Introduction IX
Original German
IX. 195 Von der Verknüpfung der Gesetzgebungen des Verstandes und der Vernunft durch die Urtheilskraft.
Der Verstand ist a priori gesetzgebend für die Natur, als Object der Sinne, zu einem theoretischen Erkenntniß derselben in einer möglichen Erfahrung. Die Vernunft ist a priori gesetzgebend für die Freiheit und ihre eigene Causalität, als das Übersinnliche in dem Subjecte, zu einem unbedingt-praktischen Erkenntniß. Das Gebiet des Naturbegriffs unter der einen und das des Freiheitsbegriffs unter der anderen Gesetzgebung sind gegen allen wechselseitigen Einfluß, den sie für sich (ein jedes nach seinen Grundgesetzen) auf einander haben könnten, durch die große Kluft, welche das Übersinnliche von den Erscheinungen trennt, gänzlich abgesondert. Der Freiheitsbegriff bestimmt nichts in Ansehung der theoretischen Erkenntniß der Natur; der Naturbegriff eben sowohl nichts in Ansehung der praktischen Gesetze der Freiheit: und es ist in sofern nicht möglich, A LIV eine Brücke von einem Gebiete zu dem andern hinüberzuschlagen. — Allein wenn die Bestimmungsgründe der Causalität nach dem Freiheitsbegriffe (und der praktischen Regel, die er enthält) gleich nicht in der Natur belegen sind, und das Sinnliche das Übersinnliche im Subjecte nicht bestimmen kann: so ist dieses doch umgekehrt (zwar nicht in Ansehung des Erkenntnisses der Natur, aber doch der Folgen aus dem ersteren auf die letztere) möglich und schon in dem Begriffe einer Causalität durch Freiheit enthalten, deren Wirkung diesen ihren formalen Gesetzen gemäß in der Welt geschehen soll, obzwar das Wort Ursache, von dem Übersinnlichen gebraucht, nur den Grund bedeutet, die Causalität der Naturdinge zu einer Wirkung gemäß ihren eigenen Naturgesetzen, zugleich aber doch auch mit dem formalen Princip der Vernunftgesetze einhellig zu bestimmen, wovon die Möglichkeit zwar nicht eingesehen, aber der Einwurf von einem vorgeblichen Widerspruch, der sich darin fände, hinreichend widerlegt werden kann2. — Die Wirkung nach dem Freiheitsbegriffe ist der A LV 196 Endzweck, der (oder dessen Erscheinung in der Sinnenwelt) existiren soll, wozu die Bedingung der Möglichkeit desselben in der Natur (des Subjects als Sinnenwesens, nämlich als Mensch) vorausgesetzt wird. Das, was diese a priori und ohne Rücksicht auf das Praktische voraussetzt, die Urtheilskraft, giebt den vermittelnden Begriff zwischen den Naturbegriffen und dem Freiheitsbegriffe, der den Übergang von der reinen theoretischen zur reinen praktischen, von der Gesetzmäßigkeit nach der ersten zum Endzwecke nach dem letzten möglich macht, in dem Begriffe einer Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur an die Hand; denn dadurch wird die Möglichkeit des Endzwecks, der allein in der Natur und mit Einstimmung ihrer Gesetze wirklich werden kann, erkannt.
Der Verstand giebt durch die Möglichkeit seiner Gesetze a priori für die Natur einen Beweis davon, daß diese von uns nur als Erscheinung A LVI erkannt werde, mithin zugleich Anzeige auf ein übersinnliches Substrat derselben, aber läßt dieses gänzlich unbestimmt. Die Urtheilskraft verschafft durch ihr Princip a priori der Beurtheilung der Natur nach möglichen besonderen Gesetzen derselben ihrem übersinnlichen Substrat (in uns sowohl als außer uns) Bestimmbarkeit durch das intellectuelle Vermögen. Die Vernunft aber giebt eben demselben durch ihr praktisches Gesetz a priori die Bestimmung; und so macht die Urtheilskraft den Übergang vom Gebiete des Naturbegriffs zu dem des Freiheitsbegriffs möglich.
