Book V, 1301a–1304b

1301a19As for the other matters we proposed to discuss, nearly20 all have now been spoken of. What causes constitutions to change, how many such causes there are and of what kinds; what destroys each constitution, and from which forms they chiefly pass into which others; further, what preserves them, both in general and each separately, and by what means each constitution might best be preserved—all these must be examined25 next, following what has been said.

We must first take as our starting point that many constitutions have arisen because, though everyone acknowledges the just and proportional equality, people miss their meaning, as we have said before. Democracy arose from the belief that those who are equal in any respect are equal without qualification1301a30 (for because everyone is equally free, they think they are equal without qualification); oligarchy, from the assumption that those who are unequal in one respect are unequal altogether (for because they are unequal in property, they assume they are unequal without qualification). Then the first group, on the ground that they are equal, claim an equal share in everything; the others, on the ground that they are unequal,35 seek a greater share, for a greater share is unequal. All these constitutions therefore contain something just, but without qualification they are mistaken. For this reason, when either group does not share in the constitution according to the conception it happens to hold, it forms factions. Some would have the most just grounds of all for faction,40 yet are least inclined to engage in it: those who surpass others in virtue;

1301b1for these alone have the strongest reasonable claim to be unequal without qualification. There are also some who, because they excel in birth, do not consider themselves entitled to equal shares on account of this inequality; for those whose ancestors possessed virtue and wealth are thought to be wellborn.

Beginnings1301b5 and sources of factions, so to speak, are these, from which people engage in faction. Hence changes also occur in two ways. Sometimes they are directed against the constitution, to replace the established one with another—for example, democracy with oligarchy, or oligarchy with democracy, or these with polity and aristocracy,10 or those with these. Sometimes they are not directed against the established constitution: people choose to retain the same arrangement, but want it in their own hands, whether oligarchy or monarchy. Again, change may concern a greater or lesser degree: for example, making an existing oligarchy more oligarchical15 or less so, or an existing democracy more democratic or less so, and likewise with the other constitutions, either intensifying or relaxing them. Again, it may be directed at changing some part of the constitution, such as establishing or abolishing a particular office. Thus some say that at Lacedaemon Lysander20 attempted to abolish kingship, and King Pausanias the office of the ephors. At Epidamnus too the constitution changed in one part (for they instituted a council in place of the tribal rulers, but the officeholders among the citizen body are still required to attend the popular court whenever25 an office is put to the vote, and the single ruler was also an oligarchical feature in this constitution). For everywhere faction arises because of inequality, unless unequal people receive proportionate shares (for perpetual kingship is unequal if it exists among equals). In general, people form factions in pursuit of equality. Equality is of two kinds: one is30 numerical, the other according to worth. By numerical equality I mean sameness and equality in number or size; by equality according to worth, equality in ratio. Thus three exceeds two numerically by the same amount as two exceeds one, whereas four exceeds two in the same ratio as two exceeds one; for two is the same fraction of four as35 one is of two: both are halves. Although people agree that what accords with worth is just without qualification, they differ, as was said before, because some think that if they are equal in any respect, they are equal altogether, while others, if they are unequal in any respect, claim unequal shares in everything. Hence chiefly two arise:40 the constitutions of democracy and oligarchy; for good birth and virtue1302a1 belong to few,

but these other qualities to more. For nowhere are there a hundred wellborn and good men, whereas in many places there are a hundred wealthy ones. Yet to arrange everything without qualification according to either kind of equality is bad. This is evident from what happens: none1302a5 of such constitutions is lasting. The reason is that, when the first principle and starting point are mistaken, it is impossible not to encounter some evil in the end. Therefore numerical equality must be used in some matters, and equality according to worth in others.

Nevertheless, democracy is more secure and less subject to faction than oligarchy. For in1302a10 oligarchies two kinds of faction arise, that of the few against one another and that against the people; in democracies only the faction against the oligarchy arises, while no faction worth mentioning arises within the people against themselves. Further, the constitution based on the middle class is closer to democracy than to the constitution of the few;15 and it is the most secure of such constitutions.

