Book VI, 1316b–1320b

1316b31The number and kinds of the deliberative element sovereign in the constitution, of the arrangement of offices, and of law courts; which arrangement belongs with which constitution; and further, the destruction and preservation of constitutions,35 from what conditions they arise and through what causes—all these have been discussed before. Since there happen to be several forms of democracy, and likewise of the other constitutions, it would be well to examine at the same time anything still left to discuss about them, and to set out the arrangement appropriate and advantageous to each. Further,40 we must examine the combinations of all the previously mentioned1317a1 arrangements themselves.

For when these are combined, they make constitutions overlap, so that aristocracies are oligarchic and polities more democratic. I mean the combinations that ought to be examined but have not yet been examined: for example, if1317a5 the deliberative element and the choice of offices are arranged oligarchically, but the law courts aristocratically; or if these and the deliberative element are arranged oligarchically, but the choice of offices aristocratically; or if in some other way not all the elements of the constitution are combined10 appropriately.

Which democracy suits which city, and likewise which oligarchy suits which multitude, and which of the remaining constitutions is advantageous to which people, has been stated before. Nevertheless, since we must make clear not only which of these constitutions is best for cities, but also1317a15 how these and the others should be established, let us go through the matter briefly. First let us speak of democracy; for at the same time the opposite constitution will become clear, the one some call oligarchy. For this inquiry we must take up all democratic features and all those thought20 to accompany democracies. For the forms of democracy result from combining these, and so there are several democracies, not one, and they differ. There are two causes for democracies being several: first, the one mentioned earlier, that peoples differ (for25 one multitude is agricultural, another consists of artisans and hired laborers; when the first is added to the second, and again the third to both, the difference is not merely that the democracy becomes better or worse, but also that it is not the same democracy); second, the cause we are now discussing. For the features that30 accompany democracies and are thought appropriate to this constitution make democracies different when combined. One will have fewer of them, another more, and another all of them. It is useful to know each, both for establishing whichever of these democracies one happens to wish for,35 and for making corrections. For those who establish constitutions seek to bring together all the features appropriate to their underlying principle, but in doing this they go wrong, as was said earlier in the discussion of the destruction and preservation of constitutions. Now let us state their claims, their characters, and their aims.

1317a40The underlying principle of a democratic constitution, then, is freedom (for this is what people usually say, claiming that only in this constitution1317b1 do they share in freedom;

for they say that every democracy aims at this). One feature of freedom is being ruled and ruling in turn. For democratic justice consists in having equality according to number, not according to worth; and if this1317b5 is the just, the multitude must be sovereign, and whatever the majority decides must be final and must be the just. For they say that each citizen ought to have an equal share. Thus in democracies those without means are more sovereign than those with means: they are more numerous, and what10 the majority decides is authoritative. This, then, is one sign of freedom, which all supporters of democracy set down as a defining feature of the constitution. Another is living as one wishes. For they say that this is the function of freedom, if indeed living not as one wishes is the condition of a slave. This, then, is the second defining feature of democracy. From it has arisen15 the wish not to be ruled, preferably by no one, but otherwise only in turn; and in this way it contributes to freedom based on equality.

With these assumptions and this starting point, the following features are democratic: that everyone should choose the offices from among everyone; that everyone should rule1317b20 each person, and each person in turn everyone; that offices should be assigned by lot, either all or those that do not require experience and skill; that offices should depend on no property qualification, or the smallest possible; that the same person should hold no office twice, or only rarely, or only a few offices, apart from military offices; that terms should be short for25 all offices, or as many as possible; that everyone, drawn from everyone, should sit in judgment on all matters, or on most and on the greatest and most authoritative, such as the scrutiny of officials, the constitution, and private transactions; that the assembly should be sovereign over all matters or the greatest, and no office30 over any, or over as few as possible, or that a council should be sovereign over the greatest matters (of offices, a council is the most democratic where there is no abundance of pay for everyone; for where there is, they deprive even this office of its power: the people brings all decisions before itself when it has abundant pay, as was said earlier in the inquiry preceding35 this one); next, that preferably everyone should receive pay, the assembly, the law courts, and the offices, but otherwise the offices, the law courts, the council, and the principal assemblies, or those offices whose holders must eat together. Further, since oligarchy is defined by birth, wealth, and education,40 the democratic features are thought to be their opposites: low birth, poverty, and manual work. Further, no office should be perpetual;

