Book III, 1285a–1288b

One,1285a15 then, is this form of kingship: generalship for life. Some of these are hereditary, others elective. Beside this there is another form of monarchy, such as the kingships found among certain barbarian peoples. All these have power resembling that of tyrannies, but they are both lawful and ancestral. For20 because the barbarians are by nature more slavish in character than the Greeks, and those in Asia more so than those in Europe, they endure a master's rule without resentment. Thus these kingships are tyrannical for this reason, but secure because they are ancestral and lawful. Their guard too is kingly,25 not tyrannical, for the same reason. For citizens guard their kings with arms, whereas tyrants are guarded by a foreign force. Kings rule according to law and over willing subjects, tyrants over unwilling ones; thus the former have a guard supplied by the citizens, the latter a guard against the citizens.

These, then, are two forms1285a30 of monarchy; another is that which existed among the ancient Greeks, whose rulers are called aisymnetes. This, to speak simply, is an elective tyranny, differing from the barbarian form not in being unlawful, but only in not being ancestral. Some held this office for life, others for certain fixed35 periods or tasks. For example, the Mytileneans once chose Pittacus to oppose the exiles led by Antimenides and the poet Alcaeus. Alcaeus makes it clear that they chose Pittacus as tyrant in one of his drinking songs: he reproaches them: “Lowborn Pittacus, over the spiritless and1285b1 ill-fated city, they set up as tyrant, all together praising him highly.”

These forms, then, are and were tyrannical because they involve a master's rule, but kingly because they are elective and accepted by willing subjects. A fourth form of kingly monarchy consists of the kingships of the heroic1285b5 ages, which arose with willing subjects and were ancestral and lawful. For because the first kings became benefactors of the multitude through the arts or war, or by bringing them together or providing land, they became kings over willing subjects, and the kingship was ancestral for their successors. They were sovereign over leadership in war10 and over sacrifices not belonging to the priesthood, and in addition they judged lawsuits. Some did this without swearing an oath, others under oath; the oath consisted in raising the scepter. The kings of ancient times thus ruled continuously over affairs in the city, in the country, and beyond its borders. Later,15 as the kings themselves relinquished some powers and the masses took others away, in the other cities only the sacrifices were left to the kings; and wherever there remained what deserved to be called kingship, they retained only leadership in warfare beyond the borders.

1285b20These, then, are the forms of kingship, four in number. One is that of the heroic ages (this was over willing subjects, but in certain defined matters: the king was a general and a juror, and sovereign over matters relating to the gods). The second is the barbarian form (this is hereditary rule by a master25 according to law). The third is what they call aisymneteia (this is an elective tyranny). The fourth of these is the Spartan form (this, to speak simply, is hereditary generalship held for life). These, then, differ from one another in this way. There is a fifth form of kingship, when, over everything,30 one person is sovereign, as each people and each city is over its common affairs, organized on the model of household management. For just as household management is a kind of kingship over a household, so absolute kingship is household management of a city and of one people or several.

There are, broadly speaking, two forms of kingship we must examine: this one1285b35 and the Spartan. For most of the others lie between these: their kings are sovereign over less than in absolute kingship and over more than in the Spartan form. Thus our examination concerns broadly two questions: one, whether it is advantageous for cities to have a general for life, either hereditary or appointed in turn,

1286a1or whether it is not advantageous; the other, whether it is advantageous for one person to be sovereign over everything or not. Examining this sort of generalship is more a matter of laws than of a constitution (for it can occur under every constitution),5 so let us set the first question aside. The remaining manner of kingship is a form of constitution, so we must consider it and go through the difficulties it contains. The starting point of the inquiry is this: is it more advantageous to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws?

