Book V, 1304b–1308a

Distinguishing the effects of these causes for each kind of constitution,1304b20 we must examine the consequences. Democracies chiefly change through the outrageous conduct of demagogues. For by bringing malicious charges against property owners individually, they draw them together (a common fear unites even the bitterest enemies), while publicly they stir up the multitude against them. As for this,25 one can see it happening in many cases. At Cos, for example, the democracy changed when wicked demagogues arose (for the notables banded together); and at Rhodes too. For the demagogues procured pay for public service and prevented the repayment of what was owed to the trierarchs; the latter, because of the impending30 lawsuits against them, were forced to band together and overthrow the people. At Heraclea too the people were overthrown soon after the colony was founded, because of the demagogues. For the notables, wronged by them, were driven into exile; then the exiles gathered together, returned, and overthrew the people. In much the same way35 the democracy at Megara was also overthrown. For the demagogues, to have property to confiscate, expelled many of the notables, until they had made the exiles numerous. The exiles returned, defeated the people in battle, and established the oligarchy.

The same thing happened at1305a1 Cyme in the democracy that Thrasymachus overthrew. In nearly all the other cases too, one would find on examination that the changes followed this pattern. For sometimes, to win favor, demagogues wrong the notables and so unite them: either their property5 is redistributed or their revenues are consumed through public services; sometimes they slander them, so that they can confiscate the possessions of the rich.

In ancient times, when the same man became both demagogue and general, democracies changed into tyranny. For nearly all the ancient tyrants arose from demagogues.1305a10 The reason this happened then but does not happen now is that the demagogues then came from among the generals (for people were not yet skilled in speaking), whereas now, with the growth of rhetoric, those able to speak act as demagogues, but their inexperience in military matters keeps them from attempting tyranny, except where there has been some small development15 of this kind. Tyrannies also arose more often in earlier times than now because important offices were entrusted to individuals, as at Miletus the tyranny arose from the presidency (for the president was sovereign over many important matters). Further, because cities then were not large, but in the countryside lived the20 people, busy with their work, the leaders of the people, when they became capable soldiers, attempted tyranny. All did this after gaining the people's trust, and the ground of that trust was hostility toward the rich. Thus at Athens Pisistratus engaged in faction against the men of the plain; and at Megara Theagenes25 slaughtered the livestock of the wealthy, seizing it as they pastured it beside the river. Dionysius, by accusing Daphnaeus and the rich, was judged worthy of tyranny, since his hostility won him trust as a friend of the people. Democracies also change from the ancestral form to the newest one. For where election is used30 for offices without property qualifications, and the people make the choice, those eager for office act as demagogues and bring things to the point where the people are sovereign even over the laws. A remedy that prevents this or makes it less frequent is for the tribes to elect the rulers, rather than the people as a whole. As for democracies,35 nearly all their changes, then, occur through these causes.

Oligarchies change chiefly in two especially evident ways. One is when they wrong the multitude, for anyone becomes a sufficient leader against them, especially when1305a40 the leader happens to come from the oligarchy itself, as did Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterward also became tyrant of the1305b1 Naxians.

The beginning of faction from outside also takes different forms. Sometimes the overthrow comes from the wealthy themselves, though not those in office, when those holding honors are exceedingly few, as happened at Massalia,1305b5 Istrus, Heraclea, and other cities. For those without a share in the offices stirred up change until first the elder brothers gained a share, and later the younger brothers in turn. In some places a father and son do not hold office together; in others one elder and one younger10 brother cannot hold office together. At Massalia the oligarchy became more constitutional, at Istrus it ended in democracy, and at Heraclea it expanded from fewer members to six hundred. At Cnidos too the oligarchy changed when the notables themselves fell into faction with one another because few had a share and, as has been said, if a father held office,15 his son could not share in it, nor, if there were several brothers, could anyone but the eldest. For the people seized their opportunity while they were divided, took a leader from among the notables, attacked, and prevailed; for what is divided by faction is weak. At Erythrae too, under the oligarchy of the Basilidae in ancient times, although20 those within the constitution administered it well, the people nevertheless resented being ruled by a few and changed the constitution.

