Book V, 1315a–1316b

Since cities consist of two parts, people without means and people with means, above all both must believe that their safety depends on the ruler, and that neither group is1315a35 subjected to any injustice by the other. Whichever group is stronger, he should make especially attached to his rule. For if this condition is secured, the tyrant need neither free slaves nor confiscate arms: either part, added to his own power, is enough to make him stronger than40 those who attack him. But to discuss each such measure is needless elaboration; the aim is clear:

he must appear to the ruled not as a tyrant1315b1 but as a household manager and a king, not as a usurper but as a trustee; he must pursue moderation in his way of life, not excess, and further, associate with the notables and court the people. For from5 these things it necessarily follows not only that his rule is nobler and more enviable, because he rules better people, not people who have been abased, and does not remain an object of hatred and fear, but also that his rule lasts longer. Further, his own character will be either well disposed toward virtue or half decent,10 not wicked but half wicked.

Yet of all constitutions, oligarchy and tyranny are the shortest-lived. The longest-lasting tyranny was that at Sicyon, belonging to Orthagoras himself and his descendants: it endured for a hundred years. The reason for this was1315b15 that they treated the ruled moderately and in many matters were subject to the laws; Cleisthenes, moreover, being a capable soldier, was not easily despised, and for the most part they courted the people by attending to their needs. Cleisthenes, at any rate, is said to have crowned the man who judged against his victory; some say that20 the seated statue in the marketplace is an image of the man who gave this judgment. They also say that Pisistratus once submitted to a summons for trial before the Areopagus. Second was the tyranny of the Cypselids at Corinth: this too lasted seventy-three years and six months. Cypselus was tyrant for25 thirty years, Periander for forty-four, and Psammetichus son of Gordius for three years. The reasons in this case were the same: Cypselus courted the people and throughout his rule had no bodyguard; Periander was tyrannical, but a capable soldier. Third came30 the tyranny of the Pisistratids at Athens. It was not continuous, for Pisistratus went into exile twice during his tyranny. Thus, of thirty-three years, he was tyrant for seventeen, and his sons for eighteen, making thirty-five years in all. Among the rest was the tyranny of Hieron and Gelon at35 Syracuse. This too endured for no great number of years, but eighteen in all: Gelon, after seven years as tyrant, died in the eighth; Hieron ruled for ten, and Thrasybulus was expelled in his eleventh month. Most tyrannies have all been very short-lived indeed.

1315b40As for constitutions and monarchies, then, the causes of their destruction and, in turn, of their preservation have nearly1316a1 all been discussed.

In the Republic, Socrates does discuss revolutions, but not well. For he does not explain the revolution of the best and first constitution in terms peculiar to it. He says that the cause is that1316a5 nothing remains, but everything changes in a certain cycle; and the beginning of these changes is when the "base in the ratio of four to three, coupled with five, yields two harmonies," meaning when the number of this figure becomes a cube, as though nature sometimes produced inferior people whom education cannot overcome. In saying this very thing,10 perhaps he is not wrong (for there may be people who cannot be educated and become worthy men). But why should this revolution be peculiar to what he calls the best constitution, rather than to all the others and to everything that comes into being? And because of the time through which, he says,15 everything changes, do things that did not begin to exist together also change together? For instance, if something came into being on the day before the turning point, does it therefore change at the same time? Besides, for what reason does this constitution change into the Laconian one? All constitutions change more often into their opposite than into20 the constitution nearest them. The same argument applies to the other revolutions too. For from the Laconian constitution, he says, it changes into oligarchy, from this into democracy, and from democracy into tyranny. Yet they also change in the reverse direction, for example from popular rule into oligarchy, and more often than into monarchy.

1316a25Further, he does not say whether tyranny will undergo a revolution or not, or, if it will, for what reason and into what constitution. The reason is that he could not easily say: it is undetermined, since on his account it must change into the first and best constitution; for in this way there would be continuity and a cycle. But a tyranny also changes30 into a tyranny, as at Sicyon, from Myron's into Cleisthenes'; and into oligarchy, as Antileon's at Chalcis; and into democracy, as Gelon's at Syracuse; and into aristocracy, as Charilaus' at Lacedaemon, and at Carthage. And a change into tyranny35 also occurs from oligarchy, as happened with almost all the ancient oligarchies in Sicily: at Leontini into the tyranny of Panaetius, at Gela into that of Cleander, at Rhegium into that of Anaxilaus, and likewise in many other cities. It is also absurd to think that the change into oligarchy is due to40 the fact that those who are lovers of money and devote themselves to wealth-getting are the people1316b1 in office,

rather than because those who far surpass others in property think it unjust that those who own nothing should have an equal share in the city with those who own property. In many oligarchies, moreover, wealth-getting is not permitted, but laws1316b5 forbid it; whereas at Carthage, under democratic rule, they pursue wealth-getting and have not yet undergone a revolution.

It is also absurd to say that the oligarchic city is two cities, one of rich people and one of poor. For why should this be truer of it than of the Laconian city, or any other where not everyone owns equal property or not everyone is equally1316b10 good? Even when no one has become poorer than before, they nonetheless change from oligarchy to popular rule if those without means become more numerous, and from popular rule to oligarchy if the wealthy part is stronger than the multitude and the one group is inattentive while the other is alert. Though there are many causes through15 which revolutions occur, he names only one: that people become poor through extravagant living and the burden of interest, as though all or most were rich at the outset. But this is false. Rather, when some of the leaders lose their property, they seek innovations; when others do, nothing alarming20 happens, and even then the change is no more likely to be into popular rule than into another constitution. Further, people form factions and change constitutions if they have no share in honors, or are wronged or treated with arrogance, even if they have not squandered their property, because they are free to do whatever they wish; and excessive freedom25 is its cause, he says. Though there are several oligarchies and democracies, Socrates speaks of their revolutions as though there were only one of each.

