married too young. They say it wasn't about gathering crops. Having women marry when they're older also helps self-control. Women who have sex when young seem more likely to lack restraint. Men's bodies too
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seem to have their growth harmed if they have sex while their semen is still developing. This too has a definite period, beyond which it no longer increases, or only a little. So it's suitable for women to marry at about eighteen, and for men at thirty-seven or a little earlier.
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At those ages the marriage will take place when their bodies are at their peak, and their ages will reach the end of childbearing together at the right time. Also, if children are born immediately, as one can reasonably expect, the children will be starting their prime as their parents' time of life is already ending,
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at about seventy years.

We have now said when people should marry. As for the season, they should follow what most people do. Even now people have correctly decided to begin married life in winter. The couple themselves must also consider, with a view to having children, what
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doctors and students of nature say. Doctors give adequate advice about the right bodily conditions,

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and students of nature advise about winds, favoring north winds over south winds. We should discuss more carefully, in our treatment of the care of children, what bodily condition in the parents would most benefit their children.
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For now, an outline is enough. The condition of athletes is no use for a citizen's fitness, or for health and having children. Nor is a pampered condition, or one worn down by too much work. The condition between these is best. The body should be trained, but not with violent exertion, or for just one
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activity, as an athlete's body is. It should be trained for the activities of free people. This should apply equally to men and women.

Pregnant women too must care for their bodies. They must not be inactive or eat too little. The lawmaker can easily bring this about by ordering them each
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day to make a journey to worship the gods whose appointed honor concerns childbirth. Their minds, however, unlike their bodies, should be kept more at rest. The unborn clearly draw nourishment from the woman carrying them, as plants do from the earth. As for exposing and
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raising newborn children, let there be a law that no child with a disability is raised. Where established customs forbid exposing any newborn because there are too many children, a limit must be set to the number of children people have. If a couple conceives beyond this limit, before sensation and life develop
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an abortion must be induced. Sensation and life will determine what is religiously permitted and what isn't. We have set the starting age for men and women to marry. Let us also set how long they should perform their public duty of having children. For older parents'
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offspring, like those of younger parents, are underdeveloped in both body and mind, while the offspring of the aged are weak. So the limit should be the mind's prime. For most people this comes at the time mentioned by some poets who measure age in periods of seven years, around fifty
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years. So four or five years after this age, a person must stop producing children for the community. After that, they should be seen to have sex for health or some other similar reason. As for relations with another woman or another man, let it be regarded as simply not noble
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to be found having such relations in any circumstances or in any way, while one is and is called a spouse.

During the period of having children,
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if anyone is found doing such a thing, let the penalty be loss of honor suited to the offense.

Once children are born, we must recognize that food makes a great difference to their bodily strength, depending on what kind
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it is. Looking at other animals and at peoples who take care to develop a condition suited to war, we see that a diet rich in milk is most suitable for their bodies, and one with less wine avoids disease. As much movement as is possible at that age is also useful.
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To keep their limbs from becoming crooked because they're soft, some peoples still use mechanical devices that keep such children's bodies straight. It's also useful to get them used to cold from early childhood. For health and military
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action, this is especially helpful. So many non-Greek peoples have a custom of dipping newborns into a cold river, or, like the Celts, putting only a light covering on them. For everything that people can get used to, it's better to start from the beginning, but to accustom them gradually.
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Children's bodily condition, because of its warmth, is naturally suited to training in enduring cold.

Care at the first stage of life should be of this kind, or something similar. At the next stage, up to five years old, it's not yet right to introduce any learning
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or compulsory work, so that these don't interfere with growth. Children should have enough movement to keep their bodies from being inactive. This should be provided through other activities and through play. Their games should not be unfit for free people, exhausting, or slack.
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The rulers called supervisors of children should take care over what stories and tales children of this age hear. All such things must prepare the way for their later activities. So most of their games should be imitations of what they will later do seriously. As for the straining
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of children and their crying, those who forbid these by law are wrong. They help growth, since they are a kind of exercise for the body. Holding the breath gives strength to people exerting themselves, and this happens with children too when they strain.

