Book III, 1281b–1285a

This arrangement of the constitution presents a difficulty: first, that1281b40 judging who has treated a patient correctly would seem to belong to the same person as treating him and making him well from his present illness; and that person is the physician.

The same holds also1282a1 for the other kinds of expertise and the arts. Just as a physician must render his account before physicians, so must the others before their peers. A physician may be a practitioner, a master of the art, or, third, someone educated in the art (for there are5 such people in practically every art); and we grant those who are educated no less right to judge than those who have expert knowledge. Further, the same would seem to hold for choice. For choosing correctly, too, is the work of those who know: choosing a geometer belongs to those versed in geometry, and10 a pilot to those versed in navigation. Even if some laymen share in certain tasks and arts, they certainly do not do so more than the experts. Thus, according to this argument, the multitude should not be made sovereign either over the choice of officeholders or over the examination of their accounts. But perhaps not all these statements are correct,15 both because of our earlier argument, provided that the multitude is not excessively slavish (each person will be a worse judge than the experts, but all together will be better or no worse), and because, in some matters, the maker is neither the only nor the best judge, wherever the work is also understood by those who do not possess the art. For example,20 knowledge of a house does not belong only to its builder: its user will judge it even better (and its user is the household manager); a pilot judges a rudder better than a carpenter, and the diner, not the cook, judges a feast.

One might perhaps think that this difficulty is adequately resolved in this way; but another follows from it.1282a25 For it seems absurd that inferior people should be sovereign over greater matters than decent people, and the examination of accounts and the choice of officeholders are matters of the greatest importance. In some constitutions, as has been said, these are assigned to the people; for the assembly is sovereign over all such matters. Yet people take part in the assembly,30 serve on the council, and sit as jurors with small property qualifications and at any ordinary age, while those who serve as treasurers and generals and hold the greatest offices have large property qualifications. One might resolve this difficulty in the same way. For perhaps these arrangements too are correct. Neither the juror, nor the council member, nor the assembly member35 is a ruler; rather, it is the law court, the council, and the people; and each of those mentioned is a part of these (by a part I mean the council member, the assembly member, and the juror). Thus the multitude is justly sovereign over greater matters; for the people, the council, and the law court consist of many. And the property qualification40 of all these together is greater than that of those who, individually or in small groups, hold the great offices. Let these matters, then, be determined1282b1 in this way.

The difficulty first mentioned makes nothing else so clear as this: laws rightly established must be sovereign, while the ruler, whether one or more, must be sovereign in those matters about which the laws cannot1282b5 speak precisely, because it is not easy to define everything in universal terms. What sort of laws rightly established ought to be is not yet clear at all; the earlier difficulty still remains. For laws must be bad or good, just or unjust, together with and in the same way as constitutions.10 This, at least, is clear: laws must be established to suit the constitution. If this is so, it is evident that laws conforming to correct constitutions must be just, and those conforming to deviant constitutions unjust.

Since in every science and art1282b15 the end is a good, and the greatest good, good in the highest degree, is the end of the most authoritative of them all, which is political capacity, and since the political good is the just, and this is the common advantage, everyone thinks the just is a certain equality. Up to a point, at least, they agree with the philosophical arguments in which20 ethical matters have been defined (for they say that the just is something for certain people, and that it must be equal for equals). But equality and inequality in what must not escape us. For this presents a difficulty and calls for political philosophy. Someone might perhaps say that offices should be distributed unequally according to superiority in any good,25 if people differ in none of the other respects but are alike. For people who differ have different claims to the just and to what accords with merit. But if this is true, superiority in color, stature, or any good whatever will give those who possess it a larger share of political rights.30 Or is the falsehood here apparent on the surface? It is clear in the other sciences and capacities. Among flute players equal in their art, those of better birth should not receive a greater share of the flutes (for they will play no better); rather, superiority in the instruments should be granted to the one superior in the work. If35 what is said is not yet clear, it will become clearer as we carry it further. Suppose someone is superior in flute playing but falls far short in birth or beauty. Even if each of these is a greater good than flute playing (I mean birth and beauty), and even if, in40 proportion, they surpass flute playing more than he surpasses the others in flute playing, still he must be given the superior1283a1 flutes.

For superiority in wealth and birth would have to contribute to the work, and they contribute nothing.