Those1286a10 who think it advantageous to be ruled by a king hold that laws speak only in universal terms and do not give commands suited to the circumstances as they arise. Thus, in any art, governing by written rules is foolish (in Egypt too, physicians are allowed to alter the treatment after the fourth day, but if they do so earlier, it is at their own risk). It is clear, then, that15 for the same reason the constitution based on written rules and laws is not the best. Yet rulers too must possess that universal account. What has no element of passion at all is better than what has it by nature. Law has no such element, but every human soul must20 have it. Yet someone might perhaps say that, in compensation for this, the king will deliberate better about particulars. It is clear, then, that he must be a lawgiver, and that laws must be established, though they must not be sovereign where they go astray, since in other matters they must be sovereign. But in matters which the law cannot judge either25 at all or well, should the one best person rule, or everyone? Even now people come together to judge lawsuits, deliberate, and decide, and all these decisions concern particulars. Any one of them, taken individually, may perhaps be inferior; but the city consists of many, and just as a feast to which many contribute30 is finer than one provided by a single person alone, so for this reason the masses judge many things better than any one person.

Further, a large number is less easily corrupted. Just as a greater quantity of water is less easily spoiled, so the multitude is less easily corrupted than the few. When one person is overcome by anger or some other such passion, his judgment must be corrupted;1286a35 but in the other case it is difficult for everyone to become angry and go wrong at once. Let the multitude consist of free people who do nothing contrary to law except in matters where the law necessarily falls short. If this is not easy to secure among many, still, if there were several who were good both as men and as citizens, would one person be less easily corrupted as40 ruler, or rather several good men,1286b1 good without exception?

Is it not clear that the several would be? But they will form factions, whereas the one person is free from faction. To this we should perhaps reply that they are good in soul, just like that one person. If, then, the rule of several men, all good, is to be1286b5 named aristocracy, and that of one kingship, aristocracy would be preferable to kingship for cities, whether the rule possesses force or lacks it, provided that several similar men can be found. Perhaps this is why they were ruled by kings in earlier times: it was rare to find men greatly distinguished in virtue, especially since they then10 lived in small cities. Further, they appointed kings because of their benefactions, which are the work of good men. But when it came about that there were many alike in virtue, they no longer endured kingship, but sought something shared and established a constitution. When, becoming worse, they made money from the common funds,15 it is reasonable to suppose that oligarchies arose from some such beginning; for they made wealth the object of honor. From these they first changed to tyrannies, and from tyrannies to democracy. For by constantly reducing the number of those in power through shameful greed, they made the multitude stronger, so that it attacked them and democracies arose.20 Since cities have also come to be larger, perhaps it is no longer even easy for any constitution other than democracy to arise.

If someone were to hold that being ruled by a king is best for cities, how will matters stand with the king's children? Must his family too be kings? But if they turn out to be whatever sort of people1286b25 chance produces, this is harmful. But, it may be said, though sovereign, he will not hand power over to his children. Yet this is no longer easy to believe: it is difficult and requires a virtue greater than human nature allows. There is also a difficulty concerning his force: must the future king have some strength about him with which he can30 compel those unwilling to obey, or how can he administer his rule? For even if he were sovereign according to law, doing nothing contrary to law at his own wish, he must nevertheless possess a force with which to guard the laws. Perhaps, then, what concerns a king of this sort is not difficult35 to determine. He must possess strength, but this strength must be such that it exceeds that of each individual and of several together, yet is less than that of the multitude. This was how the ancients granted guards when they appointed someone over the city whom they called an aisymnetes or a tyrant; and when Dionysius requested guards, someone advised40 the Syracusans to give him that number of guards.

