Section 79
Original German
79 Die Stipulation enthält die Seite des Willens, daher das Substantielle des Rechtlichen im Vertrage, gegen welches der, insofern der Vertrag noch nicht erfüllt ist, noch bestehende Besitz für sich nur das Aeußerliche ist, das seine Bestimmung allein in jener Seite hat. Durch die Stipulation habe ich ein Eigenthum und besondere Willkühr darüber aufgegeben und es ist bereits Eigenthum des andern geworden, ich bin daher durch sie unmittelbar zur Leistung rechtlich verbunden.
Der Unterschied von einem bloßen Versprechen und einem Vertrag liegt darin, daß in jenem das, was ich schenken, thun, leisten wolle, als ein Zukünftiges ausgesprochen ist und noch eine subjective Bestimmung meines Willens bleibt, die ich hiemit noch ändern kann. Die Stipulation des Vertrags hingegen ist schon selbst das Daseyn meines Willensbeschlusses in dem Sinne, daß ich meine Sache hiemit veräußert, sie itzt aufgehört habe mein Eigenthum zu seyn und daß ich sie bereits als Eigenthum des Andern anerkenne. Die römische Unterscheidung zwischen pactum und contractus ist von schlechter Art. — Fichte hat einst die Behauptung aufgestellt, daß die Verbindlichkeit, den Vertrag zu halten, nur erst mit der beginnenden Leistung des andern für mich anfange, weil ich vor der Leistung in der Unwissenheit, darüber sey, ob der andere es ernstlich mit seiner Aeußerung gemeint habe; die Verbindlichkeit vor der Leistung sey daher nur moralischer, nicht rechtlicher Natur. Allein die Aeußerung der Stipulation ist nicht eine Aeußerung überhaupt, sondern enthält den zu Stande gekommenen gemeinsamen Willen, in welchem die Willkühr der Gesinnung und ihrer Aenderung sich aufgehoben hat. Es handelt sich deswegen nicht um die Möglichkeit, ob der andere innerlich anders gesinnt gewesen oder geworden sey, sondern ob er das Recht dazu habe. Wenn der andere auch zu leisten anfängt, bleibt mir gleichfalls die Willkühr des Unrechts. Jene Ansicht zeigt ihre Nichtigkeit gleich dadurch, daß das Rechtliche des Vertrags auf die schlechte Unendlichkeit, den Prozeß ins Unendliche, gestellt wäre, auf die unendliche Theilbarkeit der Zeit, der Materie, des Thuns u. s. f. Das Daseyn, das der Wille in der Förmlichkeit der Gebehrde, oder in der für sich bestimmten Sprache hat, ist schon sein als des intellectuellen, vollständiges Daseyn, von dem die Leistung nur die selbstlose Folge ist. — Daß es übrigens im positiven Rechte sogenannte Real-Contracte gibt, zum Unterschiede von sogenannten Consensual-Contracten in dem Sinne, daß jene nur für vollgültig angesehen werden, wenn zu der Einwilligung die wirkliche Leistung (res, traditio rei) hinzukommt, thut nichts zur Sache. Jene sind theils die besondern Fälle, wo mich diese Uebergabe erst in den Stand setzt, meinerseits leisten zu können, und meine Verbindlichkeit, zu leisten, sich allein auf die Sache, insofern ich sie in die Hände erhalten, bezieht, wie beym Darlehn, Leih-Contract und Depositum, (was auch noch bey andern Verträgen der Fall seyn kann); — ein Umstand, der nicht die Natur des Verhältnisses der Stipulation zur Leistung, sondern die Art und Weise des Leistens betrifft — theils bleibt es überhaupt der Willkühr überlassen, in einem Vertrag zu stipuliren, daß die Verbindlichkeit des einen zur Leistung nicht im Vertrage als solchem selbst liegen, sondern erst von der Leistung des andern abhängig seyn solle.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
79 Stipulation contains the side of will, and hence what is substantial in the legal aspect of contract. In contrast, the possession that still subsists insofar as the contract has not yet been fulfilled is, taken by itself, merely external, and has its determination solely in that side. Through stipulation I have relinquished a property and my particular arbitrary choice over it, and it has already become the other's property. I am therefore immediately bound by stipulation, as a matter of right, to perform.
