Book IV, 1295a–1299a

1295a25What constitution is best, and what life is best, for most cities and most human beings, if we judge neither by a virtue beyond that of ordinary people, nor by an education that requires natural gifts and a fortunate provision of resources, nor by a constitution that fulfills our wishes, but by a life that30 most can share and a constitution in which most cities can participate? For even the constitutions called aristocracies, which we have just discussed, either lie beyond the reach of most cities or border on what is called polity (and therefore we must speak of both as one). The judgment concerning35 all these matters rests on the same principles. For if the Ethics rightly says that the happy life is a life according to virtue, free from impediments, and that virtue is a mean, then the middle life must be best: the life at the mean that each can attain. These same criteria must apply40 to a city's virtue and vice and to its constitution; for a constitution1295b1 is a certain way of life for a city.

In every city there are three parts of the city: the very wealthy, the very poor, and, third, those between them. Since, then, it is agreed that what is moderate and intermediate is best, it is evident that, among1295b5 the gifts of fortune too, a moderate possession is best of all. For it is most readily obedient to reason. But for someone exceptionally beautiful, strong, wellborn, or rich, or, on the contrary, exceptionally destitute, weak, or lacking in honor, it is difficult to follow reason. The former tend to become insolent and wicked on a grand scale,10 the latter malefactors and excessively petty in their wickedness; and unjust acts arise either from insolence or from malice. Moreover, those in the middle are least inclined either to shun office or to pursue it eagerly, and both these tendencies harm cities. Besides this, those who possess an excess of fortune's gifts—strength, wealth, friends,15 and other such things—neither wish nor know how to be ruled (and this begins at home when they are children: because of their luxury they are not accustomed to being ruled even at school). Those who are excessively deprived of these things are altogether abject. Thus the latter do not know how to rule, but only how to submit to20 the rule imposed on slaves, while the former know how to submit to no rule, but only how to exercise a master's rule. The city therefore becomes a city of slaves and masters, not of free people, with one group envious and the other contemptuous. Nothing is farther from friendship and political community than this; for community involves friendship. Even on a journey, people do not wish25 to share company with their enemies. Yet a city wishes to consist, as far as possible, of people who are equal and alike, and this is true above all of the middle class. Necessarily, then, the city consisting of those whom we say form a city by nature has the best constitution. These citizens are also the safest in cities. For neither30 do they themselves desire others' possessions, as the poor do, nor do others desire theirs, as the poor desire those of the rich. Because they neither suffer nor devise plots, they live without danger. For this reason Phocylides prayed well: “Many things are best for those in the middle; I wish to be in the middle in the city.”

It is clear,1295b35 then, that the political community formed through the middle class is best, and that cities can be well governed where the middle class is numerous and stronger, preferably than both the other parts together, but otherwise than either one. For when it joins either side, it tips the balance and prevents the opposing extremes from arising. Hence it is good fortune40 of the highest kind for those who take part in public life to possess moderate and sufficient property,

1296a1since where some possess an enormous amount and others nothing, either an extreme democracy arises or an unmixed oligarchy, or tyranny arises through both extremes. For tyranny arises both from the most headstrong democracy and from oligarchy, but5 from the middle constitutions and those near them much less often. We shall state the reason later, in our discussion of changes in constitutions. That the middle constitution is best is evident: it alone is free from faction. For where the middle element is numerous, faction and divisions among the citizens are least likely to occur. Large cities too are less subject to faction10 for the same reason, because the middle element is numerous. In small cities it is easy to divide everyone into two groups, leaving nothing in the middle, and nearly everyone is either poor or wealthy. Democracies too are more secure and longer-lasting than oligarchies because of the middle class (for they are more numerous15 and have a greater share in honors in democracies than in oligarchies). For when the poor, without this class, become overwhelmingly numerous, things go badly and the constitutions swiftly perish. We must also regard as evidence the fact that the best legislators belong to the middle class of citizens. Solon was one of them20 (as his poetry shows), as were Lycurgus (for he was not a king), Charondas, and nearly all the others.