Since we are examining the causes from which factions arise and constitutions change, we must first grasp their beginnings and causes generally. Broadly speaking, they are three in number, and each must be distinguished by itself in outline1302a20 first. For we must grasp the disposition in which people engage in faction, the ends for which they do so, and third, the beginnings of political disturbances and factions against one another. As the general cause of their disposition toward change, we should chiefly posit what we have already spoken of. Those who25 seek equality form factions if they think they have less, though they are equal to those who have more; those who seek inequality and superiority do so if they suppose that, though unequal, they have not more but an equal or smaller share (these desires may be just, but they may also be unjust). For those who are inferior30 form factions to become equal, and those who are equal to become superior. We have therefore stated the disposition in which people engage in faction. The objects over which they do so are profit and honor and their opposites. For people also form factions in cities to escape dishonor and loss, either for themselves or for their friends. The causes and beginnings35 of disturbances, from which people acquire the disposition described and become concerned with the objects mentioned, are in one sense seven in number, and in another more. Two of them are the same as those already mentioned, but not in the same way. For people are also incited against one another by profit and honor, not to acquire them40 for themselves, as was said before,

but because others1302b1 are seen taking a greater share of them, some justly, others unjustly. Further causes are insolence, fear, superiority, contempt, and disproportionate growth; and, in another way, electioneering, neglect, small changes,5 and dissimilarity. The power of insolence and profit among these causes, and how they operate as causes, is fairly evident. For when those in office behave insolently and take more than their share, people form factions both against one another and against the constitutions that give them their power. This grasping for more is sometimes at the expense of10 private property, sometimes of public property.—Honor too is evident, both in its power and in how it causes faction. For people form factions both when they themselves are dishonored and when they see others honored. These things happen unjustly when people are honored or dishonored contrary to their worth, and justly when according to their worth.15 —Superiority causes faction when someone, whether one person or more, is greater in power than accords with the city and the strength of its citizen body; for monarchy or the rule of a powerful group commonly arises from such conditions. Hence in some places they customarily ostracize people, as at Argos and Athens. Yet it is better to see from the beginning that there will be no people20 so greatly superior than to let them arise and seek a remedy afterward.—Through fear, both those who have done wrong, fearing punishment, and those about to suffer wrong, wishing to act before they suffer it, engage in faction. Thus at Rhodes the notables banded together against the people because of the lawsuits being brought against them.25 —Through contempt people both form factions and attack: in oligarchies, for example, when those without a share in the constitution are more numerous (for they think themselves stronger); and in democracies, when the wealthy despise the disorder and lack of rule. Thus at Thebes, after the battle at Oenophyta,30 poor government destroyed the democracy; and the democracy of the Megarians was destroyed when they were defeated through disorder and lack of rule. The same happened at Syracuse before Gelon's tyranny, and to the people at Rhodes before the uprising.

Changes in constitutions also arise through disproportionate growth. For just as1302b35 a body is composed of parts, which must grow proportionately if its symmetry is to remain, and otherwise it is ruined, when the foot is four cubits long and the rest of the body two spans; and sometimes it might even change into the shape of another animal, if not only in quantity but also in quality40 it grew disproportionately, so a city too is composed1303a1 of parts,

one of which often grows unnoticed, as does the multitude of the poor in democracies and polities. Sometimes this also happens through accidents: at Tarentum, for example, when many notables were defeated and killed by the1303a5 Iapygians shortly after the Persian Wars, democracy arose from polity. At Argos, when those of the seventh were killed by Cleomenes the Spartan, they were forced to admit some of the surrounding inhabitants. At Athens, when they suffered defeats on land, the notables became fewer because they were on the citizen list10 for military service during the Spartan War. This also happens in democracies, though less often: as the wealthy become more numerous or their properties increase, they change into oligarchies and the rule of powerful groups.—Constitutions also change without faction, through electioneering, as15 at Heraea (for they changed the offices from elective to allotted because people were choosing those who canvassed); and through neglect, when they let men unfriendly to the constitution enter the sovereign offices. Thus at Oreus the oligarchy was overthrown when Heracleodorus became one of the rulers: from an oligarchy he20 constructed a polity and democracy.—Again, through small changes. By small changes I mean that a great alteration in the laws often develops unnoticed when people overlook a small one. Thus at Ambracia the property qualification was small, and in the end people held office without any qualification, on the ground that a small amount is close to nothing or no different25 from nothing.

