Section 81
Original German
81 Im Verhältniß unmittelbarer Personen zu einander überhaupt ist ihr Wille, eben so sehr wie an sich identisch und im Vertrage von ihnen gemeinsam gesetzt, so auch ein besonderer. Es ist, weil sie unmittelbare Personen sind, zufällig, ob ihr besonderer Wille mit dem an sich seyenden Willen übereinstimmend sey, der durch jenen allein seine Existenz hat. Als besonderer für sich vom allgemeinen verschieden, tritt er in Willkühr und Zufälligkeit der Einsicht und des Wollens gegen das auf, was an sich Recht ist, — das Unrecht.
Den Uebergang zum Unrecht macht die logische höhere Nothwendigkeit, daß die Momente des Begriffs, hier das Recht an sich, oder der Wille als allgemeiner, und das Recht in seiner Existenz, welche eben die Besonderheit des Willens ist, als für sich verschieden gesetzt seyen, was zur abstracten Realität des Begriffs gehört. — Diese Besonderheit des Willens für sich aber ist Willkühr und Zufälligkeit, die ich im Vertrage nur als Willkühr über eine einzelne Sache, nicht als die Willkühr und Zufälligkeit des Willens selbst aufgegeben habe.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
81 In the relation of immediate persons to one another in general, their will is not only identical in itself and posited by them as common in contract, but also a particular will. Because they are immediate persons, it is contingent whether their particular will accords with the will that is in itself and has its existence through that particular will alone. As a particular will, distinct for itself from the universal will, it confronts what is right in itself in the arbitrary choice and contingency of insight and willing: wrong.
The transition to wrong is brought about by the higher, logical necessity that the moments of the concept—here, right in itself, or the will as universal, and right in its existence, which is precisely the particularity of the will—be posited as distinct for themselves. This belongs to the abstract reality of the concept. But this particularity of the will, taken for itself, is arbitrary choice and contingency, which in contract I have relinquished only as arbitrary choice over an individual thing, not as the arbitrary choice and contingency of the will itself.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
81 In the relationship of immediate persons to one another in general, their will is particular as well as identical in itself and established by them as a shared will in contract. Since they are immediate persons, it is a matter of chance whether their particular will agrees with the will existing in itself, which has existence only through that particular will. As a particular will on its own, different from the universal will, it sets itself against what is right in itself through arbitrary choice and the contingency of its judgment and willing. This is wrong.
The transition to wrong comes from the higher logical necessity that the elements of the concept be established as different in their own right. Here these elements are right in itself, or the will as universal, and right in its existence, which is precisely the particularity of the will. This belongs to the abstract reality of the concept. But this particularity of the will on its own is arbitrary choice and contingency. In contract I have given these up only as arbitrary choice over a single thing, not as the arbitrary choice and contingency of the will itself.
About this section
Section 81 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 83 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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