Book V, 1311b–1315a

Many, too, have been angered by bodily mistreatment through blows: some have killed,1311b25 others have attempted to kill, because they felt outraged, even men holding offices and royal power. For example, at Mytilene, Megacles and his friends attacked and killed the Penthilids, who went about striking people with clubs. Later Smerdis, after being beaten,30 was dragged away from his wife and killed Penthilus. Decamnichus also became a leader in the attack on Archelaus, being the first to incite the attackers. The cause of his anger was that Archelaus had handed him over to Euripides the poet to be whipped. Euripides was angry because Decamnichus had said something about his bad breath. Many others, too,35 have been killed or plotted against for such reasons. The same holds for fear: this was one of the causes, in monarchies as in constitutions. For example, Artapanes attacked Xerxes, fearing an accusation over Darius, whom he had hanged without Xerxes' orders, but thinking40 that Xerxes would pardon him, having forgotten the matter because he was dining. Other attacks arise from1312a1 contempt,

as when someone saw Sardanapalus carding wool with the women—if those who tell the story speak the truth; and if not of him, it could certainly be true of someone else. Dion also attacked Dionysius the Younger because he1312a5 despised him, seeing the citizens similarly disposed and Dionysius himself continually drunk. Some friends also attack out of contempt: because they are trusted, they despise the ruler, thinking they will escape notice. Those who think they can seize power also attack, in a sense, out of contempt.10 For, believing themselves capable and despising the danger because of their power, they readily make the attempt, as do those who serve as generals under monarchs: Cyrus, for example, attacked Astyages, despising both his way of life and his power, because the power had fallen idle while Astyages lived in luxury; and Seuthes the Thracian attacked Amadocus, whose general he was.15 Others attack for several of these reasons, for example both out of contempt and for profit, as Mithridates attacked Ariobarzanes. Those who are bold by nature and hold military honors under monarchs attempt it especially for this reason. For courage joined to power is audacity; and because of these20 two things they make their attacks, thinking they will prevail easily.

For those who attack from love of honor, the cause takes a different form from those mentioned earlier. Some attempt to overthrow tyrants because they see great profits and great honors awaiting them; but this is not why each of those who attack from love of honor1312a25 chooses to run the risk. The former act for the reason stated, while the latter, just as they would undertake some other extraordinary deed through which they become renowned and known to others, make an attempt against monarchs, wishing to acquire not30 monarchy but glory. Yet those who set out for this reason are very few in number. For they must presuppose that they care nothing for survival if they are not going to accomplish the deed. They must adopt Dion's conviction, though it is not easy for many to acquire it.35 For he marched against Dionysius with a few men, saying that his attitude was this: however far he could advance, it would be enough for him to have taken that much part in the enterprise. For example, if he happened to die immediately after setting foot on a small stretch of land, such a death would be acceptable to him.

Tyranny is destroyed, in one case,1312a40 in this way, like each of the other constitutions, from outside,

1312b1if an opposing constitution is stronger. For plainly the wish to destroy it will be present because their purposes are opposed, and everyone does what he wishes when he has the power. Constitutions opposed to tyranny are democracy, in Hesiod's sense,5 as potter opposes potter—for the most extreme democracy is also a tyranny—and kingship and aristocracy, because their constitutions are opposed to it. Hence the Lacedaemonians overthrew the greatest number of tyrannies, as did the Syracusans in the period when their public life was well ordered. Another way is from within, when those who share in the tyranny10 form factions, as happened with Gelon's tyranny, and now with that of Dionysius. Gelon's was destroyed when Thrasybulus, Hieron's brother, courted Gelon's son and urged him toward pleasures so that he himself might rule. The family organized to overthrow Thrasybulus, but not the tyranny as a whole; those15 who joined their cause, however, seized the opportunity and expelled them all. Dion, who was related by marriage to Dionysius, marched against him and enlisted the people; after expelling him, Dion was himself killed. Of the two chief causes for which people attack tyrannies, hatred and contempt, one is always present20 for tyrants: hatred. But contempt brings about many overthrows. The evidence is this: most of those who acquired power also kept it, while almost all who inherited it lose it immediately, one might say. For by living for enjoyment they become easy to despise and25 provide many opportunities for their attackers. Anger too should be counted as a kind of hatred, for in a sense it causes the same actions. Often it is even more effective than hatred: people attack more vehemently because this passion does not employ calculation. It happens especially30 that people follow their anger because of outrage; this was the cause of the overthrow of the Pisistratids' tyranny and many others. But hatred is more effective overall. For anger is accompanied by pain, so that calculation is not easy, whereas enmity is without pain.