Difference of stock also fosters faction until people come to share a common spirit. For just as a city does not arise from any chance multitude, neither does it arise in any chance interval of time. Hence most of those who have admitted fellow settlers or later settlers have fallen into faction. For example, Achaeans settled Sybaris together with Troezenians; then the more numerous group,1303a30 the Achaeans, expelled the Troezenians, and from this came the curse upon the Sybarites. At Thurii the Sybarites quarreled with their fellow settlers (for, claiming a greater share because the land was theirs, they were expelled). At Byzantium the later settlers were caught plotting against the Byzantines and were driven out by fighting. As for the people of Antissa, those from Chios35 whom they admitted as exiles they expelled by fighting; the people of Zancle admitted Samians and were themselves expelled. The people of Apollonia on the Euxine Sea brought in later settlers and fell into faction;

and the Syracusans, after the tyrannies, the foreigners1303b1 and mercenaries they made citizens, then fell into faction and came to battle. The people of Amphipolis admitted settlers from Chalcis, and most of them were expelled by these newcomers. In oligarchies the many engage in faction because they believe they are wronged, since5 they do not receive equal shares, as was said before, though they are equal; in democracies the notables do so because they receive equal shares though they are not equal. Cities sometimes also fall into faction because of their locations, when the territory is not naturally suited to being one city. Thus at Clazomenae those at Chytrum oppose those10 on the island, and the Colophonians oppose the people of Notium. At Athens too the inhabitants are not alike: those who live in the Piraeus are more democratic than those in the city proper. For just as in wars the crossings of ditches, even very small ones, break up the battle lines, so every difference seems to produce division.15 Perhaps the greatest division is between virtue and wickedness; next comes that between wealth and poverty, and then others, some greater than others, one of which is the difference just mentioned.

Factions, then, arise not over small matters but from small matters, and people engage in faction over great ones. Small differences are particularly powerful when among those in authority1303b20 they arise, as happened at Syracuse in ancient times. For the constitution changed because two young men holding office quarreled over a love affair. While one was away, the other won over his beloved; in return, the first, angered by this, the other's wife25 he persuaded to come to him. From this, by drawing in members of the citizen body, they divided everyone into factions. Therefore such things must be guarded against at their beginnings, and factions among leaders and powerful men must be dissolved. For the error occurs at the beginning, and the beginning is said to be half of everything,30 so that even a small error there is proportionate to errors in the other parts. In general, factions among the notables make the whole city share in their consequences. Thus at Hestiaea after the Persian Wars two brothers disputed over the division of their father's estate. The poorer brother,35 claiming that the other had not disclosed the property or the treasure their father had found, enlisted the democrats; the other, who had much property, enlisted the wealthy. At Delphi too a disagreement arising from a marriage connection became the beginning of all the factions1304a1 that followed;

for when the bridegroom came for his bride, he took some occurrence as an omen and went away without taking her. The others, considering themselves insulted, planted some of the sacred money on him while he was sacrificing and then killed him as a temple robber. At Mytilene too, over heiresses1304a5 a faction arose and became the beginning of many evils and of the war against the Athenians, in which Paches captured their city. For Timophanes, a wealthy man, left two daughters; Dexander, who was rebuffed and failed to obtain them for his sons, began the faction and incited the Athenians,10 whose city's representative he was. Among the Phocians too, a faction over an heiress between Mnaseas, Mnason's father, and Euthycrates, Onomarchus's father, became the beginning of the Sacred War for the Phocians. At Epidamnus also the constitution changed because of a marriage dispute. A man had betrothed15 his daughter to another; when the father of the man to whom she was betrothed became a ruler and fined him, the other, believing himself mistreated, brought in those outside the constitution.

