Introduction IV
Original German
IV. Von der Urtheilskraft, als einem a priori gesetzgebenden Vermögen.
Urtheilskraft überhaupt ist das Vermögen, das Besondere als enthalten unter dem Allgemeinen zu denken. Ist das Allgemeine (die Regel, A XXVI das Princip, das Gesetz) gegeben, so ist die Urtheilskraft, welche das Besondere darunter subsumirt, (auch wenn sie als transscendentale Urtheilskraft a priori die Bedingungen angiebt, welchen gemäß allein unter jenem Allgemeinen subsumirt werden kann) bestimmend. Ist aber nur das Besondere gegeben, wozu sie das Allgemeine finden soll, so ist die Urtheilskraft bloß reflectirend.
Die bestimmende Urtheilskraft unter allgemeinen transscendentalen Gesetzen, die der Verstand giebt, ist nur subsumirend; das Gesetz ist ihr a priori vorgezeichnet, und sie hat also nicht nöthig, für sich selbst auf ein Gesetz zu denken, um das Besondere in der Natur dem Allgemeinen unterordnen zu können. — Allein es sind so mannigfaltige Formen der Natur, gleichsam so viele Modificationen der allgemeinen transscendentalen Naturbegriffe, die durch jene Gesetze, welche der reine Verstand a priori giebt, weil dieselben nur auf die Möglichkeit einer Natur (als Gegenstandes der Sinne) überhaupt gehen, unbestimmt gelassen werden, daß dafür doch 180 auch Gesetze sein müssen, die zwar als empirische nach unserer Verstandeseinsicht zufällig sein mögen, die aber doch, wenn sie Gesetze heißen sollen (wie es auch der Begriff einer Natur erfordert), aus einem, wenn gleich uns unbekannten, Princip der Einheit des Mannigfaltigen als nothwendig angesehen werden müssen. — Die reflectirende Urtheilskraft, die von dem Besondern in der Natur zum Allgemeinen aufzusteigen die A XXVII Obliegenheit hat, bedarf also eines Princips, welches sie nicht von der Erfahrung entlehnen kann, weil es eben die Einheit aller empirischen Principien unter gleichfalls empirischen, aber höheren Principien und also die Möglichkeit der systematischen Unterordnung derselben unter einander begründen soll. Ein solches transscendentales Princip kann also die reflectirende Urtheilskraft sich nur selbst als Gesetz geben, nicht anderwärts hernehmen (weil sie sonst bestimmende Urtheilskraft sein würde), noch der Natur vorschreiben: weil die Reflexion über die Gesetze der Natur sich nach der Natur und diese sich nicht nach den Bedingungen richtet, nach welchen wir einen in Ansehung dieser ganz zufälligen Begriff von ihr zu erwerben trachten.
Nun kann dieses Princip kein anderes sein als: daß, da allgemeine Naturgesetze ihren Grund in unserem Verstande haben, der sie der Natur (obzwar nur nach dem allgemeinen Begriffe von ihr als Natur) vorschreibt, die besondern empirischen Gesetze in Ansehung dessen, was in ihnen durch jene unbestimmt gelassen ist, nach einer solchen Einheit betrachtet werden müssen, als ob gleichfalls ein Verstand (wenn gleich nicht der unsrige) sie zum Behuf unserer Erkenntnißvermögen, um ein System der Erfahrung nach besonderen Naturgesetzen möglich zu machen, gegeben hätte. Nicht als wenn auf diese Art wirklich ein solcher Verstand angenommen werden müßte (denn es ist nur die reflectirende Urtheilskraft, der diese Idee zum Princip dient, zum Reflectiren, nicht zum Bestimmen); A XXVIII sondern dieses Vermögen giebt sich dadurch nur selbst und nicht der Natur ein Gesetz.
Weil nun der Begriff von einem Object, sofern er zugleich den Grund der Wirklichkeit dieses Objects enthält, der Zweck und die Übereinstimmung eines Dinges mit derjenigen Beschaffenheit der Dinge, die nur nach Zwecken möglich ist, die Zweckmäßigkeit der Form desselben heißt: so ist das Princip der Urtheilskraft in Ansehung der Form der Dinge der Natur unter empirischen Gesetzen überhaupt die Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur in ihrer Mannigfaltigkeit. D. i. die Natur wird durch diesen Begriff 181 so vorgestellt, als ob ein Verstand den Grund der Einheit des Mannigfaltigen ihrer empirischen Gesetze enthalte.
Die Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur ist also ein besonderer Begriff a priori, der lediglich in der reflectirenden Urtheilskraft seinen Ursprung hat. Denn den Naturproducten kann man so etwas als Beziehung der Natur an ihnen auf Zwecke nicht beilegen, sondern diesen Begriff nur brauchen, um über sie in Ansehung der Verknüpfung der Erscheinungen in ihr, die nach empirischen Gesetzen gegeben ist, zu reflectiren. Auch ist dieser Begriff von der praktischen Zweckmäßigkeit (der menschlichen Kunst oder auch der Sitten) ganz unterschieden, ob er zwar nach einer Analogie mit derselben gedacht wird.
Musean translation
A complete machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
IV. On the Power of Judgment as a Faculty That Legislates a priori.
The power of judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, A XXVI the principle, the law) is given, then the power of judgment that subsumes the particular under it is determining (even when, as transcendental power of judgment, it states a priori the conditions under which alone subsumption under that universal can occur). But if only the particular is given, for which it is to find the universal, then the power of judgment is merely reflective.