To put it in summary, all the causes we have stated1312b35 for the destruction of unmixed and extreme oligarchy, and of the most extreme democracy, must also be assigned to tyranny. For these too are tyrannies divided among many. Kingship is least likely to be destroyed from outside, which is why it is long-lasting; most of its destructions from within40 arise. It is destroyed in two ways:

one is when1313a1 those who share in the kingship form factions; the other is when kings try to govern more tyrannically, claiming sovereignty over more things, even contrary to law. Kingships no longer arise now; if monarchies do arise, they are tyrannies5 rather than kingships, because kingship is rule over willing subjects, but sovereign over greater matters, while there are many equals and no one so superior as to measure up to the extent and dignity of the office. For this reason they do not willingly submit. But if someone gains rule through deceit or force,10 this is already thought to be tyranny. In hereditary kingships we must add to the stated causes of destruction the fact that many kings become easy to despise, and that they commit outrages although they possess not tyrannical power but royal honor. For overthrow becomes easy: when people no longer wish it,15 the king at once ceases to be king, whereas a tyrant remains even against their will. Monarchies, then, are destroyed through these causes and others like them.

It is clear that, generally speaking, they are preserved through the opposite causes; more particularly, kingships are preserved by bringing them1313a20 toward greater moderation. For the fewer things kings are sovereign over, the longer the whole of their rule must last. They themselves become less masterful and more equal to others in character, and they are less envied by the ruled. For this reason the kingship among the Molossians also lasted a long time,25 as did that of the Lacedaemonians, because its rule was divided into two parts from the beginning, and again because Theopompus moderated it in other respects and established the office of the ephors alongside it. For by diminishing its power he enlarged the kingship in duration, so that in a sense he made it not smaller but30 greater. This is also what they say he replied to his wife when she asked whether he was not ashamed to hand down to his sons a kingship smaller than the one he had received from his father: “Certainly not,” he said, “for I am handing down one that will last longer.”

Tyrannies are preserved in two entirely opposite ways.1313a35 One is the traditional way, by which most tyrants administer their rule. Most of these practices are said to have been established by Periander of Corinth, and many similar ones may also be taken from Persian rule. They include the measures mentioned long ago for preserving, as far as possible,40 tyranny: cutting down those who stand out, killing the high-spirited, and allowing neither common messes, associations, education, nor anything else of the kind,

but everything1313b1 from which two things usually arise, high spirit and mutual trust, must be guarded against. They must allow neither schools nor other gatherings for leisurely study, and must do everything possible to make5 all people strangers to one another, for acquaintance creates greater trust between them. Those staying in the city must always be visible and spend their time at the palace doors, for in this way what they do would be least likely to escape notice, and constant servitude would accustom them to think little of themselves. There are all the other such practices of Persian origin10 and the barbarian practices characteristic of tyranny, for they all have the same effect. Tyrants must also try to ensure that nothing any of the ruled happens to say or do escapes notice, but employ spies, such as the women called “informers” at Syracuse, and the “listeners” whom Hieron sent out wherever there was a gathering or meeting.15 For people speak less freely in fear of such spies, and if they do speak freely, they are less likely to escape notice. Another practice is to slander people to one another and set them at odds: friends against friends, the people against the notables, and the rich against one another. Making the ruled poor is also characteristic of tyranny, so that no guard20 can be maintained, and they are too busy with their daily needs to plot. Examples are the pyramids in Egypt, the votive offerings of the Cypselids, the building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Pisistratids, and the works of Polycrates on Samos. For all these25 have the same effect: keeping the ruled occupied and poor. So does the imposition of taxes, as at Syracuse, where under Dionysius people paid in the whole value of their property in five years. The tyrant is also a maker of war, to keep people occupied and in continual need of a leader. While30 kingship is preserved through friends, it is characteristic of tyranny to distrust friends most of all, on the assumption that everyone wishes to overthrow it, but these especially have the power.