A check must be made:
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the supervisors of children must watch how they spend their time, in general and especially to ensure that they're with slaves as little as possible. For at this age,

[Bekker 1336b]
[Bekker 1336b line 1]
and up to seven years old, they must be brought up at home. So it's reasonable to expect them, even at this age, to pick up attitudes unfit for free people from what they hear and see. In general, foul language, like any other such thing, must be
[Bekker 1336b line 5]
banished from the city by the lawmaker. Casually saying anything shameful leads directly toward doing it. Above all he must keep it away from the young, so they neither say nor hear anything like it. If anyone is found saying or doing something forbidden, a free person not yet entitled to recline
[Bekker 1336b line 10]
at the common messes, the shared meals, should be punished with loss of honor and blows. Anyone above that age should suffer humiliations unfit for a free person, because of his slavish behavior. Since we banish speaking of these things, clearly we must also ban looking at indecent pictures or accounts. The
[Bekker 1336b line 15]
rulers must ensure that no statue or picture imitates such acts, except at the shrines of certain gods to whom the law assigns even mockery. The law allows those old enough to honor these gods on behalf of themselves, their children, and their wives to do so.
[Bekker 1336b line 20]
Younger people must not be allowed to watch lampooning verse or comedy until they're old enough to share in reclining at meals and getting drunk. By then their education will make them entirely immune to the harm these things cause.

For now we have discussed this in passing.
[Bekker 1336b line 25]
Later we must examine it more closely and define it more fully. We must first consider whether or not it should be done, and how it should be done. For the present we have mentioned it as necessary. Perhaps Theodorus the tragic actor was right to say something of this kind. He never allowed anyone to come on stage before him, not even
[Bekker 1336b line 30]
a minor actor, because audiences become attached to what they hear first. The same thing happens in our contacts with people and with things. We always like the first ones more. So we must keep everything bad unfamiliar to the young, especially anything
[Bekker 1336b line 35]
that involves wickedness or ill will. After they have passed the age of five, in the two years up to seven they should watch the lessons they will have to learn themselves. Education must be divided into two age groups: from seven to puberty, and then from
[Bekker 1336b line 40]
puberty to twenty-one. Those who divide ages into periods of seven years are generally not
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[Bekker 1337a line 1]
wrong,

but we must follow nature's divisions. Every skill and every kind of education aims to fill in what nature leaves lacking. So first we must consider whether to make some organized provision for children. Next, whether a public approach is better
[Bekker 1337a line 5]
for their care, or a private one, as it is now in most cities. Third, what this care should be like.

### Book VIII, 1337a–1340b

[Bekker 1337a]
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No one would dispute that the lawmaker must give the greatest attention to educating the young. When cities don't do this, their constitutions suffer. Education must fit each constitution. For the character
[Bekker 1337a line 15]
proper to each constitution usually both preserves it and establishes it in the first place: democratic character establishes democracy, and character favoring rule by a few establishes oligarchy. A better character always produces a better constitution. Also, every ability and skill requires some preliminary education
[Bekker 1337a line 20]
and training in habits for its particular activities. Clearly, then, this is also true of actions that express virtue. Since the whole city has one goal, clearly everyone must have one and the same education. Its care must be public, not private, as it is now,
[Bekker 1337a line 25]
when each person looks after his own children privately and teaches them whatever private course of study he chooses. Training for common concerns must also be common. At the same time, we shouldn't think that any citizen belongs to himself. All belong to the city, since each is a part of it. Care
[Bekker 1337a line 30]
for each part must naturally look toward care for the whole. On this point one could praise the Lacedaemonians. They take the greatest care over children, and do so publicly.

