Section 7

7 γ) The will is the unity of these two moments: particularity reflected into itself and thereby returned to universality—individuality. It is the self-determination of the I: in one act, to posit itself as the negative of itself, namely as determinate, limited, and to remain with itself, that is, in its identity with itself and universality, and in the determination to join itself only with itself.—The I determines itself insofar as it is the relation of negativity to itself. As this relation to itself, it is equally indifferent to this determinacy, knows it as its own and as ideal, as a mere possibility by which it is not bound, but within which it is only because it posits itself there.—This is the freedom of the will, which constitutes its concept or substantiality, its gravity, just as gravity constitutes the substantiality of body.

Every self-consciousness knows itself as universal—as the possibility of abstracting from everything determinate—and as particular, with a determinate object, content, and end. Yet these two moments are only abstractions. The concrete and true—and all truth is concrete—is the universality that has the particular as its opposite, but in which the particular, through its reflection into itself, is reconciled with the universal.—This unity is individuality, not in its immediacy as a single one, as individuality is in representation, but according to its concept (Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, §§ 112–114); or this individuality is, in fact, nothing other than the concept itself. Those first two moments—that the will can abstract from everything, and that it is also determinate, whether through itself or something else—are readily conceded and grasped, because by themselves they are untrue moments of the understanding. But the third, the true and speculative—and everything true, insofar as it is comprehended, can be thought only speculatively—is what the understanding refuses to enter, always calling precisely the concept incomprehensible. The proof and fuller discussion of this innermost core of speculation—infinity as negativity relating to itself, this ultimate wellspring of all activity, life, and consciousness—belong to logic, as purely speculative philosophy.—Here we can only add that when we say, “the will is universal,” “the will determines itself,” we already express the will as a presupposed subject or substrate. Yet it is not something finished and universal before its determining, and before the sublation and ideality of this determining; it is will only as this activity mediating itself within itself and returning into itself.

7 γ) The will is the unity of these two elements: particularity reflected into itself and thereby brought back to universality—individuality. It is the I's self-determination: at once to posit itself as its own negative, namely as determinate and limited, and to remain with itself, that is, in its identity with itself and its universality. In determining itself, it joins only with itself.—The I determines itself insofar as it is negativity relating to itself. As this relation to itself, it is equally indifferent to this determinacy. It knows the determinacy as its own and as ideal, as a mere possibility that does not bind it. It is in that determinacy only because it puts itself there.—This is freedom of the will. It constitutes the will's concept or substantiality, its gravity, just as gravity constitutes the substantiality of a body.

Every self-consciousness knows itself as universal—as the possibility of abstracting from everything determinate—and as particular, with a definite object, content, and aim. Yet these two elements are only abstractions. What is concrete and true—and everything true is concrete—is universality that has the particular as its opposite, but a particular reconciled with the universal through its reflection into itself.—This unity is individuality. But it is not individuality in its immediacy as one thing, as individuality is in representation. It is individuality according to its concept (Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, §§ 112–114). Or rather, this individuality is really nothing other than the concept itself. The first two elements—that the will can abstract from everything and that it is also determined, whether by itself or by something else—are easily admitted and grasped. Taken by themselves, they are untrue elements of the understanding. But the understanding refuses to enter into the third element, the true and speculative. Everything true, insofar as it is comprehended, can be thought only speculatively. The understanding always calls precisely the concept incomprehensible. The demonstration and closer discussion of this innermost point of speculation—infinity as negativity relating to itself, this ultimate source of all activity, life, and consciousness—belong to logic as purely speculative philosophy.—We can only add here that when we say “the will is universal,” or “the will determines itself,” we express the will as an already assumed subject or substrate. But the will is not something finished and universal before it determines itself, and before the cancellation and ideality of this determining. It is will only as this activity that mediates itself within itself and returns into itself.