Introduction VII
Original German
VII. Von der ästhetischen Vorstellung der Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur.
Was an der Vorstellung eines Objects bloß subjectiv ist, d. i. ihre Beziehung auf das Subject, nicht auf den Gegenstand ausmacht, ist die ästhetische Beschaffenheit derselben; was aber an ihr zur Bestimmung 189 des Gegenstandes (zum Erkenntnisse) dient oder gebraucht werden kann, ist ihre logische Gültigkeit. In dem Erkenntnisse eines Gegenstandes der Sinne kommen beide Beziehungen zusammen vor. In der Sinnenvorstellung der Dinge außer mir ist die Qualität des Raums, worin wir sie anschauen, das bloß Subjective meiner Vorstellung derselben (wodurch, was sie als Objecte an sich sein mögen, unausgemacht bleibt), um welcher Beziehung willen der Gegenstand auch dadurch bloß als Erscheinung gedacht wird; der Raum ist aber seiner bloß subjectiven Qualität ungeachtet gleichwohl doch ein Erkenntnißstück der Dinge als Erscheinungen. Empfindung (hier die äußere) drückt eben sowohl das bloß Subjective unserer Vorstellungen der Dinge außer uns aus, aber eigentlich A XLIII das Materielle (Reale) derselben (wodurch etwas Existirendes gegeben wird), so wie der Raum die bloße Form a priori der Möglichkeit ihrer Anschauung; und gleichwohl wird jene auch zum Erkenntniß der Objecte außer uns gebraucht.
Dasjenige Subjective aber an einer Vorstellung, was gar kein Erkenntnißstück werden kann, ist die mit ihr verbundene Lust oder Unlust; denn durch sie erkenne ich nichts an dem Gegenstande der Vorstellung, obgleich sie wohl die Wirkung irgend einer Erkenntniß sein kann. Nun ist die Zweckmäßigkeit eines Dinges, sofern sie in der Wahrnehmung vorgestellt wird, auch keine Beschaffenheit des Objects selbst (denn eine solche kann nicht wahrgenommen werden), ob sie gleich aus einem Erkenntnisse der Dinge gefolgert werden kann. Die Zweckmäßigkeit also, die vor dem Erkenntnisse eines Objects vorhergeht, ja sogar, ohne die Vorstellung desselben zu einem Erkenntniß brauchen zu wollen, gleichwohl mit ihr unmittelbar verbunden wird, ist das Subjective derselben, was gar kein Erkenntnißstück werden kann. Also wird der Gegenstand alsdann nur darum zweckmäßig genannt, weil seine Vorstellung unmittelbar mit dem Gefühle der Lust verbunden ist; und diese Vorstellung selbst ist eine ästhetische Vorstellung der Zweckmäßigkeit. — Es fragt sich nur, ob es A XLIV überhaupt eine solche Vorstellung der Zweckmäßigkeit gebe.
Wenn mit der bloßen Auffassung (apprehensio) der Form eines Gegenstandes der Anschauung ohne Beziehung derselben auf einen Begriff zu einem bestimmten Erkenntniß Lust verbunden ist: so wird die Vorstellung dadurch nicht auf das Object, sondern lediglich auf das Subject bezogen; und die Lust kann nichts anders als die Angemessenheit desselben zu den Erkenntnißvermögen, die in der reflectirenden Urtheilskraft 190 im Spiel sind, und sofern sie darin sind, also bloß eine subjective formale Zweckmäßigkeit des Objects ausdrücken. Denn jene Auffassung der Formen in die Einbildungskraft kann niemals geschehen, ohne daß die reflectirende Urtheilskraft, auch unabsichtlich, sie wenigstens mit ihrem Vermögen, Anschauungen auf Begriffe zu beziehen, vergliche. Wenn nun in dieser Vergleichung die Einbildungskraft (als Vermögen der Anschauungen a priori) zum Verstande (als Vermögen der Begriffe) durch eine gegebene Vorstellung unabsichtlich in Einstimmung versetzt und dadurch ein Gefühl der Lust erweckt wird, so muß der Gegenstand alsdann als zweckmäßig für die reflectirende Urtheilskraft angesehen werden. Ein solches Urtheil ist ein ästhetisches Urtheil über die Zweckmäßigkeit des Objects, welches sich auf keinem vorhandenen Begriffe vom Gegenstande gründet und keinen von ihm verschafft. Wessen Gegenstandes Form (nicht das Materielle seiner Vorstellung, als Empfindung) in der