The determining power of judgment under universal transcendental laws given by the understanding merely subsumes; the law is prescribed for it a priori, and it therefore has no need to devise a law for itself in order to subordinate the particular in nature to the universal.—But there are so many diverse forms of nature, so many modifications, as it were, of the universal transcendental concepts of nature, left undetermined by those laws which the pure understanding gives a priori—since these concern only the possibility of a nature (as an object of the senses) in general—that for these forms there must 180 also be laws. As empirical laws, these may be contingent according to our understanding's insight; yet if they are to be called laws (as the concept of a nature also requires), they must be regarded as necessary on the basis of a principle of the unity of the manifold, even if that principle is unknown to us.—The reflective power of judgment, whose task is to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal, A XXVII therefore needs a principle it cannot borrow from experience, since that principle is precisely to ground the unity of all empirical principles under principles that are likewise empirical but higher, and thus the possibility of their systematic subordination to one another. Such a transcendental principle, therefore, the reflective power of judgment can only give itself as a law: it cannot take it from elsewhere (for then it would be determining judgment), nor prescribe it to nature, since reflection on the laws of nature conforms to nature, and nature does not conform to the conditions under which we strive to acquire a concept of it that is, in relation to those conditions, wholly contingent.
Now this principle can be none other than this: since universal laws of nature have their ground in our understanding, which prescribes them to nature (though only according to the general concept of it as nature), the particular empirical laws, with regard to what those universal laws leave undetermined in them, must be considered in terms of a unity such as they would have if an understanding (even if not ours) had likewise given them for the benefit of our cognitive faculties, to make a system of experience according to particular natural laws possible. This is not to say that such an understanding must actually be assumed (for it is only the reflective power of judgment for which this idea serves as a principle, for reflecting, not for determining); A XXVIII rather, this faculty thereby gives a law only to itself, not to nature.
Now the concept of an object, insofar as it also contains the ground of that object's actuality, is called an end; and the agreement of a thing with that constitution of things which is possible only according to ends is called the purposiveness of its form. Hence the principle of the power of judgment concerning the form of things in nature under empirical laws in general is the purposiveness of nature in its manifoldness. That is, through this concept nature is represented 181 as though an understanding contained the ground of the unity of the manifold of its empirical laws.
The purposiveness of nature is therefore a special concept a priori that has its origin solely in the reflective power of judgment. For we cannot attribute to natural products anything like a relation of nature in them to ends; we can use this concept only to reflect on them with regard to the connection of appearances in nature as given according to empirical laws. This concept is also entirely distinct from practical purposiveness (in human art or in morals), although it is thought by analogy with it.
Plain English translation
A complete, independent machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
IV. On the power of judgment as a faculty that legislates a priori.
The power of judgment in general is the ability to think of the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal—the rule, A XXVI principle, or law—is given, the power of judgment that places the particular under it is determining. This remains so even when, as transcendental power of judgment, it states a priori the conditions under which alone something can be placed under that universal. But if only the particular is given, and judgment must find the universal for it, the power of judgment is merely reflective.
The determining power of judgment, operating under universal transcendental laws supplied by the understanding, only places things under those laws. The law is prescribed for it a priori, so it does not need to devise a law for itself in order to subordinate the particular in nature to the universal.—But nature has many different forms, as though they were so many modifications of the universal transcendental concepts of nature. The laws supplied a priori by the pure understanding leave these forms undetermined, since those laws concern only the possibility of a nature in general, as an object of the senses. Yet there must 180 also be laws for these forms. As empirical laws, they may be contingent to our understanding's insight. Still, if they are to be called laws, as the concept of a nature requires, they must be regarded as necessary on the basis of some principle unifying the manifold, even if we do not know it.—The reflective power of judgment must rise from the particular in nature to the universal. To fulfill this A XXVII task, it therefore needs a principle it cannot borrow from experience. For this principle is meant to ground the unity of all empirical principles under higher principles that are likewise empirical, and thus the possibility of their systematic subordination to one another. The reflective power of judgment can therefore only give such a transcendental principle to itself as a law. It cannot take it from elsewhere, since it would then be determining judgment. Nor can it prescribe it to nature, because reflection on nature's laws takes its direction from nature. Nature does not take its direction from the conditions under which we try to acquire a concept of it that, in relation to those conditions, is entirely contingent.
This principle can only be the following. Universal laws of nature are grounded in our understanding, which prescribes them to nature, though only according to its general concept as nature. Particular empirical laws, as regards what those universal laws leave undetermined in them, must therefore be considered according to a unity of the following kind: as though an understanding, though not necessarily ours, had given them for the benefit of our cognitive faculties, to make possible a system of experience according to particular natural laws. This does not mean that such an understanding must actually be assumed. The idea serves as a principle only for reflective judgment, for reflecting, not for determining. A XXVIII Through it, this faculty gives a law only to itself, not to nature.
Now the concept of an object, insofar as it also contains the ground of that object's actuality, is called an end. A thing's agreement with the character of things that is possible only according to ends is called the purposiveness of its form. The principle of judgment concerning the form of natural things under empirical laws in general is therefore the purposiveness of nature in its diversity. That is, through this concept nature 181 is represented as though an understanding contained the ground of unity in the diversity of its empirical laws.
The purposiveness of nature is therefore a special a priori concept that originates solely in the reflective power of judgment. We cannot attribute to natural products anything like a relation of nature in them to ends. We can only use this concept to reflect on them in relation to the connection of nature's appearances given according to empirical laws. This concept is also entirely different from practical purposiveness, whether that of human art or of morals, although it is thought by analogy with it.
About this section
Introduction IV is part of Critique of Judgment by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 6 of 21 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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