Book IV, 1292a–1295a
Original Ancient Greek
1292a1ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν ἅπαντας τοὺς πολίτας ὅσοι ἀνυπεύθυνοι, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ παντὶ μετεῖναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐὰν μόνον ᾖ πολίτης, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τἆλλα5 μὲν εἶναι ταὐτά, κύριον δʼ εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ᾖ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος· συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημοκρατουμέναις οὐ γίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλʼ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσιν ἐν προεδρίᾳ·10 ὅπου δʼ οἱ νόμοι μή εἰσι κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί. μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοί εἰσιν οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες. Ὅμηρος δὲ ποίαν λέγει οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πολυκοιρανίην, πότερον ταύτην ἢ ὅταν πλείους ὦσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ὡς ἕκαστος,15 ἄδηλον. ὁ δʼ οὖν τοιοῦτος δῆμος, ἅτε μόναρχος ὤν, ζητεῖ μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου, καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός, ὥστε οἱ κόλακες ἔντιμοι, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος δῆμος ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχιῶν τῇ τυραννίδι. διότι καὶ τὸ ἦθος τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἄμφω δεσποτικὰ τῶν βελτιόνων, καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα20 ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὰ ἐπιτάγματα, καὶ ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον. καὶ μάλιστα δʼ ἑκάτεροι παρʼ ἑκατέροις ἰσχύουσιν, οἱ μὲν κόλακες παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις, οἱ δὲ δημαγωγοὶ παρὰ τοῖς δήμοις τοῖς τοιούτοις. αἴτιοι δέ εἰσι τοῦ εἶναι τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς νόμους25 οὗτοι, πάντα ἀνάγοντες εἰς τὸν δῆμον· συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι μεγάλοις διὰ τὸ τὸν μὲν δῆμον πάντων εἶναι κύριον, τῆς δὲ τοῦ δήμου δόξης τούτους· πείθεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τούτοις. ἔτι δʼ οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸν δῆμόν φασι δεῖν κρίνειν, ὁ δὲ ἀσμένως δέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν· ὥστε καταλύονται30 πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί. εὐλόγως δὲ ἂν δόξειεν ἐπιτιμᾶν ὁ φάσκων τὴν τοιαύτην εἶναι δημοκρατίαν οὐ πολιτείαν. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία. δεῖ γὰρ τὸν μὲν νόμον ἄρχειν πάντων τῶν δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστα τὰς ἀρχάς, καὶ ταύτην πολιτείαν κρίνειν. ὥστʼ εἴπερ ἐστὶ δημοκρατία35 μία τῶν πολιτειῶν, φανερὸν ὡς ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις, ἐν ᾗ ψηφίσμασι πάντα διοικεῖται, οὐδὲ δημοκρατία κυρίως· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψήφισμα εἶναι καθόλου. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατίας εἴδη διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.
ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ εἴδη ἓν μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι1292a40 τὰς ἀρχὰς τηλικούτων ὥστε τοὺς ἀπόρους μὴ μετέχειν, πλείους ὄντας, ἐξεῖναι δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας,
ἄλλο1292b1 δέ, ὅταν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μακρῶν ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἱρῶνται αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας (ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ πάντων τούτων τοῦτο ποιῶσι, δοκεῖ τοῦτʼ εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατικόν, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων, ὀλιγαρχικόν)· ἕτερον δʼ εἶδος ὀλιγαρχίας,5 ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσίῃ, τέταρτον δʼ, ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ τε τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν καὶ ἄρχῃ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλʼ οἱ ἄρχοντες. καὶ ἔστιν ἀντίστροφος αὕτη ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὥσπερ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις, καὶ περὶ ἧς τελευταίας εἴπαμεν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις· καὶ καλοῦσι10 δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν δυναστείαν.
ὀλιγαρχίας μὲν οὖν εἴδη τοσαῦτα καὶ δημοκρατίας· οὐ δεῖ δὲ λανθάνειν ὅτι πολλαχοῦ συμβέβηκεν ὥστε τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους μὴ δημοτικὴν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἔθος καὶ τὴν ἀγωγὴν πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικῶς, ὁμοίως1292b15 δὲ πάλιν παρʼ ἄλλοις τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι πολιτείαν δημοτικωτέραν, τῇ δʼ ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι μᾶλλον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο μάλιστα μετὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν· οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς μεταβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαπῶσι τὰ πρῶτα μικρὰ πλεονεκτοῦντες παρʼ ἀλλήλων,20 ὥσθʼ οἱ μὲν νόμοι διαμένουσιν οἱ προϋπάρχοντες, κρατοῦσι δʼ οἱ μεταβαλόντες τὴν πολιτείαν.
ὅτι δʼ ἔστι τοσαῦτα εἴδη δημοκρατίας καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν ἐστιν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ πάντα τὰ εἰρημένα μέρη τοῦ δήμου κοινωνεῖν τῆς πολιτείας,1292b25 ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή. ὅταν μὲν οὖν τὸ γεωργικὸν καὶ τὸ κεκτημένον μετρίαν οὐσίαν κύριον ᾖ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύονται κατὰ νόμους (ἔχουσι γὰρ ἐργαζόμενοι ζῆν, οὐ δύνανται δὲ σχολάζειν, ὥστε τὸν νόμον ἐπιστήσαντες ἐκκλησιάζουσι τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκκλησίας), τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μετέχειν ἔξεστιν ὅταν30 κτήσωνται τὸ τίμημα τὸ διωρισμένον ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων· διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτησαμένοις ἔξεστι μετέχειν· ὅλως μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐξεῖναι σχολάζειν ἀδύνατον μὴ προσόδων οὐσῶν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν εἶδος ἓν δημοκρατίας διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος διὰ τὴν35 ἐχομένην διαίρεσιν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ πᾶσιν ἐξεῖναι τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος, μετέχειν μέντοι δυναμένους σχολάζειν· διόπερ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ δημοκρατίᾳ οἱ νόμοι ἄρχουσι, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόσοδον. τρίτον δʼ εἶδος τὸ πᾶσιν ἐξεῖναι, ὅσοι ἂν ἐλεύθεροι ὦσι, μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας, μὴ μέντοι40 μετέχειν διὰ τὴν προειρημένην αἰτίαν, ὥστʼ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ἄρχειν τὸν νόμον.
