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Book VI, 1320b–1323a

22 of 28 parts in Politics by Aristotle

Original Ancient Greek

καί, εἰ μὴ πᾶσι δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φυλὰς ἤ τι μέρος ἕτερον ἐν μέρει διανέμειν, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας συνόδους τοὺς εὐπόρους εἰσφέρειν τὸν μισθόν, ἀφειμένους τῶν ματαίων λειτουργιῶν. τοιοῦτον δέ τινα τρόπον Καρχηδόνιοι1320b5 πολιτευόμενοι φίλον κέκτηνται τὸν δῆμον· ἀεὶ γάρ τινας ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιοικίδας ποιοῦσιν εὐπόρους. χαριέντων δʼ ἐστὶ καὶ νοῦν ἐχόντων γνωρίμων καὶ διαλαμβάνοντας τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀφορμὰς διδόντας τρέπειν ἐπʼ ἐργασίας. καλῶς δʼ ἔχει μιμεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ Ταραντίνων.10 ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ κοινὰ ποιοῦντες τὰ κτήματα τοῖς ἀπόροις ἐπὶ τὴν χρῆσιν εὔνουν παρασκευάζουσι τὸ πλῆθος· ἔτι δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς πάσας ἐποίησαν διττάς, τὰς μὲν αἱρετὰς τὰς δὲ κληρωτάς, τὰς μὲν κληρωτὰς ὅπως ὁ δῆμος αὐτῶν μετέχῃ, τὰς δʼ αἱρετὰς ἵνα πολιτεύωνται βέλτιον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. καὶ15 τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς μερίζοντας τοὺς μὲν κληρωτοὺς τοὺς δʼ αἱρετούς. πῶς μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰς δημοκρατίας κατασκευάζειν, εἴρηται.

σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας πῶς δεῖ φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων. ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων γὰρ δεῖ συνάγειν ἑκάστην ὀλιγαρχίαν,1320b20 πρὸς τὴν ἐναντίαν δημοκρατίαν ἀναλογιζόμενον, τὴν μὲν εὔκρατον μάλιστα τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ πρώτην— αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ σύνεγγυς τῇ καλουμένῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἐν ᾗ δεῖ τὰ τιμήματα διαιρεῖν, τὰ μὲν ἐλάττω τὰ δὲ μείζω ποιοῦντας, ἐλάττω μὲν ἀφʼ ὧν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μεθέξουσιν ἀρχῶν,25 μείζω δʼ ἀφʼ ὧν τῶν κυριωτέρων· τῷ τε κτωμένῳ τὸ τίμημα μετέχειν ἐξεῖναι τῆς πολιτείας, τοσούτου εἰσαγομένου τοῦ δήμου πλήθους διὰ τοῦ τιμήματος μεθʼ οὗ κρείττονες ἔσονται τῶν μὴ μετεχόντων· ἀεὶ δὲ δεῖ παραλαμβάνειν ἐκ τοῦ βελτίονος δήμου τοὺς κοινωνούς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐχομένην30 ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐπιτείνοντας δεῖ μικρὸν κατασκευάζειν. τῇ δʼ ἀντικειμένῃ τῇ τελευταίᾳ δημοκρατίᾳ, τῇ δυναστικωτάτῃ καὶ τυραννικωτάτῃ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν, ὅσῳ περ χειρίστη, τοσούτῳ δεῖ πλείονος φυλακῆς. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ μὲν εὖ σώματα διακείμενα πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῖα τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν35 καλῶς ἔχοντα τοῖς πλωτῆρσιν ἐπιδέχεται πλείους ἁμαρτίας ὥστε μὴ φθείρεσθαι διʼ αὐτάς, τὰ δὲ νοσερῶς ἔχοντα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὰ τῶν πλοίων ἐκλελυμένα καὶ πλωτήρων τετυχηκότα φαύλων οὐδὲ τὰς μικρὰς δύναται φέρειν ἁμαρτίας, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ χείρισται πλείστης δέονται1321a1 φυλακῆς.

τὰς μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας ὅλως ἡ πολυανθρωπία σῴζει (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀντίκειται πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν)· τὴν δʼ ὀλιγαρχίαν δῆλον ὅτι τοὐναντίον ἀπὸ τῆς εὐταξίας δεῖ τυγχάνειν τῆς σωτηρίας.

