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Book IV, 1288b–1291b

12 of 28 parts in Politics by Aristotle

Original Ancient Greek

1288b10ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ταῖς μὴ κατὰ μόριον γινομέναις, ἀλλὰ περὶ γένος ἕν τι τελείαις οὔσαις, μιᾶς ἐστι θεωρῆσαι τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἁρμόττον, οἷον ἄσκησις σώματι ποία τε ποίῳ συμφέρει, καὶ τίς ἀρίστη (τῷ γὰρ κάλλιστα πεφυκότι καὶ κεχορηγημένῳ τὴν ἀρίστην15 ἀναγκαῖον ἁρμόττειν), καὶ τίς τοῖς πλείστοις μία πᾶσιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν), ἔτι δʼ ἐάν τις μὴ τῆς ἱκνουμένης ἐπιθυμῇ μήθʼ ἕξεως μήτʼ ἐπιστήμης τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγωνίαν, μηδὲν ἧττον τοῦ παιδοτρίβου καὶ τοῦ γυμναστικοῦ παρασκευάσαι γε καὶ ταύτην ἐστὶ τὴν δύναμιν. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο20 καὶ περὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ περὶ ναυπηγίαν καὶ ἐσθῆτα καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην τέχνην ὁρῶμεν συμβαῖνον. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πολιτείαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἐπιστήμης τὴν ἀρίστην θεωρῆσαι τίς ἐστι καὶ ποία τις ἂν οὖσα μάλιστʼ εἴη κατʼ εὐχὴν μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος τῶν ἐκτός, καὶ τίς τίσιν ἁρμόττουσα (πολλοῖς25 γὰρ τῆς ἀρίστης τυχεῖν ἴσως ἀδύνατον, ὥστε τὴν κρατίστην τε ἁπλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην οὐ δεῖ λεληθέναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικόν), ἔτι δὲ τρίτην τὴν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως (δεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὴν δοθεῖσαν δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πῶς ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ γενομένη30 τίνα τρόπον ἂν σῴζοιτο πλεῖστον χρόνον· λέγω δὲ οἷον εἴ τινι πόλει συμβέβηκε μήτε τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτεύεσθαι πολιτείαν, ἀχορήγητον δὲ εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, μήτε τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἀλλά τινα φαυλοτέραν), παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τὴν μάλιστα πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἁρμόττουσαν35 δεῖ γνωρίζειν, ὥσθʼ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀποφαινομένων περὶ πολιτείας, καὶ εἰ τἆλλα λέγουσι καλῶς, τῶν γε χρησίμων διαμαρτάνουσιν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὴν ἀρίστην δεῖ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν δυνατήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ῥᾴω καὶ κοινοτέραν ἁπάσαις· νῦν δʼ οἱ μὲν τὴν ἀκροτάτην καὶ δεομένην πολλῆς40 χορηγίας ζητοῦσι μόνον, οἱ δὲ μᾶλλον κοινήν τινα λέγοντες, τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ἀναιροῦντες πολιτείας, τὴν Λακωνικὴν1289a1 ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἐπαινοῦσι·

χρὴ δὲ τοιαύτην εἰσηγεῖσθαι τάξιν ἧς ῥᾳδίως ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων καὶ πεισθήσονται καὶ δυνήσονται κοινωνεῖν, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔργον τὸ ἐπανορθῶσαι πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μεταμανθάνειν1289a5 ἢ μανθάνειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· διὸ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις πολιτείαις δεῖ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν τὸν πολιτικόν, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἀγνοοῦντα πόσα πολιτείας ἔστιν εἴδη. νῦν δὲ μίαν δημοκρατίαν οἴονταί τινες εἶναι καὶ μίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ10 τοῦτʼ ἀληθές. ὥστε δεῖ τὰς διαφορὰς μὴ λανθάνειν τὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν, πόσαι, καὶ συντίθενται ποσαχῶς. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης καὶ νόμους τοὺς ἀρίστους ἰδεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἑκάστῃ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἁρμόττοντας. πρὸς γὰρ τὰς πολιτείας τοὺς νόμους δεῖ τίθεσθαι καὶ τίθενται πάντες, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰς πολιτείας15 πρὸς τοὺς νόμους. πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἑκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν· νόμοι δʼ οἱ κεχωρισμένοι τῶν δηλούντων τὴν πολιτείαν, καθʼ οὓς δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἄρχειν καὶ φυλάττειν τοὺς20 παραβαίνοντας αὐτούς. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὰς διαφορὰς ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἔχειν τῆς πολιτείας ἑκάστης καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν νόμων θέσεις· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τοὺς αὐτοὺς νόμους συμφέρειν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐδὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις πάσαις, εἴπερ δὴ πλείους καὶ μὴ μία δημοκρατία μηδὲ ὀλιγαρχία25 μόνον ἔστιν.

ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μεθόδῳ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν διειλόμεθα τρεῖς μὲν τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, βασιλείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν πολιτείαν, τρεῖς δὲ τὰς τούτων παρεκβάσεις, τυραννίδα μὲν βασιλείας ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας δημοκρατίαν1289a30 δὲ πολιτείας, καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας εἴρηται (τὸ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας θεωρῆσαι ταὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν τῶν ὀνομάτων· βούλεται γὰρ ἑκατέρα κατʼ ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην), ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων ἀριστοκρατία καὶ βασιλεία, καὶ πότε35 δεῖ βασιλείαν νομίζειν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν περὶ πολιτείας διελθεῖν τῆς τῷ κοινῷ προσαγορευομένης ὀνόματι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, ὀλιγαρχίας τε καὶ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος. φανερὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τῶν παρεκβάσεων τίς χειρίστη καὶ δευτέρα τίς. ἀνάγκη γὰρ40 τὴν μὲν τῆς πρώτης καὶ θειοτάτης παρέκβασιν εἶναι χειρίστην, τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τοὔνομα μόνον ἔχειν οὐκ1289b1 οὖσαν,