τέταρτον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας1293a1 ἡ τελευταία τοῖς χρόνοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γεγενημένη. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μείζους γεγονέναι πολὺ τὰς πόλεις τῶν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς καὶ προσόδων ὑπάρχειν εὐπορίας, μετέχουσι μὲν πάντες τῆς πολιτείας διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλήθους, κοινωνοῦσι δὲ καὶ5 πολιτεύονται διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι σχολάζειν καὶ τοὺς ἀπόρους, λαμβάνοντας μισθόν. καὶ μάλιστα δὲ σχολάζει τὸ τοιοῦτον πλῆθος· οὐ γὰρ ἐμποδίζει αὐτοὺς οὐθὲν ἡ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια, τοὺς δὲ πλουσίους ἐμποδίζει, ὥστε πολλάκις οὐ κοινωνοῦσι τῆς ἐκκλησίας οὐδὲ τοῦ δικάζειν. διὸ γίνεται τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων10 πλῆθος κύριον τῆς πολιτείας, ἀλλʼ οὐχ οἱ νόμοι.
τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατίας εἴδη τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταύτας τὰς ἀνάγκας ἐστίν, τάδε δὲ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας· ὅταν μὲν πλείους ἔχωσιν οὐσίαν, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ μὴ πολλὴν λίαν, τὸ τῆς πρώτης ὀλιγαρχίας εἶδός ἐστιν· ποιοῦσι γὰρ ἐξουσίαν μετέχειν1293a15 τῷ κτωμένῳ, καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἀνάγκη μὴ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ τὸν νόμον εἶναι κύριον (ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλεῖον ἀπέχωσι τῆς μοναρχίας, καὶ μήτε τοσαύτην ἔχωσιν οὐσίαν ὥστε σχολάζειν ἀμελοῦντες μήθʼ οὕτως ὀλίγην ὥστε τρέφεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως,20 ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἀξιοῦν αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτούς)· ἐὰν δὲ δὴ ἐλάττους ὦσιν οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες ἢ οἱ τὸ πρότερον, πλείω δέ, τὸ τῆς δευτέρας ὀλιγαρχίας γίνεται εἶδος· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἰσχύοντες πλεονεκτεῖν ἀξιοῦσιν, διὸ αὐτοὶ μὲν αἱροῦνται ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα βαδίζοντας,25 διὰ δὲ τὸ μήπω οὕτως ἰσχυροὶ εἶναι ὥστʼ ἄνευ νόμου ἄρχειν τὸν νόμον τίθενται τοιοῦτον. ἐὰν δʼ ἐπιτείνωσι τῷ ἐλάττονες ὄντες μείζονας οὐσίας ἔχειν, ἡ τρίτη ἐπίδοσις γίνεται τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, τὸ διʼ αὑτῶν μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχειν, κατὰ νόμον δὲ τὸν κελεύοντα τῶν τελευτώντων διαδέχεσθαι τοὺς30 υἱεῖς. ὅταν δὲ ἤδη πολὺ ὑπερτείνωσι ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς πολυφιλίαις, ἐγγὺς ἡ τοιαύτη δυναστεία μοναρχίας ἐστίν, καὶ κύριοι γίνονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁ νόμος· καὶ τὸ τέταρτον εἶδος τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τοῦτʼ ἐστίν, ἀντίστροφον τῷ τελευταίῳ τῆς δημοκρατίας.
1293a35ἔτι δʼ εἰσὶ δύο πολιτεῖαι παρὰ δημοκρατίαν τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν λέγουσί τε πάντες καὶ εἴρηται τῶν τεττάρων πολιτειῶν εἶδος ἕν (λέγουσι δὲ τέτταρας μοναρχίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν δημοκρατίαν, τέταρτον δὲ τὴν καλουμένην ἀριστοκρατίαν)· πέμπτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἣ προσαγορεύεται40 τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν (πολιτείαν γὰρ καλοῦσιν), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ πολλάκις γίνεσθαι λανθάνει τοὺς πειρωμένους ἀριθμεῖν τὰ τῶν πολιτειῶν εἴδη, καὶ χρῶνται ταῖς τέτταρσι μόνον1293b1 (ὥσπερ Πλάτων) ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις.
ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἧς διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις (τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἁπλῶς κατʼ ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν μόνην δίκαιον1293b5 προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγαθός ἐστιν, οἱ δʼ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσὶ τὴν αὑτῶν)· οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ εἰσί τινες αἳ πρός τε τὰς ὀλιγαρχουμένας ἔχουσι διαφορὰς καὶ καλοῦνται ἀριστοκρατίαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην πολιτείαν.10 ὅπου γὰρ μὴ μόνον πλουτίνδην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀριστίνδην αἱροῦνται τὰς ἀρχάς, αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία διαφέρει τε ἀμφοῖν καὶ ἀριστοκρατικὴ καλεῖται. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιουμέναις κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς εἰσὶν ὅμως τινὲς οἱ εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἐπιεικεῖς. ὅπου οὖν ἡ πολιτεία βλέπει εἴς τε15 πλοῦτον καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ δῆμον, οἷον ἐν Καρχηδόνι, αὕτη ἀριστοκρατική ἐστιν, καὶ ἐν αἷς εἰς τὰ δύο μόνον, οἷον ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων, εἴς τε ἀρετὴν καὶ δῆμον, καὶ ἔστι μίξις τῶν δύο τούτων, δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς. ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ταῦτα δύο εἴδη,20 καὶ τρίτον ὅσαι τῆς καλουμένης πολιτείας ῥέπουσι πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μᾶλλον.