Clearly, then, laws must be made about education, and it must be public. But what education should be and how
[Bekker 1337a line 35]
it should be given must also be clear to us. At present people disagree about its tasks. They don't all think the young should learn the same things, either for virtue or for the best life. Nor is it clear whether education should be directed more toward understanding or toward the soul's character. From the current
[Bekker 1337a line 40]
education comes confusion about the question. It's not at all clear whether we should practice things useful for life, things leading to virtue, or studies beyond ordinary needs. All these have supporters
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[Bekker 1337b line 1]
of some kind.

There is no agreement about what leads to virtue either. People don't all honor the same virtue to begin with, so naturally they also disagree about training for it. That the necessary useful things must be taught
[Bekker 1337b line 5]
is clear. But not all useful things should be taught, since we distinguish work fit for free people from work unfit for them. People should take part only in those useful activities that don't make them mere laborers. We must regard as a laborer's work, skill, or study anything that, for the exercise and
[Bekker 1337b line 10]
practice of virtue, makes a free person's body, soul, or understanding unfit. That's why we call skills that put the body in a worse condition laborers' skills, and also work done for wages. They leave the mind no leisure and lower its outlook.
[Bekker 1337b line 15]
Even among the studies fit for free people, learning some to a certain extent isn't unfit for a free person. But devoting oneself too intensely to mastering them is open to the harms we've mentioned. The purpose for which someone acts or learns also makes a great difference. Doing something for oneself, for friends, or for virtue isn't unfit for a free person.
[Bekker 1337b line 20]
But doing that same thing for others would often seem to be the work of a hired hand or a slave.

The subjects now established in education, as we said before, have an uncertain position between these alternatives. There are roughly four subjects usually taught:

reading and writing, physical training, music, and,
[Bekker 1337b line 25]
as a fourth, drawing, which some people add. Reading and writing and drawing are taught because they're useful in life and have many uses. Physical training is taught because it contributes to courage. Music, however, raises a question. Most people now take part in it for pleasure. But those who first included it in education
[Bekker 1337b line 30]
did so because nature itself seeks not only to work rightly but also to be able to use leisure well, as we've often said. This is the single starting point for everything. Let's discuss it again. Both work and leisure are needed, but leisure is more desirable than work and is its goal. So we must ask
[Bekker 1337b line 35]
what we should do during leisure. Surely not play, since then play would have to be our goal in life. That's impossible. Instead, play should be used during work. Someone who works hard needs rest, and play is for the sake of rest. Work involves
[Bekker 1337b line 40]
effort and strain. So we must introduce play at the right times, as if we were giving medicine. This kind of movement in the soul brings relaxation,
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and its pleasure brings rest.

Leisure itself seems to contain pleasure, happiness, and a blessed life. This belongs not to those who are working but to those with leisure. Someone who works does so for some
[Bekker 1338a line 5]
goal that hasn't yet been reached. But happiness is a goal, and everyone thinks it comes with pleasure, not pain. Yet they don't all identify the same pleasure. Each judges according to himself and his own condition. The best person chooses the best pleasure, the one coming from the noblest things. So clearly
[Bekker 1338a line 10]
we must also learn some things and be educated for the way we spend our leisure. These forms of education and study must be for their own sake, while those directed toward work are necessary and for the sake of other things. That's why people in the past included music in education, not as something necessary
[Bekker 1338a line 15]
—for it has nothing of that kind—nor as something useful. Reading and writing, for example, are useful for money-making, household management, learning, and many public activities. Drawing too seems useful for judging the work of craftsmen better. Nor is music, like physical training, directed toward
[Bekker 1338a line 20]
health and strength: we don't see either of these coming from music. So its purpose must be the way we spend our leisure, and this is clearly why they introduce it. They assign it a place in what they consider a free person's way of spending time. That's why Homer wrote this:
[Bekker 1338a line 25]
"But he alone should be called to the rich feast,"
and after first mentioning some others,
"who call a singer,"
he says,
"to delight them all."
Elsewhere Odysseus says that this is the best way to spend time, when people are enjoying themselves and
"the guests throughout the hall listen to the singer,
sitting in rows."
(Hom. Od. 9.5)

