Book V, 1308a–1311b

Constitutions are preserved1308a25 not only because the things that destroy them are far away, but sometimes also because they are near. Fear makes people keep a firmer hold on their constitution. Those who care for the constitution must therefore create occasions for fear, so that people guard it and do not abandon, as they would a night watch,30 their watch over the constitution, and must bring what is distant near. Moreover, they must try, by means of the laws as well, to guard against the rivalries and factions of the notables, and to protect those outside the rivalry before they too are drawn into it. For recognizing an evil as it begins is not the work of just anyone, but requires political35 judgment. As for the change from oligarchy and polity that arises through property qualifications, when this happens because the same qualifications remain in place while money becomes more plentiful, it is advantageous to examine the total assessed value of the community against its previous value: in those40 cities where assessments are made annually, at that interval,

1308b1and in larger cities every three or five years. If it is a multiple or a fraction of the earlier value, at which the constitution's assessments were established, there should be a law to raise or lower the property qualifications: if the value has increased, raising them5 in proportion to the increase; if it has declined, lowering them and making the assessment smaller. For in oligarchies and polities, if they do not do this, in the one case an oligarchy arises in some places and the rule of a powerful clique in others, while in the other case a polity changes into a democracy, and an oligarchy10 into a polity or democracy.

A measure common to democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, and every constitution is not to enlarge anyone's power excessively, beyond due proportion, but rather to try to grant small honors over a long period than great ones quickly. For people are corrupted, and not every man can bear1308b15 good fortune. If this is not done, at least do not take back all at once honors that were given all at once, but withdraw them gradually. Above all, try to regulate matters by the laws so that no one arises with a great preponderance of power through either friends or money; failing that, arrange for such people to spend their time abroad.20 Since people also seek revolution because of their private lives, an office should be established to oversee those whose lives are at odds with the constitution: in a democracy, with democracy; in an oligarchy, with oligarchy; and similarly in each of the other constitutions. As for prosperity within the city,25 one must guard against it in any particular section for the same reasons. The remedy is always to entrust business and offices to the opposing parts—I mean that the respectable oppose the multitude, and the poor the wealthy—and to try either to blend together the multitude of the poor and, on the other side,30 that of the wealthy, or to enlarge the middle class. For this dissolves factions arising from inequality. The most important thing in every constitution is for the laws and the rest of its administration to be so arranged that offices offer no opportunity for profit.

This must be watched especially in oligarchic constitutions. For the many are not so indignant at being excluded1308b35 from rule; indeed, they are pleased if they are left free to attend to their private affairs. But if they think the rulers are stealing public funds, then both things distress them: their exclusion from honors and from profits. There is only one way in which democracy and aristocracy can exist together,40 and that is if someone establishes this arrangement.

For it would be possible for both the1309a1 notables and the multitude to have what they want. For everyone to be permitted to rule is democratic, while for the notables to hold office is aristocratic. This will happen when offices offer no opportunity for profit. For the poor5 will not wish to rule if they gain nothing, but will prefer to attend to their private affairs, while the wealthy will be able to do so because they need nothing from public funds. Thus the poor will become wealthy by spending their time at their work, and the notables will not be ruled by just anyone.10 To prevent public funds from being stolen, let the transfer of money take place in the presence of all the citizens, and let copies of the accounts be deposited with the phratries, companies, and tribes. To encourage service in office without profit, honors for those who earn distinction must be established by law. In democracies, the15 wealthy must be spared: not only must their property not be redistributed, but neither must its produce—a practice that passes unnoticed in some constitutions. It is better also to prevent them, even when they are willing, from undertaking costly but useless public services, such as sponsoring choruses, organizing torch races, and all other services of this kind.20 In an oligarchy, much care should be taken for the poor, and offices that provide income should be assigned to them. If one of the wealthy outrages them, the penalties should be greater than if he outraged someone of his own class. Inheritances should pass by descent rather than by gift, and no more than one inheritance25 should pass to the same person. For in this way properties would be more equal, and more of the poor would attain prosperity. In both democracy and oligarchy it is advantageous to allot either equality or precedence in other matters to those who have less share in the constitution: in a democracy to the wealthy, and in an oligarchy30 to the poor. The exception is offices sovereign over the constitution: these should be entrusted only, or for the most part, to those who belong to the constitution.

Those who are to hold the sovereign offices must possess three things: first, friendship toward what is established:1309a35 the constitution; next, the greatest capacity for the work of the office; and third, in each constitution, the virtue and justice appropriate to that constitution. For if the just is not the same under all constitutions, there must also be differences in justice. But a difficulty arises when these qualities do not40 all coincide in the same person: how should the choice be made?