In Ansehung der Seelenvermögen überhaupt, sofern sie als obere, d. i. als solche, die eine Autonomie enthalten, betrachtet werden, ist für das Erkenntnißvermögen (das theoretische der Natur) der Verstand dasjenige, welches die constitutiven Principien a priori enthält; für das Gefühl der Lust und Unlust ist es die Urtheilskraft unabhängig von Begriffen und Empfindungen, die sich auf Bestimmung des Begehrungsvermögens 197 beziehen und dadurch unmittelbar praktisch sein könnten; für das Begehrungsvermögen die Vernunft, welche ohne Vermittelung irgend einer Lust, woher sie auch komme, praktisch ist und demselben als oberes Vermögen den Endzweck bestimmt, der zugleich das reine intellectuelle Wohlgefallen am Objecte mit sich führt. — Der Begriff der Urtheilskraft von einer Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur ist noch zu den Naturbegriffen A LVII gehörig, aber nur als regulatives Princip des Erkenntnißvermögens, obzwar das ästhetische Urtheil über gewisse Gegenstände (der Natur oder der Kunst), welches ihn veranlaßt, in Ansehung des Gefühls der Lust oder Unlust ein constitutives Princip ist. Die Spontaneität im Spiele der Erkenntnißvermögen, deren Zusammenstimmung den Grund dieser Lust enthält, macht den gedachten Begriff zur Vermittelung der Verknüpfung der Gebiete des Naturbegriffs mit dem Freiheitsbegriffe in ihren Folgen tauglich, indem diese zugleich die Empfänglichkeit des Gemüths für das moralische Gefühl befördert. — Folgende Tafel kann die Übersicht aller oberen Vermögen ihrer systematischen Einheit nach erleichtern3.
Gesammte Vermögen des Gemüths — Erkenntnißvermögen — Principien a priori — Anwendung auf A LVIII 198Erkenntnißvermögen — Verstand — Gesetzmäßigkeit — NaturGefühl der Lust und Unlust — Urtheilskraft — Zweckmäßigkeit — KunstBegehrungsvermögen — Vernunft — Endzweck — Freiheit.
2 Einer von den verschiedenen vermeinten Widersprüchen in dieser gänzlichen Unterscheidung der Naturcausalität von der durch Freiheit ist der, da man ihr den Vorwurf macht: daß, wenn ich von Hindernissen, die die Natur der Causalität nach Freiheitsgesetzen (den moralischen) legt, oder ihre Beförderung durch dieselbe rede, ich doch der ersteren auf die letztere einen Einfluß einräume. Aber wenn man das Gesagte nur verstehen will, so ist die Mißdeutung sehr leicht zu verhüten. Der Widerstand, oder die Beförderung ist nicht zwischen der Natur und der Freiheit, sondern der ersteren als Erscheinung und den Wirkungen der letztern als Erscheinungen in der Sinnenwelt; und selbst die Causalität der Freiheit (der reinen und praktischen Vernunft) ist die Causalität einer jener untergeordneten Naturursache (des Subjects, als Mensch, folglich als Erscheinung betrachtet), von deren Bestimmung das Intelligible, welches unter der Freiheit gedacht wird, auf eine übrigens (eben so wie eben dasselbe, was das übersinnliche Substrat der Natur ausmacht) unerklärliche Art den Grund enthält.
3 Man hat es bedenklich gefunden, daß meine Eintheilungen in der reinen Philosophie fast immer dreitheilig ausfallen. Das liegt aber in der Natur der Sache. Soll eine Eintheilung a priori geschehen, so wird sie entweder analytisch sein nach dem Satze des Widerspruchs; und da ist sie jederzeit zweitheilig (quodlibet ens est aut A aut non A). Oder sie ist synthetisch; und wenn sie in diesem Falle aus Begriffen a priori (nicht wie in der Mathematik aus der a priori dem Begriffe correspondirenden Anschauung) soll geführt werden, so muß nach demjenigen, was zu der synthetischen Einheit überhaupt erforderlich ist, nämlich 1) Bedingung, 2) ein Bedingtes, 3) der Begriff, der aus der Vereinigung des Bedingten mit seiner Bedingung entspringt, die Eintheilung nothwendig Trichotomie sein.