[Bekker 1338a line 30]
Clearly, then, there is a kind of education that sons should receive not because it's useful or necessary, but because it's fit for free people and noble. Whether there's one such kind or more, what they are, and how they work must be discussed later. For now we have made this much
[Bekker 1338a line 35]
progress: the established subjects of education give us some evidence from the people of the past. Music makes this clear. Also, children should learn some useful things not just because they're useful. Reading and writing, for example, should be learned also because they make many
[Bekker 1338a line 40]
other kinds of learning possible. Similarly, drawing shouldn't be learned so that people avoid mistakes in their private purchases and can't be cheated when
[Bekker 1338b]
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buying and selling household goods,

but rather because it makes them able to observe bodily beauty. Looking everywhere for what is useful is entirely unfitting for people with greatness of soul and for free people. Clearly, through habits before reason
[Bekker 1338b line 5]
children must be educated. The body must be educated before the mind. So we must put children in the hands of experts in physical training and instructors in exercise. The former develop a particular bodily condition, and the latter teach the activities.

At present, among cities thought to take the greatest care
[Bekker 1338b line 10]
of children, some develop an athlete's condition, damaging the form and growth of their bodies. The Laconians haven't made this mistake, but their demanding exercises make children savage, as if this were the best way to develop courage. Yet, as we've often said, care shouldn't
[Bekker 1338b line 15]
aim at just one virtue, and especially not at this one alone. Even if it does aim at courage, they don't achieve it. Neither among other animals nor among human peoples do we see courage going with the most savage. Rather, it goes with gentler, lionlike characters. Many
[Bekker 1338b line 20]
peoples readily kill and eat human beings, such as the Achaeans and Heniochi around the Black Sea and other peoples inland. Some are like these, and others still worse. They are raiders, but they have no share in courage. We know that the Laconians themselves,
[Bekker 1338b line 25]
as long as they alone devoted themselves to strenuous training, surpassed others. But now they fall behind others both in athletic contests and in war. Their superiority didn't come from training their young in this way, but only from training when their opponents didn't. So the noble, not the savage,
[Bekker 1338b line 30]
should take the leading role. Neither a wolf nor any other wild animal would face any noble danger. A good man would be more likely to do so. Those who turn children loose too much in these pursuits, leaving them uneducated in necessary things, in fact make mere laborers of them. They make them useful for just one task
[Bekker 1338b line 35]
of public life, and even in that task worse than others, as the argument shows. We must judge by what happens now, not by past achievements. They now have rivals in education; before, they didn't.

There is agreement, then, that physical training should be used, and about how to use it
[Bekker 1338b line 40]
(until puberty, lighter exercises should be introduced. Forced feeding and compulsory exertion should be kept away, so that nothing hinders growth.

The evidence is not
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[Bekker 1339a line 1]
slight: these exercises can cause such harm. Among Olympic winners, one would find only two or three who won both as boys and as men. This is because compulsory exercises exhaust the strength of those who train while young. But when, after
[Bekker 1339a line 5]
puberty, three years have been spent on other studies, it's suitable to fill the next stage of life with strenuous exercises and forced feeding. We shouldn't make the mind and body work hard at the same time. Each kind of effort naturally has the opposite effect on the other: effort in the
[Bekker 1339a line 10]
body hinders the mind, and mental effort hinders the body).