1321a5ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα μὲν ἔστι μέρη μάλιστα τοῦ πλήθους, γεωργικὸν βαναυσικὸν ἀγοραῖον θητικόν, τέτταρα δὲ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πόλεμον, ἱππικὸν ὁπλιτικὸν ψιλὸν ναυτικόν, ὅπου μὲν συμβέβηκε τὴν χώραν εἶναι ἱππάσιμον, ἐνταῦθα μὲν εὐφυῶς ἔχει κατασκευάζειν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσχυράν10 (ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τοῖς οἰκοῦσι διὰ ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, αἱ δʼ ἱπποτροφίαι τῶν μακρὰς οὐσίας κεκτημένων εἰσίν), ὅπου δʼ ὁπλῖτιν, τὴν ἐχομένην ὀλιγαρχίαν (τὸ γὰρ ὁπλιτικὸν τῶν εὐπόρων ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀπόρων), ἡ δὲ ψιλὴ δύναμις καὶ ναυτικὴ δημοκρατικὴ πάμπαν. νῦν μὲν οὖν15 ὅπου τοιοῦτον πολὺ πλῆθος ἔστιν, ὅταν διαστῶσι, πολλάκις ἀγωνίζονται χεῖρον· δεῖ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο φάρμακον παρὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν λαμβάνειν στρατηγῶν, οἳ συνδυάζουσι πρὸς τὴν ἱππικὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ὁπλιτικὴν τὴν ἁρμόττουσαν τῶν ψιλῶν. ταύτῃ δʼ ἐπικρατοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς διαστάσεσιν οἱ δῆμοι20 τῶν εὐπόρων· ψιλοὶ γὰρ ὄντες πρὸς ἱππικὴν καὶ ὁπλιτικὴν ἀγωνίζονται ῥᾳδίως.

τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων καθιστάναι ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν ἐφʼ ἑαυτούς ἐστι καθιστάναι, δεῖ δὲ διῃρημένης τῆς ἡλικίας, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων πρεσβυτέρων τῶν δὲ νέων, ἔτι μὲν ὄντας νέους τοὺς αὐτῶν υἱεῖς διδάσκεσθαι1321a25 τὰς κούφας καὶ τὰς ψιλὰς ἐργασίας, ἐκκεκριμένους δὲ ἐκ παίδων ἀθλητὰς εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῶν ἔργων· τὴν δὲ μετάδοσιν γίνεσθαι τῷ πλήθει τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἤτοι καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, τοῖς τὸ τίμημα κτωμένοις, ἢ καθάπερ Θηβαίοις, ἀποσχομένοις χρόνον τινὰ τῶν βαναύσων ἔργων, ἢ καθάπερ30 ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ κρίσιν ποιουμένους τῶν ἀξίων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς κυριωτάταις, ἃς δεῖ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κατέχειν, δεῖ προσκεῖσθαι λειτουργίας, ἵνʼ ἑκὼν ὁ δῆμος μὴ μετέχῃ καὶ συγγνώμην ἔχῃ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ὡς μισθὸν πολὺν διδοῦσι τῆς35 ἀρχῆς. ἁρμόττει δὲ θυσίας τε εἰσιόντας ποιεῖσθαι μεγαλοπρεπεῖς καὶ κατασκευάζειν τι τῶν κοινῶν, ἵνα τῶν περὶ τὰς ἑστιάσεις μετέχων ὁ δῆμος καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὁρῶν κοσμουμένην τὰ μὲν ἀναθήμασι τὰ δὲ οἰκοδομήμασιν ἄσμενος ὁρᾷ μένουσαν τὴν πολιτείαν· συμβήσεται δὲ καὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις40 εἶναι μνημεῖα τῆς δαπάνης. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο νῦν οἱ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας οὐ ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον· τὰ λήμματα γὰρ ζητοῦσιν οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τὴν τιμήν. διόπερ εὖ ἔχει λέγειν1321b1 ταύτας εἶναι δημοκρατίας μικράς.

πῶς μὲν οὖν χρὴ καθιστάναι τὰς δημοκρατίας καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

ἀκόλουθον δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐστὶ τὸ διῃρῆσθαι καλῶς1321b5 τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, πόσαι καὶ τίνες καὶ τίνων, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀρχῶν χωρὶς ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, τῶν δὲ πρὸς εὐταξίαν καὶ κόσμον ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι καλῶς. ἔτι δʼ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν μὲν ταῖς μικραῖς ἐλάττους εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μεγάλαις10 πλείους, ὥσπερ τυγχάνει πρότερον εἰρημένον· ποίας οὖν ἁρμόττει συνάγειν καὶ ποίας χωρίζειν, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. πρώτη μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἡ περὶ τὴν ἀγοράν, ἐφʼ ᾗ δεῖ τινα ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὴν ἐφορῶσαν περί τε τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ τὴν εὐκοσμίαν· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον15 πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ μὲν ὠνεῖσθαι τὰ δὲ πωλεῖν πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀναγκαίαν χρείαν, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ὑπογυιότατον πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν, διʼ ἣν δοκοῦσιν εἰς μίαν πολιτείαν συνελθεῖν. ἑτέρα δὲ ἐπιμέλεια ταύτης ἐχομένη καὶ σύνεγγυς ἡ τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄστυ δημοσίων καὶ ἰδίων, ὅπως20 εὐκοσμία ᾖ, καὶ τῶν πιπτόντων οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ ὁδῶν σωτηρία καὶ διόρθωσις, καὶ τῶν ὁρίων τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅπως ἀνεγκλήτως ἔχωσιν, καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἄλλα τῆς ἐπιμελείας ὁμοιότροπα. καλοῦσι δʼ ἀστυνομίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν, ἔχει δὲ μόρια πλείω τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὧν25 ἑτέρους ἐφʼ ἕτερα καθιστᾶσιν ἐν ταῖς πολυανθρωποτέραις πόλεσιν, οἷον τειχοποιοὺς καὶ κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητὰς καὶ λιμένων φύλακας. ἄλλη δʼ ἀναγκαία τε καὶ παραπλησία ταύτῃ· περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μὲν γάρ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ ἄστεως· καλοῦσι δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας τούτους30 οἱ μὲν ἀγρονόμους οἱ δʼ ὑλωρούς. αὗται μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλειαί εἰσι τούτων τρεῖς, ἄλλη δʼ ἀρχὴ πρὸς ἣν αἱ πρόσοδοι τῶν κοινῶν ἀναφέρονται, παρʼ ὧν φυλαττόντων μερίζονται πρὸς ἑκάστην διοίκησιν· καλοῦσι δʼ ἀποδέκτας τούτους καὶ ταμίας. ἑτέρα δʼ ἀρχὴ πρὸς ἣν ἀναγράφεσθαι δεῖ τά τε ἴδια συμβόλαια35 καὶ τὰς κρίσεις τὰς ἐκ τῶν δικαστηρίων· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις καὶ τὰς γραφὰς τῶν δικῶν γίνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ τὰς εἰσαγωγάς. ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν οὖν μερίζουσι καὶ ταύτην εἰς πλείους, ἔστι δʼ οὗ μία κυρία τούτων πάντων· καλοῦνται δὲ ἱερομνήμονες καὶ ἐπιστάται καὶ μνήμονες καὶ τούτοις ἄλλα40 ὀνόματα σύνεγγυς.

μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἐχομένη μὲν ἀναγκαιοτάτη δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ χαλεπωτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τῶν καταδικασθέντων καὶ τῶν προτιθεμένων1322a1 κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφὰς καὶ περὶ τὰς φυλακὰς τῶν σωμάτων.

χαλεπὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστι διὰ τὸ πολλὴν ἔχειν ἀπέχθειαν, ὥστε ὅπου μὴ μεγάλα ἔστι κερδαίνειν, οὔτʼ ἄρχειν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτὴν οὔθʼ ὑπομείναντες ἐθέλουσι πράττειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους·1322a5 ἀναγκαία δʼ ἐστίν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄφελος γίνεσθαι μὲν δίκας περὶ τῶν δικαίων, ταύτας δὲ μὴ λαμβάνειν τέλος, ὥστʼ εἰ μὴ γιγνομένων κοινωνεῖν ἀδύνατον ἀλλήλοις, καὶ πράξεων μὴ γιγνομένων. διὸ βέλτιον μὴ μίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀλλʼ ἄλλους ἐξ ἄλλων δικαστηρίων, καὶ περὶ τὰς προθέσεις10 τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων ὡσαύτως πειρᾶσθαι διαιρεῖν, ἔτι δʼ ἔνια πράττεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τάς τε ἄλλας καὶ τὰς τῶν ἔνων μᾶλλον τὰς νέας, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνεστώτων ἑτέρας καταδικασάσης ἑτέραν εἶναι τὴν πραττομένην, οἷον ἀστυνόμους τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀγορανόμων, τὰς δὲ παρὰ τούτων ἑτέρους.15 ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐλάττων ἀπέχθεια ἐνῇ τοῖς πραττομένοις, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον λήψονται τέλος αἱ πράξεις· τὸ μὲν οὖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς καταδικάσαντας καὶ πραττομένους ἀπέχθειαν ἔχει διπλῆν, τὸ δὲ περὶ πάντων τοὺς αὐτοὺς πολεμίους πᾶσιν ποιεῖ. πολλαχοῦ δὲ δὴ διῄρηται καὶ ἡ φυλάττουσα πρὸς τὴν20 πραττομένην, οἷον Ἀθήνησιν ἡ τῶν Ἕνδεκα καλουμένων. διὸ βέλτιον καὶ ταύτην χωρίζειν, καὶ τὸ σόφισμα ζητεῖν καὶ περὶ ταύτην. ἀναγκαία μὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὐχ ἧττον τῆς εἰρημένης, συμβαίνει δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς φεύγειν μάλιστα ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, τοὺς δὲ μοχθηροὺς οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ποιεῖν κυρίους· αὐτοὶ25 γὰρ δέονται φυλακῆς μᾶλλον ἄλλων ἢ φυλάττειν ἄλλους δύνανται. διὸ δεῖ μὴ μίαν ἀποτεταγμένην ἀρχὴν εἶναι πρὸς αὐτούς, μηδὲ συνεχῶς τὴν αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ τῶν τε νέων, ὅπου τις ἐφήβων ἢ φρουρῶν ἔστι τάξις, καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν δεῖ κατὰ μέρη ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἑτέρους.

ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς1322a30 ἀρχὰς ὡς ἀναγκαιοτάτας θετέον εἶναι πρώτας, μετὰ δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἀναγκαίας μὲν οὐθὲν ἧττον, ἐν σχήματι δὲ μείζονι τεταγμένας· καὶ γὰρ ἐμπειρίας καὶ πίστεως δέονται πολλῆς. τοιαῦται δʼ εἶεν ἂν αἵ τε περὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ὅσαι τάττονται πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας. δεῖ35 δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ πυλῶν τε καὶ τειχῶν φυλακῆς ὁμοίως ἐπιμελητὰς εἶναι καὶ ἐξετάσεως καὶ συντάξεως τῶν πολιτῶν. ἔνθα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ἀρχαὶ πλείους εἰσίν, ἔνθα δʼ ἐλάττους, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς πόλεσι μία περὶ πάντων. καλοῦσι δὲ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πολεμάρχους1322b1 τοὺς τοιούτους.

ἔτι δὲ κἂν ὦσιν ἱππεῖς ἢ ψιλοὶ ἢ τοξόται ἢ ναυτικόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ἑκάστων ἐνίοτε καθίσταται ἀρχή, αἳ καλοῦνται ναυαρχίαι καὶ ἱππαρχίαι καὶ ταξιαρχίαι, καὶ κατὰ μέρος δὲ αἱ ὑπὸ ταύτας τριηραρχίαι καὶ λοχαγίαι1322b5 καὶ φυλαρχίαι καὶ ὅσα τούτων μόρια. τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἕν τι τούτου ἐστὶν εἶδος, ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔνιαι τῶν ἀρχῶν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πᾶσαι, διαχειρίζουσι πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν, ἀναγκαῖον ἑτέραν εἶναι τὴν ληψομένην λογισμὸν καὶ προσευθυνοῦσαν,1322b10 αὐτὴν μηθὲν διαχειρίζουσαν ἕτερον· καλοῦσι δὲ τούτους οἱ μὲν εὐθύνους οἱ δὲ λογιστὰς οἱ δʼ ἐξεταστὰς οἱ δὲ συνηγόρους. παρὰ πάσας δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ μάλιστα κυρία πάντων ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ πολλάκις ἔχει τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν εἰσφοράν, ἢ προκάθηται τοῦ πλήθους, ὅπου κύριός ἐστιν ὁ15 δῆμος· δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ συνάγον τὸ κύριον κύριον τῆς πολιτείας. καλεῖται δὲ ἔνθα μὲν πρόβουλοι διὰ τὸ προβουλεύειν, ὅπου δὲ πλῆθός ἐστι, βουλὴ μᾶλλον. αἱ μὲν οὖν πολιτικαὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν σχεδὸν τοσαῦταί τινές εἰσιν· ἄλλο δʼ εἶδος ἐπιμελείας ἡ περὶ τοὺς θεούς, οἷον ἱερεῖς τε καὶ ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν20 περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τοῦ σῴζεσθαί τε τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἀνορθοῦσθαι τὰ πίπτοντα τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τέτακται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς. συμβαίνει δὲ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ταύτην ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν εἶναι μίαν, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς πόλεσιν, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ πολλὰς καὶ κεχωρισμένας τῆς ἱερωσύνης, οἷον ἱεροποιοὺς25 καὶ ναοφύλακας καὶ ταμίας τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων. ἐχομένη δὲ ταύτης ἡ πρὸς τὰς θυσίας ἀφωρισμένη τὰς κοινὰς πάσας, ὅσας μὴ τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος, ἀλλʼ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἑστίας ἔχουσι τὴν τιμήν· καλοῦσι δʼ οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντας τούτους οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς οἱ δὲ πρυτάνεις.

αἱ μὲν1322b30 οὖν ἀναγκαῖαι ἐπιμέλειαί εἰσι περὶ τούτων, ὡς εἰπεῖν συγκεφαλαιωσαμένους, περί τε τὰ δαιμόνια καὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς προσόδους καὶ τὰ ἀναλισκόμενα, καὶ περὶ ἀγορὰν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ καὶ λιμένας καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἔτι περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια, καὶ συναλλαγμάτων ἀναγραφὰς35 καὶ πράξεις καὶ φυλακὰς καὶ ἐπὶ λογισμούς τε καὶ ἐξετάσεις καὶ προσευθύνας τῶν ἀρχόντων, καὶ τέλος αἳ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενόν εἰσι περὶ τῶν κοινῶν· ἴδιαι δὲ ταῖς σχολαστικωτέραις καὶ μᾶλλον εὐημερούσαις πόλεσιν, ἔτι δὲ φροντιζούσαις εὐκοσμίας, γυναικονομία νομοφυλακία παιδονομία1323a1 γυμνασιαρχία,

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ ἀγῶνας ἐπιμέλεια γυμνικοὺς καὶ Διονυσιακούς, κἂν εἴ τινας ἑτέρας συμβαίνει τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι θεωρίας. τούτων δʼ ἔνιαι φανερῶς εἰσιν οὐ δημοτικαὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, οἷον γυναικονομία καὶ παιδονομία·1323a5 τοῖς γὰρ ἀπόροις ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ παισὶν ὥσπερ ἀκολούθοις διὰ τὴν ἀδουλίαν. τριῶν δʼ οὐσῶν ἀρχῶν καθʼ ἃς αἱροῦνταί τινες ἀρχὰς τὰς κυρίους, νομοφυλάκων προβούλων βουλῆς, οἱ μὲν νομοφύλακες ἀριστοκρατικόν, ὀλιγαρχικὸν δʼ οἱ πρόβουλοι, βουλὴ δὲ δημοτικόν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν10 ἀρχῶν, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πασῶν.

