Section 80
Original German
80 Die Eintheilung der Verträge und eine darauf gegründete verständige Abhandlung ihrer Arten ist nicht von äußerlichen Umständen, sondern von Unterschieden, die in der Natur des Vertrags selbst liegen, herzunehmen. — Diese Unterschiede sind der von formellem und von reellem Vertrag, dann von Eigenthum und von Besitz und Gebrauch, Werth und von specifischer Sache. Es ergeben sich demnach folgende Arten: (Die hier gegebene Eintheilung trifft im Ganzen mit der Kantischen Eintheilung Metaph. Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre S. 120. ff. zusammen und es wäre längst zu erwarten gewesen, daß der gewöhnliche Schlendrian der Eintheilung der Verträge in Real- und Consensual- genannte und ungenannte Contracte u. s. f. gegen die vernünftige Eintheilung aufgegeben worden wäre.)
A) Schenkungsvertrag, und zwar
1) einer Sache; eigentlich sogenannte Schenkung,
2) das Leihen einer Sache, als Verschenkung eines Theils oder des beschränkten Genusses und Gebrauchs derselben, der Verleiher bleibt hiebey Eigenthümer der Sache; (mutuum und commodatum ohne Zinsen). Die Sache ist dabey entweder eine specifische, oder aber wird sie wenn sie auch eine solche ist, doch als eine allgemeine angesehen oder gilt (wie Geld) als eine für sich allgemeine.
3) Schenkung einer Dienstleistung überhaupt, z. B. der bloßen Aufbewahrung eines Eigenthums (depositum); — die Schenkung einer Sache mit der besondern Bedingung, daß der andere erst Eigenthümer wird auf den Zeitpunkt des Todes des Schenkenden d. h. auf den Zeitpunkt, wo dieser ohnehin nicht mehr Eigenthümer ist, die testamentarische Disposition, liegt nicht im Begriffe des Vertrags, sondern setzt die bürgerliche Gesellschaft und eine positive Gesetzgebung voraus.
B) Tauschvertrag,
1) Tausch als solcher:
α) einer Sache überhaupt d. i. einer specifischen Sache gegen eine andere desgleichen.
β) Kauf und Verkauf; (emtio venditio) Tausch einer specifischen Sache gegen eine, die als die allgemeine bestimmt ist, d. i. welche nur als der Werth ohne die andere specifische Bestimmung zur Benutzung gilt, — gegen Geld.
2) Vermiethung (locatio conductio) Veräußerung des temporären Gebrauchs eines Eigenthums gegen Miethzins, und zwar
α) einer specifischen Sache, eigentliche Vermiethung — oder
β) einer allgemeinen Sache, so daß der Verleiher nur Eigenthümer dieser, oder, was dasselbe ist, des Werthes bleibt, — Anleihe (mutuum, jenes auch commodatum mit einem Miethzins; — die weitere empirische Beschaffenheit der Sache, ob sie ein Stock, Geräthe, Haus u. s. f. res fungibilis oder non fungibilis ist, bringt (wie im Verleihen als Schenken No. 2.) andere besondere, übrigens aber nicht wichtige Bestimmungen herbey.)
3) Lohnvertrag (locatio operae) Veräußerung meines Producirens oder Dienstleistens, insofern es nehmlich veräußerlich ist, auf eine beschränkte Zeit oder nach sonst einer Beschränkung (s. §. 67.).
Verwandt ist hiemit das Mandat und andere Verträge, wo die Leistung auf Character und Zutrauen oder auf höhern Talenten beruht und eine Incommensurabilität des Geleisteten gegen einen äußern Werth (der hier auch nicht Lohn, sondern Honorar heißt) eintritt.
C) Vervollständigung eines Vertrags (cautio) durch Verpfändung.
Bey den Verträgen, wo Ich die Benutzung einer Sache veräußere, bin ich nicht im Besitz, aber noch Eigenthümer derselben; (wie bey der Vermiethung). Ferner kann ich bei Tausch- Kauf- auch Schenkungsverträgen Eigenthümer geworden seyn, ohne noch im Besitz zu seyn, so wie überhaupt in Ansehung irgend einer Leistung, wenn nicht: Zug um Zug, statt findet, diese Trennung eintritt. Daß ich nun auch im wirklichen Besitze des Werths, als welcher noch oder bereits mein Eigenthum ist, in dem einen Falle bleibe, oder in dem andern Falle darein gesetzt werde, ohne daß ich im Besitze der specifischen Sache bin, die ich überlasse oder die mir werden soll, dieß wird durch das Pfand bewirkt, — eine specifische Sache, die aber nur nach dem Werthe meines zum Besitz überlassenen oder des mir schuldigen Eigenthums, mein Eigenthum ist, nach ihrer specifischen Beschaffenheit und Mehrwerthe aber Eigenthum des Verpfändenden bleibt. Die Verpfändung ist daher nicht selbst ein Vertrag, sondern nur eine Stipulation (§. 77.) das einen Vertrag in Rücksicht auf den Besitz des Eigenthums vervollständigende Moment. — Hypothek, Bürgschaft sind besondere Formen hievon.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
80 The classification of contracts, and a reasoned treatment of their kinds based upon it, must be drawn not from external circumstances but from distinctions inherent in the nature of contract itself. These are the distinctions between formal and real contract, then between property and possession and use, and between value and a specific thing. The following kinds accordingly emerge. (The classification given here agrees on the whole with Kant's classification in the Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right S. 120. ff.; it was long to be expected that the customary routine of classifying contracts as real and consensual, nominate and innominate, and so forth, would have been abandoned in favor of a rational classification.)