We have already raised some questions about music in our discussion. It's good to take them up again now and carry them further, to give a kind of starting note to the arguments one might make in reaching a judgment about it. It isn't easy to determine what
[Bekker 1339a line 15]
power music has, or why we should take part in it. Is it for play and rest, as with sleep and getting drunk? These aren't serious things in themselves, but they're pleasant and "give rest from care," as Euripides says. That's why people put music alongside them and
[Bekker 1339a line 20]
use all these things alike: sleep, drunkenness, and music. They include dancing too. Or should we think that music contributes to virtue? Just as physical training develops a certain condition in the body, music might develop a certain character, training people to take pleasure
[Bekker 1339a line 25]
in the right things. Or does it contribute to the way we spend our time and to practical wisdom? This must be included as the third possibility. Clearly, the young shouldn't be educated for the sake of play. They aren't playing while learning, since learning is painful. Nor is it suitable to give children
[Bekker 1339a line 30]
and people of that age the mature use of leisure. Nothing incomplete should have the final goal assigned to it. But perhaps children's serious study might be thought to serve their play when they've become grown, fully developed men. If that's so, why should they learn music themselves, instead of, like the kings of Persia and
[Bekker 1339a line 35]
Media, sharing its pleasure and learning through others who perform it? Those who have made this their work and skill must produce better results than those who spend only enough time on it to learn. If people must work at these things themselves, they should also prepare for themselves the things involved in
[Bekker 1339a line 40]
cooking dishes. But that's absurd. The same difficulty arises if music can improve character. Why must people learn it themselves,

rather than
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listen to others and learn to enjoy and judge it rightly, like the Laconians? Although they don't learn it, they can still, they say, judge rightly which tunes are good and which aren't. The same argument applies if music should be used for a good life
[Bekker 1339b line 5]
and a free person's way of spending time. Why should people learn it themselves instead of enjoying others' performances? We can consider what we believe about the gods. In the poets, Zeus doesn't himself sing or play the lyre. In fact, we call people who do these things mere laborers, and regard performing as unfitting
[Bekker 1339b line 10]
for a man unless he's drunk or playing.

But perhaps we should examine these matters later. The first question is whether music should be included in education or not, and which of the three things we've discussed it can provide: education, play, or a way to spend our time. It's reasonably assigned to all of them, and
[Bekker 1339b line 15]
clearly has a share in them. Play is for the sake of rest, and rest must be pleasant, since it's a kind of cure for the pain that hard work causes. Everyone agrees that the way we spend our time must involve not only the noble but also pleasure, since happiness consists of both.
[Bekker 1339b line 20]
We all say that music is among the most pleasant things, both instrumental music alone and music with singing. Musaeus too says that "singing is most pleasant for mortals." So people reasonably bring music into their gatherings and the way they spend their time, because it can give delight. From this too one might conclude that learning
[Bekker 1339b line 25]
music is necessary for younger people. Harmless pleasures are suitable not only for the final goal but also for rest. People rarely reach the final goal, but they often rest and use play, not just to prepare for more work but also
[Bekker 1339b line 30]
for pleasure. So it would be useful to rest in the pleasures that music provides.

People have come to make play their goal. Perhaps the goal too contains some pleasure, though not just any pleasure. In seeking that pleasure, people take this one to be it, because, compared with the goal of our actions,
[Bekker 1339b line 35]
it bears some resemblance. The goal isn't chosen for the sake of anything in the future. These pleasures too aren't for the sake of anything in the future, but for things in the past, such as effort and pain. For seeking happiness through these pleasures, one could reasonably suppose this to be
[Bekker 1339b line 40]
the reason. But people seem to take part in music not for this reason alone, but also because it's useful for resting. Still, we must ask whether perhaps
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this is only incidental,

and music's nature is more valuable than the use we've described. We shouldn't just share in the common pleasure it gives, which everyone perceives. Music has a natural pleasure, so people of every age
[Bekker 1340a line 5]
and every character enjoy using it. We must also see whether it contributes in any way to character and the soul. This would be clear if it made us have characters of a certain kind. That it does so is clear from many other things, and especially from Olympus's
[Bekker 1340a line 10]
tunes. Everyone agrees that these make souls inspired, and inspiration is an emotional state of the soul's character. Also, everyone who listens to imitations comes to share the feelings they represent, even apart from the rhythms and tunes themselves.

