Section 5
Original German
5 Der Wille enthält α) das Element der reinen Unbestimmtheit oder der reinen Reflexion des Ich in sich, in welcher jede Beschränkung, jeder durch die Natur, die Bedürfnisse, Begierden und Triebe unmittelbar vorhandener, oder, wodurch es sey, gegebener und bestimmter Inhalt aufgelößt ist; die schrankenlose Unendlichkeit der absoluten Abstraction oder Allgemeinheit, das reine Denken seiner selbst.
Diejenigen, welche das Denken als ein besonderes, eigenthümliches Vermögen, getrennt vom Willen, als einem gleichfalls eigenthümlichen Vermögen betrachten und weiter gar das Denken als dem Willen, besonders dem guten Willen für nachtheilig halten, zeigen sogleich von vorn herein, daß sie gar nichts von der Natur des Willens wissen; eine Bemerkung, die über denselben Gegenstand noch öfters zu machen seyn wird. — Wenn die Eine hier bestimmte Seite des Willens, — diese absolute Möglichkeit von jeder Bestimmung, in der Ich mich finde, oder die Ich in mich gesetzt habe, abstrahiren zu können, die Flucht aus allem Inhalte als einer Schranke, es ist, wozu der Wille sich bestimmt oder die für sich von der Vorstellung als die Freyheit festgehalten wird, so ist dieß die negative oder die Freyheit des Verstandes. — Es ist die Freyheit der Leere, welche zur wirklichen Gestalt und zur Leidenschaft erhoben und zwar, blos theoretisch bleibend, im Religiösen der Fanatismus der indischen reinen Beschauung, aber zur Wirklichkeit sich wendend, im Politischen wie im Religiösen der Fanatismus der Zertrümmerung aller bestehenden gesellschaftlichen Ordnung, und die Hinwegräumung der einer Ordnung verdächtigen Individuen, wie die Vernichtung jeder sich wieder hervorthun wollenden Organisation wird. Nur, indem er etwas zerstört, hat dieser negative Wille das Gefühl seines Daseyns; er meynt wohl etwa irgend einen positiven Zustand zu wollen, z. B. den Zustand allgemeiner Gleichheit oder allgemeinen religiösen Lebens, aber er will in der That nicht die positive Wirklichkeit desselben, denn diese führt sogleich irgend eine Ordnung, eine Besonderung sowohl von Einrichtungen, als von Individuen herbey, die Besonderung und objective Bestimmung ist es aber, aus deren Vernichtung dieser negativen Freyheit ihr Selbstbewußtseyn hervorgeht. So kann das, was sie zu wollen meynt, für sich schon nur eine abstracte Vorstellung, und die Verwirklichung derselben nur die Furie des Zerstörens seyn.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
5 The will contains α) the element of pure indeterminacy, or the pure reflection of the I into itself, in which every limitation, every content immediately present through nature, needs, desires, and drives, or given and determined in whatever manner, is dissolved: the limitless infinity of absolute abstraction or universality, the pure thinking of itself.
Those who regard thinking as a distinct, peculiar faculty, separated from the will as an equally peculiar faculty, and who go so far as to consider thinking harmful to the will, especially to the good will, show at once that they know nothing whatever of the nature of the will—a remark that will have to be made repeatedly concerning the same subject.—If the one side of the will determined here—this absolute possibility of abstracting from every determination in which I find myself or which I have posited within myself, this flight from all content as a limitation—is what the will determines itself to be, or is what representation holds fast by itself as freedom, then this is negative freedom, or the freedom of the understanding.—It is the freedom of the void. Raised to actual form and to passion, it becomes, while remaining merely theoretical, the religious fanaticism of pure Indian contemplation; but, turning toward actuality, in politics as in religion, it becomes the fanaticism of demolishing every existing social order, removing individuals suspected of favoring an order, and annihilating every organization that seeks to emerge again. Only in destroying something does this negative will feel its existence. It may suppose that it wills some positive condition—for example, universal equality or a universal religious life—but in fact it does not will the positive actuality of that condition; for this immediately introduces some order, some particularization both of institutions and of individuals. Yet it is from the annihilation of particularization and objective determination that this negative freedom gains its self-consciousness. Thus what it supposes it wills can in itself be no more than an abstract representation, and its actualization no more than the fury of destruction.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
5 The will contains α) the element of pure indeterminacy, or of the I's pure reflection into itself. In this reflection, every limitation is dissolved, along with every content immediately present through nature, needs, desires, and drives, or given and determined in any way at all. This is the unlimited infinity of absolute abstraction, or universality: pure thinking of itself.
Those who treat thinking as a separate, distinctive faculty, divided from willing as another distinctive faculty, and who even regard thinking as harmful to the will, especially to the good will, show from the outset that they know nothing at all about the will's nature. We will have to make this point more often on the same subject.—Suppose the one aspect of the will defined here is what the will determines itself to be, or is what representation takes by itself to be freedom: this absolute possibility of abstracting from every determination in which I find myself or which I have put within myself, this escape from all content as a limitation. Then this is negative freedom, or the freedom of the understanding.—It is the freedom of emptiness. Raised to an actual form and a passion, it becomes, while remaining purely theoretical, the religious fanaticism of pure Indian contemplation. But when it turns to actual reality, in politics as in religion, it becomes the fanaticism of smashing every existing social order, removing individuals suspected of favoring an order, and destroying any organization that tries to emerge again. This negative will feels that it exists only when it destroys something. It may imagine that it wills some positive condition, for example universal equality or a universal religious life. But it does not actually will that condition's positive reality. Such reality immediately introduces some order, some particularization both of institutions and of individuals. Yet this negative freedom gains its self-consciousness precisely from destroying particularization and objective determination. So what it imagines it wills can itself only be an abstract representation, and its realization only the fury of destruction.
About this section
Section 5 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 7 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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