Introduction III
Original German
III. Von der Kritik der Urtheilskraft, als einem Verbindungsmittel der zwei Theile der Philosophie zu einem Ganzen.
Die Kritik der Erkenntnißvermögen in Ansehung dessen, was sie a priori leisten können, hat eigentlich kein Gebiet in Ansehung der Objecte: weil sie keine Doctrin ist, sondern nur, ob und wie nach der Bewandtniß, die es mit unseren Vermögen hat, eine Doctrin durch sie möglich sei, zu untersuchen hat. Ihr Feld erstreckt sich auf alle Anmaßungen derselben, um sie in die Gränzen ihrer Rechtmäßigkeit zu setzen. Was aber nicht in die Eintheilung der Philosophie kommen kann, das kann doch als ein A XXI Haupttheil in die Kritik des reinen Erkenntnißvermögens überhaupt kommen, wenn es nämlich Principien enthält, die für sich weder zum theoretischen noch praktischen Gebrauche tauglich sind.
Die Naturbegriffe, welche den Grund zu allem theoretischen Erkenntniß a priori enthalten, beruhten auf der Gesetzgebung des Verstandes. — Der Freiheitsbegriff, der den Grund zu allen sinnlich-unbedingten praktischen Vorschriften a priori enthielt, beruhte auf der Gesetzgebung der Vernunft. Beide Vermögen also haben außer dem, daß sie der logischen Form nach auf Principien, welchen Ursprungs sie auch sein mögen, angewandt werden können, überdem noch jedes seine eigene Gesetzgebung 177 dem Inhalte nach, über die es keine andere (a priori) giebt, und die daher die Eintheilung der Philosophie in die theoretische und praktische rechtfertigt.
Allein in der Familie der oberen Erkenntnißvermögen giebt es doch noch ein Mittelglied zwischen dem Verstande und der Vernunft. Dieses ist die Urtheilskraft, von welcher man Ursache hat nach der Analogie zu vermuthen, daß sie eben sowohl, wenn gleich nicht eine eigene Gesetzgebung, doch ein ihr eigenes Princip nach Gesetzen zu suchen, allenfalls ein bloß subjectives, a priori in sich enthalten dürfte: welches, wenn ihm gleich kein Feld der Gegenstände als sein Gebiet zustände, doch irgend einen Boden haben kann und eine gewisse Beschaffenheit desselben, wofür A XXII gerade nur dieses Princip geltend sein möchte.
Hierzu kommt aber noch (nach der Analogie zu urtheilen) ein neuer Grund, die Urtheilskraft mit einer anderen Ordnung unserer Vorstellungskräfte in Verknüpfung zu bringen, welche von noch größerer Wichtigkeit zu sein scheint, als die der Verwandtschaft mit der Familie der Erkenntnißvermögen. Denn alle Seelenvermögen oder Fähigkeiten können auf die drei zurück geführt werden, welche sich nicht ferner aus einem gemeinschaftlichen Grunde ableiten lassen: das Erkenntnißvermögen, das Gefühl der Lust und Unlust und das Begehrungsvermögen1. 178 Für das Erkenntnißvermögen ist allein der Verstand gesetzgebend, wenn A XXIII jenes (wie es auch geschehen muß, wenn es für sich, ohne Vermischung A XXIV mit dem Begehrungsvermögen, betrachtet wird) als Vermögen eines theoretischen Erkenntnisses auf die Natur bezogen wird, in Ansehung deren allein (als Erscheinung) es uns möglich ist, durch Naturbegriffe a priori, welche eigentlich reine Verstandesbegriffe sind, Gesetze zu geben. — Für das Begehrungsvermögen, als ein oberes Vermögen nach dem Freiheitsbegriffe, ist allein die Vernunft (in der allein dieser Begriff Statt hat) a priori gesetzgebend. — Nun ist zwischen dem Erkenntniß- und dem Begehrungsvermögen das Gefühl der Lust, so wie zwischen dem Verstande und der Vernunft die Urtheilskraft enthalten. Es ist also wenigstens vorläufig zu vermuthen, daß die Urtheilskraft eben so wohl für sich ein Princip a priori enthalte und, da mit dem Begehrungsvermögen nothwendig Lust oder Unlust verbunden ist (es sei, daß sie wie beim unteren vor dem Princip desselben vorhergehe, oder wie beim A XXV 179 oberen nur aus der Bestimmung desselben durch das moralische Gesetz folge), eben so wohl einen Übergang vom reinen Erkenntnißvermögen, d. i. vom Gebiete der Naturbegriffe, zum Gebiete des Freiheitsbegriffs bewirken werde, als sie im logischen Gebrauche den Übergang vom Verstande zur Vernunft möglich macht.
