Book IV, 1299a–1301a

Let the deliberative element, which must also be sovereign in the constitution, be defined in this way.

Next comes the distinction concerning offices. For this part of the constitution too has many differences:1299a5 how many offices there are, over what they have authority, and, concerning time, how long each office lasts (some make offices last six months, others less, others a year, and others longer); whether offices must be perpetual or long-lasting or neither, but the same people hold them several times, or10 the same person not twice but only once; and moreover, concerning the establishment of offices, from whom their holders must be appointed, by whom, and how. For in all these matters we must be able to distinguish how many ways are possible, and then determine which ways are advantageous for which constitutions. Nor is it15 easy to define which positions we should call offices. For the political community needs many supervisors, and therefore we must not regard all those chosen or appointed by lot as rulers: first, for example, the priests (for this must be considered something different from political offices). Moreover, sponsors of choruses, heralds, and ambassadors are also chosen.20 Some responsibilities are political, concerning either all citizens in a particular activity, as a general supervises those on military service, or a part of them, as the supervisor of women or the supervisor of children does. Others concern household management (for they often choose distributors of grain); others are subordinate services, to which they assign slaves if they have the means.25 Generally speaking, those positions should most properly be called offices to which the power has been assigned to deliberate about certain matters, to judge, and to command, especially this last; for commanding is more characteristic of rule. But these distinctions make virtually no difference in practice (for no legal decision has yet arisen from a dispute about30 the name), though they afford a further subject for intellectual inquiry.

Which offices, and how many, are necessary if a city is to exist, and which, though not necessary, are useful for a good constitution: these are questions one might find more perplexing, concerning every constitution and particularly small cities. For in1299a35 large cities it is both possible and necessary to assign one office to one task (for many can enter offices because the citizens are numerous, so that some offices are held again only after a long interval and others only once, and each task receives better attention when the attention is devoted to one thing1299b1 rather than many).

In small cities, however, many offices must be brought together in a few hands (for because the population is small it is not easy to have many people in office: who, then, will be left to succeed them?). Yet sometimes small cities need1299b5 the same offices and laws as large ones. But the latter often need the same services, while in the former the need arises only after long intervals. Therefore nothing prevents several responsibilities from being assigned at once (for they will not obstruct one another), and because of the small population offices must be made like10 combined spits and lamp stands. If, then, we can say how many offices every city must have, and how many, though not necessary, it ought to have, knowledge of this would make it easier to see which offices it is fitting to combine into one. It is also fitting not to overlook which matters require15 many offices to supervise them in different places and which require a single office with authority everywhere: for example, whether good order requires a market supervisor in the marketplace and someone else in another place, or the same person everywhere. And should the division follow the matter at hand or the people concerned? I mean, for example, should one person supervise good order, or one supervise children20 and another women? And regarding constitutions, does the kind of office also differ in each, or not at all? For example, in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy, do the same offices have authority, though their holders are not drawn from equal or similar people, but from different people in different constitutions: for example, in25 aristocracies from the educated, in oligarchies from the rich, and in democracies from the free? Or do some constitutions differ in the offices themselves, with the same offices advantageous in some places and different ones in others (for in one place it is fitting that the same offices should have great30 powers, and in another small ones)?

Yet some offices are peculiar to particular constitutions, such as that of the preliminary councilors; for this is not democratic. A council, however, is democratic. There must be some such body responsible for considering matters beforehand for the people, so that the people will be occupied; but if its members are few in number, this is oligarchic. The1299b35 preliminary councilors must be few in number, so this is oligarchic. But where both these offices exist, the preliminary councilors are set over the councilors; for the councilor is democratic, the preliminary councilor oligarchic. The council's power is also dissolved in those democracies in1300a1 which the people themselves assemble and transact all business.

This commonly happens when there are ample means to pay those attending the assembly. For, having leisure, they assemble often and decide everything themselves. A supervisor of children and a supervisor of women,1300a5 and any other ruler with authority over such responsibilities, is aristocratic, not democratic (for how is it possible to prevent the wives of the poor from going out?), nor oligarchic (for the wives of those who hold power in oligarchies live in luxury).

Let this be enough for now concerning these matters. As for the appointment of officeholders,1300a10 we must attempt to examine it from the beginning. The differences lie in three terms, by combining which all the ways must be included. Of these three, one is who appoints the officeholders, the second from whom, and the remaining one in what manner. For each of these three, three differences15 exist. For either all the citizens appoint or some; and either from all or from certain people defined by a qualification (for example, property, birth, virtue, or some other such thing, as at Megara from those who returned together and fought together against the people). And they do this either by choice or by lot (with these, again, combined:20 I mean that some offices are filled by some citizens and others by all, some from all and others from some, and some by choice and others by lot).

