Preface
Original German
Vorrede A III 167 zur ersten Auflage, 1790.
Man kann das Vermögen der Erkenntniß aus Principien a priori die reine Vernunft und die Untersuchung der Möglichkeit und Gränzen derselben überhaupt die Kritik der reinen Vernunft nennen: ob man gleich unter diesem Vermögen nur die Vernunft in ihrem theoretischen Gebrauche versteht, wie es auch in dem ersten Werke unter jener Benennung geschehen ist, ohne noch ihr Vermögen als praktische Vernunft nach ihren besonderen Principien in Untersuchung ziehen zu wollen. Jene geht alsdann bloß auf unser Vermögen, Dinge a priori zu erkennen, und beschäftigt sich also nur mit dem Erkenntnißvermögen mit Ausschließung des Gefühls der Lust und Unlust und des Begehrungsvermögens; und unter den Erkenntnißvermögen mit dem Verstande nach seinen Principien a priori mit Ausschließung der Urtheilskraft und der Vernunft (als A IV zum theoretischen Erkenntniß gleichfalls gehöriger Vermögen), weil es sich in dem Fortgange findet, daß kein anderes Erkenntnißvermögen als der Verstand constitutive Erkenntnißprincipien a priori an die Hand geben kann. Die Kritik also, welche sie insgesammt nach dem Antheile, den jedes der anderen an dem baaren Besitz der Erkenntniß aus eigener Wurzel zu haben vorgeben möchte, sichtet, läßt nichts übrig, als was der Verstand a priori als Gesetz für die Natur, als den Inbegriff von Erscheinungen (deren Form eben sowohl a priori gegeben ist), vorschreibt; verweiset aber alle andere reine Begriffe unter die Ideen, die für unser theoretisches Erkenntnißvermögen überschwenglich, dabei aber doch nicht etwa unnütz oder entbehrlich sind, sondern als regulative Principien dienen: theils die besorglichen Anmaßungen des Verstandes, als ob er (indem er a priori die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit aller Dinge, die er erkennen kann, anzugeben 168 vermag) dadurch auch die Möglichkeit aller Dinge überhaupt in diesen Gränzen beschlossen habe, zurück zu halten, theils um ihn selbst in der Betrachtung der Natur nach einem Princip der Vollständigkeit, wiewohl A V er sie nie erreichen kann, zu leiten und dadurch die Endabsicht alles Erkenntnisses zu befördern.
Es war also eigentlich der Verstand, der sein eigenes Gebiet und zwar im Erkenntnißvermögen hat, sofern er constitutive Erkenntnißprincipien a priori enthält, welcher durch die im Allgemeinen so benannte Kritik der reinen Vernunft gegen alle übrige Competenten in sicheren alleinigen Besitz gesetzt werden sollte. Eben so ist der Vernunft, welche nirgend als lediglich in Ansehung des Begehrungsvermögens constitutive Principien a priori enthält, in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft ihr Besitz angewiesen worden.
Ob nun die Urtheilskraft, die in der Ordnung unserer Erkenntnißvermögen zwischen dem Verstande und der Vernunft ein Mittelglied ausmacht, auch für sich Principien a priori habe; ob diese constitutiv oder bloß regulativ sind (und also kein eigenes Gebiet beweisen), und ob sie dem Gefühle der Lust und Unlust, als dem Mittelgliede zwischen dem Erkenntnißvermögen und Begehrungsvermögen, (eben so wie der Verstand dem ersteren, die Vernunft aber dem letzteren a priori Gesetze vorschreiben) A VI a priori die Regel gebe: das ist es, womit sich gegenwärtige Kritik der Urtheilskraft beschäftigt.