From this it is also evident why most constitutions are either democratic or oligarchic. Because the middle element in them is often small, whichever group gains the upper hand,1296a25 whether the property owners or the people, oversteps the middle and draws the constitution toward itself, so that either democracy or oligarchy arises. Besides this, because faction and conflict arise between the people and the wealthy, whichever side happens to prevail over its opponents does not establish30 a common or equal constitution, but takes supremacy in the constitution as the prize of victory, one side establishing a democracy and the other an oligarchy. Moreover, those who attained leadership in Greece each looked to their own constitution: democracies in the cities were what one side35 established, and oligarchies the other, considering not the cities' advantage but their own. For these reasons the middle constitution either never arises or does so rarely and in few places. For only one man among those who formerly held leadership was persuaded that this40 arrangement should be conferred. By now, among those in the cities, a custom1296b1 has arisen: not even to desire equality,

but to seek either to rule or to endure being dominated. What constitution is best, and for what reason, is therefore evident from this. As for the other constitutions, since we say that several democracies and several oligarchies1296b5 exist, it is not difficult, once the best has been defined, to see which should be ranked first and second, and in this way next in order, according as one is better and another worse. For the constitution nearest to this must always be better, and the one farther removed from the middle worse, unless one judges in relation to a particular assumption. I mean10 by judging in relation to an assumption that often, though one constitution is more desirable, nothing prevents a different constitution from being more advantageous for certain people.

Next after what has been said, we must examine which constitution is advantageous for whom, and what kind for what kind of people. First we must grasp1296b15 the same universal principle concerning all of them: the part of the city that wishes the constitution to remain must be stronger than the part that does not. Every city consists of both quality and quantity. By quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, and noble birth; by quantity, superiority in numbers. Quality may20 belong to one of the parts of which the city consists, and quantity to another. For example, those without noble birth may outnumber the wellborn, or the poor the rich, yet not be as superior in quantity as they are inferior in quality. Therefore these must be compared with one another. Where,25 then, the multitude of the poor exceeds the proportion just stated, democracy naturally exists, and each form of democracy corresponds to the superiority of each kind of people. For example, if the multitude of farmers predominates, the first democracy arises; if the multitude of artisans and wage earners,30 the last; and similarly for the others between these. But where the wealthy and the notables are more superior in quality than they are inferior in quantity, oligarchy naturally exists, and likewise each form of oligarchy corresponds to the superiority of the oligarchic multitude.

It is necessary1296b35 for the legislator always to bring the middle class into the constitution. For whether he lays down oligarchic laws, he must aim at the middle class, or democratic laws, he must attach these citizens to the laws. Where the multitude of the middle class exceeds either both extremes together or even just one of them, there it is possible40 for a constitution to endure.

For there is no fear that1297a1 the rich will ever agree with the poor against them. Neither side will ever wish to be enslaved to the other, and if they seek a constitution more common to both, they will find none other than this. For they would not endure ruling in turn because of their distrust5 of one another. Everywhere the arbitrator is the most trusted, and the person in the middle is an arbitrator. The better a constitution is mixed, the more lasting it is. Many, even among those who wish to make aristocratic constitutions, err not only in assigning more to the wealthy, but also in10 deceiving the people. For in time a real evil must arise from counterfeit goods. The grasping of the rich destroys the constitution more than that of the people.

The devices contrived in constitutions under a pretext1297a15 to deal with the people are five in number, concerning the assembly, offices, law courts, the possession of arms, and physical training. Concerning the assembly, everyone is permitted to attend, but a fine for failing to attend is imposed on the wealthy, either on them alone or a much heavier one. Concerning offices,20 those who meet the property qualification are not permitted to excuse themselves by oath, while the poor are permitted to do so. Concerning law courts, the wealthy are fined if they do not serve as jurors, while the poor are exempt, or the wealthy receive a large fine and the poor a small one, as in the laws of Charondas. In some places everyone who registers is permitted25 to attend the assembly and serve as a juror, but if, after registering, they neither attend nor serve, heavy fines are imposed on them. The intention is that the fine should make them avoid registering, and their failure to register should prevent them from serving as jurors or attending the assembly. The same manner concerning the possession of arms30 and physical training is followed in legislation. The poor are permitted not to possess arms, but the wealthy are fined for not possessing them. If they do not train, there is no fine for the poor, but a fine for the wealthy, so that the latter participate because of the fine, while the former, having nothing to fear, do not participate. These,35 then, are oligarchic devices in legislation; in democracies they devise corresponding measures against these. For they provide pay for the poor who attend the assembly and serve as jurors, but impose no fine on the wealthy. Thus it is evident that, if anyone wishes to make a just mixture, he must combine the arrangements of both40 and provide pay for the one group and a fine for the other. For in this way everyone would participate, whereas in the other way the constitution belongs1297b1 to only one of the two groups.