1309b1For example, if one man is skilled in generalship but vicious and no friend of the constitution, while another is just and friendly toward it, how should the choice be made? It seems that we must look to two things: which quality everyone shares more widely, and which less widely. Thus in choosing a general,5 we should look more to experience than to virtue, since fewer people share the skills of generalship, and more share decency; but in choosing a guardian or treasurer, the reverse, since this requires more virtue than most people possess, while the knowledge is common to all.

Someone might ask: if capacity and friendship toward the constitution are present,1309b10 what need is there of virtue? For the two together will achieve what is advantageous. Is it because people who possess both may lack self-control? Just as they do not serve their own interests, although they know and love themselves, so nothing prevents some of them from being similarly disposed toward the community. In general, all the things in the laws that we say are advantageous15 to constitutions preserve those constitutions; and the greatest element is what has often been stated: ensuring that the multitude who want the constitution is stronger than those who do not. Besides all this, we must not overlook what the deviant constitutions now overlook: the mean.20 For many things thought democratic destroy democracies, and many thought oligarchic destroy oligarchies. Those who think this is the sole virtue draw it toward excess, not knowing that a nose may depart from the straightness that is most beautiful toward being hooked or snub,25 yet still be beautiful and pleasing to the eye. But if someone presses it still further toward excess, it will first lose the proper proportion of the part, and finally he will make it appear not even to be a nose, because of the excess and deficiency of the opposing features. The same holds for30 the other parts, and this also happens with the other constitutions. For an oligarchy or a democracy can be in a satisfactory condition, although it has departed from the best arrangement. But if someone pushes either of them further, he will first make the constitution worse, and finally make it no constitution at all.35 Therefore the legislator and statesman must not be ignorant of which democratic measures preserve democracy and which destroy it, or which oligarchic measures preserve or destroy oligarchy. For neither can exist and endure without both the wealthy and the multitude; but when equality40 of property arises, this constitution must necessarily become another one.

1310a1Thus by destroying these elements through laws carried to excess, they destroy the constitutions.

Mistakes are also made in democracies and oligarchies. In democracies, the demagogues err where the multitude is sovereign over the laws: for two opposing sides1310a5 they always create within the city by fighting the wealthy, whereas they should, on the contrary, always appear to speak on behalf of the wealthy. In oligarchies, the oligarchs should speak on behalf of the people, and swear oaths opposite to those they swear now. For now in some oligarchies they swear, “I will be ill-disposed toward the people, and will devise10 whatever harm I can.” But they should adopt and profess the opposite attitude, declaring in their oaths, “I will not wrong the people.”

The greatest of all the things mentioned for making constitutions endure, which everyone now neglects, is education suited to the constitutions. For there is no benefit in1310a15 even the most beneficial laws, approved by all who take part in public life, unless people are habituated and educated in the constitution: democratically if the laws are democratic, and oligarchically if they are oligarchic. For if a single person can lack self-control, so can a city. Being educated20 to suit the constitution does not mean doing what pleases the oligarchs or those who want democracy, but what will enable the former to rule oligarchically and the latter to live under democracy. As things stand, in oligarchies the sons of the rulers live in luxury, while those of the poor become trained and hardened by toil,25 so that they are both more willing and more able to bring about revolution. In democracies thought to be especially democratic, the opposite of what is advantageous has become established. The cause is that they define freedom badly. For democracy seems to be defined by two things: the majority's being sovereign, and30 freedom. For the just is thought to be equal; and equality means that whatever the multitude decides is sovereign; while freedom and equality mean doing whatever one wishes. Thus in such democracies everyone lives as he wishes, and “toward whatever he desires,” as Euripides says. But this is bad. For we must not35 think that living in accordance with the constitution is slavery, but preservation. These, then, broadly speaking, are the causes through which constitutions change and are destroyed, and the means through which they are preserved and endure.

It remains to examine monarchy as well: the causes through which1310a40 it is destroyed and the means through which it naturally preserves itself.