1287a1Our argument has now reached the king who does everything according to his own wish, and we must examine him. For the so-called king according to law is not, as we have said, a form of constitution (for in all constitutions5 there can be a generalship for life, for example in democracy and aristocracy, and many people make one person sovereign over administration: there is such an office at Epidamnus, and also at Opus, though with somewhat lesser powers). But concerning so-called absolute kingship (this is the form in which the king rules over everything according to10 his own wish), some think that it is not even by nature for one person to be sovereign over all the citizens where the city is composed of people who are alike. For those alike by nature must by nature have the same claim to the just and the same worth. Thus, if indeed giving unequal people equal food or15 clothing is harmful to their bodies, the same holds for honors; and likewise, then, for giving unequal shares to equals. Hence it is no more just for anyone to rule than to be ruled, and therefore it is just to do so in turn. But this is already law, for an orderly arrangement is law. It is therefore preferable that law should rule rather than any one of the citizens,20 and by this same argument, even if it is better for certain people to rule, they should be appointed guardians and servants of the laws. For there must be certain offices, but it is not just, they say, that one person should hold this position, at least when all are alike. Moreover, whatever the law seems unable to determine, a human being25 would be unable to know either. But the law, having educated the rulers expressly for this purpose, sets them to judge and administer the remaining matters according to the most just judgment. Further, it allows them to correct whatever, through experience, seems better than the existing provisions. Thus one who commands that law should rule seems to command that god and intellect30 alone should rule; but one who commands that a human being should rule adds a beast as well. For appetite is such a thing, and anger distorts rulers, even the best men. Hence law is intellect without desire. The example drawn from the arts seems false: the claim that treatment according to written rules is bad, and that it is preferable to employ35 those who possess the arts. For these do nothing contrary to reason because of friendship, but earn their fee by making the sick well; those in political offices, however, are accustomed to do many things out of spite or favor. Indeed, when people suspect physicians of being bribed by their enemies to destroy them40 for profit, they would then prefer to seek treatment according to written rules.

Moreover, people call in assistance for themselves:1287b1 physicians, when sick, call in other physicians, and physical trainers, when training, call in other trainers, because they cannot judge the truth when judging their own affairs and while under the influence of feeling. Thus it is clear that in seeking the just they seek the impartial; for law is the5 impartial. Further, laws based on custom are more authoritative, and concern more authoritative matters, than written laws, so that even if a human ruler is more reliable than written laws, he is not more reliable than those based on custom.

Moreover, it is not easy for one person to oversee many things. He will therefore have to appoint several rulers under him,1287b10 so what difference does it make whether this arrangement exists from the outset or the one person establishes it in this way? Further, as has been said before, if the good man has a just claim to rule because he is better, two good men are better than one. This is the meaning of “When two go together” (Hom. Il. 10.224) and of Agamemnon's prayer:15 “If only I had ten such fellow counselors.” (Hom. Il. 2.372) Even now, officeholders have authority to judge certain matters, as the juror does, where the law cannot determine them. For in matters where it can, no one disputes that the law would rule and judge best. But since some things can be encompassed by laws and others20 cannot, these are what cause the difficulty and the inquiry whether it is preferable for the best law to rule or the best man. For it is impossible to legislate about matters on which people deliberate. Thus they do not dispute that a human being must judge such matters, but contend that it should not be25 one alone, but many.

For each ruler educated by the law judges well; and perhaps it would seem absurd if one person, judging with two eyes and two ears and acting with two feet and hands, should see better than many people with many. Even now monarchs make many eyes1287b30 and ears and hands and feet for themselves: they make those friendly to their rule and to themselves fellow rulers. If these are not friends, they will not act according to the monarch's choice; but if they are friends to him and his rule, a friend is equal and alike, so that if he thinks these should rule, he thinks that equals and those alike should rule35 equally. These, then, are broadly the arguments of those who dispute the claims of kingship.

But perhaps these matters stand in this way for some people and not so for others. For some are by nature suited to a master's rule, others to kingly rule, and others to political rule; and different arrangements are just and advantageous for different people. But none is suited to tyranny under1287b40 nature's order, nor to any of the other constitutions that are deviations; for these arise contrary to nature.

From what has been said,1288a1 at least, it is clear that among those alike and equal it is neither advantageous nor just for one person to be sovereign over all, whether there are no laws and he himself is law, or there are laws; whether he is good and rules over good people, or not good and rules over people who are not good; nor even if in virtue he is5 better, except in a certain way. We must say what this way is; it has already been mentioned to some extent before.