Oligarchies are also disturbed from within by the rivalry of those who act as demagogues (demagoguery is of two kinds: one occurs among the few themselves—for a demagogue arises1305b25 even when they are very few; thus among the Thirty at Athens, Charicles and his associates gained power by playing the demagogue to the Thirty, and among the Four Hundred Phrynichus and his associates did the same—the other occurs when those within the oligarchy play the demagogue to the masses. Thus at Larissa the citizen guardians, because they were chosen by30 the masses, acted as demagogues; and the same happens in all oligarchies where officeholders are not chosen by those from whom they are drawn, but the offices are filled from those with high property qualifications or from political clubs, while the heavy-armed soldiers or the people choose them, as happened at Abydos; and where the law courts are not drawn from the citizen body—for by playing the demagogue35 in court proceedings they change the constitution, as happened at Heraclea on the Pontus. Again, it happens when some pull the oligarchy into fewer hands, for those seeking equality are forced to call in the people as an ally). Changes in oligarchy also arise when40 men squander their private property by living extravagantly. For such men seek innovations: either they attempt tyranny themselves or1306a1 set up someone else

(as Hipparinus did Dionysius at Syracuse; and at Amphipolis a man named Cleotimus brought in settlers from Chalcis, and when they arrived he set them at odds with the wealthy; and at Aegina the man who carried on the dealings1306a5 with Chares attempted to change the constitution for such a reason). Sometimes, then, they attempt to stir up some change; sometimes they steal public funds, from which faction against one another arises, either among these men themselves or from those who fight against their theft, as happened at Apollonia on the Pontus. But an oligarchy united in concord10 is not easily destroyed from within. Evidence is the constitution at Pharsalus: though few, they are sovereign over many because they treat one another well.

Oligarchies are also overthrown when they create another oligarchy within the oligarchy. This happens when, although the whole citizen body is small,1306a15 not all the few share in the highest offices, as once happened at Elis. For although the constitution was in the hands of a few, exceedingly few of them became elders, because the elders held office for life and numbered ninety, and their choice was controlled by a powerful group, resembling the choice of the elders at Lacedaemon. Change also occurs20 in oligarchies both in war and in peace: in war because distrust of the people forces them to employ mercenaries (for the man to whom they entrust them often becomes tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth; if they entrust them to several, these secure the rule of a powerful group for themselves;25 sometimes, fearing these outcomes, they give the multitude a share in the constitution because they are forced to use the people). In peace, through distrust of one another, they entrust their defense to mercenaries and a neutral ruler, who sometimes becomes sovereign over both sides, as happened at Larissa30 under the rule of the Aleuadae led by Simus, and at Abydos under the political clubs, one of which was that of Iphiades.

Factions also arise because some members of the oligarchy are thrust aside by others and driven into faction over marriages or lawsuits. Examples arising from marriage disputes are those mentioned1306a35 before (and Diagoras also overthrew the oligarchy of the knights at Eretria after being wronged over a marriage). A verdict in a law court gave rise to the faction at Heraclea and that at Thebes, when punishment on a charge of adultery was inflicted justly but in a factious manner: at Heraclea upon Eurytion,1306b1 and at Thebes upon Archias

(for their enemies pressed the matter so that they were bound in the pillory in the marketplace). Many oligarchies have also been overthrown because they were excessively despotic, causing some of those within the constitution to grow discontented,1306b5 as with the oligarchies at Cnidos and Chios. Changes also arise by accident both in the so-called polity and in those oligarchies where people serve on the council, sit as jurors, and hold the other offices on the basis of a property qualification. For often the property qualification originally fixed to suit10 the circumstances of the time, so that in the oligarchy few might share in office and in the polity the middle class might do so, is overtaken by prosperity arising from peace or some other good fortune: the same possessions become worth many times the qualification, so that everyone shares in everything. Sometimes by stages15 the change occurs, little by little and unnoticed, and sometimes more quickly. Oligarchies, then, undergo change and faction through causes of this kind (and in general both democracies and oligarchies sometimes change not into the opposite constitutions, but into those of the same kind: for example,20 from law-governed democracies and oligarchies into those that are themselves sovereign, and from these into the former).

