Introduction II
Original German
II. 174 Vom Gebiete der Philosophie überhaupt.
So weit Begriffe a priori ihre Anwendung haben, so weit reicht der Gebrauch unseres Erkenntnißvermögens nach Principien und mit ihm die Philosophie.
Der Inbegriff aller Gegenstände aber, worauf jene Begriffe bezogen werden, um wo möglich ein Erkenntniß derselben zu Stande zu bringen, kann nach der verschiedenen Zulänglichkeit oder Unzulänglichkeit unserer Vermögen zu dieser Absicht eingetheilt werden.
Begriffe, sofern sie auf Gegenstände bezogen werden, unangesehen ob ein Erkenntniß derselben möglich sei oder nicht, haben ihr Feld, welches bloß nach dem Verhältnisse, das ihr Object zu unserem Erkenntnißvermögen überhaupt hat, bestimmt wird. — Der Theil dieses Feldes, worin für uns Erkenntniß möglich ist, ist ein Boden (territorium) für diese Begriffe und das dazu erforderliche Erkenntnißvermögen. Der Theil des Bodens, worauf diese gesetzgebend sind, ist das Gebiet (ditio) dieser Begriffe und der ihnen zustehenden Erkenntnißvermögen. Erfahrungsbegriffe haben also zwar ihren Boden in der Natur, als dem Inbegriffe A XVII aller Gegenstände der Sinne, aber kein Gebiet (sondern nur ihren Aufenthalt, domicilium): weil sie zwar gesetzlich erzeugt werden, aber nicht gesetzgebend sind, sondern die auf sie gegründeten Regeln empirisch, mithin zufällig sind.
Unser gesammtes Erkenntnißvermögen hat zwei Gebiete, das der Naturbegriffe und das des Freiheitsbegriffs; denn durch beide ist es a priori gesetzgebend. Die Philosophie theilt sich nun auch diesem gemäß in die theoretische und die praktische. Aber der Boden, auf welchem ihr Gebiet errichtet und ihre Gesetzgebung ausgeübt wird, ist immer doch nur der Inbegriff der Gegenstände aller möglichen Erfahrung, sofern sie für nichts mehr als bloße Erscheinungen genommen werden; denn ohnedas würde keine Gesetzgebung des Verstandes in Ansehung derselben gedacht werden können.
Die Gesetzgebung durch Naturbegriffe geschieht durch den Verstand und ist theoretisch. Die Gesetzgebung durch den Freiheitsbegriff geschieht von der Vernunft und ist bloß praktisch. Nur allein im Praktischen kann die Vernunft gesetzgebend sein; in Ansehung des theoretischen Erkenntnisses (der Natur) kann sie nur (als gesetzkundig vermittelst des Verstandes) 175 aus gegebenen Gesetzen durch Schlüsse Folgerungen ziehen, die doch immer nur bei der Natur stehen bleiben. Umgekehrt aber, wo Regeln praktisch sind, ist die Vernunft nicht darum sofort gesetzgebend, weil sie A XVIII auch technisch-praktisch sein können.
Verstand und Vernunft haben also zwei verschiedene Gesetzgebungen auf einem und demselben Boden der Erfahrung, ohne daß eine der anderen Eintrag thun darf. Denn so wenig der Naturbegriff auf die Gesetzgebung durch den Freiheitsbegriff Einfluß hat, eben so wenig stört dieser die Gesetzgebung der Natur. — Die Möglichkeit, das Zusammenbestehen beider Gesetzgebungen und der dazu gehörigen Vermögen in demselben Subject sich wenigstens ohne Widerspruch zu denken, bewies die Kritik der reinen Vernunft, indem sie die Einwürfe dawider durch Aufdeckung des dialektischen Scheins in denselben vernichtete.
Aber daß diese zwei verschiedenen Gebiete, die sich zwar nicht in ihrer Gesetzgebung, aber doch in ihren Wirkungen in der Sinnenwelt unaufhörlich einschränken, nicht Eines ausmachen, kommt daher: daß der Naturbegriff zwar seine Gegenstände in der Anschauung, aber nicht als Dinge an sich selbst, sondern als bloße Erscheinungen, der Freiheitsbegriff dagegen in seinem Objecte zwar ein Ding an sich selbst, aber nicht in der Anschauung vorstellig machen, mithin keiner von beiden ein theoretisches Erkenntniß von seinem Objecte (und selbst dem denkenden Subjecte) als Dinge an sich verschaffen kann, welches das Übersinnliche sein würde, wovon man die Idee zwar der Möglichkeit aller jener Gegenstände der Erfahrung A XIX unterlegen muß, sie selbst aber niemals zu einem Erkenntnisse erheben und erweitern kann.
