Book II, 1264a–1267a

We must also not overlook this very point: we should heed the long passage of time and the many years during which these arrangements, if they were sound, could not have escaped notice. For almost everything has been discovered, but some things have not been brought together, while others people do not use, though they1264a5 know them. This would become especially clear if someone saw such a constitution being established in practice. For he will not be able to make the city without dividing and separating its members, some into common messes, others into brotherhoods and tribes. Thus the only distinctive legislation will turn out to be a prohibition on farming10 for the guardians, which is just what the Lacedaemonians now try to enforce.

Moreover, Socrates has not said what the form of the entire constitution will be for those who share in it, nor is it easy to say. Yet the body of the other citizens makes up almost the whole population of the city. Nothing has been determined about them: whether1264a15 the farmers too should hold property in common or each should have his own private property, and further, whether their women and children should be private or common. For if everything is common to everyone in the same way, how will these people differ from those guardians? Or what advantage will they gain by submitting to their rule, and on what grounds will they submit20 to it, unless they devise something like the Cretans' arrangement? For the Cretans allow their slaves everything else on the same terms, prohibiting only physical training and the possession of weapons. But if these matters are arranged among them as they are in other cities, what form will their community take? Within a single city,25 two cities must exist, and these opposed to one another. For he makes the guardians a kind of garrison, while the farmers, craftsmen, and others are citizens. Accusations, lawsuits, and all the other evils he says exist in cities will exist among these people too. Yet Socrates says30 that because of their education they will not need many regulations, such as those governing the city, the market, and other such matters, while assigning education only to the guardians. Further, he makes the farmers, who pay a contribution, sovereign over the property. But they are likely to be much more troublesome, with pride35 in full measure, than the helots, penestae, and slaves found in some places. Whether these arrangements are equally necessary or not, however, nothing has now been determined, nor about the related questions: what their constitution and education will be, and what their laws. These are not easy to discover; nor is it a small matter what sort of people40 these are, for the preservation of the guardians' community.

But1264b1 if he makes the women common and the property private, who will manage the households as their husbands manage affairs in the fields—and who will do so even if the farmers' property and women are common? It is also absurd to draw the analogy from wild animals,5 arguing that women should follow the same pursuits as men, since those animals have no part in household management.

The way Socrates appoints the rulers is also precarious. For he always makes the same people rulers; and this causes faction even among people who possess no distinction, still more surely among spirited1264b10 and warlike men. It is clear that he must make the same people rulers. For the gold bestowed by the god is not mixed into the souls of one group at one time and another at another, but always into the same souls. He says the god mixed gold into some at birth, silver into others, and bronze and iron15 into those who were to become craftsmen and farmers. Further, although he deprives the guardians of happiness, he says the lawgiver must make the whole city happy. But the whole cannot be happy unless most or all of its parts, or some of them, possess happiness. For happiness does not belong to the same things20 as being even does. The latter can belong to a whole without belonging to either of its parts, but this is impossible with happiness. Moreover, if the guardians are not happy, who else is? Surely not the craftsmen and the mass of manual workers. The constitution Socrates has described, then, has these25 difficulties and others no less serious.

The situation is much the same with the Laws, written later; so it is better to examine briefly the constitution presented there as well. For in the Republic Socrates has settled very few matters: concerning women1264b30 and children, how their sharing should be arranged, property, and the ordering of the constitution. For the population is divided into two parts, one consisting of farmers, the other of those who fight in its defense; and a third part drawn from these deliberates and is sovereign over the city. But as for the farmers and craftsmen,35 whether they will share in no office or in some, and whether they too should possess weapons and fight alongside the others or not, Socrates has determined nothing. He thinks, however, that women should fight alongside the men and share the same education as the guardians. For the rest, with extraneous matters he has filled40 his account, and with discussion of education—what sort should be given1265a1 to the guardians.

Most of the Laws consists of laws; he has said little about the constitution. Although he wishes to make this one more generally applicable to cities, little by little he brings it back toward the other constitution. For apart from1265a5 the sharing of women and property, he assigns the same arrangements to both constitutions: the same education, a life free from necessary labor, and likewise the arrangements for common messes. Except that in this constitution he says there should also be common messes for women; and while the former has a thousand10 men bearing arms, this one has five thousand.