λοιπὸν δʼ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν περί τε τῆς ὀνομαζομένης πολιτείας εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ τυραννίδος. ἐτάξαμεν δʼ οὕτως οὐκ οὖσαν οὔτε ταύτην παρέκβασιν οὔτε τὰς ἄρτι ῥηθείσας ἀριστοκρατίας, ὅτι1293b25 τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς πᾶσαι διημαρτήκασι τῆς ὀρθοτάτης πολιτείας, ἔπειτα καταριθμοῦνται μετὰ τούτων εἰσί τʼ αὐτῶν αὗται παρεκβάσεις ἅσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατʼ ἀρχὴν εἴπομεν. τελευταῖον δὲ περὶ τυραννίδος εὔλογόν ἐστι ποιήσασθαι μνείαν διὰ τὸ πασῶν ἥκιστα ταύτην εἶναι πολιτείαν, ἡμῖν δὲ τὴν30 μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας. διʼ ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν τέτακται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, εἴρηται· νῦν δὲ δεικτέον ἡμῖν περὶ πολιτείας. φανερωτέρα γὰρ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς διωρισμένων τῶν περὶ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν μίξις ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. εἰώθασι35 δὲ καλεῖν τὰς μὲν ἀποκλινούσας ὡς πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατίας διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν παιδείαν καὶ εὐγένειαν τοῖς εὐπορωτέροις. ἔτι δὲ δοκοῦσιν ἔχειν οἱ εὔποροι ὧν ἕνεκεν οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἀδικοῦσιν· ὅθεν καὶ καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς καὶ γνωρίμους40 τούτους προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ἀριστοκρατία βούλεται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀπονέμειν τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας εἶναί φασιν ἐκ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν μᾶλλον.
1294a1δοκεῖ δʼ εἶναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ ἀριστοκρατουμένην πόλιν ἀλλὰ πονηροκρατουμένην, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ εὐνομουμένην. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ εὐνομία τὸ εὖ κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους, μὴ πείθεσθαι δέ. διὸ μίαν μὲν εὐνομίαν5 ὑποληπτέον εἶναι τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς κειμένοις νόμοις, ἑτέραν δὲ τὸ καλῶς κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους οἷς ἐμμένουσιν (ἔστι γὰρ πείθεσθαι καὶ κακῶς κειμένοις). τοῦτο δὲ ἐνδέχεται διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν ἐνδεχομένων αὐτοῖς, ἢ τοῖς ἁπλῶς ἀρίστοις.
δοκεῖ δὲ ἀριστοκρατία μὲν εἶναι μάλιστα τὸ τὰς1294a10 τιμὰς νενεμῆσθαι κατʼ ἀρετήν (ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ὅρος ἀρετή, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, δήμου δʼ ἐλευθερία)· τὸ δʼ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσιν, ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἐν δήμοις, ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τῷ πλείονι μέρει τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς πολιτείας, τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ κύριον.15 ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι τοῦτο τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος καλεῖται· μόνον γὰρ ἡ μίξις στοχάζεται τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθερίας· (σχεδὸν γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις οἱ εὔποροι τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν δοκοῦσι κατέχειν χώραν)· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τῆς ἰσότητος20 τῆς πολιτείας, ἐλευθερία πλοῦτος ἀρετή (τὸ γὰρ τέταρτον, ὃ καλοῦσιν εὐγένειαν, ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς δυσίν· ἡ γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστιν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή), φανερὸν ὅτι τὴν μὲν τοῖν δυοῖν μίξιν, τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πολιτείαν λεκτέον, τὴν δὲ τῶν τριῶν ἀριστοκρατίαν μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων παρὰ τὴν25 ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρώτην. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστι καὶ ἕτερα πολιτείας εἴδη παρὰ μοναρχίαν τε καὶ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν, εἴρηται, καὶ ποῖα ταῦτα, καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων αἵ τʼ ἀριστοκρατίαι καὶ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας· καὶ ὅτι οὐ πόρρω αὗται ἀλλήλων, φανερόν.
1294a30τίνα δὲ τρόπον γίνεται παρὰ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἡ καλουμένη πολιτεία, καὶ πῶς αὐτὴν δεῖ καθιστάναι, λέγωμεν ἐφεξῆς τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ἔσται καὶ οἷς ὁρίζονται τὴν δημοκρατίαν καὶ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν· ληπτέον γὰρ τὴν τούτων διαίρεσιν, εἶτα ἐκ τούτων ἀφʼ ἑκατέρας35 ὥσπερ σύμβολον λαμβάνοντας συνθετέον. εἰσὶ δὲ ὅροι τρεῖς τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ μίξεως. ἢ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ληπτέον ἃ ἑκάτεροι νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον περὶ τοῦ δικάζειν (ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τοῖς εὐπόροις ζημίαν τάττουσιν ἂν μὴ δικάζωσι, τοῖς δʼ ἀπόροις οὐδένα μισθόν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις40 τοῖς μὲν ἀπόροις μισθόν, τοῖς δʼ εὐπόροις οὐδεμίαν ζημίαν· κοινὸν δὲ καὶ μέσον τούτων ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, διὸ καὶ1294b1 πολιτικόν, μέμεικται γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν)·
εἷς μὲν οὖν οὗτος τοῦ συνδυασμοῦ τρόπος, ἕτερος δὲ τὸ τὸ μέσον λαμβάνειν ὧν ἑκάτεροι τάττουσιν, οἷον ἐκκλησιάζειν οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τιμήματος οὐθενὸς ἢ μικροῦ πάμπαν, οἱ δʼ ἀπὸ μακροῦ τιμήματος, κοινὸν1294b5 δέ γε οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέσον ἑκατέρου τίμημα τούτων. τρίτον δʼ ἐκ δυοῖν ταγμάτοιν, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ νόμου τὰ δʼ ἐκ τοῦ δημοκρατικοῦ. λέγω δʼ οἷον δοκεῖ δημοκρατικὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸ κληρωτὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, τὸ δʼ αἱρετὰς ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ δημοκρατικὸν μὲν τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ10 τιμήματος, ὀλιγαρχικὸν δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τιμήματος· ἀριστοκρατικὸν τοίνυν καὶ πολιτικὸν τὸ ἐξ ἑκατέρας ἑκάτερον λαβεῖν, ἐκ μὲν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τὸ αἱρετὰς ποιεῖν τὰς ἀρχάς, ἐκ δὲ τῆς δημοκρατίας τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος.