Each of these differences will have four ways. For either all appoint from all by choice, or all from all by lot—and either from everyone, or by turns,1300a25 for example, according to tribes, demes, and phratries, until it has passed through all the citizens, or always from everyone—or some offices in one way and others in the other. Again, if some appoint, they do so either from all by choice or from all by lot, or from some by choice or from some by lot, or some offices in one way and others in the other. I mean30 some from all by choice and others by lot, and some from some by choice and others by lot. Thus there are twelve ways apart from the two combinations. Of these, three modes of appointment are democratic: for all to appoint from all by choice, by lot, or by both, some offices by lot and others by choice. But for not all to appoint at the same time,35 yet to appoint from all or from some, by lot or by choice or by both, or some offices from all and others from some by both (by both I mean some by lot and others by choice), belongs to polity; and for some to appoint from all either by choice or by lot or by both (some by lot and others by choice)40 is oligarchic. Appointment from both groups is still more oligarchic. But appointing to some offices from all and to others from some belongs to polity with an aristocratic tendency,

1300b1or appointing to some by choice and to others by lot. For some to appoint from some by choice is oligarchic, as is for some to appoint from some by lot (though this does not occur, it is so nonetheless), and for some to appoint from some by both. But for some to appoint from all, and for all to appoint from some by choice,5 is aristocratic. These, then, are the number of ways concerning offices, and they are distinguished according to constitutions in this manner. Which are advantageous for whom, and how appointments should be made, will become evident together with the powers of the offices and what the offices are. By the power of an office I mean, for example, authority10 over revenues or authority over the guard. For the power of a generalship is of a different kind from that of the office with authority over contracts in the marketplace.

Of the three parts, it remains to discuss the judicial element. Its ways too must be considered on the same basis. The1300b15 law courts differ in three terms: from whom they are constituted, what matters they concern, and how. By “from whom” I mean whether from all or from some; by “what matters,” how many kinds of law court there are; by “how,” whether by lot or by choice. First, then, let us distinguish how many kinds of law court there are. They are eight in number: one for scrutinizing accounts,20 another for offenses against common interests, another for matters affecting the constitution, a fourth for disputes concerning penalties, involving both rulers and private individuals, a fifth for substantial private transactions, and besides these the courts for homicide and for foreigners (the kinds of homicide court, whether25 judged by the same jurors or by different ones, concern intentional killings, unintentional killings, and killings that are admitted but whose justice is disputed; a fourth concerns charges brought against those exiled for homicide regarding their return, as the court at Phreatto in Athens is said to do. Such cases occur30 rarely over the whole course of time, even in large cities. Of the courts for foreigners, one concerns foreigners against foreigners and another foreigners against citizens). Besides all these there is a court for small transactions, involving one drachma, five drachmas, or a little more. For these too require a decision, but do not35 fall to a large body of jurors.

But let us leave aside these courts and those for homicide and foreigners, and speak of the political courts: when these are not well arranged, divisions and upheavals in constitutions arise. Either all must judge all the matters distinguished, being appointed by choice1300b40 or by lot, or all must judge all matters, some appointed by lot and others by choice, or, concerning certain of the same matters, some must be appointed by lot and others1301a1 by choice.

These ways, then, are four in number; and there are as many other ways involving only a part. For, again, those who judge all matters may be appointed from some by choice, or from some for all matters by lot, or some by lot and others by choice, or certain courts1301a5 for the same matters may consist of those appointed by lot and those chosen. These, then, as stated, are the ways corresponding to those already described. Moreover, the same arrangements may be combined: I mean, for example, some courts from all, others from some, and others from both (for example, if some members of the same court were drawn from all and others from some), and either10 by lot or by choice or by both. We have therefore stated how many ways law courts can be constituted. Of these, the first are democratic,12 those drawn from all to judge all matters; the second are oligarchic, those drawn from some to judge all matters; and the third are aristocratic and belong to polity, those drawn partly from all and partly15 from some.

Let this, then, be our account of the deliberative body, which is sovereign in the constitution.