The constitution must consist only of those who possess arms. But as for the amount of the property qualification, we cannot define it unconditionally and say that so much is required. Rather, we must consider the highest level that can be set so that1297b5 those who participate in the constitution outnumber those who do not, and establish this. For the poor are willing to remain quiet even without a share in honors, provided no one insults them or takes any of their property away. But this is not easy; one cannot always count on decency among those who belong10 to the citizen body. In wartime, too, the poor are usually reluctant if they receive no provisions and lack resources; but if someone provides them with provisions, they are willing to fight.

Among some peoples the constitution consists not only of those currently serving as heavy infantry but also of those who have served. Among the Malians the constitution1297b15 consisted of these, but they chose officeholders from those on active service. The first constitution among the Greeks after kingship also consisted of the fighting men, initially of the cavalry (for the strength and superiority in war lay with the cavalry: without formation, nothing useful can be achieved20 with heavy infantry, and in ancient times experience and arrangements in these matters did not exist, so that the strength lay with the cavalry). But as cities grew and those bearing arms became stronger, more people participated in the constitution. Hence what we now call polities, people formerly called25 democracies. The ancient constitutions were oligarchic and kingly, as might be expected. For because of their small populations they did not have a numerous middle class, so that, being both few in number and poorly organized, they endured being ruled. Why there are several constitutions, and why30 there are others besides those named (for democracy is not one in number, and the same holds for the others); moreover, what their differences are and why these occur; and, besides this, which constitution is best, generally speaking, and which of the other constitutions suits which people: all this has therefore been stated.

1297b35Let us again discuss what follows, both in general and separately for each constitution, taking the appropriate starting point. There are three parts of all constitutions, concerning which the serious legislator must consider what is advantageous for each. When these are well arranged, the constitution must be well arranged, and40 constitutions differ from one another as each of these differs. Of these three, one is the element that deliberates1298a1 about common affairs;

the second concerns offices, namely what offices there must be, over what they must have authority, and how the choice of their holders must be made; the third is the element that judges. The deliberative element has authority over war and peace, alliances1298a5 and their dissolution, laws, death, exile, and confiscation, and the choice of officeholders and the scrutiny of their accounts. All these decisions must be assigned either to all the citizens, or all to some of them (for example, to one office or several, or different decisions to different offices), or some to all and others to some.

For1298a10 all to decide about everything is democratic; for the people seek this kind of equality. There are several ways in which all may participate. One is by turns, rather than all together (as in the constitution of Telecles of Miletus; in other constitutions too, the boards of officeholders meet to deliberate,15 and everyone enters office by turns from the tribes and the very smallest divisions until it has passed through them all), while they assemble only to enact laws, to consider matters concerning the constitution, and to hear what the rulers announce. Another way is for20 all to assemble together, but only to choose officeholders, to legislate, to consider war and peace, and to scrutinize accounts, while the offices appointed for each matter, filled by choice or lot from everyone, deliberate about the rest. Another way is for25 the citizens to meet concerning offices and the scrutiny of accounts, and to deliberate about war and alliances, while the offices administer the rest, being filled by choice wherever possible; such are the offices which necessarily require knowledgeable rulers. A fourth way is for everyone to assemble and deliberate about everything,30 while the offices decide nothing but merely conduct a preliminary examination. This is the way in which the last form of democracy is now administered, which we say corresponds to oligarchy ruled by a dominant group and to tyrannical monarchy. All these ways, then, are democratic; but for some to deliberate about everything is oligarchic.35 This too has several varieties. When they are chosen on the basis of more moderate property qualifications and are more numerous because of the moderation of the qualification, and when they do not alter what the law forbids but follow it, and anyone who acquires the qualification is permitted to participate, such a constitution is oligarchic but constitutional40 because of its moderation. When in deliberation not everyone1298b1 participates, but only those selected beforehand,