In aristocracies some factions arise because few share in the honors, which, as has been said, also disturbs oligarchies, since the description of aristocracy too as oligarchy1306b25 is true in a way (for in both the rulers are few, though they are few for different reasons). Indeed, for these reasons aristocracy is also thought to be oligarchy. This is especially bound to happen when there is a multitude of people who have a proud sense that they are alike in virtue, as at Lacedaemon the so-called Partheniae30 (for they were descended from the peers), whom the Lacedaemonians, after discovering their plot, sent out to found Tarentum; or when certain men of greatness, inferior to none in virtue, are dishonored by others enjoying higher honors, as Lysander was by the kings; or when a courageous man has no share in honors, as Cinadon,35 who organized the attack upon the Spartans in the time of Agesilaus. Again, faction arises when some are exceedingly poor and others wealthy (this happens especially in wars, and it happened at Lacedaemon during the Messenian War; this is also evident from Tyrtaeus's poem called1307a1 Eunomia;

for some, hard pressed by the war, demanded that the land be redistributed). Again, it arises if someone is great and capable of becoming still greater, so that he may rule alone, as is thought to have been the aim at Lacedaemon of Pausanias, who commanded during the Persian1307a5 War, and at Carthage of Hanno.

Polities and aristocracies are chiefly dissolved through a deviation from the just within the constitution itself. For the beginning lies in the failure to mix democracy and oligarchy well in a polity, and these together with virtue in an aristocracy,1307a10 particularly the first two—by the two I mean democracy and oligarchy. For polities and most of the so-called aristocracies attempt to mix these. Aristocracies differ from the so-called polities in this respect, and because of it some of them are less lasting and others more so.15 For those that lean more toward oligarchy are called aristocracies, and those that lean toward the multitude, polities. Hence the latter are more secure than the former: the larger number is stronger, and people are more content when they have an equal share, whereas the wealthy, if the constitution gives them superiority,20 seek to act insolently and take more. In general, whichever way the constitution inclines, it shifts in that direction, as each side increases its own power: for example, polity shifts into democracy, and aristocracy into oligarchy. Or they shift into their opposites: aristocracy, for example, into democracy (for, on the ground of being wronged, it is pulled toward25 the opposite by the poorer people), and polities into oligarchy (for only equality according to worth and the possession of what is one's own are lasting). What has been described happened at Thurii. Because office depended upon a high property qualification, they shifted to a lower one and a greater number of offices; and because all the land30 had been acquired by the notables contrary to the law (for the constitution was rather oligarchical, so they could take more than their share), the people, trained in war, became stronger than the guards, until those who held too much land relinquished it.

Further, the oligarchical character of all aristocratic constitutions1307a35 means that the notables take more than their share. Thus at Lacedaemon property passes into few hands; and the notables have greater freedom to do whatever they wish and to form marriage connections with whomever they wish. Hence the city of the Locrians was ruined by its marriage connection with Dionysius, which would not have happened in a democracy, nor40 in a well-mixed aristocracy.

Especially unnoticed are1307b1 aristocracies as they change, because they are dissolved little by little. As was said earlier about all constitutions generally, even a small thing is a cause of change. For when people abandon some matter concerning the constitution, afterward5 they alter another, slightly greater one more readily, until they have altered the entire order. This happened to the constitution of Thurii. For although there was a law that one could serve as general only at intervals of five years, some younger men became skilled in war and gained prestige among the mass of the guards; despising those in10 charge of affairs and thinking they would easily gain control, they first attempted to abolish this law, so that the same men could serve continuously as generals, seeing that the people would eagerly vote for them. The rulers appointed to deal with this, called councilors, at first moved to oppose them,15 but were persuaded to join them, supposing that after altering this law they would leave the rest of the constitution alone. Later, when other things were being altered and they wished to prevent it, they could no longer accomplish anything: the entire order of the constitution changed into the rule of the powerful men who had attempted the innovations.