Eine Kritik der reinen Vernunft, d. i. unseres Vermögens nach Principien a priori zu urtheilen, würde unvollständig sein, wenn die der Urtheilskraft, welche für sich als Erkenntnißvermögen darauf auch Anspruch macht, nicht als ein besonderer Theil derselben abgehandelt würde; obgleich ihre Principien in einem System der reinen Philosophie keinen besonderen Theil zwischen der theoretischen und praktischen ausmachen dürfen, sondern im Nothfalle jedem von beiden gelegentlich angeschlossen werden können. Denn wenn ein solches System unter dem allgemeinen Namen der Metaphysik einmal zu Stande kommen soll (welches ganz vollständig zu bewerkstelligen, möglich und für den Gebrauch der Vernunft in aller Beziehung höchst wichtig ist): so muß die Kritik den Boden zu diesem Gebäude vorher so tief, als die erste Grundlage des Vermögens von der Erfahrung unabhängiger Principien liegt, erforscht haben, damit es nicht an irgend einem Theile sinke, welches den Einsturz des Ganzen unvermeidlich nach sich ziehen würde. 169
Man kann aber aus der Natur der Urtheilskraft (deren richtiger Gebrauch A VII so nothwendig und allgemein erforderlich ist, daß daher unter dem Namen des gesunden Verstandes kein anderes, als eben dieses Vermögen gemeint wird) leicht abnehmen, daß es mit großen Schwierigkeiten begleitet sein müsse, ein eigentümliches Princip derselben auszufinden (denn irgend eins muß sie a priori in sich enthalten, weil sie sonst nicht, als ein besonderes Erkenntnißvermögen, selbst der gemeinsten Kritik ausgesetzt sein würde), welches gleichwohl nicht aus Begriffen a priori abgeleitet sein muß; denn die gehören dem Verstande an, und die Urtheilskraft geht nur auf die Anwendung derselben. Sie soll also selbst einen Begriff angeben, durch den eigentlich kein Ding erkannt wird, sondern der nur ihr selbst zur Regel dient, aber nicht zu einer objectiven, der sie ihr Urtheil anpassen kann, weil dazu wiederum eine andere Urtheilskraft erforderlich sein würde, um unterscheiden zu können, ob es der Fall der Regel sei oder nicht.
Diese Verlegenheit wegen eines Princips (es sei nun ein subjectives oder objectives) findet sich hauptsächlich in denjenigen Beurtheilungen, die man ästhetisch nennt, die das Schöne und Erhabne der Natur oder der A VIII Kunst betreffen. Und gleichwohl ist die kritische Untersuchung eines Princips der Urtheilskraft in denselben das wichtigste Stück einer Kritik dieses Vermögens. Denn ob sie gleich für sich allein zum Erkenntniß der Dinge gar nichts beitragen, so gehören sie doch dem Erkenntnißvermögen allein an und beweisen eine unmittelbare Beziehung dieses Vermögens auf das Gefühl der Lust oder Unlust nach irgend einem Princip a priori, ohne es mit dem, was Bestimmungsgrund des Begehrungsvermögens sein kann, zu vermengen, weil dieses seine Principien a priori in Begriffen der Vernunft hat. — Was aber die logische Beurtheilung der Natur anbelangt, da, wo die Erfahrung eine Gesetzmäßigkeit an Dingen aufstellt, welche zu verstehen oder zu erklären der allgemeine Verstandesbegriff vom Sinnlichen nicht mehr zulangt, und die Urtheilskraft aus sich selbst ein Princip der Beziehung des Naturdinges auf das unerkennbare Übersinnliche nehmen kann, es auch nur in Absicht auf sich selbst zum Erkenntniß der Natur brauchen muß, da kann und muß ein solches Princip a priori zwar zum Erkenntniß der Weltwesen angewandt werden und eröffnet zugleich A IX Aussichten, die für die praktische Vernunft vorteilhaft sind: aber es hat keine unmittelbare Beziehung auf das Gefühl der Lust und Unlust, die gerade das Räthselhafte in dem Princip der Urtheilskraft ist, welches eine besondere Abtheilung in der Kritik für dieses Vermögen nothwendig 170 macht, da die logische Beurtheilung nach Begriffen (aus welchen niemals eine unmittelbare Folgerung auf das Gefühl der Lust und Unlust gezogen werden kann) allenfalls dem theoretischen Theile der Philosophie sammt einer kritischen Einschränkung derselben hätte angehängt werden können.