All Socrates' discourses, then, possess an extraordinary quality, refinement, originality, and an inquiring spirit; but it is perhaps difficult to have everything right. For we must not overlook that the population just mentioned will require a territory as large as Babylonia,1265a15 or some other country of limitless extent, to support five thousand men living without work, and around them a further multitude of women and servants many times as numerous. We should make our assumptions according to our wishes, but assume nothing impossible. It is said that the lawgiver should frame his laws with an eye to two things:20 the territory and the people. It is also well to add the neighboring territories, first of all if the city is to live a political life. For it must use weapons of war that are useful not only within its own territory, but also outside it, in25 other regions. Even if someone does not approve of such a life, either for himself or for the city in common, they must nonetheless be formidable to their enemies, not only when these enter their territory, but also when they leave it.

We should also consider the amount of property: might it be better to define it differently, with greater clarity? For enough property1265a30 he says there must be to live temperately, as though someone had said enough to live well. But this is too general, since it is possible to live temperately yet miserably. A better definition is to live temperately and generously; for taken separately, generosity leads to luxury, temperance to hardship. These alone35 are desirable dispositions concerning the use of wealth: it is not possible, for example, to use wealth gently or courageously, but it is possible to use it temperately and generously. Hence these dispositions must concern it. It is also absurd to equalize property without making arrangements for the number of citizens, but to leave40 childbearing unrestricted, on the assumption that childlessness will sufficiently balance it out to the same population, however many children are born,

1265b1because this seems to happen in cities even now. But this cannot work out with the same precision in cities then as it does now. Now no one goes without, because property is divided among any number of people; then, since it is indivisible, those in excess must5 have nothing, whether they are few or many. One might suppose that childbearing needs to be limited more than property, so that no more than a certain number are born. This number should be set with an eye to the chance that some of those born will die, and to10 the childlessness of others. Leaving it unrestricted, as in most cities, must cause poverty among the citizens, and poverty produces faction and wrongdoing. Thus Pheidon of Corinth, one of the earliest lawgivers, thought the number of households and the number of citizens should remain the same,15 even if at the outset all had allotments unequal in size. But in these Laws the opposite holds. We must say later how we think these matters could be better arranged. These Laws also leave out how the rulers will differ from the ruled. For he says20 that, just as the warp is made from a different wool than the woof, so the rulers should stand in relation to the ruled. Since he allows total wealth to increase up to fivefold, why should this not also hold for land up to a certain limit? We must also examine the division of house plots, to see whether it does not25 benefit household management. For he allotted two house plots to each person, separating them from one another; but it is difficult to inhabit two households.

The entire arrangement is intended to be neither democracy nor oligarchy, but intermediate between them, what people call a polity; for it consists of those who bear heavy arms. If, then, he establishes this as the most generally applicable1265b30 to cities among the other constitutions, perhaps he has spoken well. But if he presents it as the best after the first constitution, he has not spoken well. For one might perhaps praise the Lacedaemonians' constitution more, or even some other more aristocratic one. Some people say the best constitution must be a mixture of all constitutions;35 for this reason they praise the Lacedaemonians' constitution. Some say it consists of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, calling the kingship monarchy and the rule of the elders oligarchy, while the rule of the ephors makes it democratic, because from the people come40 the ephors. Others say the ephorate is tyranny, and that it is democratic in the common messes and in the rest of1266a1 daily life.

But in these Laws it is said that the best constitution should consist of democracy and tyranny, which one would regard either as no constitutions at all or as the worst of all. Those who mix more forms therefore speak better, since what is composed of1266a5 more forms is a better constitution. Further, this constitution does not appear to have any monarchical element, but only oligarchic and democratic ones; and it tends to incline more toward oligarchy. This is clear from the appointment of rulers. Choosing by lot from those already elected is common to both forms; but as for the wealthier,10 requiring them to attend the assembly, elect rulers, or perform some other public duty, while exempting the others, is oligarchic. So too is the attempt to have more rulers drawn from the wealthy, and those holding the greatest offices drawn from the highest property qualifications. He also makes the choice of the council oligarchic. For they elect15 under compulsion, all of them, but from the first property qualification; then again an equal number from the second; then from the third, except that not all those of the third or fourth classes were compelled to vote. From the fourth, only those of the first and second classes are compelled to elect. Then, from those chosen, equally from each property qualification,20 a number should be appointed, he says. Those from the highest property qualifications will therefore be more numerous and better, because some of the common people will not elect, since they are not compelled to do so. That such a constitution should not be composed of democracy and monarchy is clear from these considerations and from what will be said later,25 when the investigation turns to this sort of constitution. Electing rulers from among those already elected also carries a danger. For if certain people wish to combine, even a moderate number of them, the elections will always accord with their wishes. The constitution in the Laws, then, has this30 character.