All constitutions1307b20 are dissolved sometimes from within, sometimes from outside, when an opposite constitution is either nearby or far away but powerful. This happened in the time of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians: for the Athenians everywhere overthrew oligarchies, and the Spartans democracies. The sources from which changes25 in constitutions and factions arise have now been stated for the most part.

Next we must speak about preservation, both generally and for each constitution separately. First, then, it is clear that if we possess the means through which constitutions are destroyed, we also possess those through which they are preserved; for opposite causes produce opposite effects, and destruction is1307b30 the opposite of preservation. In well-blended constitutions, then, if anything must be watched, it is that no breach of law occurs, and above all the small breach must be guarded against. For lawlessness slips in unnoticed, just as a small expense, often repeated, destroys a fortune. The expense goes unnoticed35 because it does not occur all at once; the mind is led astray by these expenses, as by the sophistical argument that if each is small, all are small. This is true in one sense, but in another it is not: for the whole and the total are not small, but are composed of small things.

This, then, is one safeguard, at the outset,1307b40 that must be taken. Next, we must not trust sophistical tricks1308a1 devised against the multitude,

for they are exposed by events (what we mean by constitutional sophistries has been stated before). Further, we must observe that some aristocracies and even oligarchies endure, not because security1308a5 belongs to their constitutions, but because those who hold office treat both those outside the constitution and those within the citizen body well. They treat those without a share well by not wronging them, by bringing their leading men into the constitution, by not wronging the ambitious through dishonor or the many10 in their gain; and they treat themselves and those who share in the constitution well by dealing democratically with one another. For the equality that democrats seek for the multitude is not only just but also advantageous among peers. Hence, if there are many within the citizen body, many democratic laws are advantageous,15 such as making offices last six months, so that all the peers may share in them; for the peers are already like a people (hence demagogues often arise among them too, as was said before). Further, oligarchies and aristocracies fall less often into the rule of powerful groups (for it is not equally easy to do wrong20 when holding office for a short time and for a long one; indeed, for this reason tyrannies arise in oligarchies and democracies. For either the most powerful in each attempt tyranny—demagogues in the one, powerful men in the other—or those holding the highest offices, when they hold them for a long time).

Taking each kind of constitution separately and sorting the effects of these causes,1304b20 we must examine the results. Democracies mainly change because of the unrestrained behavior of popular leaders, the demagogues. Sometimes they bring false charges against property owners individually and so make them unite (a shared fear brings together even the bitterest enemies). Sometimes they turn the crowd against them as a group. This happens25 in many cases, as we can see. At Cos, for example, the democracy changed when bad demagogues appeared (the notables banded together). The same happened at Rhodes. The demagogues arranged public pay and prevented repayment of the money owed to the commanders who outfitted warships. Because of the impending30 lawsuits against them, those commanders were forced to band together and overthrow the people's rule. At Heraclea, too, the people's rule was overthrown soon after the colony was founded because of the demagogues. The notables were wronged by them and driven into exile. Then the exiles gathered, returned, and overthrew the people's rule. Similarly,35 the democracy at Megara was overthrown. The demagogues expelled many of the notables to get money by confiscation, until they had created a large number of exiles. These returned, defeated the people in battle, and established the oligarchy.

The same also happened at1305a1 Cyme, under the democracy that Thrasymachus overthrew. If we look at the other cases, too, we can see that changes usually follow this pattern. Sometimes demagogues wrong the notables to win favor, and so make them unite: either their property5 is redistributed or their income is used up through public services. At other times they slander them so that they can confiscate the possessions of the rich.