1318a1and if any is left over from an ancient revolution, its power should at least be taken away, and its holders appointed by lot instead of chosen. These, then, are the features common to democracies. From what is agreed to be democratic justice5 (that everyone should have equality according to number) arises what is thought most truly to be democracy and popular rule. For equality means that those without means should rule no more than those with means, nor be alone sovereign, but that everyone should share equally according to number. For in this way they would think the constitution possessed equality10 and freedom.

The next difficulty is how they will have equality. Should the property assessments of the five hundred be divided among a thousand, and should the thousand have equal power with the five hundred? Or should equality in this respect be established not in this way, but by dividing1318a15 them in this way and then taking equal numbers from the five hundred and from the thousand, and making these sovereign over choices and law courts? Which, then, is the most just constitution according to democratic justice: this one, or rather the one based on numbers? For supporters of democracy say that the just is whatever the majority decides,20 while supporters of oligarchy say it is whatever the greater property decides; for they say that judgment should follow the amount of property. But both contain inequality and injustice. For if whatever the few decide prevails, there is tyranny (indeed, if one person owns more than the other wealthy people, according to oligarchic justice it is just for him alone to rule); but if25 whatever the numerical majority decides prevails, they will commit injustice by confiscating the property of the rich, who are fewer, as was said before.

What equality both groups would agree to must therefore be examined from the conceptions of the just by which both define their positions. For they say that whatever the majority of citizens decides must be authoritative.1318a30 Let this stand, then, but not without qualification. Since there happen to be two parts of which the city consists, rich and poor, let what both decide, or the majority in both, be authoritative; but if they decide opposite things, let it be what is decided by the greater number whose property assessment is greater. For example, if one group numbers ten and the other twenty, and of the rich35 six resolve one way, and of the poorer fifteen resolve the opposite; four of the rich have joined the poor and five of the poor have joined the rich. Whichever side's property assessment is greater, when both groups on each side are counted together, let its decision be authoritative. If they turn out equal, this must be regarded as a difficulty common to both systems, just as40 now, if the assembly or the law court is divided in two;

for either1318b1 the matter must be decided by lot or something else of the kind must be done. But concerning equality and the just, even if it is very difficult to find the truth about them, it is still easier to attain it than to persuade those who can take more than their share. For equality and the5 just are always sought by the weaker; those who prevail pay no attention to them.

Of the four democracies, the first in order is the best, as was said in the earlier discussions; and this is also the oldest of all. By first I mean according to the way one might divide the peoples. For the agricultural people1318b10 is the best, so that democracy can also be established where the multitude lives from agriculture or pasture. Because it has little property, it has no leisure, and so does not often attend the assembly; and because they have the necessities, they spend their time at their work and do not desire what belongs to others. Rather, they find15 working more pleasant than taking part in public life and holding office, where offices do not yield large profits. For most people desire gain more than honor. Here is evidence: they endured the ancient tyrannies and endure oligarchies, if no one prevents them from working or20 takes anything away from them. For some of them quickly become rich, and the others are not destitute. Further, being sovereign over choice and scrutiny makes up for what they lack, if they have any ambition for honor. For among some peoples, even if they have no share in the choice of offices, but some persons are chosen in turn from everyone,25 as at Mantinea, yet they are sovereign over deliberation, the many are satisfied; and this too must be regarded as a form of democracy, such as once existed at Mantinea. Therefore it is both advantageous to the democracy mentioned earlier, and usual in it, for everyone to choose the offices, scrutinize their holders, and30 sit in judgment, but for the greatest offices to be held by people chosen subject to property qualifications, the greater offices requiring greater qualifications; or for no office to depend on property qualifications, but for capable people to hold them. Those who take part in public life in this way necessarily do so well (for the offices will always be in the hands of the best, with the people's consent and without envy of the35 decent). This arrangement must also satisfy the decent and the notables: they will not be ruled by others worse than themselves, and they will rule justly because others are sovereign over their scrutiny. For having a restraint hanging over one, and not being free to do everything one pleases, is advantageous. The freedom40 to do whatever one wishes cannot restrain the baseness in1319a1 each human being.