Musean translation
A complete machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
IX. 195 On the Connection of the Legislations of Understanding and Reason through the Power of Judgment.
The understanding legislates a priori for nature as an object of the senses, for a theoretical cognition of it in a possible experience. Reason legislates a priori for freedom and its own causality, as the supersensible in the subject, for an unconditionally practical cognition. The domain of the concept of nature under the one legislation and that of the concept of freedom under the other are wholly separated, against any mutual influence they might of themselves have on one another (each according to its fundamental laws), by the great gulf dividing the supersensible from appearances. The concept of freedom determines nothing with regard to theoretical cognition of nature; the concept of nature likewise determines nothing with regard to the practical laws of freedom. To this extent it is impossible A LIV to throw a bridge from one domain to the other.—Yet although the determining grounds of causality according to the concept of freedom (and the practical rule it contains) do not lie in nature, and the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the subject, the reverse is nevertheless possible—not with regard to cognition of nature, but with regard to the consequences of the former for the latter. This is already contained in the concept of a causality through freedom, whose effect is to occur in the world according to freedom's formal laws. When used of the supersensible, however, the word cause means only the ground for determining the causality of natural things to an effect in conformity with their own natural laws, yet at the same time in harmony with the formal principle of the laws of reason. The possibility of this cannot indeed be understood, but the objection of an alleged contradiction within it can be sufficiently refuted2.—The effect according to the concept of freedom is the A LV 196 final end that ought to exist (or whose appearance in the sensible world ought to exist), for which the condition of its possibility in nature (in the subject as a sensible being, namely a human being) is presupposed. What presupposes this a priori and without regard to the practical—the power of judgment—supplies the mediating concept between the concepts of nature and the concept of freedom, making possible the transition from the purely theoretical to the purely practical, from lawfulness according to the former to the final end according to the latter, in the concept of a purposiveness of nature. For through this the possibility of the final end is cognized, which can become actual only in nature and in agreement with its laws.
Through the possibility of its laws a priori for nature, the understanding gives proof that we cognize nature only as appearance A LVI, and thereby also points to a supersensible substratum of nature, but leaves this wholly undetermined. Through its principle a priori for judging nature according to its possible particular laws, the power of judgment provides nature's supersensible substratum (both within us and outside us) with determinability through the intellectual faculty. Reason, however, gives this same substratum determination through its practical law a priori. Thus the power of judgment makes possible the transition from the domain of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom.
With regard to the faculties of the soul in general, insofar as they are considered as higher faculties—that is, as containing an autonomy—it is the understanding that contains the constitutive principles a priori for the faculty of cognition (the theoretical cognition of nature); for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, it is the power of judgment, independently of concepts and sensations that refer to the determination of the faculty of desire 197 and could thereby be immediately practical; for the faculty of desire, it is reason, which is practical without the mediation of any pleasure, whatever its source, and determines for that faculty, as a higher faculty, the final end, which also carries with it pure intellectual satisfaction in the object.—The power of judgment's concept of a purposiveness of nature still belongs among concepts of nature A LVII, but only as a regulative principle of the faculty of cognition, although the aesthetic judgment concerning certain objects (of nature or art) that occasions it is a constitutive principle with regard to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Spontaneity in the play of the cognitive faculties, whose harmony contains the ground of this pleasure, makes that concept fit to mediate the connection of the domains of the concept of nature and the concept of freedom in their consequences, since it also promotes the mind's receptivity to moral feeling.—The following table may make it easier to survey all the higher faculties in their systematic unity3.
All the faculties of the mind — Cognitive faculties — Principles a priori — Application to A LVIII 198Faculty of cognition — Understanding — Lawfulness — NatureFeeling of pleasure and displeasure — Power of judgment — Purposiveness — ArtFaculty of desire — Reason — Final end — Freedom.
2 One of the various supposed contradictions in this complete distinction of natural causality from causality through freedom is the reproach that, when I speak of obstacles that nature places in the way of causality according to laws of freedom (moral laws), or of its promotion by nature, I nevertheless concede an influence of the former on the latter. But if one is only willing to understand what has been said, the misinterpretation is very easily prevented. The resistance or promotion is not between nature and freedom, but between the former as appearance and the effects of the latter as appearances in the sensible world. Even the causality of freedom (of pure and practical reason) is the causality of a natural cause subordinate to freedom (of the subject considered as a human being, hence as appearance). The intelligible thought under freedom contains the ground of this cause's determination, in a manner otherwise inexplicable (just as is the very same thing that constitutes the supersensible substratum of nature).
3 It has been thought troubling that my divisions in pure philosophy almost always turn out to be threefold. But this lies in the nature of the matter. If a division is to be made a priori, it will either be analytic, according to the principle of contradiction, and then it is always twofold (every being is either A or not A); or it is synthetic. If in the latter case it is to be carried out from concepts a priori (not, as in mathematics, from the intuition corresponding a priori to the concept), then, in accordance with what is required for synthetic unity in general—namely 1) a condition, 2) something conditioned, 3) the concept arising from the union of the conditioned with its condition—the division must necessarily be a trichotomy.