Musean translation

Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Ancient Greek of all eight books, 182 Bekker pages and 1,609 line marks (the Perseus transcription of W. D. Ross’s Oxford text), for fidelity, argument, imagery and clarity.

and, if this is not possible for everyone, distribute it by tribes or some other division in turn. Meanwhile, for the necessary meetings, the prosperous should contribute the pay, being released from useless public services. In something like this fashion, the Carthaginians1320b5 conduct their public life and have secured the friendship of the people; for by continually sending some of the people out to the neighboring settlements, they make them prosperous. It also belongs to generous and intelligent notables to divide the poor among themselves and, by giving them a start, turn them toward productive work. It is also good to imitate the practices of the people of Tarentum.10 For by making their property available for the poor to use in common, they secure the goodwill of the multitude. Moreover, they have made all their offices twofold, some elective and others allotted: the allotted offices so that the people may share in them, the elective so that they may conduct public life better. This can also be done by15 dividing the same office, making some of its holders allotted and others elective. How democracies should be established has therefore been stated.

From these considerations it is also fairly clear how oligarchies should be established. For each oligarchy must be assembled from the opposite elements,1320b20 with reference to the corresponding democracy. The best-blended and first kind of oligarchy is the one close to what is called polity. In it the property qualifications must be divided, making some lower and others higher: the lower for participation in the necessary offices,25 the higher for the more authoritative ones. Anyone who acquires the property qualification must be allowed to share in the constitution, and enough of the people must be admitted through the qualification to make the participants stronger than those who do not participate. The partners must always be drawn from the better part of the people. Similarly, the next30 kind of oligarchy must be established by tightening the requirements a little. But the oligarchy opposed to the last kind of democracy, the most cliquish and tyrannical of oligarchies, needs all the more safeguarding the worse it is. For just as bodies in good condition for health, and ships well equipped for sailing35 with their crews, admit of more errors without being destroyed by them, whereas sickly bodies and unsound ships with poor crews cannot bear even small errors, so too the worst constitutions need the greatest1321a1 safeguarding.

Democracies, then, are generally preserved by a large population (for this stands opposed to the just according to merit). But oligarchy must clearly, on the contrary, find its preservation in good order.

1321a5Since there are chiefly four parts of the multitude—the farmers, the artisans, the traders, and the laborers—and four forces useful for war—cavalry, heavy infantry, light infantry, and a navy—where the territory happens to be suited to horses, there are naturally favorable conditions for establishing a strong oligarchy10 (for the inhabitants' preservation depends on this force, and keeping horses belongs to those who possess large estates). Where the territory is suited to heavy infantry, the next kind of oligarchy is appropriate (for heavy infantry belongs more to the prosperous than to the poor), whereas the light-armed force and the navy are wholly democratic. As things are now,15 where there is a large multitude of this kind, the oligarchs often fare worse in battle when faction breaks out. The remedy for this must be taken from generals experienced in war, who combine with the cavalry and heavy infantry the appropriate force of light infantry. This is how the people prevail in factions20 over the prosperous: being lightly armed, they fight easily against cavalry and heavy infantry.

To form this force out of these people, then, is to form it against themselves. Instead, since ages are divided and some are older and others young, they must have their own sons, while still young, taught1321a25 the duties of light and lightly armed troops; and once they have been selected out of boyhood, they must be practiced contestants in these duties. A share in the citizen body should be given to the multitude either, as stated before, to those who acquire the property qualification; or, as at Thebes, to those who have abstained for a certain time from artisans' work; or, as30 at Massalia, by judging the merits of those within the citizen body and those outside it. Moreover, the most authoritative offices, which those within the constitution must hold, must carry public services, so that the people will willingly refrain from sharing in them and will excuse the rulers as paying a high price for their35 office. It is fitting that on entering office they should offer magnificent sacrifices and construct some public work, so that the people, sharing in the feasts and seeing the city adorned with votive offerings in one place and buildings in another, will gladly see the constitution endure. The notables will also have40 memorials of their expenditure. But those concerned with oligarchies now do not do this; they do the opposite. For they seek profits no less than honor. For this reason it is apt to say1321b1 that these are small democracies.

Let this, then, be our account of how democracies and oligarchies should be established.

