Introduction VI
Original German
VI. Von der Verbindung des Gefühls der Lust mit dem Begriffe der Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur.
Die gedachte Übereinstimmung der Natur in der Mannigfaltigkeit ihrer besonderen Gesetze zu unserem Bedürfnisse, Allgemeinheit der Principien für sie aufzufinden, muß nach aller unserer Einsicht als zufällig beurtheilt werden, gleichwohl aber doch für unser Verstandesbedürfniß als unentbehrlich, mithin als Zweckmäßigkeit, wodurch die Natur mit unserer, aber nur auf Erkenntniß gerichteten Absicht übereinstimmt. — Die allgemeinen Gesetze des Verstandes, welche zugleich Gesetze der Natur sind, sind derselben eben so nothwendig (obgleich aus Spontaneität entsprungen), als die Bewegungsgesetze der Materie; und ihre Erzeugung setzt keine Absicht mit unseren Erkenntnißvermögen voraus, weil wir nur durch dieselben von dem, was Erkenntniß der Dinge (der Natur) sei, zuerst A XXXIX 187 einen Begriff erhalten, und sie der Natur als Object unserer Erkenntniß überhaupt nothwendig zukommen. Allein, daß die Ordnung der Natur nach ihren besonderen Gesetzen bei aller unsere Fassungskraft übersteigenden wenigstens möglichen Mannigfaltigkeit und Ungleichartigkeit doch dieser wirklich angemessen sei, ist, so viel wir einsehen können, zufällig; und die Auffindung derselben ist ein Geschäft des Verstandes, welches mit Absicht zu einem nothwendigen Zwecke desselben, nämlich Einheit der Principien in sie hineinzubringen, geführt wird: welchen Zweck dann die Urtheilskraft der Natur beilegen muß, weil der Verstand ihr hierüber kein Gesetz vorschreiben kann.
Die Erreichung jeder Absicht ist mit dem Gefühle der Lust verbunden; und ist die Bedingung der erstern eine Vorstellung a priori, wie hier ein Princip für die reflectirende Urtheilskraft überhaupt, so ist das Gefühl der Lust auch durch einen Grund a priori und für jedermann gültig bestimmt: und zwar bloß durch die Beziehung des Objects auf das Erkenntnißvermögen, ohne daß der Begriff der Zweckmäßigkeit hier im Mindesten auf das Begehrungsvermögen Rücksicht nimmt und sich also von aller praktischen Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur gänzlich unterscheidet.
In der That, da wir von dem Zusammentreffen der Wahrnehmungen mit den Gesetzen nach allgemeinen Naturbegriffen (den Kategorieen) nicht die mindeste Wirkung auf das Gefühl der Lust in uns antreffen, A XL auch nicht antreffen können, weil der Verstand damit unabsichtlich nach seiner Natur nothwendig verfährt: so ist andrerseits die entdeckte Vereinbarkeit zweier oder mehrerer empirischen heterogenen Naturgesetze unter einem sie beide befassenden Princip der Grund einer sehr merklichen Lust, oft sogar einer Bewunderung, selbst einer solchen, die nicht aufhört, ob man schon mit dem Gegenstande derselben genug bekannt ist. Zwar spüren wir an der Faßlichkeit der Natur und ihrer Einheit der Abtheilung in Gattungen und Arten, wodurch allein empirische Begriffe möglich sind, durch welche wir sie nach ihren besonderen Gesetzen erkennen, keine merkliche Lust mehr: aber sie ist gewiß zu ihrer Zeit gewesen, und nur weil die gemeinste Erfahrung ohne sie nicht möglich sein würde, ist sie allmählig mit dem bloßen Erkenntnisse vermischt und nicht mehr besonders bemerkt worden. — Es gehört also etwas, das in der Beurtheilung der Natur auf die Zweckmäßigkeit derselben für unsern Verstand aufmerksam macht, ein Studium ungleichartige Gesetze derselben wo möglich unter höhere, obwohl immer noch empirische, zu bringen, dazu, 188 um, wenn es gelingt, an dieser Einstimmung derselben für unser Erkenntnißvermögen, die wir als bloß zufällig ansehen, Lust zu empfinden. Dagegen würde uns eine Vorstellung der Natur durchaus mißfallen, durch welche man uns voraus sagte, daß bei der mindesten Nachforschung A XLI über die gemeinste Erfahrung hinaus wir auf eine Heterogeneität ihrer Gesetze stoßen würden, welche die Vereinigung ihrer besonderen Gesetze unter allgemeinen empirischen für unseren Verstand unmöglich machte: weil dies dem Princip der subjectiv-zweckmäßigen Specification der Natur in ihren Gattungen und unserer reflectirenden Urtheilskraft in der Absicht der letzteren widerstreitet.
