Section 43

43 As the immediate concept, and thus also as essentially individual, the person has a natural existence, partly in themselves, partly as an existence to which they relate as to an external world.—Here, where the person is themselves still in their first immediacy, we are speaking only of things that are immediately such, not of determinations capable of becoming things through the mediation of the will.

Spiritual skills, sciences, arts, even religious matters (sermons, masses, prayers, blessings in consecrated objects), inventions, and so forth become objects of contract and are placed on a level with acknowledged things in being bought, sold, and so forth. One may ask whether the artist, the scholar, and so on is in legal possession of their art, their science, their ability to preach a sermon, to say mass, and so on—that is, whether objects of this kind are things. We will hesitate to call such skills, knowledge, abilities, and so forth things. Since, on the one hand, such possessions are negotiated and contracted over as things, but, on the other, are something inward and spiritual, the understanding can find itself at a loss over their legal classification. It has before it only the opposition that something is either a thing or not a thing (like the either infinite, or finite). Knowledge, sciences, talents, and so forth do indeed belong to free spirit and are something inward to it, not external; but spirit can equally give them an external existence by expressing them, and can alienate them (see below), thereby bringing them under the determination of things. They are thus not immediate in the first instance, but become so only through the mediation of spirit, which reduces its inward content to immediacy and externality.—Under the wrongful and unethical provision of Roman law, children were things for their father, who was thus in legal possession of his children; yet surely he also stood in an ethical relation of love to them (though this must have been greatly weakened by that wrong). Here, then, there was a union of the two determinations of thing and non-thing, but an entirely wrongful one.—Abstract right has as its object only the person as such, and thus also what is particular and belongs to the existence and sphere of the person’s freedom only insofar as it is separable from and immediately distinct from the person—whether this constitutes its essential determination or it can acquire this determination only through the subjective will. Here spiritual skills, sciences, and so forth are considered solely in respect of their legal possession. The possession of body and spirit acquired through education, study, habituation, and so forth, which is an inner property of spirit, is not to be treated here. The transition of such spiritual property into externality, where it falls under the determination of property in the legal sense, is to be discussed only under alienation.

43 The person, as the immediate concept and therefore also essentially an individual, has a natural existence. This is partly within the person themselves and partly an existence to which they relate as an outside world. Here, where the person is still in their first immediacy, we are concerned only with things that are immediately things—not with determinations capable of becoming things through the mediation of the will.

Mental skills, sciences, arts, even religious matters—sermons, masses, prayers, blessings in consecrated objects—and inventions, and so on, become objects of contract. They are treated like acknowledged things in being bought, sold, and so on. We can ask whether artists, scholars, and so on legally possess their art, science, or ability to deliver a sermon, celebrate mass, and so on; that is, whether objects of this kind are things. We hesitate to call such skills, knowledge, and abilities things. Since possessions of this kind are negotiated and contracted over as things, yet are also inward and spiritual, the understanding can be at a loss about their legal classification. It sees only the opposition that something is either a thing or not a thing, just as it sees the opposition either infinite or finite. Knowledge, sciences, talents, and so on certainly belong to free spirit and are inward to it, not external. But spirit can equally give them an external existence by expressing them, and can transfer them (see below), thereby bringing them under the determination of things. They are therefore not immediate to begin with. They become so only through the mediation of spirit, which brings its inward content down to immediacy and externality. Under the unjust and unethical provision of Roman law, children were things for their father, who thus legally possessed them. Yet he presumably also stood in the ethical relation of love toward them, although this injustice must have greatly weakened that relation. Here, then, the two determinations of thing and non-thing were united, but quite unjustly. Abstract right concerns only the person as such. It therefore concerns the particular content belonging to the existence and sphere of the person’s freedom only insofar as that content is separable and immediately distinct from the person—whether this is its essential character or whether it can acquire that character only through the mediation of the subjective will. Within abstract right, mental skills, sciences, and so on are consequently considered only as legal possessions. Possession of the body and spirit acquired through education, study, practice, and so on, which exists as an inner property of spirit, is not to be discussed here. The transition of such spiritual property into externality, where it falls under the determination of legally recognized property, must wait until the discussion of transfer of ownership.