Since music is among pleasant things,
[Bekker 1340a line 15]
and virtue concerns taking pleasure, loving, and hating rightly, clearly nothing needs to be learned and made a habit more than judging rightly and taking pleasure in good characters and noble actions. Rhythms and tunes contain likenesses very close to the real natures of anger
[Bekker 1340a line 20]
and gentleness, courage and self-control, all their opposites, and the other qualities of character. The facts show this: our souls change when we listen to such things. Getting used to feeling pain and pleasure in likenesses comes close to having, toward reality, the same
[Bekker 1340a line 25]
response. For example, if someone enjoys looking at an image of a person for no other reason than the form itself, he must also enjoy looking at the person whose image he is viewing. Among things perceived by the senses, the other kinds contain no likeness of character: for example, things
[Bekker 1340a line 30]
we touch and taste. Visible things contain a little. There are forms of this kind, but only to a small extent, and not everyone shares this perception. Besides, these aren't likenesses of character. The forms and colors that appear are rather signs of character, and these signs appear
[Bekker 1340a line 35]
in emotional states. Still, since looking at these too makes some difference, the young shouldn't look at the works of Pauson, but at those of Polygnotus and of any other painter or sculptor who expresses character. But tunes themselves contain imitations of character. (This is clear:
[Bekker 1340a line 40]
the musical modes, or arrangements of notes, differ in their very nature. Those who listen to them are affected differently and don't respond in the same way to each. Some make them more mournful
[Bekker 1340b]
[Bekker 1340b line 1]
and more restrained,

### Book VIII, 1340b–1342b

for example, with what is called the Mixolydian mode. With other modes their minds become softer, as with the relaxed modes. Another especially gives them a balanced and steady state of mind. The Dorian seems to be the only mode that does this. They become ecstatic,
[Bekker 1340b line 5]
however, with the Phrygian. Those who have studied this kind of education explain these things well. They take the evidence for their arguments from the facts themselves). The same holds for rhythms. Some have a more settled character, others a more active one. Of the active rhythms, some have coarser
[Bekker 1340b line 10]
movements, others movements more suited to free people. These facts make it clear that music can give the soul's character a particular quality. If it can do this, then clearly young people should be introduced to music and educated in it. It suits the nature of people at this age to learn
[Bekker 1340b line 15]
music. Because they are young, they won't willingly put up with anything that gives them no pleasure, and music is naturally pleasant. We also seem to have a certain kinship with modes and rhythms. This is why many wise thinkers say either that the soul is a harmony or that it has harmony.

[Bekker 1340b line 20]
We must now discuss the question raised earlier: should the young learn by singing and playing instruments themselves, or not? Clearly, taking part in the actual performance makes a great difference to the kind of people they become. It is impossible, or at least difficult, for those who haven't taken part
[Bekker 1340b line 25]
in the performance to become good judges. Besides, children need something to occupy them. We should consider Archytas's rattle a good invention. People give it to small children so that using it will keep them from breaking things around the house. The young can't keep still. This rattle suits
[Bekker 1340b line 30]
infants, while education is a rattle for older children. These points make it clear that music should be taught in a way that includes performing it. It isn't hard to distinguish what suits each age and what doesn't, or to answer those who say that studying music
[Bekker 1340b line 35]
is a menial activity. First, since people must take part in performing to learn to judge, they should perform when young, but stop performing when they grow older. Their learning in youth should enable them to judge what is noble and enjoy it in the right way.
[Bekker 1340b line 40]
As for the criticism some people make that music turns people into menial workers, it isn't hard to answer. We need to consider how much performing is appropriate for people whose virtue
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[Bekker 1341a line 1]
is being developed for civic life,

and which melodies and rhythms they should perform. We also need to consider which instruments they should learn to play. This, too, is likely to make a difference. These points provide the answer to the criticism. There is nothing to prevent certain forms
[Bekker 1341a line 5]
of music from having the effect described. So it is clear that learning music must neither get in the way of people's later activities nor make their bodies those of menial workers, unfit for military and civic training, whether for use now or for use later.