ἢ διὰ πολλὴν ὑπεροχὴν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ βασιλεύοντος· ὥστε τὴν τυραννίδα χειρίστην οὖσαν πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν (ἡ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία διέστηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας), μετριωτάτην δὲ1289b5 τὴν δημοκρατίαν. ἤδη μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφήνατο καὶ τῶν πρότερον οὕτως, οὐ μὴν εἰς ταὐτὸ βλέψας ἡμῖν. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἔκρινε πασῶν μὲν οὐσῶν ἐπιεικῶν, οἷον ὀλιγαρχίας τε χρηστῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, χειρίστην δημοκρατίαν, φαύλων δὲ ἀρίστην· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅλως ταύτας ἐξημαρτημένας εἶναί φαμεν,10 καὶ βελτίω μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν λέγειν, ἧττον δὲ φαύλην. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης κρίσεως ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν· ἡμῖν δὲ πρῶτον μὲν διαιρετέον πόσαι διαφοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴπερ ἔστιν εἴδη πλείονα τῆς τε δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, ἔπειτα τίς κοινοτάτη καὶ15 τίς αἱρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλη τετύχηκεν ἀριστοκρατικὴ καὶ συνεστῶσα καλῶς, ἀλλʼ οὐ ταῖς πλείσταις ἁρμόττουσα πόλεσι, τίς ἐστιν, ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τίς τίσιν αἱρετή (τάχα γὰρ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαία δημοκρατία μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχίας, τοῖς δʼ αὕτη μᾶλλον ἐκείνης),20 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τίνα τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι τὸν βουλόμενον ταύτας τὰς πολιτείας, λέγω δὲ δημοκρατίας τε καθʼ ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ πάλιν ὀλιγαρχίας· τέλος δέ, πάντων τούτων ὅταν ποιησώμεθα συντόμως τὴν ἐνδεχομένην μνείαν, πειρατέον ἐπελθεῖν τίνες φθοραὶ καὶ τίνες σωτηρίαι τῶν πολιτειῶν25 καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας ταῦτα μάλιστα γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν.

τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι πλείους πολιτείας αἴτιον ὅτι πάσης ἔστι μέρη πλείω πόλεως τὸν ἀριθμόν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐξ οἰκιῶν συγκειμένας πάσας ὁρῶμεν τὰς πόλεις, ἔπειτα πάλιν τούτου1289b30 τοῦ πλήθους τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς δʼ ἀπόρους τοὺς δὲ μέσους, καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων τὸ μὲν ὁπλιτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἄνοπλον. καὶ τὸν μὲν γεωργικὸν δῆμον ὁρῶμεν ὄντα, τὸν δʼ ἀγοραῖον, τὸν δὲ βάναυσον. καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων εἰσὶ διαφοραὶ καὶ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ μεγέθη35 τῆς οὐσίας, οἷον ἱπποτροφίας (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον μὴ πλουτοῦντας ποιεῖν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων ὅσαις πόλεσιν ἐν τοῖς ἵπποις ἡ δύναμις ἦν, ὀλιγαρχίαι παρὰ τούτοις ἦσαν· ἐχρῶντο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους ἵπποις πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας, οἷον Ἐρετριεῖς καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς καὶ Μάγνητες οἱ ἐπὶ40 Μαιάνδρῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολλοὶ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν)· ἔτι πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφοραῖς ἐστιν ἡ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἡ δὲ1290a1 κατʼ ἀρετήν,

κἂν εἴ τι δὴ τοιοῦτον ἕτερον εἴρηται πόλεως εἶναι μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ διείλομεν ἐκ πόσων μερῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ πᾶσα πόλις· τούτων γὰρ τῶν μερῶν ὁτὲ μὲν πάντα μετέχει τῆς πολιτείας ὁτὲ δʼ1290a5 ἐλάττω ὁτὲ δὲ πλείω. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείας, εἴδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτʼ εἴδει διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὐτῶν. πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξις ἐστί, ταύτας δὲ διανέμονται πάντες ἢ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων ἢ κατά τινʼ αὐτῶν ἰσότητα10 κοινήν, λέγω δʼ οἷον τῶν ἀπόρων ἢ τῶν εὐπόρων ἢ κοινήν τινʼ ἀμφοῖν. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα πολιτείας εἶναι τοσαύτας ὅσαι περ τάξεις κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχάς εἰσι καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν μορίων.

μάλιστα δὲ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι δύο, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πνευμάτων λέγεται τὰ μὲν βόρεια τὰ δὲ νότια, τὰ1290a15 δʼ ἄλλα τούτων παρεκβάσεις, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν δύο, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. τὴν γὰρ ἀριστοκρατίαν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας εἶδος τιθέασιν ὡς οὖσαν ὀλιγαρχίαν τινά, καὶ τὴν καλουμένην πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πνεύμασι τὸν μὲν ζέφυρον τοῦ βορέου, τοῦ δὲ νότου τὸν εὖρον. ὁμοίως20 δʼ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας, ὥς φασί τινες· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τίθενται εἴδη δύο, τὴν δωριστὶ καὶ τὴν φρυγιστί, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα συντάγματα τὰ μὲν Δώρια τὰ δὲ Φρύγια καλοῦσιν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν εἰώθασιν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν· ἀληθέστερον δὲ καὶ βέλτιον ὡς ἡμεῖς διείλομεν, δυοῖν25 ἢ μιᾶς οὔσης τῆς καλῶς συνεστηκυίας τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι παρεκβάσεις, τὰς μὲν τῆς εὖ κεκραμένης ἁρμονίας τὰς δὲ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχικὰς μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας, τὰς δʼ ἀνειμένας καὶ μαλακὰς δημοτικάς.

1290a30οὐ δεῖ δὲ τιθέναι δημοκρατίαν, καθάπερ εἰώθασί τινες νῦν, ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ὅπου κύριον τὸ πλῆθος (καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ πλέον μέρος κύριον), οὐδʼ ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου κύριοι ὀλίγοι τῆς πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ εἴησαν οἱ πάντες χίλιοι καὶ τριακόσιοι, καὶ τούτων οἱ χίλιοι πλούσιοι,35 καὶ μὴ μεταδιδοῖεν ἀρχῆς τοῖς τριακοσίοις καὶ πένησιν ἐλευθέροις οὖσι καὶ τἆλλα ὁμοίοις, οὐθεὶς ἂν φαίη δημοκρατεῖσθαι τούτους· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ πένητες ὀλίγοι μὲν εἶεν, κρείττους δὲ τῶν εὐπόρων πλειόνων ὄντων, οὐδεὶς ἂν ὀλιγαρχίαν προσαγορεύσειεν οὐδὲ τὴν τοιαύτην, εἰ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὖσι40 πλουσίοις μὴ μετείη τῶν τιμῶν.