First, we must define what sort of people is suited to kingship, what to aristocracy, and what to polity. A multitude suited to kingship is one naturally capable of bearing a family superior in virtue for political leadership; a multitude suited to aristocracy1288a10 is one naturally capable of bearing a body of people able to be ruled with the rule appropriate to free people by those fitted through virtue to lead in political rule; a multitude suited to polity is one in which there naturally arises a body capable of war, able to be ruled and to rule according to a law that distributes, in proportion to merit,15 offices to the well-off. When, then, either a whole family or one person among the rest happens to become so distinguished in virtue that his virtue surpasses that of all the others, it is then just that this family should be kingly and sovereign over everything, and that this one person should be king. For, as was said before,20 this holds not only according to the principle of justice usually advanced by those who establish constitutions, whether aristocratic, oligarchic, or democratic (for all make their claims on the basis of superiority, though not the same superiority), but also according to what was said earlier. For killing or25 exiling or ostracizing such a person is certainly not fitting, nor is requiring him to be ruled in turn. For it is not natural for the part to surpass the whole, yet this is what has happened to the person possessing such exceptional superiority. Thus only one course remains: to obey such a person and let him be sovereign, not in turn but without qualification.30 Let kingship, then, its varieties, and whether it is disadvantageous or advantageous for cities, and for which cities and in what way, be determined in this manner.

Since we say that there are three correct constitutions, and the best of these must be the one administered by the best people, and such a constitution is one in which it happens1288a35 that one person surpasses all together, or a whole family or multitude is superior in virtue, with some able to be ruled and others to rule with a view to the most desirable life; and since it was shown in our first arguments that the virtue of a man and that of a citizen of the best city must be the same, it is clear that in the same way40 and by the same means a man becomes good and someone could establish a city governed by aristocracy or kingship,

so that1288b1 the education and habits that make a good man and those that make a statesman and a king will be practically the same. Having determined these matters, we must now try to speak about the best constitution: in what manner it naturally arises and how it is established.5 Anyone who is to undertake the appropriate inquiry into it must, then, do so.

So this is one1285a15 kind of kingship: generalship for life. Some offices of this kind are hereditary, and others are filled by choice. Alongside this is another kind of monarchy, found in the kingships of some non-Greek peoples. All these have power much like tyrannies, but they are lawful and hereditary. Because20 non-Greek peoples are by nature more slavish in character than Greeks, and the peoples of Asia more so than those of Europe, they accept a master's rule without resentment. So these kingships are like tyrannies in this respect, but secure because they are hereditary and lawful. Their guard is also a king's guard,25 not a tyrant's, for the same reason. Citizens guard kings with their weapons, while foreign troops guard tyrants. Kings rule by law over willing subjects, while tyrants rule over unwilling subjects. So the first have a guard supplied by the citizens, and the second have a guard against the citizens.

These, then, are two kinds1285a30 of monarchy. Another is the kind that existed among the ancient Greeks, whose rulers they call aisymnetes. Put simply, this is an elective tyranny. It differs from the non-Greek kind not in being unlawful, but only in not being hereditary. Some held this office for life, others for set35 periods or tasks. For example, the people of Mytilene once chose Pittacus to deal with the exiles led by Antimenides and the poet Alcaeus. Alcaeus makes it clear in one of his drinking songs that they chose Pittacus as tyrant. He criticizes them: "Lowborn Pittacus, over their spiritless,1285b1 ill-fated city, they made tyrant, all together loudly praising him."