This could be achieved
[Bekker 1341a line 10]
in learning if students didn't work at the skills needed for professional competitions, or at the dazzling and elaborate feats that have now entered competitions and passed from competitions into education. Even with less elaborate performances, they should go only far enough to be able to enjoy noble melodies and rhythms,
[Bekker 1341a line 15]
not just what is common to all music. Some other animals, and also masses of slaves and children, enjoy only that common element. These points also make it clear which instruments should be used. We shouldn't introduce pipes into education, or any other professional instrument, such as the concert lyre or anything else of that kind. We should use
[Bekker 1341a line 20]
only instruments that will make the students good listeners, whether in musical education or in other education. Besides, the pipe isn't an instrument for building character; it is more an instrument of frenzy. So it should be used on occasions when attending a performance can bring purification rather than learning. We should add that another feature counts against it in
[Bekker 1341a line 25]
education: playing the pipe prevents the player from speaking. This is why earlier generations were right to reject its use by the young and by free people, even though they had used it at first. Their prosperity gave them more leisure and made them more ambitious about virtue. Both earlier
[Bekker 1341a line 30]
and after the Persian Wars, their achievements filled them with pride. They took up every kind of learning, making no distinctions but seeking them all out. This is why they included pipe playing in their studies. In Lacedaemon, a chorus sponsor even played the pipe for the chorus himself. And in Athens it became so widespread that roughly the
[Bekker 1341a line 35]
majority of free people took part in it. The painting Thrasippus dedicated after sponsoring a chorus for Ecphantides makes this clear. Later, experience led people to reject pipe playing, as they became better able to judge what contributed to virtue and what didn't. They also rejected many old instruments,
[Bekker 1341a line 40]
such as pectis harps and barbitos lyres, and instruments aimed at giving pleasure to those who heard the players: seven-sided and triangular harps and
[Bekker 1341b]
[Bekker 1341b line 1]
sambucas,

and all instruments that require skilled manual technique. The ancient story about pipes also makes sense. They say that Athena invented pipes and then threw them away. It isn't wrong to say that the goddess did this because
[Bekker 1341b line 5]
she disliked how they distorted her face. But the more likely reason is that learning to play the pipe does nothing for the mind, and we attribute knowledge and skill to Athena. We reject professional training in instruments and performance.
[Bekker 1341b line 10]
(By professional training we mean training for competitions. Here the performer works not for his own virtue but for his listeners' pleasure, and a coarse pleasure at that. So we judge the activity unfit for free people and more like hired labor. It does turn performers into menial workers. It is a bad
[Bekker 1341b line 15]
goal they set themselves. The audience is coarse and tends to change the music. So it shapes the character of the professionals who practice to please it. Through their movements, it also shapes their bodies.)

So we must now examine modes and rhythms.
[Bekker 1341b line 20]
Should all modes and all rhythms be used in education, or should we distinguish between them? Then, for those who work at music as part of their education, should we make the same distinction, or do we need a third, different one? We see that music consists of melody and rhythm. We must understand
[Bekker 1341b line 25]
how each affects education, and whether we should prefer music with good melody or music with good rhythm. We think that some present-day musicians, and those philosophers who have experience of musical education, say many sound things about these matters. So we will leave
[Bekker 1341b line 30]
anyone who wants a detailed account of each point to seek it from them. For now, let's distinguish the kinds as a lawgiver would, giving only their general outlines.

