Introduction I
Original German
Einleitung. A XI 171
I. Von der Eintheilung der Philosophie.
Wenn man die Philosophie, sofern sie Principien der Vernunfterkenntniß der Dinge (nicht bloß wie die Logik Principien der Form des Denkens überhaupt ohne Unterschied der Objecte) durch Begriffe enthält, wie gewöhnlich in die theoretische und praktische eintheilt: so verfährt man ganz recht. Aber alsdann müssen auch die Begriffe, welche den Principien dieser Vernunfterkenntniß ihr Object anweisen, specifisch verschieden sein, weil sie sonst zu keiner Eintheilung berechtigen würden, welche jederzeit eine Entgegensetzung der Principien der zu den verschiedenen Theilen einer Wissenschaft gehörigen Vernunfterkenntniß voraussetzt.
Es sind aber nur zweierlei Begriffe, welche eben so viel verschiedene Principien der Möglichkeit ihrer Gegenstände zulassen: nämlich die Naturbegriffe und der Freiheitsbegriff. Da nun die ersteren ein theoretisches Erkenntniß nach Principien a priori möglich machen, der A XII zweite aber in Ansehung derselben nur ein negatives Princip (der bloßen Entgegensetzung) schon in seinem Begriffe bei sich führt, dagegen für die Willensbestimmung erweiternde Grundsätze, welche darum praktisch heißen, errichtet: so wird die Philosophie in zwei den Principien nach ganz verschiedene Theile, in die theoretische als Naturphilosophie und die praktische als Moralphilosophie (denn so wird die praktische Gesetzgebung der Vernunft nach dem Freiheitsbegriffe genannt), mit Recht eingetheilt. Es hat aber bisher ein großer Mißbrauch mit diesen Ausdrücken zur Eintheilung der verschiedenen Principien und mit ihnen auch der Philosophie geherrscht: indem man das Praktische nach Naturbegriffen mit dem Praktischen nach dem Freiheitsbegriffe für einerlei nahm und so 172 unter denselben Benennungen einer theoretischen und praktischen Philosophie eine Eintheilung machte, durch welche (da beide Theile einerlei Principien haben konnten) in der That nichts eingetheilt war.
Der Wille, als Begehrungsvermögen, ist nämlich eine von den mancherlei Naturursachen in der Welt, nämlich diejenige, welche nach Begriffen wirkt; und Alles, was als durch einen Willen möglich (oder nothwendig) vorgestellt wird, heißt praktisch-möglich (oder nothwendig): zum Unterschiede von der physischen Möglichkeit oder Nothwendigkeit einer Wirkung, wozu die Ursache nicht durch Begriffe (sondern wie bei der leblosen A XIII Materie durch Mechanism und bei Thieren durch Instinct) zur Causalität bestimmt wird. — Hier wird nun in Ansehung des Praktischen unbestimmt gelassen: ob der Begriff, der der Causalität des Willens die Regel giebt, ein Naturbegriff, oder ein Freiheitsbegriff sei.
Der letztere Unterschied aber ist wesentlich. Denn ist der die Causalität bestimmende Begriff ein Naturbegriff, so sind die Principien technisch-praktisch; ist er aber ein Freiheitsbegriff, so sind diese moralisch-praktisch: und weil es in der Eintheilung einer Vernunftwissenschaft gänzlich auf diejenige Verschiedenheit der Gegenstände ankommt, deren Erkenntniß verschiedener Principien bedarf, so werden die ersteren zur theoretischen Philosophie (als Naturlehre) gehören, die andern aber ganz allein den zweiten Theil, nämlich (als Sittenlehre) die praktische Philosophie, ausmachen.