Plain English translation
A complete, independent machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
IX. 195 On the connection of the legislations of understanding and reason through the power of judgment.
The understanding legislates a priori for nature as an object of the senses, for theoretical knowledge of it in possible experience. Reason legislates a priori for freedom and its own causality, as the supersensible in the subject, for unconditionally practical cognition. The domain of the concept of nature under the one legislation, and that of the concept of freedom under the other, are entirely separated from any mutual influence they could have on one another on their own, each according to its fundamental laws. They are separated by the great gulf dividing the supersensible from appearances. The concept of freedom determines nothing regarding theoretical cognition of nature; the concept of nature likewise determines nothing regarding the practical laws of freedom. To that extent it is impossible A LIV to build a bridge from one domain to the other.—But although the grounds determining causality according to the concept of freedom and the practical rule it contains are not located in nature, and the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the subject, the reverse is possible. This concerns not knowledge of nature, but the consequences of the supersensible for the sensible. It is already contained in the concept of causality through freedom, whose effect ought to occur in the world according to freedom's formal laws. When used of the supersensible, however, the word cause means only the ground for determining the causality of natural things toward an effect according to their own natural laws, yet at the same time in harmony with the formal principle of reason's laws. We cannot understand how this is possible, but we can sufficiently refute the objection that it allegedly contains a contradiction2.—The effect according to the concept of freedom is the A LV 196 final end that ought to exist, or whose appearance in the sensible world ought to exist. This presupposes the condition of its possibility in nature: the nature of the subject as a sensible being, namely a human being. The power of judgment presupposes this condition a priori and without regard to the practical. In the concept of nature's purposiveness, it supplies the mediating concept between concepts of nature and the concept of freedom. This makes possible the passage from the purely theoretical to the purely practical, from lawfulness according to the former to the final end according to the latter. Through it we recognize the possibility of the final end, which can become actual only in nature and in agreement with its laws.
Through the possibility of its a priori laws for nature, the understanding proves that we know nature only as appearance A LVI. It thereby also points to a supersensible substrate of nature, but leaves it entirely undetermined. Through its a priori principle for judging nature according to its possible particular laws, the power of judgment gives this supersensible substrate, both within and outside us, determinability through the intellectual faculty. Reason, however, gives that same substrate its determination through its a priori practical law. In this way judgment makes possible the passage from the domain of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom.
Consider the faculties of the soul in general insofar as they are regarded as higher faculties, that is, as containing autonomy. For the faculty of cognition, theoretical cognition of nature, the understanding contains the constitutive a priori principles. For the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, it is the power of judgment, independently of concepts and sensations that relate to determining the faculty of desire 197 and could thereby be directly practical. For the faculty of desire, it is reason, which is practical without any pleasure acting as intermediary, whatever its source. Reason determines for this faculty, as a higher faculty, the final end, which at the same time brings with it pure intellectual satisfaction in the object.—Judgment's concept of nature's purposiveness still belongs among concepts of nature A LVII, but only as a regulative principle of the faculty of cognition. Yet the aesthetic judgment about certain objects of nature or art that occasions this concept is a constitutive principle regarding the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Spontaneity in the play of the cognitive faculties, whose agreement grounds this pleasure, makes the concept suitable for mediating the connection between the domains of the concept of nature and the concept of freedom in their consequences. At the same time, this spontaneity promotes the mind's receptiveness to moral feeling.—The following table may make it easier to survey all the higher faculties in their systematic unity3.
All the faculties of the mind — Cognitive faculties — A priori principles — Application to A LVIII 198Faculty of cognition — Understanding — Lawfulness — NatureFeeling of pleasure and displeasure — Power of judgment — Purposiveness — ArtFaculty of desire — Reason — Final end — Freedom.
2 One of the various alleged contradictions in this complete distinction between natural causality and causality through freedom is the following objection. If I speak of obstacles nature places in the way of causality according to laws of freedom, the moral laws, or of nature's support for it, I am admitting that nature has an influence on freedom. But this misreading is very easy to avoid if one is willing to understand what has been said. The resistance or support is not between nature and freedom, but between nature as appearance and the effects of freedom as appearances in the sensible world. Even the causality of freedom, of pure practical reason, is the causality of a natural cause subordinate to freedom: the subject considered as a human being and thus as an appearance. The intelligible thought under freedom contains the ground of this cause's determination in a way that is otherwise inexplicable, just like what constitutes nature's supersensible substrate.
3 Some have found it troubling that my divisions in pure philosophy almost always have three parts. But this lies in the nature of the matter. If a division is to be made a priori, it will either be analytic, according to the principle of contradiction, in which case it always has two parts (every being is either A or not A), or it will be synthetic. If in the latter case it is to be made from a priori concepts, rather than, as in mathematics, from the intuition corresponding a priori to the concept, then the division must necessarily have three parts, in accordance with what synthetic unity in general requires: 1) a condition, 2) something conditioned, 3) the concept arising from the union of the conditioned with its condition.
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Introduction IX is part of Critique of Judgment by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 11 of 21 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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