μᾶλλον τοίνυν λεκτέον ὅτι1290b1 δῆμος μέν ἐστιν ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι κύριοι ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχία δʼ ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς δʼ ὀλίγους· ἐλεύθεροι μὲν γὰρ πολλοί, πλούσιοι δʼ ὀλίγοι. καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἰ κατὰ μέγεθος διενέμοντο τὰς ἀρχάς, ὥσπερ5 ἐν Αἰθιοπίᾳ φασί τινες, ἢ κατὰ κάλλος, ὀλιγαρχία ἦν ἄν· ὀλίγον γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν καλῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν μεγάλων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τούτοις μόνον ἱκανῶς ἔχει διωρίσθαι τὰς πολιτείας ταύτας· ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ πλείονα μόρια καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας εἰσίν, ἔτι διαληπτέον ὡς οὔτʼ ἂν οἱ10 ἐλεύθεροι ὀλίγοι ὄντες πλειόνων καὶ μὴ ἐλευθέρων ἄρχωσι, δῆμος, οἷον ἐν Ἀπολλωνίᾳ τῇ ἐν τῷ Ἰονίῳ καὶ ἐν Θήρᾳ (ἐν τούτων γὰρ ἑκατέρᾳ τῶν πόλεων ἐν ταῖς τιμαῖς ἦσαν οἱ διαφέροντες κατʼ εὐγένειαν καὶ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας, ὀλίγοι ὄντες, πολλῶν), οὔτε ἂν οἱ πλούσιοι διὰ τὸ15 κατὰ πλῆθος ὑπερέχειν, δῆμος, οἷον ἐν Κολοφῶνι τὸ παλαιόν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἐκέκτηντο μακρὰν οὐσίαν οἱ πλείους πρὶν γενέσθαι τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λυδούς), ἀλλʼ ἔστι δημοκρατία μὲν ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἄποροι πλείους ὄντες κύριοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχία δʼ ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενέστεροι20 ὀλίγοι ὄντες.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διʼ ἣν αἰτίαν, εἴρηται· διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγωμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ οὐχ ἓν μέρος ἀλλὰ πλείω πᾶσαν ἔχειν πόλιν.1290b25 ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ζῴου προῃρούμεθα λαβεῖν εἴδη, πρῶτον ἂν ἀποδιωρίζομεν ἅπερ ἀναγκαῖον πᾶν ἔχειν ζῷον (οἷον ἔνιά τε τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τὸ τῆς τροφῆς ἐργαστικὸν καὶ δεκτικόν, οἷον στόμα καὶ κοιλίαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἷς κινεῖται μορίοις ἕκαστον αὐτῶν)· εἰ δὲ τοσαῦτα εἴη μόνον, τούτων δʼ εἶεν30 διαφοραί (λέγω δʼ οἷον στόματός τινα πλείω γένη καὶ κοιλίας καὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν κινητικῶν μορίων), ὁ τῆς συζεύξεως τῆς τούτων ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιήσει πλείω γένη ζῴων (οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ταὐτὸν ζῷον ἔχειν πλείους στόματος διαφοράς, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδʼ ὤτων), ὥσθʼ ὅταν ληφθῶσι35 τούτων πάντες οἱ ἐνδεχόμενοι συνδυασμοί, ποιήσουσιν εἴδη ζῴου, καὶ τοσαῦτʼ εἴδη τοῦ ζῴου ὅσαι περ αἱ συζεύξεις τῶν ἀναγκαίων μορίων εἰσίν—τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ τῶν εἰρημένων πολιτειῶν. καὶ γὰρ αἱ πόλεις οὐκ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἀλλʼ ἐκ πολλῶν σύγκεινται μερῶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις. ἓν40 μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν πλῆθος, οἱ καλούμενοι γεωργοί,

1291a1δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καλούμενον βάναυσον (ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ὧν ἄνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι· τούτων δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὰς δὲ εἰς τρυφὴν ἢ τὸ καλῶς ζῆν), τρίτον δὲ τὸ ἀγοραῖον (λέγω δʼ ἀγοραῖον5 τὸ περὶ τὰς πράσεις καὶ τὰς ὠνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας διατρῖβον), τέταρτον δὲ τὸ θητικόν, πέμπτον δὲ γένος τὸ προπολεμῆσον, ὃ τούτων οὐθὲν ἧττόν ἐστιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἰ μέλλουσι μὴ δουλεύσειν τοῖς ἐπιοῦσιν. μὴ γὰρ ἓν τῶν ἀδυνάτων ᾖ πόλιν ἄξιον εἶναι καλεῖν τὴν φύσει δούλην·10 αὐτάρκης γὰρ ἡ πόλις, τὸ δὲ δοῦλον οὐκ αὔταρκες. διόπερ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ κομψῶς τοῦτο, οὐχ ἱκανῶς δὲ εἴρηται. φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐκ τεττάρων τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων πόλιν συγκεῖσθαι, λέγει δὲ τούτους ὑφάντην καὶ γεωργὸν καὶ σκυτοτόμον καὶ οἰκοδόμον· πάλιν δὲ προστίθησιν, ὡς οὐκ αὐτάρκων15 τούτων, χαλκέα καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις βοσκήμασιν, ἔτι δʼ ἔμπορόν τε καὶ κάπηλον· καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίνεται πλήρωμα τῆς πρώτης πόλεως, ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων τε χάριν πᾶσαν πόλιν συνεστηκυῖαν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ μᾶλλον, ἴσον τε δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν. τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν20 οὐ πρότερον ἀποδίδωσι μέρος πρὶν ἢ τῆς χώρας αὐξομένης καὶ τῆς τῶν πλησίον ἁπτομένης εἰς πόλεμον καταστῶσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέτταρσι καὶ τοῖς ὁποσοισοῦν κοινωνοῖς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τινα τὸν ἀποδώσοντα καὶ κρινοῦντα τὸ δίκαιον. εἴπερ οὖν καὶ ψυχὴν ἄν τις θείη ζῴου μόριον25 μᾶλλον ἢ σῶμα, καὶ πόλεων τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον θετέον τῶν εἰς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν συντεινόντων, τὸ πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ μετέχον δικαιοσύνης δικαστικῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ βουλευόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συνέσεως πολιτικῆς ἔργον. καὶ ταῦτʼ εἴτε κεχωρισμένως ὑπάρχει τισὶν εἴτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς, οὐθὲν διαφέρει30 πρὸς τὸν λόγον· καὶ γὰρ ὁπλιτεύειν καὶ γεωργεῖν συμβαίνει τοῖς αὐτοῖς πολλάκις. ὥστε εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκεῖνα θετέα μόρια τῆς πόλεως, φανερὸν ὅτι τό γε ὁπλιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι μόριον τῆς πόλεως.