bloßen A XLV Reflexion über dieselbe (ohne Absicht auf einen von ihm zu erwerbenden Begriff) als der Grund einer Lust an der Vorstellung eines solchen Objects beurtheilt wird: mit dessen Vorstellung wird diese Lust auch als nothwendig verbunden geurtheilt, folglich als nicht bloß für das Subject, welches diese Form auffaßt, sondern für jeden Urtheilenden überhaupt. Der Gegenstand heißt alsdann schön; und das Vermögen, durch eine solche Lust (folglich auch allgemeingültig) zu urtheilen, der Geschmack. Denn da der Grund der Lust bloß in der Form des Gegenstandes für die Reflexion überhaupt, mithin in keiner Empfindung des Gegenstandes und auch ohne Beziehung auf einen Begriff, der irgend eine Absicht enthielte, gesetzt wird: so ist es allein die Gesetzmäßigkeit im empirischen Gebrauche der Urtheilskraft überhaupt (Einheit der Einbildungskraft mit dem Verstande) in dem Subjecte, mit der die Vorstellung des Objects in der Reflexion, deren Bedingungen a priori allgemein gelten, zusammen stimmt; und da diese Zusammenstimmung des Gegenstandes mit den Vermögen des Subjects zufällig ist, so bewirkt sie die Vorstellung einer Zweckmäßigkeit desselben in Ansehung der Erkenntnißvermögen des Subjects.
Hier ist nun eine Lust, die wie alle Lust oder Unlust, welche nicht durch den Freiheitsbegriff (d. i. durch die vorhergehende Bestimmung des oberen Begehrungsvermögens durch reine Vernunft) gewirkt wird, niemals A XLVI aus Begriffen als mit der Vorstellung eines Gegenstandes nothwendig verbunden eingesehen werden kann, sondern jederzeit nur durch 191 reflectirte Wahrnehmung als mit dieser verknüpft erkannt werden muß, folglich wie alle empirische Urtheile keine objective Nothwendigkeit ankündigen und auf Gültigkeit a priori Anspruch machen kann. Aber das Geschmacksurtheil macht auch nur Anspruch, wie jedes andere empirische Urtheil, für jedermann zu gelten, welches ungeachtet der inneren Zufälligkeit desselben immer möglich ist. Das Befremdende und Abweichende liegt nur darin: daß es nicht ein empirischer Begriff, sondern ein Gefühl der Lust (folglich gar kein Begriff) ist, welches doch durch das Geschmacksurtheil, gleich als ob es ein mit dem Erkenntnisse des Objects verbundenes Prädicat wäre, jedermann zugemuthet und mit der Vorstellung desselben verknüpft werden soll.
Ein einzelnes Erfahrungsurtheil, z. B. von dem, der in einem Bergkrystall einen beweglichen Tropfen Wasser wahrnimmt, verlangt mit Recht, daß ein jeder andere es eben so finden müsse, weil er dieses Urtheil nach den allgemeinen Bedingungen der bestimmenden Urtheilskraft unter den Gesetzen einer möglichen Erfahrung überhaupt gefällt hat. Eben so macht derjenige, welcher in der bloßen Reflexion über die Form eines Gegenstandes ohne Rücksicht auf einen Begriff Lust empfindet, obzwar dieses Urtheil empirisch und ein einzelnes Urtheil ist, mit Recht A XLVII Anspruch auf Jedermanns Beistimmung: weil der Grund zu dieser Lust in der allgemeinen, obzwar subjectiven Bedingung der reflectirenden Urtheile, nämlich der zweckmäßigen Übereinstimmung eines Gegenstandes (er sei Product der Natur oder der Kunst) mit dem Verhältniß der Erkenntnißvermögen unter sich, die zu jedem empirischen Erkenntniß erfordert werden (der Einbildungskraft und des Verstandes), angetroffen wird. Die Lust ist also im Geschmacksurtheile zwar von einer empirischen Vorstellung abhängig und kann a priori mit keinem Begriffe verbunden werden (man kann a priori nicht bestimmen, welcher Gegenstand dem Geschmacke gemäß sein werde, oder nicht, man muß ihn versuchen); aber sie ist doch der Bestimmungsgrund dieses Urtheils nur dadurch, daß man sich bewußt ist, sie beruhe bloß auf der Reflexion und den allgemeinen, obwohl nur subjectiven, Bedingungen der Übereinstimmung derselben zum Erkenntniß der Objecte überhaupt, für welche die Form des Objects zweckmäßig ist.