and they rule according to law, as before, it is oligarchic. But when those with authority to deliberate also choose themselves, and when a son enters in place of his father and they are sovereign over the laws, this arrangement must be1298b5 oligarchic. When some decide certain matters—for example, everyone decides about war, peace, and the scrutiny of accounts, but rulers decide the rest, and these are chosen, not appointed by lot—the constitution is an aristocracy. If some are chosen and others appointed by lot, and the latter either without restriction or from those selected beforehand, or if those chosen10 and those appointed by lot act together, some of these arrangements belong to an aristocratic constitution, others to polity itself.

The deliberative element has therefore been distinguished in relation to constitutions in this way, and each constitution administers it according to the distinction stated. For the democracy now thought to be democracy most of all (I mean1298b15 one in which the people are sovereign even over the laws), it is advantageous, in order to deliberate better, to do the same as is done with the law courts in oligarchies (for they impose a fine on those whom they wish to serve as jurors, so that they will serve, while democrats provide pay for the poor): to do this, then, with assemblies too20 (for all will deliberate better when they deliberate together, the people with the notables and these with the multitude). It is also advantageous for those who deliberate to be chosen, or appointed by lot in equal numbers from the different parts. And if the democrats greatly outnumber those who favor a constitutional government, it is advantageous either not to25 give pay to everyone, but only to a number proportionate to the multitude of notables, or to exclude the excess by lot. In oligarchies it is advantageous either to choose some additional members from the multitude or, after establishing an office like those in certain constitutions called preliminary councilors and guardians of the laws, to conduct business on matters30 which these have considered beforehand (for in this way the people will participate in deliberation and will be unable to undo anything in the constitution); moreover, either for the people to vote for the same measures or at least for nothing contrary to those introduced, or for all to share in giving counsel while the rulers deliberate. They must also do the opposite35 of what occurs in polities. For the multitude must have authority when it votes to reject, but not when it votes to approve; rather, the matter must be referred back to the rulers. In polities they do the reverse: the few have authority when they vote to reject, but when they vote to approve,40 they do not have authority; instead, the matter is referred to the greater number1299a1 always.

1295a25What is the best constitution and the best life for most cities and most people? We must judge neither by virtue beyond what ordinary people have, nor by an education that needs natural gifts and resources supplied by good luck, nor by a constitution that meets our highest wishes. Instead, we must look for a life that30 most people can share and a constitution that most cities can adopt. The so-called aristocracies we have just discussed are either beyond the reach of most cities or close to what is called polity, a mixture of rule by the few and rule by the people. (So we must discuss both as one.) Our judgment about35 all these matters comes from the same basic principles. Suppose the Ethics rightly says that a happy life is a life of virtue without obstacles, and that virtue is a middle point between extremes. Then the best life must be the middle life, at the middle point that each person can reach. These same standards must apply40 to a city's virtue and vice and to its constitution. For a constitution1295b1 is a city's way of life.

Every city has three parts: the very rich, the very poor, and, third, those in the middle between them. Since everyone agrees that moderation and the middle point are best, it is clear that, among1295b5 the good things fortune brings, a moderate amount of property is best of all. It makes following reason easiest. Someone who is exceptionally handsome, strong, wellborn, or rich finds it hard to follow reason. So does someone at the opposite extreme: exceptionally poor, weak, or dishonored. The first group tends to become arrogant and wicked on a large scale,10 the second, criminals and petty wrongdoers in the extreme. Some injustices come from arrogance, others from criminal wrongdoing. Also, people in the middle are least likely to avoid office or chase after it. Both these things harm cities. In addition, those who have far more than others of fortune's gifts—strength, wealth, friends,15 and other things of that kind—neither want to be ruled nor know how. This starts at home when they are children. Their luxurious upbringing means that even at school they are not used to being ruled. Those who lack these things to an extreme degree are far too submissive. So the latter do not know how to rule, but only how to be ruled20 as slaves. The former do not know how to be ruled at all, but only how to rule as masters. The result is a city of slaves and masters, not of free people, with one group full of envy and the other full of contempt. Nothing is further from friendship and political community. Community rests on friendship. Even on a journey they do not want25 their enemies as companions. A city aims to consist, as far as possible, of people who are equal and alike. This is most true of the middle class. So a city made up of the people who, we say, naturally form a city must have the best constitution. These citizens are also the safest in cities. They do not30 desire other people's property, as the poor do. Nor do others desire theirs, as the poor desire the property of the rich. Since they neither plot against others nor face plots themselves, they live without danger. That is why Phocylides expressed his wish well: "Many things are best for those in the middle; I want to be in the middle in my city."