Alle technisch-praktische Regeln (d. i. die der Kunst und Geschicklichkeit überhaupt, oder auch der Klugheit, als einer Geschicklichkeit auf Menschen und ihren Willen Einfluß zu haben), so fern ihre Principien auf Begriffen beruhen, müssen nur als Corollarien zur theoretischen Philosophie gezählt werden. Denn sie betreffen nur die Möglichkeit der Dinge nach Naturbegriffen, wozu nicht allein die Mittel, die in der Natur dazu anzutreffen sind, sondern selbst der Wille (als Begehrungs-, mithin als Naturvermögen) gehört, sofern er durch Triebfedern der Natur jenen Regeln A XIV gemäß bestimmt werden kann. Doch heißen dergleichen praktische Regeln nicht Gesetze (etwa so wie physische), sondern nur Vorschriften: und zwar darum, weil der Wille nicht bloß unter dem Naturbegriffe, sondern auch unter dem Freiheitsbegriffe steht, in Beziehung auf welchen die Principien desselben Gesetze heißen und mit ihren Folgerungen den zweiten Theil der Philosophie, nämlich den praktischen, allein ausmachen.
So wenig also die Auflösung der Probleme der reinen Geometrie zu 173 einem besonderen Theile derselben gehört, oder die Feldmeßkunst den Namen einer praktischen Geometrie zum Unterschiede von der reinen als ein zweiter Theil der Geometrie überhaupt verdient: so und noch weniger darf die mechanische oder chemische Kunst der Experimente oder der Beobachtungen für einen praktischen Theil der Naturlehre, endlich die Haus-, Land-, Staatswirthschaft, die Kunst des Umganges, die Vorschrift der Diätetik, selbst nicht die allgemeine Glückseligkeitslehre, sogar nicht einmal die Bezähmung der Neigungen und Bändigung der Affecten zum Behuf der letzteren zur praktischen Philosophie gezählt werden, oder die letzteren wohl gar den zweiten Theil der Philosophie überhaupt ausmachen; weil sie insgesammt nur Regeln der Geschicklichkeit, die mithin nur technisch-praktisch sind, enthalten, um eine Wirkung hervorzubringen, die nach Naturbegriffen der Ursachen und Wirkungen möglich ist, welche, da sie zur theoretischen Philosophie gehören, jenen Vorschriften als bloßen A XV Corollarien aus derselben (der Naturwissenschaft) unterworfen sind und also keine Stelle in einer besonderen Philosophie, die praktische genannt, verlangen können. Dagegen machen die moralisch-praktischen Vorschriften, die sich gänzlich auf dem Freiheitsbegriffe mit völliger Ausschließung der Bestimmungsgründe des Willens aus der Natur gründen, eine ganz besondere Art von Vorschriften aus: welche auch gleich den Regeln, welchen die Natur gehorcht, schlechthin Gesetze heißen, aber nicht wie diese auf sinnlichen Bedingungen, sondern auf einem übersinnlichen Princip beruhen und neben dem theoretischen Theile der Philosophie für sich ganz allein einen anderen Theil unter dem Namen der praktischen Philosophie fordern.
Man sieht hieraus, daß ein Inbegriff praktischer Vorschriften, welche die Philosophie giebt, nicht einen besonderen, dem theoretischen zur Seite gesetzten Theil derselben darum ausmache, weil sie praktisch sind; denn das könnten sie sein, wenn ihre Principien gleich gänzlich aus der theoretischen Erkenntniß der Natur hergenommen wären (als technisch-praktische Regeln); sondern, weil und wenn ihr Princip gar nicht vom Naturbegriffe, der jederzeit sinnlich bedingt ist, entlehnt ist, mithin auf dem Übersinnlichen, welches der Freiheitsbegriff allein durch formale Gesetze kennbar macht, beruht, und sie also moralisch-praktisch, d. i. nicht bloß A XVI Vorschriften und Regeln in dieser oder jener Absicht, sondern ohne vorhergehende Bezugnehmung auf Zwecke und Absichten Gesetze sind.
Musean translation
A complete machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
Introduction. A XI 171
I. On the Division of Philosophy.
If philosophy, insofar as it contains principles of rational cognition of things through concepts (not merely, like logic, principles of the form of thought in general without distinction of objects), is divided, as usual, into theoretical and practical, the procedure is entirely correct. But then the concepts that assign their object to the principles of this rational cognition must also differ specifically, since otherwise they would warrant no division—a division that always presupposes an opposition between the principles of rational cognition belonging to the different parts of a science.