There are also other constitutions, some proposed by private individuals, others by philosophers and statesmen. All are closer than these two to the established constitutions under which people now take part in public life. For sharing children and1266a35 women is an innovation no one else has introduced; nor has anyone else instituted common messes for women. Instead, they begin rather with necessary matters. Some think the most important thing is that property should be well ordered, since, they say, everyone forms factions over it. Phaleas of Chalcedon therefore first introduced this proposal:40 he says the citizens' property should be equal.

This,1266b1 he thought, would not be difficult to achieve at once in cities being founded. In cities already inhabited it would be harder; nonetheless, equality could be reached most quickly if the rich gave dowries but did not receive them, while the poor did not give them but received them5 instead. Plato, writing the Laws, thought some freedom should be allowed up to a point, but no citizen should be permitted to acquire more than five times the smallest holding, as was said earlier. Those who legislate in this way must also not overlook what they now overlook: that when regulating property10 by amount, they should also set the number of children. For if the number of children exceeds the scale of the property, the law must be broken; and apart from its being broken, it is bad for many people to become poor after being rich, since it is difficult to prevent such people from seeking revolution. That there is15 some influence on the political community in equality of property was evidently recognized by some people long ago. Solon, for example, legislated on it, and among other peoples there is a law preventing anyone from acquiring as much land as he wishes. Likewise, laws prevent the sale of property: in Locri, for instance, a law20 prohibits selling unless one can show that a manifest misfortune has occurred. There are also laws preserving the original allotments. The abolition of this restriction in Leucas made their constitution excessively democratic, since it no longer happened that people proceeded to office on the basis of the prescribed property qualifications. But equality25 may exist in property, yet it may be too abundant, leading to luxury, or too scanty, leading to a pinched existence. It is clear, then, that making property equal is not enough for the lawgiver: he must aim at the mean. Further, even if someone fixed a moderate amount of property for everyone, it would be of no use. For desires need to be30 equalized more than property, and this is impossible unless people are adequately educated by the laws. But perhaps Phaleas would say that this is precisely what he means. For he thinks cities must have equality in these two things, property and education. Yet he must say what the education will be; and its being one35 and the same is of no use. For it can be one and the same, yet of a kind that will lead people to choose to grasp for more money, or honor, or both together.

Further, people form factions not only because property is unequal, but also because honors are, though in opposite ways in1266b40 each case. For the many do so because property is unequal,

1267a1while the cultivated do so over honors, if these are equal. Hence the saying: "The base and the noble alike receive the same honor." (Hom. Il. 9.319) People do wrong not only for necessities, for which he thinks equality of property is a remedy, so that they need not steal clothing because they are cold or5 hungry, but also to enjoy themselves and satisfy their desires. For if their desire goes beyond necessities, they will do wrong to remedy it. Nor is this the only reason: they may also desire to enjoy pleasures unaccompanied by pain. What, then, is the remedy for these three things? For the first, a little property10 and work; for the second, temperance. Third, if some wish to find enjoyment in themselves, they would seek a remedy nowhere but in philosophy, since the other pleasures require other people. For the greatest wrongs are committed through excess, not for necessities: people do not become tyrants to avoid being cold. Thus15 the honors are great if someone kills not a thief but a tyrant. Hence the arrangement of Phaleas' constitution helps only against minor wrongs. Further, most of his intended arrangements concern how people will conduct their public life well in their dealings with one another; but they must also do so in relation to their neighbors and all outsiders.20 The constitution must therefore be organized with a view to military strength, about which he has said nothing. The same holds for property. It must be sufficient not only for civic uses but also for dangers from outside. Therefore it should neither be so abundant that25 stronger neighbors desire it while its possessors cannot repel the invaders, nor so scanty that they cannot sustain a war even against their equals and peers. He has determined nothing about this; but we must not overlook what amount of property is advantageous. Perhaps the best limit, then, is that it should not be profitable30 for stronger powers to wage war because of its abundance, but that they should stand toward it as they would if it did not possess so much property. For example, when Autophradates was about to besiege Atarneus, Eubulus told him to consider how long he would take to capture the place and calculate the expense for that period. For he was willing to accept less35 than this and leave Atarneus immediately. By saying this he made Autophradates reflect and abandon the siege.