It is clear,1295b35 then, that the best political community is the one based on the middle class. Cities can be well governed when their middle class is large and stronger, ideally, than both other groups combined, or, failing that, than either one. When it joins one side, it tips the balance and prevents the opposite extremes from developing. So it is good fortune40 of the highest kind for those in public life to have moderate and sufficient property.

1296a1Where some own an enormous amount and others nothing, either extreme democracy or unmixed oligarchy develops, or tyranny comes from either extreme. Tyranny does arise from the most headstrong democracy and from oligarchy, but5 much less often from middle constitutions and those close to them. We will explain the reason later, in the discussion of constitutional changes. It is clear that the middle constitution is best. It alone is free from faction. Where the middle class is large, faction and division among citizens are least common. Large cities are also less prone to faction10 for the same reason: their middle class is large. In small cities it is easy to divide everyone into two groups, leaving no one in the middle, and almost everyone is either poor or rich. Democracies are also safer and last longer than oligarchies because of the middle class. (Its members are more numerous15 and have a greater share in offices in democracies than in oligarchies.) When the poor greatly outnumber the others without this middle group, things go badly and the constitutions soon collapse. We should also take as evidence the fact that the best lawmakers were middle-class citizens. Solon was one of these,20 as his poetry shows, and so were Lycurgus, who was not a king, Charondas, and almost all the others.

These points also make it clear why most constitutions are either democratic or oligarchic. The middle class in them is often small. So whichever side gets the upper hand,1296a25 whether the property owners or the people, moves away from the middle and draws the constitution toward itself. The result is either democracy or oligarchy. Furthermore, the people and the rich form factions and fight one another. Whichever side manages to defeat its opponents does not establish30 a shared or equal constitution. Instead, it takes control of the constitution as the prize of victory. One side sets up a democracy, the other an oligarchy. Also, the powers that gained leadership of Greece each looked to their own constitution. Democracies in the cities were what one side35 established; the other set up oligarchies. They considered their own advantage, not that of the cities. For these reasons, a middle constitution either never comes about or does so rarely and in few places. Only one man among those who formerly held leadership was persuaded that this40 arrangement should be introduced. By now, among people in the cities, a habit1296b1 has arisen: they do not even want equality,

but they seek either to rule or to put up with being dominated. These points make clear which constitution is best and why. As for the other constitutions, we say that several democracies and several oligarchies1296b5 exist. Once the best has been defined, it is not hard to see which should rank first, which second, and so on in order from better to worse. The one closest to the best must always be better, and the one further from the middle worse, unless we judge by particular circumstances. What I mean10 by particular circumstances is this: often, even though one constitution is more desirable, nothing prevents a different constitution from being more advantageous for some people.

After what we have said, the next step is to examine which constitution benefits which people, and what kind suits what kind of people. First we must establish1296b15 one general principle for them all. The part of the city that wants the constitution to stay must be stronger than the part that does not. Every city consists of both quality and quantity. By quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, and good birth; by quantity, superiority in numbers. Quality may20 belong to one of the parts that make up the city, and quantity to another. For example, people without good birth may outnumber the wellborn, or the poor may outnumber the rich. But their numerical superiority may not match their inferiority in quality. So these things must be compared with each other. Where,25 then, the number of the poor exceeds the proportion just described, democracy naturally exists. Each type of democracy depends on which part of the people is strongest. For example, if the farmers are the most numerous, it is the first type of democracy; if artisans and wage earners are,30 it is the last. The same applies to the other types between these. Where the rich and the notables, the prominent citizens, have a greater superiority in quality than their inferiority in numbers, oligarchy naturally exists. Similarly, each type of oligarchy depends on the superiority of the oligarchic group.