Everything that occurs in the most extreme democracy is also characteristic of tyranny: women's dominance in households, so that they may report against their1313b35 husbands, and license for slaves, for the same reason. For slaves and women do not plot against tyrants, and when they prosper they must be well-disposed toward both tyrannies and democracies. For the people too wish to be a monarch. Hence the flatterer is honored by both: among40 the peoples, the demagogue—for the demagogue is the people's flatterer—and among tyrants, those who associate with them in a servile manner,1314a1 which is the work of flattery.

For this reason, too, tyranny loves the vicious: tyrants enjoy being flattered, but no one with a free spirit would do this. Decent people show affection, or at least do not flatter. The vicious are also useful for vicious deeds:1314a5 “one nail drives out another,” as the proverb says. Disliking anyone dignified or free is also characteristic of tyranny. For the tyrant claims to be the only person of this kind, while anyone who matches his dignity and acts freely takes away the tyranny's preeminence and mastery. Tyrants therefore hate such people as if they were overthrowing their10 rule. It is also characteristic of tyranny to take foreigners rather than citizens as table companions and daily associates, on the assumption that citizens are enemies while foreigners make no rival claim. These and similar practices are characteristic of tyranny and preserve its rule, but lack nothing in wickedness. All of them, one might say, are comprised15 in three kinds. For tyranny aims at three things: first, that the ruled should think little of themselves, for no small-spirited person would plot against anyone; second, that they should distrust one another, for a tyranny is not overthrown until some people trust one another. Hence tyrants also make war on the decent as harmful20 to their rule, not only because they refuse to be ruled by a master, but also because they are trustworthy toward one another and toward others, and do not inform against one another or anyone else. Third is incapacity for action, for no one attempts the impossible, and therefore no one attempts to overthrow a tyranny without25 the power to do so. These, then, are the three ends to which the tyrants' counsels are directed. For all tyrannical measures can be referred to these aims: some to prevent mutual trust, others to prevent power to act, and others to make people think little of themselves.

This1314a30 then, is one way in which tyrannies are preserved. The other follows a course of management almost opposite to what has been said. It can be understood from the destruction of kingships. For just as one way of destroying a kingship is to make its rule more tyrannical, so for tyranny35 preservation consists in making it more kingly, while safeguarding just one thing: the power to rule not only willing but also unwilling subjects. For if the tyrant lets this go, he also lets go of being a tyrant. This must remain as a foundation; in other matters he must do some things and appear to do others,40 playing the kingly role well. First, he must appear1314b1 to care for public funds,

not spending on gifts of the kind that anger the multitudes, when rulers take money from people who labor and toil for a meager living, but give it lavishly to courtesans, foreigners, and artists, and, as for an account,1314b5 he should render one of receipts and expenses, as some tyrants have already done. For someone who administers affairs in this way would appear to be a household manager rather than a tyrant. He need not fear ever running short of money, since he is sovereign over the city. Indeed, for tyrants who go away from their own territory,10 this is more advantageous than leaving behind accumulated funds, since the guards would be less likely to attack their government. For when tyrants are abroad, the guards are more to be feared than the citizens: the guards go abroad with them, while the citizens remain. Next, the taxes and public services15 he collects must appear to be for the sake of administration and for use in emergencies of war, should the need arise. In general he must present himself as a guardian and treasurer of funds that are public, not private. He must appear not harsh but dignified, and such that those who encounter him do not fear him20 but rather respect him. Yet this is not easy to achieve if he is contemptible. Thus, even if he takes no care for the other virtues, he must care for military virtue and create this reputation for himself. Moreover, not only must he himself appear to outrage none of the ruled, neither young man nor25 young woman, but neither must anyone around him. His own women must likewise conduct themselves toward other women, since many tyrannies have also perished through outrages committed by women. In bodily pleasures he must do the opposite of what some tyrants now do: not only do they indulge in these from the very30 break of day and continuously for many days, but they also wish others to see them doing so, in order to be admired as happy and blessed. Rather, he should above all be moderate in such things; failing that, he should at least escape being seen by others. For the one easy to attack or despise35 is not the sober man but the drunk, and not the wakeful man but the sleeper. He must also do the opposite of almost everything mentioned earlier, for he must equip and adorn the city as though he were its steward, not its tyrant. Moreover, he must always appear exceptionally earnest in matters concerning the gods. For people are less40 afraid of suffering anything unlawful from such rulers,

