Book VII, 1323a–1326a

1323a14Concerning the best constitution, anyone intending to undertake the15 appropriate inquiry must first determine which life is most worthy of choice. For if this is unclear, the best constitution must also be unclear; those who take part in public life under the best arrangements their circumstances allow should fare best, unless something contrary to reasonable expectation occurs. Therefore we must first20 agree on which life is most worthy of choice for virtually everyone, and after this whether it is the same or different for a community and for an individual. Since we consider that much has been said adequately about the best life in the external discourses, we must use those discussions now as well. For in truth, at least as regards one division, no one would dispute25 that, since there are three classes of goods—external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul—the blessed must possess all of these. For no one would call blessed a person with no share in courage, moderation, justice, or practical wisdom, but who fears the passing30 flies, who abstains from none of the most extreme acts if he desires food or drink, who ruins his dearest friends for a quarter-obol, and whose mind is likewise as senseless and mistaken as that of a child or a madman. Everyone would agree to these statements, as it seems;35 but they differ about the amount and the relative superiority of the goods. For they think any amount of virtue sufficient, however small, but seek an unlimited excess of wealth, money, power, reputation, and everything of that kind. We shall tell them that it is easy to gain conviction about these matters even from the40 facts, by observing that people acquire and preserve not the virtues through external goods, but external goods through the virtues,

1323b1and that living happily, whether for human beings it lies in enjoyment, in virtue, or in both, belongs more to those whose character and mind are adorned to the highest degree, but who are moderate in the acquisition of external goods, than to those5 who possess more of those goods than is useful, but fall short in these qualities. Nevertheless, the matter is also easy to grasp when examined by reasoning. For external goods have a limit, like an instrument (and everything useful is useful for something); an excess of them must either harm or be of no benefit to their10 possessors. But each of the soul's goods is more useful the more abundant it is, if we ought to apply to these not only the term noble but also useful. In general, it is clear that we shall say the best conditions of things stand in relation to one another according to the superiority15 of the things whose conditions we say they are. So if the soul is more honorable than property and the body, both without qualification and for us, the best condition of each of these must stand in the same proportion. Moreover, these things are by nature worthy of choice for the soul's sake, and all must20 choose them for its sake if they think sensibly, not the soul for theirs.

Let us therefore agree that each person has as much happiness as he has virtue and practical wisdom, and activity in accordance with them. We call the god as witness, who is happy and blessed not through any1323b25 external goods, but through himself and the character of his nature. For these reasons good fortune must also be different from happiness (for chance and fortune cause the goods external to the soul, but no one is just or moderate by chance or through fortune). It follows,30 and requires the same arguments, that the best city is also happy and acts well. But those who do not perform noble actions cannot act well; and no noble deed of either a man or a city exists without virtue and practical wisdom. A city's courage, justice, and practical wisdom35 have the same power and form as those through participation in which each human being is called just, practically wise, and moderate. Let this suffice as a preface to the argument; for it is neither possible to leave these matters untouched nor to pursue all the arguments appropriate to them, since another inquiry concerns40 these matters. For now let this much be assumed: the best life, both for each individual separately and for cities in common,

is the life with virtue sufficiently supported1324a1 to allow participation in actions according to virtue. As for those who dispute this, we must leave them aside in the present inquiry and examine their objections later, if anyone happens not to be persuaded by what has been said.

