Introduction VIII
Original German
VIII. Von der logischen Vorstellung der Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur.
An einem in der Erfahrung gegebenen Gegenstande kann Zweckmäßigkeit vorgestellt werden: entweder aus einem bloß subjectiven Grunde, als Übereinstimmung seiner Form, in der Auffassung (apprehensio) desselben vor allem Begriffe, mit den Erkenntnißvermögen, um die Anschauung mit Begriffen zu einem Erkenntniß überhaupt zu vereinigen; oder aus einem objectiven, als Übereinstimmung seiner Form mit der Möglichkeit des Dinges selbst, nach einem Begriffe von ihm, der vorhergeht A XLIX und den Grund dieser Form enthält. Wir haben gesehen: daß die Vorstellung der Zweckmäßigkeit der ersteren Art auf der unmittelbaren Lust an der Form des Gegenstandes in der bloßen Reflexion über sie beruhe; die also von der Zweckmäßigkeit der zweiten Art, da sie die Form des Objects nicht auf die Erkenntnißvermögen des Subjects in der Auffassung derselben, sondern auf ein bestimmtes Erkenntniß des Gegenstandes unter einem gegebenen Begriffe bezieht, hat nichts mit einem Gefühle der Lust an den Dingen, sondern mit dem Verstande in Beurtheilung derselben zu thun. Wenn der Begriff von einem Gegenstande gegeben ist, so besteht das Geschäft der Urtheilskraft im Gebrauche desselben zum Erkenntniß in der Darstellung (exhibitio), d. i. darin, dem Begriffe eine correspondirende Anschauung zur Seite zu stellen: es sei, daß dieses durch unsere eigene Einbildungskraft geschehe, wie in der Kunst, 193 wenn wir einen vorhergefaßten Begriff von einem Gegenstande, der für uns Zweck ist, realisiren, oder durch die Natur in der Technik derselben (wie bei organisirten Körpern), wenn wir ihr unseren Begriff vom Zweck zur Beurtheilung ihres Products unterlegen; in welchem Falle nicht bloß Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur in der Form des Dinges, sondern dieses ihr Product als Naturzweck vorgestellt wird. — Obzwar unser Begriff von einer subjectiven Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur in ihren Formen nach empirischen Gesetzen gar kein Begriff vom Object ist, sondern nur ein A L Princip der Urtheilskraft sich in dieser ihrer übergroßen Mannigfaltigkeit Begriffe zu verschaffen (in ihr orientiren zu können): so legen wir ihr doch hiedurch gleichsam eine Rücksicht auf unser Erkenntnißvermögen nach der Analogie eines Zwecks bei; und so können wir die Naturschönheit als Darstellung des Begriffs der formalen (bloß subjectiven) und die Naturzwecke als Darstellung des Begriffs einer realen (objectiven) Zweckmäßigkeit ansehen, deren eine wir durch Geschmack (ästhetisch, vermittelst des Gefühls der Lust), die andere durch Verstand und Vernunft (logisch, nach Begriffen) beurtheilen.
Hierauf gründet sich die Eintheilung der Kritik der Urtheilskraft in die der ästhetischen und teleologischen: indem unter der ersteren das Vermögen, die formale Zweckmäßigkeit (sonst auch subjective genannt) durch das Gefühl der Lust oder Unlust, unter der zweiten das Vermögen, die reale Zweckmäßigkeit (objective) der Natur durch Verstand und Vernunft zu beurtheilen, verstanden wird.
In einer Kritik der Urtheilskraft ist der Theil, welcher die ästhetische Urtheilskraft enthält, ihr wesentlich angehörig, weil diese allein ein Princip enthält, welches die Urtheilskraft völlig a priori ihrer Reflexion über die Natur zum Grunde legt, nämlich das einer formalen Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur nach ihren besonderen (empirischen) Gesetzen für unser Erkenntnißvermögen, ohne welche sich der Verstand in sie nicht finden könnte: anstatt A LI daß gar kein Grund a priori angegeben werden kann, ja nicht einmal die Möglichkeit davon aus dem Begriffe einer Natur, als Gegenstande der Erfahrung im Allgemeinen sowohl als im Besonderen, erhellt, daß es objective Zwecke der Natur, d. i. Dinge, die nur als Naturzwecke möglich sind, geben müsse; sondern nur die Urtheilskraft, ohne ein Princip dazu a priori in sich zu enthalten, in vorkommenden Fällen (gewisser Producte), um zum Behuf der Vernunft von dem Begriffe der Zwecke Gebrauch zu machen, die Regel enthält, nachdem jenes transscendentale 194 Princip schon den Begriff eines Zwecks (wenigstens der Form nach) auf die Natur anzuwenden den Verstand vorbereitet hat.