Es giebt also ein unbegränztes, aber auch unzugängliches Feld für unser gesammtes Erkenntnißvermögen, nämlich das Feld des Übersinnlichen, worin wir keinen Boden für uns finden, also auf demselben weder für die Verstandes- noch Vernunftbegriffe ein Gebiet zum theoretischen Erkenntniß haben können; ein Feld, welches wir zwar zum Behuf des theoretischen sowohl als praktischen Gebrauchs der Vernunft mit Ideen besetzen müssen, denen wir aber in Beziehung auf die Gesetze aus dem Freiheitsbegriffe keine andere als praktische Realität verschaffen können, wodurch demnach unser theoretisches Erkenntniß nicht im Mindesten zu dem Übersinnlichen erweitert wird.
Ob nun zwar eine unübersehbare Kluft zwischen dem Gebiete des Naturbegriffs, als dem Sinnlichen, und dem Gebiete des Freiheitsbegriffs, 176 als dem Übersinnlichen, befestigt ist, so daß von dem ersteren zum anderen (also vermittelst des theoretischen Gebrauchs der Vernunft) kein Übergang möglich ist, gleich als ob es so viel verschiedene Welten wären, deren erste auf die zweite keinen Einfluß haben kann: so soll doch diese auf jene einen Einfluß haben, nämlich der Freiheitsbegriff soll den durch seine Gesetze aufgegebenen Zweck in der Sinnenwelt wirklich machen; und die Natur muß folglich auch so gedacht werden können, daß die Gesetzmäßigkeit A XX ihrer Form wenigstens zur Möglichkeit der in ihr zu bewirkenden Zwecke nach Freiheitsgesetzen zusammenstimme. — Also muß es doch einen Grund der Einheit des Übersinnlichen, welches der Natur zum Grunde liegt, mit dem, was der Freiheitsbegriff praktisch enthält, geben, wovon der Begriff, wenn er gleich weder theoretisch noch praktisch zu einem Erkenntnisse desselben gelangt, mithin kein eigenthümliches Gebiet hat, dennoch den Übergang von der Denkungsart nach den Principien der einen zu der nach Principien der anderen möglich macht.
Musean translation
A complete machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
II. 174 On the Domain of Philosophy in General.
As far as concepts a priori find application, so far extends the use of our faculty of cognition according to principles, and with it philosophy.
But the sum of all objects to which those concepts are referred, in order if possible to bring about cognition of them, can be divided according to the differing adequacy or inadequacy of our faculties for this purpose.
Concepts, insofar as they are referred to objects, regardless of whether cognition of them is possible or not, have their field, which is determined solely by the relation their object bears to our faculty of cognition in general.—The part of this field in which cognition is possible for us is a territory (territorium) for these concepts and the cognitive faculty required for them. The part of the territory in which they legislate is the domain (ditio) of these concepts and of the cognitive faculties to which they belong. Empirical concepts therefore have their territory in nature, as the sum A XVII of all objects of the senses, but no domain (only their dwelling place, domicilium). For although they are generated according to law, they do not legislate; the rules founded on them are empirical and hence contingent.
Our entire faculty of cognition has two domains, that of concepts of nature and that of the concept of freedom; for through both it legislates a priori. In accordance with this, philosophy too is divided into theoretical and practical. But the territory on which its domain is established and its legislation is exercised is always only the sum of the objects of all possible experience, insofar as they are taken as nothing more than mere appearances; for otherwise no legislation of the understanding concerning them could be thought.
Legislation through concepts of nature is effected by the understanding and is theoretical. Legislation through the concept of freedom is effected by reason and is merely practical. Only in the practical can reason legislate; with regard to theoretical cognition (of nature), it can only (as acquainted with laws through the understanding) 175 infer consequences from given laws, and these always remain confined to nature. Conversely, however, where rules are practical, reason is not on that account immediately legislative, since they A XVIII may also be technically practical.
Understanding and reason thus have two distinct legislations on one and the same territory of experience, neither of which may encroach upon the other. For just as the concept of nature has no influence on legislation through the concept of freedom, so the latter does not disturb the legislation of nature.—The critique of pure reason proved the possibility of thinking, at least without contradiction, the coexistence of both legislations and their corresponding faculties in the same subject, by defeating the objections to it through exposing the dialectical illusion within them.
But these two different domains, which continually restrict each other not in their legislation but in their effects in the sensible world, do not constitute one domain. The reason is that the concept of nature can indeed represent its objects in intuition, but not as things in themselves, only as mere appearances; whereas the concept of freedom can indeed represent in its object a thing in itself, but not in intuition. Neither, therefore, can furnish theoretical cognition of its object (or even of the thinking subject) as a thing in itself. This would be the supersensible, the idea of which must indeed be placed beneath the possibility of all those objects of experience A XIX, but can never itself be raised and extended into cognition.
There is thus an unbounded but also inaccessible field for our entire faculty of cognition: the field of the supersensible, in which we find no territory for ourselves and therefore can have no domain for theoretical cognition, either for concepts of the understanding or for those of reason. It is a field we must indeed occupy with ideas for the sake of both the theoretical and the practical use of reason; but in relation to laws arising from the concept of freedom we can confer on these ideas no reality other than practical reality, through which our theoretical cognition is not extended in the least to the supersensible.
