Section 73
Original German
73 Ich kann mich eines Eigenthums nicht nur, (§. 65.) als einer äußerlichen Sache entäußern, sondern muß durch den Begriff mich desselben als Eigenthums entäußern, damit mir mein Wille als da seyend, gegenständlich sey. Aber nach diesem Momente ist mein Wille als entäußerter zugleich ein Anderer. Dieß somit, worin diese Nothwendigkeit des Begriffes reell ist, ist die Einheit unterschiedener Willen, in der also ihre Unterschiedenheit und Eigenthümlichkeit sich aufgiebt. Aber in dieser Identität ihres Willens ist (auf dieser Stufe) eben so dieß enthalten, daß jeder ein mit dem andern nicht identischer, für sich eigenthümlicher Wille sey und bleibe.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
73 I can not only alienate a property as an external thing (§ 65.); by the concept, I must alienate it as property, so that my will may be objective to me as existing. But in this respect my will, as alienated, is at the same time an other. This necessity of the concept is thus real in the unity of different wills, in which their difference and distinctiveness are surrendered. Yet this identity of their will equally contains, at this stage, the fact that each is and remains a will not identical with the other, distinctive in its own right.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
73 I can give up property not only as an external thing (§ 65). The concept also requires me to give it up as property, so that my will has an existence that stands before me as an object. But in this respect my will, as given up, is at the same time another will. What makes this necessity of the concept real is therefore the unity of different wills, in which their difference and distinctiveness are given up. Yet this identity of their wills also includes, at this stage, the fact that each is and remains a distinctive will of its own, not identical with the other.
About this section
Section 73 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 75 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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