Section 75
Original German
75 Da die beyden contrahirenden Theile als unmittelbare selbstständige Personen sich zu einander verhalten, so geht der Vertrag α) von der Willkühr aus; β) der identische Wille, der durch den Vertrag in das Daseyn tritt, ist nur ein durch sie gesetzter, somit nur gemeinsamer, nicht an und für sich allgemeiner; γ) der Gegenstand des Vertrags ist eine einzelne äußerliche Sache, denn nur eine solche ist ihrer bloßen Willkühr, sie zu entäußern (§. 65. ff.) unterworfen.
Unter den Begriff vom Vertrag kann daher die Ehe nicht subsumirt werden; diese Subsumtion ist in ihrer — Schändlichkeit, muß man sagen, — bey Kant (Metaphys. Anfangr. der Rechtslehre S. 106. ff.) aufgestellt. — Eben so wenig liegt die Natur des Staats im Vertragsverhältnisse, ob der Staat, als ein Vertrag Aller mit Allen oder als ein Vertrag dieser Aller mit dem Fürsten und der Regierung genommen werde. — Die Einmischung dieses, so wie der Verhältnisse des Privat-Eigenthums überhaupt, in das Staats-Verhältniß, hat die größten Verwirrungen im Staatsrecht und in der Wirklichkeit hervorgebracht. Wie in frühern Perioden die Staatsrechte und Staatspflichten als ein unmittelbares Privateigenthum besonderer Individuen gegen das Recht des Fürsten und Staats angesehen und behauptet worden, so sind in einer neueren Zeitperiode die Rechte des Fürsten und des Staats als Vertrags-Gegenstände und auf ihn gegründet, als ein blos Gemeinsames des Willens und aus der Willkühr der in einen Staat Vereinigten hervorgegangenes, betrachtet worden. — So verschieden einerseits jene beyde Standpunkte sind, so haben sie dieß gemein, die Bestimmungen des Privateigenthums in eine Sphäre übergetragen zu haben, die von ganz anderer und höherer Natur ist. — Siehe unten: Sittlichkeit und Staat. —
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
75 Since the two contracting parties relate to one another as immediate, independent persons, α) contract proceeds from arbitrary choice; β) the identical will that comes into existence through contract is only a will posited by them, and thus only common, not universal in and for itself; γ) the object of contract is an individual external thing, for only such a thing is subject to their mere arbitrary choice to alienate it (§ 65. ff.).
Marriage therefore cannot be subsumed under the concept of contract. This subsumption, in all its—one must say—disgracefulness, is put forward by Kant (Metaphys. Anfangr. der Rechtslehre S. 106. ff.).—Nor does the nature of the state lie in a contractual relation, whether the state is taken as a contract of all with all, or as a contract of all of them with the prince and the government.—The intrusion of this relation, as of the relations of private property in general, into the relation of the state has produced the greatest confusions in constitutional law and in actuality. In earlier periods, political rights and duties were regarded and asserted as the immediate private property of particular individuals, against the right of the prince and the state; in a more recent period, the rights of the prince and the state have been regarded as objects of contract and founded on it, as something merely common in the will and arising from the arbitrary choice of those united in a state.—However different these two standpoints are in one respect, they have this in common: they have transferred the determinations of private property into a sphere of an entirely different and higher nature.—See below: Ethical Life and the State.—
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
75 Since the two contracting parties relate to each other as immediately independent persons, α) the contract begins with their arbitrary choice; β) the identical will that comes into existence through the contract is a will established only by them. It is therefore only a shared will, not a will universal in and for itself; γ) the object of the contract is a single external thing, since only such a thing is subject to their mere choice to give it up (§§ 65 and following).
Marriage therefore cannot be placed under the concept of contract. Kant presents this classification in its—one must say—disgracefulness (Metaphys. Anfangr. der Rechtslehre, p. 106 and following). Nor does the nature of the state lie in a contractual relationship, whether the state is taken as a contract of everyone with everyone else or as a contract of all these people with the prince and the government. Mixing this relationship, and the relationships of private property in general, into the relationship of the state has caused the greatest confusion in constitutional law and in actual reality. In earlier periods, rights and duties relating to the state were regarded and asserted as the direct private property of particular individuals against the rights of the prince and the state. In a more recent period, the rights of the prince and the state have been treated as an object of contract and as founded on it: as something merely shared by the wills, arising from the arbitrary choice of those united in a state. Different as these two standpoints are, they have this in common: they transfer the determinations of private property into a sphere of an entirely different and higher nature. See below: Ethical Life and the State.
About this section
Section 75 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 77 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.