Wenn also gleich die Philosophie nur in zwei Haupttheile, die theoretische und praktische, eingetheilt werden kann; wenn gleich alles, was wir von den eignen Principien der Urtheilskraft zu sagen haben möchten, in ihr zum theoretischen Theile, d. i. dem Vernunfterkenntniß nach Naturbegriffen, gezählt werden müßte: so besteht doch die Kritik der reinen Vernunft, die alles dieses vor der Unternehmung jenes Systems zum Behuf der Möglichkeit desselben ausmachen muß, aus drei Theilen: der Kritik des reinen Verstandes, der reinen Urtheilskraft und der reinen Vernunft, welche Vermögen darum rein genannt werden, weil sie a priori gesetzgebend sind.
1 Es ist von Nutzen: zu Begriffen, welche man als empirische Principien braucht, wenn man Ursache hat zu vermuthen, daß sie mit dem reinen Erkenntnißvermögen a priori in Verwandtschaft stehen, dieser Beziehung wegen eine transscendentale Definition zu versuchen: nämlich durch reine Kategorieen, sofern diese allein schon den Unterschied des vorliegenden Begriffs von anderen hinreichend angeben. Man folgt hierin dem Beispiel des Mathematikers, der die empirischen Data seiner Aufgabe unbestimmt läßt und nur ihr Verhältniß in der reinen Synthesis derselben unter die Begriffe der reinen Arithmetik bringt und sich dadurch die Auflösung derselben verallgemeinert. — Man hat mir aus einem ähnlichen Verfahren (Krit. der prakt. V., S. 16 [9] der Vorrede) einen Vorwurf gemacht und die Definition des Begehrungsvermögens, als Vermögens durch seine Vorstellungen Ursache von der Wirklichkeit der Gegenstände dieser Vorstellungen zu sein, getadelt: weil bloße Wünsche doch auch Begehrungen wären, von denen sich doch jeder bescheidet, daß er durch dieselben allein ihr Object nicht hervorbringen könne. — Dieses aber beweiset nichts weiter, als daß es auch Begehrungen im Menschen gebe, wodurch derselbe mit sich selbst im Widerspruche steht: indem er durch seine Vorstellung allein zur Hervorbringung des Objects hinwirkt, von der er doch keinen Erfolg erwarten kann, weil er sich bewußt ist, daß seine mechanischen Kräfte (wenn ich die nicht psychologischen so nennen soll), die durch jene Vorstellung bestimmt werden müßten, um das Object (mithin mittelbar) zu bewirken, entweder nicht zulänglich sind, oder gar auf etwas Unmögliches gehen, z. B. das Geschehene ungeschehen zu machen (O mihi praeteritos, etc.) oder im ungeduldigen Harren die Zwischenzeit bis zum herbeigewünschten Augenblick vernichten zu können. — Ob wir uns gleich in solchen phantastischen Begehrungen der Unzulänglichkeit unserer Vorstellungen (oder gar ihrer Untauglichkeit), Ursache ihrer Gegenstände zu sein, bewußt sind: so ist doch die Beziehung derselben als Ursache, mithin die Vorstellung ihrer Causalität in jedem Wunsche enthalten und vornehmlich alsdann sichtbar, wenn dieser ein Affect, nämlich Sehnsucht, ist. Denn diese beweisen dadurch, daß sie das Herz ausdehnen und welk machen und so die Kräfte erschöpfen, daß die Kräfte durch Vorstellungen wiederholentlich angespannt werden, aber das Gemüth bei der Rücksicht auf die Unmöglichkeit unaufhörlich wiederum in Ermattung zurück sinken lassen. Selbst die Gebete um Abwendung großer und, so viel man einsieht, unvermeidlicher Übel und manche abergläubische Mittel zu Erreichung natürlicherweise unmöglicher Zwecke beweisen die Causalbeziehung der Vorstellungen auf ihre Objecte, die sogar durch das Bewußtsein ihrer Unzulänglichkeit zum Effect von der Bestrebung dazu nicht abgehalten werden kann. — Warum aber in unsere Natur der Hang zu mit Bewußtsein leeren Begehrungen gelegt worden, das ist eine anthropologisch-teleologische Frage. Es scheint: daß, sollten wir nicht eher, als bis wir uns von der Zulänglichkeit unseres Vermögens zu Hervorbringung eines Objects versichert hätten, zur Kraftanwendung bestimmt werden, diese großentheils unbenutzt bleiben würde. Denn gemeiniglich lernen wir unsere Kräfte nur dadurch allererst kennen, daß wir sie versuchen. Diese Täuschung in leeren Wünschen ist also nur die Folge von einer wohlthätigen Anordnung in unserer Natur.