There are, however, only two kinds of concepts that admit correspondingly different principles of the possibility of their objects: concepts of nature and the concept of freedom. The former make theoretical cognition according to principles a priori possible; the A XII latter, in relation to these, already carries in its concept only a negative principle (of mere opposition), but establishes expansive principles for the determination of the will, which are therefore called practical. Philosophy is thus rightly divided into two parts wholly distinct in their principles: theoretical philosophy as philosophy of nature, and practical philosophy as moral philosophy (for this is the name given to reason's practical legislation according to the concept of freedom). Yet these expressions have hitherto been greatly misused in dividing the various principles and, with them, philosophy itself: what is practical according to concepts of nature has been taken as identical with what is practical according to the concept of freedom, and thus 172 a division has been made under the same names of theoretical and practical philosophy in which, in fact, nothing was divided, since both parts could have the same principles.
The will, as a faculty of desire, is namely one of the many natural causes in the world: the one that acts according to concepts. Everything represented as possible (or necessary) through a will is called practically possible (or necessary), as distinct from the physical possibility or necessity of an effect whose cause is determined to causality not through concepts, but—as in lifeless A XIII matter—through mechanism, or in animals through instinct.—Here, with regard to the practical, it remains undetermined whether the concept that gives the rule to the will's causality is a concept of nature or a concept of freedom.
But this last distinction is essential. For if the concept determining causality is a concept of nature, the principles are technically practical; if it is a concept of freedom, they are morally practical. And since the division of a rational science depends entirely on that difference between objects whose cognition requires different principles, the former will belong to theoretical philosophy (as the doctrine of nature), while the latter alone will constitute the second part, namely practical philosophy (as the doctrine of morals).
All technically practical rules—that is, those of art and skill in general, or also of prudence as a skill in influencing people and their will—insofar as their principles rest on concepts, must be counted only as corollaries to theoretical philosophy. For they concern only the possibility of things according to concepts of nature; and among these belong not only the means to be found in nature, but the will itself (as a faculty of desire and hence a natural faculty), insofar as natural incentives can determine it in conformity with those rules A XIV. Such practical rules, however, are not called laws (as physical laws are), but only precepts. This is because the will stands not only under the concept of nature but also under the concept of freedom, in relation to which its principles are called laws and, together with their consequences, alone constitute the second part of philosophy, the practical.
Just as the solution of problems in pure geometry does not belong to 173 a separate part of it, and surveying does not deserve the name practical geometry as a second part of geometry in general, distinguished from pure geometry, so—and still less—may the mechanical or chemical art of experiments or observations be counted as a practical part of the doctrine of nature. Nor may household management, agriculture, political economy, the art of social intercourse, the precepts of dietetics, or even the general doctrine of happiness—even the taming of inclinations and the restraint of emotions for the sake of happiness—be counted as practical philosophy, much less constitute the second part of philosophy in general. For all these contain only rules of skill, hence only technically practical rules, for producing an effect possible according to natural concepts of causes and effects. These, since they belong to theoretical philosophy, underlie those precepts as mere A XV corollaries of it (natural science), and thus can claim no place in a separate philosophy called practical. By contrast, morally practical precepts, grounded entirely on the concept of freedom to the complete exclusion of grounds determining the will drawn from nature, constitute a wholly distinct kind of precept. Like the rules nature obeys, they too are called laws without qualification, but unlike those rules they rest not on sensible conditions, but on a supersensible principle, and demand a separate part alongside the theoretical part of philosophy, under the name practical philosophy.
We can see from this that a body of practical precepts supplied by philosophy does not constitute a separate part alongside its theoretical part merely because those precepts are practical; for they could be practical even if their principles were drawn entirely from theoretical cognition of nature (as technically practical rules). Rather, it does so because and if its principle is not borrowed at all from the concept of nature, which is always sensibly conditioned, and therefore rests on the supersensible, which the concept of freedom alone makes knowable through formal laws. The precepts are thus morally practical—that is, not merely A XVI precepts and rules for this or that intention, but laws without prior reference to ends and intentions.
Plain English translation
A complete, independent machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
Introduction. A XI 171
I. On the division of philosophy.
Philosophy contains principles for knowing things through reason by means of concepts. Unlike logic, it does not merely contain principles of the form of thought in general, without distinguishing objects. If we divide philosophy, as usual, into theoretical and practical, we are entirely right to do so. But the concepts that assign an object to the principles of this rational cognition must then also differ in kind. Otherwise they would not justify a division. Every such division presupposes an opposition between the principles of rational cognition belonging to the different parts of a science.