ὁ μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς μίξεως οὗτος· τοῦ δʼ εὖ μεμεῖχθαι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν1294b15 ὅρος, ὅταν ἐνδέχηται λέγειν τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο πάσχουσιν οἱ λέγοντες διὰ τὸ μεμεῖχθαι καλῶς· πέπονθε δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἐμφαίνεται γὰρ ἑκάτερον ἐν αὐτῷ τῶν ἄκρων· ὅπερ συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν. πολλοὶ γὰρ20 ἐγχειροῦσι λέγειν ὡς δημοκρατίας οὔσης διὰ τὸ δημοκρατικὰ πολλὰ τὴν τάξιν ἔχειν, οἷον πρῶτον τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν τῶν παίδων (ὁμοίως γὰρ οἱ τῶν πλουσίων τρέφονται τοῖς τῶν πενήτων, καὶ παιδεύονται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν ἂν δύναιντο καὶ τῶν πενήτων οἱ παῖδες), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐχομένης25 ἡλικίας, καὶ ὅταν ἄνδρες γένωνται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον (οὐθὲν γὰρ διάδηλος ὁ πλούσιος καὶ ὁ πένης οὕτω) τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ταὐτὰ πᾶσιν ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις, καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα οἱ πλούσιοι τοιαύτην οἵαν ἄν τις παρασκευάσαι δύναιτο καὶ τῶν πενήτων ὁστισοῦν· ἔτι τὸ δύο τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχὰς τὴν30 μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι τὸν δῆμον, τῆς δὲ μετέχειν (τοὺς μὲν γὰρ γέροντας αἱροῦνται, τῆς δʼ ἐφορείας μετέχουσιν)· οἱ δʼ ὀλιχαρχίαν διὰ τὸ πολλὰ ἔχειν ὀλιγαρχικά, οἷον τὸ πάσας αἱρετὰς εἶναι καὶ μηδεμίαν κληρωτήν, καὶ ὀλίγους εἶναι κυρίους θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά. δεῖ δʼ ἐν35 τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ μεμειγμένῃ καλῶς ἀμφότερα δοκεῖν εἶναι καὶ μηδέτερον, καὶ σῴζεσθαι διʼ αὑτῆς καὶ μὴ ἔξωθεν, καὶ διʼ αὑτῆς μὴ τῷ πλείους ἔξωθεν εἶναι τοὺς βουλομένους (εἴη γὰρ ἂν καὶ πονηρᾷ πολιτείᾳ τοῦθʼ ὑπάρχον’ ἀλλὰ τῷ μηδʼ ἂν βούλεσθαι πολιτείαν ἑτέραν μηθὲν τῶν τῆς πόλεως μορίων40 ὅλως. τίνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι πολιτείαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ὀνομαζομένας ἀριστοκρατίας, νῦν εἴρηται.
1295a1περὶ δὲ τυραννίδος ἦν ἡμῖν λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ὡς ἐνούσης πολυλογίας περὶ αὐτήν, ἀλλʼ ὅπως λάβῃ τῆς μεθόδου τὸ μέρος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτην τίθεμεν τῶν πολιτειῶν τι μέρος. περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας διωρίσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις,5 ἐν οἷς περὶ τῆς μάλιστα λεγομένης βασιλείας ἐποιούμεθα τὴν σκέψιν, πότερον ἀσύμφορος ἢ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν, καὶ τίνα καὶ πόθεν δεῖ καθιστάναι, καὶ πῶς· τυραννίδος δʼ εἴδη δύο μὲν διείλομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν καὶ10 πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν, διὰ τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι ἀμφοτέρας ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς (ἔν τε γὰρ τῶν βαρβάρων τισὶν αἱροῦνται αὐτοκράτορας μονάρχους, καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἕλλησιν ἐγίγνοντό τινες μόναρχοι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὓς ἐκάλουν αἰσυμνήτας), ἔχουσι δέ τινας πρὸς ἀλλήλας αὗται15 διαφοράς, ἦσαν δὲ διὰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ νόμον βασιλικαὶ καὶ διὰ τὸ μοναρχεῖν ἑκόντων, τυραννικαὶ δὲ διὰ τὸ δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῶν γνώμην· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος τυραννίδος, ἥπερ μάλιστʼ εἶναι δοκεῖ τυραννίς, ἀντίστροφος οὖσα τῇ παμβασιλείᾳ. τοιαύτην δʼ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τυραννίδα τὴν μοναρχίαν20 ἥτις ἀνυπεύθυνος ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ βελτιόνων πάντων πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῆς συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. διόπερ ἀκούσιος· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἑκὼν ὑπομένει τῶν ἐλευθέρων τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν. τυραννίδος μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Ancient Greek of all eight books, 182 Bekker pages and 1,609 line marks (the Perseus transcription of W. D. Ross’s Oxford text), for fidelity, argument, imagery and clarity.
1292a1Another kind of democracy is that in which all citizens whose status is beyond challenge share, but the law rules; another is that in which everyone shares in offices, provided only that he is a citizen, but the law rules. Another kind of democracy is that in which the other features5 are the same, but the multitude is sovereign and not the law. This occurs when decrees are authoritative rather than the law, and it comes about through demagogues. For in cities governed democratically under law a demagogue does not arise, but the best citizens occupy the leading position;10 where the laws are not authoritative, however, demagogues arise. For the people become a monarch, one composite ruler made up of many: the many are sovereign not as individuals but collectively. Which sort of rule by many Homer means when he says it is not good—this sort or the sort in which there are several rulers acting as individuals—15 is unclear. Such a people, then, being a monarch, seeks to exercise monarchical rule because it is not ruled by law, and becomes masterful, so that flatterers are honored. Such a people corresponds, among monarchies, to tyranny. For its character is the same: both rule as masters over the better people, and decrees20 are like the commands issued there; the demagogue and the flatterer are the same and correspond to one another. Each has the greatest influence with his respective ruler: flatterers with tyrants, and demagogues with peoples of this sort. They are responsible for decrees being authoritative rather than the laws,25 because they refer everything to the people. For they themselves become great because the people are sovereign over everything, while they are sovereign over the people's opinion: the multitude obeys them. Further, those who bring charges against the officeholders say that the people must judge, and the people gladly accept the invitation. Thus dissolved are30 all offices. Someone who says that such a democracy is not a constitution would seem to make a reasonable criticism. For where laws do not rule there is no constitution. The law must rule over all, and the offices over particular cases, and we must judge this to be a constitution. Therefore, if democracy is35 one of the constitutions, it is evident that such an arrangement, in which everything is administered by decrees, is not even democracy in the proper sense; for no decree can be universal. Let the kinds of democracy, then, be distinguished in this way.