Musean translation
A complete machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
III. On the Critique of the Power of Judgment as a Means of Uniting the Two Parts of Philosophy into a Whole.
The critique of the cognitive faculties with regard to what they can accomplish a priori has, properly speaking, no domain with regard to objects. For it is not a doctrine, but has only to investigate whether and how, given the constitution of our faculties, a doctrine is possible through them. Its field extends to all their pretensions, in order to confine them within the limits of their legitimacy. But what cannot enter into the division of philosophy can nevertheless enter as a A XXI principal part into the critique of the pure faculty of cognition in general, if it contains principles that in themselves are suited neither to theoretical nor to practical use.
Concepts of nature, which contain the ground of all theoretical cognition a priori, rested on the legislation of the understanding.—The concept of freedom, which contained the ground of all practical precepts a priori unconditioned by the sensible, rested on the legislation of reason. Thus both faculties, beyond being applicable in their logical form to principles of whatever origin, also each have their own legislation 177 with regard to content, above which there is no other (a priori), and which therefore justifies the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical.
Yet in the family of the higher cognitive faculties there is still a mediating link between understanding and reason. This is the power of judgment, concerning which analogy gives us reason to suppose that it too may contain a priori, if not a legislation of its own, at least a principle of its own for seeking laws, perhaps a merely subjective one. Even if no field of objects belonged to this principle as its domain, it could still have some territory, and a certain constitution of that territory for which A XXII precisely this principle alone might hold.
There is, moreover (judging by analogy), a further ground for connecting the power of judgment with another ordering of our powers of representation, one that seems still more important than its kinship with the family of cognitive faculties. For all the faculties or capacities of the soul can be reduced to three that cannot be further derived from a common ground: the faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire1. 178 For the faculty of cognition, the understanding alone legislates, if A XXIII that faculty (as must indeed be done when it is considered by itself, without admixture A XXIV of the faculty of desire) is referred, as a faculty of theoretical cognition, to nature. For only with regard to nature (as appearance) is it possible for us to give laws through concepts of nature a priori, which are properly pure concepts of the understanding.—For the faculty of desire, as a higher faculty according to the concept of freedom, reason alone (in which alone this concept has a place) legislates a priori.—Now between the faculty of cognition and the faculty of desire stands the feeling of pleasure, just as the power of judgment stands between understanding and reason. It is therefore at least provisionally reasonable to suppose that the power of judgment likewise contains a principle a priori of its own; and since pleasure or displeasure is necessarily connected with the faculty of desire (whether, as in the lower faculty, it precedes that faculty's principle, or, as in the A XXV 179 higher, merely follows from its determination by the moral law), it will likewise effect a transition from the pure faculty of cognition—that is, from the domain of concepts of nature—to the domain of the concept of freedom, just as in its logical use it makes possible the transition from understanding to reason.