Diese Voraussetzung der Urtheilskraft ist gleichwohl darüber so unbestimmt, wie weit jene idealische Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur für unser Erkenntnißvermögen ausgedehnt werden solle, daß, wenn man uns sagt, eine tiefere oder ausgebreitetere Kenntniß der Natur durch Beobachtung müsse zuletzt auf eine Mannigfaltigkeit von Gesetzen stoßen, die kein menschlicher Verstand auf ein Princip zurückführen kann, wir es auch zufrieden sind, ob wir es gleich lieber hören, wenn andere uns Hoffnung geben: daß, je mehr wir die Natur im Inneren kennen würden, oder mit äußeren uns für jetzt unbekannten Gliedern vergleichen könnten, wir sie in ihren Principien um desto einfacher und bei der scheinbaren Heterogeneität ihrer empirischen Gesetze einhelliger finden würden, je weiter unsere Erfahrung fortschritte. Denn es ist ein Geheiß unserer Urtheilskraft, nach dem Princip der Angemessenheit der Natur zu unserem Erkenntnißvermögen zu verfahren, so weit es reicht, ohne (weil es keine bestimmende Urtheilskraft ist, die uns diese Regel giebt) auszumachen, A XLII ob es irgendwo seine Gränzen habe, oder nicht: weil wir zwar in Ansehung des rationalen Gebrauchs unserer Erkenntnißvermögen Gränzen bestimmen können, im empirischen Felde aber keine Gränzbestimmung möglich ist.
Musean translation
A complete machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
VI. On the Connection of the Feeling of Pleasure with the Concept of the Purposiveness of Nature.
The agreement of nature in the manifoldness of its particular laws with our need to find universal principles for them must, according to all our insight, be judged contingent, yet at the same time indispensable to the needs of our understanding, and hence a purposiveness through which nature agrees with our intention, though that intention is directed only toward cognition.—The universal laws of the understanding, which are at the same time laws of nature, are as necessary to nature (although they spring from spontaneity) as the laws of motion of matter; and their production presupposes no intention concerning our cognitive faculties, because only through them, concerning what cognition of things (of nature) is, do we first A XXXIX 187 acquire a concept, and they necessarily belong to nature as an object of our cognition in general. But that the order of nature according to its particular laws, despite all its at least possible manifoldness and diversity exceeding our power of comprehension, should nevertheless actually be commensurate with that power is, as far as we can see, contingent. Its discovery is a task of the understanding, pursued with a view to a necessary end of its own, namely to introduce unity of principles into nature. This end the power of judgment must then attribute to nature, because the understanding cannot prescribe a law to nature on this matter.
The attainment of every intention is connected with the feeling of pleasure; and if the condition of its attainment is a representation a priori, as here a principle for the reflective power of judgment in general, then the feeling of pleasure is also determined by a ground a priori and valid for everyone. It is determined, indeed, solely through the relation of the object to the faculty of cognition, without the concept of purposiveness here having the least regard for the faculty of desire; it is thus wholly distinct from all practical purposiveness of nature.
In fact, while we find—and can find—not the slightest effect on the feeling of pleasure within us from the agreement of perceptions with laws according to universal concepts of nature (the categories), A XL because the understanding necessarily proceeds in this way, without intention, according to its nature, on the other hand the discovery that two or more heterogeneous empirical laws of nature can be united under a principle embracing them both is the ground of a very noticeable pleasure, often even of admiration, and indeed of an admiration that does not cease even when we are sufficiently acquainted with its object. We no longer feel any noticeable pleasure in nature's comprehensibility and the unity of its division into genera and species, through which alone empirical concepts are possible by which we cognize nature according to its particular laws. But this pleasure certainly existed in its time; and only because the most ordinary experience would be impossible without it has it gradually become mingled with mere cognition and ceased to be noticed separately.—Something is therefore needed that, in judging nature, draws attention to its purposiveness for our understanding: a study aimed at bringing its heterogeneous laws, if possible, under higher, though still empirical, laws, 188 so that, when it succeeds, we may feel pleasure in their harmony with our faculty of cognition, which we regard as merely contingent. By contrast, a representation of nature would thoroughly displease us if it foretold that, with the slightest investigation A XLI beyond the most ordinary experience, we would encounter a heterogeneity of its laws that made the union of its particular laws under universal empirical laws impossible for our understanding. For this conflicts with the principle of the subjectively purposive specification of nature into its genera and with our reflective power of judgment in its aim regarding them.