We shouldn't overlook this point either: we must pay attention to the long stretch of time and the many years in which these arrangements, if they were good, couldn't have gone unnoticed. Nearly everything has already been discovered, but some things haven't been brought together, and others aren't used even though people1264a5 know about them. This would become especially clear if someone saw such a constitution being set up in practice. They couldn't create the city without dividing and separating its people, some into common meals, others into brotherhoods and tribes. So the only new law will be a ban on farming10 for the guardians. This is what the Lacedaemonians already try to do.

Still, Socrates hasn't said what form the whole constitution will take for those who share in it, and it isn't easy to say. Yet the great majority of the city consists of the other citizens. Nothing has been settled about them: whether1264a15 the farmers too should have common property, or each have their own, and whether their wives and children should be their own or shared. If everything is shared by everyone in the same way, how will they differ from the guardians? What more will they gain by submitting to the guardians' rule? What will make them submit20 to it, unless the guardians devise some trick like the Cretans? They give slaves the same rights in other matters, and only forbid physical training and owning weapons. But if these things are to be arranged as in other cities, what form will the community take? Within one city,25 two cities must exist, and these opposed to each other. He makes the guardians a kind of garrison, and the farmers, craftsmen, and others the citizens. Complaints, lawsuits, and all the other evils he says cities have will be found among these people too. Yet Socrates says30 that their education will mean they don't need many regulations, such as rules for managing the city, the market, and similar things. But he gives education only to the guardians. Also, he makes the farmers authoritative owners of the property, paying a contribution from it. Yet they are likely to be much more troublesome, with pride35 in full measure, than the enslaved helots and penestae and the other slaves found in some places. But whether these arrangements are equally necessary or not, nothing has yet been settled, nor have the related questions: what these people's constitution and education will be, and what laws they will have. This isn't easy to work out. It matters a great deal what sort of people40 they are, when it comes to preserving the guardians' community.

Furthermore,1264b1 if he makes wives common but property private, who will manage the household as their husbands manage affairs in the fields? And what if both the farmers' property and their wives are common? It is also strange to use wild animals as a comparison5 to argue that women should have the same occupations as men. Animals have no part in household management.

The way Socrates appoints the rulers is also unsafe. He makes the same people rule all the time. This causes faction even among people without standing, and all the more among spirited1264b10 and warlike men. Clearly, he has to make the same people rule. The gold from the god isn't mixed into different people's souls at different times, but always into the same people's. He says that at their birth the god mixed gold into some, silver into others, and bronze and iron15 into those who were to become craftsmen and farmers. Also, though he takes happiness away from the guardians, he says the lawgiver should make the whole city happy. But the whole can't be happy unless most, all, or some of its parts have happiness. Being happy isn't like being20 even in number. A whole can be even without either part being even, but this is impossible with happiness. And if the guardians aren't happy, who else is? Surely not the craftsmen and the mass of manual workers. So the constitution Socrates has described has these25 difficulties, and others no less serious.

The situation is much the same with the Laws, written later. So it is better to examine the constitution in that work briefly too. In the Republic, Socrates has settled very few matters at all: concerning wives1264b30 and children, how their sharing should work, the arrangements for property, and the structure of the constitution. The population is divided into two parts: the farmers and the fighting force. From these comes a third, the part that deliberates and is sovereign in the city. As for the farmers and craftsmen,35 Socrates hasn't settled whether they will share in no office or in some office, or whether they too should own weapons and join in fighting. But he thinks women should join in fighting and have the same education as the guardians. He has filled, with matters outside the subject,40 the rest of his discussion, and with education—what kind should be given1265a1 to the guardians.

Most of the Laws consists of laws. He has said little about the constitution. Though he wants to make it more widely applicable to cities, he gradually brings it back toward the other constitution. Apart from1265a5 the sharing of wives and property, he assigns the same things to both constitutions: the same education, a life free from necessary work, and the same arrangements for common meals. But in this one he says women should have common meals too. The first has a thousand10 men who own weapons; this one has five thousand.