Constitutions also change into oligarchy, democracy, and polity because an office or a part of the city gains prestige or grows stronger.1304a20 For example, the council on the Areopagus, having won prestige in the Persian Wars, was thought to have tightened the constitution; and, on the other hand, the naval masses, having brought about the victory at Salamis and thereby the city's leadership through its sea power, made the democracy stronger.25 At Argos the notables, having won prestige in the battle at Mantinea against the Lacedaemonians, attempted to overthrow the people. At Syracuse the people, having brought about victory in the war against the Athenians, changed the polity into democracy. At Chalcis, Phoxus30 the tyrant was killed by the people together with the notables, and the people immediately took control of the constitution. At Ambracia too, in the same way, the people helped those who attacked Periander the tyrant to drive him out and transferred the constitution to themselves. In general, we must not overlook this: those who have brought about an increase in power,35 whether private individuals, offices, tribes, or any part or multitude whatever, stir up faction. For either those who envy them their honors begin the faction, or these people, because of their superiority, are unwilling to remain on equal terms. Constitutions are also disturbed when the parts of the city thought to be opposed become equal1304b1 to one another,

such as the rich and the people, and there is no middle class or only a very small one. For if either part is greatly superior, the other is unwilling to risk itself against a plainly stronger opponent. Hence those who excel in virtue do not engage in faction,1304b5 so to speak; for they are few against many. In general, then, the beginnings and causes of factions and changes in all constitutions are of this kind. People change constitutions sometimes through force and sometimes through deception; by force, either compelling people immediately from the beginning or doing so afterward.10 For deception too is of two kinds. Sometimes they first deceive people into consenting to a change in the constitution, and afterward hold it by force against their will. Thus under the Four Hundred they deceived the people by saying that the King would provide money for the war against the Lacedaemonians; having lied,15 they tried to retain the constitution. Sometimes, having persuaded people from the outset, they continue afterward to rule them with their willing consent. Generally, then, changes in all constitutions arise from the causes that have been stated.

1301a19As for the other subjects we set out to cover, almost20 all have now been discussed. We must examine the causes of constitutional changes: how many there are and what kinds, what destroys each constitution, and which constitutions most often change into which others. We must also examine what preserves constitutions, both in general and individually, and what means are most likely to preserve each one,25 as the next step after what we have already said.

We must first take as our starting point that many constitutions have developed because everyone agrees about the just and about proportional equality, but gets them wrong, as we said earlier. Democracy arose from the belief that people who are equal in any one respect are equal in every respect1301a30 (because everyone is equally free, they think they are equal in every respect). Oligarchy arose from the assumption that people who are unequal in one respect are completely unequal (because they are unequal in wealth, they assume they are unequal in every respect). Then those who consider themselves equal claim an equal share in everything. Those who consider themselves unequal35 try to get a larger share, since a larger share is unequal. So all these constitutions contain something just, but taken as a whole they are mistaken. For this reason, when either group doesn't share in the constitution as its own assumptions lead it to expect, it starts a faction. Some people would have the strongest justification of all for starting a faction,40 but they do this least of all: those who stand out in virtue.

1301b1Only they can most reasonably be considered unequal in every respect. Some people who are superior in birth also think this inequality entitles them to more than equal shares. People whose ancestors had virtue and wealth are considered wellborn.