Das ist die Ursache, warum die Urtheile des Geschmacks ihrer Möglichkeit nach, weil diese ein Princip a priori voraussetzt, auch einer Kritik unterworfen sind, obgleich dieses Princip weder ein Erkenntnißprincip 192 für den Verstand, noch ein praktisches für den Willen und also a priori gar nicht bestimmend ist.
Die Empfänglichkeit einer Lust aus der Reflexion über die Formen A XLVIII der Sachen (der Natur sowohl als der Kunst) bezeichnet aber nicht allein eine Zweckmäßigkeit der Objecte in Verhältniß auf die reflectirende Urtheilskraft, gemäß dem Naturbegriffe, am Subject, sondern auch umgekehrt des Subjects in Ansehung der Gegenstände, ihrer Form, ja selbst ihrer Unform nach, zufolge dem Freiheitsbegriffe; und dadurch geschieht es: daß das ästhetische Urtheil nicht bloß als Geschmacksurtheil auf das Schöne, sondern auch, als aus einem Geistesgefühl entsprungenes, auf das Erhabene bezogen wird, und so jene Kritik der ästhetischen Urtheilskraft in zwei diesen gemäße Haupttheile zerfallen muß.
Musean translation
A complete machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
VII. On the Aesthetic Representation of the Purposiveness of Nature.
What is merely subjective in the representation of an object—that is, what constitutes its relation to the subject, not to the object—is its aesthetic character; but what serves, or can be used, to determine 189 the object (for cognition) is its logical validity. In the cognition of an object of the senses, both relations occur together. In the sensible representation of things outside me, the quality of space, in which we intuit them, is the merely subjective element of my representation of them (whereby what they may be as objects in themselves remains undecided); on account of this relation the object is also thought through it merely as appearance. Yet despite its merely subjective quality, space is nevertheless an element of the cognition of things as appearances. Sensation (here, outer sensation) likewise expresses the merely subjective element of our representations of things outside us, but properly A XLIII their material (real) element (through which something existing is given), just as space expresses the mere form a priori of the possibility of their intuition; and yet sensation too is used for the cognition of objects outside us.
But the subjective element in a representation that cannot become an element of cognition at all is the pleasure or displeasure connected with it. Through this I cognize nothing in the object of the representation, although it may well be the effect of some cognition. Now the purposiveness of a thing, insofar as it is represented in perception, is likewise not a property of the object itself (for such a property cannot be perceived), although it can be inferred from a cognition of things. Thus the purposiveness that precedes the cognition of an object, and is indeed immediately connected with its representation even without any intention of using that representation for cognition, is the subjective element in it that cannot become an element of cognition at all. The object is then called purposive only because its representation is immediately connected with the feeling of pleasure; and this representation itself is an aesthetic representation of purposiveness.—The only question is whether A XLIV there is any such representation of purposiveness at all.
If pleasure is connected with the mere apprehension (apprehensio) of the form of an object of intuition, without referring that form to a concept for a determinate cognition, then the representation is thereby referred not to the object but solely to the subject. The pleasure can express nothing but the object's commensurateness with the cognitive faculties that are at play in the reflective power of judgment 190, insofar as they are at play there, and thus merely a subjective formal purposiveness of the object. For that apprehension of forms in the imagination can never occur without reflective judgment, even unintentionally, at least comparing them with its capacity to relate intuitions to concepts. If, in this comparison, the imagination (as the faculty of intuitions a priori) is unintentionally brought into harmony with the understanding (as the faculty of concepts) by a given representation, and a feeling of pleasure is thereby aroused, then the object must be regarded as purposive for reflective judgment. Such a judgment is an aesthetic judgment concerning the purposiveness of the object, grounded on no existing concept of the object and furnishing none. If an object's form (not the material element of its representation, as sensation), in mere A XLV reflection on it (without any intention of acquiring a concept of it), is judged to be the ground of a pleasure in the representation of such an object, this pleasure is also judged to be necessarily connected with its representation, and thus not merely for the subject who apprehends this form, but for everyone who judges in general. The object is then called beautiful; and the faculty of judging through such a pleasure (and hence also with universal validity) is called taste. For since the ground of the pleasure is placed solely in the form of the object for reflection in general, hence in no sensation of the object and also without reference to a concept containing any intention, it is solely the lawfulness in the empirical use of judgment in general (the unity of imagination with understanding) in the subject with which the representation of the object agrees in reflection, whose conditions hold universally a priori. And since this agreement of the object with the subject's faculties is contingent, it brings about the representation of its purposiveness with regard to the subject's cognitive faculties.