All Socrates' discussions show originality, cleverness, innovation, and a searching mind. But perhaps it is hard to get everything right. We shouldn't overlook the fact that the population just mentioned will need a territory as large as Babylonia1265a15 or some other country of unlimited size. It must feed five thousand people who don't work, and around them another crowd of women and servants many times as large. We should assume conditions that meet our wishes, but nothing impossible. It is said that the lawgiver should make laws with two things in view:20 the territory and its people. It is also good to add the neighboring regions, especially if the city is to live a political life. It must have weapons for war useful not just in its own territory but also outside it, in25 other regions. But even if someone rejects this kind of life, either for themselves or for the city as a whole, they must still be formidable to their enemies, not just when enemies enter their territory but also after they leave.

We should also consider the amount of property. Might it be better to define it differently, and more clearly? Enough property1265a30 must be available, he says, to live with self-control. That is like saying enough to live well. It is too general, since someone can live with self-control but in hardship. A better limit is enough to live with self-control and generosity. Taken separately, generosity will lead to luxury, and self-control to hardship. These alone35 are desirable habits concerning the use of property. For example, you can't use property gently or courageously, but you can use it with self-control and generosity. So these must also be the habits concerned with it. Making property equal without arranging the number of citizens is strange too. Yet he leaves40 childbearing unrestricted. He assumes that, however many children are born, childlessness will sufficiently balance things out to the same population,

1265b1because this seems to happen in cities now. But the results in those cities and in cities now can't be exactly alike. Now no one is left without property, since estates are divided among any number of people. Then, since estates are indivisible, the extra children must5 have nothing, whether there are fewer or more of them. One might think that childbearing needs limits more than property does, so that people don't have more than a certain number of children. This number should be set with an eye to the chances of some children dying after birth and to10 other people's childlessness. Leaving it unrestricted, as in most cities, must cause poverty among the citizens. Poverty produces faction and crime. Pheidon of Corinth, one of the earliest lawgivers, thought the number of households and citizens should stay the same,15 even if everyone originally had land allotments unequal in size. In these Laws, the reverse is true. We must say later what we think would be better in these matters. These Laws also leave out how the rulers will differ from the ruled. He says20 that just as the lengthwise threads are made from different wool than the crosswise threads, the rulers should differ from the ruled. Since he allows total property to grow to as much as five times its original amount, why shouldn't this apply to land up to some limit too? We should also examine the division of house plots, in case it doesn't25 help household management. He has assigned each person two separate house plots, and it is hard to live in two houses.

The whole system is meant to be neither democracy nor oligarchy, but something between them, which people call polity. It consists of those who serve as heavy-armed soldiers. If he sets up this constitution as the most widely applicable1265b30 to cities of all constitutions, perhaps he is right. But if he presents it as the best after the first constitution, he isn't right. Someone might prefer the Lacedaemonian constitution, or another more aristocratic one. Some people say that the best constitution should be a mixture of all constitutions.35 That is why they praise the Lacedaemonian one. Some say it combines oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy. They call the kingship monarchy, the rule of the elders oligarchy, and the rule of the overseers called ephors democratic because the people supply40 the ephors. Others say the office of ephor is a tyranny, but the constitution is democratic in its common meals and the rest of its1266a1 everyday life.

But in these Laws it is said that the best constitution should combine democracy and tyranny. Someone might not count these as constitutions at all, or might count them as the worst of all. So those who mix more forms are more correct. One made up of1266a5 more forms is a better constitution. Besides, this constitution doesn't seem to contain anything monarchical, only oligarchic and democratic elements. It tends more toward oligarchy. This is clear from the way rulers are appointed. Selection by lot from elected candidates is common to both forms. But as for wealthier people,10 requiring them to attend the assembly, choose rulers, or carry out some other public duty while exempting the others is oligarchic. So is trying to have more rulers from the well-off and to fill the greatest offices from the highest property qualifications. He also makes the choice of the council oligarchic. They choose15 and everyone must do so. The candidates, though, come from the first property class. Then they choose an equal number from the second. Next they choose from the third, but not everyone in the third or fourth classes was required to do so. Only the first and second classes must choose from the fourth. Then from these candidates, equally from each property class,20 a number must be appointed, he says. Those from the highest property classes will therefore be more numerous and better, because some of the common people won't choose, since they aren't required to. So this constitution shouldn't be put together from democracy and monarchy. That is clear from these points and those to be made later,25 when our investigation turns to this sort of constitution. Also, choosing rulers by electing from elected candidates is dangerous. If some people choose to combine, even a moderate number, the choice will always follow their wishes. The constitution in the Laws, then, has this30 form.