Nearly the same1310b1 as what has been said about constitutions are the events concerning kingships and tyrannies. For kingship corresponds to aristocracy, while tyranny is composed of the most extreme oligarchy and democracy.5 For this reason it is also the most harmful to the ruled, since it is composed of two evils and possesses the deviations and errors of both constitutions. The two forms of monarchy have opposite origins from the outset. For help against the people10 came through kingship to the respectable, and a king is appointed from among the respectable because of his preeminence in virtue, or in actions springing from virtue, or through the preeminence of a family of this kind. But the tyrant comes from the people and the multitude to oppose the notables, so that the people may suffer no injustice at their hands. The events make this clear. For nearly15 all tyrants, one might say, have arisen from demagogues, winning trust by slandering the notables. Some tyrannies were established in this way after the cities had grown; those before them arose from kings who departed from ancestral ways, a more masterful form of rule20 being what they sought; others from those elected to the sovereign offices—for in ancient times the peoples made civic magistracies and sacred missions long-lasting—and others from oligarchies that chose one man as sovereign over the greatest offices. For all these ways offered the possibility of accomplishing this easily,25 if only they wished, because power was already available to them: to some through royal rule, to others through the honor of office. Thus Pheidon at Argos and others became tyrants when a kingship already existed; those in Ionia and Phalaris rose from offices; Panaetius at Leontini, Cypselus at Corinth,30 Pisistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and others rose in the same way from leadership of the people. As we said, then, kingship is ranked with aristocracy. For it rests on merit, whether personal virtue, family, benefactions, or these together with power. All35 who received this honor had benefited, or were capable of benefiting, cities or peoples: some by preventing their enslavement in war, like Codrus; others by freeing them, like Cyrus; or by founding settlements or acquiring territory, like the kings of Lacedaemon, Macedonia, and40 the Molossians. The king wishes to be a guardian,

so that1311a1 those who possess property suffer no injustice, and the people suffer no outrage. Tyranny, as has often been said, looks to no common interest, except for the sake of its own benefit. The tyrant's aim is pleasure,5 and the king's is the noble. Therefore, among the objects they seek in excess, money is more characteristic of a tyrant, and honor of a king; and a king's guard consists of citizens, while a tyrant's consists of foreigners.

It is clear that tyranny possesses the evils of both democracy and oligarchy. From oligarchy it takes1311a10 wealth as its end, for only in this way can the guard and its luxury be maintained, and complete distrust of the multitude, which is why tyrants confiscate their arms. Ill-treatment of the masses, driving them out of the urban center, and dispersing them among settlements are common to both15 oligarchy and tyranny. From democracy it takes warfare against the notables, destroying them secretly and openly and exiling them as rivals and obstacles to its rule. For plots arise from these men: some wish to rule themselves, while others wish not20 to be slaves. This is the source of Periander's advice to Thrasybulus, the cutting down of the outstanding ears of grain, meaning that the outstanding citizens must always be removed. As was more or less said, then, we must suppose that the beginnings of changes are the same for constitutions and for monarchies.25 For many of the ruled attack monarchies because of injustice, fear, or contempt; and among forms of injustice, especially because of outrage, though sometimes also because they are deprived of their private property.

The ends sought in tyrannies and kingships are also the same as in those constitutions.1311a30 For monarchs possess great wealth and honor, which everyone desires. Some attacks are directed against the rulers' persons, others against their rule. Those arising from outrage are directed against their persons. Since outrage takes many forms, each becomes a cause of anger; and of those who are angry,35 most attack for the sake of revenge, not preeminence. For example, the attack on the Pisistratids arose because they insulted Harmodius's sister and affronted Harmodius: Harmodius acted on account of his sister, and Aristogeiton on account of Harmodius. A plot was also made against Periander,40 the tyrant at Ambracia, because, while drinking with1311b1 his beloved, he asked the young man whether he was already pregnant by him.

Philip was attacked by Pausanias because he allowed Pausanias to be outraged by Attalus and his companions; Amyntas the Little by Derdas because he boasted of having enjoyed Derdas's youth; and1311b5 Evagoras of Cyprus by the eunuch, who killed him because his son had taken away the eunuch's wife and he felt outraged. Many attacks have also occurred because certain monarchs inflicted sexual dishonor. Such was Crataeus's attack on Archelaus. For he always resented their intercourse, so that sufficient10 would have been even a lesser pretext—or because Archelaus, despite his promise, gave him neither of his daughters, but, pressed by war against Sirrhas and Arrhabaeus, gave the elder to the king of Elimeia, and the younger to his son Amyntas, thinking that in this way Amyntas would be least likely to quarrel15 with his son by Cleopatra. But the beginning of the estrangement was his resentment at the sexual service. Hellanocrates of Larissa joined the attack for the same reason. For since Archelaus enjoyed his youth but did not restore him to his homeland as promised, outrage rather than erotic desire20 was, he thought, the reason for their intercourse. Python and Heraclides of Aenus destroyed Cotys to avenge their father; and Adamas revolted against Cotys because Cotys had castrated him as a boy, and he felt outraged.