A) Contract of gift, namely:
1) Of a thing: a gift properly so called.
2) The lending of a thing, as the gift of a part, or of its limited enjoyment and use; the lender here remains owner of the thing (a loan for consumption and a loan for use, without interest). The thing is either a specific thing, or, even if it is such a thing, it is nevertheless regarded as a universal one; or else, like money, it counts as a thing that is universal in its own right.
3) The gift of a service in general, for example, the mere safekeeping of a property (a deposit). The gift of a thing with the particular condition that the other party becomes owner only at the time of the donor's death, that is, at the time when the donor is in any case no longer its owner—a testamentary disposition—does not lie within the concept of contract, but presupposes civil society and positive legislation.
B) Contract of exchange:
1) Exchange as such:
α) Of a thing in general, that is, of one specific thing for another specific thing.
β) Purchase and sale (buying and selling): the exchange of a specific thing for one determined as the universal thing, that is, one that counts only as value, without the other, specific determination for use—for money.
2) Hiring (letting and hiring): alienation of the temporary use of a property in return for rent, namely:
α) Of a specific thing: hiring properly so called; or
β) Of a universal thing, so that the lender remains owner only of this, or, what is the same, of the value: an interest-bearing loan (a loan for consumption; the former kind of hiring is also a loan for use with rent; the further empirical character of the thing—whether it is a stick, equipment, a house, and so forth, a fungible or a nonfungible thing—introduces other particular, though unimportant, determinations, as it does in lending as a gift, No. 2.).
3) Contract for wages (hiring of labor): alienation of my productive activity or service, insofar as it is alienable, for a limited time or under some other limitation (s. § 67.).
Related to this are mandate and other contracts in which performance rests on character and trust, or on higher talents, and what is performed is incommensurable with an external value—which here, too, is called not wages but an honorarium.
C) Completion of a contract (security) by pledging.
In contracts in which I alienate the use of a thing, I am not in possession of it, but remain its owner, as in hiring. Further, in contracts of exchange, purchase, or gift, I may have become owner without yet being in possession; and this separation occurs in general with regard to any performance when there is no simultaneous exchange. That I should, in the one case, remain in actual possession of the value that is still my property, or, in the other case, be placed in actual possession of the value that is already my property, without possessing the specific thing that I hand over or am to receive—this is brought about by the pledge. It is a specific thing that is my property only according to the value of my property whose possession I have handed over, or of the property owed to me; in its specific character and its excess value, however, it remains the property of the pledgor. Pledging is therefore not itself a contract, but only a stipulation (§ 77.), the moment that completes a contract with regard to possession of the property. Mortgage and suretyship are particular forms of this.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
80 The classification of contracts and a reasoned treatment of their kinds based on it must be drawn not from external circumstances, but from differences within the nature of contract itself. These are the differences between formal and real contract; between property and possession and use; and between value and a specific thing. The following kinds therefore result. The classification given here agrees on the whole with Kant's classification in Metaph. Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre, p. 120 and following. It should long ago have been expected that the usual routine division into real and consensual contracts, named and unnamed contracts, and so on would have been abandoned in favor of a rational classification.
A) Contract of gift, specifically:
1) Of a thing: a gift in the strict sense.
2) The lending of a thing: giving away a part, or a limited enjoyment and use, of it. The lender remains the owner of the thing: a loan for consumption and a loan for use, without interest. The thing is either a specific thing or, even if it is specific, is treated as a universal thing; or, like money, it counts as universal in itself.
3) The gift of a service in general, for example simply keeping someone's property safe—a deposit. Giving a thing under the special condition that the other person becomes its owner only at the time of the giver's death, that is, when the giver is no longer its owner anyway—a testamentary disposition—does not fall within the concept of contract. It presupposes civil society and positive legislation.
B) Contract of exchange:
1) Exchange as such:
α) Of one thing in general, that is, a specific thing, for another such thing.
β) Purchase and sale: buying and selling, the exchange of a specific thing for one determined as universal—one that counts only as value, without the further specific determination of being useful. This means exchange for money.
2) Rental: letting and hiring, the transfer of the temporary use of property for rent, specifically:
α) Of a specific thing: rental in the strict sense; or
β) Of a universal thing, so that the lender remains owner only of this, or, what is the same, of its value: a loan—a loan for consumption, the former kind also being a loan for use with rent. The further empirical nature of the thing—whether it is a stick, equipment, a house, and so on, a replaceable or nonreplaceable thing—introduces other particular but unimportant determinations, just as in lending as a gift, No. 2.
3) Wage contract: hiring labor, the transfer of my production or service, insofar as it can be transferred, for a limited time or under some other limitation (see § 67).
Related to this are the mandate and other contracts where performance rests on character and trust or on higher talents. Here what is provided is incommensurable with an external value, which in this case is called not wages but an honorarium.
C) Completion of a contract by a pledge as security.
In contracts where I transfer the use of a thing, I am no longer in possession of it but remain its owner, as in rental. In exchange, purchase, and gift contracts, I can also have become an owner without yet possessing the thing. In general this separation occurs in any performance not made simultaneously with the other party's performance. A pledge ensures that I either remain in actual possession of the value that is still my property, or am put into possession of the value that has already become mine, without possessing the specific thing I hand over or am to receive. The pledge is a specific thing that is my property only to the value of the property I have let another possess or that is owed to me. In its specific character and any excess value it remains the pledgor's property. Giving a pledge is therefore not itself a contract, but only a stipulation (§ 77), the element that completes a contract in respect of possession of the property. Mortgage and surety are particular forms of this.
About this section
Section 80 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 82 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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