1315a1if they think the ruler fears the gods and cares for them; and they plot against him less, believing that he has the gods too as allies. Yet he must appear so without foolishness. He must honor those who become good at anything in such a way5 that they would not think they could ever be more honored by citizens living under their own laws; and he should confer such honors himself, but inflict punishments through other rulers and law courts. A safeguard common to every monarchy is to make no single person great, but, if any, several, for they will watch one another.10 If someone must be made great, at least he must not be bold in character, for such a character is most inclined to attack in every undertaking. If the tyrant decides to diminish someone's power, he should do this gradually, and not strip away all his authority at once. Moreover, he should refrain from every outrage,15 but above all from two: bodily punishment and sexual outrage against the young. He must exercise this caution especially toward those who love honor. For lovers of money deeply resent disregard for their money, while lovers of honor resent dishonor, as do the decent among20 men. Therefore he should either not employ such treatment, or appear to inflict punishments in a fatherly way, not out of contempt, and to enter into sexual relations with the young from erotic motives, not because of his power. In general he should redeem apparent dishonors with greater honors. Of those who attempt25 to kill him, the most dangerous, and those requiring the greatest vigilance, are those who do not choose to preserve their own lives after killing him. Therefore he must be especially wary of those who think that they themselves or those they care for have been outraged. For those who attack in anger have no regard for themselves,30 as Heraclitus also said, declaring that it is hard to fight anger, because it purchases its desires at the price of life.

Many people have also been angered by the physical abuse of being beaten. Some have killed,1311b25 and others have attempted to kill, even officeholders and members of royal ruling families, because they felt outraged. At Mytilene, for example, the Penthilids went around beating people with clubs. Megacles attacked them with his friends and killed them. Later, Smerdis, after being beaten,30 was dragged away from his wife and killed Penthilus. Decamnichus also became the leader of the attack on Archelaus. He was the first to stir up the attackers. The cause of his anger was that Archelaus handed him over to the poet Euripides to be whipped. Euripides was angry because Decamnichus had said something about his bad breath. Many others too35 have been killed or plotted against for reasons like these. Fear likewise causes attacks. This was one of the causes in constitutions, and it is also one in monarchies. For example, Artapanes attacked Xerxes because he feared being accused over Darius. He had hanged Darius without Xerxes's orders, but thought40 Xerxes would forgive him, being forgetful because he was dining. Other attacks come from1312a1 contempt,

as when someone saw Sardanapalus carding wool with the women. (If the storytellers tell the truth about this; and if it wasn't true of him, it could still be true of someone else.) Dion also attacked the younger Dionysius because he1312a5 despised him. He saw that the citizens felt the same way and that Dionysius was always drunk. Some friends also attack out of contempt. Being trusted makes them think they can escape notice. Those who think they can seize power also attack, in a sense, out of contempt.10 Because they believe they are capable and their power makes them dismiss the danger, they readily attempt it. This happens with generals serving monarchs. For example, Cyrus attacked Astyages, despising both his way of life and his power, because his forces had become inactive and he himself lived in luxury. Seuthes the Thracian likewise attacked Amadocus while serving as his general.15 Some attack for more than one of these reasons: from both contempt and a desire for gain, for example, as Mithridates attacked Ariobarzanes. Those most likely to attempt it for this reason are bold by nature and hold military rank under monarchs. Courage backed by power is boldness. Because of20 both, they make their attacks expecting to win easily.