But there are only two kinds of concepts that allow two different kinds of principles of the possibility of their objects: concepts of nature and the concept of freedom. The former make theoretical cognition according to a priori principles possible. The A XII latter, considered in relation to these principles, contains only a negative principle in its concept, that of mere opposition to them. Yet it establishes principles that extend the determination of the will, and these are therefore called practical. Philosophy is thus rightly divided into two parts whose principles are entirely different: theoretical philosophy as philosophy of nature, and practical philosophy as moral philosophy. The latter is the name for reason's practical legislation according to the concept of freedom. Until now, however, these terms have been seriously misused in dividing different principles and, with them, philosophy itself. What is practical according to concepts of nature has been treated as the same as what is practical according to the concept of freedom. Under the same names of theoretical and practical philosophy, people have thus 172 made a division that in fact divided nothing, since both parts could have the same principles.
The will, as a faculty of desire, is one of the many natural causes in the world: specifically, the one that acts according to concepts. Everything represented as possible or necessary through a will is called practically possible or necessary. This distinguishes it from the physical possibility or necessity of an effect whose cause is determined to act not by concepts, but by mechanism, as in lifeless A XIII matter, or by instinct, as in animals.—Here, however, calling something practical leaves undecided whether the concept that supplies the rule for the will's causality is a concept of nature or a concept of freedom.
That distinction is essential. If the concept determining causality is a concept of nature, the principles are technically practical. If it is a concept of freedom, they are morally practical. Dividing a rational science depends entirely on differences between objects whose cognition requires different principles. The former principles therefore belong to theoretical philosophy, as the study of nature. The latter alone make up the second part, practical philosophy, as the study of morals.
All technically practical rules must be counted only as corollaries of theoretical philosophy, insofar as their principles rest on concepts. These include rules of art and skill in general, and also of prudence, understood as skill in influencing people and their wills. They concern only the possibility of things according to concepts of nature. This includes not just the means found in nature, but the will itself, as a faculty of desire and thus a natural faculty, insofar as natural incentives can determine it in accordance with those rules. A XIV Such practical rules, however, are not called laws, as physical laws are, but only prescriptions. This is because the will falls not only under the concept of nature but also under the concept of freedom. In relation to freedom, its principles are called laws. Together with their consequences, these alone constitute the second, practical part of philosophy.
Solving problems of pure geometry does not belong to 173 a separate part of that science. Nor does surveying deserve the name practical geometry, as distinct from pure geometry, as though it were a second part of geometry in general. Still less may the mechanical or chemical art of experiment or observation count as a practical part of the study of nature. Nor may household management, agriculture, political economy, social skills, rules for healthy living, or even the general study of happiness count as practical philosophy. This applies even to controlling inclinations and restraining emotions for the sake of happiness. These certainly cannot make up the second part of philosophy as a whole. They all contain only rules of skill, and are therefore only technically practical: they aim to produce an effect possible according to natural concepts of causes and effects. These concepts belong to theoretical philosophy. The prescriptions in question, as mere A XV corollaries of that philosophy—the science of nature—are subject to them, and cannot claim a place in a separate philosophy called practical. Morally practical prescriptions, by contrast, rest entirely on the concept of freedom, completely excluding natural grounds for determining the will. They form an entirely distinct kind of prescription. Like the rules nature obeys, they are called laws without qualification. Unlike those rules, however, they rest not on sensible conditions but on a supersensible principle. Alongside the theoretical part of philosophy, they require a separate part of their own, called practical philosophy.
This shows that a body of practical prescriptions supplied by philosophy does not form a separate part alongside theoretical philosophy simply because the prescriptions are practical. They could be practical even if their principles came entirely from theoretical knowledge of nature, as technically practical rules do. They form a separate part only if, and because, their principle is not borrowed from the concept of nature, which is always sensibly conditioned. Their principle must instead rest on the supersensible, which the concept of freedom alone makes known through formal laws. They must therefore be morally practical: not merely A XVI prescriptions and rules for this or that purpose, but laws that make no prior reference to ends and intentions.
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Introduction I is part of Critique of Judgment by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 3 of 21 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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