In early times, when the same person was both a demagogue and a general, democracies changed into tyrannies. Almost all the early tyrants came from the demagogues.1305a10 This happened then but not now because the demagogues then came from those who served as generals (people weren't yet skilled at speaking). The art of public speaking has now developed. Capable speakers become demagogues. But they lack military experience, so they don't try to establish tyranny, except for a few minor cases15 of this kind. Tyrannies also arose more often before than now because some people were entrusted with powerful offices. At Miletus, for example, tyranny arose from the presidency (the president had authority over many important matters). Also, cities were not large then. The countryside was home to the20 people, busy with their work. So when the people's leaders had military abilities, they tried to establish tyranny. They all did this after winning the people's trust. What won that trust was their hostility toward the rich. For example, at Athens Pisistratus formed a faction against the men of the plain. At Megara Theagenes25 slaughtered the livestock of the wealthy when he found them grazing by the river. Dionysius accused Daphnaeus and the rich and was thought fit for tyranny. His hostility won him trust as a supporter of the people. Democracies also change from their traditional form into the newest one. Where appointments are made by election30 to offices without property qualifications and the people make the choice, ambitious office-seekers act as popular leaders. They give the people supreme authority even over the laws. To prevent this, or make it less common, let the tribes choose the rulers instead of the whole people. As for democracies,35 nearly all their changes happen for these reasons.

Oligarchies mainly change in two very clear ways. One is when they wrong the crowd. Anyone can become an effective leader against them, especially when1305a40 the leader happens to come from the oligarchy itself, as Lygdamis did at Naxos. He later became tyrant of the1305b1 Naxians.

Factions that start with outsiders also take different forms. Sometimes the wealthy themselves, but not those holding office, overthrow the constitution, when very few people hold the positions of honor. This happened at Massalia,1305b5 Istrus, Heraclea, and other cities. Those excluded from office stirred up unrest until first the older brothers were admitted, and later the younger ones too. In some places a father and son cannot hold office together; in others one older and one younger10 brother cannot hold office together. At Massalia the oligarchy became more like a polity, a mixed constitution. At Istrus it ended in democracy. At Heraclea it expanded from a smaller number to six hundred. At Cnidos, too, the oligarchy changed when the notables themselves formed factions against one another. Few could participate, and, as we said, if a father participated,15 his son couldn't; if there were several brothers, only the oldest could. The people seized the opportunity while they were divided. They took a leader from the notables, attacked, and won, since a divided group is weak. At Erythrae, too, in early times under the oligarchy of the Basilidae, although20 those in the constitution managed affairs well, the people resented being ruled by a few and changed the constitution.

Oligarchies are also disturbed from within when people compete with one another by acting as demagogues. This happens in two ways. One is among the few themselves—a demagogue can arise1305b25 even when they are very few. At Athens, for example, among the Thirty, Charicles and his group gained power by acting as demagogues toward the Thirty, and Phrynichus and his group did the same among the Four Hundred. The other is when members of the oligarchy act as demagogues toward the masses. At Larissa, for example, the guardians of the citizens, because they were elected by30 the masses, acted as demagogues toward them. This also happens in oligarchies where the offices aren't filled by the same people from whom the rulers are drawn. Instead, offices go to people with high property qualifications or members of clubs, but the heavily armed soldiers or the people elect them. This happened at Abydos. It also happens where the law courts aren't drawn from the citizen body. By acting as demagogues35 over court decisions, they change the constitution, as happened at Heraclea on the Black Sea. Another case is when some people try to restrict the oligarchy to fewer people. Those who want equality are forced to bring in the people as allies. Oligarchies also change when their members40 spend their own fortunes on unrestrained living. Such people, too, look for a revolution. They either try to establish tyranny themselves or1306a1 set someone else up as tyrant

(as Hipparinus did with Dionysius at Syracuse. At Amphipolis a man named Cleotimus brought in settlers from Chalcis, and after they arrived he set them in faction against the wealthy. At Aegina the man who carried out the dealings1306a5 with Chares tried to change the constitution for a reason of this kind). Sometimes, then, they try to bring about a change; at other times they steal public funds. This leads to faction against one another, involving either these people or those who fight against their theft, as happened at Apollonia on the Black Sea. But an oligarchy that agrees within itself10 isn't easily destroyed from within. The constitution at Pharsalus is evidence of this. There a few people rule over many because they treat one another well.