For those who attack from ambition, the cause is of a different kind from those mentioned before. Some attack tyrants because they see the great profits and honors available to them. But this isn't how each person who attacks from ambition1312a25 chooses to run the risk. The first group acts for the reason just mentioned. The second attacks monarchs as they would undertake any extraordinary action that would make them famous and known to others. They don't want to acquire30 monarchy, but a reputation. However, very few are moved by this cause. They must be prepared to care nothing for survival if they can't bring their undertaking to completion. They must follow Dion's thinking, but few can easily develop it.35 He marched against Dionysius with a few men, saying that his attitude was this: however far he could advance, taking that much part in the undertaking would be enough for him. For example, if he happened to die as soon as he had set foot even a little way into the country, that death would satisfy him.

A tyranny is destroyed, in one case,1312a40 in this way: like each other constitution, from outside,

1312b1if an opposing constitution is stronger. (It will clearly want to destroy it because their aims are opposed. And everyone does what they want when they can.) These are the opposing constitutions: popular government is opposed to tyranny in Hesiod's sense,5 "as potter to potter." (For the most extreme democracy is also a tyranny.) Kingship and aristocracy are opposed because their constitutions are opposite to tyranny. (That's why the Lacedaemonians destroyed the most tyrannies, and the Syracusans did so during the period when their public life was well ordered.) Another way is from within, when those who share10 in it form factions. This happened with the tyranny of Gelon and his associates, and now with that of Dionysius and his associates. In Gelon's case, Thrasybulus, Hieron's brother, played the popular leader with Gelon's son and urged him toward pleasures so that he himself could rule. The family united to stop the overthrow of the whole tyranny and get rid of Thrasybulus instead. But those15 who joined them, seeing their opportunity, drove all of them out. In Dionysius's case, Dion, his relative by marriage, marched against him and won the people to his side. He drove Dionysius out but was himself killed. Hatred and contempt are the two main causes of attacks on tyrannies. One of these is always present20 for tyrants: hatred. But contempt causes many of their overthrows. Here is evidence: most who acquired power also kept it, while almost all who inherited it lose it at once, so to speak. Living for enjoyment makes them easy to despise, and25 gives attackers many opportunities. Anger should also be treated as a part of hatred. In a sense it causes the same actions. It is often even more effective than hatred. People attack with greater force because the emotion doesn't use reasoning. (People are especially likely30 to follow their anger after abusive treatment. This was the cause of the overthrow of the tyranny of Pisistratus's sons and many others.) But hatred is more effective overall. Anger comes with pain, so reasoning isn't easy, while hostility is free from pain.

To state the main points, all the causes we have mentioned1312b35 for the unmixed and most extreme oligarchy and the most extreme democracy must also be taken as causes for tyranny. For these too are tyrannies divided among several people. Kingship is least likely to be destroyed from outside, and so it lasts a long time. Most of its destruction from within40 comes about. Two causes destroy it:

the first is1313a1 faction among those who hold royal power. The second is an attempt to rule more like tyrants. Kings claim authority over more things, even against the law. Kingships no longer arise today. Any monarchies that do arise are tyrannies5 rather than kingships, because kingship is rule over willing subjects but has authority over greater matters. There are many people who are alike, and no one stands out enough to match the scale and dignity of the office. For this reason people don't willingly submit. If someone rules through deception or force,10 this is considered tyranny from the start. In hereditary kingships, besides the causes already mentioned, we must include the fact that many kings become easy to despise. Another cause is that they behave abusively despite possessing not a tyrant's power but a king's honor. Overthrow then becomes easy. If the people no longer want him,15 he will cease to be king at once, whereas a tyrant remains even if they don't want him. Monarchies, then, are destroyed for these and other similar reasons.