ἕβδομον δὲ τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν, ὃ καλοῦμεν εὐπόρους. ὄγδοον δὲ τὸ δημιουργικὸν1291a35 καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λειτουργοῦν, εἴπερ ἄνευ ἀρχόντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν εἶναί τινας τοὺς δυναμένους ἄρχειν καὶ λειτουργοῦντας ἢ συνεχῶς ἢ κατὰ μέρος τῇ πόλει ταύτην τὴν λειτουργίαν. λοιπὰ δὲ περὶ ὧν τυγχάνομεν διωρικότες ἀρτίως, τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ τὸ κρῖνον40 περὶ τῶν δικαίων τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. εἴπερ οὖν ταῦτα δεῖ γινέσθαι ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ καλῶς γενέσθαι καὶ δικαίως,

1291b1ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μετέχοντας εἶναί τινας ἀρετῆς τῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἄλλας δυνάμεις τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν ἐνδέχεσθαι δοκεῖ πολλοῖς, οἷον τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς προπολεμοῦντας καὶ γεωργοῦντας καὶ τεχνίτας, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς βουλευομένους5 τε καὶ κρίνοντας· ἀντιποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς πάντες, καὶ τὰς πλείστας ἀρχὰς ἄρχειν οἴονται δύνασθαι· ἀλλὰ πένεσθαι καὶ πλουτεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀδύνατον. διὸ ταῦτα μέρη μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ πόλεως, οἱ εὔποροι καὶ οἱ ἄποροι. ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ10 πολλοὺς ταῦτα ἐναντία μέρη φαίνεται τῶν τῆς πόλεως μορίων. ὥστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τούτων καθιστᾶσι, καὶ δύο πολιτεῖαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, δημοκρατία καὶ ὀλιγαρχία.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσι πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνας1291b15 αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον· ὅτι δὲ ἔστι καὶ δημοκρατίας εἴδη πλείω καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας, λέγωμεν. φανερὸν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. εἴδη γὰρ πλείω τοῦ τε δήμου καὶ τῶν λεγομένων γνωρίμων ἔστιν, οἷον δήμου μὲν εἴδη ἓν μὲν οἱ γεωργοί, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἀγοραῖον τὸ περὶ20 ὠνὴν καὶ πρᾶσιν διατρῖβον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν πολεμικὸν τὸ δὲ χρηματιστικὸν τὸ δὲ πορθμευτικὸν τὸ δʼ ἁλιευτικόν (πολλαχοῦ γὰρ ἕκαστα τούτων πολύοχλα, οἷον ἁλιεῖς μὲν ἐν Τάραντι καὶ Βυζαντίῳ, τριηρικὸν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν, ἐμπορικὸν δὲ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ καὶ Χίῳ, πορθμευτικὸν25 δʼ ἐν Τενέδῳ), πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ χερνητικὸν καὶ τὸ μικρὰν ἔχον οὐσίαν ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι σχολάζειν, ἔτι τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον, κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον πλήθους εἶδος· τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων πλοῦτος εὐγένεια ἀρετὴ παιδεία καὶ τὰ τούτοις λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν30 διαφοράν.

δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστι πρώτη μὲν ἡ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. ἴσον γάρ φησιν ὁ νόμος ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης δημοκρατίας τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπερέχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ κυρίους εἶναι ὁποτερουσοῦν, ἀλλʼ ὁμοίους ἀμφοτέρους. εἴπερ γὰρ ἐλευθερία μάλιστʼ ἔστιν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ,1291b35 καθάπερ ὑπολαμβάνουσί τινες, καὶ ἰσότης, οὕτως ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, κοινωνούτων ἁπάντων μάλιστα τῆς πολιτείας ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείων ὁ δῆμος, κύριον δὲ τὸ δόξαν τοῖς πλείοσιν, ἀνάγκη δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ταύτην. ἓν μὲν οὖν εἶδος δημοκρατίας τοῦτο, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμημάτων40 εἴναι, βραχέων δὲ τούτων ὄντων· δεῖ δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ ἐξουσίαν εἶναι μετέχειν καὶ τὸν ἀποβάλλοντα μὴ μετέχειν·

Musean translation

Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Ancient Greek of all eight books, 182 Bekker pages and 1,609 line marks (the Perseus transcription of W. D. Ross’s Oxford text), for fidelity, argument, imagery and clarity.

1288b10In all arts and sciences that concern not a part of their subject but a whole single kind, it belongs to one science to consider what is fitting for each kind: for example, what sort of bodily exercise benefits what sort of body, and which is best (for the best exercise, in the case of the body best endowed by nature and supplied with resources,15 must be the one that suits it), and which single exercise suits most bodies alike (for this too is the work of physical training). Further, if someone does not desire the appropriate condition or knowledge for athletic competition, it nonetheless belongs to the trainer and the instructor in physical training to provide him with this lesser capacity as well. We see the same20 thing happen in medicine, shipbuilding, the making of clothing, and every other art. It is clear, therefore, that it also belongs to the same science to consider what the best constitution is, and what character it would have to fulfill our wishes most completely if nothing external stood in the way, and which constitution suits which people (for many25 may perhaps find it impossible to attain the best, so that the good lawgiver and the true statesman must know both the constitution that is best without qualification and the best under given conditions); and, third, the constitution assumed as a starting point (for one must also be able to consider a given constitution: how it might arise in the first place, and, once it has arisen,30 how it might be preserved for the longest time. I mean, for example, if a city happens neither to live under the best constitution, being without even the necessary resources, nor under the constitution possible with the means it has, but under some inferior one). Besides all these, the constitution best suited to all cities35 must be known. Thus most of those who pronounce on constitutions, even if they speak well in other respects, miss what is useful. For one must consider not only the best constitution but also the possible, and likewise the one that is easier to establish and more generally suited to all. As things stand, the most exalted constitution, requiring abundant40 resources, is all that some seek; others, though discussing a more common sort, sweep aside existing constitutions; the Spartan constitution1289a1 or some other is what they praise.