1324a5It remains to say whether we must declare the happiness of each individual human being and of a city to be the same or not the same. This too is evident; for everyone would agree that it is the same. Those who place living well in wealth for an individual also regard the whole city, if it is rich,10 as blessed; those who most esteem the tyrannical life would also declare the city that rules over the most people the happiest; and if someone approves of an individual because of his virtue, he will also say that the more excellent city is happier. But there are now two matters requiring examination. One is which is more worthy of choice:15 the life of taking part in public life together and sharing in a city, or rather the life of an outsider, released from the political community. The other is which constitution and which arrangement of a city must be held best, whether sharing in a city is worthy of choice for everyone, or not for some but for most. Since political20 thought and study are concerned with this, not with what is worthy of choice for each individual, and since this is the inquiry we have now chosen, the former question would be incidental, while the latter is the task of this investigation. The best constitution must be that arrangement under which anyone whatever would act best and live25 a blessed life: this, then, is clear. But even those who agree that the life with virtue is most worthy of choice dispute whether the political and active life is worthy of choice, or rather the life released from all external affairs, a contemplative life of some kind, which some say is the only philosophical life. For these are roughly the30 two lives that those most ambitious for virtue appear to choose, both in former times and now: I mean the political and the philosophical. Which view holds the truth makes no small difference; for a sensible person must direct himself toward the better aim, and so must each35 individual and the constitution in common. Some think that ruling one's neighbors as a master involves an injustice of the greatest kind, while ruling them politically involves no injustice but does impede one's own well-being. Others hold what is virtually the opposite opinion: only40 the active and political life, they say, is worthy of a man, for in the exercise of each virtue private individuals have no more scope for action1324b1 than those who conduct public affairs and take part in public life.

Some, then, suppose this; others say that only the masterful and tyrannical manner of constitution is happy. Among some peoples this is also the aim of their constitution and laws: to exercise mastery1324b5 over their neighbors. Therefore, although among most peoples most laws are laid down in a haphazard fashion, so to speak, still, wherever the laws look toward a single object, they all aim at conquest. At Lacedaemon and in Crete, for instance, education and the mass of laws are organized almost entirely for wars. Moreover, among10 all nations capable of gaining ascendancy, such power is honored: for example, among the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Celts. In some there are even laws that spur people toward this virtue. At Carthage, for example, they say that a person receives an ornament of rings corresponding to the number of15 campaigns in which he has served. There was once a law in Macedonia that a man who had killed no enemy must wear a halter around his waist. Among the Scythians, a man who had killed no enemy was not allowed to drink from the cup passed around at a certain feast. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, a matching number of stakes20 is planted around a man's tomb for the enemies he has slain. Among other peoples there are many other such practices, some embodied in laws, others in customs.

Yet perhaps it would seem altogether strange to those willing to examine the matter if this were the task of the political expert: to be able to consider how to rule1324b25 and exercise mastery over one's neighbors, whether they are willing or unwilling. For how could this belong to political expertise or legislation, when it is not even lawful? It is not lawful to rule unjustly as well as justly, but conquest can also be unjust. Nor indeed do we see this in the other sciences; for neither30 a doctor's nor a pilot's task is to persuade or compel, in the one case his patients, in the other his passengers. But most people seem to think the art of mastery is political expertise, and what each of them says is neither just nor advantageous for himself, they are not ashamed to practice upon others.35 For among themselves they seek just rule, but toward others they have no concern for the just. Yet it would be strange if there were no natural distinction between what is fit for mastery and what is not. Therefore, if this is how things stand, we must not try to exercise mastery over everyone, but over those fit for it, just as we must not hunt for a feast or sacrifice40 human beings, but what is fit to be hunted for that purpose; and what is fit to be hunted is a wild animal suitable for eating. Moreover, there could even be1325a1 a happy city on its own,

provided, of course, that it conducts its public life well, if it is possible for a city to be established somewhere on its own, using excellent laws. The organization of its constitution will not be directed toward war or toward conquering enemies;1325a5 for let us suppose that nothing of that kind exists. It is clear, then, that all preparations for war must be held noble, but not as the highest end of all; rather, they are for the sake of that end. It is the excellent legislator's task to consider, for a city, a race of human beings, or any other community, how a good life10 and the happiness possible for them can be enjoyed. Some of the laws laid down will, however, differ; and it belongs to legislation to see, if there are neighbors, which practices should be adopted toward which peoples, or how to apply to each the measures appropriate to them. But this question may later receive its proper15 examination: toward what end the best constitution must be directed.

As for those who agree that the life with virtue is most worthy of choice, but differ about how it is to be lived, we must address both groups (for some reject political offices, thinking that for a free person1325a20 the life is different from the political life and is the most worthy of choice of all, while others hold the latter to be best, since it is impossible for one who does nothing to act well, and acting well and happiness are the same). Both are right in some things they say and wrong in others. The former are right that a free person's life is better than a master's.25 For this is true: there is nothing dignified about using a slave as a slave, since giving orders about necessities has no share in the noble. Yet it is not right to think that every kind of rule is mastery; for rule over free people differs from rule over slaves no less than what is free by nature itself differs from what is30 a slave by nature. These matters have been adequately distinguished in our opening discussions. But it is not true that doing nothing should be praised more than acting. For happiness is activity, and the actions of just and moderate people achieve many noble ends.