Thus what is most beneficial in constitutions must follow: the decent rule without going wrong, while the multitude suffers no disadvantage.

That this is the best of the democracies, then, is clear,1319a5 and so is the reason: because the people is of a certain character. To make the people agricultural, some of the laws established long ago among many peoples are entirely useful: either forbidding anyone to own more land than a certain measure altogether, or within a certain distance of the town10 and the city (long ago many cities had a law forbidding even the sale of the original allotments; and the law said to be Oxylus' has something of this effect, forbidding loans secured on a certain part of each person's land). At present, corrections should also be made through the law of the Aphytaeans,15 for it is useful for what we are describing. Though they are many and own little land, they all nonetheless farm: they assess not whole properties, but divide them into portions small enough that even the poor can exceed the required assessments.

After the agricultural multitude,1319a20 the best people is one composed of herdsmen who live from livestock. For this has many features similar to agriculture, and for military actions these people are especially well trained in their habits, useful in their bodies, and able to camp in the open. Almost all the other multitudes, from25 which the remaining democracies are constituted, are far inferior to these. For their life is inferior, and none of the work undertaken by the multitude of artisans, marketplace people, and hired laborers involves virtue. Further, because virtually all this class frequents the marketplace and the town,30 it readily attends the assembly; whereas farmers, because they are scattered over the countryside, neither meet together nor have the same need for this gathering. Where the territory also happens to be so situated that the countryside lies far from the city, it is easy to establish a good democracy35 and constitution; for the multitude is compelled to make its settlements in the fields. Thus, even if there is a marketplace mob, assemblies in democracies must not be held without the multitude from the countryside. How the best and first democracy should be established, then, has been stated; it is clear40 how the others should be established too. For one must deviate in sequence1319b1 and single out a worse multitude at each stage.

The last democracy, because everyone shares in it, is neither something every city can bear nor something that can easily endure unless well constituted in its laws and customs (nearly all the things that bring destruction upon both this1319b5 and the other constitutions have been stated before). To establish this democracy and make the people strong, its leaders usually admit as many as possible, and make citizens not only of those of legitimate birth, but also of those of illegitimate birth and those with either10 parent a citizen—I mean, for example, a father or a mother. For all this is more appropriate to such a people. This, then, is how demagogues usually establish it; but they should admit people only until the multitude exceeds the notables and the middle class, and not go beyond this. For by exceeding it15 they make the constitution more disorderly and further provoke the notables to resent enduring democracy. This proved to be the cause of faction at Cyrene. For a small evil is overlooked, but as it grows large it is more conspicuous. Further,20 measures of the following kind are useful for such a democracy, like those Cleisthenes employed at Athens when he wished to enlarge the democracy, and those employed by the founders of popular rule at Cyrene. New and more numerous tribes and brotherhoods should be created, and private religious rites should be brought together into a few25 common ones; and every device should be used to mix everyone with everyone else as much as possible, and to break up their former associations. Further, all tyrannical measures also seem democratic: I mean, for example, the lack of control over slaves (this might be advantageous up to a point), over women, and over30 children, and overlooking people's living as they please. For there will be much support for such a constitution: most people find living without order more pleasant than living with self-restraint.