Following upon what has been said, we must properly distinguish1321b5 the matters concerning offices: how many there are, what they are, and what they concern, as was also said before. For without the necessary offices a city cannot exist, and without those directed toward good order and adornment it cannot be well administered. Moreover, it is necessary that in small cities there should be fewer offices and in large ones10 more, as has already been stated. We must therefore be clear about which it is fitting to combine and which to separate. The first of the necessary responsibilities is that concerning the marketplace. There must be an office to oversee contracts and good order there; for it is virtually necessary15 for all cities to buy some things and sell others to meet one another's necessary needs. This is the most immediate means to self-sufficiency, for the sake of which they seem to have come together into a single constitution. Another responsibility, following and closely related to this, concerns public and private property in the town: ensuring20 good order, preserving and repairing dilapidated buildings and roads, keeping boundaries between properties free from dispute, and whatever other responsibilities are of a similar kind. Most people call this office town supervision. It has several parts, for25 which they appoint different people in the more populous cities: for example, wall-builders, overseers of fountains, and guardians of harbors. Another office is necessary and similar to this one; for it concerns the same matters, but in the countryside and the areas outside the town. These rulers are called30 by some field-supervisors, by others forest-wardens. These, then, are three responsibilities for these matters. Another office is that to which public revenues are brought; its holders keep them and distribute them to each branch of administration. They call these officials receivers and treasurers. Another office is that with which private contracts must be registered,35 along with judgments from the law courts. These same officials must also receive the written charges in lawsuits and bring the cases to court. In some places they divide this office too among several officials, while elsewhere one has authority over all these matters. They are called sacred recorders, overseers, recorders, and other40 similar names.

Following this comes what is virtually the most necessary and most difficult of the offices: that concerned with enforcing judgments against those convicted, collecting the fines posted1322a1 in the registers, and keeping people in custody.

It is difficult because it arouses great hatred, so that where there is no great profit to be made, people neither consent to hold it nor, if they do consent, are willing to act according to the laws.1322a5 But it is necessary, because it is of no use to hold trials concerning the just if the judgments are not carried out. Hence, if it is impossible to live together without trials, it is also impossible without enforcement. For this reason it is better that this should not be a single office, but that different officials should enforce the judgments of different courts. As for the posted notices10 in the registers, we should likewise try to divide this responsibility. Moreover, some judgments should be enforced by other offices, those of the previous year preferably by the new officials, and those of the current officials by an office other than the one that passed the judgment: for example, the town-supervisors should enforce those of the market-supervisors, and others those of the town-supervisors.15 For the less hatred the enforcing officials arouse, the more readily the judgments will be carried out. When those who pass judgment and those who enforce it are the same, they incur a double hatred; and when the same people do this in every matter, it makes them enemies of everyone. In many places the office that keeps prisoners is indeed distinct from that which20 enforces judgments, as is the office of the so-called Eleven at Athens. It is therefore better to separate this office too, and to seek an ingenious arrangement for it as well. For it is no less necessary than the one mentioned; but decent people tend especially to shun this office, while it is unsafe to give authority to the wicked. They themselves25 need to be guarded more than they are able to guard others. Hence there must not be a single office assigned to them, nor the same one continually. Instead, where there is an organized body of youths or guards, different members of it, and of the offices, must take responsibility in turn.

These1322a30 offices, then, must be placed first as the most necessary. After them come those no less necessary but ranked in higher dignity; for they require much experience and trustworthiness. Such would be the offices concerned with guarding the city and all those assigned to the needs of war. There must be,35 in peace and war alike, overseers of the guarding of gates and walls, and of the inspection and organization of the citizens. In some places there are several offices for all these matters, in others fewer; in small cities, for example, one concerns itself with all of them. The names generals and war-commanders are given to1322b1 such officials.

Moreover, if there are cavalry, light infantry, archers, or a navy, sometimes an office is established over each of these as well. These are called naval commands, cavalry commands, and infantry commands; their subdivisions are commands of triremes, companies,1322b5 and tribal contingents, and whatever parts these have. The whole is one kind of responsibility: the oversight of military affairs.

So much, then, for this office. Since some offices, if not all, handle considerable public funds, there must be another to receive the accounts and examine them,1322b10 itself handling nothing else. Some call these officials auditors, others accountants, others examiners, and others public advocates. Besides all these offices there is the one with the highest authority over everything. For the same office often has authority over the final decision and the introduction of business, or presides over the multitude where sovereignty lies with the15 people; for the body that convenes the sovereign body must have authority within the constitution. In some places they are called preliminary councilors because they deliberate beforehand; where there is a multitude, it is more commonly called a council. Such, roughly, are the political offices. Another kind of responsibility concerns the gods: for example, priests and overseers of20 sacred places, charged with preserving what exists and restoring dilapidated buildings and other things dedicated to the gods. In some places this responsibility falls to a single office, as in small cities; in others to many, distinct from the priesthood, such as officials who conduct sacrifices,25 temple-guardians, and treasurers of sacred funds. Following this is the office set apart for all the common sacrifices that the law does not assign to the priests, whose holders instead receive their honor from the common hearth. Some call these officials rulers, others kings, and others presidents.

The1322b30 necessary responsibilities, then, concern the following matters, to state them in summary: divine affairs, military affairs, revenues and expenditure, the marketplace, the town, harbors, and the countryside; further, the law courts, the registration of agreements,35 enforcement of judgments, custody, accounts, examinations, and audits of rulers; and finally the offices concerned with deliberation about public affairs. Peculiar to cities with more leisure and greater prosperity, which also take care for good order, are the supervision of women, guardianship of laws, supervision of children,1323a1 and supervision of gymnasia,

and, besides these, oversight of athletic and Dionysian contests and any other such public spectacles that happen to be held. Some of these offices are clearly not democratic, such as the supervision of women and of children;1323a5 for the poor are compelled to use their wives and children as attendants because they have no slaves. There are three offices through which some select the authoritative offices: guardians of laws, preliminary councilors, and a council. Guardians of laws are aristocratic, preliminary councilors oligarchic, and a council democratic. Concerning the10 offices, then, we have now spoken in outline of virtually all of them.