These forms of rule are and were like tyrannies because they involve mastery, but like kingships because the rulers are chosen and the subjects willing. A fourth kind of kingly monarchy is found in the heroic1285b5 period. These kingships were willingly accepted, hereditary, and lawful. The first kings became benefactors of the multitude through skills or war, or by bringing people together or providing land. So they became kings over willing subjects, and those who succeeded them inherited the office. They had authority to lead in war10 and to conduct sacrifices that did not belong to priests. They also judged lawsuits. Some did this without swearing an oath, others under oath. The oath consisted in raising the scepter. So in ancient times they ruled continuously over affairs in the city, within the country, and beyond its borders. Later,15 the kings gave up some powers, and the masses took others away. In the other cities, only the sacrifices were left to the kings. Where there was still something worth calling kingship, they had only the command of military operations beyond the borders.

1285b20These, then, are the kinds of kingship, four in number. One is that of the heroic period. It was accepted willingly, but concerned certain set matters. The king was both general and judge, and had authority over matters concerning the gods. The second is the non-Greek kind. This is hereditary rule involving mastery,25 under law. The third is what they call rule by an aisymnetes. This is elective tyranny. The fourth is the Spartan kind. Put simply, this is permanent hereditary generalship. These kinds differ from one another in this way. A fifth kind of kingship exists when, over everything,30 one person is sovereign, as each nation and each city is over its common affairs. It is organized along the lines of household management. Just as household management is a kind of kingship over a household, absolute kingship is household management of a city and of one or more nations.

So there are, roughly speaking, two kinds of kingship for us to examine: this one1285b35 and the Spartan one. Most of the others lie between them. They have authority over fewer things than absolute kingship, but more than Spartan kingship. So the inquiry is roughly about two questions. One is whether it benefits cities to have a permanent general, either by heredity or by taking turns,

1286a1or whether it does not. The other is whether it benefits them for one person to be sovereign over everything, or whether it does not. Examining generalship of this kind is more a matter of laws than of a constitution, since it can exist in every constitution.5 So let us leave the first question aside. The remaining kind of kingship is a form of constitution, so we must study it and go through the difficulties it involves. The starting point of the inquiry is this: is it better to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws?

People who1286a10 think it is better to be ruled by a king believe that laws speak only in general terms, and do not give directions for particular situations as they arise. So in any skill, following written rules is foolish. In Egypt, doctors are allowed to change the treatment after four days. If they do so earlier, it is at their own risk. Clearly, then,15 a constitution based on written rules and laws is not the best, for the same reason. Still, rulers too must have that general principle to guide them. What has no emotional element at all is better than what has it by nature. Law does not have it, but every human mind must20 have it. Yet someone might say that, to make up for this, the ruler will deliberate better about individual cases. So it is clear that he must be a lawgiver, and that there must be established laws. But they must not be authoritative where they miss the mark, though they must be authoritative in other matters. Where law cannot judge either25 at all or well, should the one best person rule, or should everyone? Even now people meet to hear lawsuits, deliberate, and make decisions, and all these decisions concern individual cases. Any one of them, considered alone, may be worse. But the city consists of many people. Just as a meal to which everyone contributes30 is better than a single meal supplied by one person, so the masses judge many matters better than any one person.

Also, a large quantity is less easily corrupted. Just as a greater amount of water is harder to spoil, so the multitude is harder to corrupt than the few. When one person is overcome by anger or some other emotion of that kind, his judgment must be spoiled.1286a35 But in the other case it is difficult for everyone to become angry and go wrong at once. Let the multitude be free people who do nothing against the law except in matters where the law must fall short. If this is not easy to achieve in a large group, still, suppose there are several good men who are also good citizens. Is one person harder to corrupt as40 ruler, or are several good people,1286b1 all of them good?