Oligarchies are also overthrown when they create another oligarchy inside the existing one. This happens when the whole citizen body is small,1306a15 and not all the few share in the highest offices. It happened once at Elis. The constitution was controlled by a few, but only a very small number became elders. There were ninety, their offices were for life, and their selection favored a powerful group, like the selection of elders at Lacedaemon. Changes20 in oligarchies happen in both war and peace. In war, distrust of the people forces them to use hired soldiers (the man they entrust with command often becomes a tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth. If there are several commanders, they secure rule by a powerful group for themselves.25 Sometimes fear of this leads the oligarchs to give the crowd a share in the constitution, because they are forced to use the people). In peace, distrust of one another leads them to entrust their protection to soldiers and a ruler who stands between the two sides. He sometimes becomes sovereign over both. This happened at Larissa30 under the rule of the Aleuadae led by Simus, and at Abydos under the clubs, one of which was Iphiades' club.

Factions also arise when members of the oligarchy push one another aside and form factions over marriages or lawsuits. Examples arising from marriage are the ones mentioned1306a35 earlier (Diagoras also overthrew the oligarchy of the cavalry at Eretria after being wronged over a marriage). Factions at Heraclea and Thebes arose from a court decision. The punishment for adultery was just. But it was imposed in a way that caused faction: at Heraclea it was imposed on Eurytion,1306b1 and at Thebes on Archias.

(Their enemies insisted that they be fastened in a punishment frame in the marketplace). Many oligarchies have also been overthrown because they behaved too much like masters, and some of those within the constitution became dissatisfied,1306b5 as happened to the oligarchies at Cnidos and Chios. Accidents also cause changes in the constitution called polity. They cause changes in oligarchies too, where people need a property qualification to sit on the council, serve on juries, or hold the other offices. Often the property qualification originally set to suit10 the circumstances was meant to let only a few participate in oligarchy, and the middle class in polity. But peace or some other good fortune brings prosperity. The same property comes to be worth many times the qualification, so that everyone shares in everything. Sometimes by stages15 the change develops little by little and goes unnoticed, but sometimes it happens more quickly. These, then, are the kinds of causes that lead oligarchies to change and form factions. In general, democracies and oligarchies sometimes change into others of the same kind, not their opposites. For example, they can change20 from democracies and oligarchies governed by law into ones with sovereign power, and from these into the former.

In aristocracies some factions arise because few people share in positions of honor. As we said, this also disturbs oligarchies, since the description of aristocracy too as oligarchy1306b25 is true in a way. In both, the rulers are few, though not for the same reason. Indeed, this is why aristocracy is also thought to be oligarchy. This is most bound to happen when there is a group who proudly believe they are equals in virtue. At Lacedaemon, for example, there were the so-called Partheniae30 (they came from the equals). When their plot was discovered, they were sent out to found Tarentum. It also happens when important people, inferior to no one in virtue, are dishonored by people in higher positions of honor, as Lysander was by the kings. Or a courageous man may have no share in positions of honor, like Cinadon,35 who organized the attack against the Spartans under Agesilaus. Another cause is when some are very poor and others wealthy (this happens especially in wars. It also happened at Lacedaemon during the Messenian War. This is clear from Tyrtaeus's poem called1307a1 Good Order:

some people, hard pressed by the war, demanded that the land be redistributed). Another cause is when someone is powerful and able to become still more powerful, and wants to rule alone. This seems to have been the case at Lacedaemon with Pausanias, who commanded during the Persian1307a5 War, and at Carthage with Hanno.

Polities and aristocracies are mainly destroyed by a departure from the just within the constitution itself. The starting point is a bad mixture: in a polity, of democracy and oligarchy; in an aristocracy, of these and virtue,1307a10 but especially of the two. By the two I mean democracy and oligarchy. Polities and most so-called aristocracies try to mix these. Aristocracies differ from the constitutions called polities in this respect, and this is why some of them are less lasting and others more so.15 People call those that lean more toward oligarchy aristocracies, and those that lean toward the crowd polities. This is why the latter are more secure than the former. The greater number is stronger, and people are more content when they have equal shares. But the wealthy, if the constitution gives them a superior position,20 try to behave abusively and get more than their share. In general, whichever way the constitution leans, it changes in that direction as each side expands its own power. For example, a polity changes into democracy and an aristocracy into oligarchy. Or they change in the opposite directions. An aristocracy changes into democracy because people feel wronged and pull it toward25 the opposite. These are the poorer people. Polities change into oligarchy. Only equality based on worth, and having what belongs to oneself, are lasting. What we have described happened at Thurii. Since offices required a higher property qualification, it changed to a lower one and to more offices. But all the land30 was acquired by the notables against the law (the constitution leaned more toward oligarchy, so they could take more than their share). The people, trained in the war, became stronger than the garrison troops, until those who held too much land gave it up.