Der transscendentale Grundsatz aber, sich eine Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur in subjectiver Beziehung auf unser Erkenntnißvermögen an der Form eines Dinges als ein Princip der Beurtheilung derselben vorzustellen, läßt es gänzlich unbestimmt, wo und in welchen Fällen ich die Beurtheilung, als die eines Products nach einem Princip der Zweckmäßigkeit und nicht vielmehr bloß nach allgemeinen Naturgesetzen, anzustellen habe, und überläßt es der ästhetischen Urtheilskraft, im Geschmacke die Angemessenheit desselben (seiner Form) zu unseren Erkenntnißvermögen (sofern diese nicht durch Übereinstimmung mit Begriffen, sondern durch das Gefühl entscheidet) auszumachen. Dagegen giebt die teleologisch-gebrauchte Urtheilskraft die Bedingungen bestimmt an, unter A LII denen etwas (z. B. ein organisirter Körper) nach der Idee eines Zwecks der Natur zu beurtheilen sei; kann aber keinen Grundsatz aus dem Begriffe der Natur als Gegenstandes der Erfahrung für die Befugniß anführen, ihr eine Beziehung auf Zwecke a priori beizulegen und auch nur unbestimmt dergleichen von der wirklichen Erfahrung an solchen Producten anzunehmen: wovon der Grund ist, daß viele besondere Erfahrungen angestellt und unter der Einheit ihres Princips betrachtet werden müssen, um eine objective Zweckmäßigkeit an einem gewissen Gegenstande nur empirisch erkennen zu können. — Die ästhetische Urtheilskraft ist also ein besonderes Vermögen, Dinge nach einer Regel, aber nicht nach Begriffen zu beurtheilen. Die teleologische ist kein besonderes Vermögen, sondern nur die reflectirende Urtheilskraft überhaupt, sofern sie wie überall im theoretischen Erkenntnisse nach Begriffen, aber in Ansehung gewisser Gegenstände der Natur nach besonderen Principien, nämlich einer bloß reflectirenden, nicht Objecte bestimmenden Urtheilskraft, verfährt, also ihrer Anwendung nach zum theoretischen Theile der Philosophie gehört und der besonderen Principien wegen, die nicht, wie es in einer Doctrin sein muß, bestimmend sind, auch einen besonderen Theil der Kritik ausmachen muß; anstatt daß die ästhetische Urtheilskraft zum Erkenntniß ihrer Gegenstände nichts beiträgt und also nur zur Kritik des urtheilenden Subjects und der Erkenntnißvermögen desselben, sofern sie A LIII der Principien a priori fähig sind, von welchem Gebrauche (dem theoretischen oder praktischen) diese übrigens auch sein mögen, gezählt werden muß, welche die Propädeutik aller Philosophie ist.