Of the kinds of oligarchy, one rests on property qualifications:1292a40 these determine offices and are so high that the poor, though more numerous, do not share, but anyone who acquires the qualification is permitted to share in the constitution;
another1292b1 is that in which offices depend on large property qualifications, and the officeholders themselves choose those who fill vacancies (if they do this from all those qualified, it seems rather aristocratic, but if from a certain defined group, oligarchic). Another kind of oligarchy5 is that in which a son enters in place of his father; a fourth is that in which the condition just mentioned exists and not the law but the rulers rule. This has its counterpart in tyranny among monarchies and in the democracy we discussed last among democracies. They call10 such an oligarchy rule by a powerful group.
There are, then, this many kinds of oligarchy and democracy. But we must not overlook that in many places the constitution as laid down in the laws happens not to be democratic, yet through custom and upbringing people take part in public life democratically. Likewise,1292b15 among others the constitution as laid down in the laws is more democratic, but in upbringing and customs they are governed more oligarchically. This happens especially after changes in constitutions. For they do not change over at once, but at first are content to gain small advantages from one another,20 so that the previously existing laws remain, while those who changed the constitution hold power.
That there are this many kinds of democracy and oligarchy is evident from what has been said itself. For either all the parts of the people that have been mentioned must share in the constitution,1292b25 or some must share and others not. When the farming class and those who possess moderate property are sovereign over the constitution, they conduct public life under laws (for they earn their living by working and cannot have leisure, so they set the law over them and attend only the necessary meetings of the assembly). Others are permitted to share when30 they acquire the property qualification defined by the laws. Therefore all who acquire it are permitted to share. For, in general, it is oligarchic not to permit everyone to share; but it is impossible to have leisure without revenues. This, then, is one kind of democracy, for these reasons. Another kind arises from the35 next distinction: it is possible to permit everyone whose birth is beyond challenge to share, though only those able to have leisure actually do so. For this reason the laws rule in such a democracy, because there is no revenue. A third kind permits all who are free to share in the constitution, though they do not40 actually share, for the reason mentioned before, so that in this form too the law must rule.
A fourth kind of democracy1293a1 is the one that has arisen latest in time in the cities. For because the cities have become much larger than they originally were, and abundant revenues are available, everyone shares in the constitution owing to the predominance of the multitude. They also share in its activities and5 take part in public life because even the poor can have leisure, receiving pay. Indeed, such a multitude has the most leisure, for attention to their own affairs does not hinder them at all, whereas it hinders the rich, so that these often do not take part in the assembly or in judging. Therefore the multitude of the poor becomes10 sovereign over the constitution, rather than the laws.
The kinds of democracy, then, are this many and of this character because of these necessities; those of oligarchy are the following. When a larger number possess property, but in smaller amounts and not very much, this is the first kind of oligarchy. For they permit a share1293a15 to anyone who acquires it, and because those who share in the citizen body are numerous, not the people but the law must be sovereign (for the further they stand from monarchy, possessing neither so much property that they can have leisure while neglecting it nor so little that they must be supported by the city,20 the more they must require the law to rule for them, rather than rule themselves). But if those who possess property are fewer than those in the preceding case, yet have more of it, the second kind of oligarchy arises. For being stronger, they claim a greater share; therefore they themselves choose from among the others those who enter the citizen body,25 but because they are not yet strong enough to rule without law, they establish a law of this kind. If they intensify this by being fewer and possessing larger estates, the third stage of oligarchy arises: they retain the offices among themselves, but according to a law ordering that those who die be succeeded by their30 sons. When they greatly increase their preponderance in property and in their many connections, such rule by a powerful group is close to monarchy, and the individual rulers become sovereign rather than the law. This is the fourth kind of oligarchy, the counterpart of the last kind of democracy.
1293a35There are also two constitutions besides democracy and oligarchy. One of these is recognized by everyone and has been described as one of the four kinds of constitution (they speak of four: monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and, fourth, what is called aristocracy). The fifth is the one designated40 by the name common to all (for they call it polity); but because it does not occur often, it escapes those who try to enumerate the kinds of constitution, and they use only the four1293b1 (as Plato does) in their accounts of constitutions.
It is right, then, to call aristocracy the constitution we discussed in our first arguments (for only the constitution composed of those best in virtue without qualification, and not of men good in relation to some assumption, deserves1293b5 the name aristocracy. In it alone the same man is both a good man without qualification and a good citizen; those in the other constitutions are good in relation to their own constitution). Nevertheless, there are some constitutions that differ both from oligarchic constitutions and from what is called polity, and are called aristocracies.10 For where offices are chosen not only on the basis of wealth but also on the basis of merit, this constitution differs from both and is called aristocratic. For even in cities that do not make virtue a common concern, there are nonetheless some who enjoy a good reputation and seem to be decent. Where, then, the constitution looks to15 wealth, virtue, and the people, as in Carthage, it is aristocratic; and so are those that look only to two, as does that of the Lacedaemonians, to virtue and the people, and are a mixture of these two, democracy and virtue. These, then, are two kinds of aristocracy besides the first and best constitution,20 and a third comprises those forms of what is called polity that incline more toward oligarchy.