For the legislator and those wishing to establish some such constitution, the greatest task is not its establishment,1319b35 nor is this the only task; rather, it is to ensure its preservation. For it is not difficult to remain under any sort of constitution for one or two or three days. Therefore, from the matters examined earlier concerning the preservation and destruction of constitutions, they must try to establish security, guarding against the things that destroy them,40 and laying down laws, both unwritten and written,

1320a1that will most fully embrace the things that preserve constitutions. They must not regard as democratic or oligarchic whatever will make the city as thoroughly democratic or oligarchic as possible, but whatever will make it so for the longest time. Yet present-day demagogues,5 to please the peoples, confiscate much property through the law courts. Therefore those who care for the constitution must oppose these practices by legislating that none of the property forfeited by judgment should become public and pass into the common treasury, but should be sacred. For wrongdoers will be no less cautious10 (for they will suffer the same penalty), but the masses will be less inclined to condemn defendants, since they will receive nothing. Further, public prosecutions should always be kept as few as possible, by restraining those who bring charges recklessly with heavy penalties. For it is not supporters of democracy but the notables whom they usually bring to trial; yet15 in this constitution too, all citizens should preferably be well disposed toward it, or otherwise at least not regard its sovereign members as enemies.

Since the last democracies have large populations and it is difficult to get people to attend the assembly without pay, and where there are no revenues this is hostile to the notables1320a20 (for it must come from a levy, confiscation, and corrupt law courts, things that have already overturned many democracies), where there are no revenues few assemblies should be held, and law courts should have many members but sit for few days (for this contributes both to keeping25 the rich from fearing the expenses, even if the wealthy receive no juror's pay but the poor do, and to having cases judged far better: the wealthy are unwilling to be absent from their own affairs for many days, but are willing for a short time). Where there are revenues, one must not do what30 the demagogues do now (for they distribute the surplus; people receive it and at once need the same again: such help to those without means is a jar full of holes). Rather, someone truly devoted to democracy must see to it that the multitude is not excessively poor; for this is what makes democracy defective.35 Means must therefore be devised to bring about lasting prosperity. Since this is advantageous to the wealthy too, the proceeds from revenues should be accumulated and distributed to those without means in substantial sums, preferably, if one can collect enough, for the acquisition of a small plot of land; otherwise, as capital for trade and1320b1 agriculture,

1316b31Deliberative bodies with supreme authority within a constitution, offices, and law courts: their kinds and number, their fit with each constitution; also, constitutional destruction and preservation,35 how they happen and why—all this was discussed before. Since there are several kinds of democracy, and likewise of the other constitutions, we should also examine anything left to discuss about them. We should set out the appropriate and advantageous way of organizing each. We should also40 examine combinations of all the previously mentioned1317a1 arrangements;

combining these makes constitutions overlap, so that some aristocracies are oligarchic and some polities, constitutions combining democracy and oligarchy, more democratic. I mean combinations that need examining but have not yet been examined. For example,1317a5 the deliberative body and the choice of officeholders might be organized on oligarchic lines, but the law courts on aristocratic lines. Or the courts and the deliberative body might be oligarchic, but the choice of officeholders aristocratic. Or in some other way not all the parts of the constitution might be put together10 in a way appropriate to it.

We have already said which democracy suits which city, which oligarchy suits which population, and which of the other constitutions is advantageous for which people. Still, we need to make clear not only which of these constitutions is best for cities, but also1317a15 how to set up these and the others. Let's go through this briefly. First let's discuss democracy. This will also make clear the opposite constitution, which some call oligarchy. For this inquiry we must take all the democratic features and all the features thought20 to go with democracies. The kinds of democracy result from combinations of these. That is why there is more than one democracy, and why they differ. There are two reasons why democracies take several forms. The first, mentioned earlier, is that the people differ. Some populations are25 farmers, others craftspeople and hired workers. When the first group is added to the second, and the third in turn to both, the difference is not just that democracy becomes better or worse. It is also no longer the same democracy. The second reason is the one we are now discussing. The features that30 go with democracies and are thought appropriate to this constitution produce different democracies when combined. One will have fewer of these features, another more, and another all of them. Knowing each feature is useful both for setting up whichever democracy someone happens to want35 and for correcting it. People who establish constitutions try to gather all the features appropriate to their basic principle. But they make a mistake by doing this, as we said earlier in discussing the destruction and preservation of constitutions. Now let's discuss their principles, their habits, and their aims.