Musean translation
A complete machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
VIII. On the Logical Representation of the Purposiveness of Nature.
Purposiveness can be represented in an object given in experience either on a merely subjective ground, as the agreement of its form, in its apprehension (apprehensio) prior to any concept, with the cognitive faculties, so as to unite intuition with concepts into a cognition in general; or on an objective ground, as the agreement of its form with the possibility of the thing itself, according to a concept of it that precedes A XLIX and contains the ground of this form. We have seen that the representation of purposiveness of the first kind rests on immediate pleasure in the object's form in mere reflection on it. The representation of purposiveness of the second kind, therefore, since it refers the object's form not to the subject's cognitive faculties in apprehending it, but to a determinate cognition of the object under a given concept, has nothing to do with a feeling of pleasure in things, but with the understanding in judging them. If the concept of an object is given, then the task of the power of judgment in using it for cognition consists in presentation (exhibitio), that is, in placing beside the concept a corresponding intuition. This may be effected through our own imagination, as in art, 193 when we realize a previously conceived concept of an object that is an end for us; or through nature in its technique (as in organized bodies), when we place our concept of an end beneath nature for judging its product. In the latter case we represent not merely the purposiveness of nature in the thing's form, but this product of nature as a natural end.—Although our concept of a subjective purposiveness of nature in its forms according to empirical laws is no concept of the object at all, but only a A L principle of the power of judgment for acquiring concepts amid its overwhelming manifoldness (for being able to orient ourselves in it), we nevertheless thereby attribute to nature, as it were, a regard for our faculty of cognition by analogy with an end. Thus we can regard natural beauty as the presentation of the concept of formal (merely subjective) purposiveness, and natural ends as the presentation of the concept of real (objective) purposiveness. We judge the one through taste (aesthetically, by means of the feeling of pleasure), the other through understanding and reason (logically, according to concepts).
On this rests the division of the critique of the power of judgment into the critique of aesthetic and of teleological judgment: the first means the faculty of judging formal purposiveness (otherwise also called subjective) through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure; the second, the faculty of judging the real (objective) purposiveness of nature through understanding and reason.
In a critique of the power of judgment, the part containing aesthetic judgment belongs essentially to it, because this alone contains a principle that judgment lays entirely a priori at the foundation of its reflection on nature: namely, the principle of a formal purposiveness of nature according to its particular (empirical) laws for our faculty of cognition, without which the understanding could not find its way in nature. By contrast, A LI no ground a priori can be given—nor does even the possibility of it become apparent from the concept of a nature as an object of experience, either in general or in particular—for the necessity of objective ends of nature, that is, things possible only as natural ends. Rather, only the power of judgment contains the rule for using the concept of ends for the sake of reason in cases that arise (of certain products), without containing within itself a principle for this a priori, after that transcendental 194 principle has already prepared the understanding to apply the concept of an end (at least as regards form) to nature.
But the transcendental principle of representing a purposiveness of nature in the form of a thing, in subjective relation to our faculty of cognition, as a principle for judging nature, leaves it entirely undetermined where and in which cases I should judge a product according to a principle of purposiveness rather than merely according to universal laws of nature. It leaves to the aesthetic power of judgment, in taste, the decision concerning the product's (its form's) commensurateness with our cognitive faculties, insofar as aesthetic judgment decides not through agreement with concepts but through feeling. By contrast, the power of judgment used teleologically specifies the conditions A LII under which something (for example, an organized body) is to be judged according to the idea of an end of nature. Yet it can cite no principle from the concept of nature as an object of experience authorizing us to attribute to nature a relation to ends a priori, or even to assume such a relation indeterminately in advance of actual experience of such products. The reason is that many particular experiences must be made and considered under the unity of their principle in order to cognize an objective purposiveness in a certain object even empirically.—Aesthetic judgment is therefore a special faculty for judging things according to a rule, but not according to concepts. Teleological judgment is no special faculty, but only the reflective power of judgment in general, insofar as it proceeds, as everywhere in theoretical cognition, according to concepts, but concerning certain objects of nature according to special principles—namely those of a merely reflective, not an object-determining, power of judgment. Thus in its application it belongs to the theoretical part of philosophy; and on account of its special principles, which are not determining as they must be in a doctrine, it must also constitute a special part of the critique. Aesthetic judgment, by contrast, contributes nothing to the cognition of its objects and must therefore be counted only as belonging to the critique of the judging subject and its cognitive faculties, insofar as they A LIII are capable of principles a priori, whatever use (theoretical or practical) those principles may otherwise have. This critique is the propaedeutic of all philosophy.