It remains for us to speak of what is called polity and of tyranny. We have placed them in this order, although neither polity nor the aristocracies just mentioned are deviations, because1293b25 in truth all fall short of the most correct constitution; and, further, they are counted along with these, and the constitutions we mentioned at the beginning are deviations from them. It is reasonable to mention tyranny last, because it is least of all a constitution, while our30 inquiry concerns constitutions. The reason for this order has now been stated. We must now give our account of polity. For its character is clearer now that the matters concerning oligarchy and democracy have been distinguished. Polity is, to put it simply, a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. People are accustomed35 to call those that incline toward democracy polities, and those that incline more toward oligarchy aristocracies, because education and noble birth belong more often to the richer people. Further, the rich are thought to possess those things for the sake of which wrongdoers do wrong; hence “noble and good” and “notables”40 are also names given to them. Since, then, aristocracy aims to assign predominance to the best citizens, people also say that oligarchies are composed rather of the noble and good.
1294a1It seems impossible that a city should be well governed by laws if it is ruled not by the best but by the wicked; and likewise that it should be ruled by the best if it is not well governed by laws. Yet good government by laws does not consist in the laws being well framed but not obeyed. Therefore one aspect of good government by laws5 must be understood as obedience to the established laws, and another as the laws that people abide by being well framed (for it is possible to obey badly framed laws too). This latter is possible in two ways: the laws may be either the best possible for them or the best without qualification.
Aristocracy seems chiefly to consist in1294a10 honors being distributed according to virtue (for virtue is the defining feature of aristocracy, wealth of oligarchy, and freedom of democracy). But the authority of what the majority decides exists in all: in oligarchy, aristocracy, and democracies alike, whatever the greater part of those sharing in the constitution decides is authoritative.15 In most cities, then, this is called a kind of polity; for the mixture aims only at the rich and the poor, wealth and freedom (for among most people the rich seem to occupy the place of the noble and good). Since there are three things that lay claim to equality20 in the constitution—freedom, wealth, and virtue (the fourth, which they call noble birth, follows upon two of these, for noble birth is ancient wealth and virtue)—it is evident that the mixture of the two, the rich and the poor, should be called polity, and the mixture of the three aristocracy, more than any of the others apart from the25 true and first aristocracy. It has been said, then, that there are also other kinds of constitution besides monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy; what these are; and how the aristocracies differ from one another, and polities from aristocracy. It is also evident that these are not far removed from one another.
1294a30Let us next discuss how what is called polity arises alongside democracy and oligarchy, and how it should be established. At the same time, the features by which democracy and oligarchy are defined will also become clear. For we must grasp their distinction, and then, taking from each35 as though a token of recognition, combine them. There are three ways of combining and mixing them. Either we must take both provisions that the two enact, as in the matter of judging (for in oligarchies they impose a fine on the rich if they do not serve as jurors, but give the poor no pay; in democracies,40 they give the poor pay, but impose no fine on the rich. Both these provisions together form a common and intermediate arrangement, and for this reason it is also1294b1 characteristic of polity, since it is mixed from both).
This, then, is one way of combining them. Another is to take the middle between what each prescribes: for example, some require no property qualification, or an entirely small one, for attendance at the assembly, while others require a large qualification. The common arrangement,1294b5 however, is neither, but a qualification midway between the two. A third is to take, from the two arrangements, some provisions from the oligarchic law and others from the democratic. I mean, for example, that it is thought democratic for offices to be assigned by lot and oligarchic for them to be assigned by choice; and democratic for them not to depend on10 a property qualification, oligarchic for them to depend on one. It is therefore aristocratic and characteristic of polity to take one feature from each: from oligarchy, to make offices a matter of choice, and from democracy, to make them independent of a property qualification.
This, then, is the way to mix them. For democracy and oligarchy to be well mixed,1294b15 the criterion is that the same constitution can be called both democracy and oligarchy. For it is evident that those who describe it in this way do so because it is well mixed. This also holds of the middle, for each extreme shows itself in it. This is what happens with the constitution of the Lacedaemonians. For many20 try to describe it as a democracy because its order has many democratic features: first, for example, the rearing of children (for the children of the rich are reared in the same way as those of the poor, and educated in a manner that the children of the poor could also receive); likewise at the next25 stage of life, and when they become men, it is the same (for in this respect the rich man is in no way distinguished from the poor). Food is the same for everyone in the common messes, and the rich wear clothing of the sort that any poor man could also provide. Further, of the two greatest offices, one30 is chosen by the people and the other is shared by them (for they choose the elders and share in the office of ephor). Others call it an oligarchy because it has many oligarchic features: for example, all offices are assigned by choice and none by lot, a few have authority over death and exile, and there are many other such features. But in35 a well-mixed constitution, both forms should seem to be present and neither; and it should be preserved through itself, not from outside. It should be preserved through itself not because those who want it are more numerous outside it (for this could also hold of a bad constitution), but because no part of the city would want any other constitution40 at all. How polity should be established, and likewise what are called aristocracies, has now been said.
1295a1It remained for us to speak of tyranny, not because there is much to say about it, but so that it may receive its share of the inquiry, since we count it too as a kind of constitution. We distinguished kingship in our first arguments,5 in which we examined kingship in the fullest sense: whether it is disadvantageous or advantageous to cities, what sort of king should be established and from what source, and how. We distinguished two kinds of tyranny in our examination of kingship, because their character overlaps in a certain way10 with kingship also, since both these forms of rule are according to law (for among some non-Greek peoples they choose monarchs with absolute power, and in ancient times among the early Greeks certain monarchs arose in this way, whom they called aisymnetes). These forms have certain15 differences from one another, but were kingly because they were according to law and because the monarch ruled over willing subjects, and tyrannical because they ruled as masters and according to their own judgment. A third kind of tyranny, which seems to be tyranny in the fullest sense, is the counterpart of absolute kingship. Such tyranny must be a monarchy20 that rules without accountability over all who are its equals or betters, to its own advantage rather than that of the ruled. For this reason it is against their will: no free person willingly submits to such rule. These, then, are the kinds of tyranny, this many in number, for the reasons that have been stated.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same Greek, covering all eight books and every Bekker page and line mark.