Surely it is clear that the larger number is. But they will form factions, while the one person will not. The answer to this may be that they are good in character, just like that one person. If rule by several men, all good, should be1286b5 called aristocracy, and rule by one kingship, cities should prefer aristocracy to kingship. This holds whether the ruling body has an armed force or not, provided several similar people can be found. Perhaps this is also why people were ruled by kings in earlier times: it was rare to find men far superior in virtue, especially when they were then10 living in small cities. Also, they made men kings because of benefits they had provided, and providing benefits is the work of good men. But when there came to be many people alike in virtue, they no longer put up with kingship. They sought something shared and established a constitution. When they became worse and made money from public resources,15 it is reasonable to suppose that oligarchies arose from something like this. For they made wealth the basis of honor. From these they first changed to tyrannies, and from tyrannies to democracy. By constantly concentrating power in fewer hands because of shameful greed, they made the multitude stronger, until it attacked and democracies arose.20 Since the cities have also grown larger, perhaps it is no longer even easy for any constitution other than democracy to arise.

Suppose someone holds that kingship is best for cities. What will happen with the king's children? Should his family also rule as kings? But if they turn out to be just any sort of people,1286b25 that is harmful. Yet, it may be said, although he has the authority, he will not hand it over to his children. But it is not easy to believe that. It is difficult and demands greater virtue than human nature allows. There is also a difficulty about his armed force. Should the person who is to be king have a force around him with which he can30 compel those unwilling to obey? Otherwise, how can he manage his rule? Even if his authority is under law, and he does nothing against the law merely because he wants to, he must still have a force with which to protect the laws. Perhaps it is not difficult35 to settle the question for a king of this kind. He should have a force, but it should be strong enough to overcome any single person or several together, yet weaker than the multitude. This is how the ancients supplied guards when they appointed someone over the city whom they called an aisymnetes or a tyrant. And when Dionysius asked for guards, someone advised40 the people of Syracuse to give him that number of guards.

1287a1The argument has now reached the king who does everything as he wants, and we must examine him. For the so-called king under law is not, as we said, a form of constitution. In every constitution there can be5 a generalship for life, for example in democracy and aristocracy. Many people make one person sovereign over the administration. An office of this kind exists at Epidamnus, and at Opus too, though with somewhat less power. As for what is called absolute kingship, the king rules everything as10 he wishes. Some people think that one person's sovereignty over all the citizens goes against nature where the city consists of similar people. People who are alike by nature must have the same claim to what is just and the same worth by nature. So if unequal people have equal food or15 clothing, and this harms their bodies, the same holds for honors. Likewise, it is harmful for equals to have unequal shares. That is why it is no more just for anyone to rule than to be ruled, and the same goes for taking turns. But this is already law, since an orderly arrangement is law. So it is more desirable for law to rule than for any one of the citizens20 to do so. By the same argument, even if it is better for certain people to rule, they should be appointed guardians of the laws and servants of the laws. There must be some offices, but these people say it is not just for this to mean one person, when everyone is alike. Moreover, whatever the law seems unable to determine, a human being25 would also be unable to know. But the law gives rulers the training they need, then leaves the remaining matters to them to judge and manage with the fairest judgment. It also allows them to correct anything that experience shows to be better than the established rules. So someone who calls for law to rule seems to call for god and reason30 alone to rule. Someone who calls for a human being to rule adds a wild animal too. Desire is like that, and anger twists rulers, even the best men. That is why law is reason without appetite. The example drawn from skills seems false: that treatment by written rules is bad, and that it is better to use35 people who have the skills. They do not act against reason out of friendship. Instead, they earn their pay by curing the sick. But people in political offices often act out of spite or favoritism. In fact, when people suspect doctors of having been won over by their enemies to destroy them40 for profit, they would then prefer treatment according to written rules.

Moreover, people call in help for themselves:1287b1 doctors, when ill, call in other doctors, and athletic trainers, when training, bring in other trainers. They cannot judge truly because they are judging their own affairs and are under the influence of emotion. So it is clear that people who seek the just seek what is impartial. For law is what is5 impartial. Also, laws based on customs are more authoritative, and concern more authoritative matters, than written laws. So even if a human ruler is more reliable than written laws, he is not more reliable than laws based on custom.