But one should propose an order in which, starting from existing conditions, people will readily be persuaded to share and will be able to do so. For correcting a constitution is no less a task than establishing one from the beginning, just as learning anew is no less a task1289a5 than learning from the beginning. For this reason, in addition to what has been said, the statesman must also be able to assist existing constitutions, as was said before. But this is impossible without knowing how many kinds of constitution there are. Some now suppose that there is one democracy and one oligarchy; but this is not10 true. Therefore one must be aware of the differences among constitutions, how many there are and in how many ways they are combined. After this, the same practical wisdom must discern both the best laws and those suited to each constitution. For laws must be framed to suit constitutions, and everyone does frame them so, not constitutions15 to suit laws. A constitution is the order of a city's offices: how they are distributed, what is sovereign in the constitution, and what is the end of each community. Laws, apart from those that define the constitution, are the rules according to which the rulers must rule and watch over those20 who transgress them. It is clear, therefore, that one must grasp the differences and the definition of each constitution with a view to framing laws as well. For the same laws cannot benefit all oligarchies or all democracies, if indeed several forms, and not just one democracy or one oligarchy alone,25 exist.

In our first inquiry into constitutions we distinguished three correct constitutions—kingship, aristocracy, and polity—and three deviations from these: tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, and democracy1289a30 from polity. Aristocracy and kingship have been discussed (for to consider the best constitution is also to speak of the forms bearing these names, since each aims to be founded on virtue supplied with resources). Further, how aristocracy and kingship differ from each other, and when35 kingship should be adopted, have already been determined. It remains to discuss the constitution designated by the common name, and the other constitutions: oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. It is evident which of these deviations is worst and which comes second. For40 the deviation from the first and most divine constitution must be the worst. Kingship must either possess the name alone without1289b1 being kingship in fact,

or rest upon the great superiority of the man who reigns. Therefore tyranny, being the worst, must stand furthest from a constitution; oligarchy comes second (for aristocracy is far removed from this constitution), and the most moderate is1289b5 democracy. One of our predecessors has already pronounced this judgment, though not with the same consideration in view as ours. For he judged that, when all are decent—for example, a good oligarchy and the other forms—democracy is worst, but when they are bad it is best. We, however, maintain that these constitutions are wholly mistaken,10 and that it is not right to call one oligarchy better than another, but rather less bad. Let this sort of judgment be set aside for now. We must first distinguish how many varieties of constitution there are, if there are indeed several kinds of democracy and oligarchy; next, which is most generally applicable and15 which most desirable after the best constitution, and, if there happens to be another that is aristocratic and well constituted but unsuited to most cities, what it is. Next, we must also consider which of the other constitutions is desirable for which people (for perhaps democracy is more necessary than oligarchy for some, and oligarchy more necessary than democracy for others).20 After this, we must consider how someone who wishes to establish these constitutions should do so: I mean each kind of democracy, and likewise each kind of oligarchy. Finally, when we have given all these matters as brief an account as possible, we must try to examine what destroys and what preserves constitutions,25 both in general and in each separate case, and through what causes these things chiefly tend to occur.

The reason there are several constitutions is that every city has several parts in number. First, we see that all cities are composed of households; next, within this multitude1289b30 some must be rich, some poor, and some of the middle class. Of both the rich and the poor, some are armed and some unarmed. We also see that some of the people are farmers, some traders, and some artisans. Among the notables too there are differences in wealth and in the size35 of their estates, for example, in keeping horses (for this is not easy for those who are not wealthy. For this very reason, in ancient times all cities whose strength lay in their horses had oligarchies. They used horses in wars against their neighbors, as did the Eretrians, the Chalcidians, the Magnesians on40 the Maeander, and many other peoples in Asia). Further, besides differences in wealth there is difference in birth and in1290a1 virtue,

and any other such quality that has been said, in the discussion of aristocracy, to constitute a part of a city. For there we distinguished the necessary parts of which every city consists. Sometimes all these parts share in the constitution, sometimes1290a5 fewer, and sometimes more. It is evident, then, that there must be several constitutions differing in kind from one another, for these parts themselves also differ in kind. A constitution is the order of offices, and everyone distributes these either according to the power of those who share in them or according to some equality10 common to them: I mean, for example, an equality among the poor or among the rich, or one common to both. There must therefore be as many constitutions as there are arrangements corresponding to the superiority and the differences of the parts.

But there seem chiefly to be two: just as winds are called northern or southern, and1290a15 the others deviations from these, so too constitutions are taken to be two, democracy and oligarchy. For people count aristocracy as a kind of oligarchy, since it is a sort of oligarchy, and what is called polity as democracy, just as among winds they count the west wind as northern and the east wind as southern. The same20 holds of musical modes, as some say: there too they posit two kinds, the Dorian and the Phrygian, and call the other arrangements either Dorian or Phrygian. This is how people are chiefly accustomed to conceive of constitutions. But the distinction we have drawn is truer and better: there are two25 or one well-constituted forms, and the others are deviations—deviations from the well-blended harmony in the one case, and from the best constitution in the other. The tighter and more masterful constitutions are oligarchic, the relaxed and soft ones democratic.

1290a30But we should not define democracy, as some now commonly do, simply as a constitution in which the multitude is sovereign (for in oligarchies too, and everywhere, the larger part is sovereign), nor oligarchy as one in which a few are sovereign over the constitution. For if there were thirteen hundred people in all, and a thousand of them were rich,35 and did not grant a share in office to the three hundred, who were poor but free and like them in other respects, no one would say that these people lived under a democracy. Likewise, if the poor were few but stronger than the rich, who were more numerous, no one would call this an oligarchy either, if the others, though40 rich, had no share in honors.