1292a1Another kind of democracy lets all citizens whose status is beyond challenge take part, but the law rules. Another kind lets everyone share in office, provided only that he is a citizen, but the law rules. In another kind of democracy the other features5 are the same, but the majority is sovereign, not the law. This happens when decrees are authoritative rather than the law. Popular leaders who win the people's favor bring this about. For in democracies governed by law, no such popular leader arises. Instead, the best citizens take the leading positions.10 But where the laws aren't authoritative, such popular leaders arise. For the people become a monarch, a single ruler made up of many. The many are sovereign not as individuals but all together. When Homer says that rule by many is not good, which kind he means—this kind, or the kind where several rulers each rule individually—15 is unclear. In any case, people of this sort, being a monarch, seek to rule as one because they aren't ruled by law. They become master-like, so flatterers are held in honor. Such a people corresponds to tyranny among monarchies. For their character is the same. Both act as masters over the better people, and decrees20 are like a tyrant's commands. The popular leader and the flatterer are the same and play corresponding roles. Each has the greatest influence with his own side: flatterers with tyrants and popular leaders with peoples of this sort. These men cause decrees, rather than laws, to be authoritative25 by bringing everything before the people. They become powerful because the people are sovereign over everything, while they control the people's opinion, since the majority listens to them. Also, those who bring charges against officeholders say the people must judge. The people gladly accept the invitation. So they undermine30 all offices. It would seem reasonable for someone to criticize this sort of democracy as not being a constitution. For where laws don't rule, there is no constitution. The law must rule over everything, and the offices must rule in particular cases. This is what we must consider a constitution. So if democracy is35 one of the constitutions, clearly an arrangement of this sort, where everything is managed by decrees, isn't even a democracy in the proper sense. For no decree can be a universal rule. Let this, then, be our distinction between the kinds of democracy.
One kind of oligarchy rests on property qualifications:1292a40 these determine officeholding and are high enough to exclude the poor, who are the majority. But anyone who acquires the required property can share in the constitution.
Another1292b1 is when offices depend on high property qualifications and the officeholders themselves choose people to fill vacancies (if they choose from everyone who meets these qualifications, this seems more aristocratic; if from certain designated people, oligarchic). Another kind of oligarchy is5 when a son takes his father's place. A fourth is when this feature is present and the rulers, not the law, rule. Among oligarchies this corresponds to tyranny among monarchies, and to the last democracy we described among democracies. They call10 this kind of oligarchy the rule of powerful families.
These, then, are the kinds of oligarchy and democracy. We must not overlook the fact that in many places the constitution laid down by law isn't democratic, but custom and people's way of life make public life democratic. Likewise,1292b15 in other places the constitution laid down by law is more democratic, but people's way of life and customs make government more oligarchic. This happens especially after changes in constitutions. People don't change everything at once, but at first are satisfied to gain small advantages from one another.20 So the earlier laws remain, but those who changed the constitution are in control.
The things we have said themselves make it clear that there are this many kinds of democracy and oligarchy. For either all the parts of the people we mentioned must share in the constitution,1292b25 or some must and others must not. When the farmers and those with moderate property are sovereign in the constitution, they conduct public life according to laws (for they can make a living by working, but can't have leisure. So they put the law in charge and attend only the necessary assemblies). The others are allowed to take part when30 they acquire the property qualification set by the laws. So everyone who acquires it is allowed to take part. For, in general, not allowing everyone to take part is oligarchic, but having leisure is impossible without income. These reasons explain this one kind of democracy. Another kind results from the35 next distinction. Everyone whose birth is beyond challenge can be allowed to take part, but in fact only those able to have leisure do so. That is why the laws rule in this kind of democracy: there is no income. A third kind allows all who are free to share in the constitution, but they don't actually40 take part for the reason just mentioned. So the law must rule in this kind too.
A fourth kind of democracy is1293a1 the latest to have arisen in cities. Because cities have become much larger than they were at first, and plentiful revenue is available, everyone shares in the constitution because the majority is stronger. They also share and5 take part in public life because even the poor can have leisure, since they receive pay. This sort of population has the most leisure. For attending to their private affairs doesn't hold them back at all, but it does hold back the rich. So the rich often don't attend the assembly or serve as jurors. That is why the mass of the poor10 is sovereign in the constitution, not the laws.
The kinds of democracy, then, are this many and of this sort for these necessary reasons. The kinds of oligarchy are as follows. When a larger number of people have property, but in smaller amounts and not very much, this is the first kind of oligarchy. They allow participation1293a15 to anyone who acquires the required property. Since many belong to the citizen body, the law must be sovereign, not the people themselves. They are farther from monarchy. They have neither enough property to neglect it and have leisure, nor so little that they need support from the city.20 So they must want the law to rule for them, rather than rule themselves. But if the property owners are fewer than in the previous case and have more property, the second kind of oligarchy arises. Since they are stronger, they claim a greater advantage. That is why they themselves choose, from the others, those who enter the citizen body.25 But because they aren't yet strong enough to rule without law, they make a law of this sort. If their position grows stronger because they are fewer and have larger properties, the third stage of oligarchy arises. They keep offices in their own hands, under a law that directs that those who die be succeeded by their30 sons. When they become far stronger in property and in their many personal connections, this kind of rule by powerful families is close to monarchy. The individual rulers themselves become sovereign, not the law. This is the fourth kind of oligarchy, corresponding to the last kind of democracy.
1293a35Besides democracy and oligarchy there are two more constitutions. Everyone recognizes one of them, and it has been described as one of the four kinds of constitution (they list four: monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and, as the fourth, what is called aristocracy). The fifth is the one called by40 the name common to them all (for they call it polity, a mixture of rule by the few and rule by the people). But because it doesn't occur often, those who try to count the kinds of constitution overlook it, and use only the four1293b1 (as Plato does) in their accounts of constitutions.
It is right to call the constitution we discussed in our earlier arguments aristocracy. Only a constitution made up of those best in virtue without qualification, not men good only under some assumption, is rightly entitled1293b5 to the name aristocracy. Only in it is the same person both a good man and a good citizen without qualification. Those in the other constitutions are good relative to their own constitution. Still, there are some constitutions called aristocracies that differ both from oligarchies and from what is called polity.10 For where people choose officeholders not just by wealth but also by merit, that constitution differs from both and is called aristocratic. Even in cities that don't make virtue a public concern, there are still some people who have a good reputation and are thought to be decent. So where a constitution takes account of15 wealth, virtue, and the people, as in Carthage, it is aristocratic. So are constitutions that take account of just two, like the Spartan constitution, which takes account of virtue and the people. It is a mixture of these two: democracy and virtue. So, besides the first aristocracy, the best constitution, these are two kinds of aristocracy,20 and a third consists of those forms of what is called polity that lean more toward oligarchy.