The next subject to divide up is offices. This part of the constitution also has many differences:1299a5 how many offices there are, what they control, and how long each lasts. Some make offices last six months, others less, others a year, and others longer. We must also ask whether offices should be permanent or long-lasting, or neither, with the same people holding them repeatedly, or10 whether the same person should hold office not twice but only once. Then there is the appointment of officeholders: from whom they should be drawn, by whom, and how. In all these matters, we must be able to distinguish how many arrangements are possible, and then match the suitable ones to the constitutions they benefit. It is not15 easy even to define which positions should be called offices. The political community needs many supervisors. So we must not count everyone chosen by choice or lot as a ruler. Take priests first: their role should be counted as something different from political offices. Also, sponsors of choruses, heralds, and ambassadors are chosen by choice.20 Some supervisory duties are political. They concern either all citizens in some activity, as a general supervises those on military service, or a particular group, as a supervisor of women or children does. Others concern household management: grain measurers, for example, are often chosen by choice. Others are duties of service, for which cities with enough resources appoint slaves.25 Generally speaking, we should call offices above all those positions assigned the power to deliberate on certain matters, judge, and issue orders, especially this last. Giving orders is most characteristic of rule. But these distinctions make practically no difference in use. (No legal decision has yet arisen from disputes about30 the name.) They do, however, offer a separate subject for theoretical study.

Which offices, and how many, are necessary for a city to exist? Which are not necessary but are useful for a good constitution? These are questions we might find more difficult, both for every constitution and especially for small cities. In1299a35 large cities, one office can and should be assigned to one task. (Many people can enter the offices because the citizens are numerous. So they can hold some offices again after a long interval and others only once. Each task also gets better attention when the person responsible handles one matter1299b1 rather than many.)

In small cities, many offices must be combined in the hands of a few people. The small population makes it hard for many people to hold office: who will succeed them in turn? Yet small cities sometimes need1299b5 the same offices and laws as large ones. The difference is that large cities need the same services often, while small ones need them only at long intervals. So nothing prevents several duties from being assigned together, since they will not interfere with each other. Because of the small population, the offices must be made like10 combined spit-and-lamp stands. If, then, we can say how many offices every city must have, and how many are not necessary but should exist, someone who knows this can more easily see which offices it makes sense to combine into one. We should also be clear about which matters need15 several local offices and which need one office with authority everywhere. For example, should good order be the responsibility of a market supervisor in the marketplace, and of different officials elsewhere, or of the same one everywhere? Should duties be divided by subject or by the people concerned? I mean, for example, should one official supervise good order, or should there be one for children20 and another for women? We must also ask whether the kinds of offices differ in each constitution, or not at all. For example, in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy, do the same offices have authority, but with their holders drawn not from equal or similar people, but from different groups in different constitutions? In25 aristocracies, educated people might hold them. In oligarchies the holders might be rich, and in democracies free. Or are the offices themselves different in some constitutions? The same offices may help some cities, while others need different ones. (In some places an office should have extensive30 powers; elsewhere those powers should be limited.)

Still, some offices are distinctive, such as that of preliminary councilors. This is not democratic, while a council is democratic. There must be some body responsible for considering matters beforehand for the people, so that the people can attend to their work. But if this body has few members, it is oligarchic. The1299b35 preliminary councilors must be few in number, so this is oligarchic. Where both these offices exist, the preliminary councilors are set over the council members. A council member is democratic, a preliminary councilor oligarchic. The council's power is also abolished in democracies of the kind in1300a1 which the people themselves meet and conduct all business.

This usually happens when there is enough money to pay those who attend the assembly. Because they have leisure, they gather often and decide everything themselves. A supervisor of children and a supervisor of women,1300a5 and any other ruler responsible for supervision of this kind, is aristocratic, not democratic. (How could anyone stop the wives of the poor from going out?) Nor is it oligarchic. (The wives of oligarchic rulers live in luxury.)

Let that be enough on these matters for now. As for the appointment of officeholders,1300a10 we must try to examine it from the beginning. The differences come under three headings. Combining these must give us all the possible arrangements. The first of the three is who appoints the officeholders; the second, from whom; the last, in what way. For each of these three headings, three variations15 exist. Either all citizens make the appointments or only some; and the appointees are drawn either from everyone or from a defined group. (For example, the group may be defined by property qualification, family, virtue, or something else of that kind. In Megara it consists of those who returned together from exile and fought together against the people.) Appointments are made either by choice or by lot. These can also be combined,20 meaning that some appointments are made by a few and others by everyone, some from everyone and others from a few, and some by choice and others by lot.

