Section 44
Original German
44 Die Person hat das Recht, in jede Sache ihren Willen zu legen, welche dadurch die Meinige ist, zu ihrem substantiellen Zwecke, da sie einen solchen nicht in sich selbst hat, ihrer Bestimmung und Seele meinen Willen erhält, — absolutes Zueignungsrecht des Menschen auf alle Sachen.
Diejenige sogenannte Philosophie, welche den unmittelbaren einzelnen Dingen, dem Unpersönlichen, Realität im Sinne von Selbstständigkeit und wahrhaftem Für- und Insichseyn zuschreibt, eben so diejenige, welche versichert, der Geist könne die Wahrheit nicht erkennen und nicht wissen, was das Ding an sich ist, wird von dem Verhalten des freyen Willens gegen diese Dinge unmittelbar widerlegt. Wenn für das Bewußtseyn, für das Anschauen und Vorstellen die sogenannten Aussendinge den Schein von Selbstständigkeit haben, so ist dagegen der freye Wille der Idealismus, die Wahrheit solcher Wirklichkeit.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
44 The person has the right to place their will in every thing, which thereby becomes mine and receives my will as its substantial end—since it has no such end within itself—as its determination and soul: the human being’s absolute right of appropriation over all things.
The so-called philosophy that attributes to immediate individual things, to the impersonal, reality in the sense of independence and genuine being for and within itself, and likewise the philosophy that asserts that spirit cannot know the truth and cannot know what the thing in itself is, are directly refuted by the free will’s relation to these things. If, for consciousness, for intuition and representation, the so-called external things have the semblance of independence, the free will, by contrast, is idealism—the truth of such actuality.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
44 The person has the right to put their will into any thing, which thereby becomes mine. Since the thing has no substantial purpose of its own, it receives my will as its substantial purpose, its determination, and its soul. This is the human being’s absolute right to appropriate all things.
The so-called philosophy that attributes reality to immediate individual things, to what is impersonal—reality in the sense of independence and genuine being for itself and within itself—is directly refuted by the free will’s relation to these things. So is the philosophy that assures us that spirit cannot know truth or know what the thing in itself is. So-called external things may appear independent to consciousness, intuition, and representation. But the free will, by contrast, is the idealism, the truth, of such reality.
About this section
Section 44 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 46 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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