It remains for us to discuss what is called polity and also tyranny. We have put them in this order, even though neither polity nor the aristocracies just mentioned are deviations, because1293b25 in truth all have missed the most correct constitution. Also, they are counted alongside these, and the deviations from them are those we mentioned at the start. It is reasonable to discuss tyranny last, because it is least of all a constitution, while our30 investigation concerns constitutions. We have now said why they are arranged this way. We must now explain polity. Its character is clearer since we have defined what concerns oligarchy and democracy. For, to put it simply, polity is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. People usually35 call those that lean toward democracy polities, and those that lean more toward oligarchy aristocracies, because education and noble birth are more often found among the better-off. The well-off also seem to possess the things for which wrongdoers do wrong. That is why “noble and good” and “notables”40 are what people call them. Since aristocracy aims to give the advantage to the best citizens, people also say that oligarchies are made up more of the noble and good.
1294a1It seems impossible for a city to have good law and order if it is ruled not by the best but by the bad. Likewise, it seems impossible for a city to be ruled by the best if it doesn't have good law and order. But having well-made laws that aren't obeyed isn't good law and order. So one aspect of good law and order5 must be understood as obeying the laws in force. The other is having well-made laws that people keep (for people can also obey badly made laws). This second aspect is possible in two ways: they may obey the best laws possible for them, or the best without qualification.
Aristocracy seems above all to consist in1294a10 public honors being distributed according to virtue (for virtue is the defining feature of aristocracy, wealth of oligarchy, and freedom of democracy). But the authority of whatever the majority decides is found in all of them. In oligarchy, aristocracy, and democracies alike, whatever the larger part of those sharing in the constitution decides is authoritative.15 In most cities, then, the name polity is given to this kind of constitution. For the mixture aims only at combining the well-off and the poor, wealth and freedom (for among most people the well-off seem to occupy the place of the noble and good). Three things claim equal standing20 in the constitution: freedom, wealth, and virtue. The fourth, called noble birth, comes from two of these. Noble birth is long-established wealth and virtue. Clearly, then, we should call the mixture of the two groups, the well-off and the poor, polity. The mixture of the three is, more than any of the others, an aristocracy, apart from the25 true and first aristocracy. We have now said that there are other kinds of constitution besides monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy, and what they are. We have also said how the aristocracies differ from one another and how polities differ from aristocracy. It is clear that these aren't far apart.
1294a30Following what we have said, let's explain how the constitution called polity arises alongside democracy and oligarchy, and how it should be established. At the same time, this will make clear the features that define democracy and oligarchy. We must grasp the distinction between them, then take something from each35 as though joining matching pieces, and combine them. There are three ways to make this combination and mixture. One is to take both of the things that each side makes law, for example concerning jury service (for in oligarchies they fine the well-off if they don't serve as jurors, but give the poor no pay. In democracies,40 they give the poor pay but don't fine the well-off. Combining both these arrangements makes something shared and intermediate. That is also why it is1294b1 a feature of polity: it is a mixture of both).
This, then, is one way to combine them. Another is to take the middle between what each side lays down. For example, one side allows attendance at the assembly with no property qualification or an extremely small one, while the other requires a high property qualification. What they share1294b5 is neither of these, but a property qualification midway between the two. A third way takes some provisions from the oligarchic law and others from the democratic law. I mean, for example, that choosing officeholders by lot is thought democratic, and choosing them by election oligarchic. It is also democratic to require no10 property qualification, and oligarchic to require one. So it is aristocratic and characteristic of polity to take one feature from each: from oligarchy, choosing officeholders by election, and from democracy, having no property qualification.
This, then, is the way to make the mixture. For democracy and oligarchy to be well mixed,1294b15 the test is whether the same constitution can be called both democracy and oligarchy. For clearly people describe it this way because it is well mixed. This is also true of what lies in the middle, since each extreme appears in it. This is what happens with the Spartan constitution. Many people20 try to describe it as a democracy because its arrangement has many democratic features. First, for example, is the way children are brought up (for the children of the rich are brought up like those of the poor, and educated in a way that the children of the poor could also afford). The same applies in the next25 stage of life, and in the same way when they become men (for in this respect there is no visible difference between rich and poor). Everyone has the same food at shared meals, and the rich wear clothes that any poor person could also provide. Also, there are two highest offices. One30 is elected by the people, and the other is open to them. They elect the elders and can serve as ephors, the officials who oversee the city. Other people see it as rule by a few, since many of its features fit oligarchy. Every office is filled by election, never by lot. Only a few can sentence people to death or exile. Many other features are like this too. In35 a well-mixed constitution it should seem to be both forms and neither. It should be preserved through itself, not from outside. Preserving itself doesn't mean that more people outside it want it preserved. Even a bad constitution could have that support. It means that no part of the city would want any other constitution40 at all. We have now said how polity should be established, and likewise the constitutions called aristocracies.
1295a1We still need to discuss tyranny. There isn't much to say about it. But we count it as a kind of constitution, so it must have a place in our study. We defined kingship in our earlier arguments,5 where we examined kingship in the fullest sense: whether it is harmful or beneficial to cities, what sort of king should be appointed, from what source, and how. While examining kingship, we distinguished two kinds of tyranny because their powers overlap somewhat10 with kingship. Both forms of rule are based on law. Some non-Greek peoples choose monarchs with absolute authority. In ancient times some monarchs of this sort arose among the Greeks too. They called them aisymnetes, elected rulers with absolute power. These two forms have some15 differences from each other. They were kingly because they were based on law and because one man ruled over willing subjects, but tyrannical because he ruled as a master and according to his own judgment. A third kind of tyranny is the one that most clearly seems to be tyranny, corresponding to absolute kingship. A monarchy must be this kind of tyranny20 when it rules without accountability over all those who are its ruler's equals or better, for its own advantage rather than that of the ruled. That is why it is against their will: no free person willingly puts up with such rule. These, then, are the kinds of tyranny, and this is their number, for the reasons stated.
About this section
Book IV, 1292a–1295a is part of Politics by Aristotle. This page sets the Ancient Greek original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 13 of 28 in the work, which is kept in the Greek tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the Greek tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.