Each of these distinctions will have four arrangements. Everyone may appoint from everyone by election, or everyone may appoint from everyone by lot. The candidates may come from everyone, or from groups in rotation,1300a25 such as tribes, districts, and brotherhoods, until the cycle covers all citizens. Or the candidates may always come from everyone. Or some appointments may follow one method and others the other method. Again, if only some people make the appointments, they appoint either from everyone by choice, from everyone by lot, from a limited group by choice, or from a limited group by lot. Or some appointments are made one way and others another, meaning30 some from everyone by choice and others by lot, and some from a limited group by choice and others by lot. So there are twelve arrangements, apart from the two combined forms. Three of these forms of appointment are democratic: everyone appointing from everyone by choice, by lot, or by both, with some offices filled by lot and others by choice. Not everyone may make appointments at the same time,35 but appointees may come from everyone or from a limited group, by lot, election, or both. Or some may come from everyone and others from a limited group, using both methods. By both I mean some by lot and others by election. This belongs to polity, a mixture of rule by the few and rule by the people. When a limited group appoints from everyone by choice, lot, or both, with some offices filled by lot and others by choice,40 it is oligarchic. Drawing from both groups is more oligarchic still. Drawing some from everyone and others from a limited group belongs to polity in an aristocratic form,

1300b1or filling some offices by choice and others by lot. It is oligarchic when a limited group appoints from a limited group by election. The same holds for appointments by lot, though this does not happen, and for appointments using both methods. Some people appointing from everyone, and everyone appointing from a limited group by choice, are5 aristocratic. These, then, are the number of arrangements concerning offices, and this is how they are divided among the constitutions. Which arrangements benefit which people, and how appointments should be made, will become clear along with the powers of offices and what those offices are. By the power of an office I mean, for example, authority10 over revenue or over defense. A general's power, for example, is a different kind from the power of an official who controls contracts in the marketplace.

Of the three parts, the judicial one remains to be discussed. We must also consider its arrangements on the same basis. The1300b15 law courts differ under three headings: who serves in them, what they deal with, and how their members are appointed. By who serves, I mean whether members come from everyone or from a limited group. By what they deal with, I mean how many kinds of law courts there are. By how, I mean whether appointment is by lot or choice. First, then, let us distinguish how many kinds of law courts there are. There are eight. One reviews officials' conduct;20 another deals with anyone who wrongs the community; another with matters affecting the constitution. A fourth deals with disputes about penalties involving both rulers and private people. A fifth deals with substantial private transactions. Besides these there are the homicide court and the court for foreigners. (The kinds of homicide court, whether25 they have the same jurors or different ones, deal with deliberate killings, unintentional killings, and killings that are admitted but whose justice is disputed. A fourth deals with charges brought against people exiled for homicide, concerning their return. One example is the court said to exist at Phreatto in Athens. Such cases occur30 only rarely throughout all time, even in large cities. Of the courts for foreigners, one deals with foreigners against foreigners, the other with foreigners against local citizens.) Besides all these, there is a court for small transactions involving one drachma, five drachmas, or a little more. These too need a decision, but they do not35 fall to a large body of jurors.

Let us leave aside these courts, as well as the homicide courts and the courts for foreigners. Let us discuss the political courts. If these are not well organized, divisions and constitutional upheavals arise. One option is for everyone to judge all the cases we have distinguished, with jurors appointed by election1300b40 or lot. Another is for everyone to judge all cases, some courts appointed by lot and others by election. Or courts dealing with the same matters may have some jurors appointed by lot and others1301a1 by election.

These arrangements number four. There are just as many others drawn from a limited group. Again, jurors judging all matters may come from a limited group by election. Or they may come from a limited group for all matters by lot. Or some courts may be appointed by lot and others by election. Or certain courts1301a5 dealing with the same matters may include jurors appointed both by lot and by election. These arrangements, as stated, correspond to those already described. There are also combinations of the same arrangements. I mean, for example, that some courts are drawn from everyone, others from a limited group, and others from both. (For example, some jurors in the same court may be drawn from everyone and others from a limited group.) They may be appointed10 by lot, choice, or both. We have now said how many arrangements law courts can have. Of these, the first are democratic:12 those drawn from everyone to judge everything. The second are oligarchic: those drawn from a limited group to judge everything. The third are aristocratic and belong to polity: those in which some courts are drawn from everyone and others15 from a limited group.