Besides, it is not easy for one person to oversee many things. So he will need to appoint several rulers under him.1287b10 What difference does it make whether this arrangement exists right from the start or the one person sets it up in this way? We made this point earlier too. If a man's goodness gives him a right to rule because he is better, two good men are better still than one. That is what is meant by "Two going together" (Hom. Il. 10.224) and by Agamemnon's prayer,15 "If only I had ten such advisers." (Hom. Il. 2.372) Even now officials, like the juror, have authority to judge certain matters that the law cannot determine. Where the law can determine them, no one disputes that it would rule and judge best. But some matters can be covered by laws, while20 others cannot. These are what make people raise difficulties and ask whether it is better for the best law to rule or for the best man. Matters that people deliberate about cannot be legislated for. So they do not dispute that a human being must judge such matters. They dispute that it should be only25 one person rather than many.

For each ruler, trained by the law, judges well. It might seem strange if one person could see better, judging with two eyes and two ears and acting with two feet and hands, than many people with many. Even now monarchs provide many eyes1287b30 for themselves, and ears, hands, and feet. They make people friendly to their rule and to themselves their fellow rulers. If these people are not friends, they will not act according to the monarch's wishes. But if they are friends of both him and his rule, a friend is an equal and a similar person. So if he thinks these people should rule, he thinks equals and similar people should rule35 equally. These, roughly, are the arguments made by those who challenge kingship.

But perhaps these arguments apply in this way to some people, and not to others. Some people are by nature suited to mastery, others to kingship, and others to political rule. Different arrangements are just and beneficial for different people. But no one is suited to tyranny under1287b40 nature's order, or to any of the other constitutions that are deviations. These come about contrary to nature.

From what we have said,1288a1 it is clear that among similar and equal people it is neither beneficial nor just for one person to be sovereign over everyone. This holds whether there are no laws and he acts as law himself, or there are laws. It holds whether he is good and rules good people, or is not good and rules people who are not good. It holds even if in virtue he is5 better, except in a certain way. We must say what that way is. We have already said something about it earlier.

First we must define what makes a people suited to kingship, aristocracy, or polity, lawful government by the many. A people suited to kingship is one that naturally produces a family superior in virtue for political leadership. A people suited to aristocracy1288a10 is one that naturally produces a body able to be ruled as free people by those whose virtue equips them to lead in political rule. A people suited to polity is one in which a body capable of war naturally develops, able to be ruled and to rule under a law that assigns, according to worth,15 offices to the well-off. Suppose a whole family, or even one individual among the others, becomes outstanding in virtue. Their virtue surpasses that of all the others. Then it is just for that family to be royal and sovereign over everything, or for that individual to be king. As we said earlier,20 this follows not only from the principle of justice usually put forward by those who establish constitutions, whether aristocratic, oligarchic, or democratic. All base their claims on superiority, but not on the same superiority. It also follows from what was said before. Killing or25 exiling such a person or voting to banish him is not fitting. Nor is expecting him to be ruled in turn. A part is not naturally superior to the whole, but that is what has happened with someone whose superiority is so great. So the only course left is to obey such a person and let him be sovereign, not in turn but without qualification.30 Let this settle our account of kingship: what different kinds it has, whether it benefits cities or not, which cities it benefits, and how.

We say that there are three correct constitutions. Of these, the best must be the one managed by the best people. This is a constitution in which1288a35 either one individual, a whole family, or a body of people surpasses everyone in virtue, some able to be ruled and others to rule for the most desirable life. In our first arguments, we showed that the virtue of a man and that of a citizen of the best city must be the same. So it is clear that in the same way40 and by the same means a man becomes good and someone could organize a city ruled by an aristocracy or a king.

So1288b1 the education and habits that make a good man will be roughly the same as those that make a person fit for political rule and kingship. Now that these things have been settled, we must try to discuss the best constitution: how it naturally comes about and how it can be established.5 So anyone who intends to carry out a suitable inquiry into it must do so.