Starting points1301b5 and sources of factions are roughly these. They are the grounds on which people form them. Changes therefore happen in two ways. Sometimes they attack the constitution to replace the existing one with another. For example, they turn democracy into oligarchy or oligarchy into democracy, or turn these into polity, a mixed constitution, or aristocracy,10 or the latter into the former. Sometimes they don't attack the existing constitution. They choose to keep the same arrangement but want to run it themselves, whether it is an oligarchy or a monarchy. There are also changes of degree. An oligarchy may be made more oligarchic15 or less so, and a democracy more democratic or less so. The same applies to the other constitutions: they may be tightened or relaxed. People may also try to change some part of a constitution, such as creating or abolishing an office. For example, some say that at Lacedaemon Lysander20 tried to abolish kingship, and King Pausanias tried to abolish the office of the ephors, the Spartan overseers. At Epidamnus, too, the constitution changed in one part. They created a council to replace the tribal chiefs. But the rulers who belong to the citizen body must still go to the popular assembly whenever25 an office is put to a vote; the single ruler was also an oligarchic feature of this constitution. Everywhere inequality causes faction, unless unequal people receive proportionate shares (permanent kingship is unequal if it exists among equals). In general, people start factions because they seek equality. There are two kinds of equality. One is30 numerical, the other is based on worth. By numerical equality I mean sameness and equality in number or size; by equality based on worth I mean equality of proportion. For example, three exceeds two, and two exceeds one, by the same number. But four exceeds two, and two exceeds one, in the same proportion. Two is the same fraction of four as35 one is of two: both are halves. People agree that what is based on worth is just without qualification, but they disagree, as we said earlier. One group thinks that if people are equal in one respect, they are equal in all respects. The other thinks that if they are unequal in one respect, they deserve unequal shares in everything. This is also why two main forms arise:40 the constitutions of democracy and oligarchy. Good birth and virtue1302a1 are found in few people,

but these other qualities are found in more. Nowhere are there a hundred people who are wellborn and good, but in many places there are a hundred wealthy people. It is a mistake to organize everything entirely by either kind of equality. The results make this clear: none1302a5 of these constitutions lasts. The reason is that a mistake at the very first starting point must lead to some bad result in the end. So numerical equality must be used in some matters, and equality based on worth in others.

Still, democracy is more secure and less open to faction than oligarchy. In1302a10 oligarchies two kinds of faction arise: one among the oligarchs themselves, and another against the people. In democracies there is only faction against the oligarchy. No faction worth mentioning arises within the people against themselves. Also, a constitution based on the middle class is closer to democracy than to rule by the few.15 It is the most secure of constitutions of this kind.

Since we are examining what causes factions and constitutional changes, we must first grasp their starting points and causes in general. There are, roughly speaking, three, and we must distinguish each of them on its own in outline1302a20 first. We must identify the state of mind in which people form factions, what they form them for, and, third, what starts political disturbances and factions between people. The main general cause of the state of mind that leads people toward change must be taken to be the one we have already described. Those25 seeking equality form factions when they believe their share is smaller than that of others who are their equals. Others want unequal shares and superiority. They form factions when they believe they are unequal yet receive no larger share, but an equal or smaller one. These aims can be just or unjust. People who have less30 start factions to become equal, and those who are equal do so to become greater. We have now described the state of mind in which people start factions. The things they fight over are gain and honor, and their opposites. People also start factions in cities to avoid dishonor and loss, either for themselves or for their friends. The causes and starting points35 of these movements, which put people into the state of mind we described and turn them toward these aims, are in one way seven in number, but in another way more. Two are the same as those already mentioned, but work differently. Gain and honor also turn people against one another, not because they want to get them40 for themselves, as we said before,