It is necessary1296b35 for the lawmaker always to include the middle class in the constitution. If he makes oligarchic laws, he must aim at the middle class; if democratic laws, he must use the laws to bring them in. Where the middle class outnumbers either both extremes together or even just one of them, there can be40 a lasting constitution.

There is no fear that1297a1 the rich will ever join with the poor against the middle class. Neither side will ever want to be slaves to the other. If they seek a constitution that is more widely shared, they will find none other than this. They would not agree to rule in turn, because of their distrust5 of each other. Everywhere, the arbitrator is the person most trusted, and the person in the middle is an arbitrator. The better mixed a constitution is, the longer it lasts. Many who want to make aristocratic constitutions go wrong, not only by giving more to the rich, but also by10 deceiving the people. In time, real evil must come from false good. The greed of the rich destroys the constitution more than the greed of the people does.

The tricks used in constitutions to give a plausible pretext1297a15 are aimed against the people and are five in number. They concern the assembly, offices, law courts, weapons, and physical training. In the case of the assembly, everyone is allowed to attend, but the rich are fined if they do not. Either they alone are fined, or their fine is much larger. In the case of offices,20 those who meet the property qualification are not allowed to swear an oath declining office, but the poor are. In the law courts, the rich are fined if they do not serve as jurors, while the poor are exempt. Or the rich have a large fine and the poor a small one, as in Charondas's laws. In some places, everyone who registers is allowed25 to attend the assembly and serve as a juror. But if they register and then neither attend nor serve, they face large fines. The aim is to make them avoid registering because of the fine, and then, because they are not registered, neither serve as jurors nor attend the assembly. The same approach to owning weapons30 and taking physical training is used in making laws. The poor are allowed not to own weapons, but the rich are fined if they do not. If the poor do not train, there is no fine, but the rich are fined. The aim is that one group participates because of the fine, while the other does not because it has nothing to fear. These,35 then, are oligarchic tricks in lawmaking. Democracies use countertricks against them. They provide pay for the poor who attend the assembly and serve as jurors, but impose no fine on the rich. So clearly, anyone who wants to mix the two fairly must combine their practices,40 providing pay for one group and a fine for the other. In this way everyone would share, while otherwise the constitution belongs1297b1 to just one of the two groups.

The constitution must include only those who own weapons. We cannot set an absolute figure for the property qualification and say that it must be this much. Instead, we must consider the highest figure that still allows1297b5 those who share in the constitution to outnumber those who do not, and set that figure. The poor are willing to stay quiet even without a share in offices, provided no one mistreats them or takes any of their property. But this is not easy. The people who share10 in the citizen body are not always considerate. Also, in wartime the poor are usually reluctant to fight if they receive no support and have no resources. But if someone supplies support, they are willing to fight.

In some places the constitution includes not only those currently serving as heavy-armed foot soldiers but also those who have served. Among the Malians the constitution1297b15 was made up of these, but they chose officeholders from those on active service. The first constitution among the Greeks after the kingships also consisted of those who fought. At first it consisted of cavalry. (For military strength and superiority lay in the cavalry. Without organized formations, nothing useful can be done20 with heavy-armed foot soldiers, and the people of early times had no experience or formations of this kind. So strength lay in the cavalry.) As cities grew and their armed infantry became stronger, more people shared in the constitution. That is why the constitutions we now call polities used to be called25 democracies. The early constitutions were, understandably, oligarchic and kingly. Because the population was small, the middle class was not large. Since they were few in number and poorly organized, they put up with being ruled. Why there are several constitutions, and why30 there are others besides those usually named, have now been explained. (Democracy is not one single type, and the same is true of the others.) We have also explained what their differences are and why these occur. In addition, we have said which constitution is best, generally speaking, and which of the other constitutions suits which people.