Rather, then, we should say that1290b1 there is democracy when the free are sovereign, and oligarchy when the rich are sovereign; it happens, however, that the former are many and the latter few, for the free are many and the rich few. Indeed, if offices were distributed according to height, as5 some say they are in Ethiopia, or according to beauty, there would be an oligarchy, for both the beautiful and the tall are few in number. Nevertheless, these constitutions are not adequately distinguished by these features alone either. Since both democracy and oligarchy have several parts, we must make the further distinction that, if10 a few free people rule a greater number who are not free, this is not democracy: for example, in Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf and in Thera (for in each of these cities those distinguished by noble birth, who first occupied the colonies, held the honors, though they were few among many). Nor, if the rich rule because15 they are more numerous, is this democracy, as in Colophon in ancient times (for there the majority possessed large estates before the war against the Lydians). Rather, there is democracy when the free and poor, being more numerous, are sovereign in rule, and oligarchy when the rich and better-born are20 few and sovereign.

It has been said, then, that there are several constitutions, and for what reason. Let us now say why there are more than those mentioned, and what they are and why, taking as our starting point what was said before. For we agree that every city has not one part but several.1290b25 Thus, if we undertook to determine the kinds of animal, we would first distinguish what every animal must have (for example, certain sense organs, the organs for processing and receiving food, such as a mouth and a stomach, and, besides these, the parts by which each animal moves). If there were only so many parts, but these had30 varieties (I mean, for example, several kinds of mouth, stomach, and sense organs, and also of the parts used for movement), the number of their combinations would necessarily produce several kinds of animal (for the same animal cannot have several different kinds of mouth, nor, similarly, of ears). Thus, when35 all their possible pairings have been determined, they will produce kinds of animal, and there will be as many kinds of animal as there are combinations of their necessary parts—the same holds for the constitutions we have mentioned. For cities too consist not of one part but of many, as has often been said. One40 part, then, is the multitude concerned with food, those called farmers;

1291a1a second is that called the artisan class (this consists of those concerned with the arts without which a city cannot be inhabited: some of these arts must exist out of necessity, others for luxury or for living well); a third is the trading class (by the trading class I mean5 those occupied with selling and buying, foreign trade and retail trade); a fourth is the laboring class; and a fifth kind is the class that will fight in the city's defense. Its existence is no less necessary than that of the others, if they are not to be enslaved by invaders. For surely it is impossible for a community that is a slave by nature to deserve the name of city:10 a city is self-sufficient, but what is enslaved is not self-sufficient. For this reason the account of this in the Republic is ingenious but inadequate. For Socrates says that a city consists of the four most necessary people, naming a weaver, a farmer, a shoemaker, and a builder. Then he adds more, since these are not self-sufficient:15 a smith and those concerned with the necessary livestock, and also a merchant and a retailer; all these make up the first city. It is as though every city were constituted for the sake of necessities and not rather for the noble, and needed shoemakers and farmers equally. As for the fighting class,20 he does not assign it a place until the territory grows and encroaches on that of the neighbors, bringing them into war. Yet even among the four, or among any number whatever of partners, there must be someone who will dispense and judge what is just. If, then, one would count the soul as a part of an animal25 more than the body, we must also count parts of this sort as parts of cities more than those serving necessary uses: the military part, the part that shares in judicial justice, and, besides these, the deliberative part, which is the work of political understanding. Whether these functions belong separately to different people or to the same people makes no difference30 to the argument; for the same people often both serve as infantry and farm. Thus, if both these and those are to be counted as parts of a city, it is evident that the infantry class, at least, is a necessary part of the city.

A seventh part is the class that performs public services with its property, whom we call the rich. An eighth is the class that serves the public1291a35 and performs the services connected with offices, if indeed a city cannot exist without rulers. There must therefore be some who are able to rule and who perform this public service for the city, either continuously or in turn. The remaining parts are those we have just distinguished: the part that deliberates and the part that judges40 the just in disputes. If, then, these functions must be performed in cities, and performed well and justly,

1291b1there must also be some who share in the virtue of statesmen. Many people think that the other capacities can belong to the same people: for example, that the same people may be defenders, farmers, and artisans, and also those who deliberate5 and judge. All also lay claim to virtue and think themselves capable of holding most offices. But it is impossible for the same people to be both poor and rich. For this reason these seem above all to be parts of a city: the rich and the poor. Further, because the former are generally few and the latter10 many, these appear as opposed parts among the city's parts. Therefore people also establish constitutions according to the predominance of these, and there seem to be two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy.

That there are several constitutions, and through what1291b15 causes, has been said before. Let us now say that there are also several kinds of democracy and oligarchy. This is evident from what has been said as well. For there are several kinds both of the people and of those called the notables. For example, among the kinds of the people, one consists of farmers, another of those engaged in the arts, another of the trading class occupied with20 buying and selling, another of those concerned with the sea; and of this last, one part is naval, another concerned with wealth-getting, another with ferrying, and another with fishing (for in many places each of these is very numerous: for example, fishermen in Tarentum and Byzantium, the crews of triremes in Athens, merchant seamen in Aegina and Chios, and ferry workers25 in Tenedos). Besides these there is the class of manual laborers, and those whose property is too small to allow them leisure; further, those who are free but not born of two citizen parents, and any other such kind of multitude. Among the notables, the distinctions are wealth, noble birth, virtue, education, and the qualities spoken of under the same30 distinction as these.

The first democracy, then, is the one so called chiefly on the basis of equality. For the law of such a democracy defines equality as the poor having no greater predominance than the rich, neither group being sovereign, but both alike. For if freedom is found most fully in democracy,1291b35 as some suppose, and so is equality, they would be found most fully in this way, when all share as equally as possible in the constitution. Since the people are more numerous, and what the majority decides is sovereign, this must be a democracy. This, then, is one kind of democracy: for offices, a property qualification40 is required, though it is small. Anyone acquiring the qualification must be permitted to share, and anyone losing it must not share.

Plain English translation

Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same Greek, covering all eight books and every Bekker page and line mark.