There are also some other constitutions, some proposed by private individuals, others by philosophers and statesmen. They are all closer than either of these two to established constitutions under which people now take part in public life. Sharing children and1266a35 wives is something new that no one else has introduced. Nor has anyone else introduced common meals for women. Instead, they start more with necessities. Some think the most important thing is to arrange property well. They say everyone starts factions over this. So Phaleas of Chalcedon was the first to introduce this proposal:40 he says citizens' property should be equal.

This,1266b1 he thought, wouldn't be hard to do at once in cities being founded. It would be harder in those already settled. Still, equality could be reached fastest if the rich gave dowries but didn't receive them, while the poor didn't give them but received them5 instead. Plato, in writing the Laws, thought property should be allowed to increase up to a point, but no citizen should be allowed to acquire more than five times the smallest holding, as we said earlier. People making laws this way shouldn't overlook something they now do overlook: when regulating property10 by amount, they should also fix the number of children. If the number of children exceeds what the property can support, the law must break down. Apart from that breakdown, it is bad for many people to become poor after being rich. It is hard to keep such people from starting revolutions. There is15 some influence on the political community from equal property. Some people long ago clearly recognized this. Solon, for example, made a law about it. Among other peoples too there is a law that prevents someone from acquiring as much land as they want. Laws also prevent selling property. In Locri, for example, a law20 prohibits selling unless someone can show that a clear misfortune has happened to them. Laws also preserve the old land allotments. The abolition of this rule in Leucas made their constitution too democratic, since people no longer entered offices on the basis of the fixed property qualifications. But equality25 can exist in property, yet it can be too plentiful, leading to luxury, or too scanty, leading to a meager life. Clearly, then, it isn't enough for the lawgiver to make property equal. The middle amount must be the goal. Even if someone set a moderate amount of property for everyone, it would do no good. Desires need to be30 made equal more than property does. This can't happen unless people are properly educated by the laws. But perhaps Phaleas would say that this is exactly what he means. He thinks cities need equality in these two things: property and education. But he must say what the education will be. Having one35 and the same education does no good. It can be one and the same but of a kind that makes people choose to get more than their share of money, honor, or both.

Also, people form factions not just because of inequality in property but because of inequality in honors. Things work oppositely1266b40 in each case: the many do so because property is unequal,

1267a1but the people of distinction do so if honors are equal. Hence the line, "The bad and the good have the same honor." (Hom. Il. 9.319) People don't act unjustly only because they lack necessities. He thinks equality of property is a cure for this, so that people won't steal clothing because they are cold or5 hungry. But people also do wrong to enjoy themselves and stop feeling desire. If their desire goes beyond necessities, they will do wrong to remedy it. And not only for this reason: they may also desire to enjoy pleasures that involve no pain. What, then, is the cure for these three cases? For the first, a little property10 and work; for the second, self-control. For the third, if people want to find enjoyment through themselves, they should look for the cure only in philosophy. The other pleasures need other people. People commit the greatest injustices for excess, not for necessities. They don't become tyrants to avoid being cold, for example. This is why15 the honors are great for killing a tyrant, not a thief. So Phaleas' kind of constitution only helps against small injustices. Also, he mostly wants to arrange things so that people will take part in public life well among themselves. But they must do so in relation to their neighbors and all outsiders too.20 So the constitution must be organized with military strength in mind, and he has said nothing about this. The same goes for property. There must be enough not just for the city's uses, but also to meet dangers from outside. For this reason, there shouldn't be so much that25 stronger neighbors covet it while the owners can't repel the invaders. Nor should there be so little that they can't sustain a war even against equals and people like themselves. He has settled nothing about this. But we mustn't overlook what amount of property is advantageous. Perhaps the best limit is one that makes it unprofitable30 for stronger neighbors to wage war because of the excess wealth, so that the city is in the same position as if it had less property. For example, when Autophradates was about to besiege Atarneus, Eubulus told him to consider how long it would take to capture the place and calculate the expense over that time. He was willing to take less35 than this amount and leave Atarneus at once. By saying this, he made Autophradates think it over and abandon the siege.