Now although an immeasurable gulf is fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, 176 as the supersensible, so that no passage from the former to the latter (thus by means of the theoretical use of reason) is possible, as though they were so many different worlds, the first of which can have no influence on the second, yet the second ought to have an influence on the first. The concept of freedom is to make actual in the sensible world the end enjoined by its laws; and nature must consequently also be capable of being thought in such a way that the lawfulness A XX of its form agrees at least with the possibility of the ends to be realized in it according to laws of freedom.—There must therefore be a ground for the unity of the supersensible underlying nature with what the concept of freedom contains practically. Although the concept of this ground attains no cognition of it, either theoretically or practically, and thus has no domain of its own, it nevertheless makes possible the transition from the way of thinking according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other.
Plain English translation
A complete, independent machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
II. 174 On the domain of philosophy in general.
The use of our faculty of cognition according to principles, and with it philosophy, extends as far as a priori concepts can be applied.
The whole set of objects to which these concepts are related, with the aim of knowing them if possible, can be divided according to the different degrees to which our faculties are adequate or inadequate for this purpose.
Concepts have a field insofar as they are related to objects, whether knowledge of these objects is possible or not. This field is determined solely by the relation their object has to our faculty of cognition in general.—The part of this field in which knowledge is possible for us is a territory (territorium) for these concepts and for the faculty of cognition required for them. The part of the territory in which they legislate is the domain (ditio) of these concepts and their corresponding faculties of cognition. Empirical concepts thus have their territory in nature as the whole A XVII of all objects of the senses. But they have no domain, only a dwelling place, domicilium. Although they are generated according to laws, they do not legislate. The rules founded on them are empirical and therefore contingent.
Our faculty of cognition as a whole has two domains: that of concepts of nature and that of the concept of freedom. Through both it legislates a priori. Philosophy is accordingly divided into theoretical and practical. Yet the territory on which its domain is established and its legislation is exercised is always only the whole of the objects of all possible experience, insofar as they are taken to be nothing more than mere appearances. Otherwise no legislation of the understanding concerning them could be thought.
Legislation through concepts of nature is carried out by the understanding and is theoretical. Legislation through the concept of freedom is carried out by reason and is solely practical. Reason can legislate only in the practical sphere. In theoretical cognition of nature it can only, through its knowledge of laws supplied by the understanding, 175 draw conclusions from given laws by inference. These conclusions always remain confined to nature. Conversely, where rules are practical, reason is not immediately legislative just for that reason, since the rules A XVIII may also be technically practical.
Understanding and reason therefore have two different legislations on one and the same territory of experience, without either being allowed to interfere with the other. The concept of nature has no influence on legislation through the concept of freedom, and the latter equally does not disturb the legislation of nature.—The critique of pure reason proved that we can at least think without contradiction of these two legislations and their corresponding faculties coexisting in the same subject. It did so by exposing the dialectical illusion in the objections to this coexistence and thereby defeating them.
These two different domains do not constitute one domain, even though they constantly limit one another in their effects in the sensible world, if not in their legislation. The reason is this: the concept of nature represents its objects in intuition, but not as things in themselves, only as appearances. The concept of freedom, by contrast, represents in its object a thing in itself, but not in intuition. Neither can therefore provide theoretical cognition of its object, or even of the thinking subject, as things in themselves. Such cognition would be cognition of the supersensible. We must place the idea of the supersensible beneath the possibility of all those objects of experience A XIX, but can never raise and extend this idea itself into cognition.
There is therefore a boundless but also inaccessible field for our faculty of cognition as a whole: the field of the supersensible. We find no territory there for ourselves, and so can have no domain there for theoretical cognition, either for concepts of the understanding or for concepts of reason. We must occupy this field with ideas for both the theoretical and the practical use of reason. But we can give these ideas only practical reality, in relation to the laws arising from the concept of freedom. This does not extend our theoretical cognition to the supersensible in the slightest.
An immeasurable gulf is fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, 176 as the supersensible. No passage from the former to the latter, and thus no passage through reason's theoretical use, is possible. It is as though they were two different worlds, the first of which can have no influence on the second. Yet the second ought to influence the first. The concept of freedom ought to make the end set by its laws actual in the sensible world. Consequently, nature must also be capable of being thought in such a way that the lawfulness A XX of its form agrees at least with the possibility of the ends to be achieved in it according to laws of freedom.—There must therefore be a ground for the unity of the supersensible underlying nature with what the concept of freedom contains practically. The concept of this ground does not achieve knowledge of it either theoretically or practically, and therefore has no domain of its own. Yet it makes possible a passage from thinking according to the principles of the one to thinking according to the principles of the other.
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Introduction II is part of Critique of Judgment by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 4 of 21 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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