Clearly, in general terms, they are preserved by the opposite causes. To be specific, kingships are preserved by making them1313a20 more moderate. The fewer things kings have authority over, the longer the whole rule must last. They become less like masters and more like equals in their character, and the ruled resent them less. This is why kingship among the Molossians lasted a long time.25 Kingship among the Lacedaemonians lasted because the rule was divided in two from the start. Theopompus also moderated it in other ways and established the office of the ephors alongside it. By taking away some of its power, he lengthened the kingship's duration. So in a sense he made it not smaller but30 greater. They say this was also his reply to his wife. She asked whether he wasn't ashamed to hand down a smaller kingship to his sons than he had received from his father. He said, "Certainly not. I'm handing down one that will last longer."

Tyrannies are preserved in two completely opposite ways.1313a35 One is the traditional way, by which most tyrants manage their rule. They say Periander of Corinth established most of these practices. Many similar ones can also be drawn from Persian rule. They include the measures discussed long ago for preserving, as far as possible,40 a tyranny: cut down those who stand out and kill those with proud spirits. Allow no shared meals, clubs, education, or anything else of that kind.

Instead, everything1313b1 that usually produces two things, self-confidence and trust, must be guarded against. Allow no places for leisure or other gatherings for spending leisure together. Do everything possible to make5 everyone strangers to one another. (Getting to know one another creates more mutual trust.) Residents must always be visible and spend their time at the palace gates. (Then what they're doing is least likely to escape notice, and their constant slavery will train them to think little of themselves.) There are also all the other practices of Persian origin10 and the foreign practices of this tyrannical kind. (They all have the same effect.) The tyrant must try to keep anything any of the ruled says or does from escaping notice. There should be spies, like the women called "informers" at Syracuse, and the "listeners" Hieron sent out wherever there was a meeting or gathering.15 (People speak less freely because they fear such people, and if they do speak freely, they're less likely to escape notice.) People should be slandered to one another and set against one another: friends against friends, the people against the notables, and the rich against one another. Making the ruled poor is also a tyrannical practice. Then no guard20 can be maintained, and people are busy earning their daily living and have no time to plot. Examples are the pyramids in Egypt, the offerings of the Cypselids, the construction of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the sons of Pisistratus, and the works of Polycrates on Samos. (All these25 have the same effect: keeping the ruled busy and poor.) There is also the imposition of taxes, as at Syracuse. (Under Dionysius, people ended up paying in their whole property over five years.) A tyrant also makes war, to keep people busy and make them constantly need a leader. And30 while kingship is preserved through friends, it is characteristic of tyranny to distrust friends most of all. Everyone wants to attack, but friends are especially able to do so.

Everything that happens in the most extreme democracy is also characteristic of tyranny: women's power in the homes, so that they can report on1313b35 their husbands, and freedom from restraint for slaves, for the same reason. Neither slaves nor women plot against tyrants. When they prosper, they must be well disposed toward both tyrannies and democracies. For the people too want to be a monarch. That's also why flatterers are honored by both. Among40 the people, it's the popular leader. (The popular leader is the people's flatterer.) Among tyrants, it's those who deal with them submissively,1314a1 which is the work of flattery.

For this reason too, tyranny likes bad people. Tyrants enjoy being flattered, and no one with a free spirit would do that. Decent people offer affection or at least don't flatter. Bad people are also useful for bad tasks:1314a5 "one nail drives out another," as the proverb says. It's also characteristic of tyranny to dislike anyone dignified or free. (The tyrant claims that he alone should be like that. Anyone who shows dignity in return and behaves freely takes away the superiority and mastery of tyranny. So tyrants hate them as people who would overthrow their10 rule.) It's also characteristic of tyranny to prefer foreigners to citizens as companions at meals and during the day. Citizens are seen as enemies, while foreigners make no claim on power—these and similar practices are tyrannical and preserve the rule, but they lack nothing in wickedness. All these things can, broadly speaking, be grouped under15 three headings. Tyranny aims at three things. First, it makes the ruled think little of themselves. (Someone who thinks little of himself wouldn't plot against anyone.) Second, it makes them distrust one another. (A tyranny isn't overthrown until some people trust one another. That's why tyrants fight decent people as harmful20 to their rule. Decent people don't think they should be ruled like slaves. They are also trustworthy to one another and to others. They don't inform against one another or others.) Third, it makes them unable to act. (No one attempts the impossible, so no one attempts to overthrow a tyranny without25 the power to do so.) These, then, are the three goals to which tyrants' plans lead. All tyrannical measures can be traced back to these principles: some prevent people from trusting one another, others keep them powerless, and others make them think little of themselves.