Further, by this argument every good would be comparable with every other. For if a certain stature counts for more, then1283a5 stature in general would compete with wealth and freedom. Thus, if this person exceeds that one more in stature than that one exceeds him in virtue, and virtue in general is superior to stature, everything would be comparable. For if so much stature is better than so much virtue, clearly a certain amount is equal to it. But since this is impossible,10 it is evident that in political matters too people reasonably do not claim offices on the basis of every inequality (for if some are slow and others fast, that is no reason for some to have more and others less; rather, their difference receives its honor in athletic contests). Instead, those things of which a city is composed15 must be the basis of the claim. This is why the wellborn, the free, and the wealthy reasonably lay claim to honor. For there must be people who are free and who contribute property: a city could not consist entirely of the poor, any more than of slaves. But if these are needed, it is clear that20 justice and political virtue are needed too, for without these a city cannot be governed. The difference is that without the former a city cannot exist, and without the latter it cannot be governed well.

As regards a city's existence, then, all or at least some of these would seem to make a just claim; as regards the good life, however,1283a25 education and virtue would make the most just claim, as was said before. Since those who are equal in only one respect ought not to have an equal share in everything, nor those unequal in one respect an unequal share, all constitutions of this kind must be deviations. It was also said earlier30 that everyone makes a just claim in a certain sense, but not everyone makes a just claim without qualification. The wealthy do so because they have a larger share of the land, and the land is common, and because they are also generally more trustworthy in contracts. The free and the wellborn do so because they are closely related (for fuller citizenship35 belongs to those of nobler birth than to those of low birth, and noble birth is honored in each people's homeland); further, because those descended from better people are likely to be better, for noble birth is virtue of a family. Likewise, we shall say that virtue too makes a just claim, for we say that justice is a communal virtue, which must be followed by40 all the other virtues. But the greater number also makes a claim against the lesser, for they are stronger, wealthier, and better, when the greater number is taken collectively against the lesser.

So,1283b1 if all were in one city—I mean, for example, the good, the wealthy, the wellborn, and also some other multitude of citizens—would there be a dispute over who ought to rule, or not? In each of the constitutions mentioned, beyond dispute5 is the judgment as to who ought to rule (for they differ from one another in who is sovereign: one, for example, has rule through the wealthy, another through good men, and each of the others in the same way). Nevertheless, let us examine how the matter should be determined when all these are present at the same time. If, then,10 those who possess virtue are very few in number, how ought we to decide? Or must we consider their fewness in relation to the task, asking whether they can govern the city, or whether they are numerous enough to form a city by themselves? There is a difficulty that bears on all those who dispute over political honors. For it would seem15 that those who claim to rule because of wealth, and likewise those who claim it because of family, have no just argument. For it is clear that if, in turn, one person is wealthier than all the rest, by the same principle of justice this one must rule over all; and likewise the person distinguished in noble birth must rule over those who lay claim20 on the basis of freedom. Perhaps the same will occur with virtue in aristocracies. For if one man is better than the other good men in the citizen body, by the same principle of justice he must be sovereign. Thus, if the multitude ought to be sovereign because they are stronger than25 the few, then if one person, or more than one but fewer than the many, is stronger than the others, these should be sovereign rather than the multitude. All these considerations seem to make it clear that none of these standards is correct as a basis on which people claim that they themselves should rule and that the others should be ruled by them,30 all of them. For even against those who claim to be sovereign over the citizen body on the basis of virtue, and likewise those who claim it on the basis of wealth, the multitudes could advance a certain just argument. Nothing prevents the multitude from sometimes being better than the few and wealthier, not individually but35 collectively. For this reason, the difficulty that some people investigate and put forward can also be answered in this way. Some ask whether the lawgiver who wishes to establish the most correct laws should legislate for the advantage of the better people or for that of the greater number, when the situation described occurs.40 What is correct must be understood as equitable; and what is equitably correct looks to the advantage of the whole city and to the common advantage of its citizens. One who shares in ruling and being ruled, in the general sense,1284a1 is a citizen,

but differs according to each constitution; in the best constitution, he is one who is able and chooses to be ruled and to rule with a view to the life of virtue.

