Section 74
Original German
74 Dieß Verhältniß ist somit die Vermittelung eines in der absoluten Unterscheidung fürsichseyender Eigenthümer identischen Willens, und enthält, daß jeder mit seinem und des andern Willen, aufhört Eigenthümer zu seyn, es bleibt und es wird; — die Vermittlung des Willens, ein und zwar einzelnes Eigenthum aufzugeben und des Willens, ein solches, hiemit das eines andern, anzunehmen, und zwar in dem identischen Zusammenhange, daß das eine Wollen nur zum Entschluß kommt, insofern das andere Wollen vorhanden ist.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
74 This relation is thus the mediation of a will that is identical within the absolute distinction between owners existing for themselves. It contains the fact that each, with his own will and the other's, ceases to be an owner, remains an owner, and becomes an owner. It is the mediation of the will to relinquish a property, and an individual property at that, with the will to accept such a property, thus one belonging to another; and this occurs in the identical connection in which the one act of willing reaches a decision only insofar as the other act of willing is present.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
74 This relationship thus mediates a single, identical will within the absolute separation of owners who each exist for themselves. It involves each person, through both their own will and the other's, ceasing to be an owner, remaining an owner, and becoming an owner. It mediates the will to give up a single piece of property and the will to accept such property, which therefore belongs to someone else. The two are linked in one identity: the one act of willing reaches a decision only insofar as the other act of willing is present.
About this section
Section 74 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 76 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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