1297b35Let us now discuss the next points, both generally and separately for each constitution, taking the appropriate starting point. All constitutions have three parts. A good lawmaker must consider what is advantageous for each constitution in each of these parts. If they are well arranged, the constitution must be well arranged. Constitutions40 differ from one another because each of these parts differs. Of these three, one is the body that deliberates1298a1 on common affairs,

the second concerns offices: which there must be, what they must control, and how the choice of their holders should take place. The third is the body that judges. The deliberative body is sovereign in matters of war and peace, alliances1298a5 and their ending, laws, death, exile, confiscation, and the choice of officeholders and the review of their conduct. Either all these decisions must be assigned to all citizens, or all to some of them—for example, to one office or several, or different decisions to different offices—or some to everyone and some to a limited group.

For1298a10 everyone to decide everything is democratic. The people seek this kind of equality. But there are several ways for everyone to participate. One is for them to do so in turns, not all together, as in the constitution of Telecles of Miletus. (In other constitutions too, boards of officeholders meet to deliberate.15 Everyone holds office in turn, drawn from the tribes and the very smallest divisions. The cycle continues until it has gone through everyone.) They meet together only to make laws, to discuss the constitution, and to hear announcements from the rulers. Another way is for20 everyone to meet together, but only to choose officeholders, make laws, consider war and peace, and review officials' conduct. The other matters are deliberated on by the offices assigned to each, whose holders are chosen from everyone by choice or lot. Another way is for25 the citizens to meet for the choice of officeholders and the review of their conduct, and to deliberate on war and alliances. The offices manage the other matters, with their holders chosen by choice wherever possible. Such offices are those that must be held by people with expert knowledge. A fourth way is for everyone to meet and deliberate on everything,30 while the offices decide nothing but only examine matters beforehand. This is how the last type of democracy is now managed, the one we say corresponds to oligarchy controlled by a ruling clique and to tyrannical monarchy. All these ways are democratic. For only some people to decide everything is oligarchic.35 This too has several variations. Suppose officeholders are chosen on moderate property qualifications, so that their number is fairly large because the qualification is moderate. They do not change matters where the law forbids it, but follow the law. Anyone who acquires the required property can participate. Such an oligarchy has the character of a polity40 because of its moderation. When in deliberation not everyone1298b1 shares, but only a selected group,

and they rule according to law as in the previous case, the arrangement is oligarchic. When those who control deliberation also choose themselves, when a son takes his father's place, and when they have authority over the laws, this arrangement must1298b5 be oligarchic. When particular people decide particular matters—for example, everyone decides war, peace, and reviews of officials, while rulers decide the rest, and these rulers are chosen by choice, not lot—the constitution is an aristocracy. Some may be chosen by election and others by lot. The lot may be drawn from everyone or from a selected group. Or those chosen by election10 and those chosen by lot may act together. Some of these arrangements belong to an aristocratic constitution, others to polity itself.

This is how the deliberative body is divided according to the constitutions, and each constitution manages it in line with the division described. For the democracy now regarded as the fullest democracy—I mean1298b15 the one in which the people are sovereign even over the laws—it is advantageous, for better deliberation, to do what oligarchies do with law courts. (They impose a fine on those they want to serve as jurors, to make them serve, while democracies pay the poor.) The same should be done with assemblies.20 (Everyone will deliberate better if they deliberate together: the people with the notables, and the notables with the masses.) It is also advantageous for those who deliberate to be chosen by choice or by lot in equal numbers from the different groups. If supporters of democracy greatly outnumber supporters of polity, it is also advantageous either not to25 give pay to everyone, but only to a number proportionate to the notables, or to exclude the excess by lot. In oligarchies it helps to add some members from the masses. Another option is to establish officials like the preliminary councilors and guardians of the laws found in some constitutions. They should conduct business30 on matters these officials have considered beforehand. (In this way the people will share in deliberation without being able to overturn any part of the constitution.) Further, the people should either vote for the same measures or for nothing contrary to those put forward. Or everyone should have a share in giving advice, while the rulers make the decisions. They should also do the opposite35 of what happens in polities. The masses must have authority when they vote to reject a measure, but not when they vote to approve it. Instead, it must go back to the rulers. A polity reverses this arrangement. Rejection by the few settles the matter, but their approval40 doesn't. Instead, the matter goes back to the larger body1299a1 every time.