But if there is one person so exceptionally superior in virtue, or more than one, though not1284a5 enough to provide the full complement of a city, that the virtue of all the others and their political capacity cannot be compared with theirs, if there are several, or with his alone, if there is one, these people should no longer be regarded as part of the city. For they will be treated unjustly if deemed worthy of equal shares, when they are so unequal in10 virtue and political capacity; such a person would naturally be like a god among human beings. Hence it is clear that legislation too must concern those who are equal in birth and capacity; but there is no law for such people, for they themselves are law. It would be ridiculous for anyone to legislate15 for them. They might perhaps say what Antisthenes said the lions said when the hares were making speeches and demanding that everyone have an equal share. For this reason democratic cities institute ostracism: these cities are thought to pursue equality above all,20 so that they ostracized those who seemed to be superior in power through wealth, many friends, or some other political strength, and removed them from the city for fixed periods. The story is told that the Argonauts too left Heracles behind for such a reason: the Argo refused to carry him25 with the other voyagers, because he surpassed them so greatly. Thus those who condemn tyranny and Periander's advice to Thrasybulus should not be thought entirely correct in their criticism. For they say that Periander said nothing to the herald sent to seek his advice, but cut off30 the ears of grain that rose above the others and leveled the field. The herald did not understand the reason for what was done, but reported what had happened, and Thrasybulus realized that he must eliminate the men who stood above the rest. For this is not advantageous only to tyrants, nor do tyrants alone do it;35 the same holds for oligarchies and democracies. For ostracism has, in a sense, the same effect as cutting down and exiling those who stand above the rest. Those who control power do the same to cities and peoples: the Athenians, for example, to the Samians,40 Chians, and Lesbians (for as soon as they had a firm hold on their empire, they humbled them contrary to their agreements),

and the Persian1284b1 king often cut down the Medes, Babylonians, and others whose pride arose from having once held power.

The problem applies generally to all constitutions, including the correct ones. For deviant constitutions1284b5 do this with a view to their own advantage; yet the same holds for those that look to the common good. This is clear also in the other arts and sciences. A painter would not allow the figure to have a foot that exceeds its proper proportion, even if10 it were exceptionally beautiful; nor would a shipbuilder allow this in the stern or any other part of the ship, nor would a chorus trainer allow someone whose voice is louder and finer than the whole chorus to sing with it. Thus, on this ground, nothing prevents monarchs from agreeing with cities, provided their own rule is advantageous15 to the cities when they act in this way. Hence, where the superiorities are acknowledged, the argument concerning ostracism contains an element of political justice. It is better, then, for the lawgiver to construct the constitution from the beginning so that it needs no such remedy; but as a second course, if the situation arises, he should try through some such20 remedial measure to correct it. This was not what happened in cities: they did not look to the advantage of their own constitution but used ostracisms for factional purposes. In deviant constitutions, then, it is clear that this is advantageous and just for them in particular; and perhaps it is also clear that it is not unconditionally25 just. But in the best constitution there is a great difficulty—not concerning superiority in other goods, such as strength, wealth, and many friends, but if someone becomes outstanding in virtue: what should be done? Surely no one would say that such a person should be expelled and removed;30 yet neither should people rule over him. That would be much the same as claiming to rule over Zeus by dividing the offices. What remains, then, and what seems natural, is that everyone should willingly obey such a person, so that such people are kings in their cities for life.

1284b35Perhaps, after the arguments given, it is appropriate to pass on to examine kingship; for we say that this is one of the correct constitutions. We must examine whether it is advantageous for a city and territory that are to be well governed to be ruled by a king, or not, but rather by some other constitution,40 or whether it is advantageous for some and not for others. First, then, we must distinguish whether there is one kind of kingship or whether it has several1285a1 varieties.

It is easy to see at least this: that it includes several kinds, and that the manner of rule is not the same in all. For kingship in the Spartan constitution seems to be kingship according to law in the fullest sense, but it is not sovereign over everything;1285a5 rather, when the king goes beyond the country's borders, he leads in matters of war. Further, matters relating to the gods have been assigned to the kings. This kingship, then, is a kind of generalship with full powers and held for life. For the king has no authority to put anyone to death except in a particular circumstance, as among the ancients on10 military expeditions, under the law of force. Homer makes this clear: Agamemnon endured abuse in the assemblies, but once they went out he had authority even to put someone to death. At any rate, he says: “Whomever I find far from battle … … he will not be sure of escaping the dogs and birds; for death is in my hands.” (Hom. Il. 2.391)

This arrangement of the constitution raises a difficulty. The first is that1281b40 the person qualified to judge who has treated a patient correctly would seem to be the same person qualified to give treatment and cure the patient of the illness he has. That person is the doctor.