Thus, although philosophy can be divided into only two principal parts, theoretical and practical; although everything we might have to say about the principles peculiar to the power of judgment would have to be counted in philosophy as belonging to its theoretical part, that is, to rational cognition according to concepts of nature: nevertheless the critique of pure reason, which must settle all this before that system is undertaken, for the sake of making it possible, consists of three parts: the critique of pure understanding, of pure power of judgment, and of pure reason. These faculties are called pure because they legislate a priori.
1 For concepts used as empirical principles, when there is reason to suppose that they are related to the pure faculty of cognition a priori, it is useful, on account of this relation, to attempt a transcendental definition: namely through pure categories, insofar as these alone already indicate sufficiently the distinction between the concept in question and others. Here we follow the example of the mathematician, who leaves the empirical data of his problem undetermined and brings only their relation in their pure synthesis under the concepts of pure arithmetic, thereby generalizing its solution.—A similar procedure of mine (Critique of Practical Reason, p. 16 [9] of the preface) has been made a reproach against me, and the definition of the faculty of desire as the faculty of being, through one's representations, the cause of the actuality of the objects of these representations has been criticized: for mere wishes, too, are desires, although everyone acknowledges that through these alone he cannot produce their object.—But this proves only that there are also desires in a human being through which he contradicts himself: through his representation alone he works toward producing the object, yet can expect no success from it, because he is conscious that his mechanical powers (if I may so call the nonpsychological ones), which would have to be determined by that representation in order to bring about the object (hence indirectly), are either insufficient or even directed toward something impossible—for example, undoing what has happened (Oh, if only those past years, etc., were mine) or, in impatient waiting, annihilating the interval before the longed-for moment.—Although in such fantastic desires we are conscious of the insufficiency (or even the complete unfitness) of our representations to be the cause of their objects, their relation as cause, and thus the representation of their causality, is nevertheless contained in every wish, and is especially apparent when the wish is an emotion, namely longing. For by swelling and weakening the heart, and thus exhausting our powers, these desires show that the powers are repeatedly strained by representations, yet, in view of the impossibility, continually let the mind sink back into exhaustion. Even prayers for the averting of great and, as far as we can see, unavoidable evils, and many superstitious means of attaining ends naturally impossible, prove this causal relation of representations to their objects: even the consciousness of their insufficiency to produce the effect cannot deter them from striving toward it.—But why a propensity to consciously empty desires has been implanted in our nature is an anthropological-teleological question. It seems that if we were not determined to exert our powers until we had assured ourselves of their adequacy to produce an object, those powers would remain largely unused. For generally we first come to know our powers only by trying them. This deception in empty wishes is therefore only the consequence of a beneficent arrangement in our nature.
Plain English translation
A complete, independent machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
III. On the critique of the power of judgment as a means of joining the two parts of philosophy into a whole.
The critique of the cognitive faculties, with regard to what they can accomplish a priori, has strictly speaking no domain of objects. It is not a doctrine. It need only investigate whether and how a doctrine is possible through these faculties, given their character. Its field extends to all their claims, in order to confine them within the limits of their legitimacy. But something that cannot enter into the division of philosophy can still enter as a A XXI main part into the critique of the pure faculty of cognition in general: namely, if it contains principles that in themselves are fit for neither theoretical nor practical use.
Concepts of nature, which contain the basis of all theoretical cognition a priori, rested on the understanding's legislation.—The concept of freedom, which contained the basis of all a priori practical prescriptions independent of sensible conditions, rested on reason's legislation. Both faculties, then, can be applied, in terms of logical form, to principles whatever their origin. But beyond that, each also has its own legislation 177 regarding content, above which there is no other (a priori) legislation. This justifies dividing philosophy into theoretical and practical.
Yet within the family of higher cognitive faculties there is still an intermediate member between understanding and reason. This is the power of judgment. Analogy gives us reason to suppose that it too may contain a priori, if not a legislation of its own, then at least a principle of its own for seeking laws, perhaps a merely subjective one. Even if no field of objects belonged to this principle as its domain, it could still have some territory, and some feature of that territory for which A XXII precisely this principle alone might hold.