Da die Untersuchung des Geschmacksvermögens, als ästhetischer Urtheilskraft, hier nicht zur Bildung und Cultur des Geschmacks (denn diese wird auch ohne alle solche Nachforschungen, wie bisher, so fernerhin, ihren Gang nehmen), sondern bloß in transscendentaler Absicht angestellt wird: so wird sie, wie ich mir schmeichle, in Ansehung der Mangelhaftigkeit jenes Zwecks auch mit Nachsicht beurtheilt werden. Was aber die letztere Absicht betrifft, so muß sie sich auf die strengste Prüfung gefaßt machen. Aber auch da kann die große Schwierigkeit, ein Problem, welches die Natur so verwickelt hat, aufzulösen, einiger nicht ganz zu vermeidenden Dunkelheit A X in der Auflösung desselben, wie ich hoffe, zur Entschuldigung dienen, wenn nur, daß das Princip richtig angegeben worden, klar genug dargethan ist; gesetzt, die Art das Phänomen der Urtheilskraft davon abzuleiten habe nicht alle Deutlichkeit, die man anderwärts, nämlich von einem Erkenntniß nach Begriffen, mit Recht fordern kann, die ich auch im zweiten Theile dieses Werks erreicht zu haben glaube.
Hiemit endige ich also mein ganzes kritisches Geschäft. Ich werde ungesäumt zum doctrinalen schreiten, um wo möglich meinem zunehmenden Alter die dazu noch einigermaßen günstige Zeit noch abzugewinnen. Es versteht sich von selbst, daß für die Urtheilskraft darin kein besonderer Theil sei, weil in Ansehung derselben die Kritik statt der Theorie dient; sondern daß nach der Eintheilung der Philosophie in die theoretische und praktische und der reinen in eben solche Theile die Metaphysik der Natur und die der Sitten jenes Geschäft ausmachen werden.
Musean translation
A complete machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
Preface A III 167 to the First Edition, 1790.
The faculty of cognition from principles a priori may be called pure reason, and the inquiry into its possibility and limits in general the critique of pure reason—even if by this faculty we understand reason only in its theoretical use, as was also done in the first work bearing that title, without yet intending to investigate its capacity as practical reason according to its special principles. That critique then concerns only our capacity to cognize things a priori, and thus deals solely with the faculty of cognition, excluding the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the faculty of desire; and among the cognitive faculties, with the understanding according to its principles a priori, excluding the power of judgment and reason (as A IV faculties that likewise belong to theoretical cognition). For in the course of the inquiry it emerges that no cognitive faculty but the understanding can supply constitutive principles of cognition a priori. The critique, therefore, which examines them all with regard to the share each of the others might claim in the actual possession of cognition from its own root, leaves nothing but what the understanding prescribes a priori as law for nature, as the sum of appearances (whose form is likewise given a priori). It assigns all other pure concepts to the ideas, which transcend our theoretical faculty of cognition, yet are by no means useless or dispensable. Rather, they serve as regulative principles: partly to restrain the understanding's troubling pretensions, as though, because it can state a priori the conditions of the possibility of everything it can cognize, 168 it had thereby confined the possibility of all things in general within these limits; and partly to guide the understanding itself in the contemplation of nature according to a principle of completeness, although A V it can never attain that completeness, and thus to advance the ultimate aim of all cognition.
It was therefore properly the understanding, which has its own domain within the faculty of cognition insofar as it contains constitutive principles of cognition a priori, that the work generally called the critique of pure reason was to establish in secure and exclusive possession against all other claimants. In the same way, reason, which contains constitutive principles a priori only with regard to the faculty of desire, was assigned its possession in the critique of practical reason.
Whether the power of judgment, which forms a mediating link between understanding and reason in the order of our cognitive faculties, also has principles a priori of its own; whether these are constitutive or merely regulative (and thus establish no domain of its own); and whether it gives the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, as the mediating link between the faculty of cognition and the faculty of desire (just as understanding prescribes laws a priori to the former, and reason to the latter), A VI its rule a priori: these are the questions with which the present critique of the power of judgment is concerned.
A critique of pure reason—that is, of our capacity to judge according to principles a priori—would be incomplete if the critique of the power of judgment, which as a cognitive faculty also lays claim to such principles in its own right, were not treated as a distinct part of it. Yet its principles must not form a separate part between the theoretical and the practical in a system of pure philosophy; they may instead, as occasion requires, be attached to either. For if such a system is ever to be achieved under the general name of metaphysics (and its complete realization is both possible and of the utmost importance for every use of reason), the critique must first have explored the ground for this building down to the very foundation of our capacity for principles independent of experience, so that it does not subside at any point, which would inevitably bring the whole down with it. 169
From the nature of the power of judgment, however (whose proper use A VII is so necessary and so universally required that the name common sense means precisely this faculty and no other), it is easy to see that considerable difficulties must attend the discovery of a principle peculiar to it. For it must contain some principle a priori within itself, since otherwise it would not, as a distinct cognitive faculty, be subject even to the most ordinary criticism. Yet this principle must not be derived from concepts a priori, for these belong to the understanding, while the power of judgment concerns only their application. It must therefore itself supply a concept through which, properly speaking, no thing is cognized, but which serves as a rule for itself alone—not as an objective rule to which it can conform its judgment, since that would in turn require another power of judgment to distinguish whether or not the case fell under the rule.