1288b10In every art and science that doesn't deal with just one part of a subject but covers a whole field, a single science studies what suits each kind of thing. Physical training, for example, studies which exercise benefits which body, and which exercise is best (for a body with the best natural condition and resources, the best exercise15 must be the right one). It also studies which single exercise suits most people alike (this too is the work of physical training). And if someone doesn't want the condition or knowledge needed for athletic competition, the trainer and the expert in physical training still have the job of preparing him for that lesser ability. We see the same thing20 in medicine, shipbuilding, clothing, and every other art. So clearly the same science must study the best constitution: what it is, and what form would best meet our wishes if no outside obstacle stood in the way. It must also study which constitution suits which people (for many25 may find it impossible to achieve the best. So a good lawgiver and a genuine statesman must know both the best constitution without qualification and the best under given conditions). Third, it must study a constitution based on an assumption (for it must be able to study a given constitution: how it could first come into being, and, once established,30 how it could last the longest. I mean, for example, a city that happens to have neither the best constitution, because it lacks even the necessary resources, nor the best one possible with what it has, but some worse one). Besides all these, the constitution best suited to all cities35 must be known. Most people who pronounce on constitutions, even if they speak well on other matters, miss what is useful. We must study not just the best constitution but also the possible one, and likewise the one that is easier to achieve and more widely suited to all cities. As things stand, the most perfect constitution, which needs abundant40 resources, is the only kind some seek. Others propose something more generally applicable, but reject existing constitutions. The Spartan constitution1289a1 or some other one is what they praise.

We should propose an arrangement that people can easily be persuaded to accept and can share in, starting from their present conditions. For correcting a constitution is no smaller task than building one from the start, just as relearning1289a5 is no smaller task than learning from the start. So, besides the things mentioned, a statesman must also be able to help existing constitutions, as we said earlier. This is impossible if he doesn't know how many kinds of constitution there are. Some now think there is just one democracy and one oligarchy. But that isn't10 true. So we must know the differences among constitutions, how many there are, and how many ways they can be combined. After this, the same practical wisdom must also identify the best laws and those that suit each constitution. Laws must be made to fit constitutions, and everyone does make them that way, not constitutions15 to fit laws. A constitution is a city's arrangement of its offices: how they are distributed, what is sovereign in the constitution, and what the aim of each community is. Laws are distinct from the provisions that define the constitution. They are the rules by which rulers must rule and guard against those who20 break them. So clearly, even for making laws, we must understand the differences between constitutions and the definition of each. The same laws can't benefit all oligarchies or all democracies, if several kinds, not just one democracy and one oligarchy alone,25 really exist.

In our first investigation of constitutions, we distinguished three correct constitutions: kingship, aristocracy, and polity, lawful government by the many. We also distinguished three deviations from these: tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, and democracy1289a30 from polity. We have already discussed aristocracy and kingship (for studying the best constitution is the same as discussing the forms bearing these names. Each aims to be established on the basis of virtue, with the necessary resources). Also, how aristocracy and kingship differ from each other, and when35 kingship should be accepted, were explained earlier. What remains is to discuss polity, the form called by the name shared by all constitutions, and the other constitutions: oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. We can also see which wrong form is worst and which ranks second. Necessarily,40 the worst departure is from the constitution that ranks first and is most divine. Kingship must either have the name alone without actually1289b1 being kingship,

or rest on the great superiority of the man who is king. So tyranny, being worst, must be farthest from a constitution. Oligarchy comes second (for aristocracy is very far removed from this constitution), and the most moderate is1289b5 democracy. One of the earlier thinkers has already given this verdict, but not with the same point in view as us. He judged that, when all the constitutions are decent—for example, a good oligarchy and the others—democracy is worst, but when they are bad, it is best. We say that these constitutions are altogether mistaken,10 and that it isn't right to call one oligarchy better than another, but rather less bad. Still, let's leave that sort of judgment aside for now. First we must distinguish how many varieties of constitution there are, if democracy and oligarchy each have several kinds. Next, which is the most widely applicable and15 which is the most desirable after the best constitution? And if there happens to be another constitution that is aristocratic and well organized but doesn't suit most cities, what is it? Then, among the other constitutions, which is desirable for which people? (Perhaps democracy is more necessary than oligarchy for some, and oligarchy more than democracy for others.)20 After that, we must ask how someone who wants these constitutions should establish them. I mean each kind of democracy and, in turn, each kind of oligarchy. Finally, once we have discussed all these as briefly as we can, we must try to examine what destroys and what preserves constitutions,25 both in general and for each one separately, and what causes most naturally bring these things about.

There are several constitutions because every city has several parts. First, we see that all cities are made up of households. Next, among this1289b30 population, some must be well-off, some poor, and some in the middle. Among both the well-off and the poor, some have heavy arms and some are unarmed. We see that some of the people are farmers, some work in trade, and some are manual workers. The notables also differ in wealth and in the size35 of their property: for example, in their ability to keep horses (for this isn't easy without wealth. That is why, in ancient times, cities whose strength lay in cavalry had oligarchies. In wars with neighboring cities they fought on horseback. The Eretrians and Chalcidians did this, as did the Magnesians settled beside40 the Maeander, and many other Asian peoples). Besides differences in wealth, there are differences in birth and1290a1 virtue,

and any other such distinction mentioned as a part of a city in our discussion of aristocracy. For there we distinguished how many necessary parts every city has. Sometimes all these parts share in the constitution, sometimes1290a5 fewer, and sometimes more. So clearly there must be several constitutions differing in kind from one another, since these parts themselves differ in kind. A constitution is the arrangement of offices. Everyone distributes these either according to the power of those taking part or according to some equality they10 share. I mean, for example, an equality among the poor, among the well-off, or common to both. So there must be as many constitutions as there are arrangements based on the superior position and the differences of the city's parts.

People generally think there are two constitutions. Just as winds are said to be either north or south winds, and1290a15 the others deviations from these, so there are said to be two constitutions: democracy and oligarchy. They class aristocracy as a kind of oligarchy, since it is a sort of rule by a few, and the constitution called polity as democracy. This is like classing the west wind with the north wind, and the east wind with the south wind. It is the same20 with patterns of musical notes, called modes, according to some people. There too they set out two kinds, Dorian and Phrygian, and call the other arrangements either Dorian or Phrygian. This, then, is the usual way people understand constitutions. But the division we made is truer and better: there are two25 or one that are well organized, and the others are deviations—some from the well-balanced musical mode, others from the best constitution. The tighter and more master-like constitutions are oligarchic, while the looser and softer ones are democratic.