Since cities are made up of two groups, poor people and wealthy people, the main thing is to make both believe that his rule keeps them safe, and that neither group is1315a35 wronged by the other. Whichever group is stronger, he should make it especially loyal to his rule. If he achieves this, the tyrant won't need to free slaves or take away weapons. Adding either group to his own forces is enough to make him stronger than40 those who attack him. There is no need to discuss each of these measures separately. The aim is clear:

he must seem to the ruled not like a tyrant,1315b1 but like a household manager and a king; not someone who takes what belongs to others, but someone who looks after it. He must aim for moderation in his way of life, not excess. He must also be friendly with the notables and win over the people. As a result,5 these measures must make his rule nobler and more desirable. He rules better people, not people who have been humiliated. He does not remain hated and feared. His rule must also last longer. Besides, his own character will either be well disposed toward virtue or at least halfway good,10 and not bad, but only halfway bad.

Yet oligarchy and tyranny are the shortest-lived of all constitutions. The longest-lasting tyranny was the one at Sicyon, that of Orthagoras and his descendants. It lasted a hundred years. The reason was1315b15 that they treated the ruled with moderation and obeyed the laws in many matters. Cleisthenes was also a capable soldier, so he was not easily despised. For the most part, they won over the people by looking after them. Cleisthenes, for instance, is said to have crowned the judge who denied him victory. Some say that20 the seated statue in the marketplace is a likeness of the man who made this judgment. They also say that Pisistratus once submitted to trial when summoned before the Areopagus. Second came the tyranny of the Cypselids at Corinth. This lasted seventy-three years and six months. Cypselus was tyrant for25 thirty years, Periander for forty-four, and Psammetichus, the son of Gordius, for three. The reasons for its survival were the same. Cypselus won over the people and went without a bodyguard throughout his rule. Periander was tyrannical, but a capable soldier. Third came30 the tyranny of the Pisistratids at Athens. It was not continuous, since Pisistratus went into exile twice during his tyranny. So out of thirty-three years he was tyrant for seventeen. His sons ruled for eighteen, making thirty-five years in all. Among the remaining tyrannies was that of Hieron and Gelon at35 Syracuse. This too lasted only a few years: eighteen in all. Gelon was tyrant for seven years and died in the eighth. Hieron ruled for ten, and Thrasybulus was driven out in the eleventh month. All of the many other tyrannies have been very short-lived.

1315b40As for constitutions and monarchies, and what destroys them or preserves them, almost1316a1 everything has now been discussed.

In the Republic, Socrates discusses changes of constitution, but his account is not good. He does not explain the particular change that affects the best and first constitution. He says the cause is that1316a5 nothing stays as it is, but changes within a certain cycle. These changes begin when the base ratio of four to three, joined with five, produces two harmonies. He means when the number of this geometrical figure becomes a cube, on the supposition that nature sometimes produces inferior people who are beyond the reach of education. On this point10 he may not be wrong. There may be some people who cannot be educated and become good men. But why would this change be peculiar to what he calls the best constitution, rather than to all the others and everything that comes into being? And through the action of time, which he says15 changes everything, do things that did not begin together also change together? For example, if something came into being the day before the turning point, does it change at the same time? Besides, why does this constitution change into the Spartan one? All constitutions change into their opposites more often than into20 a closely related form. The same objection applies to the other changes. He says the Spartan constitution changes into oligarchy, oligarchy into democracy, and democracy into tyranny. Yet they also change in the reverse direction: for example, from democracy into oligarchy, and more often than into monarchy.

1316a25Besides, he does not say whether tyranny will change or not, or, if it does, why and into what constitution. The reason is that he could not easily say. It is undetermined, though on his account it ought to change into the first and best constitution. That would make the sequence continuous and circular. But tyranny also changes30 into tyranny, as at Sicyon, from Myron's tyranny into that of Cleisthenes. It also changes into oligarchy, as Antileon's did at Chalcis; into democracy, as that of Gelon's family did at Syracuse; and into aristocracy, as Charilaus's did at Lacedaemon, and as happened at Carthage. A change into tyranny35 also takes place from oligarchy. This happened to almost all the old oligarchies in Sicily. At Leontini the change was into the tyranny of Panaetius. At Gela it was into that of Cleander, and at Rhegium into that of Anaxilaus. The same happened in many other cities. It is also strange to think that a change into oligarchy is due to40 the love of money and money-making among those1316b1 in office.

Instead, people with much greater wealth think it unjust for those who own nothing to have an equal share in the city with property owners. In many oligarchies, money-making is not allowed. There are laws1316b5 against it. But in democratic Carthage they make money and have not yet changed their constitution.

It is also strange to say that an oligarchic city is two cities, one of the rich and one of the poor. Why is this more true of it than of Sparta or any other city? In those cities too, not everyone owns the same amount or is equally1316b10 good. Even without anyone becoming poorer than before, an oligarchy still changes into democracy if the poor become more numerous. A democracy changes into oligarchy if the wealthy group is stronger than the masses, and the latter are careless while the former pay attention. There are many causes15 of changes, but he names only one: people become poor by wasting their money and being ruined by interest payments. This assumes that all or most of them were rich to begin with. That is false. When some of the leaders lose their wealth, they bring about change. When others do, nothing serious20 happens. Even then, they are no more likely to change into democracy than into another constitution. Besides, if they are denied honors, wronged, or insulted, they form factions and change constitutions, even if they have not used up their wealth, because they are allowed to do whatever they want. Excessive freedom25 is the cause of this, he says. There are several forms of oligarchy and democracy, but Socrates discusses their changes as though there were only one of each.