This difficulty concerning a principle (whether subjective or objective) arises chiefly in those judgments called aesthetic, which concern the beautiful and sublime in nature or A VIII art. And yet the critical investigation of a principle of the power of judgment in these judgments is the most important part of a critique of this faculty. For although they contribute nothing by themselves to the cognition of things, they nevertheless belong solely to the faculty of cognition and show an immediate relation of this faculty to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure according to some principle a priori, without confusing it with what can be a determining ground of the faculty of desire, since the latter has its principles a priori in concepts of reason.—As for the logical judging of nature, however, where experience presents a lawfulness in things that the understanding's general concept of the sensible no longer suffices to understand or explain, and where the power of judgment can draw from itself a principle relating the natural thing to the unknowable supersensible, while having to use it for the cognition of nature only with regard to itself: there such a principle a priori can and must indeed be applied to the cognition of beings in the world, and at the same time opens A IX prospects favorable to practical reason. But it has no immediate relation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. It is precisely this relation that is puzzling in the principle of the power of judgment and makes a separate division in the critique necessary 170 for this faculty; whereas logical judging according to concepts (from which no immediate inference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure can ever be drawn), together with a critical restriction of it, could at most have been appended to the theoretical part of philosophy.
Since the investigation of the faculty of taste, as aesthetic power of judgment, is undertaken here not to form and cultivate taste (for this will continue on its course in the future, as in the past, without any such inquiries), but solely with a transcendental intention, I flatter myself that its shortcomings with regard to the former end will be judged indulgently. With regard to the latter intention, however, it must prepare for the strictest scrutiny. Yet even here the great difficulty of solving a problem that nature has so entangled may, I hope, excuse a certain obscurity A X in its solution that cannot entirely be avoided, provided only that the correct statement of the principle has been made sufficiently clear—even if the manner of deriving the phenomenon of the power of judgment from it does not have all the clarity one may rightly demand elsewhere, namely in cognition through concepts, which I believe I have also achieved in the second part of this work.
With this, then, I bring my entire critical undertaking to a close. I shall proceed without delay to the doctrinal undertaking, to wrest, if possible, from my advancing age the time still somewhat favorable to it. It goes without saying that the power of judgment will have no separate part in that undertaking, since for it the critique serves in place of theory. Rather, in accordance with the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical, and of pure philosophy into the same parts, the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals will constitute that undertaking.
Plain English translation
A complete, independent machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
Preface A III 167 to the first edition, 1790.
We can call the ability to gain knowledge from a priori principles pure reason, and the investigation of its possibility and limits in general the critique of pure reason. We may do this even if we understand this ability only as reason in its theoretical use. This was also how the term was used in the first work bearing that title, without yet intending to investigate reason's ability as practical reason according to its special principles. In that case the investigation concerns only our ability to know things a priori. It deals only with the faculty of cognition, excluding the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the faculty of desire. Within the faculties of cognition, it deals with the understanding and its a priori principles, excluding the power of judgment and reason (as faculties A IV that likewise belong to theoretical cognition). For the investigation shows that no faculty of cognition other than the understanding can supply constitutive a priori principles of cognition. The critique examines them all, testing whatever share each of the other faculties might claim in the actual stock of knowledge derived from its own resources. It leaves standing only what the understanding prescribes a priori as law for nature, understood as the whole of appearances, whose form is likewise given a priori. It assigns all other pure concepts to the ideas. These go beyond our theoretical faculty of cognition, but they are not therefore useless or dispensable. Instead, they serve as regulative principles. On the one hand, they check the understanding's dangerous pretensions: because it can state a priori the conditions under which all the things it can know are possible, 168 it might suppose it has thereby confined the possibility of all things whatsoever within these limits. On the other hand, they guide the understanding itself in studying nature according to a principle of completeness, even though A V it can never reach that completeness. In this way they advance the final aim of all cognition.
