Section 42
Original German
42 Das von dem freyen Geiste unmittelbar Verschiedene ist für ihn und an sich das Aeußerliche überhaupt, — eine Sache, ein unfreyes, unpersönliches und rechtloses.
Sache hat wie das Objective die entgegengesetzten Bedeutungen, das einemal, wenn man sagt: das ist die Sache, es kommt auf die Sache, nicht auf die Person an, — die Bedeutung des Substantiellen; das andremal gegen die Person, (nemlich nicht das besondere Subject) ist die Sache das Gegentheil des Substantiellen, das seiner Bestimmung nach nur Aeußerliche. — Was für den freyen Geist, der vom bloßen Bewußtseyn wohl unterschieden werden muß, das Aeußerliche ist, ist es an und für sich, darum ist die Begriffsbestimmung der Natur dieß, das Aeußerliche an ihr selbst zu seyn.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
42 What is immediately distinct from free spirit is, for spirit and in itself, the external in general—a thing, something unfree, impersonal, and without rights.
“Thing,” like “the objective,” has opposed meanings. In the one case, when we say, “That is the thing at issue,” or, “It is the thing, not the person, that matters,” it means the substantial. In the other case, as opposed to the person (not, that is, to the particular subject), the thing is the opposite of the substantial: what, by its determination, is merely external.—What is external for free spirit—which must be clearly distinguished from mere consciousness—is external in and for itself; hence the conceptual determination of nature is to be the external in its own self.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
42 What is immediately different from free spirit is, both for it and in itself, the external in general: a thing, something unfree, impersonal, and without rights.
Like “objective,” thing has opposite meanings. When we say “that is the thing,” or “the thing, not the person, is what matters,” it means what is substantial. But in contrast to the person—not merely the particular subject—the thing means the opposite of the substantial: what is, by definition, merely external. What is external for free spirit, which must be clearly distinguished from mere consciousness, is external in and for itself. The conceptual determination of nature is therefore to be what is external within itself.
About this section
Section 42 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 44 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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