Here, then, is a pleasure which, like all pleasure or displeasure not produced through the concept of freedom (that is, through the prior determination of the higher faculty of desire by pure reason), can never A XLVI be understood from concepts as necessarily connected with the representation of an object. Rather, it must always be cognized only through 191 reflected perception as connected with that representation, and consequently, like all empirical judgments, can announce no objective necessity or lay claim to validity a priori. But the judgment of taste, like every other empirical judgment, also claims only to hold for everyone, which remains possible despite its inner contingency. What is strange and distinctive lies only in this: it is not an empirical concept, but a feeling of pleasure (hence no concept at all), that the judgment of taste nevertheless expects of everyone and would connect with the object's representation, just as though it were a predicate connected with cognition of the object.
A singular judgment of experience—for example, that of someone who perceives a movable drop of water in a rock crystal—rightly demands that everyone else must find it so as well, because he has made this judgment according to the universal conditions of determining judgment under the laws of a possible experience in general. Likewise, someone who feels pleasure in mere reflection on the form of an object, without regard to a concept, although this judgment is empirical and singular, rightly A XLVII claims everyone's assent. For the ground of this pleasure is found in the universal, though subjective, condition of reflective judgments: namely, the purposive agreement of an object (whether a product of nature or of art) with the mutual relation of the cognitive faculties required for every empirical cognition (imagination and understanding). Thus in the judgment of taste pleasure does indeed depend on an empirical representation and cannot be connected a priori with any concept (we cannot determine a priori which object will or will not accord with taste; we must try it). Yet it is the determining ground of this judgment only because we are conscious that it rests solely on reflection and the universal, although merely subjective, conditions of reflection's agreement with the cognition of objects in general, for which the object's form is purposive.
This is why judgments of taste are also subject to a critique with regard to their possibility, since that possibility presupposes a principle a priori, although this principle is neither a principle of cognition 192 for the understanding nor a practical principle for the will, and hence is not determining a priori at all.
But receptivity to pleasure from reflection on the forms A XLVIII of things (in nature as well as art) indicates not only a purposiveness of objects in relation to the reflective power of judgment in the subject, according to the concept of nature; it also indicates, conversely, a purposiveness of the subject with regard to objects, in their form or even their formlessness, according to the concept of freedom. Hence aesthetic judgment is referred not only, as a judgment of taste, to the beautiful, but also, as springing from a feeling of spirit, to the sublime. Accordingly that critique of aesthetic judgment must fall into two principal parts corresponding to these.
Plain English translation
A complete, independent machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
VII. On the aesthetic representation of nature's purposiveness.
What is merely subjective in the representation of an object—that is, what constitutes its relation to the subject rather than to the object—is its aesthetic character. What serves, or can be used, to determine 189 the object, to know it, is its logical validity. In knowing an object of the senses, both relations occur together. In the sensory representation of things outside me, the quality of the space in which we intuit them is what is merely subjective in my representation of them. It leaves undecided what they may be as objects in themselves. Because of this relation, the object is thereby thought only as an appearance. Yet despite its merely subjective quality, space is still an element in knowing things as appearances. Sensation, here external sensation, likewise expresses what is merely subjective in our representations of things outside us, but more specifically A XLIII their material or real element, through which something existing is given. Space, by contrast, expresses merely the a priori form of the possibility of intuiting them. Yet sensation too is used to know objects outside us.
But the subjective element in a representation that can never become an element of cognition is the pleasure or displeasure connected with it. Through this I know nothing about the object of the representation, although it may indeed be the effect of some cognition. Now a thing's purposiveness, insofar as it is represented in perception, is also not a feature of the object itself, since such a feature cannot be perceived, although it can be inferred from knowledge of things. A purposiveness that precedes knowledge of an object, and is even connected directly with its representation without our wanting to use that representation for cognition, is therefore the subjective element that can never become an element of cognition. The object is then called purposive only because its representation is directly connected with the feeling of pleasure. This representation itself is an aesthetic representation of purposiveness.—The only question is whether A XLIV there is any such representation of purposiveness at all.