1317a40The basic principle of a democratic constitution is freedom. This is what people usually say, claiming that only in this constitution1317b1 do people have a share in freedom;

they say that every democracy aims at this. One part of freedom is to be ruled and to rule in turn. For democratic justice means equality based on number, not on worth. If this1317b5 is the just, the masses must be sovereign. Whatever the majority decides must be final and must be the just. They say that each citizen should have an equal share. As a result, in democracies the poor have more authority than the wealthy. There are more of them, and what10 the majority decides is authoritative. This is one sign of freedom, which all supporters of democracy set up as a defining feature of the constitution. Another is to live as one wants. They say this is the effect of freedom, since the slave's condition is to live not as he wants. This is democracy's second defining feature. From it comes15 the desire not to be ruled, preferably by anyone, or, failing that, only in turn. In this way it contributes to freedom based on equality.

With these assumptions and this basic principle, the following arrangements are democratic. Everyone chooses officeholders from everyone. Everyone rules1317b20 each person, and each person in turn rules everyone. Offices are filled by lot, either all of them or those that do not need experience and skill. Offices require no property qualification, or the smallest possible one. No one holds the same office twice, or only rarely, or in only a few offices apart from military ones. Terms are short for25 all offices, or as many as possible. Everyone serves as a juror, drawn from everyone, and judges all matters, or most of them and the greatest and most important ones. These include reviews of officeholders' conduct, constitutional matters, and private dealings. The assembly is sovereign in everything or in the most important matters. No office30 is sovereign in anything, or only in as few matters as possible; or the council is sovereign in the most important matters. Of the offices, the council is the most democratic where there is not enough money to pay everyone. Where there is, they take away the power of this office too. When the people have enough pay, they bring all decisions before themselves, as was said earlier in the inquiry preceding35 this one. Next, preferably everyone should be paid: the assembly, the law courts, and the officeholders. If that is not possible, the officeholders, the law courts, the council, and the sovereign meetings of the assembly should be paid, or those officeholders who must eat together. Also, since oligarchy is defined by birth, wealth, and education,40 their opposites are thought democratic: low birth, poverty, and manual work. Another feature is that no office is held for life.

1318a1If an office of this kind survives from an earlier change, at least its power should be taken away, and its holders should be selected by lot instead of by choice. These, then, are the features common to democracies. From what people agree is democratic justice5 (everyone having an equal share based on number) comes the form thought most fully democratic: rule by the people. Equality means that the poor should have no more rule than the wealthy, and should not be the only sovereign group. Everyone should have an equal share based on number. In this way, people would think that the constitution had both equality10 and freedom.

The next question is how they will have an equal share. Should the property qualifications of the five hundred be divided among a thousand, so that the thousand have the same power as the five hundred? Or should equality in this respect be arranged differently: divide them1318a15 in this way, then take equal numbers from the five hundred and the thousand and make these people sovereign over the choice of officeholders and the law courts? Is this constitution the most just by democratic standards of justice, or is the one based on numbers more just? Supporters of democracy say that whatever the majority decides is just.20 Supporters of oligarchy say the same about the decision of the greater wealth, since they say that the amount of wealth should decide. Both involve inequality and injustice. If what the few decide is authoritative, that is tyranny. For if one person has more than the other wealthy people, oligarchic justice makes it just for him alone to rule. If,25 on the other hand, the numerical majority decides, they will act unjustly by confiscating the property of the rich, who are fewer, as we said earlier.