Also, the oligarchic character of all aristocratic constitutions1307a35 means that the notables take more than their share. At Lacedaemon, for example, property ends up in the hands of a few. The notables have more freedom to do whatever they want and to form marriage ties with whomever they want. This is why the city of the Locrians was destroyed by the marriage connection with Dionysius. This would not have happened in a democracy, or40 in a well-mixed aristocracy.

Especially likely to go unnoticed are1307b1 aristocracies as they change. They break down little by little. We said earlier, about all constitutions in general, that small things also cause changes. Once people let something connected with the constitution slip, they then5 change another, slightly bigger thing more easily, until they have changed the whole arrangement. This also happened in the constitution of Thurii. A law required five years between terms as general. Some younger men became skilled in war and gained a good reputation with the mass of garrison troops. They despised those in10 charge and thought they could easily take control. They first tried to abolish this law, so that the same men could serve as generals continuously, seeing that the people would eagerly vote for them. The officials responsible for this, called the councilors, initially set out to oppose it,15 but were persuaded to agree. They assumed that after changing this law the men would leave the rest of the constitution alone. Later, when other things were changed, they wanted to prevent it, but could no longer do anything. The whole structure of the constitution changed into rule by the powerful men who had attempted the revolution.

All constitutions1307b20 are sometimes destroyed from within, sometimes from outside, when an opposite constitution is either nearby or far away but powerful. This happened with the Athenians and Lacedaemonians. The Athenians overthrew oligarchies everywhere, and the Spartans overthrew democracies. As for the sources of changes25 in constitutions and factions, we have now said nearly all we need to.

Next we must discuss how constitutions are preserved, both in general and individually. First, it is clear that if we know what destroys constitutions, we also know what preserves them. Opposite things produce opposite results, and destruction is1307b30 the opposite of preservation. In well-mixed constitutions, then, we must make sure above all that people don't break the law, and be especially watchful over small things. Lawbreaking slips in unnoticed, just as small expenses repeated often consume a fortune. The spending goes unnoticed35 because it doesn't happen all at once. The mind is misled by these expenses, as by the deceptive argument that if each thing is small, all of them are small too. This is true in one sense but not in another. The whole, the total, isn't small; it is made up of small things.

This, then, is one precaution that, to begin with,1307b40 we must take. Next, we mustn't trust deceptive tricks1308a1 devised against the crowd,

because the facts expose them (we explained earlier what we mean by constitutional tricks). We must also notice that some aristocracies and even oligarchies survive not because security1308a5 belongs to their constitutions, but because those who hold office treat both those outside the constitution and those in the citizen body well. They don't wrong those excluded. They admit their leading men into the constitution. They don't wrong those who seek honor by dishonoring them, or the many10 by depriving them of gain. Within their own group, among those who participate, they treat one another democratically. The equality that democrats seek for the crowd is not only just among equals but also an advantage. So if the citizen body is fairly large, many democratic laws are useful,15 such as six-month terms of office, so that all the equals can share in them. The equals already form something like a people (this is why demagogues often arise among them too, as we said earlier). Also, oligarchies and aristocracies are then less likely to fall under the rule of powerful groups. It isn't as easy to do harm20 when holding office for a short time as for a long one. This is why tyrannies arise in oligarchies and democracies. Either the most powerful men try to establish tyranny: the demagogues in one, the powerful oligarchs in the other. Or those holding the highest offices try to do so when their terms are long.