Suppose pleasure is connected with merely taking in (apprehension) the form of an object of intuition, without relating that form to a concept for a definite cognition. The representation is then related not to the object, but solely to the subject. The pleasure can express nothing other than the object's suitability to the cognitive faculties that are at play in reflective judgment 190, insofar as they are at play there. It thus expresses only a subjective, formal purposiveness of the object. For the imagination can never take in forms without reflective judgment comparing them, even unintentionally, at least with its ability to relate intuitions to concepts. If, in this comparison, a given representation unintentionally brings imagination, as the faculty of a priori intuitions, into agreement with understanding, as the faculty of concepts, and thereby awakens a feeling of pleasure, the object must be regarded as purposive for reflective judgment. Such a judgment is an aesthetic judgment about the object's purposiveness. It rests on no existing concept of the object and supplies none. Suppose the form of an object—not the material element of its representation as sensation—is judged in mere A XLV reflection on it, without intending to acquire a concept of it, as the ground of pleasure in the representation of such an object. This pleasure is then also judged to be necessarily connected with its representation: not merely for the subject who takes in this form, but for everyone who judges at all. The object is then called beautiful, and the ability to judge through such pleasure, and thus with universal validity, is called taste. For the ground of the pleasure is placed solely in the object's form for reflection in general. It lies in no sensation of the object, and involves no relation to a concept containing any aim. Hence it is solely the lawfulness of judgment's empirical use in general within the subject—the unity of imagination with understanding—with which the object's representation agrees in reflection, whose conditions hold universally a priori. Since this agreement of the object with the subject's faculties is contingent, it produces the representation of the object's purposiveness with respect to the subject's cognitive faculties.
Here, then, is a pleasure that, like all pleasure or displeasure not produced through the concept of freedom—that is, through pure reason's prior determination of the higher faculty of desire—can never A XLVI be understood from concepts as necessarily connected with the representation of an object. We must always recognize it as connected with that representation only through 191 perception reflected upon. Consequently, like all empirical judgments, it can declare no objective necessity or claim a priori validity. But a judgment of taste claims only, like every other empirical judgment, to hold for everyone. This is always possible despite its inner contingency. What is strange and different is simply this: it is not an empirical concept but a feeling of pleasure, and thus no concept at all, that the judgment of taste expects everyone to have and connect with the object's representation, as though it were a predicate connected with knowledge of the object.
An individual judgment of experience—for example, that of someone who perceives a moving drop of water in a rock crystal—rightly demands that everyone else must find the same thing. The person has made this judgment according to the general conditions of determining judgment under the laws of possible experience in general. Similarly, someone who feels pleasure in merely reflecting on an object's form, without reference to a concept, although this judgment is empirical and an individual judgment, rightly A XLVII claims everyone's agreement. For the ground of this pleasure lies in the universal, though subjective, condition of reflective judgments: the purposive agreement of an object, whether a product of nature or art, with the mutual relation of the cognitive faculties required for every empirical cognition, imagination and understanding. Thus pleasure in a judgment of taste does depend on an empirical representation and cannot be connected a priori with any concept. We cannot determine a priori which object will or will not suit taste; we must try it. Yet pleasure determines this judgment only because we are aware that it rests solely on reflection and on the universal, though merely subjective, conditions of reflection's agreement with knowing objects in general, for which the object's form is purposive.
This is why judgments of taste are also subject to a critique regarding their possibility: that possibility presupposes an a priori principle. Yet this principle is neither a principle of cognition 192 for the understanding nor a practical principle for the will, and so is not determining a priori at all.
But receptiveness to pleasure from reflecting on the forms A XLVIII of things, in nature as well as art, indicates more than a purposiveness of objects in relation to reflective judgment in the subject, according to the concept of nature. It also indicates, conversely, a purposiveness of the subject with regard to objects, in respect of their form and even their formlessness, according to the concept of freedom. As a result, aesthetic judgment relates not only to the beautiful as a judgment of taste, but also to the sublime, as a judgment arising from a feeling of the spirit. The critique of aesthetic judgment must therefore divide into two main parts corresponding to these.
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Introduction VII is part of Critique of Judgment by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 9 of 21 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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