There is also a further reason, judging by analogy, to connect the power of judgment with another ordering of our powers of representation. This seems even more important than its kinship with the family of cognitive faculties. For all the faculties or capacities of the soul can be reduced to three that cannot be derived further from a common ground: the faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire1. 178 For the faculty of cognition, the understanding alone legislates when A XXIII that faculty—as it must be, if considered by itself without mixing it A XXIV with the faculty of desire—is related to nature as a faculty of theoretical cognition. Only with respect to nature, as appearance, can we give laws through a priori concepts of nature, which are really pure concepts of the understanding.—For the faculty of desire, considered as a higher faculty according to the concept of freedom, reason alone legislates a priori, since that concept has a place in reason alone.—Now the feeling of pleasure stands between the faculty of cognition and the faculty of desire, just as the power of judgment stands between understanding and reason. We may therefore at least provisionally suppose that the power of judgment likewise contains an a priori principle of its own. Pleasure or displeasure is necessarily connected with the faculty of desire: in its lower form, pleasure precedes its principle; in its A XXV 179 higher form, pleasure follows only from its determination by the moral law. We may therefore also suppose that the power of judgment will bring about a passage from the pure faculty of cognition, that is, from the domain of concepts of nature, to the domain of the concept of freedom, just as in its logical use it makes possible the passage from understanding to reason.
Philosophy, then, can be divided into only two main parts, theoretical and practical. Everything we might have to say about the power of judgment's own principles would have to be assigned within philosophy to the theoretical part, that is, rational cognition according to concepts of nature. Yet the critique of pure reason must settle all this before that system is undertaken, in order to make it possible. It consists of three parts: the critique of pure understanding, of pure power of judgment, and of pure reason. These faculties are called pure because they legislate a priori.
1 It is useful to attempt a transcendental definition of concepts we use as empirical principles when we have reason to suspect that they are related a priori to the pure faculty of cognition. Because of this relation, we should define them through pure categories, insofar as these alone already distinguish the concept in question sufficiently from others. Here we follow the example of the mathematician. He leaves the empirical data of his problem undetermined and brings only their relation, in their pure synthesis, under the concepts of pure arithmetic. In this way he generalizes its solution.—I have been criticized for a similar procedure (Krit. der prakt. V., S. 16 [9] der Vorrede). The definition of the faculty of desire as the ability, through one's representations, to cause the actuality of the objects of those representations was faulted on the grounds that mere wishes are also desires, although everyone admits that wishes alone cannot produce their object.—But this proves only that human beings also have desires through which they contradict themselves. Through their representation alone they work toward producing an object, yet cannot expect any success. They are aware that their mechanical powers, if I may so call the nonpsychological ones, would have to be determined by that representation in order to produce the object indirectly. But these powers are either inadequate, or directed at something impossible: for example, undoing what has happened (Oh, if only my past years, and so on!) or, in impatient waiting, being able to erase the time until the wished-for moment.—In such fanciful desires we are aware that our representations are inadequate, or even unfit, to be the cause of their objects. Still, every wish contains a relation of these representations as cause, and thus a representation of their causality. This becomes especially visible when the wish is an emotion, namely longing. Such desires stretch and weaken the heart and so exhaust our powers. This proves that representations repeatedly put our powers under strain, yet, as the mind considers the impossibility, continually let it sink back into exhaustion. Even prayers to avert great and, as far as we can see, unavoidable evils, as well as many superstitious means of achieving ends impossible by natural means, show this causal relation of representations to their objects. Even awareness that the representations are inadequate to produce the effect cannot stop the effort to do so.—Why our nature contains a tendency toward desires we know to be empty is an anthropological and teleological question. It seems that if we were not moved to exert our powers until we had assured ourselves that they were sufficient to produce an object, these powers would largely go unused. For generally we first learn what our powers are only by trying them. This illusion in empty wishes is therefore merely the consequence of a beneficial arrangement in our nature.
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Introduction III is part of Critique of Judgment by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 5 of 21 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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