Section 6
Original German
6 β) Eben so ist Ich das Uebergehen aus unterschiedsloser Unbestimmtheit zur Unterscheidung, Bestimmen und Setzen einer Bestimmtheit als eines Inhalts und Gegenstands. — Dieser Inhalt sey nun weiter als durch die Natur gegeben oder aus dem Begriffe des Geistes erzeugt. Durch dieß Setzen seiner selbst als eines bestimmten tritt Ich in das Daseyn überhaupt; — das absolute Moment der Endlichkeit oder Besonderung des Ich.
Dieß zweyte Moment der Bestimmung ist eben so Negativität, Aufheben als das erste — es ist nehmlich das Aufheben der ersten abstracten Negativität. — Wie das Besondere überhaupt im Allgemeinen, so ist deswegen dieß zweyte Moment im ersten schon enthalten und nur ein Setzen dessen, was das erste schon an sich ist; — das erste Moment, als erstes für sich nehmlich ist nicht die wahrhafte Unendlichkeit, oder concrete Allgemeinheit, der Begriff, — sondern nur ein Bestimmtes, Einseitiges; nehmlich weil es die Abstraction von aller Bestimmtheit ist, ist es selbst nicht ohne die Bestimmtheit; und als ein abstractes, einseitiges zu seyn, macht seine Bestimmtheit, Mangelhaftigkeit und Endlichkeit aus. — Die Unterscheidung und Bestimmung der zwey angegebenen Momente findet sich in der Fichteschen Philosophie, eben so in der Kantischen u. s. f.; nur, um bey der Fichteschen Darstellung stehen zu bleiben, ist Ich als das Unbegrenzte (im ersten Satze der Fichteschen Wissenschaftslehre) ganz nur als Positives genommen, (so ist es die Allgemeinheit und Identität des Verstandes) so daß dieses abstracte Ich für sich das Wahre seyn soll, und daß darum ferner die Beschränkung, — das Negative überhaupt, sey es als eine gegebene, äußere Schranke oder als eigene Thätigkeit des Ich — (im zweyten Satze) hinzukommt. — Die im Allgemeinen oder Identischen, wie im Ich, immanente Negativität aufzufassen, war der weitere Schritt, den die speculative Philosophie zu machen hatte; — ein Bedürfniß, von welchem diejenigen nichts ahnden, welche den Dualismus der Unendlichkeit und Endlichkeit nicht einmal in der Immanenz und Abstraction, wie Fichte, auffassen.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
6 β) Equally, the I is the transition from undifferentiated indeterminacy to differentiation, determination, and positing of a determinacy as a content and object.—This content may, in turn, be given through nature or produced from the concept of spirit. Through this positing of itself as something determinate, the I enters into existence in general: the absolute moment of the finitude or particularization of the I.
This second moment of determination is just as much negativity, sublation, as the first: it is the sublation of the first abstract negativity. Just as the particular is contained in the universal in general, so this second moment is already contained in the first and is merely a positing of what the first already is in itself. For the first moment, as the first by itself, is not true infinity, or concrete universality, the concept, but only something determinate, one-sided. Precisely because it is abstraction from all determinacy, it is itself not without determinacy; and being something abstract and one-sided constitutes its determinacy, deficiency, and finitude.—The distinction and determination of the two moments stated here are found in Fichte’s philosophy, as also in Kant’s, and so forth. But, to remain with Fichte’s presentation, the I as the unlimited (in the first proposition of Fichte’s Science of Knowledge) is taken wholly as something positive—as such it is the universality and identity of the understanding—so that this abstract I by itself is supposed to be the truth, while limitation, the negative in general, whether as a given external limit or as the I’s own activity, is then added (in the second proposition).—To grasp the negativity immanent in the universal or identical, as in the I, was the further step speculative philosophy had to take—a need not even suspected by those who do not even grasp the dualism of infinity and finitude in immanence and abstraction, as Fichte does.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
6 β) Equally, the I is the transition from indeterminacy without distinctions to distinguishing, determining, and positing a determinacy as a content and object. This content may be given by nature or produced from the concept of spirit. By thus positing itself as something determinate, the I enters into existence in general. This is the absolute element of the I's finitude or particularization.
This second element, determination, is negativity and cancellation just as much as the first. It cancels the first, abstract negativity. Just as the particular is contained in the universal in general, this second element is already contained in the first. It is only a positing of what the first already is in itself. For the first element, taken by itself as the first, is not true infinity, or concrete universality, the concept. It is only something determinate, something one-sided. Precisely because it is abstraction from all determinacy, it is itself not without determinacy. Being abstract and one-sided makes up its determinacy, deficiency, and finitude.—The distinction and definition of these two elements are found in Fichte's philosophy, as in Kant's, and so forth. But to stay with Fichte's presentation: the I as unlimited, in the first proposition of Fichte's Science of Knowledge, is taken simply as something positive. In this way, it is the universality and identity of the understanding. This abstract I is then supposed to be the truth by itself. Limitation, the negative in general, consequently is added, in the second proposition, whether as a given external limit or as the I's own activity.—To grasp the negativity immanent in the universal or identical, as in the I, was the further step speculative philosophy had to take. People who do not even grasp the dualism of infinity and finitude in its immanence and abstraction, as Fichte does, have no inkling of this need.
About this section
Section 6 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 8 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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