So we must examine what equality both groups will accept, starting from the definitions of the just that both use. They say that whatever the majority of citizens decides must be authoritative.1318a30 Let this stand, but not without qualification. Since the city consists of two groups, the rich and the poor, let whatever both groups, or their majorities, decide be authoritative. If they make opposite decisions, let the decision follow the majority whose total property qualification is greater. For example, suppose one group has ten members and the other twenty. Suppose one decision is favored, among the rich, by35 six people, while the opposite is favored by fifteen of the poorer people. Four of the rich have joined the poor, and five of the poor have joined the rich. Whichever side has the greater total property qualification, counting both groups on each side together, should be authoritative. If they turn out equal, this is a problem shared by all constitutions, just as40 now when the assembly or law court is evenly divided.

Either1318b1 we must decide by lot or do something else of that kind. But however hard it may be to discover the truth about equality and the just, it is still easier to find it than to persuade people who can take more than their share. Equality and5 what is just are always sought by the weaker. Those who have the upper hand do not care at all.

There are four democracies, and the first in order is the best, as we said in the earlier discussions. It is also the oldest of them all. I call it the first according to the way we might divide the people into groups. The farming people1318b10 are the best. So it is possible to make a democracy where the masses live by farming or raising livestock. Because they have little property, they have no leisure and cannot often attend the assembly. Since they have the necessities of life, they spend their time at work and do not want what belongs to others. They find it more pleasant15 to work than to take part in public life and hold office, where offices do not offer large profits. Most people want profit more than honor. There is evidence for this: they put up with the old tyrannies and still put up with oligarchies, provided no one stops them from working or20 takes anything from them. Some of them soon get rich, and the others are not in need. Besides, being sovereign over the choice of officeholders and the review of their conduct makes up for what they lack, if they have any desire for honor. In some democracies, even if the people have no part in the choice of officeholders, but certain people chosen from everyone take turns doing this,25 as at Mantinea, the masses are satisfied if they are sovereign over deliberation. We should regard this too as a form of democracy, like the one that once existed at Mantinea. So in the democracy described earlier, it is useful and usual for everyone to choose officeholders, review their conduct, and30 serve as jurors. The greatest offices are held by people chosen on the basis of property qualifications. Greater offices require greater qualifications. Alternatively, no office need have a property qualification, but capable people should hold office. People who take part in public life in this way must do so well. The offices will always be in the hands of the best people, with the people's consent and without their resenting35 the decent people. This arrangement must also satisfy the decent people and the notables. They will not be ruled by others who are worse than themselves, and they will rule justly because others are sovereign over the review of their conduct. It is advantageous to have a check hanging over them, and not to be free to do anything they decide. Freedom40 to do whatever one wants cannot keep in check the bad that is in1319a1 every human being.

So the result must be what is most beneficial in constitutions: decent people rule without making mistakes, while the masses lose nothing.

It is clear, then, that this is the best democracy,1319a5 and why: because the people are of a certain kind. To make the people farmers, some laws established long ago in many places are certainly useful. One forbids anyone to own more land than a certain amount, either anywhere or within a certain distance of the town10 and city. In many cities there was an old law that even forbade selling the original allotments. The law said to be that of Oxylus has a similar effect: it forbids lending against a certain part of each person's land. Today we should also make corrections by using the law of the people of Aphytis,15 since it is useful for what we are discussing. Although there are many of them and they own little land, they all farm. They do not assess whole properties, but divide them into portions small enough that even the poor can exceed the required property qualifications.

After the farming population,1319a20 the best people are those who herd animals and live from livestock. This has many similarities to farming. These people are especially well trained in the habits needed for military action. Their bodies are fit for it, and they can live outdoors. Almost all the other populations25 that make up the remaining democracies are much worse than these. Their way of life is bad. None of the work done by the population of craftspeople, marketplace workers, and hired laborers involves virtue. Besides, since practically all people of this kind spend their time around the marketplace and the town,30 they can easily attend the assembly. Farmers, on the other hand, are scattered across the countryside. They neither come together nor feel the same need for this gathering. Where the territory is laid out so that the countryside is far from the city, it is also easy to make a good democracy35 and constitution. The masses have to settle in the fields. So even if there are masses of marketplace workers, democracies should not hold assemblies without the country population. We have now said how to set up the best and first democracy. It is also clear40 how to set up the others. We must depart from this in successive steps,1319b1 singling out a worse population at each step.