So it was really the understanding that the work generally called the critique of pure reason was meant to establish in secure, exclusive possession against all rival claimants. The understanding has its own domain within the faculty of cognition, insofar as it contains constitutive a priori principles of cognition. Similarly, the Critique of Practical Reason assigned to reason its own possession. Reason contains constitutive a priori principles nowhere except in relation to the faculty of desire.
The present critique of the power of judgment therefore addresses these questions. Does the power of judgment, which stands between understanding and reason in the order of our cognitive faculties, also have a priori principles of its own? Are these constitutive, or merely regulative and thus unable to establish a domain of their own? And does it give the feeling of pleasure and displeasure—which stands between the faculty of cognition and the faculty of desire, just as understanding prescribes a priori laws to the former and reason to the latter—A VI an a priori rule?
A critique of pure reason—that is, of our ability to judge according to a priori principles—would be incomplete without treating the critique of the power of judgment as a separate part. For the power of judgment, as a faculty of cognition, also claims such principles for itself. Its principles, however, must not form a separate part between the theoretical and the practical in a system of pure philosophy. If necessary, they can be attached to either part as occasion requires. For if such a system is ever to be completed under the general name of metaphysics—and completing it in full is possible and extremely important for every use of reason—the critique must first investigate the ground for this building. It must go as deep as the first foundation of our ability to have principles independent of experience. Otherwise some part of the building might sink, which would inevitably bring down the whole. 169
We can readily see from the nature of the power of judgment that finding a principle peculiar to it must involve great difficulties. Its proper use A VII is so necessary and so universally required that the name common sense means precisely this faculty and no other. It must contain some a priori principle, or it would not be subject even to the most ordinary criticism as a distinct faculty of cognition. Yet this principle must not be derived from a priori concepts. Those belong to the understanding, while the power of judgment concerns only their application. It must therefore itself supply a concept through which, strictly speaking, no thing is known. This concept serves only as a rule for the power of judgment itself, not as an objective rule to which it can adapt its judgment. That would require yet another power of judgment to decide whether or not the case fell under the rule.
This difficulty about a principle, whether subjective or objective, occurs mainly in the judgments called aesthetic, which concern the beautiful and the sublime in nature or A VIII art. Yet critically investigating a principle of the power of judgment in these judgments is the most important part of a critique of this faculty. Although on their own they contribute nothing at all to our knowledge of things, they still belong solely to the faculty of cognition. They show that this faculty has a direct relation to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure according to some a priori principle. This does not mix it with what can determine the faculty of desire, since that faculty has its a priori principles in concepts of reason.—Logical judgment of nature is a different matter. Experience sometimes presents a lawfulness in things that the understanding's general concept of what is sensible no longer suffices to understand or explain. Here the power of judgment can draw from itself a principle for relating a natural thing to the unknowable supersensible, though it must use this principle to know nature only with regard to itself. Such an a priori principle can and must be applied to the cognition of beings in the world. It also opens up A IX prospects useful to practical reason. But it has no direct relation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. That relation is precisely what is puzzling in the principle of the power of judgment and makes a separate section of the critique necessary 170 for this faculty. Logical judgment according to concepts, from which no direct inference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure can ever be drawn, could otherwise have been appended to the theoretical part of philosophy, together with a critical restriction of it.
The investigation of the faculty of taste as the aesthetic power of judgment is undertaken here not to train and cultivate taste, but solely for a transcendental purpose. The cultivation of taste will continue on its course without any such investigations, as it has in the past. I therefore hope the investigation will be judged leniently for its shortcomings in serving the former purpose. As for the latter purpose, it must be prepared for the strictest examination. Even there, however, I hope that the great difficulty of solving a problem nature has made so complicated can excuse some obscurity A X in the solution that cannot entirely be avoided. What matters is that I have shown clearly enough that the principle has been correctly stated. The way the phenomenon of the power of judgment is derived from that principle may not have all the clarity we can rightly demand elsewhere, namely in cognition through concepts. I believe I have achieved that clarity in the second part of this work.
With this, then, I conclude my entire critical undertaking. I will move without delay to doctrinal work, to win from my advancing age, if possible, the time that is still reasonably favorable for it. It goes without saying that this will contain no separate part for the power of judgment, since for this faculty the critique takes the place of theory. Instead, following the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical, and of pure philosophy into the same parts, the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals will make up that undertaking.
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Preface is part of Critique of Judgment by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 2 of 21 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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