The difference between a mere promise and a contract lies in this: in a promise, what I intend to give, do, or perform is expressed as something future and remains a subjective determination of my will, which I can therefore still change. The stipulation of a contract, by contrast, is itself already the existence of my decision of will, in the sense that I have thereby alienated my thing, that it has now ceased to be my property, and that I already acknowledge it as the other's property. The Roman distinction between pact and contract is a poor one. Fichte once advanced the claim that my obligation to keep a contract begins only when the other party begins to perform, since before performance I am ignorant of whether the other party seriously meant what he declared; the obligation before performance would therefore be merely moral, not legal, in nature. But the declaration of the stipulation is not a declaration in general: it contains the common will that has come into being, in which arbitrary choice concerning one's disposition and its alteration has been sublated. The issue is therefore not whether it is possible that the other party inwardly held, or came to hold, a different disposition, but whether he has the right to do so. Even if the other party begins to perform, the arbitrary choice to do wrong remains open to me as well. That view reveals its nullity at once in the fact that it would make the legal character of contract rest on bad infinity, the process to infinity: on the infinite divisibility of time, matter, action, and so forth. The existence that the will has in the formality of gesture, or in language that is determinate in its own right, is already its complete existence as something intellectual; performance is only the consequence, with no independent selfhood of its own. That positive law, incidentally, has so-called real contracts, distinguished from so-called consensual contracts in the sense that the former are regarded as fully valid only when actual performance (the thing, delivery of the thing) is added to consent, is irrelevant here. In part these are the particular cases in which this delivery first puts me in a position to perform on my side, and my obligation to perform relates solely to the thing insofar as I have received it into my hands, as with a loan for consumption, a loan for use, and a deposit for safekeeping—which may also be the case with other contracts. This circumstance concerns not the nature of the relation between stipulation and performance, but the manner of performance. In part, it remains in any case a matter of arbitrary choice to stipulate in a contract that one party's obligation to perform shall not lie in the contract as such, but shall depend only on the other party's performance.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
79 Stipulation contains the side of the will, and therefore the substantial legal element in the contract. By comparison, the possession that still continues while the contract remains unfulfilled is, on its own, only the external side, determined solely by that element of will. Through stipulation I have given up property and my particular choice over it. It has already become the other person's property. Stipulation therefore immediately binds me legally to perform.
The difference between a mere promise and a contract is this: in a promise, what I intend to give, do, or provide is stated as something future. It remains a subjective determination of my will, which I can therefore still change. The stipulation of a contract, by contrast, is itself already the existence of my decision, in the sense that I have thereby transferred my thing, that it has now ceased to be my property, and that I already recognize it as the other's property. The Roman distinction between pactum (agreement) and contractus (contract) is a poor one. Fichte once claimed that my obligation to keep a contract begins only when the other party starts to perform. Before performance, I supposedly do not know whether the other person seriously meant their declaration; the obligation before performance would therefore be only moral, not legal. But the declaration in a stipulation is not just any declaration. It contains the shared will that has been established, in which arbitrary choice about one's disposition and changes in it has been overcome. The issue is therefore not whether the other person may inwardly have had, or come to have, a different intention, but whether they have the right to do so. Even when the other person starts to perform, I still have the arbitrary choice to act wrongly. This view immediately shows its emptiness: it would base the legal character of the contract on bad infinity, a process going on forever—on the infinite divisibility of time, matter, action, and so on. The existence the will has in a formal gesture or in language definite in itself is already its complete existence as an intellectual will. Performance is only the consequence, with no independent standing of its own. It makes no difference that positive law also has so-called real contracts, as distinct from so-called consensual contracts. In this usage, the former are regarded as fully valid only when actual performance (res, traditio rei: the thing, the handing over of the thing) is added to consent. Some of these are special cases in which the handover first enables me to perform my part. My obligation to perform relates only to the thing insofar as I have received it, as with a loan for consumption, a loan for use, or a deposit. This can also happen in other contracts. That circumstance concerns not the nature of the relationship between stipulation and performance but the manner of performance. In other cases, it is in general left to choice to stipulate in a contract that one party's obligation to perform is not to lie in the contract itself as such, but is to depend on the other party's performance.
About this section
Section 79 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 81 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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