The last form, because everyone shares in it, is not one that every city can bear. Nor can it easily last unless its laws and habits are well organized. As for nearly all the things that destroy this1319b5 and the other constitutions, we have already discussed them. To establish this democracy and make the people strong, its leaders usually bring in as many people as possible. They make citizens not only of legitimate children, but also of illegitimate children and of anyone with either10 parent a citizen, whether the father or the mother. All this is more suited to a people of this kind. This is how popular leaders usually set it up. But they should add people only until the masses outnumber the notables and the middle class, and go no further. If they go too far,15 they make the constitution more disorderly and provoke the notables to find democracy still harder to put up with. This was the cause of faction at Cyrene. People overlook a little evil, but when it grows large, it is more noticeable. Also,20 measures like those Cleisthenes used at Athens when he wanted to expand democracy, and those used by the founders of democracy at Cyrene, are useful for this kind of democracy. They should create more tribes and kinship groups, different from the old ones. They should combine the rites of private shrines into a few25 common ones. They should devise every means of mixing everyone together as much as possible and breaking up their old associations. All the measures used by tyrants also seem democratic. I mean, for example, the lack of control over slaves, which can be advantageous up to a point, and over women and30 children, and overlooking people's living however they want. There will be much support for a constitution of this kind. Most people find it more pleasant to live without discipline than with self-control.

The greatest task of the lawgiver and those who want to organize a constitution of this kind is not to establish it,1319b35 nor is that their only task. Rather, they must ensure that it survives. It is not hard for people to live under any sort of constitution for one, two, or three days. So they should use our earlier examination of what preserves and destroys constitutions to try to secure it. They should guard against what destroys it40 and establish laws, both unwritten and written,

1320a1that include as fully as possible what preserves constitutions. They should not think democratic or oligarchic measures are those that make the city as democratic or oligarchic as possible. They are the ones that make it remain so for the longest time. Today's popular leaders,5 to please the people, confiscate a great deal of property through the law courts. So those who care about the constitution should oppose this. They should make a law that none of the property taken by court judgment becomes public property or goes into the public treasury, but that it belongs to the gods. Wrongdoers will be just as careful,10 since they will face the same penalties. But the masses will be less likely to convict defendants when they stand to gain nothing. Also, public prosecutions should always be kept as few as possible. Heavy penalties should deter people from bringing charges without grounds. They usually prosecute the notables, not supporters of democracy. Yet15 in this constitution too, all citizens should preferably be well disposed toward it. If not, at least they should not regard those who are sovereign as enemies.

The most extreme democracies have large populations, and it is hard to get people to attend the assembly without pay. Where there is no revenue, this is hostile to the notables,1320a20 since the pay must come from a special tax, confiscation, and corrupt law courts. These things have already overthrown many democracies. So where there is no revenue, there should be few meetings of the assembly. Law courts should have many jurors but sit on few days. This helps keep25 the rich from fearing the expense, even if the wealthy receive no juror's pay and the poor do. It also makes trials much better. The wealthy are unwilling to be away from their own affairs for many days, but they are willing for a short time. Where there is revenue, they should not do what30 the popular leaders do now. They distribute the surplus, but as soon as people receive it, they need the same help again. Helping the poor this way is like a jar with holes in it. Someone who truly supports democracy must see to it that the masses are not too poor. This is what makes democracy bad.35 So they must find a way to make prosperity last. Since this is also advantageous for the wealthy, they should collect the income from public revenues and distribute it to the poor in lump sums. Ideally, if possible, they should collect enough for each to buy a small plot of land. Otherwise, it should be enough to provide starting funds for trade and1320b1 farming,