Yet perhaps someone might suppose, now that these distinctions have been made,1325a35 that being sovereign over everything is best; for in this way he would have authority over the most numerous and noblest actions. Hence someone capable of ruling should not yield to his neighbor but rather take rule away from him; neither a father should take account of his children, nor children of their father, nor, in general, any friend of a friend, nor40 pay any heed to them in this regard. For the best is most worthy of choice, and acting well is best. Perhaps, then, what they say is true,

if indeed1325b1 those who rob others and use force will possess what is most worthy of choice among things that exist. But perhaps it cannot belong to them, and their assumption is false. For the actions of a person cannot any longer be noble unless he is as far superior as a man is to a woman, or a father5 to his children, or a master to slaves. Hence the transgressor could not subsequently achieve any success so great as his existing departure from virtue. For among those who are alike, the noble and the just lie in taking turns, since this is equal and alike. But inequality among equals and unlikeness among those alike are contrary to nature, and nothing10 contrary to nature is noble. Therefore, if someone else is superior to the best in virtue and in the power to act, it is noble to follow him and just to obey him. He must possess not virtue alone but also the power by which he will be able to act. But if these things are rightly stated, and happiness15 must be held to be acting well, the active life would be best both for every city in common and for each individual. Yet the active life need not be directed toward others, as some think; nor are only those thoughts active that arise for the sake of the results of action. Much more so are20 the contemplations and thoughts complete in themselves and undertaken for their own sake; for acting well is an end, and therefore also a kind of activity. Even in external actions, we say that those who direct them through thought are most properly acting. Nor indeed must cities established on their own, which have25 chosen to live in this way, be inactive; for activity can occur among their parts, since the parts of a city have many associations with one another. The same holds for any individual human being. For the god and the whole universe could hardly be in a good condition if this were not so, since they have no external actions30 beyond those proper to themselves. It is therefore clear that the same life must be best for each individual human being and for cities and human beings in common.

Since what we have now said about these matters has served as a preface, and we have previously examined the other constitutions,1325b35 the starting point for what remains is to state first what assumptions must be made about the city that is to be constituted as we would wish. For the best constitution cannot come into being without suitable resources. We must therefore assume many conditions beforehand, as though expressing wishes, yet none of them must be impossible. I mean,40 for example, the number of citizens and the territory. For just as other craftsmen, such as a weaver or a shipbuilder,

must have1326a1 material suited to their work (for the better this happens to have been prepared, the finer the product of their craft must also be), so the political expert and the legislator must have their proper material5 in a suitable condition.

The first resource for political expertise is the multitude of human beings: how many there must be and of what natural character; and likewise with the territory, how large it must be and of what kind. Most people think a happy city ought to be large; but if this is1326a10 true, they do not know what makes a city large or small. For they judge its largeness by the number of inhabitants, whereas we should look not so much to numbers as to capacity. A city too has a certain task; hence the city most capable of accomplishing it must be thought the greatest. For example,15 one might say that Hippocrates is greater, not as a man but as a doctor, than someone superior in bodily size. Nevertheless, even if we must judge by looking to numbers, we must not do so by looking at just any multitude (for cities must perhaps contain large numbers of slaves,20 resident foreigners, and strangers), but at those who are parts of the city and constitute it as its proper members. A great number of these is a sign of a large city; but a city from which many artisans go out and few heavy infantry cannot be large. For a large25 city and a populous one are not the same.

Moreover, experience makes this too evident: it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, for an excessively populous city to be well governed by laws. At any rate, we see that none of the cities thought to conduct public life well is unrestricted in its population. This is also clear from the evidence of reasoning. For1326a30 law is a kind of order, and good government by laws must be good order, but an excessively great number cannot share in order. For that is surely the work of divine power, which also holds together this universe. Therefore a city that combines magnitude with the limit just mentioned must be the finest;35 for beauty ordinarily arises in number and magnitude. But there is also a certain measure for a city's size, just as for everything else—animals, plants, instruments. Each of these, when excessively small or excessively large, will not possess its proper capacity, but will sometimes be wholly deprived of its nature, sometimes40 be in a poor condition. A ship a span long, for example, will not be a ship at all, nor will one two stades long.