The same applies1282a1 to other kinds of practical knowledge and skill. So, just as a doctor must answer for his work before doctors, other skilled workers must answer before people like themselves. There is the doctor who practices, the doctor who directs the work, and, third, the person educated about the skill. There are5 people of this third kind in practically every skill. We allow educated people to judge no less than experts. Then choice would seem to work in the same way. Making the right choice is also the job of people who know: choosing a surveyor is the job of people who know surveying, and10 choosing a ship's pilot is the job of people who know navigation. In some kinds of work and skill, some nonspecialists do have a share in the knowledge, but certainly no greater share than the experts. So, on this argument, the multitude should not be made sovereign over either the choice of officials or the examination of their accounts. But perhaps these points are not all correct.15 The earlier argument counts against them, if the multitude is not too slavish. Each person will be a worse judge than the experts. But all together will be better or no worse. In some cases, too, the maker is neither the only judge nor the best. This holds wherever people without the skill also understand its products. For example,20 a house is not understood only by its builder. The person who uses it will judge it better, and the person who uses it is the household manager. A pilot judges a rudder better than a carpenter does, and a dinner is judged by the diner, not the cook.

Someone might think this solves the difficulty well enough. But another difficulty follows from it.1282a25 It seems strange for inferior people to be sovereign over more important matters than decent people. Examining officials' accounts and choosing officials are matters of the greatest importance. In some constitutions, as we have said, these are assigned to the people. The assembly is sovereign over all such matters. Yet people take part in the assembly,30 serve on the council, and act as jurors with small property qualifications and at any age, while treasurers, generals, and holders of the highest offices have large property qualifications. This difficulty too could be solved in the same way. Perhaps these arrangements are also right. For neither an individual juror, nor a council member, nor an assembly member35 is a ruler. The law court, the council, and the people are. Each of the people just named is a part of these bodies. By a part I mean the council member, assembly member, and juror. So the multitude is rightly sovereign over more important matters. The people, the council, and the law court consist of many people. And the property qualification40 of all of them together is greater than that of the people who hold high offices individually or in small groups. Let these points be settled1282b1 in this way.

The difficulty mentioned first makes one thing clearer than anything else: correctly established laws should be sovereign. The ruler, whether one person or several, should be sovereign over the matters on which the laws cannot1282b5 speak precisely, because it is not easy to lay down general rules about everything. But what correctly established laws should be like is not yet clear. The earlier difficulty still remains. Laws must be bad or good, and just or unjust, at the same time and in the same way as the constitutions.10 At least this is clear: laws must be established to fit the constitution. If that is so, laws that fit correct constitutions must be just, and laws that fit deviant constitutions must be unjust.

In every science and skill,1282b15 the goal is a good. The greatest good, in the fullest sense, is the goal of the most authoritative of them all, which is political expertise. The political good is the just, and that is the common advantage. Now everyone thinks the just is a kind of equality. Up to a point, people agree with the philosophical arguments in which20 ethical questions have been settled. They say that the just is something assigned to certain people, and that equals should have equal shares. But we must not overlook what equality and inequality apply to. This raises a difficulty and calls for political philosophy. Someone might say that offices should be distributed unequally according to superiority in any good quality,25 if people do not differ in any other way but are alike in everything else. People who differ, he might say, have different claims to what is just and what fits their worth. But if this is true, people who are superior in complexion, height, or any other good quality will have a larger share of political rights.30 Or is the mistake here obvious? It is clear in the other sciences and abilities. Among flute players with equal skill, those of better birth should not get a larger share of the flutes. They will not play any better. The better instruments should go to the person who is better at the job. If35 what we mean is not yet clear, it will become clear as we take it further. Suppose someone is better at flute playing but much worse in birth or beauty. Each of those may be a greater good than flute playing. I mean good birth and beauty. Even if,40 proportionately, their superiority over flute playing is greater than his superiority as a flute player, he should still be given the better1283a1 flutes.