Plain English translation

Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same Greek, covering all eight books and every Bekker page and line mark.

and if this can't be done for everyone, distribute it to the tribes or some other group in turn. Meanwhile, the rich should pay for attendance at the necessary meetings, and be excused from useless public services. In something like this way, the Carthaginians1320b5 conduct their public life and have won the people's friendship. They are always sending some of the people out to the neighboring communities and making them well-off. Decent and sensible notables should also divide the poor among themselves, give them resources, and turn them toward work. It is also good to copy the practices of the Tarentines.10 They make their property available for the poor to use, and so win the goodwill of the population. They have also divided all their offices into two kinds, some filled by choice and others by lot. Those filled by lot let the people have a share in them. Those filled by choice make public life better. This can also be done by15 dividing the same office, so that some holders are appointed by lot and others by choice. We have now explained how democracies should be set up.

From this it is also fairly clear how oligarchies should be set up. Each oligarchy must be put together from the opposite elements,1320b20 matching it to the opposite democracy. Start with the best-balanced and first kind of oligarchy. This is the one close to what is called polity, a constitution combining democracy and oligarchy. In it the property qualifications must be divided, with some lower and some higher. The lower ones should give access to the necessary offices,25 and the higher ones to the more authoritative offices. Anyone who acquires the required property should be allowed a share in the constitution. The property qualification should admit enough of the people to make those who take part stronger than those who don't. New members must always be drawn from the better part of the people. In the same way, the next30 kind of oligarchy should be set up by tightening these requirements a little. But the oligarchy opposite the last kind of democracy, the one most dominated by powerful families and most like a tyranny, needs more protection the worse it is. Healthy bodies and ships that are in good sailing condition35 can stand more mistakes by their sailors without being destroyed by them. But sick bodies, and ships that are coming apart and have poor sailors, can't stand even small mistakes. In the same way, the worst constitutions need the most1321a1 protection.

In general, democracies are kept safe by their large population, since this counterbalances justice based on merit. Clearly, an oligarchy must get its safety from the opposite source, good order.

1321a5There are four main parts of the population: farmers, craftsmen, traders, and laborers. There are also four kinds of forces useful in war: cavalry, or mounted soldiers; heavy infantry, or heavily armed foot soldiers; light infantry, or lightly armed foot soldiers; and the navy. Where the land is suitable for horses, conditions naturally favor setting up a strong oligarchy.10 The inhabitants' safety depends on this force, and keeping horses is something people with large fortunes can do. Where the land suits heavy infantry, conditions favor the next kind of oligarchy, since heavy infantry belongs more to the well-off than to the poor. Light infantry and naval forces, however, are entirely democratic. As things are now,15 where there are large numbers of these people, the oligarchs often fight at a disadvantage when the two sides split. The remedy must be taken from generals experienced in war. They combine cavalry and heavy infantry with a suitable force of light infantry. This is how, in civil conflicts, the people defeat20 the well-off. As light infantry, they can easily fight cavalry and heavy infantry.

To build up this force from the common people, then, is to build it up against themselves. Instead, the age groups should be divided into older and younger men. While their own sons are still young, they must have them taught1321a25 light and unarmored military exercises. Once they have passed beyond childhood, they should be trained competitors in these activities. The population should enter the citizen body as we said before, by acquiring the required property. Or they should enter as at Thebes, after keeping away from manual trades for a certain time. Another way is the one used30 at Massalia: judging who deserves membership, both among those in the citizen body and those outside it. Also, the most authoritative offices, which those who share in the constitution must hold, should carry costly public duties. Then the people will willingly stay out of them and accept the rulers, seeing that they pay a high price for35 office. On taking office, they should make splendid sacrifices and build some public work. The people will share in the feasts and see the city decorated with offerings and buildings. This will make them glad to see the constitution stay in place. The notables, too, will have40 memorials of their spending. But those who run oligarchies now don't do this. They do the opposite. They look for profits no less than honor. So it is fair to say1321b1 that these are small democracies.

Let this, then, settle how democracies and oligarchies should be established.

The next step after what we have said is to make clear distinctions1321b5 about offices: how many there should be, what they should be, and what they should deal with, as we said earlier too. Without the necessary offices a city can't exist. Without the offices that provide good order and proper arrangements, it can't be run well. Also, smaller cities must have fewer offices, and larger ones10 more, as we said before. We must therefore understand which offices it makes sense to combine and which to keep separate. The first necessary responsibility is the marketplace. There must be an office to supervise its contracts and good order. It is virtually necessary15 for every city to buy some things and sell others to meet one another's necessary needs. This is the most direct way to achieve self-sufficiency, for which people seem to have joined together under one constitution. The next responsibility, closely connected with this one, concerns public and private property in the town. Its job is to ensure20 good order, preserve and repair buildings that are falling down and roads, keep boundaries between properties free of disputes, and handle other similar matters. Most people call this office town supervision. It has several branches, and25 in more populated cities different people are appointed to different tasks, such as building walls, looking after fountains, and guarding harbors. Another necessary office is similar to this. It deals with the same things, but in the countryside and the districts outside the town. Its rulers are called30 rural supervisors by some, and forest wardens by others. These, then, are three responsibilities for these matters. Another office receives the public revenues, keeps them safe, and allocates them to each department. These officials are called receivers and treasurers. Another office must keep a record of private contracts35 and judgments from the law courts. The same officials must also receive written claims and bring cases before the courts. In some places this office too is divided among several officials. Elsewhere one office is responsible for all these things. They are called sacred recorders, supervisors, recorders, and other40 similar names.