1323a14Anyone planning a study of the best constitution in the15 proper way must first settle which life is most worth choosing. If this is unclear, the best constitution must also be unclear. Those who take part in public life in the best way their circumstances allow should do best, unless something unexpected happens. So we must first20 agree on which life is most worth choosing for practically everyone. After that, we must ask whether it is the same life for a community and for an individual, or a different one. Much has been said about the best life in our discussions for a general audience, and we can treat that as sufficient and use it here too. In fact, no one would dispute one division:25 there are three kinds of goods, those outside us, those of the body, and those of the soul, and people who are blessed must have all of these. No one would call someone blessed who had no trace of courage, self-control, justice, or practical wisdom. Nor would anyone call him blessed if he feared passing30 flies. Nor would he count as blessed if he held back from none of the worst excesses when he wanted to eat or drink, or ruined his dearest friends for a quarter of an obol, a small coin. Nor would anyone call him blessed if his thinking was as foolish and mistaken as a child's or a madman's. Almost everyone would agree with these statements.35 But they disagree about how much of each good is needed and which should count for more. They think any amount of virtue, however small, is enough. But they seek unlimited amounts of wealth, money, power, reputation, and all such things. We will tell them that it is easy to find proof of this in40 facts. We can see that people don't acquire and preserve the virtues through external goods, but external goods through the virtues.

1323b1Human happiness may consist in enjoyment, virtue, or both. We can also see who is happier: people whose character and thinking are highly developed but who have a moderate amount of external goods, rather than people5 with more external goods than they can use but poor character and thinking. The same point is also easy to see by reasoning. External goods have a limit, like a tool, since everything useful is useful for something. Too much of them must either cause harm or do no good to10 their owners. But the more someone has of each good of the soul, the more useful it must be—if we should call these goods useful as well as noble. In general, we will clearly say that the best conditions of different things have relative importance15 matching that of the things whose conditions they are. So if the soul is more valuable than property and the body, both in itself and for us, the best condition of each must stand in the same proportion. Also, property and the body are naturally worth choosing for the soul's sake. Everyone must20 choose them for that reason if they think sensibly, not choose the soul for their sake.

Let us agree, then, that each person's share of happiness is as great as his share of virtue and practical wisdom and of action guided by them. We can use the god as a witness. He is happy and blessed, not because of any1323b25 external goods, but because of himself and the nature he has. For the same reasons, good fortune must be different from happiness. Chance and fortune cause the goods outside the soul, but no one is just or self-controlled by chance or because of chance. The next30 point follows from this and needs the same arguments: the best city is also happy and does well. People who don't do noble things can't do well. No noble deed, whether by a person or a city, is possible without virtue and practical wisdom. A city's courage, justice, and practical wisdom35 have the same force and form as the qualities that make each person who shares in them just, wise in practice, and self-controlled. Let this be enough of an introduction to our discussion. We can't avoid touching on these subjects, but we can't go through every relevant argument either. Another course of study deals with40 these matters. For now, let us assume this much: the best life, both for each individual and for cities as communities,

is a life of virtue with enough resources1324a1 to take part in virtuous actions. If anyone disputes this and isn't persuaded by what we have said, we must examine those objections later and leave them aside in our present inquiry.