For being richer or better born would have to improve the performance. Neither does.

Also, on this argument, every good would be comparable with every other good. For if a certain amount of size counts for more, then1283a5 size in general could compete with wealth and freedom too. So if one person stands out more in size than another does in virtue, and virtue in general is far superior to size, everything would be comparable. For if this much size is better than that much virtue, clearly some amount is equal to it. But this is impossible.10 So it is reasonable that, in political matters too, people do not claim offices on the basis of every inequality. If some are slow and others fast, that is no reason for some to have more and others less. The difference between them gets its reward in athletic contests. Instead, the things from which a city is made15 must be the basis of the claims. That is why people of good birth, free people, and rich people reasonably claim honor. The citizens must be free and must contribute property. A city could not consist entirely of people without resources, any more than it could consist of slaves. But if these qualities are needed, clearly20 justice and political virtue are needed too. A city cannot be run without these either. The difference is that without the first qualities a city cannot exist, while without the latter it cannot be run well.

So, as far as the city's existence goes, all or at least some of these qualities would seem to support valid claims. But for a good life,1283a25 education and virtue would have the strongest claim, as we said earlier. People equal in only one respect should not have equal shares in everything, and people unequal in one respect should not have unequal shares in everything. So all constitutions of these kinds must be deviations. We have already said30 that everyone has some justice on their side in these disputes, but not everyone is right without qualification. The rich make their claim because they have a larger share of the land, and the land is common property. Also, they are generally more trustworthy in contracts. Free people and people of good birth make their claim as closely related groups. Fuller citizenship35 belongs to people of better birth than to people of low birth, and good birth is honored in each people's own country. Also, people from better families are likely to be better, since good birth is the virtue of a family. In the same way, we will say that virtue too has a just claim. We say that justice is a virtue of social life, and it must be followed by40 all the other virtues. But the greater number also has a claim against the smaller number. They are stronger, richer, and better, if the larger group is taken together and compared with the smaller.

So,1283b1 if all these groups were in one city—I mean, for example, good people, rich people, people of good birth, and also some other body of citizens—would there be a dispute about who should rule, or not? In each of the constitutions we have mentioned, there is no dispute5 about the decision on who should rule. They differ from one another in who is sovereign: one is governed by rich people, another by good men, and each of the others differs in the same way. Still, let us consider how to decide when these groups all exist at the same time. If the10 people with virtue are very few in number, how should we draw the distinction? Should we judge how few they are in relation to their task—whether they can manage the city—or ask whether there are enough of them to make a city by themselves? There is a difficulty for everyone who disputes political honors. For it might seem15 that those who claim the right to rule because of wealth have no just argument. The same goes for those who claim it because of birth. For if, in turn, one person is richer than everyone else, then clearly, on the same principle of justice, that one person must rule them all. The same goes for someone whose birth is superior to that of those claiming the right to rule20 because they are free. Perhaps the same result will follow in aristocracies on the basis of virtue. If one man is better than the other good men in the citizen body, he must be sovereign on the same principle of justice. Suppose the multitude should be sovereign because it is stronger than25 the few. Then if one person, or several who are fewer than the multitude, are stronger than the rest, they should be sovereign instead. All this seems to show that none of these standards is correct as a basis for claiming that they should rule and the others should be ruled by them,30 every one of them. For the multitudes could make a fairly just argument against those who claim to be sovereign over the citizen body on the basis of virtue, and equally against those who claim it on the basis of wealth. Nothing prevents the multitude from sometimes being better and richer than the few, not individually but35 all together. So this also gives a way to answer the difficulty that some people investigate and raise. Some ask whether a lawgiver who wants to establish the most correct laws should legislate for the advantage of the better people or of the greater number, when the situation just described occurs.40 What is right must be understood as equal treatment. Equal treatment is right when it serves the advantage of the whole city and the common advantage of the citizens. Someone who shares in ruling and being ruled1284a1 is a citizen in general,

but the citizen differs with each constitution. Under the best constitution, a citizen is someone able and willing to be ruled and to rule for a life in accordance with virtue.