We accept the division of melodies made by some philosophers. They classify some as shaping character, some as prompting action, and some as producing ecstatic excitement.
[Bekker 1341b line 35]
They also assign to each of these classes the modes whose nature suits it, a different mode for each class. We say that music should be used not for just one benefit, but for several. It serves education and purification. We use the word purification here without elaborating, but in our discussion of
[Bekker 1341b line 40]
poetry we will explain it more clearly. Third, music serves the spending of leisure, relaxation, and rest from strain.

[Bekker 1342a]
[Bekker 1342a line 1]
So clearly we should use all the modes, but not all in the same way. For education we should use those that do most to shape character. For listening to others perform, we should also use those that prompt action or produce ecstatic excitement. An
[Bekker 1342a line 5]
emotion that affects some souls strongly is present in all souls, though to a greater or lesser degree. Pity and fear are examples, and so is ecstatic excitement. Some people are possessed by this excitement. We see from sacred melodies that when these people hear frenzied
[Bekker 1342a line 10]
melodies that stir the soul, they settle down as though they had received treatment and purification. The same must happen to people who are prone to pity or fear, or to emotion generally, and to everyone else to the extent that each shares in such feelings. Everyone must experience some purification and feel relief
[Bekker 1342a line 15]
with pleasure. In the same way, melodies that prompt action give people harmless enjoyment. So competitors who perform music in the theater should use modes and melodies of this kind. Audiences are of two kinds: one is free and educated, the other
[Bekker 1342a line 20]
coarse, made up of manual workers, hired laborers and others like them. We must provide competitions and performances for these people too, to let them rest. Just as their souls have been twisted away from their natural state, there are also distorted modes and melodies that are tense and unnaturally colored.
[Bekker 1342a line 25]
What gives each group pleasure is what naturally suits it. So performers should be allowed to use music of this sort for audiences of this kind. For education, however, as we have said, we should use melodies that shape character and the corresponding modes. One such mode
[Bekker 1342a line 30]
is the Dorian, as we said earlier. We should also accept any other mode recommended by people who combine philosophical study with musical education. But Socrates in the Republic is wrong to keep only the Phrygian mode alongside the Dorian, especially after rejecting
[Bekker 1342b]
[Bekker 1342b line 1]
the pipe among instruments.

The Phrygian has the same effect among modes as the pipe has among instruments. Both produce frenzy and strong emotion. Poetry shows this. All frenzy in the worship of Bacchus and all excitement of that sort
[Bekker 1342b line 5]
find their main instrument in pipes. Among modes, Phrygian melodies give these things their proper expression. Poetry shows this: The dithyramb, for example, is generally agreed to be Phrygian. Experts in this field give many examples. Among others, they say that Philoxenus tried, in
[Bekker 1342b line 10]
the Dorian mode, to compose his dithyramb, The Mysians, but couldn't. The nature of the composition itself drove him back into the Phrygian, the mode that suited it. Everyone agrees that the Dorian is the steadiest mode and has the most courageous character. Besides, we praise the middle between extremes
[Bekker 1342b line 15]
and say we should pursue it. Since the Dorian has this character compared with the other modes, it is clear that Dorian melodies are more suitable for teaching the young.

There are two aims: what is possible and what is suitable. Each person should use what is possible and what suits them.
[Bekker 1342b line 20]
These things also depend on age. For example, people weakened by age find it hard to sing the tense modes. Nature suggests the relaxed modes for people of that age. So some musical experts are also right to criticize Socrates on this point. He rejected the relaxed modes
[Bekker 1342b line 25]
for amusement, treating them as intoxicating. This wasn't because they have the effect of drunkenness. Drunkenness produces religious frenzy instead. It was because they are enfeebled. So, with a view to the later stage of life, old age, we should also study modes and melodies of this sort. Further,
[Bekker 1342b line 30]
we should study any mode that suits childhood because it can provide both orderly behavior and education. The Lydian seems to do this more than any other mode. Clearly, then, we should set these three standards for education: the middle, the possible and the suitable.