1324a5It remains to say whether happiness is the same for each individual person and for a city, or not the same. This too is clear. Everyone would agree that it is the same. Those who think an individual's good life consists in wealth also consider the whole city, if it is rich,10 blessed. Those who value the life of a tyrant most would also call the city that rules the most people the happiest. And anyone who approves of an individual because of virtue will say that the better city is happier. But there are now two questions that need examining. One is which is more worth choosing:15 a life of taking part in public life and sharing in a city, or a life apart from it, free of the political community. The other is which constitution and arrangement of a city we should call best, whether sharing in a city is worth choosing for everyone or for most people but not for some. Since political20 thought and study deal with this second question, not with what each individual should choose, and since this is the inquiry we have now chosen, the first question is a side issue. The second is the task of this inquiry. The best constitution must be the arrangement under which anyone could do best and live25 a blessed life: this is clear. But even those who agree that a life of virtue is most worth choosing disagree. Should we choose political activity, or rather a life free of all outside involvement? The latter is a life of reflective thinking, which some say is the only philosophical life. These are roughly the30 two lives that people most ambitious for virtue seem to choose, both in earlier times and now. I mean the political life and the philosophical life. It matters a great deal which view is true. Anyone who thinks sensibly must arrange his life around the better goal, and this holds for35 each individual and for the constitution as a whole. Some think that ruling others as a master involves one of the greatest kinds of injustice. Ruling them politically, they think, isn't unjust, but hinders one's own well-being. Others hold the opposite view. They think only40 an active, political life is fit for a man. For each virtue, private individuals have no more scope for action1324b1 than those who handle public affairs and take part in public life.

That is what some people think. Others say that only a constitution based on mastery and tyranny is happy. For some peoples, the goal of both the constitution and the laws is to exercise mastery1324b5 over their neighbors. So although most legal arrangements among most peoples are, broadly speaking, put together at random, wherever the laws look toward one goal, they all aim at domination. At Lacedaemon and Crete, for example, both education and most of the laws are directed toward war. Also, among10 all peoples able to get the upper hand, this kind of power is honored—for example, among the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Celts. Some even have laws that encourage this virtue. At Carthage, for example, they say a man gets a decoration of rings corresponding to the number of15 campaigns he has served in. Macedonia once required a man to wear a horse's halter around his waist if he had never killed an enemy. A Scythian who had never killed an enemy could not drink from the cup passed around at a certain festival. Among the Iberians, a warlike people, the number of stakes20 planted around a man's grave matches the number of enemies he has killed. Many other peoples have other customs like these, some laid down in laws and others in established practice.

Still, anyone willing to examine the matter might find it very strange if a statesman's job is to work out how to rule1324b25 and exercise mastery over his neighbors, whether they want it or not. How could something that isn't even lawful belong to statesmanship or lawmaking? Ruling not only justly but also unjustly isn't lawful, and it is possible to dominate others unjustly. We don't see this in the other fields of knowledge either. It isn't30 a doctor's job to persuade or force his patients, or a ship captain's to persuade or force his sailors. But most people seem to think mastery is statesmanship. They aren't ashamed to do to others what they each say is neither just nor to their own advantage.35 For themselves, among their own people, they seek just rule. But where others are concerned, they don't care about justice. Yet it would be strange if some were not by nature fit for mastery and others not fit for it. So if this is how things stand, we shouldn't try to exercise mastery over everyone, but only over those fit for it. Likewise, we shouldn't hunt for a feast or sacrifice40 human beings, but animals fit to be hunted for this purpose. What is fit to be hunted is a wild animal that can be eaten. Moreover, there could also be1325a1 a happy city on its own,

provided, of course, that it takes part in public life well. A city could exist somewhere on its own and use good laws. Its constitution wouldn't be organized for war or for defeating enemies.1325a5 Let us suppose it has none of these things. Clearly, then, we should regard all preparations for war as noble, but not as the highest goal of all. Instead, they serve that goal. A good lawmaker must consider a city, a race of human beings, and every other community. How can a good life10 and the happiness possible for them be enjoyed? Some of the laws laid down will, however, differ. If there are neighbors, it is also the lawmaker's job to see which practices to use toward which neighbors, or how to adopt the measures appropriate to each. But later we can give proper15 consideration to the question of the goal toward which the best constitution should aim.

We must now answer both groups who agree that the life of virtue is most worth choosing but disagree about how to live it. Some reject political offices, thinking that a free person's1325a20 life is different from a political life and is the most worth choosing of all. Others think the political life is best. A person who does nothing, they say, can't do well, and doing well and happiness are the same. We must tell them that both groups are right in some things and wrong in others. The first group is right that a free person's life is better than a master's.25 This is true. There is nothing dignified about using a slave as a slave. Giving orders about necessary tasks has no share in the noble. But it is wrong to think that all rule is mastery. Rule over free people differs from rule over slaves no less than someone free by nature differs from someone30 a slave by nature. We made adequate distinctions about these matters in our opening discussions. But it isn't true that inactivity deserves more praise than activity. Happiness is an activity, and the actions of just and self-controlled people achieve many noble results.