Constitutions survive1308a25 not only because the things that destroy them are far away, but sometimes because they're close. Fear makes people keep a firmer grip on their constitution. So those who care for the constitution should create fears. This will make people guard it and not abandon, as they would a night watch,30 their watch over the constitution. They must also make distant dangers seem close. They must also try to use the laws to keep the rivalries and factions of the notables in check. They must protect those outside the rivalry before they're drawn into it too. Recognizing an evil as it begins isn't the work of just anyone, but requires political35 judgment. There is also the change from oligarchy and polity, a mixed constitution, caused by property qualifications. This happens when the qualifications stay the same but money becomes more plentiful. To deal with it, it helps to compare the total assessed value of wealth with its earlier amount. In some40 cities assessments are made every year. The comparison should be done each year;

1308b1in larger cities, every three or five years. If the total is a multiple or a fraction of what it was when the constitution's assessments were set, a law should require the property qualifications to be raised or lowered. If the total has grown, the qualifications should rise5 in the same proportion. If it has fallen, they should be lowered and the assessment made smaller. If this isn't done in oligarchies and polities, one kind of shift produces an oligarchy in some cases and a ruling clique in others. The opposite shift turns a polity into a democracy, and an oligarchy into10 a polity or popular government.

One rule applies to popular government, oligarchy, monarchy, and every constitution: don't increase anyone's power too far beyond its proper proportion. Instead, try to give small honors over a long period rather than great ones quickly. (People become corrupted, and not everyone can bear1308b15 good fortune.) Failing that, at least don't take away all at once honors that were given all at once. Take them away gradually. Above all, try to regulate things through the laws so that no one becomes far more powerful than others through friends or money. Failing that, arrange for these people to spend their time abroad.20 People's private lives also lead them to seek revolution. So there should be an office to watch ways of life that don't fit the constitution. In a democracy, watch those who don't fit democracy; in an oligarchy, those who don't fit oligarchy. The same applies in each other constitution. Prosperity within the city25 should be watched in any particular section for the same reasons. The remedy is always to give public business and offices to opposing sections. (By opposing sections I mean the decent people and the multitude, and the poor and the wealthy.) Try either to mix the poor with those who are30 wealthy, or to enlarge the middle class. (This ends factions caused by inequality.) The most important thing in every constitution is to arrange the laws and the rest of the administration so that offices can't be used for profit.

This needs special attention in oligarchic constitutions. The many aren't so angry at being kept out1308b35 of office. In fact, they're happy if they're allowed time for their own affairs. But if they think the rulers are stealing public funds, then both things upset them: having no share in the honors and having no share in the profits. There is just one way for democracy and aristocracy to exist together:40 by setting things up like this.

For then both the1309a1 notables and the multitude could have what they want. Allowing everyone to hold office is democratic. Having the notables in office is aristocratic. This will happen when offices offer no profit. The poor5 won't want office if they make nothing from it. They'll prefer to attend to their own affairs. The wealthy will be able to hold office because they don't need anything from public funds. So the poor will become wealthy by spending their time at work, while the notables won't be ruled by just anyone.10 To keep public funds from being stolen, the money should be handed over with all the citizens present. Copies of the accounts should be deposited with the brotherhoods, companies, and tribes. To encourage service without profit, honors should be set by law for those who earn a good name. In democracies, the15 wealthy should be spared. Not only should their property not be redistributed, but neither should its produce. In some constitutions this happens without people noticing. It's also better to stop them, even when they want to, from performing costly but useless public services, such as funding choruses, torch races, and other things of that kind.20 In an oligarchy, take great care of the poor. Give them the offices that provide income. If a wealthy person treats them abusively, the penalties should be greater than if he did the same to someone of his own class. Inheritances should pass by family connection, not by gift, and no more than one inheritance25 should pass to the same person. This would make properties more equal and bring more of the poor into wealth. In both democracy and oligarchy, it also helps to give those with less of a share in the constitution equality or precedence in other matters: the wealthy in popular government and, in oligarchy,30 the poor. The exception is offices that control the constitution. These should be entrusted only, or mainly, to members of the governing body.