Plain English translation
A complete, independent machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
VIII. On the logical representation of nature's purposiveness.
Purposiveness can be represented in an object given in experience in either of two ways. It can rest on a merely subjective ground: the agreement of its form, in taking it in (apprehension) before any concept, with the cognitive faculties, in order to unite intuition with concepts into cognition in general. Or it can rest on an objective ground: the agreement of its form with the possibility of the thing itself, according to a concept of it that precedes A XLIX the form and contains its ground. We have seen that the representation of the first kind of purposiveness rests on direct pleasure in the object's form in mere reflection on it. The representation of the second kind, however, relates the object's form not to the subject's cognitive faculties in taking it in, but to a definite cognition of the object under a given concept. It therefore has nothing to do with a feeling of pleasure in things, but with the understanding in judging them. When the concept of an object is given, judgment's task in using it for cognition consists in presentation (exhibition): placing a corresponding intuition alongside the concept. This may be done through our own imagination, as in art, 193 when we realize a preconceived concept of an object that is an end for us. Or it may be done through nature in its technique, as with organized bodies, when we place our concept of an end beneath nature in order to judge its product. In this case we represent not just nature's purposiveness in the form of the thing, but this product of nature as a natural end.—Our concept of a subjective purposiveness of nature in its forms according to empirical laws is not a concept of the object at all. It is only a A L principle of judgment for acquiring concepts in nature's immense diversity, for finding our way in it. Yet through it we attribute to nature, as it were, a regard for our faculty of cognition, by analogy with an end. We can thus regard natural beauty as the presentation of the concept of formal, merely subjective purposiveness, and natural ends as the presentation of the concept of real, objective purposiveness. We judge the former through taste, aesthetically, by means of the feeling of pleasure; the latter through understanding and reason, logically, according to concepts.
This grounds the division of the critique of judgment into the critiques of aesthetic and teleological judgment. The former means the ability to judge formal purposiveness, also called subjective purposiveness, through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The latter means the ability to judge nature's real, objective purposiveness through understanding and reason.
The part concerning aesthetic judgment belongs essentially to a critique of judgment. For aesthetic judgment alone contains a principle that judgment places entirely a priori at the basis of its reflection on nature: the principle of nature's formal purposiveness, according to its particular empirical laws, for our faculty of cognition. Without this, the understanding could not find its way in nature. By contrast, A LI no a priori ground can be given for the claim that there must be objective ends of nature, things possible only as natural ends. Even the possibility of this claim cannot be seen from the concept of nature as an object of experience, whether in general or in particular. Rather, judgment alone contains the rule for using the concept of ends in the service of reason in cases that arise, involving certain products, without itself containing an a priori principle for doing so. The transcendental 194 principle has already prepared the understanding to apply the concept of an end, at least in form, to nature.
The transcendental principle allows us to represent a purposiveness of nature in the form of a thing, in subjective relation to our faculty of cognition, as a principle for judging nature. But it leaves entirely undetermined where and in what cases I must judge something as a product according to a principle of purposiveness rather than merely according to universal natural laws. It leaves it to aesthetic judgment, in taste, to decide the suitability of the product's form to our cognitive faculties, insofar as taste decides not through agreement with concepts but through feeling. By contrast, judgment used teleologically states definite conditions A LII under which something, for example an organized body, is to be judged according to the idea of an end of nature. But it can cite no principle from the concept of nature as an object of experience authorizing us to attribute to nature a priori a relation to ends, or even to assume such a relation indeterminately from actual experience of such products. The reason is that many particular experiences must be undertaken and considered under the unity of their principle before we can know, even empirically, an objective purposiveness in a particular object.—Aesthetic judgment is therefore a special ability to judge things according to a rule, but not according to concepts. Teleological judgment is not a special faculty. It is simply reflective judgment in general, proceeding, as everywhere in theoretical cognition, according to concepts. But for certain natural objects it proceeds according to special principles: those of a merely reflective judgment, not one determining objects. In its application it therefore belongs to the theoretical part of philosophy. Because its special principles are not determining, as they must be in a doctrine, it must also form a separate part of the critique. Aesthetic judgment, on the other hand, contributes nothing to knowledge of its objects. It must therefore be assigned only to the critique of the judging subject and its cognitive faculties insofar as they A LIII are capable of a priori principles, whatever use those principles may have, theoretical or practical. This critique is the preparatory study for all philosophy.
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Introduction VIII is part of Critique of Judgment by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 10 of 21 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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