but because other people1302b1 are seen getting a larger share of them, some justly, others unjustly. Other causes are abusive behavior, fear, superiority, contempt, and growth out of proportion. There are also causes of another kind: election scheming, carelessness, small changes,5 and differences between people. The force of abusive behavior and gain, and how they act as causes, is fairly clear. When people in office behave abusively and take more than their share, people start factions both against one another and against the constitutions that give them this power. They take extra shares sometimes from10 private property, sometimes from public property.—Honor is also clear, both in its force and in how it causes faction. People start factions because they themselves are dishonored and because they see others honored. This happens unjustly when people are honored or dishonored against their worth, and justly when it matches their worth.15 —Superiority causes faction when someone, whether one person or several, has more power than suits the city and the power of its citizen body. Such situations usually produce monarchy or the rule of a powerful group. This is why some places practice ostracism, for example Argos and Athens. Yet it is better to make sure from the start that there won't be people20 with such great superiority than to let them arise and find a cure later.—Fear leads both people who have done wrong and people who are about to suffer wrong to start factions. The first fear punishment; the second want to act before they are wronged. For example, the notables at Rhodes banded together against the people because of the lawsuits being brought against them.25 —Contempt also makes people start factions and launch attacks. In oligarchies this happens when those excluded from the constitution are more numerous (they think they are stronger). In democracies the wealthy come to despise the disorder and lack of government. For example, at Thebes, after the battle at Oenophyta,30 bad government destroyed the democracy. The democracy at Megara was also destroyed when disorder and lack of government led to defeat. The same happened at Syracuse before Gelon's tyranny, and to the people's rule at Rhodes before the uprising.

Constitutions also change because of growth out of proportion. Compare a body:1302b35 it consists of parts. They must grow in proportion to keep their proper balance. Otherwise the body is ruined, as when its foot is four cubits long and the rest of its body two spans. Sometimes it might even take the form of another animal. This could happen if, not only in size but also in kind,40 it grew out of proportion. In the same way, a city consists1303a1 of parts.

One of them often grows unnoticed, such as the number of poor people in democracies and polities. Sometimes this also happens by chance. At Tarentum, for example, many notables were defeated and killed by the1303a5 Iapygians shortly after the Persian Wars, and the polity became a democracy. At Argos, after those on the seventh were killed by Cleomenes the Spartan, they were forced to admit some of the surrounding inhabitants. At Athens, military disasters on land reduced the number of notables, because they were on the citizen roll10 for military service during the Spartan War. This also happens in democracies, but less often. When wealthy people become more numerous or their fortunes grow, democracies change into oligarchies and the rule of powerful groups.—Constitutions also change without faction through election scheming, as15 at Heraea (they replaced elected offices with offices assigned by lot because people were electing those who schemed for votes). They also change through carelessness, when people allow those unfriendly to the constitution to enter the offices with sovereign power. At Oreus, for example, the oligarchy was overthrown when Heracleodorus became one of the rulers. From an oligarchy he20 created a polity and a democracy.—Another cause is small changes. By this I mean that a great change in the laws often goes unnoticed when people overlook a small one. At Ambracia, for example, the property qualification was small, and in the end people held office with none, on the grounds that a small amount was close to, or no different from,25 nothing.

Differences in origin also cause faction until people come to think alike. A city cannot be formed from just any crowd, nor can it be formed in just any amount of time. This is why most cities that have admitted fellow settlers or later settlers have experienced faction. For example, Achaeans settled Sybaris together with Troezenians. Then the more numerous group,1303a30 the Achaeans, expelled the Troezenians. This brought the curse upon the people of Sybaris. At Thurii the Sybarites fought with those who settled with them (they claimed a larger share because the land was theirs, and were expelled). At Byzantium the later settlers were discovered plotting and were driven out after a fight. As for the people of Antissa, those from Chios35 whom they admitted as exiles they then drove out after a fight. The people of Zancle admitted Samians but were themselves driven out. The people of Apollonia on the Black Sea brought in later settlers and experienced faction.

At Syracuse, too, after the tyrannies, the foreigners1303b1 and mercenaries were made citizens. This led to factions and fighting. The people of Amphipolis admitted settlers from Chalcis, and most of the original inhabitants were driven out by them. In oligarchies the many form factions because they think they are wronged because5 they don't receive equal shares, though they are equal, as we said earlier. In democracies the notables do so because they receive equal shares though they are not equal. Sometimes cities also experience faction because of their geography, when the land isn't naturally suited to being a single city. For example, at Clazomenae the people at Chytrum were opposed to those10 on the island, and the people of Colophon to those of Notium. At Athens, too, people are not alike: those who live in Piraeus are more democratic than those in the town. In war, crossings over ditches, even very small ones, break up battle formations. In the same way, every difference seems to create division.15 The greatest division is perhaps between virtue and badness, then between wealth and poverty. After that one difference is greater than another, and the one we mentioned is among them.