Next comes an office that is about the most necessary and difficult of all. It deals with enforcing penalties against those convicted, collecting the sums posted1322a1 in the public records, and keeping prisoners in custody.

It is difficult because it causes so much hostility. Where there is no large profit to be made, people won't accept the office, or, if they do, won't carry out their duties according to the laws.1322a5 But it is necessary. There is no use in having trials about what is just if the judgments aren't carried out. If people can't live together without judgments, neither can they live together without enforcing them. So it is better not to have a single office for this, but different officials for different law courts. As for posted debts10 in public records, their collection should likewise be divided if possible. Also, other offices should enforce some penalties. Newly appointed officials should enforce those imposed by the officials of the previous year. For current officials, one office should impose the penalty and another enforce it. For example, town supervisors should enforce penalties imposed by market supervisors, and others those imposed by town supervisors.15 The less hostility there is toward those enforcing penalties, the more likely enforcement is to succeed. When the same people both impose and enforce penalties, they face double the hostility. If the same people handle everything, they become everyone's enemies. In many places the office that keeps prisoners is separate from the one that20 enforces penalties, as with the officials called the Eleven at Athens. So it is better to separate this office too, and to look for a clever arrangement for it as well. It is no less necessary than the office we mentioned. But decent people especially avoid it, and it isn't safe to put bad people in charge. They themselves25 need guarding more than they can guard others. So there shouldn't be one office assigned to the prisoners, or the same office doing the job continuously. Instead, where young men are organized into cadet groups or guards, these and the offices should take turns, with different people providing supervision.

These1322a30 offices, then, should be put first as the most necessary. Next come those that are no less necessary but have higher standing, since they need great experience and trustworthiness. These include the offices concerned with protecting the city and those assigned to military needs. There must be,35 in peace and war alike, people responsible for guarding the gates and walls and for inspecting and organizing the citizens. Some places have several offices for all these tasks, and others fewer. In small cities, for example, one office handles them all. They use the titles general and war commander for1322b1 these officials.

Also, if there are cavalry, light infantry, archers, or a navy, an office is sometimes set up for each of these. These are called naval commands, cavalry commands, and infantry commands. Under them are more specialized commands of warships with three banks of oars, companies,1322b5 and tribal units, and whatever subdivisions these have. All of this is one kind of responsibility: military affairs.

This is how matters stand with that office. Since some offices, if not all, handle large amounts of public money, there must be another office to take and audit their accounts,1322b10 without handling anything else itself. Some call these officials examiners of accounts, others accountants, others inspectors, and others public advocates. Besides all these offices there is the one with the greatest authority over everything. It often has both the final decision and the introduction of proposals, or presides over the population where power lies with the15 people. The office that brings together the sovereign body must have authority over the constitution. In some places its members are called preliminary councilors, because they deliberate in advance. Where there is a large population, it is more often called a council. These are roughly the political offices. Another kind of responsibility concerns the gods. Priests and those who look after20 the temples have this responsibility. They preserve existing buildings, restore those that are falling down, and care for the other things set apart for the gods. In some places, such as small cities, this is a single responsibility. Elsewhere it is divided among many offices separate from the priesthood, such as officials who conduct sacrifices,25 temple wardens, and treasurers of sacred funds. Next to this is the office assigned to all the common sacrifices that the law doesn't give to the priests. These officials have their honor from the common hearth. Some call them rulers, others kings, and others presidents.

The1322b30 necessary responsibilities, then, to put them briefly together, concern religion, military affairs, revenues and spending, the marketplace, the town, harbors, and the countryside. They also concern the law courts, records of transactions,35 enforcing penalties, custody, taking accounts, inspecting and auditing rulers, and finally deliberating about public affairs. Cities with more leisure and greater prosperity that also care about good order have special offices for supervising women, guarding the laws, supervising children,1323a1 and managing gymnasiums.

Besides these, they have offices for overseeing athletic contests, contests in honor of Dionysus, and any other public spectacles of this sort that take place. Some of these offices are clearly not democratic, such as those that supervise women and children.1323a5 The poor have to use their wives and children like attendants because they have no slaves. There are three offices by means of which some people select the authoritative offices: guardians of the laws, preliminary councilors, and a council. Guardians of the laws are aristocratic, preliminary councilors oligarchic, and a council democratic. As for the10 offices, this is a rough account of pretty much all of them.

About this section

Book VI, 1320b–1323a is part of Politics by Aristotle. This page sets the Ancient Greek original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 22 of 28 in the work, which is kept in the Greek tradition.

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