Now that we have made these distinctions, someone might suppose1325a35 that being sovereign over everyone is best. This would put him in charge of the most numerous and noblest actions. So anyone able to rule shouldn't give way to his neighbor but should instead take rule away from him. A father should take no account of his children, nor children of their father, nor, in general, a friend of any friend. Nor should they40 worry about these things. What is best is most worth choosing, and doing well is best. Perhaps they speak truly,

if1325b1 the most desirable thing there is will belong to those who rob others and use force. But perhaps it can't belong to them, and their assumption is false. A person's actions can no longer be noble unless he is as superior to others as a man is to a woman, a father to5 his children, or a master to slaves. So someone who breaks this rule could never later achieve anything so great as the loss of virtue he has already suffered. For people who are alike, the noble and the just consist in taking turns. That is equal and alike treatment. Unequal treatment of equals and unlike treatment of those who are alike go against nature. Nothing10 that goes against nature is noble. So if someone is superior to the best people in virtue and in the ability to act, it is noble to follow him and just to obey him. But he must have not only virtue but also the power that will let him act. If these points are right and happiness15 should be understood as doing well, then the active life would be best both for every city as a community and for each individual. But an active life doesn't have to involve other people, as some think. Nor are practical thoughts limited to those aimed at the results of action. Much more practical are20 the forms of contemplation and thinking that are complete in themselves and pursued for their own sake. Doing well is a goal, so it too is a kind of action. Even with external actions, we say that those who direct them through their thinking are most truly acting. Nor must cities established on their own, which have25 chosen to live this way, be inactive. Activity can take place among their parts. The parts of a city have many dealings with one another. The same holds for any individual person. Otherwise the god and the whole universe would hardly be in a good condition, since they have no external activities30 beyond their own proper activities. Clearly, then, the best life must be the same for each individual person and for cities and human beings as communities.

These points have introduced the subject, and we have already studied the other constitutions.1325b35 So we must begin the rest by stating the conditions we assume for the city we want to establish according to our wishes. The best constitution can't come into being without suitable resources. So we must assume many things in advance, as if we were expressing wishes. But none of them should be impossible. I mean,40 for example, the number of citizens and the territory. Other craftsmen, such as a weaver or a shipbuilder,

need1326a1 materials suited to their work. The better these are prepared, the finer the product of their skill must be. In the same way, a statesman and a lawmaker must have their own materials5 in a suitable condition.

The first resources for political work concern the population: how many people there should be and what their natural character should be. The same applies to the territory: how large it should be and what it should be like. Most people think a happy city should be great. Even if this is1326a10 true, they don't understand what makes a city great or small. They judge greatness by the number of inhabitants. But we should look at its capacity rather than its population. A city too has a task, so we should consider the city most able to carry it out the greatest. For example,15 someone might say Hippocrates is greater, not as a human being but as a doctor, than a person who stands out for his bodily size. But even if we should judge by population, we shouldn't do so by just any population. Cities may necessarily contain large numbers of slaves,20 resident foreigners, and visitors. We should count those who are parts of the city, the proper parts that make it up. A large number of these is a sign of a great city. But a city that sends out large numbers of craftsmen and few heavily armed foot soldiers can't be great. For a great25 city is not the same thing as a highly populated city.

The facts also make this clear: it is difficult, perhaps impossible, for an excessively populated city to be well governed by laws. At any rate, none of the cities thought to conduct public life well has an unrestricted population. Reasoning also makes this clear. For1326a30 law is a kind of order, and good government by law must be good order. But an excessively large number can't share in order. That would require the divine power that also holds this whole universe together. So the finest city must be one that combines greatness with the defining limit just described.35 The noble usually involves number and size. But a city's size also has a measure, as everything else does—animals, plants, and tools. None of these will have its proper capacity if it is too small or excessively large. In one case it will lose its nature altogether, and in another40 it will be in a poor condition. For example, a boat a handspan long won't be a boat at all, nor will one two stades, or racecourse lengths, long.