Those who are going to hold the sovereign offices need three things. First, they must be loyal to what is established:1309a35 the constitution. Next, they must have the greatest possible ability to do the office's work. Third, they need the virtue and justice that fit the constitution in each case. (If the just isn't the same under all constitutions, there must also be differences in justice.) But there's a difficulty when these qualities aren't40 all found in the same person: how should the choice be made?

1309b1Suppose one person is skilled as a general but bad and not loyal to the constitution, while another is just and loyal. How should we make the choice? It seems we must look at two things: which quality people generally have more of, and which they have less of. So in choosing a general,5 look more to experience than to virtue. (People have less of a general's skill and more decency.) In choosing a guardian or treasurer, do the opposite. (These posts need more virtue than most people have, while the knowledge is common to everyone.)

Someone might ask: if a person has ability and loyalty to the constitution,1309b10 why is virtue needed? The other two will bring about what is to our advantage. Isn't it because people with those two qualities can lack self-control? They can fail to act in their own interests, even though they know and love themselves. So nothing prevents some from behaving the same way toward the public. In short, all the things we describe in the laws as being to the advantage15 of constitutions preserve them. And the greatest element is the one often mentioned: take care that the body of people who want the constitution is stronger than the body who don't. Besides all this, we mustn't overlook something that deviant constitutions now overlook: the middle course.20 Many apparently democratic measures destroy democracies, and many apparently oligarchic ones destroy oligarchies. People who think this is the only virtue pull things to an extreme. They don't realize that a nose can depart from the most beautiful straight shape toward a hooked or snub shape and25 still be beautiful and pleasant to look at. But if someone pushes it still further to an extreme, it will first lose the proper proportion of that part. In the end, excess and deficiency in these opposite features will make it no longer even look like a nose. The same holds for30 the other parts of the body. This also happens with the other constitutions. An oligarchy or a democracy can work well enough even though it has departed from the best arrangement. But if someone pushes either further, he will first make the constitution worse and finally leave no constitution at all.35 So the lawgiver and the statesman must know which democratic measures preserve democracy and which destroy it, and likewise which oligarchic measures preserve or destroy oligarchy. Neither can exist or last without both the wealthy and the multitude. But when40 property becomes equal, this must be a different constitution.

1310a1So when they destroy these groups through extreme laws, they destroy their constitutions.

Mistakes are made both in democracies and in oligarchies. In democracies, the popular leaders make them where the multitude is sovereign over the laws. Two opposing sides1310a5 they constantly create within the city by fighting the wealthy. Instead, they should always appear to speak for the wealthy. In oligarchies, the oligarchs should speak for the people. And oligarchs should swear the opposite oaths to those they swear now. In some places they now swear: "I will be hostile to the people and plan10 whatever harm I can." They should think and publicly profess the opposite, declaring in their oaths: "I won't wrong the people."

Of all the things mentioned, the most important for keeping constitutions in place is education suited to the constitution. Everyone neglects it now. There is no benefit in1310a15 even the most helpful laws, approved by all who take part in public life, if people aren't trained and educated in the constitution: democratically if the laws are democratic, oligarchically if they're oligarchic. For if an individual can lack self-control, a city can too. Education20 suited to the constitution doesn't mean doing what pleases the oligarchs or those who want democracy. It means doing what will let the former govern as oligarchs and the latter live under democratic government. As things stand in oligarchies, the rulers' sons live in luxury, while the sons of the poor are trained and used to hard work,25 so they have both more desire and more ability to make revolutionary changes. In the democracies thought to be most democratic, the arrangement is the opposite of what is to their advantage. This is because they define freedom badly. Two things are thought to define democracy: the majority being sovereign and30 freedom. The just is thought to mean equality, and equality means that whatever the multitude decides is sovereign. Freedom and equality mean doing whatever you want. So in democracies of this kind everyone lives as he wants, "for whatever he longs for," as Euripides says. This is bad. We shouldn't35 think of living in line with the constitution as slavery, but as safety. These, then, are broadly the causes through which constitutions change and are destroyed, and the means through which they're preserved and endure.

It remains to discuss monarchy too: what causes1310a40 its destruction and what naturally preserves it.

