Section 4
Original German
4 Der Boden des Rechts ist überhaupt das Geistige, und seine nähere Stelle und Ausgangspunkt der Wille, welcher frey ist, so daß die Freyheit seine Substanz und Bestimmung ausmacht, und das Rechtssystem das Reich der verwirklichten Freyheit, die Welt des Geistes aus ihm selbst hervorgebracht, als eine zweyte Natur, ist.
In Ansehung der Freyheit des Willens kann an die vormalige Verfahrungsart des Erkennens erinnert werden. Man setzte nehmlich die Vorstellung des Willens voraus und versuchte aus ihr eine Definition desselben heraus zu bringen und festzusetzen; dann wurde nach der Weise der vormaligen empirischen Psychologie aus den verschiedenen Empfindungen und Erscheinungen des gewöhnlichen Bewußtseyns, als Reue, Schuld und dergl., als welche sich nur aus dem freyen Willen sollen erklären lassen, der sogenannte Beweis geführt, daß der Wille frey sey. Bequemer ist es aber, sich kurzweg daran zu halten, daß die Freyheit als eine Thatsache des Bewußtseyns gegeben sey und an sie geglaubt werden müsse. Daß der Wille frey und was Wille und Freyheit ist — die Deduction hievon kann, wie schon bemerkt ist (§. 2.) allein im Zusammenhange des Ganzen Statt finden. Die Grundzüge dieser Prämisse, — daß der Geist zunächst Intelligenz und daß die Bestimmungen, durch welchen sie in ihrer Entwicklung fortgeht, vom Gefühl, durch Vorstellen, zum Denken, der Weg sind, sich als Wille hervorzubringen, welcher, als der praktische Geist überhaupt, die nächste Wahrheit der Intelligenz ist, — habe ich in meiner Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (Heidelberg, 1817.) §. 363 — 399. dargestellt und hoffe, deren weitere Ausführung dereinst geben zu können. Es ist mir um so mehr Bedürfniß, dadurch, wie ich hoffe, zu gründlicherer Erkenntniß der Natur des Geistes das Meinige beyzutragen, da sich, wie daselbst §. 367. Anmerk. bemerkt ist, nicht leicht eine philosophische Wissenschaft in so vernachlässigtem und schlechtem Zustande befindet, als die Lehre vom Geiste, die man gewöhnlich Psychologie nennt. — In Ansehung der in diesem und in den folgenden §§. der Einleitung angegebenen Momente des Begriffes des Willens, welche das Resultat jener Prämisse sind, kann sich übrigens zum Behuf des Vorstellens auf das Selbstbewußtseyn eines jeden berufen werden. Jeder wird zunächst in sich finden, von Allem, was es sey, abstrahiren zu können und eben so sich selbst bestimmen, jeden Inhalt durch sich in sich setzen zu können, und ebenso für die weitern Bestimmungen das Beyspiel in seinem Selbstbewußtseyn haben.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
4 The ground of right is, in general, the spiritual; its more precise place and starting point is the will, which is free. Freedom therefore constitutes its substance and determination, and the system of right is the realm of actualized freedom, the world of spirit brought forth from spirit itself as a second nature.
Concerning freedom of the will, we may recall the former procedure of knowing. The representation of the will was presupposed, and an attempt was made to extract and establish a definition of it. Then, in the manner of the former empirical psychology, the so-called proof that the will was free was drawn from the various sensations and appearances of ordinary consciousness—remorse, guilt, and the like—which were supposedly explicable only from a free will. More convenient, however, is the simple insistence that freedom is given as a fact of consciousness, and must be believed in. That the will is free, and what will and freedom are, can be deduced, as already remarked (§ 2), only within the interconnection of the whole. I have presented the outlines of this premise—that spirit is initially intelligence, and that the determinations through which intelligence advances in its development, from feeling, through representation, to thinking, are the path by which it brings itself forth as will, which, as practical spirit in general, is the nearest truth of intelligence—in my Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Heidelberg, 1817), §§ 363–399, and hope one day to be able to give a fuller development of them. I feel all the more need to contribute, through this, what I hope will be my small share toward a more thorough knowledge of the nature of spirit, since, as remarked there in the remark to § 367, scarcely any philosophical science is in so neglected and poor a condition as the doctrine of spirit, commonly called psychology.—Moreover, concerning the moments of the concept of the will stated in this and the following sections of the Introduction, which are the result of that premise, we may appeal, for the purpose of representation, to everyone’s self-consciousness. Everyone will find within themselves, first, the capacity to abstract from anything whatsoever and, equally, to determine themselves, to posit within themselves, through themselves, any content; and they will likewise find in their self-consciousness the example for the further determinations.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
4 Right has its basis in the spiritual in general. Its more precise place and starting point is the will, which is free. Freedom therefore makes up its substance and essential determination. The system of right is the realm of freedom made real: the world of spirit brought forth by spirit itself as a second nature.
In considering freedom of the will, we can recall the earlier procedure for knowing. People assumed the representation of the will and tried to extract and establish a definition of it. Then, in the manner of the old empirical psychology, they drew on the various feelings and appearances of ordinary consciousness, such as remorse, guilt, and the like, which were supposed to be explainable only through free will. From these, they offered the so-called proof that the will was free. It is more convenient, however, simply to hold that freedom is given as a fact of consciousness and must be believed in. That the will is free, and what will and freedom are, can be derived only within the interconnection of the whole, as already noted (§ 2). I have presented the outlines of this premise in my Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Heidelberg, 1817), §§ 363–399. The premise is that spirit is initially intelligence, and that the determinations through which it develops—from feeling, through representation, to thinking—are its path toward producing itself as will. As practical spirit in general, will is the next truth of intelligence. I hope one day to be able to develop this account further. I feel all the more need to make this contribution, I hope, to a more thorough knowledge of spirit's nature because, as noted there in § 367, Remark, scarcely any philosophical science is in so neglected and poor a condition as the doctrine of spirit, commonly called psychology.—As for the elements of the concept of will given in this and the following sections of the Introduction, which are the result of that premise, we can also appeal to everyone's self-consciousness for a representation of them. Everyone will first find within themselves the ability to abstract from anything whatever. They will likewise find that they can determine themselves, putting any content within themselves through their own activity. And for the further determinations too, they will find the example in their own self-consciousness.
About this section
Section 4 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 6 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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