Factions arise not over small things but from small things. People fight over great things. Even small differences have the greatest force when among those with sovereign power1303b20 they arise, as happened at Syracuse in early times. The constitution changed because two young men who held office quarreled over a love affair. While one was away, the other won over his boyfriend. In return, the first man was angry. The other's wife25 he persuaded to come to him. They then brought the members of the citizen body onto their sides and split them all into factions. So we must guard against such things when they begin, and settle the factions of leaders and powerful people. The mistake happens at the beginning, and the beginning is said to be half of everything,30 so even a small mistake there corresponds in scale to mistakes in the other parts. In general, factions among the notables draw the whole city into their consequences. This happened at Hestiaea after the Persian Wars, when two brothers disagreed over the division of their father's property. The poorer one,35 claiming that the other hadn't disclosed the property or the treasure their father had found, brought the democrats onto his side. The other, who had a large fortune, brought in the wealthy. At Delphi a dispute arising from a marriage became the starting point for all the factions that came1304a1 later.

When the groom came for the bride, he took some incident as a bad omen and went away without her. Her family felt insulted, planted some of the sacred property on him while he was sacrificing, and then killed him as a temple robber. At Mytilene, too, over heiresses1304a5 a faction arose and started many troubles, including the war against Athens in which Paches captured their city. Timophanes, a wealthy man, left two daughters. Dexander was rejected and failed to obtain them for his sons. He started the faction and stirred up the Athenians,10 whose city's representative he was. Among the Phocians, too, a faction over an heiress involving Mnaseas, Mnason's father, and Euthycrates, Onomarchus's father, became the starting point of the Sacred War for the Phocians. At Epidamnus the constitution also changed because of marriage matters. Someone had arranged a betrothal15 for his daughter. The young man's father became a ruler and fined him. Feeling mistreated, he brought in those outside the constitution.

Constitutions also change into oligarchy, democracy, or polity because some office or part of the city gains a good reputation or grows in power.1304a20 For example, the council on the Areopagus gained a good reputation during the Persian Wars and was thought to have tightened the constitution. On the other hand, the naval masses, who brought about the victory at Salamis and, through it, leadership based on naval power, made the democracy stronger.25 At Argos the notables won a good reputation in the battle against the Lacedaemonians at Mantinea and tried to overthrow the people's rule. At Syracuse the people brought about victory in the war against the Athenians and changed the polity into a democracy. At Chalcis, Phoxus30 the tyrant was killed by the people together with the notables. The people immediately took control of the constitution. At Ambracia, similarly, the people joined those who attacked Periander the tyrant in driving him out, and transferred the constitution to themselves. In general, we mustn't overlook this: those who have helped create power,35 whether private individuals, officials, tribes, or any part or group whatever, stir up faction. Either people who envy the honors they receive start the faction, or they themselves refuse to remain on equal terms because of their superiority. Constitutions also become unstable when the parts of the city thought to be opposed are equal1304b1 to each other,

such as the rich and the people, and there is no middle class or only a very small one. If either side is far stronger, the other won't risk a fight with an obviously stronger opponent. This is also why people who stand out in virtue do not start a faction,1304b5 so to speak. They are few against many. In general, then, these are the starting points and causes of factions and changes in all constitutions. People change constitutions sometimes by force, sometimes by deception. They use force either right from the start or by imposing it later.10 Deception is also of two kinds. Sometimes they deceive people at first and change the constitution with their consent, but later hold it by force against their will. Under the Four Hundred, for example, they deceived the people by claiming that the king would provide money for the war against the Lacedaemonians. After this lie,15 they tried to keep control of the constitution. At other times they persuade people at the start and later persuade them again, and rule over them with their consent. Generally, then, changes in all constitutions arise from the causes we have described.