Almost the same1310b1 as what we described for constitutions is what happens to kingships and tyrannies. Kingship follows the pattern of aristocracy. Tyranny combines the most extreme oligarchy with democracy.5 This is why it is also the most harmful to the ruled. It combines two bad forms and has the deviations and faults of both constitutions. From the very beginning, the two kinds of monarchy arise from opposite sources. Help against the people10 came through kingship to the decent people. A king is appointed from among the decent people for outstanding virtue, deeds arising from virtue, or outstanding family background of that kind. A tyrant comes from the people and the multitude to oppose the notables, so that the people aren't wronged by them. Events make this clear. Nearly15 all tyrants, we might say, have come from popular leaders who won trust by attacking the notables. Some tyrannies were set up in this way after the cities had already grown. Earlier ones arose from kings who departed from ancestral customs. Rule more like that of a master20 was what they wanted. Others arose from men elected to the sovereign offices. (In early times, the people appointed civic officials and sacred envoys for long terms.) Others arose from oligarchies that chose one person to control the greatest offices. In all these ways it was easy to achieve tyranny,25 if they only wanted to, because they already had power: some from royal rule, others from the honor of office. For example, Pheidon at Argos and others became tyrants from existing kingships. Those in Ionia and Phalaris did so from offices. Panaetius at Leontini, Cypselus at Corinth,30 Pisistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and others likewise did so from popular leadership. As we said, kingship follows the pattern of aristocracy. It rests on merit: personal virtue, family background, services rendered, or these together with power. All35 who had benefited cities or peoples, or had the ability to do so, received this honor. Some kept them from being enslaved in war, like Codrus. Others freed them, like Cyrus. Others founded a settlement or acquired territory, like the kings of Lacedaemon, Macedonia, and40 the Molossians. The king wants to be a guardian,

so that1311a1 property owners suffer no injustice and the people suffer no abuse. Tyranny, as we've said many times, has no concern for anything public except for the sake of its own benefit. The tyrant's aim is pleasure,5 the king's is the noble. So among the advantages they seek, money is more characteristic of tyranny, and honor of kingship. A king's guard consists of citizens; a tyrant's, of foreigners.

It's clear that tyranny has the evils of both democracy and oligarchy. From oligarchy it takes1311a10 wealth as its goal. (This is the only way its guard and its luxury can be maintained.) It also takes complete distrust of the multitude. (That's why tyrants take away their weapons.) Mistreating the masses, driving them out of the urban center, and scattering them into separate settlements are common to both15 oligarchy and tyranny. From democracy it takes hostility to the notables: secretly or openly destroying them and sending them into exile as rivals and obstacles to rule. Plots arise from these people, since some want to rule themselves and others don't want20 to be slaves. This explains Periander's advice to Thrasybulus: cutting off the ears of grain that stood above the rest, meaning that the outstanding citizens should always be killed. So, as we have more or less said, we must take the starting points of changes in constitutions and monarchies to be the same.25 Many of the ruled attack monarchies because of injustice, fear, or contempt. Among forms of injustice, abusive treatment is the main cause, though sometimes it is the loss of their own property.

The aims are also the same in tyrannies and kingships as in the other constitutions.1311a30 Monarchs possess great wealth and honor, which everyone desires. Some attacks target the rulers' persons, others their rule. Those caused by abusive treatment target the person. Abuse has many forms, and each causes anger. Among those who are angry,35 most attack for revenge, not for a position of superiority. For example, the attack on the sons of Pisistratus came from the public insult to Harmodius's sister and the affront to Harmodius. (Harmodius acted because of his sister, and Aristogeiton because of Harmodius.) There was also a plot against Periander,40 the tyrant at Ambracia, because, while drinking with1311b1 his young lover, he asked him whether he was pregnant by him yet.

Pausanias's attack on Philip came because Philip allowed Attalus and his associates to abuse him. Derdas's attack on Amyntas the Small came because Amyntas boasted about his youthful favors. There was also the1311b5 eunuch's attack on Evagoras of Cyprus. He killed Evagoras because Evagoras's son had taken his wife from him. He considered this an outrage. Many attacks have also happened because some monarchs sexually disgraced people. Crataeus's attack on Archelaus was one. He always resented their sexual relationship, so enough10 would have been even a smaller pretext—or because Archelaus gave him neither daughter, though he had promised one to him. Instead, when pressed by war with Sirrhas and Arrhabaeus, he gave the older daughter to the king of Elimeia, and the younger to his son Amyntas. He thought this would make Amyntas least likely to quarrel15 with his son by Cleopatra. But the starting point of Crataeus's alienation was his resentment at providing sexual favors. Hellanocrates of Larissa joined in the attack for the same reason. Archelaus enjoyed his youthful favors but didn't restore him to his home as promised. An intent to humiliate, not sexual desire,20 was, he thought, the reason for their relationship. Python and Heraclides of Aenus killed Cotys to avenge their father. Adamas rebelled against Cotys because Cotys had castrated him as a boy, which he considered an outrage.