Nevertheless, this presupposition of the power of judgment is so indeterminate concerning how far that ideal purposiveness of nature for our faculty of cognition should extend that, if we are told that a deeper or more extensive knowledge of nature through observation must ultimately encounter a manifoldness of laws that no human understanding can reduce to a principle, we are content with that as well. Yet we would rather hear others give us hope that the more we came to know nature inwardly, or could compare it with external members as yet unknown to us, the simpler we would find it in its principles, and the more concordant despite the apparent heterogeneity of its empirical laws, as our experience advanced. For our power of judgment commands us to proceed according to the principle of nature's commensurateness with our faculty of cognition as far as that principle reaches, without (since it is not determining judgment that gives us this rule) deciding A XLII whether or not it has limits anywhere. For although we can determine limits with regard to the rational use of our cognitive faculties, no determination of limits is possible in the empirical field.
Plain English translation
A complete, independent machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
VI. On the connection of the feeling of pleasure with the concept of nature's purposiveness.
The agreement we have in mind is that of nature, in the diversity of its particular laws, with our need to find universal principles for them. According to all our insight, we must judge this agreement contingent. Yet we must also judge it indispensable for our understanding's needs, and therefore a purposiveness through which nature agrees with our aim, which is directed solely at cognition.—The universal laws of the understanding, which are also laws of nature, are as necessary to nature as the laws of motion are to matter, although they arise from spontaneity. Their generation presupposes no intention concerning our cognitive faculties. Only through them do we first acquire a concept of what knowledge of things—of nature—is A XXXIX 187, and they necessarily belong to nature as the object of our cognition in general. But nature's order according to its particular laws may display a diversity and variety beyond our capacity to grasp. That this order is nevertheless actually suited to that capacity is, as far as we can see, contingent. Discovering this order is a task the understanding pursues with a view to a necessary end of its own: bringing unity of principles into nature. Judgment must then attribute this end to nature, since the understanding can prescribe no law to nature in this respect.
Achieving any aim is connected with a feeling of pleasure. If the condition of that achievement is an a priori representation, as here a principle for reflective judgment in general, then an a priori ground also determines the feeling of pleasure validly for everyone. It does so solely through the object's relation to the faculty of cognition. Here the concept of purposiveness takes no account whatever of the faculty of desire, and so differs entirely from all practical purposiveness of nature.
In fact, we find not the slightest effect on our feeling of pleasure when perceptions agree with laws according to universal concepts of nature, the categories. A XL Nor can we find such an effect, since the understanding necessarily proceeds in this way according to its nature, without intention. By contrast, discovering that two or more heterogeneous empirical laws of nature can be brought under a principle embracing them both is the ground of a very noticeable pleasure. It often even produces admiration that continues after we have become quite familiar with its object. We no longer feel any noticeable pleasure in nature's comprehensibility and its unity in the division into genera and species. Yet this alone makes empirical concepts possible, through which we know nature according to its particular laws. Certainly that pleasure existed at one time. Only because even the most ordinary experience would be impossible without it has it gradually merged with mere cognition and ceased to be noticed separately.—Something is therefore needed to draw attention, when judging nature, to its purposiveness for our understanding. We must study how to bring its heterogeneous laws, if possible, under higher laws, though these remain empirical. 188 If this succeeds, we can feel pleasure in their agreement with our faculty of cognition, an agreement we regard as merely contingent. Conversely, we would be thoroughly displeased by a representation of nature predicting that the slightest investigation A XLI beyond the most ordinary experience would confront us with such heterogeneity in its laws that our understanding could not unite its particular laws under universal empirical ones. This would conflict with the principle of nature's subjectively purposive specification into genera, and with the aim of our reflective power of judgment in this regard.
Yet this presupposition of judgment leaves entirely undetermined how far nature's ideal purposiveness for our faculty of cognition should extend. If we are told that deeper or wider knowledge of nature through observation must eventually encounter a diversity of laws that no human understanding can reduce to a principle, we accept this too. Still, we prefer to hear others offer the hope that the better we know nature internally, or can compare it with external members now unknown to us, the simpler we will find it in its principles as our experience advances, and the more harmonious despite the apparent heterogeneity of its empirical laws. For our power of judgment commands us to proceed according to the principle of nature's suitability to our faculty of cognition as far as it reaches. Since it is not determining judgment that gives us this rule, it does not decide A XLII whether that principle has limits anywhere. We can determine limits regarding the rational use of our cognitive faculties, but in the empirical field no determination of limits is possible.
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Introduction VI is part of Critique of Judgment by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 8 of 21 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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