Suppose one person has far superior virtue, or several people do, though not1284a5 enough to make up a city. Suppose all the others' virtue and political ability cannot be compared with theirs, if there are several. If there is only one, the comparison is with that one person's virtue and ability. Such people should no longer be treated as part of the city. They will be wronged if they are judged worthy of equal shares, when they are so unequal in10 virtue and political ability. Such a person would naturally be like a god among human beings. So it is clear that legislation must concern people equal in birth and ability. There is no law for people like these: they are themselves a law. It would be ridiculous for anyone to legislate15 for them. They might say what Antisthenes said the lions said when the hares made speeches and demanded that everyone have an equal share. This is also why democratic cities establish ostracism, or temporary banishment. They seem to pursue equality more than anything else,20 so they ostracized people thought to have superior power because of wealth, many friends, or some other political strength, and removed them from the city for set periods. The story says that the Argonauts left Heracles behind for a similar reason. The Argo would not carry him25 with the other sailors because he far surpassed them. So we should not think that people who criticize tyranny and Periander's advice to Thrasybulus are simply right in their criticism. They say Periander said nothing to the messenger sent to ask his advice, but cut off the30 ears of grain that stood out and made the field level. The messenger did not understand why he did this, but reported what happened. Thrasybulus then understood that he must eliminate the men who stood out. This does not benefit only tyrants, and tyrants are not the only ones who do it.35 The same applies to oligarchies and democracies. In a way, ostracism has the same effect as cutting down those who stand out and sending them into exile. Those who hold power also do the same to cities and nations. The Athenians, for example, did it to the people of Samos,40 Chios, and Lesbos. As soon as they had firm control of their empire, they humbled them, contrary to the treaties.

The Persian1284b1 king often cut down the Medes, Babylonians, and others who were proud because they had once held power.

The problem applies generally to all constitutions, including the correct ones. Deviant constitutions1284b5 do this with an eye to their own advantage, but the same applies to those that look to the common good. This is clear in other skills and sciences too. A painter would not let a figure have a foot out of proportion, even if10 it were exceptionally beautiful. Nor would a shipbuilder allow an oversized stern or any other part of a ship. Nor would a chorus trainer let someone sing with the chorus whose voice was louder and more beautiful than the whole chorus. So, for this reason, nothing prevents monarchs from agreeing with cities, provided their own rule is beneficial15 to the cities when they act in this way. So the argument for ostracism has some political justice on its side when it concerns acknowledged kinds of superiority. It is better, then, for the lawgiver to organize the constitution from the start so that it does not need this kind of treatment. The next-best course, if the situation arises, is to try with some such20 remedy to put things right. But that is not what happened in the cities. They did not look to the advantage of their own constitution. Instead, they used ostracism for factional purposes. In deviant constitutions it is clear that ostracism serves their particular advantage and is just in that particular sense. Perhaps it is also clear that it is not in every sense25 just. But in the best constitution it raises a serious difficulty. This does not concern superiority in other goods, like strength, wealth, or having many friends. Rather, if someone is exceptionally virtuous, what should be done? Surely people would not say that such a person should be expelled and removed.30 But neither should they rule over him. That would be much like claiming to rule over Zeus by dividing up the offices. So the only course left, which seems natural, is for everyone to obey such a person willingly. People like this should therefore be kings in their cities for life.

1284b35After these arguments, it may be a good idea to move on and examine kingship. We say it is one of the correct constitutions. We must examine whether rule by a king benefits a city and territory that are to be run well. Would some other constitution be better,40 or would kingship benefit some cities but not others? First we must distinguish whether there is just one kind of it or several1285a1 different kinds.

It is easy to see that it includes several kinds, and that the way rule is exercised is not the same in all of them. Kingship in the Spartan constitution seems the clearest example of kingship under law. But it is not sovereign over everything.1285a5 When the king leaves the country, he leads in matters of war. Matters concerning the gods are also assigned to the kings. So this kingship is like a permanent generalship with full command. The king has no authority to put someone to death, except in certain circumstances, as among the ancients on10 military expeditions, under the law of force. Homer makes this clear. Agamemnon put up with insults in the assemblies, but once they had marched out he had authority even to kill. At any rate, he says, "Whoever I find away from battle … … he will not be safe from the dogs and birds; for death is in my hands." (Hom. Il. 2.391)