This1314a30 then, is one way tyrannies are preserved. The other approach is almost the opposite of what we have described. We can learn it from the way kingships are destroyed. One way to destroy kingship is to make its rule more tyrannical. For tyranny, the way35 to preserve it is to make it more like kingship. Only one thing must be kept: the power to rule not only over willing subjects but over unwilling ones too. Giving this up means giving up being a tyrant. This must remain as the basic condition. For the rest, the tyrant should do some things and appear to do others,40 playing the king's part well. First, he should appear to1314b1 care for public affairs,

not spending on gifts that anger the multitude. They get angry when tyrants take money from people who work and struggle to scrape by, then give lavishly to courtesans, foreigners, and performers. As for an account,1314b5 he should also give one of what he receives and spends, as some tyrants have already done. (By managing things in this way, he would seem to be a household manager rather than a tyrant. He needn't fear that he will ever run short of money, since he controls the city. In fact, for tyrants who travel away from their own country,10 this is more to their advantage than leaving behind a pile of money. The guards would be less likely to attack the government. For tyrants abroad, the guards are more dangerous than the citizens. The guards go abroad with them, while the citizens stay behind.) Next, the levies and public services15 should appear to be collected for the sake of administration and to meet needs that may arise in times of war. In general, he should act as guardian and treasurer of public funds, not of his own. He should appear dignified rather than harsh, and be the sort of person whose visitors feel no fear20 but respect instead. But this isn't easy to achieve if he's easy to despise. So even if he doesn't attend to the other virtues, he must attend to military virtue and create that reputation for himself. Moreover, not only must he appear to abuse none of the ruled, neither young men nor25 young women, but neither must anyone around him. The women of his household must likewise treat other women this way. Many tyrannies have been lost through women's abusive behavior too. As for bodily pleasures, he should do the opposite of what some tyrants now do. (They don't just indulge from30 early morning and continuously for many days. They also want others to see them doing it, so people will admire them as happy and blessed.) Ideally, he should be moderate in such things. Failing that, he should at least avoid being seen by others. (The one easy to attack or despise35 is not the sober man but the drunk; not the wakeful man but the sleeping one.) He should do the opposite of almost everything mentioned earlier. (He should equip and beautify the city as its steward, not as its tyrant.) He should also always appear especially serious about his duties to the gods. (People are less40 afraid of being treated unlawfully by such rulers

1315a1if they think the ruler is religious and cares about the gods. They also plot less against him, thinking he has the gods as allies.) But he should show this without foolishness. He should honor people who are good at something in such a way5 that they don't think they could ever be honored more by citizens governing themselves. He should award these honors himself, but impose punishments through other rulers and law courts. A safeguard common to every monarchy is not to make any one person great, but, if necessary, several. (They will watch one another.)10 If it is necessary to make someone great, at least don't choose someone bold in character. (That sort of character is most ready to attack in every undertaking.) If he decides to reduce someone's power, he should do this gradually, not take away all his authority at once. He should also keep away from every kind of abuse,15 and especially two: bodily punishment and sexual abuse of the young. He must be particularly careful of this with those who love honor. Those who love money resent disrespect for their money. Those who love honor resent dishonor, as do decent20 people. So he should either not do such things, or make punishments appear fatherly and not contemptuous, and sexual relationships with the young appear based on desire, not on power. In general, he should make up for apparent dishonors with greater honors. Among those who attempt25 to kill him, the most dangerous and those who need the most guarding against are those who don't choose to preserve their own lives after the killing. So he must be especially wary of people who think they themselves or those they care about have been abused. People who attack out of anger have no concern for themselves,30 as Heraclitus also said: "It's hard to fight anger, because it buys at the price of life."