1290a30We shouldn't define democracy simply as a constitution where the majority is sovereign, as some people now tend to do (for in oligarchies too, and everywhere, the larger part is sovereign). Nor should we define oligarchy as a constitution where a few are sovereign. Suppose there were thirteen hundred people in all, and a thousand of them were rich,35 and didn't let the three hundred share in office, though they were poor free people and like them in other respects. No one would say that these people lived under a democracy. Likewise, if a few poor people were stronger than the larger number of well-off people, no one would call this an oligarchy either, if the others, who were40 rich, had no share in public honors.

So it is better to say that1290b1 there is democracy when the free are sovereign, and oligarchy when the rich are. But it happens that the former are many and the latter few, since many people are free and few are rich. If offices were distributed by height, as5 some say happens in Ethiopia, or by beauty, there would still be an oligarchy. For the number of beautiful people and tall people alike is small. Yet these features alone aren't enough to define these constitutions. Since both the people and the oligarchy have several parts, we must make a further distinction. If10 a few free people rule a larger number who aren't free, that isn't democracy. This happens in Apollonia on the Ionian Sea and in Thera. In each city the men of outstanding noble birth who first settled the colonies held public honors. They were few among many. Nor is it democracy if the rich rule because they15 outnumber the others, as in Colophon long ago (for there most people owned large properties before the war against the Lydians). Rather, there is democracy when the free and poor, who are the majority, are sovereign in government, and oligarchy when the rich and better-born,20 who are few, are sovereign.

We have now said that there are several constitutions, and why. Let's say why there are more than those we have mentioned, what they are, and why they exist, starting from the point we made earlier. For we agree that every city has not one part but several.1290b25 Suppose we wanted to identify the kinds of animal. First we would set out the parts every animal must have (for example, some sense organs, parts for processing and receiving food, such as the mouth and stomach, and also the parts each animal uses to move). Suppose these were the only parts, but there were30 differences among them. I mean, for example, several kinds of mouth, stomach, sense organs, and parts used for movement. The number of combinations would necessarily produce several kinds of animal. For the same animal can't have several different types of mouth, or of ears either. So when35 all the possible combinations of these are identified, they will produce kinds of animal. There will be as many kinds of animal as there are combinations of the necessary parts. The same applies to the constitutions we have mentioned. For cities too consist of many parts, not one, as we have often said. One40 is the group concerned with food, those called farmers,

1291a1and a second is the group called manual workers (these work in the crafts without which a city can't be inhabited. Some of these crafts must exist out of necessity, others for luxury or living well). A third is the trading group (by the trading group I mean5 those who spend their time selling and buying, in wholesale and retail trade). A fourth is the hired laborers, and a fifth the group that fights to defend the city. This is as necessary as any of the others if people are not to become slaves to attackers. For surely it is impossible for a community that is by nature enslaved to deserve the name of city.10 A city is self-sufficient, and what is enslaved isn't self-sufficient. That is why the account of this in the Republic is clever but inadequate. Socrates says that a city consists of four groups that are most necessary: a weaver, a farmer, a shoemaker, and a builder. Then he adds more, because these aren't self-sufficient:15 a smith, people who look after the necessary livestock, and also a wholesale and a retail trader. All these make up the first city, as though every city were established for necessities rather than for the noble, and needed shoemakers as much as farmers. As for the fighting force,20 he doesn't give it a place until the territory expands, encroaches on that of its neighbors, and brings them to war. Yet even among the four partners, or however many there are, someone must distribute and decide what is just. So suppose we count the soul as part of an animal25 more truly than the body. Likewise, we should count these groups as parts of cities more truly than those serving necessary uses. They are the military group, those administering justice in the law courts, and those who deliberate. Deliberation calls for political understanding. Whether these functions belong to separate people or to the same people makes no difference30 to the argument. For the same people often serve as heavily armed soldiers and work as farmers. So if both these groups and those others are to be considered parts of the city, clearly the heavily armed soldiers are a necessary part of it.

A seventh part is the group that serves the city with its property, whom we call the well-off. An eighth is the group that performs public services1291a35 and serves in offices, if a city can't exist without rulers. So there must be people able to rule and to provide this service for the city either continually or in turn. The remaining groups are those we happened to define just now: the group that deliberates and the one that judges40 what is just between people in dispute. If cities must have these functions, and have them carried out well and justly,

1291b1there must also be some people who share in the virtue of statesmen. Many people think the same individuals can have the other abilities: for example, that the same people can defend the city, farm, practice crafts, and also deliberate5 and judge. Everyone also claims to have virtue, and thinks they can hold most offices. But the same people can't be poor and rich. That is why these seem to be the city's main parts: the well-off and the poor. Also, because the former are usually few and the latter10 many, these seem to be opposing parts among the city's groups. So constitutions are established according to which of these has the upper hand, and there seem to be two constitutions: democracy and oligarchy.

That there are several constitutions, and what1291b15 causes this, have already been explained. Let's now explain that democracy and oligarchy also have several kinds. This is clear from what we have said as well. For there are several kinds both of the people and of those called the notables, the prominent citizens. For example, one kind of the people is farmers, another is those working in crafts, another is the trading group concerned with20 buying and selling, and another is the group connected with the sea. Of this last group, some serve in the navy, some engage in money-making, some carry passengers, and some fish. In many places each group is large. Examples are fishermen in Tarentum and Byzantium, warship crews in Athens, traders in Aegina and Chios, and passenger carriers25 in Tenedos. Besides these are manual laborers, those with so little property that they can't have leisure, those who are free but don't have two citizen parents, and any other such kind of population. The notables are distinguished by wealth, noble birth, virtue, education, and the things spoken of under the same30 kinds of distinction.

The first democracy is the one most clearly based on equality. The law of this kind of democracy defines equality as neither the poor nor the well-off having any advantage, and neither being sovereign over the other, but both being alike. For if freedom is found most of all in democracy,1291b35 as some people suppose, and equality too, this would be most true when everyone shares in the constitution as equally as possible. Since the people are the majority, and what the majority decides is authoritative, this must be a democracy. So this is one kind of democracy: for offices, a property qualification40 is required, but it is low. Anyone who acquires the required property must be allowed to take part, and anyone who loses it must not take part.

About this section

Book IV, 1288b–1291b is part of Politics by Aristotle. This page sets the Ancient Greek original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 12 of 28 in the work, which is kept in the Greek tradition.

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