Section 45
Original German
45 Daß Ich etwas in meiner selbst äußern Gewalt habe, macht den Besitz aus, so wie die besondere Seite, daß Ich etwas aus natürlichem Bedürfnisse, Triebe und der Willkühr zu dem Meinigen mache, das besondere Interesse des Besitzes ist. Die Seite aber, daß Ich als freyer Wille mir im Besitze gegenständlich und hiemit auch erst wirklicher Wille bin, macht das Wahrhafte und Rechtliche darin, die Bestimmung des Eigenthums aus.
Eigenthum zu haben, erscheint in Rücksicht auf das Bedürfniß, indem dieses zum Ersten gemacht wird, als Mittel; die wahrhafte Stellung aber ist, daß vom Standpunkte der Freyheit aus das Eigenthum als das erste Daseyn derselben, wesentlicher Zweck für sich ist.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
45 That I have something in my own external power constitutes possession; likewise, the particular aspect—that I make something mine out of natural need, drive, and arbitrary choice—is the particular interest of possession. But the aspect in which, as free will, I become an object to myself in possession, and thus first become actual will, constitutes what is true and rightful in possession: the determination of property.
When need is made primary, having property appears, in relation to need, as a means. The true position, however, is that, from the standpoint of freedom, property, as freedom’s first existence, is an essential end in itself.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
45 Having something in my own external power constitutes possession. Making something mine out of natural need, drive, or choice is the particular side of possession, its particular interest. But in possession I also become an object to myself as a free will and so become an actual will in the first place. This is what is true and rightful in possession: the determination of property.
When need is treated as primary, having property appears as a means to meet it. But the true relation is that, from the standpoint of freedom, property, as freedom’s first existence, is an essential purpose in its own right.
About this section
Section 45 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 47 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.